44.  3.  /yoo. 


^ t\vt  Ihtologiw,/  ^ 


PRINCETON,  N.  J. 


Purchased  by  the  Hamill  Missionary  Fund. 


Division 


Section 


35S479 

."R64- 


t 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


9- 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/fortyoneyearsini00robe_0 


FIELD-MARSHAL  LORD  ROBERTS,  V.C. 

From 

a photograph  by  Messrs.  Bourne  and  Shepherd. 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


FROM 

Subaltern  to  Commanber»in=Cbtef 


BY 


F I ELD-MARSHAL 

LORD  ROBERTS  OF  KANDAHAR 

V.C.,  K.P.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I.,  G.C.I.E. 


NEW  EDITION  IN  ONE  VOLUME 


WITH  FORTY-FOUR  ILLUSTRATIONS 


NEW  YORK 

LONGMANS,  GREEN  & CO. 

LONDON  : MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Limited 
1900 


[ vii  ] 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 

I would  never  have  ventured  to  intrude  upon  the  public  with  my 
personal  reminiscences  had  I not  been  urged  to  do  so  by  friends  who, 
being  interested  themselves  in  what  I was  able  to  tell  them  of  India 
as  my  father  knew  it,  and  as  I found  it  and  left  it,  persuaded  me  that 
my  experiences  of  the  many  and  various  aspects  under  which  I have 
known  the  wonderful  land  of  my  adoption  and  its  interesting  peoples 
would  be  useful  to  my  countrymen.  It  was  thought  that  I might  thus 
contribute  towards  a more  intimate  knowledge  of  the  glorious  heritage 
our  forefathers  have  bequeathed  to  us,  than  the  greater  number  of 
them  possess,  and  towards  helping  them  to  understand  the  charac- 
teristics and  requirements  of  the  numerous  and  widely  different  races 
by  whom  India  is  inhabited. 

It  is  difficult  for  people  who  know  nothing  of  Natives  to  under- 
stand and  appreciate  the  value  they  set  on  cherished  customs,  peculiar 
idiosyncrasies,  and  fixed  prejudices,  all  of  which  must  be  carefully 
studied  by  those  who  are  placed  in  the  position  of  their  Rulers,  if  the 
suzerain  Power  is  to  keep  their  respect  and  gain  then'  gratitude  and 
affection. 

The  Natives  of  India  are  particularly  observant  of  character,  and 
intelligent  in  gauging  the  capabilities  of  those  who  govern  them ; and 
it  is  because  the  English  Government  is  trusted  that  a mere  handful  of 
Englishmen  are  able  to  direct  the  administration  of  a country  with 
nearly  three  hundred  millions  of  inhabitants,  differing  in  race,  religion, 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 


viii 

and  manners  of  life.  Throughout  all  the  changes  which  India  has 
undergone,  political  and  social,  luring  the  present  century,  this  feeling 
has  been  maintained,  and  it  will  last  so  long  as  the  services  are  filled 
by  honourable  men  who  sympathize  with  the  Natives,  respect  their 
prejudices,  and  do  not  interfere  unnecessarily  with  their  habits  and 
customs. 

My  father  and  I spent  between  us  nearly  ninety  years  in  India. 
The  most  wonderful  of  the  many  changes  that  took  place  during  that 
time  may  be  said  to  date  from  the  Mutiny.  I have  endeavoured  in 
the  following  pages  to  explain  the  causes  which,  I believe,  brought 
about  that  terrible  event — an  event  which  for  a while  produced  a 
much-to-be-regretted  feeling  of  racial  antagonism.  Happily,  this 
feeling  did  not  last  long ; even  when  things  looked  blackest  for  us,  it 
was  softened  by  acts  of  kindness  shown  to  Europeans  in  distress,  and 
by  the  knowledge  that,  but  for  the  assistance  afforded  by  the  Natives 
themselves,  the  restoration  of  order,  and  the  suppression  of  a fierce 
military  insurrection,  would  have  been  a far  more  arduous  task. 
Delhi  could  not  have  been  taken  without  Sikhs  and  Gurkhas ; 
Lucknow  could  not  have  been  defended  without  the  Hindustani 
soldiers  who  so  nobly  responded  to  Sir  Henry  Lawrence’s  call;  and 
nothing  that  Sir  John  Lawrence  might  have  done  could  have 
prevented  our  losing,  for  a time,  the  whole  of  the  country  north  of 
Calcutta,  had  not  the  men  of  the  Punjab  and  the  Derajat*  remained 
true  to  our  cause. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  all  outward  signs  of  the  Mutiny  should 
be  obliterated,  that  the  monument  on  the  Ridge  at  Delhi  should  be 
levelled,  and  the  picturesque  Residency  at  Lucknow  allowed  to  fall 
into  decay.  This  view  docs  not  commend  itself  to  mo.  These  relies 
of  that  tremendous  struggle  are  memorials  of  heroic  sendees  per- 
formed by  Her  Majesty’s  soldiers,  Native  as  well  as  British;  and  by 
the  civilians  who  shared  the  duties  and  dangers  of  the  army.  They 
are  valuable  as  reminders  that  we  must  never  again  allow  ourselves  to 
be  lulled  into  fancied  security ; and  above  all,  they  stand  as  warnings 

* Tracts  beyond  the  Indus. 


PREFACE  IO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 


IX 


that  we  should  never  do  anything  that  can  possibly  be  interpreted  by 
the  Natives  into  disregard  for  their  various  forms  of  religion. 

The  Mutiny  was  not  an  unmitigated  evil,  for  to  it  we  owe  the 
consolidation  of  our  power  in  India,  as  it  hastened  on  the  construction 
of  the  roads,  railways,  and  telegraphs,  so  wisely  and  thoughtfully 
planned  by  the  Marquis  of  Dalhousie,  and  which  have  done  more 
than  anything  to  increase  the  prosperity  of  the  people  and  preserve 
order  throughout  the  country.  It  was  the  Mutiny  which  brought 
Lord  Canning  into  closer  communication  with  the  Princes  of  India, 
and  paved  the  way  for  Lord  Lvtton’s  brilliant  conception  of  the 
Imperial  Assemblage  — a great  political  success  which  laid  the 
foundation  of  that  feeling  of  confidence  which  now,  happily,  exists 
between  the  Ruling  Chiefs  and  the  Queen-Empress.  And  it  was  the 
Mutiny  which  compelled  us  to  reorganize  our  Indian  Army  and  make 
it  the  admirable  fighting  machine  it  now  is. 

In  the  account  I have  given  of  our  relations  with  Afghanistan  and 
the  border  tribes,  I have  endeavoured  to  bring  before  my  readers  the 
change  of  our  position  in  India  that  has  been  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  the  propinquity  upon  our  North-West  Frontier  of  a 
first-class  European  Power.  The  change  has  come  about  so 
gradually,  and  has  been  so  repeatedly  pronounced  to  be  chimerical 
by  authorities  in  whom  the  people  of  Great  Britain  had  every  reason 
to  feel  confidence,  that  until  recently  it  had  attracted  little  public 
attention,  and  even  now  a great  majority  of  my  countrymen  may 
scarcely  have  realized  the  probability  of  England  and  Russia  ever 
being  near  enough  to  each  other  in  Asia  to  come  into  actual  conflict. 
I impute  no  blame  to  the  Russians  for  their  advance  towards  India. 
The  force  of  circumstances — the  inevitable  result  of  the  contact  of 
civilization  with  barbarism  — impelled  them  to  cross  the  Jaxartes 
and  extend  their  territories  to  the  Khanates  of  Turkestan  and  the 
banks  of  the  Oxus,  just  as  the  same  uncontrollable  force  carried 
us  across  the  Sutlej  and  extended  our  territories  to  the  valley  of  the 
Indus.  The  object  I have  at  heart  is  to  make  my  fellow-subjects 
recognize  that,  under  these  altered  conditions,  Great  Britain  now 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 


occupies  in  Asia  the  position  of  a Continental  Power,  and  that  her 
interests  in  that  part  of  the  globe  must  be  protected  by  Continental 
means  of  defence. 

The  few  who  have  carefully  and  steadily  watched  the  course  of 
events,  entertained  no  doubt  from  the  first  as  to  the  soundness  of 
these  views ; and  their  aim  has  always  been,  as  mine  is  now,  not  to 
sound  an  alarm,  but  to  give  a warning,  and  to  show  the  danger  of 
shutting  our  eyes  to  plain  facts  and  their  probable  consequences. 

Whatever  may  be  the  future  course  of  events,  I have  no  fear  of  the 
result  if  we  are  only  true  to  ourselves  and  to  India.  Thinking 
Natives  thoroughly  understand  the  situation ; they  believe  that  the 
time  must  come  when  the  territories  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  in 
their  part  of  Asia  will  be  separated  only  by  a common  boundary  line, 
and  they  would  consider  that  we  were  wanting  in  the  most  essential 
attributes  of  Rulers  if  we  did  not  take  all  possible  precautions,  and 
make  every  possible  preparation  to  meet  such  an  eventuality. 

I send  out  this  book  in  the  earnest  hope  that  the  friendly 
anticipations  of  those  who  advised  me  to  write  it  may  not  be 
seriously  disappointed ; and  that  those  who  care  to  read  a plain, 
unvarnished  tale  of  Indian  life  and  adventure,  will  bear  in  mind  that 
the  writer  is  a soldier,  not  a man  of  letters,  and  will  therefore  forgive 
all  faults  of  style  or  language. 

ROBERTS. 

3 Oth  September,  1896. 


KASHMIR  GATE  AT  DELHI. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

Voyage  to  India — Life  in  Calcutta — A destructive  cyclone — Home- 
sickness --------  1-6 


CHAPTER  II. 

Bengal  Horse  Artillery — Incidents  of  the  journey — New  Friends  - 6-9 

CHAPTER  III. 

With  my  father  at  Peshawar — Peshawar  in  1852 — Excitements  of  a 
frontier  station — A flogging  parade — Mackeson’s  assassination — The 
Jowaki  expedition — A strange  dream — A typical  frontier  fight  - 9-19 

CHAPTER  IV. 

A trip  to  Khagan — The  Vale  of  Kashmir — With  the  Horse  Artillery — 

My  first  visit  to  Simla — Life  at  Peshawar — A staff  appointment — The 
bump  of  locality  19-27 


CHAPTER  V. 

Lord  Dalhousie’s  Afghan  policy — Treaty  with  Dost  Mahomed — War 
with  Persia — The  advantage  of  the  Amir’s  friendship — John  Nichol- 
son— ‘ A pillar  of  strength  on  the  frontier  ’ - - - - 27-33 

CHAPTER  VI. 

First  tidings  of  the  mutiny — Prompt  action  at  Peshawar — A bold  policy 
— The  Movable  Column — An  annoying  occurrence — I leave  Peshawar  34-40 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

PAGE 

Sir  Colin’s  wise  decision — Robert  Napier — Impressions  on  visiting  the 
Residency — Henry  Lawrence — Lawrence  as  Statesman  and  Ruler — 
Lawrence’s  friendliness  for  Natives — A hazardous  duty  - 190-198 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 

Death  of  General  Havelock — Appeals  from  Cawnpore — General  Wind- 
ham—The  passage  of  the  Ganges  ....  198-203 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

The  fight  at  Cawnpore — Unexpected  visitors — A long  chase — Unjur 
Tiwari — Bithur — Windham  at  Cawnpore  - - - 204-212 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

The  Fight  at  Khudaganj — A melee — Oudh  or  Rohilkand  ? - 212-216 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Mianganj — Curious  effect  of  a mirage — The  Dilkusha  re  visited — Passage 
of  the  Gumti — Capture  of  the  Chakar  Kothi — Capture  of  the  iron 
bridge — Hodson  mortally  wounded — Outram’s  soldierly  instinct — A 
lost  opportunity — Sam  Browne — Start  for  England — Death  of  Sir 
William  Peel 216-230 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

What  brought  about  the  Mutiny  ? — Religious  fears  of  the  people — The 
land  question— The  annexation  of  Oudh — Fulfilment  of  Malcolm’s 
prophecy — The  Delhi  royal  family— The  Nana  Sahib — The  Native 
army — Greased  cartridges — Limited  number  of  British  troops — 
Objection  to  foreign  service — Excessive  age  of  the  British  officers  231-244 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

Discontent  of  the  Natives — Successful  administrators — Paternal 
despotism  — Money-lenders  and  the  Press  — Faddists  — Cardinal 
points  --------  245-251 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

Home  again — Back  in  India — Allahabad  and  Cawnpore — The  Viceroy’s 
camp — State  entry  into  Lucknow— The  Talukdars  of  Oudh — Loyalty 
of  the  Talukdars — Cawnpore  and  Fatehgarh — The  Agra  Durbar  251-262 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

Delhi  under  a different  aspect — Lord  Clyde — Umritsar  and  Lahore — 

The  Lahore  Durbar— Simla — Life  at  Simla  - • • 262-269 


CONTENTS 


XV 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

PAOE 

The  Staff  Corps — With  the  Viceroy’s  camp  again — The  marble  rocks — 

Lady  Canning’s  death — Pig-sticking  at  Jamu — Lord  Canning— 
Another  cold-weather  march — Gwalior  and  Jhansi — Departmental 
promotion  269-280 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

The  Umbeyla  expedition— The  Akhund  of  Swat — The  ‘ Eagle’s  Nest’ 
and  ‘ Crag  piquet  ’ — The  death  of  Lord  Elgin — Loyalty  of  our 
Pathan  soldiers — Bunerwals  show  signs  of  submission — The  conical 
hill — Umbeyla  in  flames — Bunerwals  agree  to  our  terms — Malka 
destroyed  .......  280-293 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

A voyage  round  the  Cape — Cholera  camps — The  Abyssinian  expedition 
— Landed  at  Zula  ......  293-298 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

Sir  Robert  Napier  to  command — Defective  transport — King  Theodore 
commits  suicide — First  A.Q.M.G.  ....  298-303 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

Afzal  Khan  ousts  Sher  Ali — Sher  Ali  regains  the  Amirship — Foresight 
of  Sir  Henry  Rawlinson — The  Umballa  Durbar  - - 303-308 

CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

The  Lushais — The  Lushai  expedition— Defective  transport  again— 
Practice  versus  theory — A severe  march — Lushais  foiled  by  Gurkhas 
— A successful  turning  movement — Murder  of  Lord  Mayo  - 308-319 

CHAPTER  XL. 

Lord  Napier’s  care  for  the  soldier— Negotiations  with  Sher  Ali  renewed 
— Sher  Ali’s  demands  ......  319-323 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

A trip  in  the  Himalayas — The  famine  in  Behar — The  Erince  of  Wales 
in  India — Farewell  to  Lord  Napier  ....  323-328 

CHAPTER  XLII. 

Lord  Lytton  becomes  Viceroy — Difficulties  with  Sher  Ali — Imperial 
assemblage  at  Delhi — Reception  of  the  Ruling  Chiefs — Queen  pro- 
claimed Empress  of  India — Political  importance  of  the  assemblage — 

Sher  Ali  proclaims  a ‘ Jahad  ’ — A journey  under  difficulties  - 328-337 

CHAPTER  XLIII. 

Object  of  the  first  Afghan  war — Excitement  caused  by  Russia’s 
advances  .......  338-341 


xviii 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  LXII. 

PAGE 

Commencement  of  the  fight — 72nd  Highlanders  and  2nd  Sikhs — 92nd 
Highlanders  and  2nd  Gurkhas — Ayub  Khan’s  camp — Difficulties 
about  supplies — Parting  with  the  troops — A pleasing  memory  487-495 

CHAPTER  LXIII. 

Reception  in  England — A fruitless  journey — Andaman  Isles  and  Burma 
— The  Madras  Army — Measures  for  improving  the  Madras  Army — 
Memories  of  Madras — An  allegory  ....  495-502 

CHAPTER  LXIV. 

Disturbing  action  of  Russia — Abdur  Rahman  Khan — The  Rawal  Pindi 

Durbar — Unmistakable  loyalty  of  the  Natives  - - 503-507 

CHAPTER  LXV. 

The  Burma  expedition — The  Camp  of  Exercise  at  Delhi — Defence  of 
the  North-West  Frontier — Quetta  and  Peshawar — Communications 
versus  fortifications — Sir  George  Chesney  - - - 507-514 

CHAPTER  LX VI. 

Nursing  for  the  soldier — Pacification  of  Burma  considered — Measures 
recommended — The  Buddhist  priesthood— The  Regimental  Institute 
— The  Army  Temperance  Association  - - - 514-520 

CHAPTER  LXVII. 

Defence  and  Mobilization  Committees— The  Transport  Department — 
Utilization  of  Native  States  armies — Marquis  of  Lansdowne  becomes 
Viceroy — Raj pu tana  and  Kashmir— Musketry  instruction — Artillery 
and  Cavalry  training  521-529 

CHAPTER  LXVIII. 

Extension  of  command — Efficiency  of  the  Native  Army — Concessions 
to  the  Native  Army — Officering  of  the  Native  Army — The  Hunza- 
Naga  campaign — Visit  to  Nepal — A Nepalese  entertainment — Pro- 
posed mission  to  the  Amir — A last  tour — Farewell  entertainments 
— Last  days  in  India  529-543 

Appendices  545-584 

Index  ........  585-601 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

I.  Portrait  of  Field-Marshal  Lord  Eoberts.  (From  a Photo- 
graph by  Bourne  and  Shepherd,  Simla,  engraved  upon  wood  by 

IV.  Cheshire)  ....  - Frontispiece 

II.  The  Kashmir  Gate  at  Delhi  - - Over  List  of  Contents 

III.  The  Peiwar  Kotal  - - Over  List  of  Illustrations 

IV.  Portrait  of  General  Sir  Abraham  Roberts,  G.C.B.  (From 

a Photograph,  engraved  upon  wood  by  TV.  Cheshire)  To  face  page  10 

V.  Portrait  of  Brigadier-General  John  Nicholson,  C.B. 
(From  a Painting  by  J.  R.  Dicksee  in  possession  of  the  Rev.  Canon 
Seymour,  engraved  upon  wood  by  George  Pearson)  To  face  page  32 

VI.  Portrait  of  Major-General  Sir  Harry  Tombs,  V.C.,  K.C.B. 
(From  a Photograph  by  Grillet  and  Co.,  engraved  upon  wood  by 
Swain)  ......  To  face  page  84 

VII.  Portrait  of  Lieutenant-General  Sir  James  Hills-Johnes, 

V. C.,  G.C.B.  (From  a Photograph  by  Bourne  and  Shepherd, 

engraved  upon  wood  by  George  Pearson)  - - To  face  page  96 


XX 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

VIII.  Portrait  of  Field-Marshal  Sir  Donald  Martin  Stewart, 
Bart.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I.,  C.I.E.  ( From  a Photograph  by 
Elliott  and  Pry,  engraved  upon  wood  by  George  Pearson) 

To  face  page  98 

IX.  Plan  of  the  Engagement  at  Najafgarh.  (From  a Plan 

made  by  Lieutenant  Gencste,  by  permission  of  Messrs.  Wm. 
Blackwood  and  Sons)  - - - - To  face  page  116 

X.  Plan  to  illustrate  the  Siege  and  Attack  of  Delhi,  in 

1857  ......  To  face  page  140 

XI.  Portraits  of  General  Sir  Colin  Campbell  (Lord  Clyde) 
and  Major-General  Sir  William  Mansfield  (Lord 
Sandhurst).  (From  a Photograph  taken  in  India , engraved 
upon  wood  by  George  Pearson)  - - -To  face  page  1 66 

XII.  Portrait  of  Major-General  Sir  James  Outram,  G.C.B. 

(From  a Painting  by  Thomas  Brigstocke,  R.A.,  engraved  upon 
wood  by  George  Pearson)  - - To  face  page  188 

XIII.  Portrait  of  Brigadier-General  Sir  Henry  Lawrence, 

K.C.B.  (From  a Photograph  taken  at  Lucknow,  engraved 
upon  wood  by  Swain)  - - - - To  face  page  194 

XIV.  Plan  to  illustrate  the  Relief  of  Lucknow,  in  1857 

To  face  page  198 

XV.  Plan  of  Cawnpore  - - - ,,  ,,  208 

XVI.  Plan  of  the  Engagement  at  Khudaganj  - ,,  ,,  214 

XVII.  Portrait  of  General  Sir  Samuel  Browne,  V.C.,  G.C.B., 
K.C.S.I.  (From  a Photograph  by  Elliott  and  Fry,  engraved 
upon  wood  by  George  Pearson)  • - - To  face  page  228 

XVIII.  Plan  to  illustrate  the  Siege  and  Capture  of  Lucknow, 

IN  1858  .....  To  face  page  230 

XIX.  Portrait  of  Lady  Roberts  (wife  of  Sir  Abraham 
Roberts).  ( From  a Sketch  by  Carpenter,  engraved  upon  wood 
by  W.  Cheshire)  - - - - To  face  ]>age  252 

XX.  Portrait  of  His  Excellency  Earl  Canning,  K.G.,  G.C.B., 
G.M.S.I.,  Viceroy  and  Governor-General  of  India. 
(From  a Photograph  by  Mayall  aiul  Co.,  engraved  upon  wood 
by  Swain)  - ■ ■ - -To  face  page  278 

XXI.  The  Storming  of  the  Conical  Hill  at  Umbeyla  by  the 
101st  Foot  (Bengal  Fusiliers).  ( From  a Sketch  by  General 
Sir  John  Adye,  G.C.B. , R.A.,  engraved  upon  wood  by 
IV.  Cheshire)  .....  To  face  page  288 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


xxl 


PAGE 

XXII.  Portrait  of  Fif.ld-Marshal  Lord  Napier  of  Magdala, 
G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I.  ( From  a Photograph  by  Maull  and 
Fox,  engraved  upon  wood  by  IV.  Cheshire)  To  face  page  328 

XXIII.  Portrait  of  His  Excellency  thf,  Earl  of  Lytton, 
G.C.B.,  G.M.S.I.,  G.M.I.E.,  Viceroy  of  India.  (From 
a Photograph  by  Maull  and  Fox,  engraved  upon  wood  by 
George  Pearson)  ....  To  face  page  334 

XXIV.  The  Attack  on  the  Peiwar  Kotal.  ( From  a Painting 
by  Vereker  Hamilton,  engraved  upon  wood  by  George 
Pearson)  - • • - -To  face  page  356 

XXV.  Plan  of  the  Attack  upon  the  Peiwar  Kotal.  (En- 
graved by  George  Pearson)  • - - To  face  page  358 

XXVI.  General  Roberts's  Gurkha  Orderlies.  (From  a JVater- 
colour  Sketch  by  the  late  General  IVoodthorpe,  C.B.,  R.E., 
engraved  upon  wood  by  tV.  Clmh  ire)  - To  face  page  360 

XXVII.  General  Roberts’s  Sikh  Orderlies.  (From  a Water- 
colour  Sketch  by  the  late  General  Woodthorpe,  C.B.,  R.E., 
engraved  upon  wood  by  W.  Cheshire)  - To  face  page  362 

XXVIII.  One  of  General  Roberts’s  Pathan  Orderlies.  (From 
a Water-colour  Sketch  by  the  late  General  Woodthorpe, 

C.B.,  E.E.,  engraved  upon  wood  by  W.  Cheshire) 

To  face  page  364 

XXIX.  One  of  General  Roberts’s  Pathan  Orderlies.  (From 
a Water-colour  Sketch  by  the  late  General  Woodthorpe, 

C.B.,  R.E.,  engraved  upon  wood  by  W.  Cheshire) 

To  face  page  366 

XXX.  The  Entrance  to  the  Bala  Hissar — The  Lahore  Gate 

at  Kabul.  (From  a Photograph,  engraved  upon  wood  by 
W.  Cheshire)  ....  To  face  page  412 

XXXI.  The  Lataband  Pass.  (From  a photograph  by  J.  Burke, 

engraved  upon  wood  by  George  Pearson)  - To  face  page  424 

XXXII.  Sketch  showing  the  Operations  in  the  Chardeh 
Valley  on  December  10th  and  11th,  1879 

To  face  page  440 

XXXIII.  The  Laager  and  Abattis  North-West  Corner, 
Sherpur,  December  23,  1879.  The  Fifth  Punjab 
Infantry  in  foreground,  the  Paghman  Range  in 


xxu 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


XXXIV. 

XXXV. 

XXXVI. 

XXXVII. 

XXXVIII. 


XXXIX. 


XL. 

XLI. 

XLII. 

XLIII. 

XLIV 


the  background.  ( From  a photograph  by  J.  Burke, 
engraved  uvon  wood  by  George  Pearson)  - To  face  page  450 
Plan  to  illustrate  the  Defences  of  Sherpur  and 
the  Operations  round  Kabul  in  December,  1879 

To  face  page  454 

Crossing  the  Zamburak  Kotal.  ( From  a Painting  by 

the  Chevalier  Desanges,  engraved  upon  wood  by  W.  Cheshire) 

To  face  page  480 

Plan  of  the  Route  taken  from  Kabul  to  Kandahar 

, To  face  page  484 

Sketch  of  the  Battle-field  of  Kandahar  To  face  page  492 
Portraits  of  the  Three  Commanders-in-Chief  in  India 
(Sir  Donald  Stewart,  Sir  Frederick  Roberts,  and 
Sir  Arthur  Hardinge).  ( From  a Photograph,  engraved 
upon  wood  by  Swain)  - - - To  face  page  500 

Portrait  of  His  Excellency  the  Marquis  of 
Dufferin  and  Ava,  K.P.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.M.G.,  G.M.S.I., 
G.M.I.E.,  F.R.S.,  Viceroy  of  India.  (From,  an  engrav- 
ing by  the  Fine  Art  Society  of  a portrait  by  the  late  Frank 
Roll,  It. A.,  re-engraved  upon  wood  by  George  Pearson) 

To  face  page  502 

Portrait  of  His  Highness  Abdur  Rahman,  Amir  of 
Afghanistan.  (From  a Photograph,  engraved  upon 
wood  by  Swain)  - - • -To  face  page  504 

Map  of  Central  Asia  - - - ,,  ,,  506 

Portrait  of  Lady  Roberts  of  Kandahar.  (From  a 
Photograph  by  Johnson  and  Hofmann,  engraved  upon 
wood  by  Geoi  ge  Pearson)  - - - To  face  page  514 

Portrait  of  His  Excellency  the  Marquess  of  Lans- 
downe,  K.G.,  G.C.M.G.,  G.M.S.I.,  G.M.I.E.,  Viceroy 
of  India.  (From  a Photogravh  by  Cowell,  Simla, 
engraved  upon  wood  by  Swain)  - • To  face  page  524 

Portrait  of  Field-Marshal  Lord  Roberts  on  his 
Arab  Charger  ‘ Vonolel.’  (From  an  Oil-painting  by 
Charles  Furse,  made  from  an  Ivstantnaeous  Photograph, 
and  engraved  upon  wood  by  E.  Whymper)  ■ To  face  page  580 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


CHAPTER  I. 

Forty  years  ago  the  departure  of  a cadet  for  India  was  a much  more 
serious  affair  than  it  is  at  present.  Under  the  regulations  then  in 
force,  leave,  except  on  medical  certificate,  could  only  be  obtained  once 
during  the  whole  of  an  officer’s  service,  and  ten  years  had  to  be  spent 
in  India  before  that  leave  could  be  taken.  Small  wonder,  then,  that 
I felt  as  if  I were  bidding  England  farewell  for  ever  when,  on  the 
‘20th  February,  1852,  I set  sail  from  Southampton  with  Calcutta  for 
my  destination.  Steamers  in  those  days  ran  to  and  from  India  but 
once  a month,  and  the  fleet  employed  was  only  capable  of  transporting 
some  2,400  passengers  in  the  course  of  a year.  This  does  not  include 
the  Cape  route ; but  even  taking  that  into  consideration,  I should 
doubt  whether  there  were  then  as  many  travellers  to  India  in  a year 
as  there  are  now  in  a fortnight  at  the  busy  season. 

My  ship  was  the  Peninsular  and  Oriental  Company’s  steamer  Ripon, 
commanded  by  Captain  Moresby,  an  ex-officer  of  the  Indian  Navy, 
in  which  he  had  earned  distinction  by  his  survey  of  the  Red  Sea. 
A few  Addiscombe  friends  were  on  board,  leaving  England  under  the 
same  depressing  circumstances  as  myself,  and  what  with  wind  and 
weather,  and  the  thought  that  at  the  best  we  were  bidding  farewell  to 
home  and  relations  for  ten  long  years,  we  were  anything  but  a cheerful 
party  for  the  first  few  days  of  the  voyage.  Youth  and  high  spirits  had, 
however,  re-ssserted  themselves  long  before  Alexandria,  which  place 
we  reached  without  incident  beyond  the  customary  halts  for  coaling 
at  Gibraltar  and  Malta.  At  Alexandria  we  bade  adieu  to  Captain 
Moresby,  who  had  been  most  kind  and  attentive,  and  whose  graphic 
accounts  of  the  difficulties  he  had  had  to  overcome  whilst  mastering 
the  navigation  of  the  Red  Sea  served  to  while  away  many  a tedious 
hour. 

On  landing  at  Alexandria  we  were  hurried  on  board  a large  mast- 

1 


2 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1852 

less  canal  boat,  shaped  like  a Nile  dahabeah.  In  this  we  were  towed 
up  the  Mahmoudieh  canal  for  ten  hours,  until  we  arrived  at  Atfieh,  on 
the  Nile ; thence  we  proceeded  by  steamer,  reaching  Cairo  in  about 
sixteen  hours.  Here  we  put  up  at  Shepherd’s  Hotel  for  a couple  of 
days,  which  were  most  enjoyable,  especially  to  those  of  the  party  who, 
like  myself,  saw  an  eastern  city  and  its  picturesque  and  curious  bazaars 
for  the  first  time.  From  Cairo  the  route  lay  across  the  desert  for 
ninety  miles,  the  road  being  merely  a cutting  in  the  sand,  quite  undis- 
tinguishable  at  night.  The  journey  was  performed  in  a conveyance 
closely  resembling  a bathing-machine,  which  accommodated  six  people, 
and  was  drawn  by  four  mules.  \My  five  fellow-travellers  were  all 
cadets,  only  one  of  whom  (Colonel  John  Stewart,  of  Ardvorlich,  Perth- 
shire) is  now  alive.  The  transit  took  some  eighteen  hours,  with  an 
occasional  halt  for  refreshments.  Our  baggage  was  carried  on  camels, 
as  were  the  mails,  cargo,  and  even  the  coal  for  the  Red  Sea  steamers. 

On  arrival  at  Suez  we  found  awaiting  us  the  Oriental,  commanded 
by  Captain  Powell.  A number  of  people  met  us  there  who  had  left 
England  a month  before  we  did;  but  their  steamer  having  broken 
down,  they  had  now  to  be  accommodated  on  board  ours.  We  were 
thus  very  inconveniently  crowded  until  we  arrived  at  Aden,  where 
several  of  the  passengers  left  us  for  Bombay.  We  were  not,  however, 
much  inclined  to  complain,  as  some  of  our  new  associates  proved 
themselves  decided  acquisitions.  Amongst  them  was  Mr.  (afterwards 
Sir  Barnes)  Peacock,  an  immense  favourite  with  all  on  board,  and 
more  particularly  with  us  lads.  He  was  full  of  fun,  and  although  then 
forty-seven  years  old,  and  on  his  way  to  Calcutta  to  join  the  Governor- 
General’s  Council,  he  took  part  in  our  amusements  as  if  he  were  of  the 
same  age  as  ourselves.  His  career  in  India  was  brilliant,  and  on  the 
expiration  of  his  term  of  office  as  member  of  Council  he  was  made 
Chief  Justice  of  Bengal.  Another  of  the  passengers  was  Colonel  (after- 
wards Sir  John  Bloomfield)  Gough,  who  died  not  long  ago  in  Ireland, 
and  was  then  on  his  way  to  take  up  his  appointment  as  Quartermaster- 
General  of  Queen’s  troops.  He  had  served  in  the  3rd  Light  Dragoons 
and  on  the  staff  of  his  cousin,  Lord  Gough,  during  the  Sutlej  and 
Punjab  campaigns,  and  was  naturally  an  object  of  the  deepest  venera- 
tion to  all  the  youngsters  on  board. 

At  Madras  we  stopped  to  land  passengers,  and  I took  this  oppor- 
tunity of  going  on  shore  to  see  some  old  Addiscombe  friends,  most  of 
whom  were  greatly  excited  at  the  prospect  of  a war  in  Burma.  The 
transports  were  then  actually  lying  in  the  Madras  roads,  and  a few 
days  later  this  portion  of  the  expedition  started  for  Rangoon. 

At  last,  on  the  1st  April,  we  reached  Calcutta,  and  I had  to  say 
good-bye  to  the  friends  I had  made  during  the  six  weeks’  voyage,  most 
of  whom  I was  never  to  meet  again. 

On  landing,  I received  a letter  from  my  father,  who  commanded  th$ 


LIFE  IN  CALCUTTA 


3 


1852] 

Lahore  division,  informing  me  that  the  proprietor  of  Spence’s  Hotel 
had  been  instructed  to  receive  me,  and  that  I had  better  put  up  there 
until  I reported  myself  at  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Bengal  Artillery 
at  Dum-Dum.  This  was  chilling  news,  for  I was  the  only  one  of  our 
party  who  had  to  go  to  a hotel  on  landing.  The  Infantry  cadets  had 
either  been  taken  charge  of  by  the  Town  Major,  who  provided  them 
with  quarters  in  Fort  William,  or  had  gone  to  stay  with  friends,  and 
the  only  other  Artilleryman  (Stewart)  went  direct  to  Dum-Dum,  where 
he  had  a brother,  also  a gunner,  who,  poor  fellow,  was  murdered  with 
his  young  wife  five  years  later  by  the  mutineers  at  Gwalior.  I was 
still  more  depressed  later  on  by  finding  myself  at  dinner  tete-a-tete 
with  a first-class  specimen  of  the  results  of  an  Indian  climate.  He 
belonged  to  my  own  regiment,  and  was  going  home  on  medical  certi- 
ficate, but  did  not  look  as  if  he  could  ever  reach  England.  He  gave 
me  the  not  too  pleasing  news  that  by  staying  in  that  dreary  hotel, 
instead  of  proceeding  direct  to  Dum-Dum,  I had  lost  a day’s  service 
and  pay,  so  I took  care  to  join  early  the  following  morning. 

A few  years  before,  Dum-Dum  had  been  a large  military  station, 
but  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab,  and  the  necessity  for  maintaining  a 
considerable  force  in  northern  India,  had  greatly  reduced  the  garrison. 
Even  the  small  force  that  remained  had  embarked  for  Burma  before 
my  arrival,  so  that,  instead  of  a large,  cheery  mess  party,  to  which 
I had  been  looking  forward,  I sat  down  to  dinner  with  only  one  other 
subaltern. 

No  tune  was  lost  in  appointing  me  to  a Native  Field  Battery,  and  I 
was  put  through  the  usual  laboratory  course  as  a commencement  to 
my  duties.  The  life  was  dull  in  the  extreme,  the  only  variety  being  an 
occasional  week  in  Fort  William,  where  my  sole  duty  was  to  super- 
intend the  firing  of  salutes.  Nor  was  there  much  in  my  surroundings 
to  compensate  for  the  prosaic  nature  of  my  work.  Fort  William  was 
not  then  what  it  has  since  become — one  of  the  healthiest  stations  in 
India.  Quite  the  contrary.  The  men  were  crowded  into  small  badly- 
ventilated  buildings,  and  the  sanitary  arrangements  were  as  deplorable 
as  the  state  of  the  water  supply.  The  only  efficient  scavengers  were 
the  huge  birds  of  prey  called  adjutants,  and  so  great  was  the  depen- 
dence placed  upon  the  exertions  of  these  unclean  creatures,  that  the 
young  cadets  were  warned  that  any  injury  done  to  them  would  be 
treated  as  gross  misconduct.  The  inevitable  result  of  this  state  of 
affairs  was  endemic  sickness,  and  a death-rate  of  over  ten  per  cent,  per 
annum.* 

* In  the  fifty-seven  years  preceding  the  Mutiny  the  annual  rate  of  mor- 
tality amongst  the  European  troops  in  India  was  sixty-nine  per  thousand, 
and  in  some  stations  it  was  even  more  appalling.  The  Royal  Commission 
appointed  in  1864  to  inquire  into  the  sanitary  condition  of  the  army  in  India 
expressed  the  hope  that,  by  taking  proper  precautions,  the  mortality  might  be 

1—2 


4 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1852 


Calcutta  outside  the  Fort  was  but  a dreary  place  to  fall  back  upon 
It  was  wretchedly  lighted  by  smoky  oil-lamps  set  at  very  rare  intervals. 
The  slow  and  cumbrous  palankin  was  the  ordinary  means  of  convey- 
ance, and,  as  far  as  I was  concerned,  the  vaunted  hospitality  of  the 
Anglo-Indian  was  conspicuous  by  its  absence. 

I must  confess  I was  disappointed  at  being  left  so  completely  to 
myself,  especially  by  the  senior  military  officers,  many  of  whom  were 
personally  known  to  my  father,  who  had,  I was  aware,  written  to 
some  of  them  on  my  behalf.  Under  these  circumstances,  I think  it 
is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  that  I became  terribly  home -sick,  and 
convinced  that  I could  never  be  happy  in  India.  Worst  of  all,  the 
prospects  of  promotion  seemed  absolutely  hopeless;  I was  a super- 
numerary Second  Lieutenant,  and  nearly  every  officer  in  the  list  of 
the  Bengal  Artillery  had  served  over  fifteen  years  as  a subaltern. 
This  stagnation  extended  to  every  branch  of  the  Indian  Army. 

There  were  singularly  few  incidents  to  enliven  this  unpromising 
stage  of  my  career.  I do,  however,  remember  one  rather  notable 
experience  which  came  to  me  at  that  time,  in  the  form  of  a bad  cyclone. 
I was  dining  out  on  the  night  in  question.  Gradually  the  wind  grew 
higher  and  higher,  and  it  became  evident  that  we  were  in  for  a storm 
of  no  ordinary  kind.  Consequently,  I left  my  friend’s  house  early. 
A Native  servant,  carrying  a lantern,  accompanied  me  to  light  me  on 
my  way.  At  an  angle  of  the  road  a sudden  gust  of  wind  extinguished 
the  light.  The  servant,  who,  like  most  Natives,  was  quite  at  home 
in  the  dark,  walked  on,  believing  that  I was  following  in  his  wake. 
I shouted  to  him  as  loudly  as  I could,  but  the  uproar  was  so  terrific 
that  he  could  not  hear  a word,  and  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  try 
and  make  my  own  way  home.  The  darkness  was  profound.  As  I was 
walking  carefully  along,  I suddenly  came  in  contact  with  an  object, 
which  a timely  Hash  of  lightning  showed  me  was  a column,  standing 
in  exactly  the  opposite  direction  from  my  own  house.  I could  now 
locate  myself  correctly,  and  the  lightning  becoming  every  moment 
more  vivid,  I was  enabled  to  grope  my  way  by  slow  degrees  to  the 
mess,  where  I expected  to  find  someone  to  show  me  my  way  home, 
but  the  servants,  who  knew  from  experience  the  probable  effects  of  a 
cyclone,  had  already  closed  the  outside  Venetian  shutters  and  barred 
all  the  doors.  I could  just  see  them  through  the  cracks  engaged  in 
making  everything  fast.  In  vain  I banged  at  the  door  and  called  at 
the  top  of  my  voice — they  heard  nothing.  Reluctantly  I became  con- 
vinced that  there  was  no  alternative  but  to  leave  my  shelter  and  face 
the  rapidly  increasing  storm  once  more.  My  bungalow  was  not  more 
than  half  a mile  away,  but  it  took  me  an  age  to  accomplish  this  short 

reduced  to  the  rate  of  twenty  per  thousand  per  annum.  I am  glad  to  say 
that  this  hope  has  been  more  than  realized,  the  annual  death-rate  since  1882 
having  never  risen  t.o  seventeen  per  thousand. 


A DESTRUCTIVE  CYCLONE 


1852] 

distance,  as  I was  only  able  to  move  a few  steps  at  a time  whenever 
the  lightning  showed  me  the  way.  It  was  necessary  to  be  careful,  as 
the  road  was  raised,  with  a deep  ditch  on  either  side;  several  trees 
had  already  been  blown  down,  and  lay  across  it,  and  huge  branches 
were  being  driven  through  the  air  like  thistle-down.  I found  extreme 
difficulty  in  keeping  my  feet,  especially  at  the  cross-roads,  where  I was 
more  than  once  all  but  blown  over.  At  last  I reached  my  house,  but 
even  then  my  struggles  were  not  quite  at  an  end.  It  was  a very  long 
time  before  I could  gain  admittance.  The  servant  who  had  been 
carrying  the  lantern  had  arrived,  and,  missing  me,  imagined  that  I 
must  have  returned  to  the  house  at  which  I had  dined.  The  men  with 
whom  I chummed,  thinking  it  unlikely  that  I should  make  a second 
attempt  to  return  home,  had  carefully  fastened  all  the  doors,  momen- 
tarily expecting  the  roof  of  the  house  to  be  blown  off.  I had  to  con- 
tinue hammering  and  shouting  for  a long  time  before  they  heard  and 
admitted  me,  thankful  to  be  comparatively  safe  inside  a house. 

By  morning  the  worst  of  the  storm  was  over,  but  not  before  great 
damage  had  been  done.  The  Native  bazaar  was  completely  wrecked, 
looking  as  if  it  had  suffered  a furious  bombardment,  and  great  havoc 
had  been  made  amongst  the  European  houses,  not  a single  verandah 
or  outside  shutter  being  left  in  the  station.  As  I walked  to  the  mess, 
I found  the  road  almost  impassable  from  fallen  trees ; and  dead  birds, 
chiefly  crows  and  kites,  were  so  numerous  that  they  had  to  be  carried 
off  in  cartloads.  How  I had  made  my  way  to  my  bungalow  without 
accident  the  night  before  was  difficult  to  imagine.  Even  the  column 
against  which  I had  stumbled  was  levelled  by  the  fury  of  the  blast. 
This  column  had  been  raised  a few  years  before  to  the  memory  of  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  1st  Troop,  1st  Brigade,  Bengal  Horse  Artillery, 
who  were  killed  in  the  disastrous  retreat  from  Kabul  in  1841.  It  was 
afterwards  rebuilt. 

Dum-Dum  in  ruins  was  even  more  dreary  than  before  the  cyclone, 
and  I felt  as  if  I could  not  possibly  continue  to  live  there  much  longer. 
Accordingly  I wrote  to  my  father,  begging  him  to  try  and  get  me  sent 
to  Burma ; but  he  replied  that  he  hoped  soon  to  get  command  of  the 
Peshawar  division,  and  that  he  would  then  like  me  to  join  him.  Thus, 
though  my  desire  to  quit  Dum-Dum  was  not  to  be  immediately  grati- 
fied, I was  buoyed  up  by  the  hope  that  a definite  limit  had  now  been 
placed  to  my  service  in  that,  to  me,  uninteresting  part  of  India,  and 
my  restlessness  and  discontent  disappeared  as  if  by  magic. 

In  time  of  peace,  as  in  war,  or  during  a cholera  epidemic,  a soldier’s 
moral  condition  is  infinitely  more  important  than  his  physical  surround- 
ings, and  it  is  in  this  respect,  I think,  that  the  subaltern  of  the  present 
day  has  an  advantage  over  the  youngster  of  forty  years  ago.  The  life 
of  a young  officer  during  his  first  few  months  of  exile,  before  he  has 
fallen  into  the  ways  of  his  new  life  and  made  friends  for  himself,  can 


6 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1852 


never  be  very  Happy ; but  in  these  days  he  is  encouraged  by  the  feeling 
that,  however  distasteful,  it  need  not  necessarily  last  very  long  ; and  he 
can  look  forward  to  a rapid  and  easy  return  to  England  and  friends  at 
no  very  distant  period.  At  the  time  I am  writing  of  he  could  not  but 
feel  completely  cut  off  from  all  that  had  hitherto  formed  his  chief 
interests  in  life — his  family  and  his  friends — for  ten  years  is  an  eternity 
to  the  young,  and  the  feeling  of  loneliness  and  home-sickness  was  apt 
to  become  almost  insupportable. 

The  climate  added  its  depressing  influence  ; there  was  no  going  to 
the  hills  then,  and  as  the  weary  months  dragged  on,  the  young  stranger 
became  more  and  more  dispirited  and  hopeless.  Such  was  my  case.  I 
had  only  been  four  months  in  India,  but  it  seemed  like  four  years.  My 
joy,  therefore,  was  unbounded  when  at  last  my  marching  orders  arrived. 
Indeed,  the  idea  that  I was  about  to  proceed  to  that  grand  field  of 
soldierly  activity,  the  North  -West  Frontier,  and  there  join  my  father, 
almost  reconciled  me  to  the  disappointment  of  losing  my  chance  of 
field  service  in  Burma.  My  arrangements  were  soon  made,  and  early 
in  August  I bade  a glad  good-bye  to  Dum-Dum. 


CHAPTER  II. 

When  I went  to  India  the  mode  of  travelling  was  almost  as  primitive 
as  it  had  been  a hundred,  and  probably  five  hundred,  years  before. 
Private  individuals  for  the  most  part  used  palankins,  while  officers, 
regiments,  and  drafts  were  usually  sent  up  country  by  the  river  route 
as  far  as  Cawnpore.  It  was  necessarily  a slow  mode  of  progression — 
how  slow  may  be  imagined  from  the  fact  that  it  took  me  nearly  three 
months  to  get  from  Dum-Dum  to  Peshawar,  a distance  now  traversed 
with  the  greatest  ease  and  comfort  in  as  many  days.  As  far  as  Benares 
I travelled  in  a barge  towed  by  a steamer — a performance  which  took 
the  best  part  of  a month  to  accomplish.  From  Benares  to  Allahabad 
it  was  a pleasant  change  to  get  upon  wheels,  a horse-dak  having  been 
recently  established  between  these  two  places.  At  Allahabad  I was 
most  kindly  received  by  Mr.  Lowther,  the  Commissioner,  an  old  friend 
of  my  father’s,  in  whose  house  I experienced  for  the  first  time  that 
profuse  hospitality  for  which  Anglo-Indians  are  proverbial.  I was 
much  surprised  and  amused  by  the  circumstance  of  my  host  smoking  a 
hookah  even  at  meals,  for  he  was  one  of  the  few  Englishmen  who  still 
indulged  in  that  luxury,  as  it  was  then  considered.  The  sole  duty  of 
one  servant,  called  the  hookah-bardar,  was  to  prepare  the  pipe  for  his 
master,  and  to  have  it  ready  at  all  times. 

My  next  resting-place  was  Cawnpore,  my  birthplace,  where  I 
remained  a few  days.  The  Cawnpore  division  was  at  that  time  com- 


1852] 


BENGAL  HOUSE  ARTILLERY 


7 


rnanded  by  an  officer  of  the  name  of  Palmer,  who  had  only  recently 
attained  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General,  though  he  could  not  have  been 
less  than  sixty-eight  years  of  age,  being  of  the  same  standing  as  my 

father. 

From  Cawnpore  I went  to  Meerut,  and  there  came  across,  for  the 
first  time,  the  far-famed  Bengal  Horse  Artillery,  and  made  the 
acquaintance  of  a set  of  officers  who  more  than  realized  my  expecta- 
tions regarding  the  wearers  of  the  much-coveted  jacket,  association 
with  whom  created  in  me  a fixed  resolve  to  leave  no  stone  unturned 
in  the  endeavour  to  become  a horse  gunner.  Like  the  Cavalry  and 
Infantry  of  the  East  India  Company’s  service,  the  Artillery  suffered 
somewhat  from  the  employment  of  many  of  its  best  officers  on  the  staff 
and  in  civil  appointments ; the  officers  selected  were  not  seconded  or 
replaced  in  their  regiments.  This  was  the  case  in  a less  degree,  no 
doubt,  in  the  Horse  Artillery  than  in  the  other  branches,  for  its  esjirit 
was  great,  and  officers  were  proud  to  belong  to  this  corps  d' elite.  It 
certainly  was  a splendid  service  ; the  men  were  the  pick  of  those 
recruited  by  the  East  India  Company,  they  were  of  magnificent 
physique,  and  their  uniform  was  singularly  handsome.  The  jacket 
was  much  the  same  as  that  now  worn  by  the  Royal  Horse  Artillery, 
but  instead  of  the  busby  they  had  a brass  helmet  covered  in  front  with 
leopard  skin,  surmounted  by  a long  red  plume  which  drooped  over  the 
back  like  that  of  a French  Cuirassier.  This,  with  white  buckskin 
breeches  and  long  boots,  completed  a uniform  which  was  one  of  the 
most  picturesque  and  effective  I have  ever  seen  on  a parade-ground. 

The  metalled  highway  ended  at  Meerut,  and  I had  to  perform  the 
remainder  of  my  journey  to  Peshawar,  a distance  of  600  miles,  in  a 
palankin,  or  doolie. 

This  manner  of  travelling  was  tedious  in  the  extreme.  Starting 
after  dinner,  the  victim  was  carried  throughout  the  night  by  eight  men, 
divided  into  reliefs  of  four.  The  whole  of  the  eight  were  changed  at 
stages  averaging  from  ten  to  twelve  miles  apart.  The  baggage  was  also 
conveyed  by  coolies,  who  kept  up  an  incessant  chatter,  and  the  pro- 
cession was  lighted  on  its  way  by  a torch-bearer,  whose  torch  consisted 
of  bits  of  rag  tied  round  the  end  of  a stick,  upon  which  he  continually 
poured  the  most  malodorous  of  oils.  If  the  palankin-bearers  were 
very  good,  they  shuffled  along  at  the  rate  of  about  three  miles  an  hour, 
and  if  there  were  no  delays,  forty  or  forty-five  miles  could  be  accom- 
plished before  it  became  necessary  to  seek  shelter  from  the  sun  in  one 
of  the  dak-bungalows,  or  rest-houses,  erected  by  Government  at  con- 
venient intervals  along  all  the  principal  routes.  In  these  bungalows  a 
bath  could  be  obtained,  and  sorely  it  was  needed  after  a journey  of 
thirteen  or  fourteen  hours  at  a level  of  only  a few  inches  above  an 
exceedingly  dusty  road.  As  to  food,  the  khansamah,  like  ‘ mine  host  ’ 
in  the  old  country,  declared  himself  at  the  outset  prepared  to  provide 


8 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1852 


everything  the  heart  of  man  could  desire  ; when,  however,  the  traveller 
was  safely  cornered  for  the  rest  of  the  day,  the  menu  invariably 
dwindled  down  to  the  elementary  and  universal  ‘ sudden  death,’  which 
meant  a wretchedly  thin  chicken,  caught,  decapitated,  grilled,  and 
served  up  within  twenty  minutes  of  the  meal  being  ordered.  At  dinner 
a variety  was  made  by  the  chicken  being  curried,  accompanied  by  an 
unlimited  supply  of  rice  and  chutney. 

I was  glad  to  be  able  to  break  the  monotony  of  this  long  journey  by 
a visit  to  a half-sister  of  mine,  who  was  then  living  at  the  hill-station 
of  Mussoorie.  The  change  to  the  delightful  freshness  of  a Himalayan 
climate  after  the  Turkish-bath-like  atmosphere  of  the  plains  in  Septem- 
ber was  most  grateful,  and  I thoroughly  enjoyed  the  few  days  I spent 
in  the  midst  of  the  lovely  mountain  scenery. 

My  next  station  was  Umballa.  There  I fell  in  with  two  other  troops 
of  Horse  Artillery,  and  became  more  than  ever  enamoured  with  the 
idea  of  belonging  to  so  splendid  a service.  From  Umballa  it  was  a 
two  nights’  journey  to  Ludhiana,  where  I rested  for  the  day,  and  there 
met  a cousin  in  the  Survey  Department,  who  had  been  suddenly  ordered 
to  Lahore,  so  we  agreed  to  travel  together. 

The  next  halting  place  was  Jullundur.  To  make  a change,  we  hired 
a buggy  at  this  place,  in  which  to  drive  the  first  stage,  sending  our 
palankins  on  ahead ; when  we  overtook  them,  we  found,  to  our 
surprise,  that  their  number  had  increased  to  six.  We  were  preparing 
for  a start,  when  it  struck  us  that  we  ought  to  make  some  inquiries 
about  the  additional  four,  which,  from  the  luggage  lying  about,  we 
assumed  to  be  occupied,  but  which  appeared  to  be  stranded  for  want  of 
bearers  to  carry  them  on.  The  doors  were  carefully  closed,  and  it  was 
some  time  before  we  could  get  an  answer  to  our  offers  of  assistance. 
Eventually  a lady  looked  out,  and  told  us  that  she  and  a friend,  each 
accompanied  by  two  children  and  an  ayah*  were  on  their  way  to 
Lahore  ; that  the  bearers  who  had  brought  them  so  far  had  run  away, 
and  that  they  were  absolutely  in  despair  as  to  how  they  were  to  pro- 
ceed. It  turned  out  that  the  bearers,  who  had  been  engaged  to  carry 
the  ladies  on  the  second  stage  towards  Lahore,  found  it  more  amusing 
to  attend  the  ceremony  of  the  installation  of  the  Raja  of  Ivaparthala, 
then  going  on,  than  to  fulfil  their  engagement.  After  discussing  the 
situation,  the  ladies  were  persuaded  to  get  out  of  their  palankins  and 
into  our  buggy.  We  divided  the  baggage  and  six  doolies  between  our 
sixteen  bearers,  and  started  off,  my  cousin,  the  ayahs,  and  I on  foot. 
It  was  then  10  p.m.  We  hoped  relays  of  bearers  for  the  whole  party 
would  be  forthcoming  at  the  next  stage,  but  we  were  doomed  to  disap- 
pointment. Our  reliefs  were  present,  but  none  for  the  ladies.  We 
succeeded,  however,  in  inducing  our  original  bearers  to  come  on  a 
further  stage,  thus  arranging  for  the  carriage  of  the  ayahs , while  we 
* A Native  woman-servant. 


NEW  ERIENDS 


9 


1852] 

two  men  trudged  on  beside  the  buggy  for  another  ten  or  twelve  miles. 
It  was  a heavy,  sandy  road,  and  three  stages  were  about  as  much  as  the 
horse  could  manage. 

Soon  after  daybreak  next  morning  we  reached  the  Bias  river. 
Crossing  by  a bridge  of  boats,  we  found  on  the  other  side  a small  one- 
roomed  house  with  a verandah  running  round  it,  built  for  the  use  of  the 
European  overseer  in  charge  of  the  road.  On  matters  being  explained, 
this  man  agreed  to  turn  out.  The  ladies  and  children  were  put  inside, 
and  my  cousin  and  I spent  the  day  in  the  verandah  ; in  the  evening, 
with  the  assistance  of  the  overseer,  we  were  able  to  get  a sufficient 
number  of  bearers  to  carry  us  all  on  to  Mian  Mir  without  further 
adventure.  In  the  course  of  conversation  we  found  that  one  of  the 
ladies  was  the  wife  of  Lieutenant  Donald  Stewart,*  of  the  9th  Bengal 
Infantry,  and  that  she  and  her  friend  were  returning  to  join  their 
respective  husbands  after  spending  the  summer  months  at  Simla.  This 
meeting  was  the  beginning  of  a close  friendship  with  Sir  Donald  and 
Lady  Stewart,  which  has  lasted  to  the  present  day. 

At  Mian  Mir  (the  military  cantonment  of  Lahore)  I stayed  a few 
days  with  another  half-sister,  and  from  there,  as  the  weather  was 
beginning  to  get  cooler,  I travelled  day  and  night.  One  evening  about 
eight  o’clock  I was  disappointed  at  not  having  come  across  the  usual 
rest-house ; lights  could  be  seen,  however,  at  no  great  distance,  and  I 
proceeded  towards  them ; they  turned  out  to  be  the  camp  fires  of  a 
Cavalry  regiment  which  was  halting  there  for  the  night.  Being  half 
famished,  and  fearing  that  my  craving  for  food  was  not  likely  to  be 
gratified  unless  someone  in  the  camp  would  take  pity  upon  my  forlorn 
condition,  I boldly  presented  myself  at  the  first  tent  I came  across. 
The  occupant  came  out,  and,  on  hearing  the  strait  I was  in,  he  with 
kindly  courtesy  invited  me  to  enter  the  tent,  saying,  ‘ You  are  just  in 
time  to  share  our  dinner.’  My  host  turned  out  to  be  Major  Crawford 
Chamberlain, f commanding  the  1st  Irregular  Cavalry,  the  famous 
Skinner’s  Horse,  then  on  its  way  to  Peshawar.  A lady  was  sitting  at 
the  table — Mrs.  Chamberlain — to  whom  I was  introduced  ; I spent  a 
very  pleasant  evening,  and  in  this  way  commenced  another  equally 
agreeable  and  lasting  friendship. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Even  the  longest  journey  must  come  to  an  end  at  last,  and  early  in 
November  I reached  Peshawar.  My  father,  who  was  then  in  his  sixty  - 
nintb  year,  had  just  been  appointed  to  command  the  division  with  the 

* Now  Field  Marshal  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  Bart.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I. 
t Now  General  Crawford  Chamberlain,  C.S.I.,  a brother  of  General  Sir 
Neville  Chamberlain. 


10 


FORTY. ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1852 


temporary  rank  of  Major-General.  Old  as  this  may  appear  at  a period 
when  Colonels  are  superannuated  at  fifty-seven,  and  Major-Generals 
must  retire  at  sixty-two,  my  father  did  not  consider  himself  particularly 
unlucky.  As  for  the  authorities,  they  evidently  thought  they  were  to 
be  congratulated  on  having  so  young  and  active  an  officer  to  place  in  a 
position  of  responsibility  upon  the  North-West  Frontier,  for  amongst 
my  father’s  papers  I found  letters  from  the  Adjutant-General  and 
Quartermaster-General  expressing  high  satisfaction  at  his  appointment 
to  this  difficult  command. 

It  was  a great  advantage  as  well  as  a great  pleasure  to  me  to  be  with 
my  father  at  this  time.  I had  left  India  an  infant,  and  I had  no  recol- 
lection of  him  until  I was  twelve  years  old,  at  which  time  he  came 
home  on  leave.  Even  then  I saw  very  little  of  him,  as  I was  at 
school  during  the  greater  part  of  his  sojourn  in  England,  thus  we  met 
at  Peshawar  almost  as  strangers.  We  did  not,  however,  long  remain  so  ; 
his  affectionate  greeting  soon  put  an  end  to  any  feeling  of  shyness  on 
my  part,  and  the  genial  and  kindly  spirit  which  enabled  him  to  enter 
into  and  sympathize  with  the  feelings  and  aspirations  of  men  younger 
than  himself,  rendered  the  year  I spent  with  him  at  Peshawar  one  of 
the  brightest  and  happiest  of  my  early  life.  In  one  respect  particularly 
I benefited  by  the  intercourse  and  confidence  of  the  year  in  question. 
My  father  spoke  to  me  freely  of  his  experiences  in  Afghanistan,  where 
he  commanded  during  the  Afghan  war  first  a brigade,  and  then  Shah 
Shuja’s  contingent.  The  information  I in  this  way  gathered  regarding 
the  characteristics  of  that  peculiar  country,  and  the  best  means  of 
dealing  with  its  still  more  peculiar  people,  was  invaluable  to  me  when 
I,  in  my  turn,  twenty-five  years  later,  found  myself  in  command  of  an 
army  in  Afghanistan. 

Eleven  years  only  had  elapsed  since  the  first  Afghan  war,  when  my 
father  went  to  Peshawar  and  found  himself  again  associated  with 
several  Afghan  friends ; some  had  altogether  settled  in  the  Peshawar 
district,  for  nearly  all  of  those  who  had  assisted  us,  or  shown  any 
friendly  feeling  towards  us,  had  been  forced  by  Dost  Mahomed  Khan, 
on  his  return  as  Amir  to  Kabul,  to  seek  refuge  in  India.  One  of  the 
chief  of  these  unfortunate  refugees  was  Mahomed  Usman  Khan,  Shah 
Shuja’s  Wazir,  or  Prime  Minister.  He  had  been  very  intimate  with 
my  father,  so  it  was  pleasant  for  them  to  meet  again  and  talk  over 
events  in  which  they  had  both  played  such  prominent  parts.  Usman 
Khan  died  some  years  ago  ; but  visitors  to  India  who  travel  as  far  as 
Peshawar  may  still  meet  his  sons,  one  of  whom  is  the  Commandant  of 
the  Khyber  Kifles,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Aslam  Khan,  C.I.E.,  a fine 
specimen  of  a Native  soldier  and  gentleman,  who  has  proved  his  loyalty 
and  done  excellent  service  to  the  State  on  many  trying  occasions. 

My  father  had  also  been  on  terms  of  intimacy  with  Dost  Mahomed 
himself  and  many  other  men  of  influence  in  Kabul,  from  whom,  while 


GENERAL  SIR  ABRAHAM  ROBERTS,  G.CB. 
From  a photograph. 


1852] 


WITH  MY  FATHER  AT  PESHAWAR 


ii 


at  Peshawar,  he  received  most  interesting  letters,  in  which  anxiety  was 
often  expressed  as  to  whether  the  English  were  amicably  disposed 
towards  the  Amir.  To  these  communications  my  father  was  always 
careful  to  send  courteous  and  conciliatory  replies.  The  correspondence 
which  took  place  confirmed  him  in  his  frequently  expressed  opinion 
that  it  would  be  greatly  to  the  advantage  of  the  Government,  and 
obviate  the  necessity  for  keeping  such  large  garrisons  on  the  frontier, 
if  friendly  relations  could  be  established  with  the  Amir,  and  with  the 
neighbouring  tribes,  who  more  or  less  looked  to  the  Euler  of  Kabul  as 
their  Chief.  My  father  accordingly  addressed  the  Secretary  to  the 
Government  of  India,  and  pointed  out  how  successfully  some  of  the 
most  experienced  Anglo-Indian  officials  had  managed  barbarous  tribes 
by  kindness  and  conciliation. 

My  father  was  prevented  by  ill-health  from  remaining  long  enough 
at  Peshawar  to  see  the  result  of  his  proposals,  but  it  was  a source  of 
great  satisfaction  to  him  to  learn  before  he  left  India*  that  they  were 
approved  by  Lord  Dalhousie  (the  Governor-General),  and  that  they 
were  already  bearing  fruit.  That  the  Amir  was  himself  ready  to 
respond  to  any  overtures  made  to  him  was  evident  from  a letter  written 
by  a brother  of  the  Dost’s,  which  was  discovered  amongst  the  papers  of 
Colonel  Mackeson  (the  Commissioner  of  Peshawar)  after  his  death. 
It  was  still  more  gratifying  to  my  father  to  find  that  the  views  of 
Mackeson’s  successor,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Herbert  Edwardes,  on  this 
subject  entirely  coincided  with  his  own.  This  distinguished  officer  and 
brilliant  administrator  zealously  maintained  this  policy,  and  succeeded 
in  establishing  such  a good  understanding  with  the  Ruler  of  Kabul 
that,  when  the  Mutiny  broke  out,  Afghanistan  stood  aloof,  instead  of, 
as  might  have  been  the  case,  turning  the  scale  against  us. 

The  Peshawar  division  in  1852  was  not  only  the  most  important, 
but  the  largest,  in  India.  It  included  besides  Attock,  Eawal  Pindi, 
and  Jhelum,  the  hill-station  of  Murree,  which  had  only  been  recently 
occupied.  The  cantonment  of  Peshawar  had  been  laid  out  by  Sir  Colin 
Campbell  (afterwards  Lord  Clyde),  who  commanded  there  when  we 
first  occupied  that  place  in  1849.  He  crowded  the  troops,  European 

* Shortly  before  my  father  left  Peshawar  he  received  the  following  letter 
from  Colonel  Outram,  dated  Calcutta,  the  23rd  October,  1853  : ‘ As  I know 
that  your  views  as  to  the  policy  that  should  be  pursued  towards  Dost 
Mahomed  must  be  in  accordance  with  those  of  the  Governor-General,  I 
accordingly  showed  your  letter  to  Grant,  Courtney,  and  Colonel  Low,  all  of 
whom  were  glad  to  learn  that  you  entertained  such  sound  views,  opposed 
though  they  be  with  the  general  clamour  for  war  with  the  Kabulese  which 
appears  to  be  the  cry  of  the  army.  This,  together  with  the  wise  forethought 
you  displayed  before  the  Kabul  insurrection  (which,  though  at  the  time  it 
found  no  favour  at  Head-Quarters,  was  subsequently  so  mournfully  estab- 
lished by  the  Kabul  massacre,  which  would  have  been  prevented  had  your 
warnings  been  attended  to),  shows  how  well  you  would  combine  the  military 
and  political  control  of  the  country  beyond  the  Indus.’ 


12 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1852 

and  Native,  into  as  small  a space  as  possible  in  order  that  the  station 
might  be  the  more  easily  protected  from  the  raids  of  the  Afridis  and 
other  robber  tribes,  who  had  their  homes  in  the  neighbouring  moun- 
tains, and  constantly  descended  into  the  valley  for  the  sake  of  plunder. 
To  resist  these  marauders  it  was  necessary  to  place  guards  all  round 
the  cantonment.  The  smaller  the  enclosure,  the  fewer  guards  would 
be  required.  From  this  point  of  view  alone  was  Sir  Colin’s  action 
excusable  ; but  the  result  of  this  overcrowding  was  what  it  always  is, 
especially  in  a tropical  climate  like  that  of  India,  and  for  long  years 
Peshawar  was  a name  of  terror  to  the  English  soldier  from  its  pro- 
verbial unhealthiness.  The  water-supply  for  the  first  five-and-twenty 
years  of  our  occupation  was  extremely  bad,  and  sanitary  arrange- 
ments, particularly  as  regards  Natives,  were  apparently  considered 
unnecessary. 

In  addition  to  the  cordon  of  sentries  round  the  cantonment,  strong 
piquets  were  posted  on  all  the  principal  roads  leading  towards  the 
hills  ; and  every  house  had  to  be  guarded  by  a chokidar,  or  watchman, 
belonging  to  one  of  the  robber  tribes.  The  maintaining  this  watchman 
was  a sort  of  blackmail,  without  consenting  to  which  no  one’s  horses  or 
other  property  were  safe.  The  watchmen  were  armed  with  all  sorts  of 
quaint  old  firearms,  which,  on  an  alarm  being  given,  they  discharged 
in  the  most  reckless  manner,  making  it  quite  a work  of  danger  to  pass 
along  a Peshawar  road  after  dark.  No  one  was  allowed  to  venture 
beyond  the  line  of  sentries  when  the  sun  had  set,  and  even  in  broad 
daylight  it  was  not  safe  to  go  any  distance  from  the  station. 

I11  the  autumn  of  1851  an  officer --Captain  Frank  Grantham,  of  the 
98th  Foot — was  riding  with  a young  lady  on  the  Michni  road,  not  far 
from  the  Artillery  quarter-guard,  when  he  was  attacked  by  five  hill- 
men.  Grantham  was  wounded  so  severely  that  he  died  in  a few  days, 
the  horses  were  carried  off,  but  the  girl  was  allowed  to  escape.  She 
ran  as  fast  as  she  could  to  the  nearest  guard,  and  told  her  storj' ; the 
alarm  was  given,  and  the  wounded  man  was  brought  in.  The  young 
lady  was  called  upon  shortly  afterwards  to  identify  one  of  the  supposed 
murderers,  but  she  could  not  recognize  the  man  as  being  of  the  party 
who  made  the  attack  ; nevertheless,  the  murderer’s  friends  were  afraid 
of  what  she  might  remember,  and  made  an  attempt  one  night  to  carry 
her  off.  Fortunately,  it  was  frustrated,  but  from  that  time,  until  she 
left  Peshawar,  it  was  considered  necessary  to  keep  a guard  over  the 
house  in  which  she  lived. 

From  all  this  my  readers  may  probably  think  that  Peshawar,  as  I 
first  knew  it,  was  not  a desirable  place  of  residence  ; but  I was  very 
happy  there.  There  was  a good  deal  of  excitement  and  adventure  ; I 
made  many  friends ; and,  above  all,  I had,  to  me,  the  novel  pleasure  of 
being  with  my  father. 

It  was  the  custom  in  those  days  for  the  General  commanding  one  of 


MY  FATHER'S  STAFF 


13 


1853] 

the  larger  divisions  to  have  under  him,  and  in  charge  of  the  Head- 
Quarter  station,  a senior  officer  styled  Brigadier.  Soon  after  I went  to 
Peshawar,  Sydney  Cotton*  held  this  appointment,  and  remained  in  it 
for  many  years,  making  a great  reputation  for  himself  during  the 
Mutiny,  and  being  eventually  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  division. 
The  two  senior  officers  on  my  father's  staff  were  Lieutenant  Norman f 
and  Lieutenant  Lumsden, J the  former  Deputy  Assistant-Adjutant- 
General  and  the  latter  Deputy  Assistant-Quartermaster-General.  The 
high  opinion  of  them  which  my  father  had  formed  was  subsequently 
justified  by  their  distinguished  careers.  Norman,  with  sixteen  years’ 
service,  and  at  the  age  of  thirty-four,  became  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Army  in  India,  and  a year  or  two  later  Secretary  to  Government  in 
the  Military  Department.  He  finished  his  Indian  service  as  Military 
Member  of  Council.  Lumsden  became  Quartermaster-General,  and 
afterwards  Adjutant-General,  the  two  highest  positions  on  the  Indian 
staff. 

There  was  a separate  mess  for  all  the  staff  officers,  and  I remember 
a curious  circumstance  in  connexion  with  that  mess  which,  unless  the 
exception  proves  the  rule,  is  strong  evidence  against  the  superstition 
that  thirteen  is  an  unlucky  number  to  sit  down  to  dinner.  On  the 
1st  January,  1853.  thirteen  of  us  dined  together  ; eleven  years  after  we 
were  all  alive,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  party  having  taken  part  in  the 
suppression  of  the  Mutiny,  and  five  or  six  having  been  wounded. 

From  the  time  of  my  arrival  until  the  autumn  of  1853,  nothing  of 
much  importance  occurred.  I lived  with  my  father,  and  acted  as  his 
Aide-de-camp,  while,  at  the  same  time,  I did  duty  with  the  Artillery. 
The  2nd  Company,  2nd  Battalion,  to  which  I belonged,  was  composed 
of  a fine  body  of  men,  who  had  a grand  reputation  in  the  field,  but, 
being  somewhat  troublesome  in  quarters,  had  acquired  the  nickname 
of  ‘ The  Devil’s  Own.’  Because  of  the  unusually  good  physique  of  the 
men,  this  company  was  selected  for  conversion  into  a Mountain 
Battery,  which  it  was  thought  advisable  to  raise  at  that  time.  1 was 
the  only  subaltern  with  this  battery  for  several  months,  and  though  my 
commanding  officer  had  no  objection  to  my  acting  as  A.D.C.  to  my 
father,  he  took  good  care  that  I did  my  regimental  duty  strictly  and 
regularly. 

One  very  painful  circumstance  stamped  itself  on  my  memory.  I 
was  obliged  to  be  present  at  a flogging  parade — the  only  one,  I am 
glad  to  say,  I have  ever  had  to  attend,  although  the  barbarous  and 
degrading  custom  of  flogging  in  the  army  wras  not  done  away  with 
until  nearly  thirty  years  later. § A few  years  before  I joined  the 

* The  late  General  Sir  Sydney  Cotton,  G.C.B. 

t Now  General  Sir  Henry  Norman,  G.C.B.,  G.C.M.G.,  lately  Governor  of 
Queensland. 

X Now  General  Sir  Peter  Lumsden,  G.C.B.  § 1881. 


14 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1853 

service,  the  number  of  lashes  which  might  be  given  was  limited  to 
fifty,  but  even  under  this  restriction  the  sight  was  a horrible  one  to 
witness.  The  parade  to  which  I refer  was  ordered  for  the  punishment 
of  two  men  who  had  been  sentenced  to  fifty  lashes  each  for  selling 
their  kits,  and  to  a certain  term  of  imprisonment  in  addition.  They 
were  fine,  handsome  young  Horse  Artillerymen,  and  it  was  hateful  to 
see  them  thus  treated.  Besides,  one  felt  it  was  productive  of  harm 
rather  than  good,  for  it  tended  to  destroy  the  men’s  self-respect,  and 
to  make  them  completely  reckless.  In  this  instance,  no  sooner  had 
the  two  men  been  released  from  prison  than  they  committed  the  same 
offence  again.  They  were  a second  time  tried  by  Court-Martial,  and 
sentenced  as  before.  How  I longed  to  have  the  power  to  remit  the 
fifty  lashes,  for  I felt  that  selling  their  kits  on  this  occasion  was  their 
way  of  showing  them  resentment  at  the  ignominious  treatment  they 
had  been  subjected  to,  and  of  proving  that  flogging  was  powerless  to 
prevent  their  repeating  the  offence.  A parade  was  ordered,  as  on  the 
previous  occasion.  One  man  was  stripped  to  the  waist,  and  tied  to 
the  wheel  of  a gun.  The  finding  and  sentence  of  the  Court-Martial 
were  read  out — a trumpeter  standing  ready  the  while  to  inflict  the 
punishment— when  the  commanding  officer,  Major  Robert  Waller, 
instead  of  ordering  him  to  begin,  to  the  intense  relief  of,  I believe, 
every  officer  present,  addressed  the  prisoners,  telling  them  of  his  dis- 
tress at  finding  two  soldiers  belonging  to  his  troop  brought  up  for 
corporal  punishment  twice  in  a little  more  than  six  weeks,  and  adding 
that,  however  little  they  deserved  such  leniency,  if  they  would  promise 
not  to  commit  the  same  offence  again,  and  to  behave  better  for  the 
future,  he  would  remit  the  flogging  part  of  the  sentence.  If  the 
prisoners  were  not  happy,  I was ; but  the  clemency  was  evidently 
appreciated  by  them,  for  they  promised,  and  kept  their  words.  I did 
not  lose  sight  of  these  two  men  for  some  years,  and  was  always  grati- 
fied to  learn  that  their  conduct  was  uniformly  satisfactory,  and  that 
they  had  become  good,  steady  soldiers. 

The  Commissioner,  or  chief  civil  authority,  when  I arrived  at 
Peshawar,  was  Colonel  Mackeson,  a well-known  frontier  officer  who 
had  greatly  distinguished  himself  during  the  first  Afghan  war  by  his 
work  among  the  Afridis  and  other  border  tribes,  by  whom  he  was  liked 
and  respected  as  much  as  he  was  feared.  During  Shah  Shuja’s  brief 
reign  at  Kabul,  Mackeson  was  continually  employed  on  political  duty 
in  the  Khyber  Pass  and  at  Peshawar.  On  the  breaking  out  of  the 
insurrection  at  Kabul,  he  was  indefatigable  in  forwarding  supplies  and 
money  to  Sir  Robert  Sale  at  Jalalabad,  hastening  up  the  reinforce- 
ments, and  maintaining  British  influence  in  the  Khyber,  a task  of  no 
small  magnitude  when  we  remember  that  a religious  war  had  been 
proclaimed,  and  all  true  believers  had  been  called  upon  to  exterminate 
the  Feringhis.  While  at  Peshawar,  as  Commissioner,  his  duties  were 


MACKESON 'S  ASSASSINATION 


>5 


1853] 

arduous  and  his  responsibilities  heavy — the  more  so  as  at  that  time 
the  Afghan  inhabitants  of  the  city  were  in  a dangerous  and  excited 
state. 

On  the  10th  September,  1853,  we  were  horrified  to  learn  that  Macke- 
son  had  been  murdered  by  a religious  fanatic.  He  was  sitting  in  the 
verandah  of  his  house  listening  to  appeals  from  the  decisions  of  his 
subordinates,  when,  towards  evening,  a man — who  had  been  remarked 
by  many  during  the  day  earnestly  engaged  in  his  devotions,  his  prayer- 
carpet  being  spread  within  sight  of  the  house— came  up  and,  making  a 
low  salaam  to  Mackeson,  presented  him  with  a paper.  The  Commis- 
sioner, supposing  it  to  be  a petition,  stretched  out  his  hand  to  take  it 
when  the  man  instantly  plunged  a dagger  into  his  breast.  The  noise 
consequent  on  the  struggle  attracted  the  attention  of  some  of  the 
domestic  servants  and  one  of  the  Native  officials.  The  latter  threw 
himself  between  Mackeson  and  the  fanatic,  and  was  himself  slightly 
wounded  in  his  efforts  to  rescue  his  Chief. 

Mackeson  fingered  until  the  14th  September.  His  death  caused 
considerable  excitement  in  the  city  and  along  the  border,  increasing  to 
an  alarming  extent  when  it  became  known  that  the  murderer  had  been 
hanged  and  his  body  burnt.  This  mode  of  disposing  of  one  of  then- 
dead  is  considered  by  Mahomedans  as  the  greatest  insult  that  can  be 
offered  to  their  religion,  for  in  thus  treating  the  corpse,  as  if  it  were 
that  of  (by  them)  a hated  and  despised  Hindu,  the  dead  man  is  sup- 
posed to  be  deprived  of  every  chance  of  paradise.  It  was  not  without 
careful  and  deliberate  consideration  that  this  course  was  decided  upon, 
and  it  was  only  adopted  on  account  of  the  deterrent  effect  it  would 
have  upon  fanatical  Mahomedans,  who  count  it  all  gain  to  sacrifice 
their  fives  by  the  murder  of  a heretic,  and  thereby  secure,  as  they 
firmly  believe,  eternal  happiness,  but  loathe  the  idea  of  being  burned, 
which  effectually  prevents  the  murderer  being  raised  to  the  dignity  of 
a martyr,  and  revered  as  a saint  ever  after. 

It  being  rumoured  that  the  Pathans  intended  to  retaliate  by  dese- 
crating the  late  Commissioner’s  grave,  it  was  arranged  that  he  should 
be  buried  within  cantonment  limits.  A monument  was  raised  to  his 
memory  by  public  subscription,  and  his  epitaph*  was  written  by  the 
Governor-General  himself. 

* ‘here  lies  the  body 

OF 

FREDERICK  MACKESON, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  in  the  Bengal  Army,  Companion  of 
the  Bath,  and  Commissioner  of  Peshawar, 
who  was  born  September  2nd,  1807, 
and  died  September  14th,  1853, 

OF  A WOUND  INFLICTED  BY  A RELIGIOUS  FANATIC. 

He  was  the  beau-ideal  of  a soldier — cool  to  conceive,  brave  to  dare,  and 


l6 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['853 

Shortly  before  Mackeson’s  murder  my  father  had  found  it  necessary 
to  go  to  the  hill-station  of  Murree ; the  hot  weather  had  tried  him  very 
much,  and  he  required  a change.  He  had  scarcely  arrived  there,  when 
he  was  startled  by  the  news  of  the  tragedy  which  had  occurred,  and  at 
once  determined  to  return,  notwithstanding  its  being  the  most  sickly 
season  of  the  year  at  Peshawar,  for  he  felt  that  at  a time  of  such 
dangerous  excitement  it  was  his  duty  to  be  present.  As  a precautionary 
measure,  he  ordered  the  22nd  Foot  from  Rawal  Pindi  to  Peshawar. 
This  and  other  steps  which  he  deemed  prudent  to  take  soon  put  an  end 
to  the  disturbances. 

No  sooner  had  matters  quieted  down  at  Peshawar  than  the  Jowaki 
Afridis,  who  inhabit  the  country  immediately  to  the  east  of  the  Ivohat 
Pass,  began  to  give  trouble,  and  we  went  out  into  camp  to  select  a site 
for  a post  which  would  serve  to  cover  the  northern  entrance  to  the 
pass  and  keep  the  tribesmen  under  surveillance.  The  great  change  of 
temperature,  from  the  intense  heat  he  had  undergone  in  the  summer 
to  the  bitter  cold  of  November  nights  in  tents,  was  too  severe  a trial 
for  my  father.  He  was  then  close  on  seventy,  and  though  apparently' 
active  as  ever,  he  was  far  from  well,  consequently  the  doctors  strongly 
urged  him  not  to  risk  another  hot  weather  in  India.  It  was  accord- 
ingly settled  that  he  should  return  to  England  without  delay. 

Shortly  before  his  departure,  an  incident  occurred  which  I will  relate 
for  the  benefit  of  psychological  students ; they  may,  perhaps,  be  able 
to  explain  it,  I never  could.  My  father  had  some  time  before  issued 
invitations  for  a dance  which  was  to  take  place  in  two  days’  time— on 
Monday,  the  17  th  October,  1853.  On  the  Saturday  morning  he  ap- 
peared disturbed  and  unhappy,  and  during  breakfast  he  was  silent  and 
despondent — very  different  from  his  usual  bright  and  cheery  self.  On 
my  questioning  him  as  to  the  cause,  he  told  me  he  had  had  an  un- 
pleasant dream — one  which  he  had  dreamt  several  times  before,  and 

strong  to  do.  The  Indian  Army  was  proud  of  his  noble  presence  in  its  ranks 
— not  without  cause.  On  the  dark  page  of  the  Afghan  war  the  name  of 
“ Mackeson  ” shines  brightly  out ; the  frontier  was  his  post,  and  the  future 
his  field.  The  defiles  of  the  Khyber  and  the  peaks  of  the  Black  Mountain 
alike  witness  his  exploits.  Death  still  found  him  in  front.  Unconquercd 
enemies  felt  safer  when  he  fell.  His  own  Government  thus  mourn  the  fall. 

‘ The  reputation  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mackeson  as  a soldier  is  known  to 
and  honoured  by  all.  His  value  as  a political  servant  of  the  State  is  known 
to  none  better  than  to  the  Governor-General  himself,  who  in  a difficult 
and  eventful  time  had  cause  to  mark  his  great  ability,  and  the  admirable 
prudence,  discretion,  and  temper,  which  added  tenfold  value  to  the  high 
soldierly  qualities  of  his  public  character. 

‘ The  loss  of  Colonel  Mackeson’s  life  would  have  dimmed  a victory  ; to  lose 
him  thus,  by  the  hand  of  a foul  assassin,  is  a misfortune  of  the  heaviest 
gloom  for  the  Government,  which  counted  him  amongst  its  bravest  and  best. 

‘General  orders  of  the  Marquis  Dalhousie,  Governor  General  of  India, 
3rd  October,  1853. 

‘This  monument  was  erected  by  his  friends.’ 


A STRANGE  DREAM 


>7 


ISS31 

which  had  always  been  followed  by  the  death  of  a near  relation.  As 
the  day  advanced,  in  spite  of  my  efforts  to  cheer  him,  he  became  more 
and  more  depressed,  and  even  said  he  should  like  to  put  off  the  dance. 
I dissuaded  him  from  taking  this  step  for  the  time  being ; but  that 
night  he  had  the  same  dream  again,  and  the  next  morning  he  insisted 
on  the  dance  being  postponed.  It  seemed  to  me  rather  absurd  to  have 
to  disappoint  our  friends  because  of  a dream ; there  was,  however, 
nothing  for  it  but  to  carry  out  my  father’s  wishes,  and  intimation  was 
accordingly  sent  to  the  invited  guests.  The  following  morning  the  post 
brought  news  of  the  sudden  death  of  the  half-sister  at  Lahore  with 
whom  I had  stayed  on  my  way  to  Peshawar. 

As  my  father  was  really  very  unwell,  it  was  not  thought  advisable 
for  him  to  travel  alone,  so  it  was  arranged  that  I should  accompany 
him  to  ltawal  Pindi.  We  started  from  Peshawar  on  the  27th  Novem- 
ber', and  drove  as  far  as  Nowshera.  The  next  day  we  went  on  to 
Attock.  I found  the  invalid  had  benefited  so  much  by  the  change 
that  it  was  quite  safe  for  him  to  continue  the  journey  alone,  and  I 
consented  the  more  readily  to  leave  him,  as  I was  anxious  to  get  back 
to  my  battery,  which  had  been  ordered  on  service,  and  was  then  with 
the  force  assembled  at  Bazidkhel  for  an  expedition  against  the  Bori 
villages  of  the  Jowaki  Afridis. 

Having  said  farewell  to  my  father,  I started  for  Bazidkhel  early  on 
the  29th  November.  At  that  time  there  was  no  direct  road  to  that 
place  from  Nowshera,  nor  was  it  considered  safe  to  travel  alone  along 
the  slopes  of  the  lower  Afridi  hills.  I had,  therefore,  to  go  all  the  way 
back  to  Peshawar  to  get  to  my  destination.  I rode  as  fast  as  relays  of 
horses  could  carry  me,  in  the  hope  that  I should  reach  Bazidkhel  in 
time  for  the  fun ; but  soon  after  passing  Nowshera  I heard  guns  in 
the  direction  of  the  Kohat  Pass,  and  realized  that  I should  be  too  late. 
I was  very  disappointed  at  missing  this,  my  first  chance  of  active 
service,  and  not  accompanying  the  newly  raised  Mountain  Train  (as 
it  was  then  called)  on  the  first  occasion  of  its  being  employed  in  the  field. 

The  object  of  this  expedition  was  to  punish  the  Jowaki  section  of 
the  Afridis  for  their  many  delinquencies  during  the  three  previous 
years.  Numerous  murders  and  raids  on  the  Kohat  and  Peshawar 
districts,  the  plunder  of  boats  on  the  Indus,  and  the  murder  of  a 
European  apothecary,  were  all  traced  to  this  tribe.  They  had  been 
blockaded,  and  their  resort  to  the  salt-mines  near  Bahadurkhel  and  to 
the  markets  of  Kohat  and  Peshawar  had  been  interdicted,  but  these 
measures  produced  no  effect  on  the  recalcitrant  tribesmen.  John 
(afterwards  Lord)  Lawrence,  who  had  come  to  Peshawar  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  over  frontier  affairs  with  Edwardes,  the  new  Com- 
missioner, held  a conference  with  the  maliks*  of  the  villages  connected 
with  the  Jowaki  Pass,  and  being  anxious  to  avoid  hostilities,  offered  to 

* Head  men. 


2 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[>853 


18 

condone  all  past  offences  if  the  tribes  would  agree  to  certain  conditions, 
which,  briefly,  were  that  no  further  crimes  should  be  committed  in 
British  territory ; that  such  criminals  as  had  taken  refuge  in  their 
villages  should  be  given  up ; and  that  for  the  future  criminals  and 
outlaws  flying  from  justice  should  not  be  afforded  an  asylum  in  Jowaki 
lands.  To  the  second  condition  the  whole  tribe  absolutely  refused  to 
agree.  They  stated,  with  truth,  that  from  time  immemorial  it  was 
their  custom  to  afford  an  asylum  to  anyone  demanding  it,  an*d  that  to 
surrender  a man  who  had  sought  and  found  shelter  with  them  would 
be  a disgrace  which  they  could  not  endure. 

Afridis  have  curious  ideas  as  to  the  laws  of  hospitality;  it  is  no 
uncommon  thing  for  them  to  murder  their  guests  in  cold  blood,  but  it 
is  contrary  to  their  code  of  honour  to  surrender  a fugitive  who  has 
claimed  an  asylum  with  them. 

The  sections  of  the  tribe  living  nearest  our  territory  agreed  to  the 
first  and  third  of  our  conditions,  no  doubt  because  they  felt  they  were 
in  our  power,  and  had  suffered  considerably  from  the  blockade.  But 
the  Bori  Afridis  would  make  no  atonement  for  the  past  and  give  no 
security  for  the  future,  although  they  admitted  having  robbed  and 
murdered  our  subjects.  There  was  nothing  for  it,  therefore,  but  to 
send  a force  against  them.  This  force  consisted  of  rather  more  than 
1,500  men,  British  and  Native.  The  Afridis  made  no  stand  until  we 
reached  their  main  position,  when  they  offered  a stout  resistance,  which, 
however,  proved  of  no  avail  against  the  gallantry  of  the  Guides  and  66th 
(now  1st)  Gurkhas.  The  Bori  villages  were  then  destroyed,  with  a loss 
to  us  of  eight  men  killed  and  thirty-one  wounded. 

Sufficient  punishment  having  been  inflicted,  our  force  retired.  The 
rear  guard  was  hotly  pressed,  and  it  was  late  in  the  evening  before  the 
troops  got  clear  of  the  hills. 

The  tribesmen  with  whom  we  had  just  made  friends  sat  in  hundreds 
on  the  ridges  watching  the  progress  of  the  fight.  It  was  no  doubt  a 
great  temptation  to  them  to  attack  the  1 infidels  ’ while  they  were  at 
their  mercy,  and  considerable  anxiety  was  felt  by  Lawrence  and 
Edwardes  as  to  the  part  which  our  new  allies  would  play  ; their  relief 
was  proportionate  when  it  was  found  they  intended  to  maintain  a 
neutral  attitude. 

I shall  not  further  describe  the  events  of  that  day,  more  especially  as 
I was  not  fortunate  enough  to  be  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  proceed- 
ings. I have  only  referred  to  this  expedition  as  being  typical  of  many 
little  frontier  fights,  and  because  I remember  being  much  impressed  ut 
the  time  with  the  danger  of  trusting  our  communications  in  a difficult 
mountainous  country  to  people  closely  allied  to  those  against  whom  we 
were  fighting.  This  over-confidence  in  the  good  faith  of  our  frontier 
neighbours  caused  us  serious  embarrassments  a few  years  later  during 
the  Umbeyla  campaign. 


1854] 


A TRIP  TO  K HAG  AN 


19 


The  force  remained  in  camp  for  some  time  for  the  protection  of  the 
men  employed  in  building  the  post,  which  was  called  Fort  Mackeson, 
after  the  murdered  Commissioner.  When  it  was  completed  we  returned 
to  I'eslmwar. 


CHATTER  IV. 

I had  had  a great  deal  of  fever  during  my  eighteen  months’  residence 
at  Peshawar,  and  in  April,  1854,  I obtained  six  months’  leave  to 
Kashmir.  I travelled  via  Murree  to  Abbottabad,  along  the  route  now 
well  known  as  the  ‘ Gullies.’  Here  I was  joined  by  Lieutenant  George 
Rodney  Brown,*  a subaltern  of  Horse  Artillery,  with  whom  I chummed 
at  Peshawar. 

Abbottabad  was  a very  small  place  in  those  days.  It  was  named 
after  its  first  Deputy-Commissioner,  James  Abbott, f famous  for  his 
journey  via  Bokhara  and  Khiva  to  Russia  in  1839,  undertaken  for  the 
release  of  Russian  prisoners  who  were  kept  as  slaves  by  the  Turko- 
mans. He  had  just  left,  and  had  been  succeeded  as  Deputy-Commis- 
sioner by  a Captain  Becher,  who,  fortunately  for  us,  was  away  in  the 
district.  I say  fortunately,  because  we  were  bent  on  visiting  Ivhagan, 
and  had  obtained  permission  from  the  Commissioner  of  Peshawar  to 
do  so.  He  had  told  us  to  apply  to  Bccher  for  assistance,  but  from 
what  we  heard  of  that  officer,  it  did  not  seem  likely  he  would  help  us. 
Khagan  was  beyond  our  border,  and  the  inhabitants  were  said  to  be 
even  more  fanatical  than  the  rest  of  the  frontier  tribes.  The  Commis- 
sioner, however,  had  given  us  leave,  and  as  his  Deputy  appeared  to  be 
the  kind  of  man  to  create  obstacles,  we  made  up  our  minds  to  slip 
away  before  he  returned. 

We  started  on  the  21st  May,  and  marched  to  Habibula-Ki-Ghari. 
Here  the  road  bifurcates,  one  branch  leading  to  Kashmir,  the  other  to 
Khagan.  We  took  the  latter,  and  proceeded  to  Balakot,  twelve  miles 
further  on,  which  was  then  our  frontier  post.  There  we  found  a small 
guard  of  Frontier  Police,  two  of  whom  we  induced  to  accompany  us  on 
our  onward  journey  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  to  look  after  the  baggage 
and  collecting  coolies.  Three  days’  more  marching  brought  us  to 
Khagan.  The  road  almost  the  whole  way  from  Balakot  ran  along  a 
precipice  overhanging  the  Nainsukh  river,  at  that  time  of  year  a 
rushing  torrent,  owing  to  the  melting  of  the  snows  on  the  higher 
ranges.  The  track  was  rough,  steep,  and  in  some  places  very  narrow. 
We  crossed  and  recrossed  the  river  several  times  by  means  of  snow- 
bridges,  which,  spanning  the  limpid,  jade-coloured  water,  had  a very 
pretty  effect.  At  one  point  our  silik  arris*  stopped,  and  proudly  told 

* Now  a retired  Major-General. 

t Now  General  Sir  Janies  Abbott,  K.C.B. 

X Men  who  carry  the  guns,  and  point  out  the  most  likelv  places  for  game,  etc. 

2—2 


20 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1854 

us  that  on  that  very  spot  their  tribe  had  destroyed  a Sikh  army  sent 
against  them  in  the  time  of  liunjit  Sing.  It  certainly  was  a place  well 
chosen  for  a stand,  not  more  than  fifty  yards  wide,  with  a perpendicular 
cliff  on  one  side  and  a roaring  torrent  on  the  other. 

The  people  apparently  did  not  object  to  our  being  in  their  country, 
and  treated  us  with  much  civility  throughout  our  journey.  We  were 
enjoying  ourselves  immensely,  so  when  an  official  cover  reached  us 
with  the  signature  of  the  dreaded  Deputy-Commissioner  in  the  corner, 
we  agreed  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  open  it  just  then. 

Khagan  was  almost  buried  in  snow.  The  scenery  -was  magnificent, 
and  became  every  moment  more  wonderful  as  we  slowly  climbed  the 
steep  ascent  in  front  of  us  ; range  after  range  of  snow-capped  mountains 
disclosed  themselves  to  our  view,  rising  higher  and  higher  into  the  air, 
until  at  last,  towering  above  all,  Nanga  Parbat*  in  all  her  spotless 
beauty  was  revealed  to  our  astonished  and  delighted  gaze. 

We  could  not  get  beyond  Khagan.  Our  coolies  refused  to  go  further, 
alleging  as  then-  reason  the  danger  to  be  dreaded  from  avalanches  in 
that  month  ; but  I suspect  that  fear  of  hostility  from  the  tribes  further 
north  had  more  to  do  with  their  reluctance  to  proceed  than  dread  of 
falling  avalanches.  We  remained  at  Khagan  for  two  or  three  days  in 
the  hope  of  being  able  to  shoot  an  ibex,  but  we  were  disappointed;  we 
never  even  saw  one. 

We  retraced  our  steps  with  considerable  regret,  and  reached  Habibula- 
Ki  Ghari  on  the  31st  May.  Here  we  received  a second  official  docu- 
ment from  Abbottabad.  It  contained,  like  the  previous  letter,  which 
we  now  looked  at  for  the  first  time,  orders  for  our  immediate  return, 
and  warnings  that  we  were  on  no  account  to  go  to  Khagan.  Since 
then  Khagan  has  been  more  than  once  visited  by  British  officers,  and 
now  a road  is  in  course  of  construction  along  the  route  we  travelled,  as 
being  a more  direct  line  of  communication  with  Gilghit  than  that  via 
Kashmir. 

Wc  made  no  delay  at  Habibula-Ki- Ghari,  but  started  at  once  for  the 
lovely  Vale  of  Kashmir,  where  we  spent  the  summer,  amusing  ourselves 
by  making  excursions  to  all  the  places  of  interest  and  beauty  we  had  so 
often  heard  of,  and  occasionally  shooting  a bear.  The  place  which 
impressed  me  most  was  Martund.t  where  stand  the  picturesque  ruins 
of  a once  renowned  Hindu  temple.  These  noble  ruins  are  the  most 
striking  in  size  and  position  of  all  the  existing  remains  of  the  past 
glories  of  Kashmir. 

From  Martund  we  made  our  way  to  Vernag,  the  celebrated  spring 
which  is  supposed  to  be  the  source  of  the  Jhelum  river.  The  Moghul 
Emperor  Akbar  built  there  a summer  palace,  and  the  arches,  on  which 
it  is  said  rested  the  private  apartments  of  the  lovely  Nur  Jchan,  are 
still  visible. 

* 26,000  feot  above  the  sea-level. 


t Three  miles  cast  of  Islamabad. 


I«54] 


THE  VALE  OF  KASHMIR 


21 


We  wandered  over  the  beautiful  and  fertile  Lolab  valley,  and  pitched 
our  little  camp  in  the  midst  of  groves  of  chunar,  walnut,  apple,  cherry, 
and  peach  trees  ; and  we  marched  up  the  Sind  valley,  and  crossed  the 
Zojji  La  Pass  leading  into  Thibet.  The  scenery  all  along  this  route  is 
extremely  grand.  On  either  side  are  lofty  mountains,  their  peaks 
wrapped  in  snow,  their  sides  clothed  with  pine,  and  their  feet  covered 
with  forests,  in  which  is  to  be  found  almost  every  kind  of  deciduous  tree. 
From  time  to  time  we  returned  for  a few  days  to  Srinagar,  the  capital 
of  Kashmir,  to  enjoy  the  pleasures  of  more  civilized  society.  Srinagar 
is  so  well  known  nowadays,  and  has  been  so  often  described  in  poetry 
and  prose,  that  it  is  needless  for  me  to  dwell  at  length  upon  its  delights, 
which,  I am  inclined  to  think,  are  greater  in  imagination  than  in  reality. 
It  has  been  called  the  Venice  of  the  East,  and  in  some  respects  it 
certainly  does  remind  one  of  the  ‘ Bride  of  the  Sea,’  both  in  its 
picturesqueness  and  (when  one  gets  into  the  small  and  tortuous  canals) 
its  unsavouriness.  Even  at  the  time  of  which  I am  writing  it  was 
dilapidated,  and  the  houses  looked  exactly  like  those  made  by  children 
out  of  a pack  of  cards,  which  a puff  of  wind  might  be  expected  to 
destroy.  Of  late  years  the  greater  part  of  the  city  lias  been  injured 
by  earthquakes,  and  Srinagar  looks  more  than  ever  like  a card  city. 
The  great  beauty  of  the  place  in  those  days  was  the  wooden  bridges 
covered  with  creepers,  and  gay  with  booths  and  shops  of  all  descriptions! 
which  spanned  the  Jhelum  at  intervals  for  the  three  miles  the  river 
runs  through  the  town— now,  alas ! for  the  artistic  traveller,  no  more. 
Booths  and  shops  have  been  swept  away,  and  the  creepers  have 
disappeared — decidedly  an  advantage  from  a sanitary  point  of  view,  but 
destructive  of  the  quaint  picturesqueness  of  the  town. 

The  floating  gardens  are  a unique  and  very  pretty  characteristic  of 
Srinagar.  The  lake  is  nowhere  deeper  than  ten  or  twelve  feet,  and  in 
some  places  much  less.  These  gardens  are  made  by  driving  stakes  into 
the  bed  of  the  lake,  long  enough  to  project  three  or  four  feet  above  the 
sm'face  of  the  water.  These  stakes  are  placed  at  intervals  in  an  oblong 
form,  and  are  bound  together  by  reeds  and  rushes  twined  in  and  out 
and  across,  until  a kind  of  stationary  raft  is  made,  on  which  earth  and 
turf  are  piled.  In  this  soil  seeds  are  sown,  and  the  crops  of  melons 
and  other  fruits  raised  in  these  fertile  beds  are  extremely  fine  and 
abundant. 

The  magnificent  chunar-trees  are  another  very  beautiful  feature  of 
the  country.  They  grow  to  a great  height  and  girth,  and  so  luxuriant 
and  dense  is  their  foliage  that  I have  sat  reading  and  writing  for  hours 
during  heavy  rain  under  one  of  these  trees  and  kept  perfectly  dry. 

The  immediate  vicinity  of  Srinagar  is  very  pretty,  and  the  whole 
valley  of  Kashmir  is  lovely  beyond  description : surrounded  by 
beautifully-wooded  mountains,  intersected  with  streams  and  lakes,  and 
gay  with  flowers  of  every  description,  for  in  Kashmir  many  of  the 


22  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1854 

gorgeous  eastern  plants  and  the  more  simple  but  sweeter  ones  of 
England  meet  on  common  ground.  To  it  may  appropriately  be  applied 
the  Persian  couplet : 

‘ Agar  fardos  baru-i  zarnin  ast,  hamin  ast,  liamin  ast  ’ 

(If  there  be  an  Elysium  on  earth,  it  is  this,  it  is  this). 

The  soil  is  extremely  productive  ; anything  will  grow  in  it.  Put  a stick 
into  the  ground,  and  in  an  extraordinary  short  space  of  time  it  becomes 
a tree  and  bears  fruit.  What  were  we  about,  to  sell  such  a country  for 
three  quarters  of  a million  sterling  ? It  would  have  made  the  most 
perfect  sanatorium  for  our  troops,  and  furnished  an  admirable  field  for 
British  enterprise  and  colonization,  its  climate  being  as  near  perfection 
as  anything  can  be. 

How  sad  it  is  that,  in  a country  4 where  every  prospect  pleases,  only 
man  ’ should  be  ‘ vile  ’ ! And  man,  as  he  existed  in  Kashmir,  was  vile 
— vile,  because  so  miserable  The  Mahomedan  inhabitants  were  being 
ground  down  by  Hindu  rulers,  who  seized  all  their  earnings,  leaving 
them  barely  sufficient  to  keep  body  and  soul  together.  What  interest 
could  such  people  have  in  cultivating  their  land,  or  doing  any  work 
beyond  what  was  necessary  to  mere  existence  ? However  hard  they 
might  labour,  their  efforts  would  benefit  neither  themselves  nor  their 
children,  and  so  their  only  thought  was  to  get  through  life  with  as  little 
exertion  as  possible— in  the  summer  sitting  in  the  sun  absolutely  idle 
the  greater  part  of  the  day,  and  in  the  winter  wrapped  up  in  their 
blankets,  under  which  were  concealed  curious  little  vessels  called 
kangris,  holding  two  or  three  bits  of  live  charcoal.  Every  Kashmiri 
still  carries  one  of  these  kangris,  as  the  most  economical  way  of  keeping 
himself  warm. 

Early  in  September  we  said  good-bye  to  the  happy  vallej'  and  re- 
turned to  Peshawar,  where  I rejoined  the  Mountain  Battery. 

In  November,  to  my  great  delight,  I was  given  my  jacket.  At  first 
my  happiness  was  somewhat  damped  by  the  fact  that  the  troop  to 
which  I was  posted  was  stationed  at  Umballa.  I did  not  want  to  leave 
Peshawar,  and  in  the  end  I had  not  to  do  so,  as  a vacancy  most 
opportunely  occurred  in  one  of  the  troops  of  Horse  Artillery  at  that 
station,  which  was  given  to  me. 

Life  on  the  frontier  in  those  days  had  a great  charm  for  most  young 
men ; there  was  always  something  of  interest  going  on  ; military 
expeditions  wore  constantly  taking  place,  or  being  speculated  upon, 
and  one  lived  in  hope  of  being  amongst  those  chosen  for  active  service. 
Peshawar,  too,  notwithstanding  its  unhealthiness,  was  a favourite 
station  with  officers.  To  me  it  was  particularly  pleasant,  for  it  had 
the  largest  force  of  Artillery  of  any  station  in  India  except  Meerut ; 
the  mess  was  a good  one,  and  was  composed  of  as  nice  a set  of  fellows 
as  were  to  be  found  in  the  army.  In  addition  to  the  officers  of  the 
regiment,  there  were  a certain  number  of  honorary  members  ; all  the 


WITH  THE  HORSE  ARTILLERY 


2 3 


1854] 

staff  and  civilians  belonged  to  the  Artillery  mess,  and  on  guest-nights 
we  sat  down  as  many  as  sixty  to  dinner.  Another  attraction  was  the 
‘ coffee  shop,’  an  institution  which  has  now  almost  ceased  to  exist,  at 
which  we  all  congregated  after  morning  parade  and  freely  discussed 
the  home  and  local  news. 

The  troop  to  which  I was  posted  was  composed  of  a magnificent 
body  of  men,  nearly  all  Irishmen,  most  of  whom  could  have  lifted  me 
up  with  one  hand.  They  were  fine  riders,  and  needed  to  be  so,  for  the 
stud-horses  used  for  Artillery  purposes  at  that  time  were  not  the  quiet, 
well-broken  animals  of  the  present  day.  I used  to  try  my  hand  at 
riding  them  all  in  turn,  and  thus  learnt  to  understand  and  appreciate 
the  amount  of  nerve,  patience,  and  skill  necessary  to  the  making  of  a 
good  Horse  Artillery  ‘ driver,’  with  the  additional  advantage  that  I was 
brought  into  constant  contact  with  the  men.  It  also  qualified  me  to 
ride  in  the  officers’  team  for  the  regimental  brake.  The  brake,  it  must 
be  understood,  was  drawn  by  six  horses,  each  ridden  postilion  fashion 
by  an  officer. 

My  troop  was  commanded  by  Captain  Barr,  a dear  old  fellow  who 
had  seen  a good  deal  of  service  and  was  much  liked  by  officers  and 
men,  but  hardly  the  figure  for  a Horse  Artilleryman,  as  he  weighed 
about  seventeen  stone.  On  a troop  parade  Barr  took  up  his  position 
well  in  advance  and  made  his  own  pace,  but  on  brigade  parades  he  had 
to  conform  to  the  movements  of  the  other  arms,  and  on  these  occasions 
he  used  to  tell  one  of  the  subalterns  as  he  galloped  past  him  to  come 
* left  about  ’ at  the  right  time  without  waiting  for  his  order.  This,  of 
course,  we  were  always  careful  to  do,  and  by  the  time  we  had  come 
into  action  Barr  had  caught  us  up  and  was  at  his  post. 

During  the  winter  of  1854-55  I had  several  returns  of  Peshawar 
fever,  and  by  the  beginning  of  the  spring  I was  so  reduced  that  I was 
given  eight  months’  leave  on  medical  certificate,  with  orders  to  report 
myself  at  Mian  Mir  at  its  expiration,  in  view  to  my  going  through  the 
riding  course,  there  being  no  Riding-Master  at  Peshawar. 

I decided  to  return  to  Kashmir  in  the  first  instance,  and  thence  to 
march  across  the  Himalayas  to  Simla. 

On  my  way  into  Kashmir  I was  fortunate  enough  to  fall  in  with  a 
very  agreeable  travelling  companion — Lieutenant  John  Watson.*  He 
was  then  Adjutant  of  the  1st  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  was  looked  upon  as 
one  of  the  most  promising  officers  of  the  Frontier  Force.  We  spent 
a very  enjoyable  time  hi  Kashmir,  and  early  in  August  I started  for 
Simla  with  two  brother  officers  named  Light  and  Mercer,  whose 
acquaintance  I had  only  recently  made,  but  who  turned  out  to  be  very 
pleasant  fellow-travellers. 

We  marched  via  Kishtwar,  Chamba,  and  Dharmsala,  a distance  of 
about  400  miles,  through  most  beautiful  scenery.  At  the  last-named 
* How  General  Sir  John  Watson,  V.C.,  K.C.B, 


24  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1855 

place  I parted  from  my  companions,  who  travelled  onwards  to  Simla 
by  the  Kulu  valley,  while  I took  the  shorter  route  via  Bilaspur. 

The  Simla  of  those  days  was  not  the  busy  and  important  place  it  has 
since  become.  The  Governor-General  seldom  visited  it,  and  the 
Commander-in-Chief  only  spent  a summer  there  occasionally.  When 
I arrived,  Sir  William  Gomm,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  that  day, 
who  had  been  spending  the  hot  weather  months  there,  was  about  to 
give  up  his  command,  and  Colonel  Grant,*  who  had  been  his  Adjutant- 
General,  had  left  not  long  before. 

The  only  thing  of  interest  to  myself  which  occurred  during  the 
month  I remained  at  Simla  was  that  I lunched  with  Colonel  Arthur 
Becher,  the  Quartermaster-General. f I think  I hear  my  reader  say, 
‘ Not  a very  remarkable  event  to  chronicle.’  But  that  lunch  was  a 
memorable  one  to  me  ; indeed,  it  was  the  turning-point  in  my  career, 
for  my  host  was  good  enough  to  say  he  should  like  to  have  me  in  his 
department  some  day,  and  this  meant  a great  deal  to  me.  Joining  a 
department  at  that  time  generally  resulted  in  remaining  in  it  for  the 
greater  part  of  one’s  service.  There  was  then  no  limit  to  the  tenure 
of  staff  appointments,  and  the  object  of  every  ambitious  young  officer 
was  to  get  into  one  department  or  another — political,  civil,  or  the  army 
staff.  My  father  had  always  impressed  upon  me  that  the  political 
department  was  the  one  to  aspire  to,  and  failing  that,  the  Quarter- 
master-General’s, as  in  the  latter  there  was  the  best  chance  of  seeing 
service.  I had  cherished  a sort  of  vague  hope  that  I might  some  day 
be  lucky  enough  to  become  a Deputy  Assistant-Quartermaster-General, 
for  although  I fully  recognized  the  advantages  of  a political  career,  I 
preferred  being  more  closely  associated  with  the  army,  and  I had  seen 
enough  of  staff  work  to  satisfy  myself  that  it  would  suit  me  ; so  the 
few  words  spoken  to  me  by  Colonel  Becher  made  me  supremely  happy. 

It  never  entered  into  my  head  that  I should  get  an  early  appoint- 
ment ; the  fact  of  the  Quartermaster-General  thinking  of  me  as  a 
possible  recruit  was  quite  enough  for  me.  I was  in  no  hurry  to  leave 
the  Horse  Artillery,  to  which  I was  proud  of  belonging,  and  in  which 
I hoped  to  see  service  while  still  on  the  frontier.  I left  Simla  very 
pleased  with  the  result  of  my  visit,  and  very  grateful  to  Colonel  Becher, 
who  proved  a good  friend  to  me  ever  after,  and  I made  my  way  to 
Mian  Mir,  where  I went  through  the  riding-school  course,  and  then 
returned  to  Peshawar. 

The  winter  of  1855-56  passed  much  as  the  cold  weather  generally 
does  in  the  north  of  India.  Our  amusements  consisted  of  an  occasional 
race-meeting  or  cricket  match.  Polo  was  unknown  in  those  days,  and 
hunting  the  jackal,  a sport  which  has  been  a source  of  so  much  recrea- 
tion to  the  Peshawar  garrison  for  thirty  odd  years,  had  not  then  been 
thought  of.  It  was  a pleasant  change  to  visit  the  outposts,  and  when- 

* The  late  Field-Marshal  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  G.O.B.,  U.C.S.I. 

t The  late  Major-General  Sir  Arthur  Becher,  K.C.B. 


.856] 


LIFE  AT  PESHAWAR 


25 


ever  I got  the  chance  I rode  over  to  Mardan,  where  the  Corps  of  Guides 
were  stationed,  commanded  by  that  gallant  soldier,  Harry  Lumsden,* 
who  had  raised  the  corps  in  1846  under  the  auspices  of  Henry  Lawrence. 
Many  were  the  good  gallops  I enjoyed  with  his  hawks,  hunting  the 
aubara.  f Of  work  there  was  plenty  at  Peshawar,  for  the  Brigadier, 
Sydney  Cotton, J kept  us  alive  with  field  days,  carefully  instilling  into 
us  his  idea  that  parade-grounds  were  simply  useful  for  drill  and  pre- 
liminary instruction,  and  that  as  soon  as  the  rudiments  of  a soldier’s 
education  had  been  learnt,  the  troops  should  leave  their  nursery,  and 
try  as  far  as  possible  to  practise  in  peace  what  they  would  have  to 
do  m war.  Sydney  Cotton  was  never  tired  of  explaining  that  the 
machinery  of  war,  like  all  other  machinery,  should  be  kept,  so  to  speak, 
oiled  and  ready  for  use. 

My  dream  of  a staff  appointment  was  realized  more  quickly  than  1 
had  expected.  In  the  early  part  of  1856  the  Surveyor-General  applied 
for  the  services  of  two  or  three  experienced  officers  to  assist  in  the 
survey  of  Kashmir.  Lumsden,  the  D.A.Q.M.G.,  was  one  of  those 
selected  for  the  duty,  and  I was  appointed  to  officiate  for  him.  So 
delighted  was  I to  get  my  foot  on  the  lowest  rung  of  the  staff  ladder, 
that  I cheerfully  agreed  to*  the  condition  my  Captain  insisted  upon, 
that  I should  perform  my  regimental  duties  in  addition  to  the  staff 
work.  Things  went  merrily  with  me  for  a short  time,  when  most 
unexpectedly  my  hopes  of  some  day  becoming  Quartermaster- General 
of  the  Army  in  India  were  dashed  to  the  ground  by  the  Governor- 
General  refusing  to  confirm  my  appointment,  because  I had  not  passed 
the  prescribed  examination  in  Hindustani.  A rule  existed  requiring  a 
language  test,  but  it  had  seldom  been  enforced,  certainly  not  in  the 
case  of  ‘ acting  appointments,’  so  that  this  refusal  came  as  a great  blow 
to  me.  It  had,  however,  excellent  results,  for  it  made  me  determined 
to  pass  in  Hindustani.  It  was  then  May,  and  in  July  the  half-yearly 
examination  was  to  be  held.  I forthwith  engaged  the  best  viunslii§  at 
Peshawar,  shut  myself  up,  and  studied  Indian  literature  from  morning 
till  night,  until  I felt  pretty  confident  of  success. 

* The  late  General  Sir  Harry  Lumsden,  K.C.S.  I.,  C.B. 

f Bastard  florican. 

J This  officer  arrived  in  India  as  a Cornet  in  the  24th  Light  Dragoons  in 
the  year  1810,  and  although,  when  he  reached  Peshawar  with  his  regiment — 
the  ‘22nd  Foot — in  1853,  he  had  been  forty-three  years  in  the  army,  and  was 
sixty-one  years  of  age,  he  had  not  even  succeeded  to  the  command  of  a 
battalion.  He  was  an  officer  of  unusual  energy  and  activity,  a fine  rider,  a 
pattern  drill,  and  a thorough  soldier  all  round.  He  was  not  fortunate  enough 
to  see  much  active  service,  but  it  must  have  been  a source  of  consolation  to 
him  to  feel,  when  ending  his  days  as  Governor  of  the  Royal  Hospital  at 
Chelsea,  that  it  was  in  a great  measure  owing  to  his  foresight  and  decision 
that  there  was  no  serious  disturbance  at  Peshawar  during  the  ev  entful  summer 
of  1857. 

§ Instructor  in  Oriental  languages. 


26 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[.856 

Just  before  the  examination  took  place,  the  officer  who  had  stepped 
into  my  shoes  when  I was  turned  out  (Lieutenant  Mordaunt  Fitz- 
Gerald, of  my  own  regiment)  was  offered  an  appointment  in  the  Punjab 
Frontier  Force.  He  consulted  me  as  to  the  advisability  of  accepting  it, 
and  I told  him  I thought  he  ought  not  to  do  so.  I considered  this  most 
disinterested  advice,  for  I had  good  reason  to  believe  that  I should  be 
re-appointed  to  the  staff,  should  the  appointment  again  become  vacant. 
Fortunately  for  me,  Fitz-Gerald  followed  the  usual  procedure  of  those 
who  delight  in  consulting  their  friends.  He  listened  to  my  advice,  and 
then  decided  not  to  follow  it.  Accordingly,  he  joined  the  Punjab 
Frontier  Force,  whilst  I,  having  passed  the  examination,  went  back  to 
the  coveted  appointment,  and  continued  in  the  department,  with  the 
exception  of  one  or  two  short  intervals,  until  1878,  when  I left  it 
as  Quartermaster- General. 

The  autumn  of  1856  was  a very  sickly  one  at  Peshawar  ; fever  was 
rife  amongst  the  troops,  and  in  the  hope  of  shaking  it  off  Brigadier 
Cotton  got  permission  to  take  a certain  number  into  camp.  It  was 
September,  and  the  sun  was  still  very  hot,  so  that  it  was  necessary  to 
begin  the  daily  march  long  before  dawn  in  order  to  reach  the  new 
camping  ground  while  it  was  still  tolerably  eool.  We  crossed  the  Kabul 
river  at  Nowshera,  which  place  was  then  being  made  into  a station  for 
troops,  and  marched  about  the  Yusafzai  plain  for  three  weeks.  The 
chief  difficulty  was  the  absence  of  water,  and  I had  to  prospect  the 
country  every  afternoon  for  a sufficient  supply,  and  to  determine,  with 
regard  to  this  sine  qua  non , where  the  camp  should  be  pitched  the 
next  day.  On  one  occasion  the  best  place  I could  discover  was  between 
two  and  three  miles  off  the  main  road.  There  was  no  difficulty  in 
reaching  it  by  day,  but  I was  afraid  of  some  mistake  being  made  when 
we  had  to  leave  it  in  the  small  hours  of  the  morning,  few  things  being 
more  bewildering  than  to  find  one’s  way  in  the  dark  from  a camp 
pitched  in  the  open  country  when  once  the  tents  have  been  struck.  It 
was  my  duty  to  lead  the  column  and  see  that  it  marched  off  in  the 
right  direction  ; knowing  how  anxious  the  Brigadier  was  that  the  new 
ground  should  be  reached  while  it  was  cool,  and  the  men  be  thus  saved 
from  exposure  to  the  sun,  I was  careful  to  note  my  position  with  regard 
to  the  stars,  and  to  explain  to  the  officer  who  was  in  orders  to  command 
the  advance  guard  the  direction  he  must  take.  When  the  time  came 
to  start,  and  the  Brigadier  was  about  to  order  the  bugler  to  sound  the 
march,  I saw  that  the  advance  guard  was  drawn  up  at  right  angles  to 
the  way  in  which  wo  had  to  proceed.  The  officer  commanding  it  was 
positive  he  was  right,  and  in  this  he  was  supported  by  Brigadier  Cotton 
and  some  of  the  other  officers;  I was  equally  positive  that  he  was 
wrong,  and  that  if  we  marched  as  he  proposed,  we  should  find  ourselves 
several  miles  out  of  our  course.  The  Brigadier  settled  the  question  by 
saying  I was  responsible  for  the  troops  going  in  the  right  direction,  and 


THE  BUMP  OF  LOCALITY 


27 


1856] 

ordering  me  to  show  the  way.  The  country  was  perfectly  bare,  there 
was  not  a tree  or  object  of  any  kind  to  guide  mo.  and  the  distance 
seemed  interminable.  I heard  opinions  freely  expressed  that  I was  on 
the  wrong  road,  and  at  last,  when  the  Brigadier  himself  came  up  to  me 
and  said  he  thought  I must  have  lost  the  way,  I really  began  to  waver 
in  my  conviction  that  I was  right.  At  that  moment  my  horse  stumbled 
into  a ditch,  which  proved  to  be  the  boundary  of  the  main  road.  I was 
immensely  relieved,  the  Brigadier  was  delighted,  and  from  that  moment 
I think  he  was  satisfied  that  I had,  what  is  so  essential  to  a Quarter- 
master-General in  the  field,  the  bump  of  locality. 

In  October  the  Artillery  moved  into  the  practice  camp  at  Chamkanie, 
about  five  miles  from  Peshawar.  It  was  intended  that  we  should 
remain  there  for  a couple  of  months,  but  before  the  end  of  that  tune  I 
had  to  join  the  General  at  Rawal  Pindi,  where  he  had  gone  on  a tour 
of  inspection.  Being  anxious  not  to  shirk  my  regimental  duty,  I did 
not  leave  Chamkanie  until  the  last  moment,  and  had  but  one  day  in 
which  to  reach  Rawal  Pindi,  a distance  of  one  hundred  miles,  which  I 
accomplished  on  horseback  between  7 a.m.  and  6 p.m.,  only  stopping 
at  Attock  a short  time  for  refreshment. 

This  tour  with  General  Reed  ended  my  staff  duties  for  a time,  as 
the  survey  in  Kashmir  had  come  to  an  end  and  Lumsden  rejoined  his 
appointment  before  Christmas. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  year  1856,  a rumour  reached  us  that  the 
Amir,  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  was  shortly  expected  to  arrive  at 
Peshawar  to  meet  the  Chief  Commissioner,  Sir  John  Lawrence,  who 
had  recently  been  made  a K.C.B. 

Before  describing  the  Amir’s  visit  and  its  results,  it  seems  desirable 
that  I should  briefly  explain  how  and  why  the  visit  was  brought  about, 
and  then  endeavour  to  show  what  an  important  bearing  its  results  had 
on  the  great  crisis  which  occurred  so  unexpectedly  a few  months  later. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  murdered  Mackeson  was  succeeded 
as  Commissioner  of  Peshawar  by  Herbert  Edwardes,  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  men  that  the  Indian  army  has  ever  produced,  and  who,  as 
I have  already  mentioned,  entirely  concurred  in  my  father’s  expressed 
opinion  as  to  the  great  advantage  it  would  be  for  the  Government  of 
India  to  enter  into  more  friendly  relations  with  the  Ruler  of  Kabul. 
They  both  held  that  the  constant  troubles  all  along  our  frontier  were 
in  a great  measure  due  to  the  Amir’s  hostility,  and  that  such  troubles 
would  increase  rather  than  diminish  unless  we  could  succeed  in 
establishing  an  entente  cor  diale  with  Dost  Mahomed. 


28 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1856 

In  1854  Edwardes  had  a correspondence  with  the  Governor-General 
on  the  subject,  and  on  one  occasion  expressed  himself  as  follows : ‘ My 
own  feeling  is,  that  we  have  much  injured  Dost  Mahomed,  and  may 
very  well  afford  to  let  by-gones  be  by-gones.  It  would  contribute  much 
to  the  security  of  this  frontier  if  open  relations  of  goodwill  were 
established  at  Kabul.  There  is  a sullenness  in  our  present  relations,  as 
if  both  parties  were  brooding  over  the  past,  and  expecting  an  oppor- 
tunity in  the  future.  This  keeps  up  excitement  and  unrest,  and 
prevents  our  influence  and  institutions  taking  root.  I should  be  very 
glad  to  see  a new  account  opened  on  the  basis  of  an  open  treaty  of 
friendship  and  alliance.’ 

Lord  Dalhousie  was  quite  in  accord  with  Edwardes.  He  thought  it 
very  desirable  to  be  on  better  terms  with  Kabul,  but  believed  this  to  be 
a result  diflicult  to  attain.  ‘ I give  you,’  he  said  in  a letter  to  Edwardes, 
1 carte  blanche,  and  if  you  can  only  bring  about  such  a result  as  you 
propose,  it  will  be  a new  feather  in  your  cap.’ 

Lord  Dalhousie  was  supported  by  the  British  Government  in  his 
opinion  as  to  the  desirability  of  coming  to  a better  understanding  with 
the  Amir.  War  with  Kussia  was  then  imminent,  and  the  strained 
condition  of  European  politics  made  it  expedient  that  we  should  be  on 
more  amicable  terms  with  Afghanistan. 

The  Governor- General  thus  wrote  to  Edwardes : 

‘ Prospects  of  a war  between  Kussia  and  Turkey  are  watched  with 
interest  by  all.  ...  In  England  they  are  fidgety  regarding  this  border 
beyond  all  reason,  and  most  anxious  for  that  declared  amity  and  that 
formal  renewal  of  friendly  relations  which  you  advocate  in  your  letter.’ 
The  balance  of  Indian  opinion,  however,  was  against  our  making 
overtures  to  Dost  Mahomed.  John  Lawrence,  at  that  time  the  great 
power  in  the  Punjab,  was  altogether  opposed  to  Edwardes’s  policy  in 
this  matter.  He  admitted  that  it  might  be  vise  to  renew  intercourse 
with  the  Kabul  ruler  if  he  first  expressed  his  regret  for  previous  mis- 
understandings ; but  later  he  wrote  to  Edwardes  : 

‘ I dare  say  you  are  right ; still,  I cannot  divest  myself  of  the  idea 
that  it  is  a mistake,  and  will  end  in  mixing  us  up  in  Afghan  politics 
and  affairs  more  than  is  desirable.  The  strength  which  a treaty  can 
give  us  seems  to  be  a delusion.  It  will  be  like  the  reed  on  which,  if  a 
man  lean,  it  will  break  and  pierce  his  hand.’ 

John  Nicholson,  Outram,  and  James  Abbott  agreed  with  Lawrence 
They  urged  that  any  advance  on  our  part  would  be  looked  upon  as  an 
indication  of  conscious  weakness ; and  the  probability  was  that  an 
arrogant,  irritated  Mussulman  ruler  would  regard  an  overture  as  a 
proof  of  our  necessity,  and  would  make  our  necessity  his  opportunity. 
But  Lord  Dalhousie,  while  anxious  to  avoid  any  communication  being 
made  which  could  be  liable  to  misconstruction,  saw  neither  objection 
nor  risk  in  opening  the  door  to  reconciliation,  provided  no  undue 


TREATY  WITH  DOST  HA  HOMED 


29 


1856] 

anxiety  was  displayed  on  our  part.  The  Governor-General  practically 
left  the  matter  in  the  hands  of  Edwardes,  who  lost  no  time  in  trying  to 
attain  the  desired  object.  The  greatest  forbearance  and  diplomatic 
skill  were  necessary  to  bring  the  negotiations  to  a satisfactory  termina- 
tion, but  they  were  concluded  at  last,  most  successful^’ , and  to 
Edwardes  alone  is  due  the  credit.  It  is  instructive  to  read  the  full 
record*  of  this  tedious  and  difficult  piece  of  diplomacy,  for  it  serves  as 
an  interesting  example  of  Oriental  subtlety  and  circumlocution,  con- 
trasted with  the  straightforward  dealing  of  a high-minded  Englishman. 

The  Amir  wrote  a letter  to  the  Governor-General  couched  in  most 
satisfactory  terms,  which  he  forwarded  to  Peshawar  by  the  hand  of  his 
confidential  secretary,  and  which  received,  as  it  deserved,  a very 
friendly  reply.  This  resulted  in  Dost  Mahomed  sending  his  son  and 
heir-apparent,  Sardar  Ghulam  Haidar  Khan,  to  Peshawar,  and  deputing 
him  to  act  as  his  Plenipotentiary  in  the  negotiations.  Ghulam  Haidar 
Khan  reached  Peshawar  in  March,  1855,  where  he  was  met  by  the 
Chief  Commissioner,  and  on  the  30th  of  that  month  the  treaty  was 
concluded.  ‘ It  guaranteed  that  we  should  respect  the  Amir’s  posses- 
sions in  Afghanistan,  and  never  interfere  with  them  ; while  the  Amir 
engaged  similarly  to  respect  British  territory,  and  to  be  the  friend  of 
our  friends  and  the  enemy  of  our  enemies.' 

The  Governor-General  had  at  first  resolved  to  entrust  to  Edwardes 
the  duty  of  meeting  the  expected  Envoy  from  Kabul,  and  orders  to  that 
effect  were  issued.  But  Edwardes,  more  anxious  for  the  success  of 
the  negotiations  than  for  his  own  honour  and  glory,  wrote  to  Lord 
Dalhousie  suggesting  that  the  Government  of  India  should  be  repre- 
sented by  the  Chief  Commissioner  of  the  Punjab,  and  promising  to 
afford  Sir  John  Lawrence  all  the  assistance  in  his  power.  Edwardes 
believed  that  the  importance  of  the  treaty  would  be  enhanced  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Afghans  by  the  presence  of  the  higher  official ; and  in  this 
opinion  the  Governor-General  concurred.  On  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaty,  Lord  Dalhousie  wrote  to  Edwardes : ‘ I congratulate  you  and 
myself  and  all  else  concerned  on  this  successful  issue  of  the  negotiations, 
which  have  now  lasted  just  a year.’ 

This  treaty  of  March,  1855,  was  only  preliminary  to  that  for  the 
ratification  of  which  the  Amir  came  in  person  to  Peshawar  the  follow- 
ing year. 

Towards  the  end  of  1S55  Dost  Mahomed  found  himself  in  con- 
siderable difficulties,  and  appealed  to  us  for  assistance.  A revolt  had 
occurred  at  Herat,  and  a Persian  army  was  preparing  to  besiege  that 
fortress  ; the  chiefs  and  people  of  Kandahar  were  disaffected ; and  the 
province  of  Balkh  was  threatened  with  invasion  both  by  the  King  of 
Bokhara  and  by  Turkoman  hordes.  The  Amir  looked  upon  Herat  as 

* See  ‘Memorials  of  the  Life  and  Letters  of  Major-General  Sir  Herbert 
Edwardes.’ 


30 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

an  integral  part  of  the  Afghan  dominions,  and  was  very  desirous  of  re- 
establishing his  authority  over  that  place  and  preventing  its  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  Persians  ; but  he  felt  himself  too  weak  to  have  any 
hope  of  success  without  help  from  us  in  men  and  money.  It  was, 
therefore,  Dost  Mahomed’s  interest  to  convince  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  the  Shah  had  infringed  the  conditions  of  an  engagement 
entered  into  with  us  in  1853,  under  which  Persia  abandoned  all  claim 
to  Herat.  The  Amir  thus  hoped  to  establish  a quarrel  between 
England  and  Persia  for  his  own  benefit,  and  to  secure  our  assistance 
against  the  latter  power.  To  further  this  design,  Dost  Mahomed 
offered  to  come  to  Peshawar  and  consult  with  the  British  authorities. 
Edwardes  was  in  favour  of  the  proposed  visit.  John  Lawrence  was 
opposed  to  it,  saying  he  did  not  think  much  good  would  result  from  such 
a meeting,  because  it  could  hardly  be  anticipated  that  the  views  of  the 
Amir  and  the  British  Government  would  coincide,  and  if  Dost  Mahomed 
should  fail  to  obtain  what  he  wanted,  his  dissatisfaction  would  be  a 
positive  evil.  The  Governor-General  admitted  the  force  of  these  objec- 
tions, but  in  the  end  considered  that  they  should  be  set  aside  if  the 
Amir  was  in  earnest  in  desiring  a consultation.  ‘ A refusal  or  an 
evasion  to  comply  with  his  wish,’  Lord  Dalhousie  thought,  ‘ might  be 
misunderstood,  and  although  a meeting  might  lead  to  disappointment 
and  disagreement,  it  would,  at  any  rate,  put  the  relations  of  the  British 
Government  with  the  Amir,  as  regards  Herat,  upon  a clear  footing.’ 

While  this  discussion  was  going  on,  the  advance  of  a Persian  army  for 
the  purpose  of  besieging  Herat,  coupled  with  the  insults  offered  to  the 
British  flag  at  Teheran,  led  to  the  declaration  of  war  between  England 
and  Persia.  The  Chief  Commissioner  was  therefore  directed  to  tell  the 
Amir  that  he  would  be  paid  a periodical  subsidy  to  aid  him  in  carrying 
on  hostile  operations  against  Persia,  subject  to  certain  conditions.  On 
receiving  these  instructions,  the  Chief  Commissioner  directed  Edwardes 
to  invite  the  Amir  to  an  interview.  Dost  Mahomed  accepted  the 
invitation,  but  before  the  auspicious  meeting  could  take  place  Lord 
Dalhousie  had  left  India,  and  Lord  Canning  reigned  in  his  stead. 
Lord  Dalhousie  resigned  on  the  29th  February,  1856,  after  having  filled 
the  arduous  and  responsible  position  of  Governor-General  for  no  less 
than  eight  years,  adding  year  by  year  fresh  lustre  to  his  splendid 
reputation. 

The  first  day  of  1857  witnessed  the  meeting  between  the  Amir  of 
Kabul  and  the  Chief  Commissioner  of  the  Punjab.  The  Amir's  camp 
was  pitched  at  the  mouth  of  the  Kliyber  Pass,  and  that  of  the  Chief 
Commissioner  on  the  plain  near  Jamrud.  Barr’s  troop  of  Horse 
Artillery  formed  part  of  the  escort,  so  I was  in  the  midst  of  it  all.  On 
the  occasion  of  the  Amir’s  first  visit  to  the  English  camp,  there  was  a 
force  present  of  upwards  of  7,000  soldiers,  including  three  regiments  of 
British  Infantry ; the  troops  lined  the  road  for  more  than  a mile,  and 


31 


1S57]  THE  ADVANTAGE  Of  THE  AMIR'S  FRIENDSHIP 

it  was  evident  that  their  strength  and  soldierly  appearance  inspired  the 
Amir  and  his  followers  with  a very  salutary  feeling  of  awe  and 
admiration.* 

The  result  of  the  conferences  between  these  two  great  personages  was 
an  agreement  confirming  the  treaty  of  the  year  before.  In  addition, 
the  Amir  bound  himself  to  keep  up  a certain  number  of  regular  troops 
for  the  defence  of  Afghanistan,  so  long  as  the  war  with  Persia  con- 
tinued, in  consideration  of  a monthly  subsidy  of  Rs.  100,000  and  a gift 
of  4,000  muskets.  lie  also  engaged  to  communicate  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  any  overtures  he  might  receive  from  Persia,  and  he  con- 
sented to  allow  British  officers  to  visit  certain  parts  of  his  dominions, 
either  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  his  subjects  against  Persia,  or  to 
ascertain  that  the  subsidy  was  properly  applied. 

I have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  this  treaty  with  Afghanistan,  first, 
because  the  policy  of  which  this  was  the  outcome  was,  as  I have  already 
shown,  initiated  by  my  father ; and,  secondly,  because  I do  not  think 
it  is  generally  understood  how  important  to  us  were  its  results.  Not 
only  did  it  heal  the  wounds  left  open  from  the  first  Afghan  war,  but  it 
relieved  England  of  a great  anxiety  at  a time  when  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  India  there  was  distress,  revolt,  bloodshed,  and 
bitter  distrust  of  our  Native  troops.  Dost  Mahomed  loyally  held  to  his 
engagements  during  the  troublous  days  of  the  Mutiny  which  so  quickly 
followed  this  affiance,  when,  had  he  turned  against  us,  we  should 
assuredly  have  lost  the  Punjab  ; Delhi  could  never  have  been  taken ; 
in  fact,  I do  not  see  how  any  part  of  the  country  north  of  Bengal  could 
have  been  saved.  Dost  Mahomed’s  own  people  could  not  understand 
his  attitude.  They  frequently  came  to  him  during  the  Mutiny,  throw- 
ing their  turbans  at  his  feet,  and  praying  him  as  a Mahomedan  to  seize 
that  opportunity  for  destroying  the  ‘ infidels.’  ‘ Hear  the  news  from 
Delhi,’  they  urged ; ‘ see  the  difficulties  the  Feringhis  are  in.  Why 
don’t  you  lead  us  on  to  take  advantage  of  their  weakness,  and  win  back 
Peshawar  ?’  f 

But  I am  anticipating,  and  must  return  to  my  narrative. 

The  clause  of  the  treaty  which  interested  me  personally  was  that 
relating  to  British  officers  being  allowed  to  visit  Afghanistan,  to  give 
effect  to  which  a Mission  was  despatched  to  Kandahar.  It  consisted 
of  three  officers,  the  brothers  Harry  and  Peter  Lumsden,  and  Dr. 
Bellew,  together  with  two  of  Edwardes’s  trusted  Native  Chiefs.  The 
selection  of  Peter  Lumsden  as  a member  of  this  Mission  again  left  the 
Deputy  Assistant-Quartermaster-Generalship  vacant,  and  I was  a 
second  time  appointed  to  officiate  in  his  absence. 

Shortly  afterwards  the  General  of  the  division  (General  Reed)  started 
on  his  tour  of  inspection,  taking  me  with  him  as  his  staff  officer. 
Jhelum  was  the  first  place  we  visited.  Whether  the  sepoys  had  then 
* ‘ Memorials  of  Major-General  Sir  Herbert  Edwardes.’  t ibid. 


Forty -one  years  in  india 


32 


[185? 


any  knowledge  of  what  was  so  soon  to  happen  is  doubtful.  If  they 
had,  there  was  no  evidence  that  such  was  the  case.  Nothing  could 
have  been  more  proper  or  respectful  than  their  behaviour ; no  crimes 
were  reported,  no  complaints  were  made.  The  British  officers,  cer- 
tainly, had  not  the  slightest  idea  of  the  storm  that  was  brewing,  for 
they  spoke  in  the  warmest  terms  of  their  men. 

From  Jhelum  we  went  to  Rawal  Pindi.  John  Lawrence  happened 
to  be  in  camp  there  at  the  time,  and  looked  on  at  the  General’s  in- 
spection. At  the  conclusion  of  the  parade  he  sent  his  secretary  to  ask 
me  if  I would  like  to  be  appointed  to  the  Public  Works  Department. 
I respectfully  declined  the  offer,  though  very  grateful  for  its  having 
been  made.  Some  of  my  friends  doubted  the  wisdom  of  my  refusing 
a permanent  civil  appointment ; but  it  meant  having  to  give  up  soldier- 
ing, which  I could  not  make  up  my  mind  to  do,  and  though  only 
officiating,  I was  ali'eady  in  the  department  to  which  of  all  others  I 
wished  to  belong. 

Nowshera  was  the  last  station  we  visited.  It  was  the  beginning  of 
April,  and  getting  rather  hot  for  parading  troops.  I there  met  for  the 
first  time  the  present  Commander-in-Chief  in  India,  General  Sir  George 
White,  who  was  then  a subaltern  in  the  27th  (Inniskilling)  Regiment. 

I recollect  the  commanding  officer  of  the  55th,  the  Native  Infantry 
corps  at  this  station,  who  had  served  all  his  life  with  clean-looking, 
closely-shaven  Hindustanis,  pointing  with  a look  of  contempt,  not  to 
say  disgust,  to  some  Sikhs  (a  certain  proportion  of  whom  had  been 
under  recent  orders  enlisted  in  regiments  of  Native  Infantry),  and 
expressing  his  regret  that  he  could  not  get  them  to  shave  their  beards 
and  cut  their  hair.  ‘ They  quite  spoil  the  look  of  my  regiment,’  he 
said.  In  less  than  two  months’  time  the  Hindustanis,  of  whom  the 
Colonel  was  so  proud,  had  broken  into  open  mutiny  ; the  despised 
Sikhs  were  the  only  men  of  the  regiment  who  remained  faithful ; and 
the  commanding  officer,  a devoted  soldier  who  lived  for  his  regiment, 
and  who  implored  that  his  men  might  not  have  their  arms  taken  away, 
as  he  had  ‘ implicit  confidence  ’ in  them,  and  would  ‘ stake  his  life  on 
their  fidelity,’  had  blown  his  brains  out  because  he  found  that  con- 
fidence misplaced. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  I was  ordered  to  report  on  the  capabilities 
of  Cherat  (now  well  known  to  all  who  have  been  stationed  at  Peshawar) 
as  a sanatorium  for  European  soldiers.  I spent  two  or  three  days 
surveying  the  hill  and  searching  for  water  in  the  neighbourhood.  It 
was  not  safe  to  remain  on  the  top  at  night,  so  I used  to  return  each 
evening  to  the  plain  below,  where  my  tent  was  pitched.  On  one 
occasion  I was  surprised  to  find  a camp  had  risen  up  during  my  absence 
quite  close  to  my  tent.  I discovered  that  it  belonged  to  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  John  Nicholson,  the  Deputy-Commissioner,  who  was  on  his 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  .JOHN  NICHOLSON,  C.B, 

From 

a painting  by  J.  R.  Dicksec, 
in 

the  possession  of  the  Reverend  Canon  Seymour. 


JOHN  NICHOLSON 


33 


1857] 

tour  of  inspection,  and  very  soon  I received  an  invitation  to  dine  with 
him,  at  which  I was  greatly  pleased.  John  Nicholson  was  a name  to 
conjure  with  in  the  Punjab.  I had  heard  it  mentioned  with  an  amount 
of  respect — indeed,  awe — which  no  other  name  could  excite,  and  I was 
all  curiosity  to  see  the  man  whose  influence  on  the  frontier  was  so 
great  that  his  word  was  law  to  the  refractory  tribes  amongst  whom  lie 
lived.  He  had  only  lately  arrived  in  Peshawar,  having  been  trans- 
ferred from  Bannu,  a difficult  and  troublesome  district  ruled  by  him  as 
it  had  never  been  ruled  before,  and  where  he  made  such  a reputation 
for  himself  that,  while  he  was  styled  ‘a  pillar  of  strength  on  the 
frontier’  by  Lord  Dalhousie,  he  was  looked  up  to  as  a god  by  the 
Natives,  who  loved  as  much  as  they  feared  him.  By  some  of  them  he 
was  actually  worshipped  as  a saint ; they  formed  themselves  into  a sect, 
and  called  themselves  ‘ Nicbolseyns.’  Nicholson  impressed  me  more 
profoundly  than  any  man  I had  ever  met  before,  or  have  ever  met 
since.  I have  never  seen  anyone  like  him.  He  was  the  beau  ideal  of 
a soldier  and  a gentleman.  His  appearance  was  distinguished  and 
commanding,  with  a sense  of  power  about  him  which  to  my  mind  was 
the  result  of  his  having  passed  so  much  of  his  life  amongst  the  wild  and 
lawless  tribesmen,  with  whom  his  authority  was  supreme.  Intercourse 
with  this  man  amongst  men  made  me  more  eager  than  ever  to  remain 
on  the  frontier,  and  I was  seized  with  ambition  to  follow  in  his  foot- 
steps. Had  I never  seen  Nicholson  again,  I might  have  thought  that 
the  feelings  with  which  he  inspired  me  were  to  some  extent  the  result 
of  my  imagination,  excited  by  the  astonishing  stories  I had  heard  of 
his  power  and  influence ; my  admiration,  however,  for  him  was  im- 
measurably strengthened  when,  a few  weeks  later,  I served  as  his  staff 
officer,  and  had  opportunities  of  observing  more  closely  his  splendid 
soldierly  qualities  and  the  workings  of  his  grand,  simple  mind. 

It  was  the  end  of  April  when  I returned  to  Peshawar  from  Cherat, 
and  rapidly  getting  hot.  On  the  strength  of  being  a D.A.Q.M.G.,  I 
had  moved  into  a better  house  than  I had  hitherto  been  able  to  afford, 
which  I shared  with  Lieutenant  Hovenden  of  the  Engineers.  We 
were  just  settling  down  and  making  ourselves  comfortable  for  the  long 
hot  weather,  when  all  our  plans  were  upset  by  the  breaking  out  of  the 
Mutiny. 


3 


34 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  first  threatenings  of  coming  trouble  were  heard  in  the  early  part 
of  1857.  During  the  months  of  February,  March,  and  April,  rumours 
reached  us  at  Peshawar  of  mysterious  chupattia  (unleavened  cakes) 
being  sent  about  the  country  with  the  object,  it  was  alleged,  of  pre- 
paring the  Natives  for  some  forthcoming  event.  There  was  also  an 
evident  feeling  of  unrest  and  dissatisfaction  in  the  minds  of  the  sepoys. 
We  heard  that  the  19th  Native  Infantry  at  Berhampur,  a military 
station  about  100  miles  from  Calcutta,  had  broken  open  the  bells-of- 
arms,*  and  forcibly  taken  possession  of  their  muskets  and  ammunition  ; 
that  a sepoy  named  Mangal  Pandy,f  belonging  to  the  34th  Native 
Infantry  at  Barrackpore,  had  attacked  and  severely  wounded  the 
Adjutant  and  Sergeant-Major  of  his  regiment ; that  it  was  found  neces- 
sary to  disband  the  19th  on  the  30th  March,  and  the  34th  on  the 
6th  May  ; that  bungalows  had  been  burnt  in  several  stations  ; and  that 
the  sepoys  at  the  Schools  of  Musketry  had  objected  to  use  the  cart- 
ridges served  out  with  the  new  rifles,  because,  it  was  asserted,  they 
were  greased  with  a mixture  of  cow’s  fat  and  lard,  the  one  being  as 
obnoxious  to  the  prejudices  of  the  Hindu  as  the  other  is  to  those  of  the 
Mussulman. 

It  seems  strange  on  looking  back  that  these  many  warnings  should 
have  passed  almost  unheeded,  and  that  there  should  have  been  no 
suspicion  amongst  the  officers  serving  with  Native  regiments  that  dis- 
content was  universal  amongst  the  sepoys,  and  that  a mutiny  of  the 
whole  Bengal  Army  was  imminent.  But  at  that  time  the  reliance  on 
the  fidelity  of  the  Native  troops  was  unbounded,  and  officers  believed 
implicitly  in  the  contentment  and  loyalty  of  their  men.  Their  faith  in 
them  was  extraordinary.  Even  after  half  the  Native  army  had 
mutinied  and  many  officers  had  been  murdered,  those  belonging  to 
the  remaining  regiments  could  not  believe  that  their  own  particular 
men  could  be  guilty  of  treachery. 

At  Peshawar  there  was  not  the  slightest  suspicion  of  the  extent  to 
which  the  evil  had  spread,  and  we  were  quite  thunderstruck  when,  on 
the  evening  of  the  11th  May,  as  we  were  sitting  at  mess,  the  telegraph 
signaller  rushed  in  breathless  with  excitement,  a telegram  in  his  hand, 
which  proved  to  be  a message  from  Delhi  ‘ to  all  stations  in  the  Punjab,’ 
conveying  the  startling  intelligence  that  a very  serious  outbreak  had 
occurred  at  Meerut  the  previous  evening,  that  some  of  the  troopers 
from  there  had  already  reached  Delhi,  that  the  Native  soldiers  at  the 

* Place  whore  the  anus  and  accoutrements  of  Native  regiments  were 
kopt. 

f This  name  was  the  origin  of  the  sepoys  generally  being  called  Pundies. 


PROMPT  ACTIOS  AT  PESHAWAR 


35 


1857] 

latter  place  had  joined  the  mutineers,  and  that  many  officers  and 
residents  at  both  stations  had  been  killed. 

Lieutenant  - Colonel  Davidson,  commanding  the  16th  Irregular 
Cavalry,  who  happened  to  be  dining  at  mess  that  evening,  was  the  first 
to  recover  from  the  state  of  consternation  into  which  we  were  thrown 
by  the  reading  of  this  telegram.  He  told  us  it  was  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance that  the  Commissioner  and  the  General  should  at  once  be  put 
in  possession  of  this  astounding  news,  and  at  the  same  time  impressed 
upon  us  the  imperative  necessity  for  keeping  it  secret. 

Davidson  then  hurried  off  to  the  Commissioner,  who  with  his  deputy, 
Nicholson,  lived  within  a stone’s-throw  of  the  mess.  Edwardes  drove 
at  once  to  the  General’s  house,  while  Nicholson  came  to  our  mess. 
He  too  pointed  out  to  us  the  importance  of  preventing  the  news  from 
getting  about  and  of  keeping  it  as  long  as  possible  from  the  Native 
soldiers. 

We  had  at  Peshawar  three  regiments  of  Native  Cavalry  and  five  of 
Native  Infantry,  not  less  than  5,000  men,  while  the  strength  of  the  two 
British  regiments  and  the  Artillery  did  not  exceed  2,000.  This  European 
force  was  more  than  sufficient  to  cope  with  the  eight  Native  corps,  but 
in  the  event  of  any  general  disturbance  amongst  the  Native  troops,  we 
had  to  calculate  on  the  probability  of  their  being  joined  by  the  50,000 
inhabitants  of  the  city,  and,  indeed,  by  the  entire  population  of  the 
Peshawar  valley ; not  to  speak  of  the  tribes  all  along  the  border,  who 
were  sure  to  rise. 

It  was  an  occasion  for  the  gravest  anxiety,  and  the  delay  of  even  a 
few  hours  in  the  sepoys  becoming  aware  of  the  disastrous  occurrences 
at  Meerut  and  Delhi  meant  a great  deal  to  us. 

Fortunately  for  India,  there  were  good  men  and  true  at  Peshawar  in 
those  days,  when  hesitation  and  irresolution  would  have  been  fatal, 
and  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  they  were  comparatively  young  men — 
Edwardes  was  thirty-seven,  Nicholson  thirty-five  ; Neville  Chamber- 
lain,  the  distinguished  Commandant  of  the  Punjab  Frontier  Force  (who 
was  hastily  summoned  from  Kohat,  where  he  happened  to  be  on  his 
tour  of  inspection),  was  thirty-seven  ; and  the  Brigadier,  Sydney  Cotton, 
though  much  older,  being  sixty-five,  was  not  only  exceptionally  young  for 
his  years  and  full  of  energy  and  intelligence,  but  actually  much  younger 
than  the  average  of  General  officers  commanding  stations  in  India. 

At  once,  on  hearing  of  the  Mutiny,  Edwardes,  acting  in  unison  with 
Nicholson,  sent  to  the  post-office  and  laid  hands  on  all  Native  corre- 
spondence ; the  letters  they  thus  secured  showed  but  too  plainly  how 
necessary  was  this  precaution.  The  number  of  seditious  papers  seized 
was  alarmingly  great ; they  were  for  the  most  part  couched  in  figurative 
and  enigmatical  language,  but  it  was  quite  sufficiently  clear  from  them 
that  every  Native  regiment  in  the  garrison  was  more  or  less  implicated 
and  prepared  to  join  the  rebel  movement. 


3—2 


36 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


I185? 


A strong  interest  attaches  to  these  letters,  for  they  brought  to  light 
the  true  feeling  of  the  Natives  towards  us  at  the  time,  and  it  was 
evident  from  them  that  the  sepoys  had  really  been  made  to  believe 
that  we  intended  to  destroy  their  caste  by  various  unholy  devices,  of 
which  the  issue  of  contaminating  cartridges  was  one.  The  seeds  of 
disaffection  had  been  sown  by  agitators,  who  thought  they  saw  an 
opportunity  for  realizing  their  hope  of  overthrowing  our  rule,  main- 
tained as  it  was  by  a mere  handful  of  Europeans  in  the  midst  of  a vast 
population  of  Asiatics.  This  feeling  of  antagonism,  only  guessed  at 
before,  was  plainly  revealed  in  these  letters,  never  intended  to  meet 
the  European  eye.  Some  corps  did  not  appear  to  be  quite  so  guilty  as 
others,  but  there  could  now  be  no  doubt  that  all  were  tainted  with  dis- 
loyalty, and  that  none  of  the  Hindustani  troops  could  any  longer  be 
trusted. 

In  the  afternoon  of  Tuesday,  the  12th  May,  I received  a note  from 
the  General  commanding  the  division  directing  me  to  present  myself 
at  his  house  the  following  morning,  which  I accordingly  did.  Besides 
General  Reed  I found  there  the  Brigadier,  Sydney  Cotton ; the  Com- 
missioner, Herbert  Edwardes ; the  Deputy  Commissioner,  John 
Nicholson;  Brigadier  Neville  Chamberlain,  and  Captain  Wright, 
Deputy  Assistant-Adjutant-General,  who,  like  myself,  had  been  sum- 
moned to  record  the  decisions  that  might  be  arrived  at. 

This  meeting  was  a most  momentous  one,  and  I remember  being 
greatly  impressed  with  the  calm  and  comprehensive  view  of  the  situa- 
tion taken  by  Edwardes  and  Nicholson.  They  had  already  been  in 
communication  with  the  Chief  Commissioner,  and  had,  previous  to  the 
meeting,  received  a telegram  from  him  approving  generally  of  the 
several  proposals  they  contemplated.  John  Lawrence  also  informed 
them  that  the  authorities  at  Lahore  had  decided  on  disarming  the 
Native  troops  at  Mian  Mir  that  very  morning. 

The  problem  to  be  solved  was  how  the  Punjab  could  best  be  made 
secure  with  the  small  force  of  British  troops  available — all  told  not 
more  than  15,000,  with  84  guns— against  upwards  of  65,000  Natives 
of  whom  42,000  were  Hindustanis),  with  62  guns.*  In  all  stations 

* At  Meerut,  Delhi,  and  Rurki,  and  in  the  Punjab  there  were  : 


British  Troops. 


MEN. 


GUNS. 


2 Regiments  of  Cavalry  - 
12  Regiments  of  Infantry  - 
9 Troops  of  Horse  Artillery 
5 Light  Field  Batteries 


- 1,410 

- 12,624 


- 1,017  - 54 

415  - 30 

837 


10  Companies  of  Foot  Artillerymen 


16.303 


84 


Total 


.4  BOLD  POLICY 


iS57] 


37 


Native  troops  preponderated,  and  in  some  there  were  no  European 
soldiers  at  all. 

Edwardes  and  Nicholson  gave  it  as  their  opinion  that  the  only  ehanee 
of  keeping  the  Punjab  and  the  frontier  quiet  lay  in  trusting  the  Chiefs 
and  people,  and  in  endeavouring  to  induce  them  to  side  with  us  against 
the  Hindustanis.  They  undertook  to  communicate,  regarding  the 
raising  of  lovies  and  fresh  troops,  with  their  friends  and  acquaintances 
along  the  border,  who  had  proved  such  staunch  allies  in  1848-49,  when 
we  were  fighting  with  the  Sikhs.  How  nobly  these  loyal  men  re- 
sponded to  the  demand  made  upon  them,  and  how  splendidly  the 
frontier  and  Punjab  soldiers  whom  they  brought  to  our  assistance 
behaved,  will  be  seen  hereafter. 

Amongst  other  matters  of  importance,  it  was  proposed  by  those  two 
able  soldier-civilians,  Edwardes  and  Nicholson,  that  General  Reed,  as 
the  senior  officer  in  the  Punjab,  should  join  the  Chief  Commissioner  at 
Rawal  Pindi,  leaving  Brigadier  Cotton  in  command  at  Peshawar ; that 
a Movable  Column,  composed  of  reliable  troops,  should  be  organized  at 
some  convenient  place  in  the  Punjab,*  prepared  to  move  in  any  direction 


Native  1 

f'roops. 

MEN. 

GUNS. 

7 Regiments  of  Light  Cavalry  - 
14  Regiments  of  Irregular  Cavalry  and 

3,514 

Guides  Cavalry 

8,519 

31  Regiments  of  Regular  Infantry  - , 

15  Regiments  of  Irregular  Infantry  and 

J 50,188 

Guides  Infantry 

3 Troops  of  Horse  Artillery 

411 

- 18 

6 Light  Field  Batteries 

930 

30  (3  batteries  had  only 

4 guns  each) 

2 Mountain  Batteries 

192 

14(1  battery  had  8,  the 

other  6 guns) 

3 Companies  of  Foot  Artillery  - 
Head-Quarters  and  12  Companies  of 

330 

Sappers  and  Miners  - 

1,394 

Total  - 

65,478 

- 62 

The  above  figures  show  the  treojs  at  full  strength.  There  were  probably 
not  more  than  15,000  British  soldiers  in  the  Punjab  available  for  duty  in 
May,  1857. 

* The  original  proposal  was  that  the  Movable  Column  should  be  formed  at 
Jhelum,  and  composed  of  the  24th  Foot  from  Rawal  Pindi,  the  27th  Foot  from 
Xowsliera,  a troop  of  Horse  Artillery  from  Peshawar,  a Native  Field  Battery 
from  Jhelum,  the  Guides  from  Murdan,  the  16th  Irregular  Cavalry  from 
Rawal  Pindi,  the  Kumaon  battalion  from  Murree,  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry 
from  Bannu,  and  a wing  of  the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry  from  Kohat.  But  events 
developed  so  rapidly  that  before  the  column  was  formed  every  one  of  these 
troops  was  otherwise  employed.  It  was  thought  unwise  to  unduly  weaken  the 
Peshauar  valley  ; the  troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  therefore,  stood  fast,  the  27th 


3» 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

where  its  services  might  be  required ; that  the  Hindustani  regiments 
should  be  scattered  as  much  as  possible,  in  order  to  prevent  dangerous 
combinations ; that  a detachment  of  Punjab  Infantry  from  Kohat 
should  replace  the  Hindustani  sepoys  in  the  fort  of  Attock,  which  was 
a very  important  position,  as  it  contained  a magazine,  and  covered  the 
passage  of  the  Indus ; and  that  a small  guard  of  Pathan  levies,  under 
a tried  and  trusty  frontier  Native  officer,  should  be  placed  in  charge  of 
the  Attock  ferry. 

All  these  proposals  were  cordially  and  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the 
military  authorities  present. 

The  question  of  the  command  of  the  Movable  Column  was  then 
discussed.  It  was  considered  essential  that  the  officer  selected  should, 
in  addition  to  other  necessary  qualifications,  have  considerable  experience 
of  the  country,  and  an  intimate  knowledge  of  Native  soldiers.  It  was 
no  ordinary  command.  On  the  action  of  the  Movable  Column  would 
depend,  to  a great  extent,  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  order  through- 
out the  Punjab,  and  it  was  felt  that,  at  such  a crisis,  the  best  man  must 
be  selected,  irrespective  of  seniority.  It  was  a position  for  which  Cotton 
and  Nicholson  would  have  given  much,  and  for  which  they  were  well 
qualified,  but  there  was  important  work  for  them  to  do  at  Peshawar. 
Neville  Chamberlain  was  available,  and  there  was  a general  consensus 
of  opinion  that  he  should  be  appointed.  It  was  necessary,  however,  to 
refer  the  matter  to  the  Chief  Commissioner,  with  a request  that  he 
would  submit  it  for  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  This  course 
was  adopted,  and  in  a few  hours  a reply  was  received  from  General 
Anson  nominating  Chamberlain  to  the  command.  My  anxiety  as  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief’s  decision  was  very  considerable;  for  Brigadier 
Chamberlain,  to  my  infinite  delight  and  astonishment,  had  offered,  in 
the  event  of  his  being  appointed,  to  take  me  with  him  as  Iris  staff 
officer — the  most  wonderful  piece  of  good  fortune  that  could  have  come 
to  me ; my  readers  must  imagine  my  feelings,  for  it  is  impossible  for 
me  to  describe  them.  My  most  sanguine  hopes  seemed  about  to  be 
more  than  realized  ; for  though  the  serious  aspect  of  affairs  seemed  to 
promise  the  chance  of  active  service,  I little  thought  that  I should  be 
lucky  enough  to  be  employed  as  the  staff  officer  of  such  a distinguished 
soldier  as  Neville  Chamberlain. 

When  the  meeting  was  over  I was  ordered  to  take  the  several 
messages,  which  Wright  and  I had  written  out,  to  the  telegraph  office, 

Foot  was  halted  at  Attock,  and  the  ‘24th  Foot  and  Kumaon  battalion  were  kept 
at  their  stations  rear]}7  to  move  towards  the  frontier.  The  Guides,  2nd  Punjab 
Cavalry,  and  1st  Punjab  Infantry  were  ordered  to  Delhi,  and  the  16th  Irregular 
Cavalry  and  the  Native  Field  Battery  were  not  considered  sufficiently  loyal  to 
be  employed  on  such  a duty.  Eventually,  the  column  was  formed  of  one 
troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  one  Field  Battery,  and  one  Infantry  regiment,  all 
British  and  all  from  Sialkot. 


AN  ANNOYING  OCCURRENCE 


39 


*857] 

and  see  them  despatched  myself ; as  they  disclosed  more  or  less  the 
measures  that  had  been  decided  upon,  it  was  necessary  to  avoid  any 
chance  of  their  falling  into  the  hands  of  Native  clerks.  One  of  the 
messages*  contained  a summary  of  the  proceedings  of  the  council,  and 
was  addressed  to  the  commanding  officers  of  all  stations  in  the  Punjab, 
with  the  view  of  imparting  confidence,  and  letting  them  know  what 
steps  were  being  taken  for  the  protection  of  the  British  residents 
throughout  the  province.  This  duty  having  been  carried  out,  I returned 
home  in  a not  unpleasant  frame  of  mind,  for  though  the  crisis  was  a 
grave  one,  the  outlook  gloomy,  and  the  end  doubtful,  the  excitement 
was  great.  There  were  stirring  times  in  store  for  us,  when  every  man’s 
powers  would  be  tested,  and  the  hopefulness  of  youth  inclined  me  to 
look  only  on  the  bright  side  of  the  situation. 

My  equanimity  was  somewhat  disturbed  later  in  the  day  by  an 
occurrence  which  caused  me  a good  deal  of  annoyance  at  the  time, 
though  it  soon  passed  away.  Nicholson  came  to  my  house  and  told  me 
that  the  proceedings  at  the  meeting  that  morning  had  in  some  un- 
accountable manner  become  known ; and  he  added,  much  to  my 
disgust,  that  it  was  thought  I might  perhaps  have  been  guilty  of  the 
indiscretion  of  divulging  them.  I was  very  angry,  for  I had  appreciated 
as  much  as  anyone  the  immense  importance  of  keeping  the  decisions 
arrived  at  perfectly  secret ; and  I could  not  help  showing  something  of 
the  indignation  I felt  at  its  having  been  thought  possible  that  I could 
betray  the  confidence  reposed  in  me.  I denied  most  positively  having 
done  so;  upon  which  Nicholson  suggested  that  we  should  proceed 
together  to  the  telegraph  office  and  see  whether  the  information  could 
have  leaked  out  from  there.  The  signaller  was  a mere  boy,  and 
Nicholson’s  imposing  presence  and  austere  manner  were  quite  too  much 
for  him  ; he  was  completely  cowed,  and,  after  a few  hesitating  denials, 

* The  full  text  of  the  message  was  as  follows  : 

1 From  General  Reed,  Peshawar. 

‘To  Sir  John  Lawrence,  Rawal  Pindi,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Simla,  and 
officers  commanding  all  stations  in  the  Punjab  respectively  : to  be  for- 
warded by  the  assistant  in  charge  of  the  telegraph  office,  or  post,  as  the 
case  may  be. 

‘ The  senior  military  officer  in  the  Punjab,  Major-General  Reed,  having  this 
morning  received  news  of  the  disarming  of  the  troops  at  Mian  Mir,  a council 
of  war  was  held,  consisting  of  General  Reed,  Brigadier  Cotton,  Brigadier 
Neville  Chamberlain,  Colonel  Edwardes,  and  Colonel  Nicholson,  and  the 
following  measures  were  decided  on,  subject  to  the  confirmation  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. General  Reed  assumes  the  chief  military  command  in  the 
Punjab  ; his  Head-Quarters  will  be  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Punjab  Civil 
Government,  and  a Movable  Column  will  be  formed  at  Jhelum  at  once,  con- 
sisting of  [the  troops  were  here  detailed].  The  necessary  orders  for  this 
column  have  been  issued.  The  column  will  move  on  every  point  in  the 
Punjab  where  open  mutiny  requires  to  be  put  down  by  force,  and  officers 
commanding  at  all  stations  in  the  Punjab  will  co-operate  with  the  column.’ 


40 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

he  admitted  having  satisfied  the  curiosity  of  a friend  who  had  inquired 
of  him  how  the  authorities  intended  to  deal  with  the  crisis.  This  was 
enough,  and  I was  cleared.  The  result  to  me  of  this  unpleasant 
incident  was  a delightful  increase  of  intimacy  with  the  man  for  whom 
above  all  others  I had  the  greatest  admiration  and  most  profound 
respect.  As  if  to  make  up  for  his  momentary  injustice,  Nicholson  was 
lander  to  me  than  ever,  and  I felt  I had  gained  in  him  a firm  and 
constant  friend.  So  ended  that  eventful  day. 

At  that  time  it  was  the  custom  for  a staff  officer,  who  had  charge  of 
any  Government  property,  to  have  a guard  of  Native  soldiers  in  charge 
of  his  house.  That  night  it  happened  that  my  guard  was  furnished  by 
the  64th  Native  Infantry,  a regiment  with  a particularly  bad  reputation, 
and  which  had,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  measures  proposed  at  the 
morning’s  meeting,  been  ordered  to  leave  Peshawar  and  proceed  to  the 
outposts.  The  intercepted  letters  showed  that  this  regiment  was  on 
the  point  of  mutinying,  and  I could  not  help  feeling,  as  I lay  down  on 
my  bed,  which,  as  usual  in  the  hot  weather,  was  placed  in  the  verandah 
for  the  sake  of  coolness,  how  completely  I was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
sentry  who  walked  up  and  down  within  a few  feet  of  me.  Fortunately, 
he  was  not  aware  that  his  regiment  was  suspected,  and  could  not  know 
the  reason  for  the  sudden  order  to  march,  or  my  career  might  have 
been  ended  then  and  there. 

"Within  a week  from  that  time  I had  started  for  Rawal  Pindi  to  be 
ready  to  join  the  Movable  Column,  which  was  to  be  formed  at 
"Wazirabad  as  soon  as  the  troops  could  be  got  together.  I took  with 
me  only  just  enough  kit  for  a hot-weather  inarch,  and  left  everything 
standing  in  my  house  just  as  it  was,  little  thinking  that  I should  never 
return  to  it  or  be  quartered  in  Peshawar  again. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Before  proceeding  with  the  account  of  my  experiences  with  the  Movable 
Column,  and  the  subsequent  operations  for  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion,  in  which  I was  fortunate  enough  to  take  part,  it  will,  I think, 
be  advisable,  for  the  better  understanding  of  the  whole  situation,  to 
devote  a little  time  to  the  consideration  of  the  progress  of  events  from 
the  first  appearance  of  symptoms  of  disaffection  in  Lower  Bengal,  to  the 
crisis  I have  just  been  describing,  when  Peshawar  became  involved  in 
the  general  disturbance. 

The  substitution  of  a new  rifle  for  the  old  musket  with  which  the 
sepoys  had  hitherto  been  armed  entailed  a different  kind  of  drill;  and 
in  order  that  this  drill  should  be  speedily  learned  by  the  whole  Native 


FIRST  SYMPTOMS  OF  DISAFFECTION 


41 


1857] 

army,  depots  were  formed  at  convenient  places  for  the  instruction  of 
selected  men  from  every  corps,  who,  on  becoming  proficient,  were  to 
return  and  instruct  their  own  regiments.  One  of  these  depots  was  at 
Dum-Dum,  and  as  early  as  the  24th  January  General  Hearsay,  com- 
manding the  Presidency  division,  reported  to  Head-Quarters  that  he 
perceived  an  ‘ unpleasant  feeling  ’ amongst  the  Native  soldiers  learning 
the  new  drill,  caused  by  a belief  instilled  into  them  * by  designing 
persons,  most  likelj'  Brahmins,’  that  they  were  to  be  forced  to  embrace 
Christianity,  and  that  for  the  furtherance  of  this  object  the  new  ball- 
cartridges  received  from  the  arsenal  at  Fort  "William  were  greased  with 
the  fat  of  pigs  and  cows,  with  the  intention  of  violating  the  religious 
prejudices  and  destroying  the  caste  of  those  who  would  have  to  bite 
them. 

A little  later  various  acts  of  incendiarism  took  place  at  other  stations 
in  the  command,  and  Hearsay  became  more  than  ever  convinced  that 
there  was  grave  dissatisfaction  amongst  the  troops.  He  therefore 
ordered  a Court  of  Inquiry  to  be  held  to  enable  him  to  ascertain  the 
real  cause  of  the  ill-feeling  which  so  evidently  existed. 

In  the  General’s  opinion,  the  statements  recorded  in  the  proceedings 
of  this  Court  clearly  established  the  fact,  that  the  Native  officers  and 
sepoys  were  undoubtedly  imbued  with  the  belief  that  an  unholy 
mixture  of  cow's  fat  and  lard  had  been  used  in  the  manufacture  of  the 
new'  cartridge,  and  he  recommended  that  the  ritie  ammunition  should 
in  future  be  made  up  wdth  the  same  description  of  paper  that  had  always 
been  used  for  the  musket- cartridge,  which,  he  conceived,  would  put  an 
end  to  their  suspicions  and  uneasiness. 

The  General,  however,  was  told  in  reply  that  it  was  impossible  to 
use  the  old  paper  for  the  new  cartridge,  as  the  bore  of  the  rifle  being 
much  smaller  than  that  of  the  musket,  thinner  paper  wras  indispensable ; 
and  he  was  directed  to  inform  the  sepoys  that  the  newr  paper,  though 
tougher  and  less  bulky,  w'as  made  of  exactly  the  same  material  as  the 
old.  With  respect  to  the  lubricating  mixture,  he  was  to  announce  that 
the  Government  had  authorized  the  preparation  of  a grease,  composed 
of  wax  and  oil,  which  was  to  be  made  up  and  applied  to  the  cartridges 
by  the  men  themselves.  These  orders  were  carefully  explained  to  the 
Native  troops,  but  without  any  good  result.  Their  religious  objection 
to  the  new  cartridge  was  not  removed,  and  they  frankly  acknowledged 
their  fears. 

On  the  6th  February  an  officer  of  the  34th  Native  Infantry  at 
Barrackpore  was  informed  by  a sepoy  of  his  company  that  the  four 
Native  regiments  at  that  station,  fearing  that  they  would  be  forced  to 
destroy  their  caste  and  become  Christians,  had  determined  to  rise 
against  their  officers,  and  when  they  had  plundered  and  burned  their 
bungalows,  to  proceed  to  Calcutta  and  try  to  seize  Fort  William,  or,  if 
that  proved  beyond  their  pow’ers,  to  take  possession  of  the  treasury. 


42 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

This  circumstance  was  reported  to  Government  by  General  Hearsay 
on  the  11th  February.  In  the  same  letter  he  said,  ‘We  have  at 
Barrackpore  been  living  upon  a mine  ready  for  explosion,’  and  he 
reported  a story  which  had  reached  him  from  Dum-Dum  of  a sepoy,  on 
his  way  to  cook  his  food  with  his  lota * full  of  water,  meeting  a low- 
caste  man  belonging  to  the  arsenal  where  the  Enfield  cartridges  were 
being  manufactured.  This  man,  it  was  said,  asked  the  sepoy  to  allow 
him  to  drink  from  his  lota.  The  sepoy,  a Brahmin,  refused,  saving: 

‘ I have  scoured  my  lota ; you  will  defile  it  by  your  touch.’  The  low- 
caste  man  replied  : ‘ You  think  much  of  your  caste,  but  wait  a little : 
the  Sahib-loguei  will  make  you  bite  cartridges  soaked  in  cow’s  fat,  and 
then  where  will  your  caste  be  ?’  The  sepoy  no  doubt  believed  the  man, 
and  told  his  comrades  what  was  about  to  happen,  and  the  report 
rapidly  spread  to  other  stations. 

Early  in  March  several  of  the  Hindu  sepoys  belonging  to  the  Dum- 
Dum  School  of  Musketry  expressed  their  unwillingness  to  bite  the  new 
cartridge,  and  the  Commandant  proposed  that  the  drill  should  be  altered 
so  as  to  admit  of  the  cartridge  being  torn  instead  of  bitten.  Hearsay 
supported  the  proposal,  remarking  that  the  new  mode  of  loading  need 
not  be  made  to  appear  as  a concession  to  agitation,  but  as  part  of  the 
drill  for  the  new  weapon.  Events,  however,  moved  so  quickly  that, 
before  sanction  could  be  received  to  this  suggestion,  the  troops  at  Ber- 
hampur  had  broken  into  open  mutiny.  They  refused  to  receive  their 
ammunition,  on  the  ground  of  its  being  polluted,  even  after  it  was 
explained  to  them  that  they  were  not  being  given  the  new  cartridges, 
but  those  which  had  been  made  up  in  the  regiment  a year  before.  That 
night  they  broke  open  the  bells-of-arms,  and  carried  off  their  muskets. 

The  Government  then  became  aware  that  prompt  action  was  neces- 
sary. They  decided  that  such  open  mutiny  could  not  be  excused  on  the 
grounds  of  religious  scruples,  and  ordered  the  regiment  to  be  disbanded. 
As  Berhampur  was  somewhat  isolated,  and  some  distance  from 
European  troops,  it  was  arranged  that  the  disbandment  should  take 
place  at  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Presidency  division,  and  the  19th 
Native  Infantry  was  accordingly  ordered  to  march  to  Barrackpore. 

The  revolt  of  this  regiment  brought  forcibly  before  Lord  Canning  and 
his  advisers  the  perilous  position  of  Lower  Bengal,  owing  to  the  paucity 
of  European  troops.  Well  may  the  authorities  have  been  startled,  for 
between  Calcutta  and  Meerut,  a distance  of  900  miles,  there  were  only 
four  regiments  of  British  infantry  and  a few  scattered  Artillerymen, 
numbering  in  all  less  than  5,000,  while  the  Native  troops  amounted  to 
upwards  of  55,000.  One  of  the  four  Infantry  regiments  was  at  I*  ort 

» A metal  drinking  vessel,  which  the  Hindu  religiously  guards  against 
defilement,  and  to  which  he  clings  as  a cherished  posussion  when  he  has 
nothing  else  belonging  to  him  in  the  world. 

t European  officers. 


'857] 


MAN GAL  PANDY 


43 


"William ; but  as  only  a portion  of  it  could  be  spared  for  the  disband- 
ment of  the  19th,  a special  steamer  was  despatched  to  Rangoon  to  bring 
over  the  84th  Foot.  This  regiment  reached  Calcutta  on  the  20th  March, 
and  on  the  31st  the  disbandment  of  the  mutinous  Native  Infantry 
regiment  was  carried  out.  The  men  were  paid  up  and  escorted  across 
th  river  Hughly,  whence  they  were  allowed  to  proceed  to  their  homes. 
They  behaved  in  the  most  orderly  manner  on  the  march  from  Ber- 
hampur  and  throughout  the  proceedings,  and  as  they  left  the  parade- 
ground  they  cheered  General  Hearsay,  and  washed  him  a long  life, 
apparently  well  pleased  at  being  let  off  so  easily. 

At  Barrackpore  itself  an  outbreak  had  occurred  two  days  before  in 
the  34th  Native  Infantry.  As  I have  already  related,  the  sepoy,  Mangal 
Bandy,  shot  at  the  sergeant-major.*  The  Adjutant,  on  hearing  what 
had  happened,  galloped  to  the  parade-ground.  As  he  neared  the 
quarter-guard  he  was  fired  at,  and  his  horse  shot  by  the  mutineer,  who 
then  badly  wounded  him  with  a sword  as  he  was  trying  to  disentangle 
himself  from  the  fallen  animal.  The  General  now  appeared  on  the 
scene,  and,  instantly  grasping  the  position  of  affairs,  rode  straight  at 
Mangal  Pandy,  who  stood  at  bay  with  his  musket  loaded,  ready  to 
receive  him.  There  was  a shot,  the  whistle  of  a bullet,  and  a man  fell 
to  the  ground — but  not  the  General ; it  was  the  fanatic  sepoy  himself, 
who  at  the  last  moment  had  discharged  the  contents  of  his  musket  into 
his  own  breast  1 The  wretched  man  had  been  worked  up  to  a pitch  of 
madness  by  the  sepoys  of  his  regiment,  who  stood  by  while  he  attacked 
the  Adjutant,  and  would  have  allowed  him  to  kill  their  Commander, 
but  they  were  too  great  cowards  to  back  liim  up  openly.  Mangal 
Pandy  was  not  dead.  He  was  taken  to  the  hospital,  and  eventually  was 
tried  by  a Court-Martial  composed  of  Native  officers,  sentenced  to  death, 
and  hanged  in  the  presence  of  all  the  troops  at  Barrackpore.  The 
Native  officer  in  command  of  the  quarter-guard  met  the  same  fate,  and 
the  regiment  was  then  disbanded. 

The  orders  for  the  disbandment  of  the  19th  and  34th  Native  Infantry 
were  directed  to  be  read  to  every  Native  corps  in  the  service,  and  it  was 
hoped  that  the  quick  retribution  which  had  overtaken  these  regiments 
would  check  the  spirit  of  mutiny  throughout  the  army.  For  a time 
this  hope  appeared  to  be  justified.  Satisfactory  reports  were  received 
from  different  parts  of  Bengal,  and  anything  like  a serious  or  general 
outbreak  was  certainly  not  contemplated  by  the  authorities.  General 
Hearsay  reported  to  Government  that  he  had  directed  the  European 
troops,  temporarily  located  at  Barrackpore,  to  return  to  their  respective 
cantonments,  as  he  did  not  think  it  probable  that  he  would  require 
then-  presence  again.  About  the  same  time  Sir  John  Lawrence,  aftei 
visiting  the  Musketry  School  at  Sialkot,  wrote  hopefully  to  the 

* Each  Hindustani  regiment  had  a European  sergeant-major  and  quarter- 
master-sergeant. 


44 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

Governor-General  of  the  aspect  of  affairs  in  the  Punjab.  Lord  Canning 
and  his  advisers,  owing  to  these  favourable  reports,  were  on  the  point 
of  sending  the  84th  Foot  back  to  Burma,  when  news  reached  them 
from  Upper  India  of  the  calamitous  occurrences  at  Meerut  and  Delhi. 

The  Meerut  division  was  commanded  by  Major-General  Hewitt,  an 
officer  of  fifty  years’  service,  and  the  station  of  Meerut  by  Brigadier 
Archdale  Wilson,  Commandant  of  the  Bengal  Artillery.  The  garrison 
consisted  of  the  6th  Dragoon  Guards,  a troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  a 
battery  of  Field  Artillery,  a company  of  Foot  Artillery,  the  1st  Bat- 
talion 60tli  Bifles,  and  three  Native  corps — the  3rd  Light  Cavalry,  and 
the  11th  and  20th  Native  Infantry. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  incendiary  fires  began  to  take  place,  and 
the  Native  soldiers  evinced  more  or  less  disrespect  in  their  manner 
towards  their  officers.  These  signs  of  disaffection  were  followed  by  the 
refusal  of  some  of  the  troopers  of  the  3rd  Light  Cavalry  to  receive  their 
cartridges,  although  the  commanding  officer  carefully  explained  to  them 
that  they  were  not  the  new  cartridges,  but  the  very  same  they  had 
always  used,  and  that  according  to  the  new  drill  they  were  not  required 
to  bite  them  when  loading  their  carbines. 

A Court  of  Inquiry  was  held  to  investigate  the  matter,  composed 
entirely  of  Native  officers,  three  of  whom  belonged  to  the  offending 
regiment.  The  verdict  of  the  Court  was  that  no  adequate  cause  could 
be  assigned  for  the  disobedience  of  orders  in  refusing  to  receive  and  use 
the  cartridges  that  were  served  out.  ‘ The  only  conclusion  the  Court 
can  arrive  at  in  regard  to  this  point  is  that  a report  seems  to  have  got 
abroad  which  in  some  vague  form  attaches  suspicion  of  impurity  to  the 
materials  used  for  making  these  cartridges,  but  the  Court  are 
unanimously  of  opinion  that  there  is  nothing  whatever  objectionable 
in  the  cartridges  of  the  3rd  Begiment  Light  Cavalry,  and  that  they  may 
be  freely  received  and  used  as  heretofore  without  in  the  slightest  degree 
affecting  any  religious  scruple  of  either  a Hindu  or  Mussulman,  and  if 
any  pretence  contrary  to  that  is  urged,  that  it  must  be  false.’  This 
opinion,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  the  opinion  of  Natives,  not 
Europeans,  and  was  given  only  sixteen  days  before  the  outbreak 
occurred  at  Meerut. 

After  carefully  reviewing  the  evidence  brought  before  the  Court,  and 
considering  the  opinion  expressed  by  the  Native  officers  who  composed 
it,  the  Commander-in-Chief  decided  to  try  the  eighty-five  men  who  bad 
refused  to  receive  the  cartridges  by  a General  Court-Martial  compo  sed 
entirely  of  their  own  countrymen.  The  Court  was  formed  of  six 
Mahomedans  and  nine  Hindus,  six  Native  officers  being  brought  over 
from  Delhi  for  the  purpose. 

The  prisoners  were  tried  on  the  8th  May,  found  guilty,  and  sentenced 
to  imprisonment  with  hard  labour  for  ten  years. 

The  following  morning  there  was  a parade  of  the  whole  of  the  Meerut 


MUTINY  AT  MEERUT 


45 


1857] 

garrison,  and  the  finding  and  sentence  of  the  Court  were  read  to  the 
men.  The  eighty-five  troopers  were  then  stripped  of  their  uniform  and 
fetters  were  fastened  on  their  ankles.  As  each  culprit  was  marched 
forward,  he  called  on  his  comrades  to  rescue  him,  but  no  response  came 
from  the  ranks ; and  when  the  ceremony  was  finished  the  prisoners 
were  marched  down  the  line  and  escorted  to  the  gaol.  In  his  report  of 
the  parade  to  Army  Head-Quarters,  General  Hewitt  stated  that  ‘ the 
majority  of  the  prisoners  seemed  to  feel  acutely  the  degradation  to 
which  their  folly  and  insubordination  had  brought  them.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  troops  are  behaving  steady  and  soldier-like.’ 

The  action  of  the  Meerut  authorities  in  putting  the  prisoners  in  irons 
on  the  parade-ground,  in  the  presence  of  their  regiment,  before  being 
made  over  to  the  civil  power,  met  with  the  disapproval  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  and  the  Governor-General.  The  former  expressed  his 
regret  at  the  unusual  procedure.  The  latter  was  more  pronounced,  and 
thus  expressed  himself : ‘ The  riveting  of  the  men’s  fetters  on  parade, 
occupying,  as  it  did,  several  hours,  in  the  presence  of  many  who  were 
already  ill-disposed  and  many  who  believed  in  the  cartridge  fable,  must 
have  stung  the  brigade  to  the  quick.  The  consigning  the  eighty-five 
prisoners  after  such  a ceremony  to  gaol  with  no  other  than  a Native 
guard  over  them  was  folly  that  is  inconceivable.’ 

The  procedure  was  no  doubt  unusual,  and  it  certainly  was  most  im- 
prudent, under  the  circumstances,  to  trust  the  gaol  to  a Native  guard. 
I think  also,  considering  the  number  of  the  prisoners,  and  the  length 
of  time  necessary  for  riveting  the  fetters,  that  it  was  not  judicious  to 
subject  the  troops  to  such  a severe  and  protracted  trial  of  their  nerves 
and  patience  ; but,  before  acquiescing  in  Lord  Canning’s  sweeping  con- 
demnation, it  should  be  considered  that  the  object  of  the  punishment 
was  to  produce  a deterrent  effect  on  those  who  were  likely  to  follow  the 
bad  example  that  had  been  set  them,  and  as  the  offence  of  the  troopers 
had  been  public  and  ostentatious,  General  Hewitt  no  doubt  thought  it 
right  to  make  the  punishment  as  marked  and  public  as  possible. 

The  next  day  was  Sunday,  and  outwardly  the  cantonment  of  Meerut 
had  assumed  its  usual  appearance  of  Sabbath  calm  ; but  there  was  an 
undercurrent  of  unrest— there  was  considerable  commotion  in  the  Native 
bazaars,  which  were  unusually  crowded,  and  had  not  the  European 
officers  been  blinded  by  over-confidence  in  their  men,  signs  might  have 
been  perceived  amongst  the  Native  soldiers  of  preparation  for  some 
untoward  event. 

It  was  late  in  the  day  before  the  storm  burst.  The  Chaplain  of 
Meerut  tells  us  that  he  was  about  to  start  with  his  wife  for  evening 
service,  when  the  Native  nurse  warned  them  of  coming  danger,  beseech- 
ing her  mistress  to  remain  indoors,  and,  on  being  asked  to  explain, 
saying  there  would  be  a fight  with  the  sepoys.  The  idea  seemed 
incredible,  and  the  Chaplain  would  have  paid  no  attention  to  the 


46 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[•857 

warning  had  not  his  wife  been  greatly  alarmed.  At  her  earnest  request 
he  took  his  two  children  with  them  in  the  carriage,  instead  of  leaving 
them  in  the  house  with  the  ayah , as  had  been  intended.  It  was  soon 
apparent  that  the  ayah  had  not  spoken  without  reason,  for  before  the 
church  was  reached  sounds  of  musketry  were  heard  and  columns  of 
smoke  were  seen  rising  above  the  quarter  occupied  by  the  Native  troops. 
As  the  Chaplain  arrived  at  the  church  enclosure,  the  buglers  of  the  60th 
Rifles,  who  were  drawn  up  ready  to  enter  the  church,  sounded  the 
‘ alarm  ’ and  the  ‘ assembly.’  The  parade  was  dismissed,  and  as  the 
British  soldiers  rushed  to  the  barracks  for  their  arms  and  ammunition, 
the  congregation  rapidly  dispersed,  some  to  their  homes,  others  to  seek 
safety  in  the  nearest  quarter-guard. 

It  was  the  custom  before  the  Mutiny  for  our  soldiers  to  attend  Divine 
Service  unarmed,  save  with  their  side-arms.  The  Native  soldiers  were 
aware  of  this,  and  they  no  doubt  calculated  on  the  60th  Rifles  being 
safe  and  almost  defenceless  inside  the  church  as  soon  as  the  bells  ceased 
tolling.  What  they  were  not  aware  of  was  the  fact  that,  owing  to  the 
lengthening  days  and  the  increasing  heat,  the  evening  church  parade 
had  been  ordered  half  an  hour  later  than  on  the  previous  Sunday.  The 
mutineers  therefore  showed  their  hand  half  an  hour  too  soon,  and  as 
they  galloped  down  the  60th  Rifles  lines  they  came  upon  the  men  fully 
armed  and  rapidly  falling  in.  Being  thus  disappointed  in  their  hope  of 
surprising  the  white  soldiers,  the  3rd  Cavalry  proceeded  without  a 
moment’s  delay  to  the  gaol,  broke  into  the  cells,  and  released  their 
eighty-five  comrades  and  all  the  other  prisoners,  about  1,200  in  number. 

While  this  was  going  on,  the  two  Native  Infantry  regiments 
assembled  on  their  respective  parade-grounds  in  wild  excitement,  dis- 
charging their  muskets  at  random,  and  setting  fire  to  their  own  huts. 
The  British  officers,  hearing  the  tumult,  hastened  to  their  lines  and  did 
their  best  to  restore  order,  but  in  vain.  The  sepoys  had  gone  too  far, 
and  were  absolutely  deaf  to  threats  and  entreaties.  They  did  not 
attack  their  own  officers,  but  warned  them  to  get  away,  telling  them 
the  Company's  ‘ raj  ’*  was  at  an  end.  Their  clemency,  however,  did 
not  extend  to  officers  of  other  regiments. 

Colonel  Finnis,  who  had  served  forty  years  with  the  sepoys,  and 
firmly  believed  in  their  loyalty,  was  the  first  victim  ; he  fell  riddled 
with  bullets  from  a volley  fired  by  the  20th,  while  exhorting  the  men 
of  his  own  regiment  (the  11th)  to  be  true  to  their  salt.  The  work  of 
destruction  then  began  in  earnest,  in  which  the  population  from  the 
bazaars  and  the  neighbouring  villages  eagerly  joined,  for  (as  the  Com- 
missioner reported)  they  were  armed  and  ready  for  the  onslaught  before 
the  sepoys  commenced  the  attack,  plainly  showing  how  perfectly  they 
were  aware  of  what  was  about  to  happen.  They  poured  forth  in 
thousands  from  every  direction,  and  in  a surprisingly  short  time  almost 

* Rule. 


THE  WORK  OF  DESTRUCTION 


47 


1857] 

every  bungalow  belonging  to  a British  officer  serving  with  Native  troops 
was  gutted  and  burnt.  Besides  Colonel  Finnis,  seven  officers,  three 
officers’  wives,  two  children,  and  every  stray  European  man,  woman  and 
child  in  the  outskirts  of  the  cantonments  were  massacred. 

It  was  now  time  for  the  sepoys  to  think  of  themselves.  They  had 
thrown  off  all  allegiance  to  the  Sarkar  ;*  they  had  been  guilty  of 
murder,  robbery,  and  incendiarism,  and  they  knew  that  retribution 
must  speedily  overtake  them  if  they  remained  at  Meerut ; they  there- 
fore lost  no  time  in  making  their  escape  towards  Delhi.  They  had 
had  ample  opportunity  for  consultation  with  the  Native  officers  from 
that  station,  who  had  come  to  Meerut  as  members  of  the  Court-Martial 
on  the  men  of  the  3rd  Light  Cavalry,  and  they  knew  perfectly  well 
that  the  troops  at  Delhi  were  prepared  to  help  them  to  seize  the 
magazine  and  resuscitate  the  old  Moghul  dynasty.  ‘ To  Delhi ! To 
Delhi !’  was  their  cry,  and  off  they  went,  leaving  naught  behind  them 
in  their  lines  but  the  smouldering  fires  of  their  officers’  houses  and  the 
lifeless  bodies  of  their  English  victims. 

But  it  will  be  asked,  Where  were  the  British  troops  ? Where  indeed  ? 
On  the  alarm  being  given,  the  British  troops  got  under  arms  ‘ in  an 
incredibly  short  time,’  but  there  was  unaccountable  delay  in  marching 
them  to  the  spot  where  their  help  was  so  greatly  needed.  The 
Carabineers  occupied  barracks  within  a few  hundred  yards  of  the  Native 
Infantry  lines,  the  60th  Rifles  were  only  about  a mile  and  a half  away, 
and  the  Artillery  lay  just  beyond  the  60th.  The  Brigadier  (Wilson) 
despatched  one  company  of  the  Rifles  to  guard  the  treasury,  another  he 
left  to  protect  the  barracks,  and  with  the  remainder,  accompanied  by 
the  Carabineers  and  Artillery,  he  leisurely  proceeded  towards  the 
Native  Infantry  lines.  It  was  almost  dark  when  he  arrived,  but  there 
was  light  enough  to  discern,  from  the  ruined  houses  and  the  dead 
bodies  of  the  murdered  officers  lying  about,  in  what  a merciless  spirit 
the  revolt  had  been  perpetrated.  A few  shots  were  fired  from  behind 
the  burning  huts,  but  not  a single  living  being  was  visible,  except  two  or 
three  Native  troopers  who  were  dimly  perceptible  in  the  distance 
coming  from  the  direction  of  the  gaol,  and  it  was  evident  that  the 
sepoys  as  a body  had  vanished.  But  whither  ? A lengthened  dis- 
cussion took  place  as  to  what  was  the  best  course  to  pursue,  which  only 
resulted  in  the  troops  being  marched  back  to  their  own  end  of  the 
cantonment  and  bivouacking  on  the  mall  for  the  night.  The  General 
and  Brigadier,  misled  by  the  tumult  in  the  city,  which  they  could 
distinctly  hear,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sepoys  had  congregated 
within  its  walls  and  might  shortly  be  expected  to  attack  that  part  of  the 
station  where  the  European  residents  chiefly  lived.  It  was  not  dis- 
covered till  the  nextmorning  that  all  three  Native  regiments  had  made 
for  Delhi. 


* British  Government. 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[>857 


48 


It  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event,  but  one  cannot  but  feel  that 
there  was  unaccountable,  if  not  culpable,  want  of  energy  displayed  by 
the  Meerut  authorities  on  this  disastrous  occasion.  The  officer  in  com- 
mand was  afterwards  severely  censured  for  not  acting  with  sufficient 
promptitude  on  first  hearing  of  the  outbreak  ; for  not  trying  to  find  out 
where  the  mutineers  had  gone  ; and  for  not  endeavouring  to  overtake 
them  before  they  reached  Delhi.  The  Government  of  India  finally 
signified  their  disapproval  by  removing  General  Hewitt  from  his  com- 
mand. 

Wilson,  the  Brigadier,  like  everyone  else  at  Meerut,  appears  to  have 
been  completely  taken  by  surprise.  But  why  this  should  have  been 
the  case,  after  the  warning  that  had  been  given  by  the  mutinous  con- 
duct of  the  3rd  Cavalry,  and  why  no  steps  should  have  been  taken 
after  the  exasperating  parade  on  the  9th  to  guard  against  a possible, 
if  not  probable,  outbreak,  is  difficult  to  understand  ; and  can  only  be 
accounted  for  by  that  blind  faith  in  the  Native  soldier,  and  disbelief  in 
his  intention  or  ability  to  revolt,  which  led  to  such  unfortunate  results 
all  over  India. 

The  following  story  will  exemplify  how  completely  the  authorities  at 
Meerut  were  blinded  by  this  misplaced  confidence.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  9th  the  British  officers  of  the  3rd  Light  Cavalry  went  to  the  gaol 
to  pay  up  the  prisoners  belonging  to  their  regiment.  When  Lieutenant 
Hugh  Gough,*  who  was  one  of  these  officers,  returned  to  his  house,  a 
Hindu  Native  officer,  belonging  to  the  troop  Gough  was  temporarily 
commanding,  told  him  that  the  men  had  determined  to  rescue  their 
comrades,  and  that  the  Native  guard  over  the  gaol  had  promised  to 
help  them.  Gough  went  at  once  to  his  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Carmichael  Smyth,  and  reported  what  he  had  heard,  but  the 
Colonel  pooh-poohed  the  idea  as  ridiculous,  and  told  Gough  he  must 
not  give  credence  to  anything  so  monstrous. 

Later  in  the  day  Gough  met  Brigidier  Wilson  and  told  him  of  the 
warning  which  had  been  given  to  him,  without,  however,  producing 
any  impression  ; the  information  was  received  with  the  same  con- 
temptuous disbelief  displayed  by  Colonel  Carmichael  Smyth. 

The  following  day  (Sunday),  late  in  the  afternoon,  the  same  Native 
officer,  attended  by  two  troopers,  galloped  to  Gough’s  house,  shouting 
to  him  that  the  halaf  had  begun,  and  that  the  Native  Infantry  were 
firing  on  then’  officers.  Gough  mounted  his  horse,  and,  accompanied 
by  the  three  Cavalry  soldiers,  proceeded  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the 
Infantry  parade-ground,  where  he  arrived  just  as  the  wild  scene  of 
excitement  and  confusion  I have  before  described  was  at  its  height. 
The  sepoys,  some  in  uniform,  some  in  their  own  Native  clothes,  were 
rushing  about  in  the  maddest  disorder,  yelling,  shouting,  and  dancing 
* Now  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Hugh  Gough,  V.C.,  G.C. B. 
t Tumult. 


•857] 


HUGH  GOUGH'S  EXPERIENCES 


49 


as  if  possessed,  while  the  flames  from  the  burning  huts  shed  a lurid 
light  on  the  demoniacal  proceedings. 

When  Gough’s  party  appeared  in  sight,  the  sepoys  called  to  the  three 
troopers  to  get  out  of  the  way,  as  they  wanted  to  shoot  the  sahib.  No 
notice  being  taken  of  this  warning,  they  fired  straight  at  the  whole 
party,  but  without  hitting  anyone.  Gough,  seeing  tilings  had  gone  too 
far  for  him  to  do  any  good,  rode  off  with  his  little  escort  to  his  own 
lines,  where  he  found  the  men  busy  saddling  their  horses,  and  helping 
themselves  to  ammunition  from  the  regimental  magazine,  which  they 
had  broken  open.  He  endeavoured  in  vain  to  allay  the  excitement ; 
one  or  two  shots  were  fired  at  him  by  recruits,  but  no  determined  attempt 
was  made  to  take  his  life,  and  at  last  the  Native  officers  combined  to 
force  him  away,  saying  they  could  no  longer  answer  for  his  safety. 

It  was  then  all  but  dark.  Gough  rode  off  towards  the  European 
lines,  still  accompanied  by  his  trusty  Native  escort,  and  on  his  way 
came  upon  an  enormous  crowd  of  people  from  the  bazaar,  armed  with 
swords,  sticks,  and  anything  they  could  get  hold  of,  who  tried  to  stop 
him.  Through  these  he  charged,  closely  followed  by  the  Native  officer 
and  two  troopers,  who  did  not  leave  him  until  he  was  within  sight  of 
the  Artillery  mess.  Then  they  pulled  up,  and  said  they  could  go  no 
further.  Gough  did  all  he  could  to  persuade  them  to  remain  with  him, 
but  to  no  purpose.  They  told  him  it  was  impossible  for  them  to 
separate  themselves  from  their  friends  and  relations,  and  making  the 
officer  they  had  so  carefully  protected  a respectful  salaam,  they  rode  off 
to  join  their  mutinous  comrades.  Gough  never  heard  of  them  again, 
though  he  tried  hard  to  trace  what  had  become  of  the  men  who  proved 
themselves  such  ‘ friends  in  need.’ 

However  much  the  authorities  at  Meerut  deserved  to  be  censured  for 
their  dilatoriness  in  dealing  with  the  revolt  in  the  first  instance,  and  their 
lack  of  energy  in  not  trying  to  discover  in  what  direction  the  mutineers 
had  gone,  I doubt  whether  anything  would  have  been  gained  by  follow- 
ing them  up,  or  whether  it  would  have  been  possible  to  overtake  them 
before  they  reached  Delhi.  Only  a very  few  European  Cavalry  were 
available  for  pursuit,  for  the  Carabineers,  having  lately  arrived  in  India, 
were  composed  mainly  of  recruits  still  in  the  riding-school,  and  their 
horses  for  the  most  part  were  quite  unbroken.  These  few,  with  the  six 
Horse  Artillery  guns,  might  have  been  despatched ; but  the  mutineers 
had  a considerable  start,  the  Cavalry  could  not  have  been  overtaken, 
and  as  soon  as  the  Infantry  became  aware  that  they  were  being 
followed,  they  would  have  scattered  themselves  over  the  country,  the 
features  of  which  were  familiar  to  them,  and,  favoured  by  the  darkness, 
could  have  defied  pursuit.  Delhi  is  forty  miles  from  Meerut,  and  it 
would  not  have  been  possible  for  the  60th  Rifles,  marching  in  the 
terrible  heat  of  the  month  of  May,  to  have  reached  that  place  before 
the  next  evening  (the  11th),  and,  as  was  afterwards  ascertained,  the 

4 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


So 


[1857 


work  of  murder  and  devastation  there  began  on  the  morning  of  that 
day.  The  three  Native  Infantry  regiments  and  the  battery  of  Artillery 
stationed  at  Delhi  were  prepared  to  join  the  insurgent  troopers  from 
Meerut  directly  they  arrived.  The  magazine,  with  its  vast  stores  of 
war  material,  was  in  the  hands  of  the  King,  and  the  150,000  inhabitants 
of  the  city  were  ready  to  assist  in  the  massacre  of  the  white  men  and 
women,  and  the  destruction  of  their  property. 

After  careful  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  revolt  at 
Meerut,  I have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  have  been  futile 
to  have  sent  the  small  body  of  mounted  troops  available  in  pursuit  of 
the  mutineers  on  the  night  of  the  10th  May,  and  that,  considering  the 
state  of  feeling  throughout  the  Native  Army,  no  action,  however 
prompt,  on  the  part  of  the  Meerut  authorities  could  have  arrested  the 
Mutiny.  The  sepoys  had  determined  to  throw  off  their  allegiance  to 
the  British  Government,  and  the  when  and  the  how  were  merely 
questions  of  time  and  opportunity. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

While  the  events  I have  recounted  were  taking  place,  the  Commander- 
in- Chief  and  the  Head-Quarters  staff  were  on  their  way  up  country 
inspecting  the  troops  at  the  various  stations  en  route  to  Simla,  at  which 
place  it  had  been  arranged  that  the  summer  of  1857  was  to  be  spent. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  in  India  at  that  time  was  General  the  Hon. 
George  Anson,  an  officer  of  forty-three  years’  service,  but  without 
much  Indian  experience,  having  been  only  four  years  in  the  country. 
He  was  an  able,  intelligent  man,  an  excellent  judge  of  character,  a 
great  authority  on  whist  and  on  horses,  and  he  was  well  known  in 
London  society,  which  was  somewhat  surprised  when  he  accepted  an 
appointment  in  India — the  command  of  the  Meerut  division.  He  did 
not,  however,  remain  long  in  that  position,  for  he  was  soon  given  the 
command  of  the  Madras  Army,  and  a year  and  a half  later  became 
Commander-in  Chief  in  India.  General  Anson  was  present  at  Waterloo 
as  an  Ensign,  but  had  seen  no  service  afterwards,  and  until  he  arrived 
in  India  had  held  no  high  appointment. 

When  the  Commander-in-Chief  left  Calcutta  the  previous  autumn, 
all  was  apparently  quiet  in  the  Native  army.  He  visited  the  principal 
military  stations,  amongst  others  Meerut  and  Delhi,  and  although 
reports  of  an  uneasy  feeling  amongst  the  Native  troops  in  the  Presi- 
dency division  had  reached  him  from  time  to  time,  it  was  not  until  he 
arrived  at  Umballa,  about  the  middle  of  March,  that  these  reports  were 
confirmed  by  personal  communication  with  tho  sepoys  attending  the 
School  of  Musketry  which  had  been  formed  at  that  station. 


1*57] 


GENERAL  ANSON 


51 


On  the  occasion  of  the  Comnmnder-in-Chief’s  inspection  of  the  School, 
he  learnt  from  the  men  of  the  various  regiments  under  instruction  how 
strongly  opposed  they  were  to  using  a cartridge  which  they  believed  to 
be  injurious  to  their  caste.  Anson  listened  attentively  to  all  the  sepoys 
had  to  say,  and  then  explained  to  them  in  a manly,  sensible  speech, 
that  the  old  cartridge  was  not  suited  to  the  rifle  about  to  bo  introduced. 
A new  cartridge  had,  therefore,  to  be  made  ; but  they  must  not  listen 
to  any  foolish  rumour  as  to  its  being  designed  to  destroy  their  caste. 
He  assured  them,  ‘ on  the  honour  of  a soldier  like  themselves,’  that  it 
had  never  been,  and  never  could  be,  the  policy  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  coerce  the  religious  feeling  of  either  the  military  or  the  civil 
population  of  India,  or  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  their  caste  or 
customs.  He  told  the  Native  officers  to  do  all  in  their  power  to  allay 
the  men’s  unfounded  fears,  and  called  upon  them  to  prove  themselves 
worthy  of  the  high  character  they  had  hitherto  maintained  ; he  con- 
cluded by  warning  all  ranks  that  the  Government  were  determined  not 
to  yield  to  insubordination,  which  would  be  visited  with  the  severest 
punishment. 

The  demeanour  of  the  sepoys  was  most  respectful,  and  when  the 
parade  was  over  they  expressed  their  high  sense  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief’s  goodness.  They  declared  that  he  had  removed  their  own 
objections,  but  that  the  story  was  universally  believed  by  their  country- 
men and  relations,  and  if  they  were  to  use  the  cartridge  they  must 
become  social  outcasts. 

General  Anson,  feeling  that  the  doubts  and  anxieties  of  the  men  with 
regard  to  the  use  of  the  new  cartridges  were  by  no  means  imaginary, 
suspended  their  issue  until  a special  report  had  been  prepared  as  to  the 
composition  of  the  paper  in  which  they  were  wrapped.* 

'Tam  not  so  much  surprised,’  wrote  General  Anson  to  Lord  Canning  on 
the  23rd  March,  ‘at  their  objections  to  the  cartridges,  having  seen  them.  I 
had  no  idea  they  contained,  or,  rather,  are  smeared  with,  such  a quantity  of 
grease,  which  looks  exactly  like  fat.  After  ramming  down  the  ball,  the 
muzzle  of  the  musket  is  covered  with  it.  This,  however,  will,  I imagine,  not 
be  the  case  with  those  prepared  according  to  the  late  instructions.  But  there 
are  now  misgivings  about  the  paper,  and  I think  it  so  desirable  that  they 
should  be  assured  that  no  animal  grease  is  used  in  its  manufacture,  that  I 
have  ordered  a special  report  to  be  made  to  me  on  that  head  from  Meerut,  and 
until  I receive  an  answer,  and  am  satisfied  that  no  objectionable  material  is 
used,  no  firing  at  the  depots  by  the  sepoys  will  take  place.  It  would  be  easy 
to  dismiss  the  detachments  to  their  regiments  without  any  practice,  on  the 
ground  that  the  hot  weather  is  so  advanced,  and  that  very  little  progress 
could  be  made,  but  I do  not  think  that  would  be  admissible.  The  question, 
having  been  raised,  must  be  settled.  It  would  only  be  deferred  till  another 
year,  and  I trust  that  the  measures  taken  by  the  Government  when  the  objec- 
tion was  first  made,  and  the  example  of  the  punishment  of  the  19th  Native 
Infantry  and  of  the  other  delinquents  of  the  70tli,  now  being  tried  by  a General 
Court-Martial,  will  have  the  effect  we  desire.’ — Kaye,  vol.  i.,  p.  558. 

4—2 


52 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


Having  thus  done  all  that  he  could  at  the  time  to  allay  any  feeling 
of  uneasiness,  and  hoping  that  the  news  of  the  disbandment  of  the 
19th  Native  Infantry  would  check  the  spirit  of  insubordination,  General 
Anson  continued  his  journey  to  Simla,  that  beautiful  place  in  the 
Himalayas,  7,000  feet  above  the  sea,  which  has  since  become  the  seat 
of  the  Government  of  India  and  Army  Head-Quarters  during  the  hot 
weather  months. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  had  been  at  Simla  rather  more  than  a 
month,  when,  on  the  afternoon  of  Tuesday,  the  12th  May,  an  Aide-de- 
camp  galloped  in  from  Umballa  (the  Head-Quarters  station  of  the 
Sirhind  division),  distant  eighty  miles,  bringing  with  him  a copy  of  the 
telegraphic  message  which  had  been  despatched  from  Delhi  the  previous 
day  to  ‘ all  stations  in  the  Punjab,’  and  which  had  caused  such  con- 
sternation at  Peshawar  on  the  evening  of  the  11th  May. 

Sir  Henry  Barnard,  commanding  the  Sirhind  division,  desired  the 
Aide-de-camp  (his  own  son)  to  inform  the  Commander-in-Chief  that 
the  temper  of  the  three  Native  regiments  at  Umballa  was  more  than 
doubtful,  and  that  it  seemed  advisable  that  the  three  regiments  of 
British  Infantry  stationed  in  the  hills  near  Simla  should  be  ordered  at 
once  to  Umballa.  So  urgent  did  this  seem  to  Barnard,  that,  in  antici- 
pation of  sanction  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  he  told  his  son  to 
warn  the  75th  Foot  as  he  passed  through  Kasauli  to  be  prepared  for  an 
immediate  move. 

General  Anson  at  once  saw  the  necessity  for  taking  prompt  action. 
That  same  afternoon  he  despatched  an  Aide  de-camp  to  Kasauli  to 
order  the  75th  to  proceed  without  delay  to  Umballa,  and  the  1st  Bengal 
Fusiliers  at  Dagshai  to  follow  the  75th  as  soon  as  carriage  could  be 
collected  ; also  to  warn  the  2nd  Bengal  Fusiliers  at  Subathu  to  be  ready 
to  move.  Expresses  were  sent  at  the  same  to  Ferozepore  and  Jullundur 
directing  that  a European  guard  should  be  placed  in  charge  of  the 
magazine  at  the  former  place,  and  a detachment  of  European  Infantry 
thrown  into  the  fort  of  Philour  from  the  latter.  The  confidence  re- 
posed in  the  Native  army  before  the  Mutiny  was  so  great  that  these 
two  important  magazines,  like  almost  all  the  arsenals  and  magazines 
in  India,  were  guarded  by  Native  soldiers,  and  subsequent  events 
proved  that,  but  for  General  Anson’s  timely  precautions,  the  mutineers 
must  have  obtained  possession  of  the  magazines  at  Ferozepore  and 
Philour.* 

* Surely  those  whom  God  has  a mind  to  destroy,  He  first,  deprives  of  their 
senses  ; for  not  only  were  the  magazines  at  Delhi  and  Cawnpore  allowed  to 
fall  into  the  enemy’s  hands,  but  the  great  arsenal  at  Allahabad  narrowly 
escaped  the  same  fate.  Up  till  May,  1857,  this  fort  was  garrisoned  only  by 
Native  soldiers.  Early  in  that  month  sixty  worn-out  European  pensioners 
were  brought  to  Allahabad  from  Chunar,  with  whose  assistance,  and  that  of  a 
few  hastily  raised  Volunteers,  Lieutenants  Russell  and  Tod  Brown  of  the 


ANSON  LOSES  NO  TIME 


S3 


1857] 

Anson  had  not  long  to  wait  before  he  received  confirmation  of  the 
alarming  news  brought  by  General  Barnard's  son.  The  very  next 
afternoon  a letter  arrived  from  Meerut  giving  an  account  of  the  out- 
break on  the  10th,  and  a few  particulars  of  what  had  occurred  at  Delhi. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  immediately  decided  on  proceeding  to 
Umballa,  to  superintend  personally  the  organization  of  the  force 
which,  as  he  rightly  judged,  would  have  to  be  sent  to  Delhi.  There 
was  no  hesitation  on  General  Anson’s  part,  or  delay  in  issuing  the 
necessary  orders.* *  The  2nd  Bengal  Fusiliers  were  directed  to  march 
to  Umballa,  and  an  Artillery  officer  was  sent  express  to  Philour  with 
instructions  for  a third-class  siege-train  to  be  got  ready,  and  for  reserve 
Artillery  and  Infantry  ammunition  to  be  despatched  to  Umballa. 
Orders  were  also  issued  for  the  Nasiri  battalion,  stationed  at  Jutog, 
near  Simla,  and  for  the  company  of  Native  Artillery  at  Kangra  and 
Nurpurf  to  march  with  all  expedition  to  Philour,  for  the  purpose  of 
accompanying  the  siege-train  ; and  for  the  Sirmur  battalion  of  Gurkhas 
Dehra  Dun,  and  the  Sappers  and  Miners  at  Rurki,  to  proceed  to 
Meerut. 

Having  thus  pressed  forward  the  measures  for  the  suppression  of  the 
revolt  which  to  him  seemed  most  urgent,  General  Anson  left  Simla 
early  on  the  14th  May,  within  forty-eight  hours  of  the  receipt  of  the 
first  news  of  the  outbreak,  and  reached  Umballa  the  following  morning. 
His  last  act  at  Simla  was  to  draft  a circular  which  he  hoped  would  have 
the  effect  of  allaying  excitement  in  the  Native  army. 

The  report  which  Sir  Henry  Barnard  had  to  make  to  the  Chief  on 
his  arrival  at  Umballa  was  not  reassuring.  The  troops  at  that  station 
consisted  of  Her  Majesty’s  9th  Lancers,  two  troops  of  Horse  Artillery, 
the  4th  Bengal  Light  Cavalry,  and  two  regiments  of  Native  Infantry. 
The  75th  Foot  and  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers  had  just  marched  in  with  only 
thirty  and  seventy  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man,  respectively,  and 
(from  want  of  carriage)  without  tents  or  baggage.  The  Commissariat 
and  Medical  Departments  were  totally  unprepared  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  a force  suddenly  ordered  to  take  the  field  ; there  were  no 
doolies  for  the  sick ; supplies  were  difficult  to  collect,  for  the  bazaars 


Bengal  Artillery,  were  able  to  overawe  and  disarm  the  Native  guard  on  the  very 
night  on  which  the  regiments  to  which  they  belonged  mutinied  in  the  adjoining 
cantonment.  These  two  gallant  officers  had  taken  the  precaution  to  till  the 
cellars  below  the  armoury  (which  contained  some  50.000  or  60,000  stands  of 
arms)  with  barrels  of  powder,  their  intention  being  to  blow  up  the  whole  place 
in  the  event  of  the  sepoys  getting  the  upper  hand.  This  determination  was 
known  to  all  in  the  fort,  and  no  doubt  had  something  to  say  to  the  guard 
submitting  to  be  disarmed. 

* He  has  been  accused  of  dilatoriness  and  want  of  decision  after  hearing  the 
news. 

t Places  at  the  foot  of  the  Himalayas. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


54 


['857 


were  partially  deserted ; there  was  a scarcity  of  contractors,  and  no 
ammunition  was  available  nearer  than  Philour,  eighty  miles  off. 

At  Delhi  all  the  Europeans  who  had  not  escaped  had  been  massacred, 
and  the  city  had  been  taken  possession  of  by  the  Native  garrison  and 
the  mutinous  troops  from  Meerut  in  the  name  of  the  old  King. 

At  Meerut  the  European  troops  were  entrenching  themselves ; the 
surrounding  district  was  in  the  most  complete  disorder,  and  the  civil 
courts  powerless. 

At  Umballa  and  Jullundur,  although  the  presence  of  European 
troops  had  hitherto  kept  the  Native  regiments  from  open  mutiny,  it 
was  evident  that  they  were  not  in  the  least  to  be  depended  upon. 

At  Ferozepore  an  aggravated  revolt  had  occurred,  and  at  Lahore  it 
had  been  found  necessary  to  disarm  all  the  Native  troops. 

From  below  Meerut  there  was  no  intelligence  whatever,  but  it 
seemed  more  than  probable  that  the  spirit  of  rebellion  had  broken  out 
in  many  stations,  and  later  this  was  known  to  be  the  case. 

To  add  to  the  Commander-in-Chief’s  anxieties,  it  was  reported  that 
the  Nasiri  battalion  at  Jutog  had  got  out  of  hand  for  a time  and  refused 
to  march  to  Philour,  while  a detachment  of  the  same  corps  at  Kasauli 
plundered  the  treasury,  rendering  it  necessary  to  send  back  100  men  of 
the  75th  Foot  to  reinforce  the  depot  at  that  place,  where  a large  number 
of  European  soldiers’  families  were  collected. 

The  behaviour  of  the  Gurkhas  gave  rise  to  a panic  at  Simla,  which, 
however,  did  not  last  long.  Lord  William  Hay,*  who  was  Deputy- 
Commissioner  at  the  time,  induced  most  of  the  ladies,  with  their 
children,  to  seek  a temporary  asylum  with  the  Raja  of  Kiunthal.f 
Hay  himself  managed  to  keep  Simla  quiet,  and  the  men  of  the  Nasiri 
battalion  coming  to  their  senses,  order  was  restored  throughout  the 
hills.  The  money  taken  from  the  Kasauli  treasury  was  nearly  all 
voluntarily  given  up,  and  before  the  year  was  out  the  battalion  did  us 
good  service. 

It  was  a long  list  of  troubles  that  was  placed  before  the  Commander  - 
in-Chief.  Disturbing  as  they  all  were,  each  requiring  prompt  and 
special  action,  there  was  one  amongst  them  which  stood  out  in  bold 
relief — the  situation  at  Delhi ; and  to  wrest  that  stronghold  from  the 
hands  of  the  mutineers  was,  General  Anson  conceived,  his  most  pressing 
obligation.  But  could  it  be  done  with  the  means  at  his  disposal  ? He 
thought  not ; and  in  this  opinion  he  was  supported  by  the  senior  officers 
at  Umballa,  with  whom  the  question  was  anxiously  discussed  at  a 
conference  held  at  Sir  Henry  Barnard's  house  on  the  16th  May.J  It 

* Now  the  Marquis  of  Twocddale. 

t A small  hill  state  near  Simla. 

t It  is  a remarkable  fact  that  the  five  senior  officers  at  this  conference  were 
all  dead  in  less  than  seven  weeks.  General  Anson,  Brigadier  Hallifax,  com- 
manding the  Umballa  station,  and  Colonel  Mowatt,  commanding  the  Artillery. 


JOHN  LA  WRENCE 


55 


1857] 

was  nevertheless  determined  to  push  on  to  Delhi,  and  General  Hewitt 
was  asked  what  force  he  could  spare  from  Meerut  to  co  operate  with 
the  Umballa  column.  He  was  warned  that  time  was  an  object,  and 
that  the  23rd  May  was  the  date  on  which  his  troops  would  probably  be 
required  to  start  All  details  were  carefully  considered.  The  first 
difficulty  to  be  overcome  was  the  want  of  carriage.  No  organized 
system  of  transport — one  of  the  most  essential  requirements  of  an 
efficient  army — existed,  and,  owing  to  the  restlessness  and  uncertainty 
which  prevailed  throughout  the  country,  the  civil  authorities  were 
unable  to  collect  carts  and  camels  with  the  usual  rapidity.* * 

That  afternoon  General  Anson  received  a letter  from  Sir  John 
Lawrence  urging  the  importance  of  an  immediate  advance  on  Delhi, 
and  giving  an  outline  of  the  measures  he  proposed  to  adopt  in  the 
Punjab.  He  asked  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  give  a general  sanction 
to  the  arrangements,  and  concluded  with  these  words : “ I consider 
this  to  be  the  greatest  crisis  which  has  ever  occurred  in  India.  Our 
European  force  is  so  small  that,  unless  effectively  handled  in  the  outset, 
and  brought  to  bear,  it  will  prove  unequal  to  the  emergency.  But 
with  vigour  and  promptitude,  under  the  blessing  of  God,  it  will  prove 
irresistible.’ 

Anson  naturally  hesitated  to  advance  with  an  inefficient  and  only 
partially  equipped  force  against  a strongly-fortified  city  with  an  immense 
armed  population,  defended  by  many  thousand  desperate  mutineers, 
and  in  his  reply  (dated  the  17th  May)  he  put  the  case  plainly  before  Sir 
John  Lawrence.  He  pointed  out  that  the  Europeans  were  without 
tents  ; that  there  were  no  guns  at  Umballa  or  Meerut  heavier  than  six 
or  nine  pounders  with  which  to  batter  down  the  walls  of  Delhi ; that 
the  required  imount  of  carriage  could  not  be  provided  in  less  than 
sixteen  or  twenty  days;  and  that  the  three  Native  corps  at  Umballa 
could  not  be  depended  upon.  He  asked  Sir  John  whether  he  considered 
‘ it  would  be  prudent  to  risk  the  small  European  force  we  have  here  in 
an  enterprise  against  Delhi,’  and  he  wrote  : ‘ Mjr  own  view  of  the  state 
of  things  now  is,  by  carefully  collecting  our  resources,  having  got  rid  of 
the  bad  materials  which  we  cannot  trust,  and  having  supplied  their 
places  with  others  of  a better  sort,  it  would  not  be  very  long  before  we 
could  proceed,  without  a chance  of  failure,  in  whatever  direction  we 
might  please.’  Adding,  ‘ this  is  now  the  opinion  of  all  here  whom  I 
have  consulted  — the  Major-General  and  Brigadier,  the  Adjutant- 
General,  Quartermaster- General  and  Commissary-General.’  Anson 
concluded  his  letter  with  the  following  words : 1 It  would  give  me 


died  within  ten  days  ; Colonel  Chester,  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  was 
killed  at  Badli-ki-Serai  on  the  8th  June,  and  Sir  Henry  Barnard  died  at  Delhi 
on  the  5th  July. 

* See  Kaye’s  ‘History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,’  vol.  ii. , p.  120. 


56  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

great  satisfaction  to  have  your  views  upon  the  present  crisis,  for  I would 
trust  to  them  more  than  to  my  experience.’ 

John  Lawrence,  who  was  straining  every  nerve  to  check  the  Mutiny 
and  prevent  a general  rising  of  the  population,  was  impatient  at  the 
idea  of  delay,  and  lost  no  time  in  giving  Anson  his  opinion.  He 
telegraphed  it  briefly  on  the  20th,  and  the  following  day  he  wrote  to 
the  effect  that  he  knew  Delhi  well,  having  been  stationed  there  for 
nearly  thirteen  years,  and  it  seemed  incredible  to  him  that  mutineers 
could  hold  and  defend  it ; his  belief  was  1 that,  with  good  management 
on  the  part  of  the  civil  officers,  it  would  open  its  gates  on  the  approach 
of  our  troops.’  He  admitted  that  ‘ on  military  principles,  in  the  present 
state  of  affairs,  it  may  not  be  expedient  to  advance  on  Delhi  until  the 
Meerut  force  is  prepared  to  act.’  But  he  protested  against  European 
soldiers  being  ‘ cooped  up  in  their  cantonments,  tamely  awaiting  the 
progress  of  events.’  He  went  on  to  say  : ‘ Pray  only  reflect  on  the 
W'hole  history  of  India.  Where  have  we  failed  when  we  acted  vigor- 
ously ? Where  have  we  succeeded  when  guided  by  timid  counsels  ? 
Clive  with  1,200  men  fought  at  Plassy,  in  opposition  to  the  advice  of 
his  leading  officers,  beat  40,000  men,  and  conquered  Bengal.’ 

That  Sir  John  Lawrence  greatly  under-estimated  the  difficulties 
which  Anson  had  to  overcome  we  now  know.  Delhi  did  not  open  its 
gates  on  our  approach,  but  for  more  than  three  months  defied  all  our 
efforts  to  capture  it.  And  in  his  eagerness  to  get  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  think  as  he  did,  the  resolute  Chief  Commissioner  forgot  that 
Clive— not  with  1,200  men,  but  with  3,000  disciplined  troops — had  to 
deal  in  the  open  field  with  an  enemy  little  better  than  a rabble ; 
whereas  Anson  had  to  attack  a strong  fortress,  amply  supplied  with 
stores  and  ammunition,  possessing  a powerful  armament,  and  held  by 
soldiers  who  were  not  only  well  trained  and  equipped,  but  were  fighting 
for  their  lives,  and  animated  by  religious  fanaticism. 

Still,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  John  Lawrence’s  views  as  to  the 
necessity  for  Delhi  being  taken  at  all  hazards  were  correct.  The 
Governor-General  held  the  same  opinion,  and  strongly  urged  it  upon 
Anson,  who  loyally  responded,  and  during  the  short  time  he  remained 
at  Umballa  strenuously  exerted  himself  to  equip  the  troops  destined  for 
the  arduous  task. 

While  preparing  for  his  advance  on  the  Moghul  capital,  Anson  did 
not  neglect  to  provide,  as  far  as  lay  in  his  power,  for  the  safety  of 
Umballa.  The  soldiers’  wives  and  children  were  sent  to  Kasauli ; a 
place  of  refuge  was  made  for  the  non-combatants  at  the  church,  round 
which  an  entrenchment  was  thrown;  a garrison,  about  600  strong, was 
formed  of  the  sick  and  weakly  men  of  the  several  European  regiments, 
assisted  by  some  of  the  Patiala  troops ; and  as  an  additional  security 
half  the  Native  corps  were  sent  into  the  district,  and  the  other  half  with 
the  column  to  Delhi. 


THE  PHULKIAN  FAMILY 


57 


i857] 

John  Lawrence  had  strongly  advocated  the  policy  of  trusting  the 
Maharaja  of  Patiala  and  the  Rajas  of  Jhind  and  Nabha.  The  attitude 
of  these  Chiefs  was  of  extreme  importance,  for  if  they  had  not  been 
well  disposed  towards  us,  our  communication  with  the  Punjab  would 
have  been  imperilled.  There  was  therefore  much  anxiety  at  Uinballa 
as  to  the  course  Patiala,  Jhind,  and  Nabha  (the  three  principal  members 
of  the  great  Phulkian  family)  would  elect  to  take.  Douglas  Forsyth,* 
Deputy-Commissioner  of  Umballa,  who  was  a personal  friend  of  the 
Maharaja  of  Patiala,  at  once  sought  an  interview  with  him.  He  was 
beginning  to  explain  to  the  Maharaja  the  difficulties  of  the  situation, 
when  he  was  interrupted  by  His  Highness,  who  said  he  was  aware  of 
all  that  had  happened ; on  which  Forsyth  asked  if  it  was  true  that 
emissaries  from  tlia  King  of  Delhi  had  come  to  Tatiala.  The  Maharaja 
pointed  to  some  men  seated  at  a little  distance,  saying,  ‘ There  they 
are.’  Forsyth  then  asked  for  a word  in  private.  As  soon  as  they  were 
alone,  he  addressed  the  Maharaja  thus : ‘ Maharaja  sahib,  answer 
me  one  question : Are  you  for  us,  or  against  us  ?’  The  Maharaja’s 
reply  was  very  hearty : * As  long  as  I live  I am  yours,  but  you  know  I 
have  enemies  in  my  own  country  ; some  of  my  relations  are  against 
me — my  brother  for  one.  What  do  you  want  done?’  Forsyth  then 
asked  the  Maharaja  to  *end  some  of  his  troops  towards  Ivurnal  to  keep 
open  the  Grand  Trunk  Road.  The  Maharaja  agreed  on  the  under- 
standing that  Europeans  should  soon  be  sent  to  support  them — a very 
necessary  condition,  for  he  knew  that  his  men  could  only  be  trusted  so 
long  as  there  was  no  doubt  of  our  ultimate  success. 

Patiala  was  true  to  his  word,  and  throughout  the  Mutiny  the  Phulkian 
Chiefs  remained  perfectly  loyal,  and  performed  the  important  service 
of  keeping  open  communication  between  Delhi  and  the  Punjab. f 

On  the  19tli  May  General  Anson  was  cheered  by  hearing  from  John 
Laurence  that  the  Corps  of  Guides  and  four  trusty  Punjab  regiments 
were  proceeding  by  forced  marches  to  join  him.  On  the  21st  he 
received  a message  from  the  Governor- General  informing  him  that 
European  troops  were  coming  from  Madras,  Bombay,  and  Ceylon.  He 
also  heard  of  the  arrival  of  the  siege-train  at  Umballa,  and  he  had  the 
satisfaction  of  telegraphing  to  the  Chief  Commissioner  that  the  first 
detachment  of  the  column  destined  for  Delhi  had  started. 

On  the  23rd  the  Commander-in-Chief  communicated  his  plan  of 
operations  to  General  Hewitt.  It  was  as  follows : Two  brigades  were 
to  advance  from  Umballa,  commanded  by  Brigadier  Hallifax  of  the 
75th  Foot,  and  Colonel  Jones  of  the  60th  Rifles ; and  one  brigade  from 
Meerut,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  Archdale  Wilson.  The  two 
former  were  to  be  concentrated  at  Kurnal  by  the  30th  May,  and  were 
then  to  advance,  under  General  Anson,  so  as  to  arrive  opposite  Baghput 

* The  late  Sir  Douglas  Forsyth,  K.C.S.I. 

+ See  ‘The  Life  of  Sir  Douglas  Forsyth.’ 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


58 


[1857 


on  the  5th  June,  at  which  place  they  were  to  be  joined  by  the  Meerut 
brigade,  and  the  united  force  was  then  to  proceed  to  Delhi. 

All  his  arrangements  being  now  completed,  Anson  left  Umballa  on 
the  24th  May,  and  reached  Kurnal  the  following  morning.  On  the  26th 
he  was  struck  down  by  cholera,  and  in  a few  hours  succumbed  to  that 
fatal  disease.  His  last  words  expressed  a hope  that  his  country  would 
do  him  justice,  and  it  is  grievous  to  feel  that,  in  estimating  his  work 
and  the  difficulties  he  had  to  encounter,  full  justice  has  not  been  done 
him.  Anson  has  been  undeservedly  blamed  for  vacillation  and  want 
of  promptitude.  He  was  told  to  ‘ make  short  work  of  Delhi,’  but  before 
Delhi  could  be  taken  more  men  had  perished  than  his  whole  force  at 
that  time  amounted  to.  The  advice  to  march  upon  Delhi  was  sound, 
but  had  it  been  rashly  followed  disaster  would  have  been  the  inevitable 
result.  Had  the  Commander-in-Chief  been  goaded  into  advancing 
without  spare  ammunition  and  siege  Artillery,  or  with  an  insufficient 
force,  he  must  have  been  annihilated  by  the  overwhelming  masses  of 
the  mutineers — those  mutineers,  who,  we  shall  see  later,  stoutly 
opposed  Barnard’s  greatly  augmented  force  at  Badli-ki-Serai,  would 
almost  certainly  have  repulsed,  if  not  destroyed,  a smaller  body  of 
troops. 

On  the  death  of  General  Anson  the  command  of  the  Field  Force 
devolved  on  Major-General  Sir  Henry  Barnard. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

I will  now  continue  my  story  from  the  time  I left  Peshawar  to  join 
the  Movable  Column. 

On  the  18th  May  Brigadier  Chamberlain  and  I arrived  at  Rawal 
Pindi,  where  we  joined  the  Chief  Commissioner,  who  had  got  thus  far 
on  his  way  to  his  summer  residence  in  the  Murree  Hills  when  tidings 
of  the  disaster  reached  him.  One  of  Sir  John  Lawrence’s  first  acts 
after  talking  over  matters  with  Chamberlain  was  to  summon  Edwardes 
from  Peshawar,  for  he  wished  to  consult  with  him  personally  about  the 
question  of  raising  levies  and  enlisting  more  frontier  men,  the  only  one 
of  Edwardes’s  and  Nicholson’s  proposals  regarding  which  the  Chief 
Commissioner  had  any  doubt ; it  appeared  to  him  a somewhat  risky 
step  to  take,  and  he  desired  to  give  the  matter  very  careful  considera- 
tion before  coming  to  any  decision.  I remember  being  greatly  struck 
with  the  weight  given  by  Lawrence  to  Edwardes’s  opinion.  He  called 
him  his  Councillor,  he  eagerly  sought  his  advice,  and  he  evidently 
placed  the  utmost  reliance  on  his  judgment. 

During  the  six  days  that  we  remained  at  Rawal  Pindi  waiting  for  the 


1 857] 


JOHN  LA  WRENCE'S  WISE  MEASURES 


59 


Movable  Column  to  be  assembled,  I spent  the  greater  part  of  my  time 
in  the  Chief  Commissioner’s  office,  drafting  or  copying  confidential 
letters  and  telegrams.  I thus  learned  everj’thing  that  was  happening 
in  the  Punjab,  and  became  aware  of  the  magnitude  of  the  crisis  through 
which  we  were  passing.  This  enabled  me  to  appreciate  the  tremendous 
efforts  required  to  cope  with  the  danger,  and  to  understand  that  the 
fate  of  Delhi  and  the  lives  of  our  countrymen  and  countrywomen  in 
Upper  India  depended  upon  the  action  taken  by  the  authorities  in  the 
Punjab.  I realized  that  Sir  John  Lawrence  thought  of  every  detail, 
and  how  correct  was  his  judgment  as  to  which  of  his  subordinates 
could,  or  could  not,  be  trusted.  The  many  European  women  and 
children  scattered  over  the  province  caused  him  the  greatest  anxiety, 
and  he  wisely  determined  to  collect  them  as  much  as  possible  at  hill 
stations  and  the  larger  centres,  where  they  would  be  under  the  protec- 
tion of  British  troops ; for  this  reason  he  ordered  the  families  of  the 
European  soldiers  at  Sialkot  (who  were  being  withdrawn  to  join  the 
Movable  Column)  to  be  sent  to  Lahore.  But,  notwithstanding  all  that 
had  occurred,  and  was  daily  occurring,  to  demonstrate  how  universal 
was  the  spirit  of  disaffection  throughout  the  Native  Army,  Brigadier 
Frederick  Brind,  who  commanded  at  Sialkot,  could  not  be  brought  to 
believe  that  the  regiments  serving  under  his  command  would  ever 
prove  disloyal,  and  he  strongly  objected  to  carry  out  an  order  which  he 
denounced  as  ‘ showing  a want  of  confidence  in  the  sepoys.’  John 
Lawrence,  however,  stood  firm.  Brind  was  ordered  to  despatch  the 
soldiers’  families  without  delay,  and  advised  to  urge  the  civilians  and 
military  officers  to  send  away  their  families  at  the  same  time.  A few 
of  the  ladies  and  children  were  sent  off,  but  some  were  allowed  to 
remain  until  the  troops  mutinied,  when  the  Brigadier  was  one  of  the 
first  to  pay  the  penalty  of  his  misplaced  confidence,  being  shot  down  by 
one  of  his  own  orderlies. 

We  had  not  been  long  at  Rawal  Pindi  before  we  heard  that  the  un- 
easiness at  Peshawar  was  hourly  increasing,  and  that  the  detachment 
of  the  55th  Native  Infantry*  at  Nowshera  had  mutinied  and  broken 
open  the  magazine.  The  military  force  in  the  Peshawar  valley  had 
been  considerably  weakened  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  27th  Foot 
and  Corps  of  Guides;  it  was  evident  that  disaffection  was  rapidly 
spreading,  and  what  was  still  more  alarming  was  the  ominously  rest- 
less feelings  amongst  the  principal  tribes  on  the  frontier.  Nicholson 
encountered  considerable  difficulty  in  raising  local  levies,  and  there  was 
a general  unwillingness  to  enlist.  Our  disasters  in  Kabul  in  1841-42 
had  not  been  forgotten  ; our  cause  was  considered  desperate,  and  even 
Nicholson  could  not  persuade  men  to  join  it.  It  was  clear  that  this 
state  of  affairs  must  not  be  allowed  to  continue,  and  that  some  decisive 

* The  Head-Quarters  of  this  regiment  had  been  sent  to  Mardan  in  place  of 
the  Guides. 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


60 


[1857 


measures  must  quickly  be  taken,  or  there  would  be  a general  rising 
along  the  frontier. 

Matters  seemed  to  be  drawing  to  a head,  when  it  was  wisely  deter- 
mined to  disarm  the  Native  regiments  at  Peshawar  without  delay. 
This  conclusion  was  come  to  at  midnight  on  the  21st  May,  when  the 
news  of  the  unfortunate  occurrences  at  Nowshera  reached  Edwardes, 
who  had  returned  that  morning  from  Rawal  Pindi.  He  and  Nicholson 
felt  that  no  time  was  to  be  lost,  for  if  the  sepoys  heard  that  the  regi- 
ment at  Nowshera  had  mutinied,  it  would  be  too  late  to  attempt  to 
disarm  them.  Going  forthwith  to  the  Brigadier’s  house,  they  com- 
municated their  views  to  Sydney  Cotton,  who  thoroughly  appreciated 
the  urgency  of  the  case,  and,  acting  with  the  most  praiseworthy 
decision,  summoned  the  commanding  officers  of  all  the  Native  regi- 
ments to  be  at  his  house  at  daybreak. 

When  they  were  assembled,  the  Brigadier  carefully  explained  to  the 
officers  how  matters  stood.  He  pointed  out  to  them  that  their  regi- 
ments were  known  to  be  on  the  verge  of  mutiny,  and  that  they  must 
be  disarmed  forthwith,  ending  by  expressing  his  great  regret  at  having 
to  take  so  serious  a step. 

The  officers  were  quite  aghast.  They  were  persistent  and  almost  in- 
subordinate in  expressing  their  conviction  that  the  measure  was  wholly 
uncalled-for,  that  the  sepoys  were  thoroughly  loyal,  and  that,  notwith- 
standing what  had  occurred  in  other  places,  they  had  perfect  confidence 
in  their  men. 

The  Brigadier,  who  knew  the  officers  well,  felt  that  every  allowance 
should  be  made  for  them,  called  upon  as  they  were  to  disarm  the  men 
with  whom  they  had  been  so  long  associated,  and  in  whom  they  still 
implicitly  believed.  But  although  he  regarded  the  officers’  remon- 
strances as  natural  and  excusable,  Cotton  never  wavered  in  his  decision, 
for  he  was  experienced  enough  to  see  that  the  evil  was  widespread  and 
deep-seated,  and  that  any  display  of  confidence  or  attempt  at  concilia- 
tion in  dealing  with  the  disaffected  regiments  would  be  worse  than 
useless. 

The  parade,  which  was  ordered  for  7 a.m.,  was  conducted  with  great 
judgment.  The  European  troops  were  skilfully  disposed  so  as  to  render 
resistance  useless,  and  four  out  of  the  five  regular  Native  regiments 
were  called  upon  to  lay  down  their  arms.  The  fifth  regiment — the 
21st  Native  Inf  an  try*-— was  exempted  from  this  indignity,  partly 
because  it  had  shown  no  active  symptoms  of  disaffection,  was  well 
commanded  and  had  good  officers,  and  partly  because  it  would  have 
been  extremely  difficult  to  carry  on  the  military  duties  of  the  station 
without  some  Native  Infantry. 

The  two  regiments  of  Irregular  Cavalry  were  also  spared  the  disgrace 


Now  the  1st  Bengal  Infantry. 


SALUTARY  EFFECT  IN  THE  VALLEY 


bi 


l»57] 


of  being  disarmed.  It  was  hoped  that  the  stake  the  Native  officers  and 
men  had  in  the  service  (their  horses  and  arms  being  their  own  property) 
would  prevent  them  from  taking  an  active  part  in  the  Mutiny,  and  it 
was  believed  that  the  British  officers  who  served  with  them,  and  who 
for  the  most  part  were  carefully  selected,  had  sufficient  influence 
over  their  men  to  keep  them  straight.  This  hope  proved  to  be  not 
altogether  without  foundation,  for  of  the  eighteen  regiments  of  Irregular 
Cavalry  which  existed  in  May,  1857,  eight  are  still  borne  on  the  strength 
of  the  Bengal  Army ; while  of  the  ten  regiments  of  Regular  Cavalry 
and  seventy  four  of  Infantry,  none  of  the  former,  and  only  eleven  of 
the  latter,  now  remain. 

How  immediate  and  salutary  were  the  effects  of  the  disarmament  on 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Peshawar  valley  will  be  seen  by  the  following 
account  which  Edwardes  gave  of  it.  ‘ As  we  rode  down  to  the  dis- 
arming a very  few  Chiefs  and  yeomen  of  the  country  attended  us ; and 
I remember  judging  from  their  faces  that  they  came  to  see  which  way 
the  tide  would  turn.  As  we  rode  back  friends  were  as  thick  as  summer 
flies,  and  levies  began  from  that  moment  to  come  in.’ 

The  Subadar-Major  of  the  51st — one  of  the  four  regiments  disarmed 
— had  a few  days  before  written  to  the  men  of  the  64th,  who  were 
divided  amongst  the  outposts,  calling  upon  them  to  return  to  Peshawar 
in  time  to  join  in  the  revolt  fixed  for  the  22nd  May.  The  letter  ran  ; 
‘ In  whatever  way  you  can  manage  it,  come  into  Peshawar  on  the  21st 
instant.  Thoroughly  understand  that  point ! In  fact,  eat  there  and 
drink  here.’  The  rapidity  with  which  the  disarmament  had  been 
carried  through  spoilt  the  Subadar- Major’s  little  game ; he  had,  how- 
ever, gone  too  far  to  draw  back,  and  on  the  night  of  the  22nd  he 
deserted,  taking  with  him  250  men  of  the  regiment.  His  hopes  were  a 
second  time  doomed  to  disappointment.  However  welcome  250 
muskets  might  have  been  to  the  Afridis,  250  unarmed  sepoys  were  no 
prize  ; and  as  our  neighbours  in  the  hills  had  evidently  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  our  raj  was  not  in  such  a desperate  state  as  they 
had  imagined,  and  that  their  best  policy  was  to  side  with  us,  they 
caught  the  deserters,  with  the  assistance  of  the  district  police,  and  made 
them  over  to  the  authorities.  The  men  were  all  tried  by  Court-Martial, 
and  the  Subadar-Major  was  hanged  in  the  presence  of  the  whole 
garrison. 

On  the  23rd  May,  the  day  after  the  disarmament,  news  was  received 
at  Peshawar  that  the  55th  Native  Infantry  had  mutinied  at  Mardan, 
and  that  the  10th  Irregular  Cavalry,  which  was  divided  between 
Nowshera  and  Mardan,  had  turned  against  us.  A force  was  at  once 
despatched  to  restore  order,  and  Nicholson  accompanied  it  as  political 
officer.  No  sooner  did  the  mutineers,  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  catch 
sight  of  the  approaching  column  than  they  broke  out  of  the  fort  and 
fled  towards  the  Swat  hills.  Nicholson  pursued  with  his  levies  and 


62 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

mounted  police,  and  before  night  120  fugitives  were  killed  and  as  many 
more  made  prisoners.  The  remainder  found  no  welcome  among  the 
hill  tribes,  and  eventually  became  wanderers  over  the  country  until  they 
died  or  were  killed.  Poor  Spottiswoode,  the  Colonel,  committed  suicide 
shortly  before  the  Peshawar  troops  reached  Mardan. 


CHAPTER  X. 

While  I was  employed  in  the  Chief  Commissioner’s  office  at  Rawal 
Pindi  it  became  known  that  the  Mutineers  intended  to  make  their 
stand  at  Delhi,  and  immediately  urgent  demands  came  from  the  Head- 
Quarters  of  the  army  for  troops  to  be  sent  from  the  Punjab.  Sir  John 
Lawrence  exerted  himself  to  the  uttermost,  even  to  the  extent  of 
denuding  his  own  province  to  a somewhat  dangerous  degree,  and  the 
Guides  and  1st  Punjab  Infantry,  which  had  been  told  off  for  the 
Movable  Column,  were  ordered  instead  to  proceed  to  Delhi. 

The  Guides,  a corps  second  to  none  in  Her  Majesty’s  Indian  Army, 
was  commanded  by  Captain  Daly,*  and  consisted  of  three  troops  of 
Cavalry  and  six  companies  of  Infantry.  The  regiment  had  got  as  far 
as  Attock,  when  it  received  the  order  to  proceed  to  Delhi,  and  pushed 
on  at  once  by  double  marches.  The  4th  Sikhs,  under  Captain  Rothney, 
and  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry,  under  Major  Coke,+  followed  in  quick 
succession,  and  later  on  the  following  troops  belonging  to  the  Punjab 
Frontier  Force  were  despatched  towards  Delhi : a squadron  of  the  1st 
Punjab  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  John  Watson  (my  companion  in 
Kashmir) ; a squadron  of  the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant 
Charles  Nicholsonj  (John  Nicholson’s  brother)  ; a squadron  of  the 
5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  Younghusband  ; and  the  2nd 
and  4th  Punjab  Infantry,  commanded  respectively  by  Captains 
G.  Green§  and  A.  Wilde.  || 

We  (Brigadier  Chamberlain  and  I)  remained  at  Rawal  Pindi  until 
the  24th  May  to  give  our  servants  and  horses  time  ‘o  reach  Wazirabad, 
and  then  started  on  a mail-cart  for  the  latter  place,  which  we  reached  on 
the  27th.  Lieutenant  James  Walker, IT  of  the  Bombay  Engineers, 
accompanied  us  as  the  Brigadier’s  orderly  officer. 

* The  late  General  Sir  Henry  Daly,  G.C.  B. 

t Now  General  Sir  John  Coke,  G.C.  B. 

J Afterwards  commanded  by  Lieutenant,  now  General,  Sir  Dighton 
Probyn,  V.C.,  G.C.V.O.,  K.C.B. 

§ The  late  Major-General  Sir  George  Green,  K.C.B. 

||  The  late  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Alfred  Wilde,  K.C.B.,  K.C.S.I. 

IT  The  late  General  James  Walker,  C.B.,  sometime  Surveyor-General  in 
India. 


■ 857] 


AN  INTERCEPTED  MESSAGE 


63 


The  Grand  Trunk  Road,  which  runs  in  a direct  line  from  Calcutta  to 
Peshawar,  was  then  in  course  of  construction  through  the  Punjab,  and 
in  places  was  in  rather  an  elementary  condition.  The  drivers  of  the 
mail-carts  sent  along  their  half-wild  and  entirely  unbroken  ponies  at 
racing  speed,  regardless  alike  of  obstacles  and  consequences.  With  an 
enterprising  coachman  the  usual  pace  was  about  twelve  miles  an  hour, 
including  stoppages.  As  we  w-ere  recklessly  flying  along,  the  Brigadier, 
who  was  sitting  in  front,  perceived  that  one  of  the  reins  had  become 
unbuckled,  and  warned  Walker  and  me  to  look  out  for  an  upset.  Had 
the  coachman  not  discovered  the  state  of  his  tackle  all  might  have  been 
well,  for  the  ponies  needed  no  guiding  along  the  well-known  road. 
Unfortunately,  however,  he  became  aware  of  what  had  happened,  lost 
his  head,  and  pulled  the  reins ; the  animals  dashed  off  the  road,  there 
was  a crash,  and  we  found  ourselves  on  the  ground,  scattered  in 
different  directions.  No  great  damage  was  done,  and  in  a few  minutes 
we  had  righted  the  cart,  re-harnessed  the  ponies,  and  were  rushing  along 
as  before. 

In  order  that  the  authorities  at  Rawal  Pindi  might  be  able  to  com- 
municate with  the  Movable  Column  while  on  the  march  and  away  from 
telegraph  stations,  which  were  few  and  far  between  in  1857,  a signaller 
accompanied  us,  and  travelled  with  his  instruments  on  a second  mail- 
cart,  and  wherever  we  halted  for  the  day  he  attached  his  wire  to  the 
main  line.  He  had  just  completed  the  attachment  on  our  arrival  at 
Wazirabad,  when  I observed  that  the  instrument  was  working,  and  on 
drawing  the  signaller’s  attention  to  it,  he  read  off  a message  which  was 
at  that  moment  being  transmitted  to  the  Chief  Commissioner,  informing 
him  of  the  death  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  at  Kurnal  the  previous 
day.  This  sad  news  did  not  directly  affect  the  Movable  Column, 
as  it  had  been  organized  by,  and  was  under  the  orders  of,  the 
Punjab  Government,  wilick  for  the  time  being  had  become  responsible 
for  the  military,  as  well  as  the  civil,  administration  in  the  north  of 
India. 

The  column  had  marched  into  Wazirabad  the  day  before  we  arrived. 
It  consisted  of  Major  Dawes’  troop  of  European  Horse  Artillery,  a 
European  battery  of  Field  Artillery,  commanded  by  Captain  Bourchier,* 
and  Her  Majesty’s  52nd  Light  Infantry,  commanded  by  Colonel  George 
Campbell.  In  addition,  and  with  a view  to  reducing  the  Native 
garrison  of  Sialkot,  a wing  of  the  9th  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  and  the 
35th  Native  Infantry  were  attached  to  the  column. 

My  first  duty  at  Wazirabad  was  to  call  upon  the  senior  officer, 
Colonel  Campbell,  and  inform  him  that  Brigadier  Chamberlain  had 
come  to  take  over  command  of  the  Movable  Column.  I found  the 
Colonel  lying  on  his  bed  trying  to  make  himself  as  comfortable  as  it 

* Now  General  Sir  George  Bourchier,  K.C.B. 


64 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

was  possible  with  the  thermometer  at  117°  Fahienheit.  We  had  not 
met  before,  and  he  certainly  received  me  in  a very  off-hand  manner. 
He  never  moved  from  his  recumbent  position,  and  on  my  delivering 
my  message,  he  told  me  he  was  not  aware  that  the  title  of  Brigadier 
carried  military  rank  with  it ; that  he  understood  Brigadier  Chamberlain 
was  only  a Lieutenant-Colonel,  whereas  he  held  the  rank  of  Colonel  in 
Her  Majesty’s  army  ; and  that,  under  these  circumstances,  he  must 
decline  to  acknowledge  Brigadier  Chamberlain  as  his  senior  officer.  I 
replied  that  I would  give  his  message  to  the  Brigadier,  and  took  my 
leave. 

When  Chamberlain  heard  what  had  occurred,  he  desired  me  to  return 
to  Campbell  and  explain  that  he  had  no  wish  to  dispute  the  question  of 
relative  seniority,  and  that  in  assuming  command  of  the  column  he 
was  only  carrying  out  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  India. 
Campbell,  who  technically  speaking  had  the  right  on  his  side,  was  not 
to  be  appeased,  and  requested  me  to  inform  the  Brigadier  of  his 
determination  not  to  serve  under  an  officer  whom  he  considered  to  be 
his  junior. 

This  was  not  a pleasant  beginning  to  our  duties  with  the  column,  and 
Chamberlain  thought  that  we  had  better  take  our  departure  and  leave 
Campbell  in  command  until  the  question  could  be  settled  by  superior 
authority.  Campbell  was  accordingly  asked  to  march  the  troops  to 
Lahore,  to  which  place  we  continued  our  journey  by  mail-cart. 

At  the  same  time  a reference  was  made  to  Sir  John  Lawrence  and 
General  Beed,  which  resulted  in  the  decision  that,  under  the  peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  case,  it  was  essential  that  an  officer  of  Indian 
experience  should  be  in  command  of  the  column,  and  that  Campbell, 
having  only  been  a very  short  time  in  the  country,  did  not  fulfil  this 
condition ; but  Campbell  was  told  that,  if  he  objected  to  serve  under 
Chamberlain,  he  could  remain  at  Lahore  with  the  Head-Quarters  of 
his  regiment.  Campbell,  who  at  heart  was  really  a very  nice  fellow 
and  an  excellent  officer,  would  not  be  separated  from  the  52nd,  and 
agreed  to  serve  under  the  Brigadier,  reserving  to  himself  the  right  of 
protesting  when  the  new  Commander-in-Chief  should  arrive  in  India. 

There  was  probably  another  reason  for  Campbell  not  wishing  to 
serve  under  Chamberlain  besides  that  of  being  senior  to  him  in  the 
army,  in  the  fact  that  the  Brigadier  was  a servant  of  ‘ John  Company,’ 
while  Campbell  belonged  to  the  ‘ Queen’s  Service.’  From  the  time  of 
the  establishment  of  a local  army  there  had  existed  an  absurd  and 
unfortunate  jealousy  between  the  officers  of  the  Queen’s  and  Com- 
pany’s services,  and  one  of  the  best  results  of  the  Mutiny  was  its  gradual 
disappearance.  This  ill-feeling  influenced  not  only  fellow-countrymen, 
but  relations,  even  brothers,  if  they  belonged  to  the  different  services, 
and  was  distinctly  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  tho  Government.  It 
is  difficult  to  understand  how  so  puerile  a sentiment  could  have  been  so 


ROBERT  MONTGOMERY 


i8S7] 


65 


long  indulged  in  by  officers  who  no  doubt  considered  themselves  sensible 
Englishmen.* 

On  the  31st  May  we  arrived  at  Lahore,  where  we  found  everyone  in 
a state  of  considerable  excitement.  Lahore  was  and  is  the  great  centre 
of  the  Punjab,  and  to  it  non-combatants  and  English  ladies  with  their 
children  were  hurrying  from  all  the  outlying  districts.  In  the  city 
itself  there  was  a mixed  population  of  nearly  100,000,  chiefly  Sikhs  and 
Mahomedans,  many  of  the  former  old  soldiers  who  had  served  in  the 
Khalsa  Army.  The  fort,  which  was  within  the  walls  of  the  city,  was 
garrisoned  by  half  a regiment  of  sepoys,  one  company  of  European 
Infantry,  and  a few  European  Artillerymen.  Mian  Mir,  five  miles  off, 
was  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Lahore  division  ; it  was  a long,  straggling 
cantonment,  laid  out  for  a much  larger  force  than  it  has  ever  been 
found  necessary  to  place  there,  with  the  European  Infantry  at  one  end 
and  the  European  Artillery  at  the  other,  separated  by  Native  troops. 
This  arrangement  (which  existed  in  almost  every  station  in  India)  is 
another  proof  of  the  implicit  confidence  placed  in  the  Native  army — a 
confidence  in  mercenary  soldiers  of  alien  races  which  seems  all  the 
more  surprising  when  we  call  to  mind  the  warnings  that  for  nearly  a 
hundred  years  had  been  repeatedly  given  of  the  possibility  of  disaffection 
existing  amongst  Native  troops. 

There  were  four  Native  regiments  at  Mian  Mir,  one  of  Cavalry  and 
three  of  Infantry,  while  the  European  portion  of  the  garrison  consisted 
of  one  weak  Infantry  regiment,  two  troops  of  Horse  Artillery,  and  four 
companies  of  Foot  Artillery.  This  fore  3 was  commanded  by  Brigadier 
Corbett,  of  the  Bengal  Army  ; he  had  been  nearly  forty  3’ears  in  the 
service,  was  mentally  and  physically  vigorous,  and  had  no  fear  of 
responsibility.  Robert  Montgomeryf  was  then  chief  civil  officer  at 
Lahore.  He  was  of  a most  gentle  and  benevolent  nature,  with  a 
rubicund  countenance  and  a short,  somewhat  portlj’  figure,  which 
characteristics  led  to  his  being  irreverently  called  ‘ Pickwick,’  and 
probably  if  he  had  lived  in  less  momentous  times  he  would  never  have 
been  credited  with  the  great  qualities  which  the  crisis  in  the  Punjab 
proved  him  to  possess. 

On  receipt  of  the  telegraphic  news  of  the  outbreaks  at  Meerut  and 
Delhi,  Montgomery  felt  that  immediate  action  was  necessary.  He  at 
once  set  to  work  to  discover  the  temper  of  the  Native  troops  at  Mian 
Mir,  and  soon  ascertained  that  they  were  disaffected  to  the  core,  and 
were  only  waiting  to  hear  from  their  friends  in  the  south  to  break  into 


* Now,  except  for  one  short  interval,  every  officer  who  has  joined  the  Indian 
Army  since  1861  must,  in  the  first  instance,  have  belonged  or  been  attached 
to  one  of  Her  Majesty’s  British  regiments  : the  great  majority  have  been 
educated  at  Sandhurst  or  Woolwich,  and  all  feel  that  they  are  members  of 

the  same  army. 

t The  late  Sir  Robert  Montgomery,  G.C.B. 


5 


66 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

open  mutiny.  He  thoroughly  understood  the  Native  character,  and 
realized  the  danger  to  the  whole  province  of  there  being  anything  in 
the  shape  of  a serious  disturbance  at  its  capital ; so  after  consulting  his 
various  officials,  Montgomery  decided  to  suggest  to  the  Brigadier  the 
advisability  of  disarming  the  sepoys,  or,  if  that  were  considered  too 
strong  a measure,  of  taking  their  ammunition  from  them.  Corbett  met 
hi m quite  half-way ; he  also  saw  that  the  danger  was  imminent,  and 
that  prompt  action  was  necessary,  but  he  not  unnaturally  shrank  from 
taking  the  extreme  step  of  disarming  men  whose  loyalty  had  never  until 
then  been  doubted — a step,  moreover,  which  he  knew  would  be  keenly 
resented  by  all  the  regimental  officers — he  therefore  at  first  only  agreed 
to  deprive  the  sepoys  of  their  ammunition  ; later  in  the  day,  however, 
after  thinking  the  matter  over,  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would 
be  better  to  adopt  Montgomery’s  bolder  proposal,  and  he  informed  him 
accordingly  that  he  would  ‘ go  the  whole  hog.  ’ 

I do  not  think  that  Corbett’s  action  on  this  occasion  has  been  suf- 
ficiently appreciated.  That  he  decided  rightly  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
but  very  few  officers  holding  commands  in  India  at  that  time  would 
have  accepted  such  responsibility.  His  knowledge  as  to  what  had 
happened  at  Meerut  and  Delhi  was  based  on  one  or  two  meagre 
telegrams,  and  the  information  Montgomery  gave  him  as  to  the 
treacherous  intentions  of  the  sepoys  at  Mian  Mir  had  been  obtained  by 
means  of  a spy,  who,  it  was  quite  possible,  might  have  been  actuated 
by  interested  motives. 

Having  made  up  his  mind  what  should  be  done,  Corbett  had  the  good 
sense  to  understand  that  success  depended  on  its  being  done  quickly, 
and  on  the  Native  troops  being  kept  absolutely  in  the  dark  as  to  what 
was  about  to  take  place.  A general  parade  was  ordered  for  the  next 
morning,  the  13th  May,  and  it  was  wisely  determined  not  to  put 
off  a ball  which  was  being  given  that  evening  to  the  officers  of 
the  81st  Foot.  The  secret  was  confided  to  very  few,  and  the  great 
majority  of  those  who  were  taking  part  in  the  entertainment  were 
ignorant  of  the  reason  for  a parade  having  been  ordered  the  following 
morning — an  unusual  proceeding  which  caused  a certain  amount  of 
grumbling. 

When  the  sepoys  were  drawn  up,  it  was  explained  to  them  in  their 
own  language  that  they  were  about  to  be  deprived  of  their  arms,  in 
order  to  put  temptation  out  of  their  reach,  and  save  them  from  the 
disgrace  of  being  led  away  by  the  evil  example  of  other  corps.  Whilst 
they  were  being  thus  addressed,  the  Horse  Artillery  and  81st  Foot  took 
up  a second  line  immediately  in  rear  of  the  Native  regiments,  the  guns 
being  quietly  loaded  with  grape  during  the  manoeuvre.  The  regiments 
were  then  directed  to  change  front  to  the  rear,  when  they  found  them- 
selves face  to  face  with  the  British  troops.  The  order  was  given  to  the 
sepoys  to  ‘ pile  arms  one  of  the  regiments  hesitated,  but  only  for  a 


DISARMAMENT  AT  MIAN  MIR 


1857] 


67 


moment;  resistance  was  hopeless,  and  the  word  of  command  was 
sullenly  obeyed. 

The  same  morning  the  fort  of  Lahore  was  secured.  Three  companies 
of  the  81st  marched  into  it  at  daylight,  relieved  the  sepoys  of  their 
guards,  and  ordered  them  to  lay  down  their  arms.  Another  company 
of  the  same  regiment  travelled  through  the  night  in  carriages  to 
Umritsar,  the  holy  city  of  the  Sikhs,  and  occupied  the  fortress  of 
Govindgarh.  Montgomery  had  been  very  anxious  about  these  two 
strongholds,  and  it  was  a great  satisfaction  to  him  to  know  that  they 
were  at  length  safely  guarded  by  British  bayonets. 

Although,  as  I have  said,  we  found  Lahore  in  a state  of  considerable 
excitement,  it  was  satisfactory  to  see  how  fully  the  situation  had  been 
grasped,  and  how  everything  that  was  possible  had  been  done  to 
maintain  order,  and  show  the  people  of  the  Punjab  that  we  were 
prepared  to  hold  our  own.  Montgomery’s  foresight  and  decision,  and 
Corbett’s  hearty  and  willing  co-operation,  checked,  if  not  altogether 
stopped,  what,  under  less  energetic  management,  would  assuredly  have 
resulted  in  very  grievous  trouble.  Excitement  was  inevitable.  There 
was  a general  stir  throughout  the  province.  Laho'e  was  crowded  with 
the  families  of  European  soldiers,  and  with  ladies  who  had  come  there 
from  various  parts  of  the  Punjab,  all  in  terrible  anxiety  as  to  what 
might  be  the  ultimate  fate  of  their  husbands  and  relatives ; some  of 
whom  were  with  Native  regiments,  whose  loyalty  was  more  than 
doubtful ; some  with  the  Movable  Column,  the  destination  of  which 
was  uncertain ; while  others  were  already  on  their  way  to  join  the  army 
hurrying  to  Delhi. 

The  difficulty  with  Campbell  having  been  settled,  Chamberlain 
assumed  the  command  of  the  Movable  Column,  the  advent  of  which  on 
the  2nd  June  was  hailed  with  delight  by  all  the  Europeans  at  Lahore. 
A regiment  of  British  Infantry  and  two  batteries  of  Artillery  afforded 
a much  needed  support  to  the  handful  of  British  soldiers  keeping  guard 
over  the  great  capital  of  the  Punjab,  and  gave  confidence  to  the  Sikhs 
and  others  disposed  to  be  loyal,  but  who  were  doubtful  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  siding  with  us. 

The  disturbing  element  was  the  Native  troops  which  accompanied 
the  column.  They  had  not  shown  openty  that  they  contemplated 
mutiny,  but  we  knew  that  they  were  not  to  be  trusted,  and  were  only 
watching  for  an  opportunity  to  break  out  and  escape  to  Delhi  with 
their  arms. 

I was  living  with  the  Brigadier  in  a house  only  a few  minutes’  walk 
from  the  garden  where  the  Native  regiments  were  encamped,  and  the 
spies  we  were  employing  to  watch  them  had  orders  to  come  to  me 
whenever  anything  suspicious  should  occur.  During  the  night  of  the 
8th  June  one  of  these  men  awoke  me  with  the  news  that  the  85th 
Native  Infantry  intended  to  revolt  at  daybreak,  and  that  some  of  them 

5—2 


68 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[«857 

had  already  loaded  their  muskets.  I awoke  the  Brigadier,  who  directed 
me  to  go  at  once  to  the  British  officers  of  the  regiment,  tell  them  what 
we  had  heard,  and  that  he  would  be  with  them  shortly.  As  soon  as 
the  Brigadier  arrived  the  men  were  ordered  to  fall  in,  and  on  their 
arms  being  examined  two  of  them  were  found  to  have  been  loaded. 
The  sepoys  to  whom  the  muskets  belonged  were  made  prisoners,  and  I 
was  ordered  to  see  them  lodged  in  the  police-station. 

Chamberlain  determined  to  lose  no  time  in  dealing  with  the  case, 
and  although  Drum-Head  Courts-Martial  were  then  supposed  to  be 
obsolete,  he  decided  to  revive,  for  this  occasion,  that  very  useful  means 
of  disposing,  in  time  of  war,  of  grave  cases  of  crime. 

The  Brigadier  thought  it  desirable  that  the  Court-Martial  should  be 
composed  of  Native,  rather  than  British,  officers,  as  being  likely  to  be 
looked  upon  by  the  prisoners  as  a more  impartial  tribunal,  under1  the 
peculiar  circumstances  in  which  we  were  placed.  This  was  made 
possible  by  the  arrival  of  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry — Coke’s  Rifles — a 
grand  regiment  under  a grand  Commander.  Raised  in  1849,  composed 
chiefly  of  Sikhs  and  Pathans,  and  possessing  Native  officers  of 
undoubted  loyalty,  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry  had  taken  part  in  almost 
every  frontier  expedition  during  the  previous  eight  years.  Its  history 
was  a glorious  record  of  faithful  and  devoted  service,  such  as  can  only 
be  rendered  by  brave  men  led  by  officers  in  whom  they  believe  and 
trust.*  The  Subadar-Major  of  the  corps  was  a man  called  Mir  Jaffir, 
a most  gallant  Afghan  soldier,  who  entered  the  British  service  during 
the  first  Afghan  war,  and  distinguished  himself  greatly  in  all  the  sub- 
sequent frontier  fights.  This  Native  officer  was  made  president  of  the 
Court-Martial.  The  prisoners  were  found  guilty  of  mutiny,  and 
sentenced  to  death.  Chamberlain  decided  that  they  should  be  blown 
away  from  guns,  in  the  presence  of  their  own  comrades,  as  being  the 
most  awe-inspiring  means  of  carrying  the  sentence  into  effect. f A 
parade  was  at  once  ordered.  The  troops  were  drawn  up  so  as  to  form 
three  sides  of  a square ; on  the  fourth  side  were  two  guns.  As  the 
prisoners  were  being  brought  to  the  parade,  one  of  them  asked  me  if 
they  were  going  to  be  blown  from  guns.  I said,  ‘ Yes.’  He  made  no 
further  remark,  and  they  both  walked  steadily  on  until  they  readied 
the  guns,  to  which  they  were  bound,  when  one  of  them  requested  that 
some  rupees  he  had  on  his  person  might  be  saved  for  his  relations. 
The  Brigadier  answered : ‘ It  is  too  late  ! ’ The  word  of  command  was 

* During  the  operations  in  the  Kohat  Pass  in  February,  18>0.  within 
twelve  months  of  the  corps  being  raised,  several  of  the  men  were  killed  and 
wounded.  Among  the  latter  was  a Pathan  named  Mahomed  Gul.  He  was 
shot  through  the  body  in  two  places,  and  as  Coke  sat  by  him  while  he  was 
dying,  lie  said,  with  a smile  on  his  face:  'Sahib,  I am  happy  ; but  promise 
me  one  thing— don’t  let  my  old  mother  want.  I leave  her  to  your  care.’ 

f Awe  inspiring  certainly,  but  probably  the  most  humane,  as  being  a sure 
and  instantaneous  mode  of  execution. 


FEROZEPORE 


1857] 


69 


given ; the  guns  went  off  simultaneously,  and  the  two  mutineers  were 
launched  into  eternity. 

It  was  a terrible  sight,  and  one  likely  to  haunt  the  beholder  for 
many  a long  day;  but  that  was  what  was  intended.  I carefully 
watched  the  sepoys'  faces  to  see  how  it  affected  them.  They  were 
evidently  startled  at  the  swift  retribution  which  had  overtaken  their 
guilty  comrades,  but  looked  more  crest-fallen  than  shocked  or  horrified, 
and  we  soon  learnt  that  their  determination  to  mutiny,  and  make  the 
best  of  their  way  to  Delhi,  was  in  nowise  changed  by  the  scene  they 
had  witnessed. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

For  a few  days  after  our  arrival  at  Lahore  nothing  could  be  settled  as 
to  the  further  movements  of  the  column.  It  was  wanted  in  all  parts 
of  the  Punjab:  Ferozepore,  Multan,  Jhelum,  Sialkot,  Umritsar, 
Jullundur,  Philour,  Ludhiana — all  these  places  were  more  or  less 
disturbed,  and  all  were  clamorous  for  help. 

At  Ferozepore  the  Native  regiments*  broke  out  on  the  13th  May, 
when  they  made  a daring,  but  unsuccessful  effort  to  seize  the  arsenal, 
situated  inside  the  fort  and  the  largest  in  Upper  India.  Had  that 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  Delhi  could  not  have  been  captured 
without  very  considerable  delay,  for  the  besieging  force  depended 
mainly  upon  Ferozepore  for  the  supply  of  munitions  of  war.  The 
fort  had  been  allowed  to  fall  into  bad  repair,  and  the  mutineers  had  no 
difficulty  in  forcing  their  way  inside ; there,  fortunately,  they  were 
checked  by  the  wall  which  surrounded  the  arsenal,  and  this  obstacle, 
insignificant  as  it  was,  enabled  the  guard  to  hold  its  own.  Originally 
this  guard  consisted  entirely  of  Native  soldiers,  but,  as  I have  already 
recorded,  after  the  outbreak  at  Meerut,  Europeans  had  been  told  off 
for  the  charge  of  this  important  post ; so  strong,  however,  here  as  else- 
where, was  the  belief  in  the  loyalty  of  the  sepoys,  and  so  great  was 
the  reluctance  to  do  anything  which  might  hurt  their  feelings,  that  the 
Native  guard  was  not  withdrawn.  This  same  guard,  when  the  attack 
took  place,  did  its  best  to  assist  the  assailants,  and  even  prepared 
scaling-ladders  to  enable  the  latter  to  gain  access  to  the  magazine 
enclosure.  The  Europeans,  however,  were  equal  to  the  emergency; 
they  overpowered  and  disarmed  their  treacherous  companions,  and 
then  succeeded  in  beating  off  and  dispersing  the  attacking  party. 

Being  foiled  in  this  attempt,  the  mutineers  returned  to  the  canton- 
ment, set  fire  to  the  church  and  other  buildings,  and  then  started  for 
Delhi.  Ferozepore  had  a large  European  garrison,  a regiment  of 

* One  Cavalry  and  two  Infantry. 


7o 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

Infantry,  a battery  of  Field  Artillery,  and  a company  of  Foot  Artillery, 
and  was  supposed  to  be  able  to  look  after  itself,  although  affairs  had 
been  greatly  mismanaged. 

Multan  had  next  to  be  considered.  Matters  at  that  station  were 
very  unsettled,  and  indeed  were  causing  the  authorities  grave  anxiety, 
but  Multan  was  more  fortunate  than  many  places,  in  being  in  the 
hands  of  an  unusually  able,  experienced  officer,  Major  Crawford 
Chamberlain.  Consequently,  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  Chief 
Commissioner  agreed,  while  fully  appreciating  the  great  value  of 
Multan,  that  the  presence  of  British  troops  was  less  urgently  needed 
there  than  elsewhere,  and  it  was  decided  they  could  not  be  spared 
from  the  Punjab  for  its  protection. 

The  garrison  at  Multan  consisted  of  a troop  of  Native  Horse 
Artillery,  two  regiments  of  Native  Infantry,  and  the  1st  Irregular 
Cavalry,  composed  entirely  of  Hindustanis  from  the  neighbourhood  of 
Delhi ; while  in  the  old  Sikh  fort  there  were  about  fifty  European 
Artillerymen,  in  charge  of  a small  magazine.  The  station  was 
nominally  commanded  by  an  officer  who  had  been  thirty-four  years  in 
the  army,  and  had  great  experience  amongst  Natives ; but  he  had 
fallen  into  such  a bad  state  of  health,  that  he  was  quite  unfit  to  deal 
with  the  crisis  which  had  now  arrived.  The  command,  therefore,  wTas 
practically  exercised  by  Chamberlain.  Next  to  Delhi  and  Lahore, 
Multan  was  the  most  important  place  in  Upper  India,  as  our  com- 
munication with  the  sea  and  southern  India  depended  on  its 
preservation. 

To  Chamberlain’s  own  personality  and  extraordinary  influence  over 
the  men  of  the  1st  Irregular  Cavalry  must  be  attributed  his  success. 
His  relations  with  them  were  of  a patriarchal  nature,  and  perfect 
mutual  confidence  existed.  He  knew  his  hold  over  them  was  strong, 
and  he  determined  to  trust  them.  But  in  doing  so  he  had  really  no 
alternative — had  they  not  remained  faithful,  Multan  must  have  been 
lost  to  us.  One  of  his  first  acts  was  to  call  a meeting  at  his  house  of 
the  Native  officers  of  the  Artillery,  Infantry,  and  his  own  regiment,  to 
discuss  the  situation.  Taking  for  granted  the  absolute  loyalty  of  these 
officers,  he  suggested  that  a written  bond  should  be  given,  in  which 
the  seniors  of  each  corps  should  guarantee  the  fidelity  of  their  men. 
The  officers  of  his  regiment  rose  en  masse,  and  placing  their  signet- 
rings  on  the  table,  said:  ‘ Kabul  sir-o-chasm'  (‘Agreed  to  on  our 
lives  ’).  The  Artillery  Subadar  declared  that  his  men  had  no  scruples, 
and  would  fire  in  whichever  direction  they  were  required ; while  the 
Infantry  Native  officers  pleaded  that  they  had  no  power  over  their 
men,  and  could  give  no  guarantee.  Thus,  Chamberlain  ascertained 
that  the  Cavalry  were  loyal,  the  Artillery  doubtful,  and  the  Infantry 
were  only  biding  their  time  to  mutiny. 

Night  after  night  sepoys,  disguised  beyond  all  recognition,  attempted 


1857]  CRAWFORD  CHAMBERLAIN  AT  MULTAN  71 

to  tamper  with  the  Irregular  Cavalry.  The  Wurdi-Major,* * * §  a particu- 
larly fine,  handsome  Bangar,\  begged  Chamberlain  to  hide  himself  in 
his  house,  that  he  might  hear  for  himself  the  open  proposals  to 
mutiny,  massacre,  and  rebellion  that  were  made  to  him  ; and  the  pro- 
mises that,  if  they  succeeded  in  their  designs,  he  (the  Wurdi-Major) 
should  be  placed  upon  the  gaddi  J of  Multan  for  his  reward.  Cham- 
berlain declined  to  put  himself  in  such  a position,  fearing  he  might  not 
be  able  to  restrain  himself. 

Matters  now  came  to  a climax.  A Mahomedan  Subadar  of  one  of 
the  Native  Infantry  regiments  laid  a plot  to  murder  Chamberlain  and 
his  family.  The  plot  was  discovered  and  frustrated  by  Chamberlain’s 
own  men,  but  it  became  apparent  that  the  only  remedy  for  the  fast 
increasing  evil  was  to  disarm  the  two  Native  Infantry  regiments. 
How  was  this  to  be  accomplished  with  no  Europeans  save  a few 
gunners  anywhere  near  ? Sir  John  Lawrence  was  most  pressing  that 
the  step  should  be  taken  at  once  ; lie  knew  the  danger  of  delay  ; at  the 
same  time,  he  thoroughly  appreciated  the  difficulty  of  the  task  which 
he  was  urging  Chamberlain  to  undertake,  and  he  readily  responded  to 
the  latter’s  request  for  a regiment  of  Punjab  Infantry  to  be  sent  to  him. 
The  2nd  Punjab  Infantry  was,  therefore,  despatched  from  Dera  Ghazi 
Khan,  and  at  the  same  time  the  1st  Punjab  Cavalry  arrived  from  Asni,§ 
under  Major  Hughes, ' who,  hearing  of  Chamberlain’s  troubles,  had 
marched  to  Multan  without  waiting  for  orders  from  superior  authority. 

The  evening  of  the  day  on  which  these  troops  reached  Multan,  the 
British  officers  of  the  several  regiments  were  directed  to  assemble  at 
the  Deputy- Commissioner’s  house,  when  Chamberlain  told  them  of  the 
communication  he  had  received  from  Sir  John  Lawrence,  adding  that, 
having  reliable  information  that  the  Native  Infantry  were  about  to 
mutiny,  he  had  settled  to  disarm  them  the  next  morning. 

* Native  Adjutant. 

t A name  applied  by  the  Hindus  to  any  Rajput  who  has,  or  whose  ancestors 
have,  been  converted  to  Islam.  There  were  several  Hangars  in  the  1st 
Irregulars.  One  day  in  June,  Shaidad  Khan,  a Resaidar  of  this  class,  came 
to  Chamberlain,  and  said : ‘ There  was  a rumour  that  he  (Chamberlain)  had 
not  as  much  confidence  in  Hangars  as  in  other  classes  of  the  regiment,  and  he 
came  to  be  comforted  ’ ! Chamberlain  asked  him  to  sit  down,  and  sent  to  the 
banker  of  the  regiment  for  a very  valuable  sword  which  he  had  given  him  for 
safe  custody.  It  had  belonged  to  one  of  the  Amirs  of  Sindh,  was  taken  in 
battle,  and  given  to  Chamberlain  by  Major  Fitzgerald,  of  the  Sindh  Horse. 
On  the  sword  being  brought,  Chamberlain  handed  it  over  to  Shaidad  Khan 
and  his  sect  for  safety,  to  be  returned  when  the  Mutiny  was  over.  The  tears 
rose  to  the  Native  officer’s  eyes,  he  touched  Chamberlain’s  knees,  and  swore 
that  death  alone  would  sever  the  bond  of  fidelity  of  w hich  the  sword  was  the 
token.  He  took  his  leave,  thoroughly  satisfied. 

I Throne. 

§ A station  since  abandoned  for  Rajanpur. 

Now  General  Sir  W.  T.  Hughes,  K.C.B. 


72 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

It  was  midnight  before  the  meeting  broke  up.  At  4 a.m.  the  Horse 
Artillery  troop  and  the  two  Native  Infantry  regiments  were  ordered  to 
march  as  if  to  an  ordinary  parade.  When  they  had  gone  about  a 
quarter  of  a mile  they  were  halted,  and  the  Punjab  troops  moved 
quietly  between  them  and  their  lines,  thus  cutting  them  off  from  their 
spare  ammunition  ; at  the  same  time  the  European  Artillerymen  took 
their  places  with  the  guns  of  the  Horse  Artillery  troop,  and  a carefully 
selected  body  of  Sikhs  belonging  to  the  1st  Punjab  Cavalry,  under 
Lieutenant  John  Watson,  was  told  off  to  advance  on  the  troop  and 
cut  down  the  gunners  if  they  refused  to  assist  the  Europeans  to  work 
the  guns. 

Chamberlain  then  rode  up  to  the  Native  Infantry  regiments,  and 
after  explaining  to  them  the  reason  for  their  being  disarmed,  he  gave 
the  word  of  command,  ‘Pile  arms!’  Thereupon  a sepoy  of  the  62nd 
shouted : ‘ Don’t  give  up  your  arms ; fight  for  them  !’  Lieutenant 
Thomson,  the  Adjutant  of  the  regiment,  instantly  seized  him  by  the 
throat  and  threw  him  to  the  ground.  The  order  was  repeated,  and, 
wonderful  to  relate,  obeyed.  The  Native  Infantry  regiments  were  then 
marched  back  to  then-  lines,  while  the  Punjab  troops  and  Chamberlain’s 
Irregulars  remained  on  the  ground  until  the  arms  had  been  carted  off 
to  the  fort. 

It  was  a most  critical  time,  and  enough  credit  has  never  been  given 
to  Chamberlain.  Considering  the  honours  which  were  bestowed  on  others 
who  took  more  or  less  conspicuous  parts  in  the  Mutiny,  he  was  very 
insufficiently  rewarded  for  this  timely  act  of  heroism.  Had  he  not  shown 
such  undaunted  courage  and  coolness,  or  had  there  been  the  smallest 
hesitation,  Multan  wquld  certainly  have  gone.  Chamberlain  managed 
an  extremely  difficult  business  in  a most  masterly  manner.  His  per- 
sonal influence  insured  his  own  regiment  continuing  loyal  throughout 
the  Mutiny,  and  it  has  now  the  honour  of  being  the  1st  Regiment  of 
Bengal  Cavalry,  and  the  distinction  of  wearing  a different  uniform  from 
every  other  regiment  in  the  service,  being  allowed  to  retain  the  bright 
yellow  which  the  troopers  wore  when  they  were  first  raised  by  Colonel 
James  Skinner,  and  in  which  they  performed  such  loyal  service.* 

At  Jhelum  and  Sialkot  it  was  decided  that,  as  the  Native  troops  had 
been  considerably  reduced  in  numbers,  the  danger  was  not  so  great  as 
to  require  the  presence  of  the  Movable  Column. 

Umritsar  had  been  made  safe  for  the  time,  but  it  was  a place  the 

* The  two  disarmed  regiments  remained  quietly  at  Multan  for  more  than  a 
year,  when,  with  unaccountable  inconsistency,  a sudden  spirit  of  revolt  seized 
them,  and  in  August,  1858,  they  broke  out,  tried  to  get  possession  of  the  guns, 
murdered  the  Adjutant  of  the  Bombay  Fusiliers,  and  then  fieri  from  the 
station.  But  order  by  that  time  had  been  quite  restored,  our  position  in  the 
Punjab  was  secure  aud  nearly  all  the  sepoys  were  killed  or  captured  by 
the  country  people. 


857] 


NICHOLSON  SUCCEEDS  N.  CHAMBERLAIN 


73 


importance  of  which  could  not  be  over-estimated,  and  it  was  thought 
that  keeping  a strong  column  in  its  vicinity  for  a few  days  would 
materially  strengthen  our  position  there.  Moreover,  Umritsar  lay  in 
the  direct  route  to  Jullundur,  where  the  military  authorities  had 
proved  themselves  quite  unfitted  to  deal  with  the  emergency.  It  was 
decided,  therefore,  that  Umritsar  should  be  our  objective  in  the  first 
instance.  We  marched  from  Lahore  on  the  10th  June,  and  reached 
Umritsar  the  following  morning. 

News  of  a severe  fight  at  Badli-ki-Serai  had  been  received,  which 
increased  our  anxiety  to  push  on  to  Delhi,  for  we  feared  the  place 
might  be  taken  before  we  could  get  there.  But  to  our  mortification  it 
was  decided  that  the  column  could  not  be  spared  just  then  even  for 
Delhi,  as  there  was  still  work  for  it  in  the  Punjab.  To  add  to  our  dis- 
appointment, we  had  to  give  up  our  trusted  Commander ; for  a few 
hours  after  our  arrival  at  Umritsar  a telegram  came  to  Neville  Cham- 
berlain offering  him  the  Adjutant-Generalship  of  the  Army  in  succession 
to  Colonel  Chester,  who  had  been  killed  at  Badli-ki-Serai.  He  accepted 
the  offer,  and  I made  certain  I should  go  with  him.  My  chagrin,  there- 
fore, can  easily  be  understood  when  he  told  me  that  I must  remain  with 
the  column,  as  it  would  be  unfair  to  his  successor  to  take  away  the  staff 
officer.  We  were  now  all  anxiety  to  learn  who  that  successor  should 
be,  and  it  was  a satisfaction  to  hear  that  John  Nicholson  was  the  man. 

Chamberlain  left  for  Delhi  on  the  13th ; but  Nicholson  could  not  join 
for  a few  days,  and  as  troops  were  much  needed  at  Jullundur,  it  was 
arranged  that  the  column  should  move  on  to  that  place,  under  the 
temporary  command  of  Campbell,  and  there  await  the  arrival  of  the 
new  Brigadier. 

On  my  going  to  Campbell  for  orders,  he  informed  me  that  he  was  no 
longer  the  senior  officer  with  the  column,  as  a Colonel  Denniss,  junior 
to  him  regimentally,  but  his  senior  in  army  rank,  had  just  rejoined  the 
52nd.  Accordingly  I reported  myself  to  Denniss,  who,  though  an 
officer  of  many  years’  service,  had  never  before  held  a command,  not 
even  that  of  a regiment ; and,  poor  man  ! was  considerably  taken  aback 
when  he  heard  that  he  must  be  in  charge  of  the  column  for  some 
days.  He  practically  left  everything  to  me — a somewhat  trying  posi- 
tion for  almost  the  youngest  officer  in  the  force.  It  was  under  these 
circumstances  I found  what  an  able  man  Colonel  Campbell  really  was. 
He  correctly  gauged  Denniss’s  fitness,  or  rather  unfitness,  for  the  com- 
mand, and  appreciating  the  awkwardness  of  my  position,  advised  me  so 
wisely  that  I had  no  difficulty  in  carrying  on  the  work. 

We  reached  Jullundur  on  the  20th,  Nicholson  taking  over  command 
the  same  day.  He  had  been  given  the  rank  of  Brigadier- General, 
which  removed  all  grounds  for  objection  on  the  part  of  Campbell,  and 
the  two  soon  learnt  to  appreciate  each  other,  and  became  fast  friends. 

Jullundur  was  in  a state  of  the  greatest  confusion.  The  Native 


74 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 


troops,  consisting  of  a regiment  of  Light  Cavalry  and  two  regiments  of 
Native  Infantry,  began  to  show  signs  of  disaffection  soon  after  the  out- 
break at  Meerut,  and  from  that  time  until  the  7th  June,  when  they 
broke  into  open  mutiny,  incendiary  fires  were  almost  of  daily  occurrence. 

The  want  of  resolution  displayed  in  dealing  with  the  crisis  at  Jullun- 
dur  was  one  of  the  regrettable  episodes  of  the  Mutiny.  The  European 
garrison  consisted  of  Her  Majesty’s  8th  Foot  and  a troop  of  Horse 
Artillery.  The  military  authorities  had  almost  a whole  month’s  warning 
of  the  mutinous  intentions  of  the  Native  troops,  but  though  they  had 
before  them  the  example  of  the  prompt  and  successful  measures 
adopted  at  Lahore  and  Peshawar,  they  failed  to  take  any  steps  to  pre- 
vent the  outbreak. 

The  Brigadier  (Johnstone)  was  on  leave  at  the  commencement  of  the 
Mutiny,  and  during  his  absence  the  treasure  was  placed  in  charge  of  a 
European  guard,  in  accordance  with  instructions  from  Sir  John  Law- 
rence. This  measure  was  reversed  as  soon  as  the  Brigadier  rejoined, 
for  fear  of  showing  distrust  of  the  sepoys,  and  another  wise  order  of 
the  watchful  Chief  Commissioner — to  disarm  the  Native  troops— was 
never  carried  out.  The  Commissioner,  Major  Edward  Lake,  one  of 
Henry  Lawrence’s  most  capable  assistants,  had  also  repeatedly  urged 
upon  Johnstone  the  advisability  of  depriving  the  sepoys  of  their  arms, 
but  his  advice  remained  unheeded.  When  the  inevitable  revolt  took 
place  European  soldiers  were  allowed  to  be  passive  spectators  while 
property  was  being  destroyed,  and  sepoys  to  disappear  in  the  darkness 
of  the  night  carrying  with  them  their  muskets  and  all  the  treasure  and 
plunder  they  could  lay  their  hands  on. 

A futile  attempt  at  pursuit  was  made  the  following  morning,  but,  as 
will  be  seen,  this  was  carried  out  in  so  half-hearted  a manner,  that  the 
mutineers  were  able  to  get  safely  across  the  Sutlej  with  their  loot,  not- 
withstanding that  the  passage  of  this  broad  river  had  to  be  made  by 
means  of  a ferry,  where  only  very  few  beats  were  available.  Having 
reached  Philour,  the  British  troops  were  ordered  to  push  on  to  Delhi, 
and  as  Jullundur  was  thus  left  without  protection,  Lake  gladly 
accepted  the  offer  of  the  Raja  of  Kapurthala  to  garrison  it  with  his 
own  troops. 

There  was  no  doubt  as  to  the  loyalty  of  the  Raja  himself,  and  his 
sincere  desire  to  help  us ; but  the  mismanagement  of  affairs  at 
Jullundur  had  done  much  to  lower  our  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  his 
people,  and  there  was  no  mistaking  the  offensive  demeanour  of  his 
troops.  They  evidently  thought  that  British  soldiers  had  gone  never 
to  return,  and  they  swaggered  about  in  swash-buckler  fashion,  as  only 
Natives  who  think  they  have  the  upper  hand  can  swagger. 

It  was  clearly  Lake’s  policy  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  the  Kapur- 
thala people.  His  position  was  much  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of 
our  column  ; but  we  were  birds  of  passnge,  and  might  be  off  at  any 


GENERAL  MEHTAB  SING 


75 


1857] 

moment,  so  in  order  to  pay  a compliment  to  the  officers  and  principal 
men  with  the  Kapurthala  troops,  Lake  asked  Nicholson  to  meet  them 
at  his  house.  Nicholson  consented,  and  a durbar  was  arranged.  I was 
present  on  the  occasion,  and  was  witness  of  rather  a curious  scene, 
illustrative  alike  of  Nicholson  and  Native  character. 

At  the  close  of  the  ceremony  Mehtab  Sing,  a general  officer  in  the 
Kapurthala  Army,  took  his  leave,  and,  as  the  senior  in  rank  at  the 
durbar,  was  walking  out  of  the  room  first,  when  I observed  Nicholson 
stalk  to  the  door,  put  himself  in  front  of  Mehtab  Sing  and,  waving  him 
back  with  an  authoritative  air,  prevent  him  from  leaving  the  room. 
The  rest  of  the  company  then  passed  out,  and  when  they  had  gone, 
Nicholson  said  to  Lake  : ‘ Do  you  see  that  General  Mehtab  Sing  has 
his  shoes  on  ?’*  Lake  replied  that  he  had  noticed  the  fact,  but  tried  to 
excuse  it.  Nicholson,  however,  speaking  in  Hindustani,  said  : ‘ There 
is  no  possible  excuse  for  such  an  act  of  gross  impertinence.  Mehtab 
Sing  knows  perfectly  well  that  he  would  not  venture  to  step  on  his  own 
father’s  carpet  save  barefooted,  and  he  has  only  committed  this  breach 
of  etiquette  to-day  because  he  thinks  we  are  not  in  a position  to  resent 
the  insult,  and  that  he  can  treat  us  as  he  would  not  have  dared  to  do  a 
month  ago.’  Mehtab  Sing  looked  extremely  foolish,  and  stammered 
some  kind  of  apology  ; but  Nicholson  was  not  to  be  appeased,  and  con- 
tinued: ‘If  I were  the  last  Englishman  left  in  Jullundur,  you’ 
(addressing  Mehtab  Sing)  ‘ should  not  come  into  my  room  with  your 
shoes  on  ;’  then,  politely  turning  to  Lake,  he  added,  ‘ I hope  the  Com- 
missioner will  now  allow  me  to  order  you  to  take  your  shoes  off  and 
carry  them  out  in  your  own  hands,  so  that  your  followers  may  witness 
your  discomfiture.’  Mehtab  Sing,  completely  cowed,  meekly  did  as  he 
was  told. 

Although  in  the  kindness  of  his  heart  Lake  had  at  first  endeavoured 
to  smooth  matters  over,  he  knew  Natives  well,  and  he  readily  admitted 
the  wisdom  of  Nicholson’s  action.  Indeed,  Nicholson’s  uncompro- 
mising bearing  on  this  occasion  proved  a great  help  to  Lake,  for  it  had 
the  best  possible  effect  upon  the  Kapurthala  people ; their  manner  at 
once  changed,  all  disrespect  vanished,  and  there  was  no  more  swagger- 
ing about  as  if  they  considered  themselves  masters  of  the  situation. 

Five  or  six  years  after  this  occurrence  I was  one  of  a pig-sticking 
party  at  Kapurthala,  given  by  the  Raja  in  honour  of  the  Commander  - 
in-Chief,  Sir  Hugh  Rose.!  When  riding  home  in  the  evening  I found 
myself  close  to  the  elephant  on  which  our  host  and  the  Chief  were 
sitting.  The  conversation  happening  to  turn  on  the  events  of  the 
Mutiny,  I asked  what  had  become  of  General  Mehtab  Sing.  The 
Raja,  pointing  to  an  elephant  a little  distance  off  on  which  two  Native 

* No  Native,  in  Native  dress,  keeps  his  shoes  on  when  he  enters  a room, 
unless  he  intends  disrespect. 

t The  late  Field  Marshal  Lord  Strathnairn,  G.C.  B.,  G.C.  S.  I. 


76 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


Ei857 


gentlemen  were  riding,  said,  ‘ There  he  is.’  I recognized  the  General, 
and  making  him  a salaam,  which  he  politely  returned,  I said  to  him, 
‘ I have  not  had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  you  since  those  hot  days  in 
June,  1857,  when  I was  at  Jullundur.’  The  Raja  then  asked  me  if  I 
knew  Nicholson.  On  my  telling  him  I had  been  his  staff  officer,  and 
with  him  at  the  durbar  at  Lake  Sahib's  house,  the  Raja  laughed 
heartily,  and  said,  1 Oh  i then  you  saw  Mehtab  Sing  made  to  walk  out 
of  the  room  with  his  shoes  in  his  hand  ? We  often  chaff  him  about 
that  little  affair,  and  tell  him  that  he  richly  deserved  the  treatment  he 
received  from  the  great  Nicholson  Sahib.' 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  greatly  interested  in  the  story,  which  he  made 
me  repeat  to  him  as  soon  as  we  got  back  to  camp,  and  he  was  as  much 
struck  as  I was  with  this  spontaneous  testimony  of  a leading  Native  to 
the  wisdom  of  Nicholson’s  procedure. 

On  taking  over  command,  Nicholson’s  first  care  was  to  establish  an 
effective  system  of  intelligence,  by  means  of  which  he  was  kept 
informed  of  what  was  going  on  in  the  neighbouring  districts ; and, 
fully  recognizing  the  necessity  for  rapid  movement  in  the  event  of  any 
sudden  emergency,  he  organized  a part  of  his  force  into  a small  flying 
column,  the  infantry  portion  of  which  was  to  be  carried  in  chkas.*  I 
was  greatly  impressed  by  Nicholson’s  knowledge  of  military  affairs. 
He  seemed  always  to  know  exactly  what  to  do  and  the  best  way  to  do 
it.  This  was  the  more  remarkable  because,  though  a soldier  by  pro- 
fession, his  training  had  been  chiefly  that  of  a civilian — a civilian  of 
the  frontier,  however,  where  his  soldierly  instincts  had  been  fostered  in 
his  dealing  with  a lawless  and  unruly  people,  and  where  he  had 
received  a training  which  was  now  to  stand  him  in  good  stead. 
Nicholson  was  a born  Commander,  and  this  was  felt  by  every  officer 
and  man  with  the  column  before  he  had  been  amongst  them  many 
days. 

The  Native  troops  with  the  column  had  given  no  trouble  since  we 
left  Lahore.  We  were  travelling  in  the  direction  they  desired  to  go, 
which  accounted  for  their  remaining  quiet;  but  Nicholson,  realizing 
the  danger  of  having  them  in  our  midst,  and  the  probability  of  their 
refusing  to  turn  away  from  Delhi  in  the  event  of  our  having  to  retrace 
our  steps,  resolved  to  disarm  the  35th.  The  civil  authorities  in  the 
district  urged  that  the  same  course  should  be  adopted  with  the  33rd,  a 
Native  Infantry  regiment  at  Iloshiarpur,  about  twentj'-seven  miles 
from  Jullundur,  which  it  had  been  decided  should  join  the  column. 
The  Native  soldiers  with  the  column  already  exceeded  the  Europeans 
in  number,  and  as  the  addition  of  another  regiment  would  make  the 
odds  against  us  very  serious,  it  was  arranged  to  disarm  the  35th  before 
the  33rd  joined  us. 

We  left  Jullundur  on  the  24th  June,  and  that  afternoon,  accom- 
* A kind  of  light  cart. 


MORE  DISARMAMENTS 


77 


1857] 

panied  by  the  Deputy-Commissioner  of  the  district,  I rode  to  Philour 
to  choose  a place  for  the  disarming  parade.  The  next  morning  we 
started  early,  the  Europeans  heading  the  column,  and  when  they 
reached  the  ground  we  had  selected  they  took  up  a position  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  the  two  batteries  in  the  centre  and  the  52nd  in  wings 
on  either  flank.  The  guns  were  unlimbered  and  prepared  for  action. 
On  the  left  of  the  road  was  a serai,*  behind  which  the  officer  com- 
manding the  35th  was  told  to  take  his  regiment,  and,  as  he  cleared  it, 
to  wheel  to  the  right,  thus  bringing  his  men  in  column  of  companies 
facing  the  line  of  Europeans.  This  manoeuvre  being  accomplished,  I 
was  ordered  to  tell  the  commanding  officer  that  the  regiment  was  to  be 
disarmed,  and  that  the  men  were  to  pile  arms  and  take  off  their  belts. 
The  sepoys  and  their  British  officers  were  equally  taken  aback  ; the 
latter  had  received  no  information  of  what  was  going  to  happen,  while 
the  former  had  cherished  the  hope  that  they  would  be  able  to  cross  the 
Sutlej,  and  thence  slip  off  with  their  arms  to  Delhi. 

I thought  I could  discover  relief  in  the  British  officers’  faces,  certainly 
in  that  of  Major  Younghusband,  the  Commandant,  and  when  I gave 
him  the  General’s  order,  he  murmured,  ‘ Thank  God !’  lie  had  been 
with  the  35th  for  thirty  three  years ; he  had  served  with  it  at  the  siege 
of  Bhurtpore,  throughout  the  first  Afghan  war,  and  in  Sale’s  defence  of 
Jalalabad ; he  had  been  proud  of  his  old  corps,  but  knowing  probably 
that  his  men  could  no  longer  be  trusted,  he  rejoiced  to  feel  that  they 
were  not  to  be  given  the  opportunity  for  further  disgracing  themselves,  f 
The  sepoys  obeyed  the  command  without  a word,  and  in  a few  minutes 
their  muskets  and  belts  were  all  packed  in  carts  and  taken  off  to  the 
fort. 

As  the  ceremony  was  completed,  the  33rd  arrived  and  was  dealt  with 
in  a similar  manner  ; but  the  British  officers  of  this  regiment  did  not 
take  things  so  quietly — they  still  believed  in  their  men,  and  the 
Colonel,  Sandeman,  trusted  them  to  any  extent.  He  had  been  with 
the  regiment  for  more  than  two-and-thirty  years,  and  had  commanded 
it  throughout  the  Sutlej  campaign.  On  hearing  the  General’s  order,  he 
exclaimed  : ‘ What  ! disarm  my  regiment  ? I will  answer  with  my 
life  for  the  loyalty  of  every  man !’  On  my  repeating  the  order  the 
poor  old  fellow  burst  into  tears.  His  son,  the  late  Sir  Robert  Sande- 
man, who  was  an  Ensign  in  the  regiment  at  the  time,  told  me  after- 
wards how  terribly  his  father  felt  the  disgrace  inflicted  upon  the 
regiment  of  which  he  was  so  proud. 

It  was  known  that  the  wing  of  the  9th  Light  Cavalry  was  in  com- 
munication with  the  mutineers  at  Delhi,  and  that  the  men  were  only 
waiting  their  opportunity ; so  they  would  also  certainly  have  been  dis- 

* A four-walled  enclosure  for  the  accommodation  of  travellers. 

f It  will  be  remembered  that  this  was  the  regiment  in  which  two  men  had 
been  found  with  loaded  muskets,  and  blown  away  from  guns  at  Lahore. 


78 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

armed  at  this  time,  but  for  the  idea  that  such  a measure  might  have  a 
bad  effect  on  the  other  wing,  which  still  remained  at  Sialkot.  The 
turn  of  this  regiment,  however,  came  a few  days  later. 

Up  till  this  time  we  all  hoped  that  Delhi  was  our  destination,  but, 
greatly  to  our  surprise  and  disappointment,  orders  came  that  morning 
directing  the  column  to  return  to  Umritsar ; the  state  of  the  Punjab 
was  causing  considerable  anxiety,  as  there  were  several  stations  at 
which  Native  corps  still  remained  in  possession  of  their  arms. 

The  same  afternoon  I was  in  the  Philour  fort  with  Nicholson,  when 
the  telegraph- signaller  gave  him  a copy  of  a message  from  Sir  Henry 
Barnard  to  the  authorities  in  the  Punjab,  begging  that  all  Artillery 
officers  not  doing  regimental  duty  might  be  sent  to  Delhi,  where  their 
services  were  urgently  required.  I at  once  felt  that  this  message 
applied  to  me.  I had  been  longing  to  find  myself  at  Delhi,  and  lived 
in  perpetual  dread  of  its  being  captured  before  I could  get  there  ; now 
at  last  my  hopes  seemed  about  to  be  realized  in  a legitimate  manner, 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  I did  not  like  the  idea  of  leaving  Nicholson — 
the  more  closely  I was  associated  with  him  the  more  I was  attracted 
by  him— and  I am  always  proud  to  remember  that  he  did  not  wish  to 
part  with  me.  He  agreed,  however,  that  my  first  uuiy  was  to  my 
regiment,  and  only  stipulated  that  before  leaving  him  I should  find 
someone  to  take  my  place,  as  he  did  not  know  a single  officer  with  the 
column.  This  I was  able  to  arrange,  and  that  evening  Nicholson  and 
I dined  tete-ci-tete.  At  dawn  the  next  morning  I left  by  mail-cart  for 
Delhi,  my  only  kit  being  a small  bundle  of  bedding,  saddle  and  bridle, 
my  servants  having  orders  to  follow  with  my  horses,  tents,  and  other 
belongings. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

The  mail-cart  rattled  across  the  bridge  of  boats,  and  in  less  than  an 
hour  I found  myself  at  Ludhiana,  at  the  house  of  George  Ricketts,* 
the  Deputy  Commissioner.  Ricketts’s  bungalow  was  a resting-place 
for  everyone  passing  through  en  route  to  Delhi.  In  one  room  I 
found  Lieutenant  Williams  of  the  4th  Sikhs,  who  had  been  dangerously 
wounded  three  weeks  before,  while  assisting  Ricketts  to  prevent  the 
Jullundur  mutineers  from  crossing  the  Sutlej. 

While  I was  eating  my  breakfast,  Ricketts  sat  down  by  my  side  and 
recounted  a stirring  tale  of  all  that  had  happened  at  Philour  and 
Ludhiana  consequent  on  the  rising  of  the  Native  regiments  at  Jullundur. 
The  mutineers  had  made,  in  the  first  instance,  for  Philour,  a small 

* George  Ricketts,  Esq.,  C.B.,  afterwards  a member  of  the  Board  of  Revenue 
of  the  North-West  Provinces. 


1857] 


GEORGE  RICKETTS  AT  LUDHIANA 


79 


cantonment,  but  important  from  the  fact  of  its  containing  a fair-sized 
magazine,  and  from  its  situation,  commanding  the  passage  of  the 
Sutlej.  It  was  garrisoned  by  the  3rd  Native  Infantry,  which  furnished 
the  sole  guard  over  the  magazine— a danger  which,  as  I have  mentioned, 
had  fortunately  been  recognized  by  the  Commnnder-m-Chief  when  he 
first  heard  of  the  outbreak  at  Meerut.  The  men  of  the  3rd  remained 
quiet,  and  even  did  good  service  in  helping  to  drag  the  guns  of  the 
siege-train  across  the  river,  and  in  guarding  the  treasury,  until  the 
mutineers  from  Jullundur  arrived  on  the  8th  June.  They  then  gave 
their  British  officers  warning  to  leave  them,  saying  they  did  not  mean 
to  injure  them  or  their  property,  but  they  had  determined  they  would 
no  longer  serve  the  SirTtar.  Twelve  British  officers  (there  could  not 
have  been  more),  confronted  by  3,000  sepoys,  felt  themselves  powerless, 
and  retired  to  the  fort. 

Ricketts  had  with  him  at  that  time  an  assistant  named  Thornton,* 
who  had  gone  to  Philour  to  lodge  some  money  in  the  treasury.  This 
officer  had  started  to  ride  back  to  Ludhiana,  when  he  suddenly  became 
aware  of  what  had  happened,  and  how  perilous  was  the  position.  Had 
he  consulted  his  own  safety,  he  would  have  returned  and  taken  refuge 
in  the  fort,  instead  of  which  he  galloped  on,  having  to  pass  close  by  the 
mutineers,  until  he  reached  the  bridge  of  boats,  which,  with  admirable 
coolness  and  presence  of  mind,  he  cut  behind  him,  then,  hurrying  on, 
he  informed  Ricketts  of  what  had  taken  place  ; and  that  the  rebels  might 
shortly  be  expected  to  attempt  the  passage  of  the  river.  Fortunately 
the  4th  Sikhs  from  Abbottabad  had  that  very  morning  marched  into 
Ludhiana,  and  Ricketts  hoped,  with  their  assistance,  to  hold  the  sepoys 
in  check  until  the  arrival  of  the  British  troops,  which  he  believed  must 
have  been  despatched  from  Jullundur  in  pursuit  of  the  mutineers. 

The  garrison  of  Ludhiana  consisted  of  a detachment  of  the  3rd  Native 
Infantry,  guarding  the  fort,  in  which  was  stored  a large  amount  of 
powder.  The  detachment  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Yorke,  who, 
on  hearing  Thornton’s  story,  went  at  once  to  the  fort.  He  was  much 
liked  by  his  men,  who  received  him  quite  civilly,  but  told  him  they 
knew  that  their  regiment  had  joined  the  rebels  from  Jullundur,  and 
that  they  themselves  could  no  longer  obey  his  orders.  Ricketts  then 
understood  that  he  had  but  the  4th  Sikhs  and  a small  party  of  troops 
belonging  to  the  Raja  of  Nablia  to  depend  upon.  There  were  only  two 
officers  with  the  4th  Sikhs — Captain  Rothney,  in  command,  and 
Lieutenant  Williams,  the  Adjutant.  Taking  three  companies  of  the 
regiment  under  Williams,  and  two  guns  of  the  Nabha  Artillery,  one 
dragged  by  camels,  the  other  by  horses,  Ricketts  started  off  towards 
the  bridge  of  boats.  Galloping  on  alone,  he  found  that  the  gap  in  the 
bridge  made  by  Thornton  had  not  been  repaired,  which  proved  that  the 

* Thomas  Thornton,  Esq.,  C.S.I.,  afterwards  Secretary  to  the  Government 
of  India  in  the  Foreign  Department. 


8o 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


rebels  had  not  crossed  by  that  passage,  at  all  events.  He  widened  the 
gap  by  cutting  adrift  some  more  boats,  and  then  had  himself  ferried 
across  the  river,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  exact  state  of  affairs  at 
Philour.  fie  learnt  that  no  tidings  had  been  received  of  any  British 
troops  having  been  sent  from  Jullundur  in  pursuit  of  the  mutineers, 
who,  having  failed  to  get  across  the  bridge,  owing  to  Thornton’s  timely 
action,  had  gone  to  a ferry  reported  to  be  three  miles  up  the  river. 

Kicketts  recrossed  the  river  as  quickly  as  he  could,  and  joined 
Williams.  It  was  then  getting  dark,  but,  hoping  they  might  still  be  in 
time  to  check  the  rebels,  they  pushed  on  in  the  direction  of  the  ferry, 
which  proved  to  be  nearer  six  than  three  miles  away.  The  ground  was 
rough  and  broken,  as  is  always  the  case  on  the  banks  of  Indian  rivers, 
swollen  as  they  often  are  by  torrents  from  the  hills,  which  leave  behind 
boulders  and  debris  of  all  kinds.  They  made  but  little  way ; one  of 
the  gun  camels  fell  lame,  the  guides  disappeared,  and  they  began  to 
despair  of  reaching  the  ferry  in  time,  when  suddenly  there  was  a 
challenge  and  they  knew  they  were  too  late.  The  sepoys  had  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  river  and  were  bivouacking  immediately  in  front  of  them. 

It  was  not  a pleasant  position,  but  it  had  to  be  made  the  best  of ; 
and  both  the  civilian  and  the  soldier  agreed  that  their  only  chance  was 
to  fight.  Williams  opened  fire  with  his  Infantry,  and  Bicketts  took 
command  of  the  guns.  At  the  first  discharge  the  horses  bolted  with 
the  limber,  and  never  appeared  again ; almost  at  the  same  moment 
Williams  fell,  shot  through  the  body.  Bicketts  continued  the  fight 
until  his  ammunition  was  completely  expended,  when  he  was  reluctantly 
obliged  to  retire  to  a village  in  the  neighbourhood,  but  not  until  he  had 
killed,  as  he  afterwards  discovered,  about  fifty  of  the  enemy. 

Bicketts  returned  to  Ludhiana  early  the  next  morning,  and  later  in 
the  day  the  mutineers  passed  through  the  city.  They  released  some 
500  prisoners  who  were  in  the  gaol,  and  helped  themselves  to  what 
food  they  wanted,  but  they  did  not  enter  the  cantonment  or  the  fort. 
The  gallant  little  attempt  to  close  the  passage  of  the  Sutlej  was  entirely 
frustrated,  owing  to  the  inconceivable  want  of  energy  displayed  by  the 
so-called  ‘ pursuing  force  had  it  pushed  on,  the  rebels  must  have  been 
caught  in  the  act  of  crossing  the  river,  when  Bicketts’s  small  party 
might  have  afforded  considerable  help.  The  Europeans  from  Jullundur 
reached  Philour  before  dark  on  the  8th  ; they  heard  the  firing  of 
Bicketts’s  guns,  but  no  attempt  was  made  by  the  officer  in  command 
to  ascertain  the  cause,  and  they  came  leisurely  on  to  Ludhiana  the 
iollowing  day. 

Having  listened  with  the  greatest  interest  to  Bicketts’s  story,  and 
refreshed  the  inner  man,  I resumed  my  journey,  and  reached  Umballa 
late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  27th,  not  sorry  to  get  under  shelter,  for  the 
monsoon,  which  had  been  threatening  for  some  days  past,  burst  with 
great  fury  as  I was  leaving  Ludhiana. 


>857] 


PUSHING  ON  TO  DELHI 


81 


On  driving  to  the  dak -bungalow  I found  it  crowded  with  officers, 
some  of  whom  had  been  waiting  there  for  days  for  an  opportunity  to 
go  on  to  Delhi ; they  laughed  at  me  wiien  I expressed  my  intention  of 
proceeding  at  once,  and  told  me  that  the  seats  on  the  mail-carts  had  to 
be  engaged  several  days  in  advance,  and  that  I might  make  up  my 
mind  to  stay  where  I was  for  some  time  to  come.  I was  not  at  all 
prepared  for  this,  and  I determined  to  get  on  by  hook  or  by  crook ; as 
a preliminary  measure,  I made  friends  with  the  postmaster,  from 
whose  office  the  mail-carts  started.  From  him  I learnt  that  my  only 
chance  was  to  call  upon  the  Deputy- Commissioner,  by  whose  orders 
the  seats  were  distributed.  I took  the  postmaster’s  advice,  and  thus 
became  acquainted  with  Douglas  Forsyth,  w ho  in  later  years  made  a 
name  for  himself  by  his  energetic  attempts  to  establish  commercial 
relations  with  Yarkand  and  Kashgar.  Forsyth  confirmed  what  I had 
already  heard,  but  told  me  that  an  extra  cart  was  to  be  despatched  that 
night,  laden  with  small-arm  ammunition,  on  which  I could,  if  I liked, 
get  a seat,  adding:  ‘Your  kit  must  be  of  the  smallest,  as  there  will  be 
no  room  for  anything  inside  the  cart.’ 

I returned  to  the  dak-bungalow,  overjoyed  at  my  success,  to  find 
myself  quite  an  important  personage,  with  everyone  my  friend,  like 
the  boy  at  school  who  is  the  lucky  recipient  of  a hamper  from  home. 

‘ Take  me  with  you !’  wras  the  cry  on  all  sides.  Only  twro  others 
besides  the  driver  and  myself  could  possibly  go,  and  then  only  by 
carrying  our  kits  in  our  laps.  It  was  finally  arranged  that  Captain 
Law  and  Lieutenant  Packe  should  be  my  companions.  Packe  was 
lamed  for  life  by  a shot  through  his  ankle  before  we  had  been  forty- 
eight  hours  at  Delhi,  and  Law'  w'as  killed  on  the  23rd  July,  having 
greatly  distinguished  himself  by  his  gallantry  and  coolness  under  fire 
during  the  short  time  he  served  with  the  force. 

We  got  to  Kurnal  soon  after  daybreak  on  the  28th.  It  w'as  occupied 
by  a few'  of  the  Kaja  of  Jhind’s  troops,  a Commissariat  officer,  and  one 
or  two  civilians,  who  were  trying  to  keep  the  country  quiet  and  collect 
supplies.  Before  noon  w7e  passed  through  Panipat,  where  there  was  a 
strong  force  of  Patiala  and  Jhind  troops,  and  early  in  the  afternoon  we 
reached  Alipur.  Here  our  driver  pulled  up,  declaring  he  would  go  no 
further.  A fewr  days  before  there  had  been  a sharp  fight  on  the  road 
betwreen  Alipur  and  Delhi,  not  far  from  Badli-ki- Serai,  where  the 
battle  of  the  8th  June  had  taken  place,  and  as  the  enemy  were 
constantly  on  the  road  threatening  the  rear  of  the  besieging  force,  the 
driver  did  not  consider  it  safe  to  go  on.  We  could  not,  however,  stop 
at  Alipur,  so  after  some  consultation  we  settled  to  take  the  mail-cart 
ponies  and  ride  on  to  camp.  We  could  hear  the  boom  of  guns  at 
intervals,  and  as  we  neared  Delhi  we  came  across  several  dead  bodies 
of  the  enemy.  It  is  a curious  fact  that  most  of  these  bodies  were 
exactly  like  mummies ; there  was  nothing  disagreeable  about  them 

6 


82 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

Why  this  should  have  been  the  case  I cannot  say,  but  I often  wished 
during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign  that  the  atmospheric  influences, 
which,  I presume,  had  produced  this  effect,  could  assert  themselves 
more  frequently. 

We  stopped  for  a short  time  to  look  at  the  position  occupied  by  the 
enemy  at  Badli-ki-Serai ; but  none  of  us  were  in  the  mood  to  enjoy 
sight-seeing.  We  had  never  been  to  Delhi  before,  and  had  but  the 
vaguest  notion  where  the  Ridge  (the  position  our  force  \yas  holding) 
was.  or  how  the  city  was  situated  with  regard  to  our  camp.  The 
sound  of  heavy  firing  became  louder  and  louder,  and  we  knew  that 
fighting  must  be  going  on.  The  driver  had  solemnly  warned  us  of  the 
risk  we  were  running  in  continuing  our  journey,  and  when  we  came  to 
the  point  where  the  Grand  Trunk  Road  bifurcates,  one  branch  going 
direct  to  the  city  and  the  other  through  the  cantonment,  we  halted  for 
a few  minutes  to  discuss  which  we  should  take.  Fortunately  for  us, 
we  settled  to  follow  that  which  led  to  the  cantonment,  and,  as  it  was 
then  getting  dark,  we  pushed  on  as  fast  as  our  tired  ponies  could  go. 
The  relief  to  us  when  we  found  ourselves  safe  inside  our  own  piquets 
may  be  imagined.  My  father’s  old  staff-officer,  Henry  Norman,  who 
was  then  Assistant-Adjutant-General  at  Head-Quarters,  kindly  asked 
me  to  share  his  tent  until  I could  make  other  arrangements.  He  had 
no  bed  to  offer  me,  but  I required  none,  as  I was  thoroughly  tired  out, 
and  all  I wanted  was  a spot  on  which  to  throw  myself  down.  A good 
night’s  rest  quite  set  me  up.  I awoke  early,  scarcely  able  to  believe  in 
my  good  fortune.  I was  actually  at  Delhi,  and  the  city  was  still  in  the 
possession  of  the  mutineers. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Before  entering  on  the  narrative  of  what  came  under  my  own 
observation  during  the  three  months  I was  at  Delhi,  I will  relate  what 
took  place  after  Sir  Henry  Barnard  succeeded  General  Anson  in 
command  on  the  26th  May,  and  how  the  little  British  force  maintained 
itself  against  almost  overwhelming  odds  during  the  first  three  weeks 
of  that  memorable  siege. 

Barnard  had  served  as  Chief  of  the  Staff  in  the  Crimea,  and  had 
held  various  staff  appointments  in  England;  but  he  was  an  utter 
stranger  to  India,  having  only  arrived  in  the  country  a few  weeks 
before.  He  fully  realized  the  difficulties  of  the  position  to  which  he 
had  so  unexpectedly  succeeded,  for  he  was  aware  how  unjustly  Anson 
was  being  judged  by  those  who,  knowing  nothing  of  war,  imagined  he 
could  have  started  to  attack  Delhi  with  scarcely  more  preparation  than 
would  have  been  necessary  for  a morning’s  parade.  The  officers  of  the 


THE  FIRST  VICTORY 


«3 


1857] 

column  were  complete  strangers  to  him,  and  he  to  them,  and  he  was 
ignorant  of  the  characteristics  and  capabilities  of  the  Native  portion  of 
his  troops.  It  must,  therefore,  have  been  with  an  anxious  heart  that 
he  took  over  the  command. 

One  of  Barnard's  first  acts  was  to  get  rid  of  the  unreliable  element 
which  Anson  had  brought  away  from  Umballa.  The  Infantry  he  sent 
to  llohtuk,  where  it  shortly  afterwards  mutinied,  and  the  Cavalry  to 
Meerut.  That  these  troops  should  have  been  allowed  to  retain  their 
weapons  is  one  of  the  mysteries  of  the  Mutiny.  For  more  than  two 
months  their  insubordination  had  been  apparent,  incendiarism  had 
occurred  which  had  been  clearly  traced  to  them,  and  they  had  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  fire  at  their  officers;  both  John  Lawrence  and  Robert 
Montgomery  had  pressed  upon  the  Commander  in-Chief  the  advisability 
of  disarming  them;  but  General  Anson,  influenced  by  the  regimental 
officers,  who  could  not  believe  in  the  disaffection  of  their  men,  had  not 
grasped  the  necessity  for  this  precautionary  measure.  The  European 
soldiers  with  the  column,  however,  did  not  conceal  their  mistrust  of 
these  sepoys,  and  Barnard  acted  wisely  in  sending  them  away ; but  it 
was  extraordinary  that  they  should  have  been  allowed  to  keep  their 
arms. 

On  the  5th  June  Barnard  reached  Alipur,  within  ten  miles  of  Delhi, 
where  he  decided  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  siege-train  and  the  troops 
from  Meerut. 

The  Meerut  brigade,  under  Brigadier  Wilson,  had  started  on  the 
27th  May.  It  consisted  of  two  squadrons  of  the  Carabineers,  Tombs's* 
troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  Scott’s  Field  Battery  and  two  18  pounder 
guns,  a wing  of  the  1st  Battalion  60th  Rifles,  a few  Native  Sappers 
and  Miners,  and  a detachment  of  Irregular  Horse. 

Early  on  the  30th  the  village  of  Ghazi-u-din-nagar  (now  known  as 
Ghaziabad)  close  to  the  Hindun  river,  and  about  eleven  miles  from 
Delhi,  was  reached.  Thence  it  was  intended  to  make  a reconnaissance 
towards  Delhi,  but  about  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  a vedette 
reported  that  the  enemy  were  approaching  in  strength.  A very  careless 
look-out  had  been  kept,  for  almost  simultaneously  with  the  report  a 
round  shot  came  tumbling  into  camp.  The  troops  fell  in  as  quickly  as 
possible,  and  the  Artillery  came  into  action.  The  Rifles  crossed  the 
Hindun  suspension  bridge,  and,  under  cover  of  our  guns,  attacked  the 
enemy,  who  were  strongly  posted  in  a village.  From  this  position 
they  were  speedily  dislodged,  and  the  victory  was  complete.  Seven 
hundred  British  soldiers  defeated  seven  times  their  number,  capturing 
five  guns  and  a large  quantity  of  ammunition  and  stores.  Our  loss 
was  one  officer  and  ten  men  killed,  and  one  officer  and  eighteen  men 
wounded. 

* The  late  Major-General  Sir  Harry  Tombs,  V.C.,  K.C. B. 

6—2 


84 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


The  following  day  (Sunday)  the  enemy  reappeared  about  noon,  but 
after  two  hours’  fighting  they  were  again  routed,  and  on  our  troops 
occupying  their  position,  they  could  be  seen  in  full  retreat  towards 
Delhi.  The  rebels  succeeded  in  taking  their  guns  with  them,  for  our 
men,  prostrated  by  the  intense  heat  and  parched  with  thirst,  were  quite 
unable  to  pursue.  We  had  one  officer  and  eleven  men  killed,  and  two 
officers  and  ten  men  wounded.  Among  the  latter  was  an  ensign  of  the 
60th  Rifles,  a boy  named  Napier,  a most  gallant  young  fellow,  full  of 
life  and  spirit,  who  had  won  the  love  as  well  as  the  admiration  of  his 
men.  He  was  hit  in  the  leg,  and  the  moment  he  was  brought  into 
camp  it  had  to  be  amputated.  When  the  operation  was  over,  Napier 
was  heard  to  murmur,  ‘ I shall  never  lead  the  Rifles  again  ! 1 shall 

never  lead  the  Rifles  again !’  His  wound  he  thought  little  of.  What 
grieved  him  was  the  idea  of  having  to  give  up  his  career  as  a soldier, 
and  to  leave  the  regiment  he  was  so  proud  of.  Napier  was  taken  to 
Meerut,  where  he  died  a few  days  afterwards.* 

On  the  1st  June  Wilson’s  force  was  strengthened  by  the  Sirmur 
battalion  of  Gurkhas,  f a regiment  which  later  covered  itself  with  glory, 
and  gained  an  undying  name  by  its  gallantry  during  the  siege  of  Delhi. 

On  the  7th  June  Wilson’s  brigade  crossed  the  Jumna  at  Baghput, 
and  at  Alipur  it  joined  Barnard’s  force,  the  men  of  which  loudly 
cheered  their  Meerut  comrades  as  they  marched  into  camp  with  the 
captured  guns.  The  siege-train  had  arrived  the  previous  day,  and 
Barnard  was  now  ready  for  an  advance.  His  force  consisted  of  about 
600  Cavalry  and  2,400  Infantry,  with  22  field-guns.  There  were 
besides  150  European  Artillerymen,  chiefly  recruits,  with  the  siege- 
train,  which  comprised  eight  18-pounders,  four  8-inch  and  twelve 
5^-inch  mortars.  The  guns,  if  not  exactly  obsolete,  were  quite  un- 
suited for  the  work  that  had  to  be  done,  but  they  were  the  best  pro- 
curable. George  Campbell,  in  his  ‘ Memoirs  of  my  Indian  Career,’ 
thus  describes  the  siege-train  as  he  saw  it  passing  through  Kurnal : ‘ I 
could  not  help  thinking  that  it  looked  a very  trumpery  affair  with 
which  to  bombard  and  take  a great  fortified  city  ;’  and  he  expressed  his 
‘ strong  belief  that  Delhi  would  never  be  taken  by  that  battery.’ 

Barnard  heard  that  the  enemy  intended  to  oppose  his  march  to 
Delhi,  and  in  order  to  ascertain  their  exact  position  he  sent  Lieutenant 
Hodson  (who  had  previously  done  good  service  for  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  by  opening  communication  with  Meerut)  to  reconnoitre  the  road. 
Hodson  reported  that  the  rebels  were  in  force  at  Badli-ki-Serai  a little 
more  than  halfway  between  Alipur  and  Delhi.  Orders  were  accord- 
ingly issued  for  an  advance  at  midnight  on  the  7th  June. 

When  it  became  known  that  a battle  was  imminent,  there  was  great 
enthusiasm  amongst  the  troops,  who  were  burning  to  avenge  the 

* The  Chaplain’s  Narrative  of  the  siege  of  Delhi. 

+ Now  the  1st  Battalion,  2nd  Gurkhas. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  SIR  HARRY  TOMBS.  V.C.,  K.C.B. 
From 

a photograph  hy  Messrs.  Grillet  and  Co. 


1857] 


BARNARD'S  SUCCESS  AT  BA DLI-KI-SERA I 


85 


massacres  of  Meerut  and  Delhi.  The  sick  in  hospital  declared  they 
would  remain  there  no  longer,  and  many,  quite  unlit  to  walk,  insisted 
on  accompanying  the  attacking  column,  imploring  their  comrades  not 
to  mention  that  they  were  ill,  for  fear  they  should  not  be  allowed  to 
take  part  in  the  fight.* * * § 

The  mutineers  had  selected  an  admirable  position  on  both  sides  of 
the  main  road.  To  their  right  was  a serai  and  a walled  village  capable 
of  holding  large  numbers  of  Infantry,  and  protected  by  an  impassable 
swamp.  To  their  left,  on  some  rising  ground,  a sand-bag  battery  for 
four  heavy  guns  and  an  8-inch  mortar  had  been  constructed.  On  both 
sides  the  ground  was  swampy  and  intersected  by  water-cuts,  and  about 
a mile  to  the  enemy’s  left,  and  nearly  parallel  to  the  road,  ran  the 
Western  Jumna  Canal. 

At  the  hour  named,  Brigadier  Hope  Grant, f commanding  the 
Cavalry,  started  with  ten  Horse  Artillery  guns,  three  squadrons  of  the 
9th  Lancers,  and  fifty  Jliind  horsemen  under  Lieutenant  Hodson,  with 
the  object  of  turning  the  enemy’s  left  flank.  Shortly  afterwards  the 
main  body  marched  along  the  road  until  the  lights  in  the  enemy’s 
camp  became  visible.  Colonel  Showers,  who  had  succeeded  Hallifax 
in  the  command  of  the  1st  Brigade,^  moved  off  to  the  right  of  the  road, 
and  Colonel  Graves,  who  had  taken  Jones’s  place  with  the  2nd  Brigade, § 
to  the  left.  The  heavy  guns  remained  on  the  road  with  a battery  of 
Field  Artillery  on  either  flank.  Just  as  day  broke  our  guns  advanced, 
but  before  they  were  in  position  the  fight  began  by  a cannonade  from 
the  rebel  Artillery,  which  caused  us  severe  loss.  To  this  destructive 
fire  no  adequate  reply  could  be  made ; our  guns  were  too  few  and  of 
too  small  calibre.  To  add  to  our  difficulties,  the  Native  bullock-drivers 
of  our  heavy  guns  went  off  with  their  cattle,  and  one  of  the  waggons 
blew  up.  At  this  critical  moment  Barnard  ordered  Showers  to  charge 
the  enemy’s  guns,  a service  which  was  performed  with  heroic  gallantry 
by  Her  Majest3'’s  75th  Foot,  who  carried  the  position  at  the  point  of 
the  bayonet,  with  a loss  of  19  officers  and  men  killed  and  43  wounded. 
Then,  supported  by  the  1st  Fusiliers,  the  same  regiment  dashed  across 
the  road  and  burst  open  the  gates  of  the  serai.  A desperate  fight 
ensued,  but  the  sepoys  were  no  match  for  British  bayonets,  and  they 
now  learnt  that  their  misdeeds  were  not  to  be  allowed  to  go  unpunished. 
Graves’s  brigade,  having  passed  round  the  jhil, ||  appeared  on  the 
enemy’s  right  rear,  while  Grant  with  his  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery 
threatened  their  left.  The  defeat  was  complete,  and  the  rebels  retreated 
hastily  towards  Delhi,  leaving  their  guns  on  the  ground. 

* 1 Siege  of  Delhi  ; by  an  Officer  who  served  there.’ 

+ The  late  General  Sir  Hope  Grant,  G.C.B. 

t 75th  and  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers. 

§ 1st  Battalion  60th  Rifles,  2nd  Bengal  Fusiliers,  and  Sirmur  battalion. 

||  Swampy  ground. 


86 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


Although  the  men  were  much  exhausted,  Barnard  determined  to 
push  on,  for  he  feared  that  if  he  delayed  the  rebels  might  rally,  and 
occupy  another  strong  position. 

From  the  cross-roads  just  beyond  Badli-ki-Serai  could  be  seen  the 
Bidge  on  which  the  British  force  was  to  hold  its  own  for  more  than 
three  months  during  the  heat  of  an  Indian  summer,  and  under  the  rain 
of  an  Indian  monsoon.  At  this  point  two  columns  were  formed,  Bar- 
nard taking  command  of  the  one,  which  proceeded  to  the  left  towards 
the  cantonment,  and  Wilson  of  the  other,  which  moved  along  the  city 
road.  Wilson’s  column  fought  its  way  through  gardens  and  enclosures 
until  it  reached  the  western  extremity  of  the  Ridge.  Barnard,  as  he 
came  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  guns,  made  a flank  movement  to 
the  left,  and  then,  wheeling  to  his  right,  swept  along  the  Ridge  from 
the  Flagstaff  Tower  to  Hindu  Rao’s  house,  where  the  two  columns 
united,  the  rebels  flying  before  them. 

Barnard  had  achieved  a great  success  and  with  comparatively  small 
loss,  considering  the  formidable  position  occupied  by  the  enemy,  their 
great  strength  in  Artillery,  and  their  superiority  in  numbers. 

Our  casualties  were  51  killed  and  131  wounded.  Among  the  former 
was  Colonel  Chester,  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army.  Of  the  troops 
opposed  to  us  it  was  reckoned  that  1,000  never  returned  to  Delhi ; 
thirteen  guns  were  captured,  two  of  them  being  24-pounders. 

I have  frequently  wandered  over  the  Ridge  since  1857,  and  thought 
how  wonderfully  we  were  aided  by  finding  a ready-made  position  — not 
only  a coign  of  vantage  for  attack,  but  a rampart  of  defence,  as  Forrest* 
describes  it.  This  Ridge,  rising  sixty  feet  above  the  city,  covered  the 
main  line  of  communication  to  the  Punjab,  upon  the  retention  of  which 
our  very  existence  as  a force  depended.  Its  left  rested  on  the  Jumna, 
unfordable  from  the  time  the  snow  on  the  higher  ranges  begins  to  melt 
until  the  rainy  season  is  over,  and  of  sufficient  width  to  prevent  our 
being  enfiladed  by  field-guns  ; although,  on  the  immediate  right,  bazaars, 
buildings,  and  garden-walls  afforded  cover  to  the  enemy,  the  enclosed 
nature  of  the  ground  was  so  far  advantageous  that  it  embarrassed  and 
impeded  them  in  their  attempts  to  organize  an  attack  in  force  upon 
our  flank  or  rear ; and  a further  protection  was  afforded  by  the 
Najafgarh  jliil,  which  during  the  rains  submerges  a vast  area  of  land. 

The  distance  of  the  Ridge  from  the  city  walls  varied  considerably. 
On  our  right,  where  the  memorial  monument  now  stands,  it  was  about 
1,200  yards,  at  the  Flagstaff  Tower  about  a mile  and  a half,  and  at  the 
end  near  the  river  nearly  two  miles  and  a half.  This  rendered  our  left 
comparatively  safe,  and  it  was  behind  the  Ridge  in  this  direction  that 
the  main  part  of  our  camp  was  pitched.  The  Flagstaff  Tower  in  the 
centre  was  the  general  rendezvous  for  the  non-combatants,  and  for 

* ‘The  Indian  Mutiny,’  by  George  W.  Forrest. 


1857] 


THE  FLAGSTAFF  TOWER 


87 


those  of  the  sick  and  wounded  who  were  able  to  move  about,  as  they 
could  assemble  there  and  hear  the  news  from  the  front  without  much 
risk  of  injury  from  the  enemy’s  fire. 

The  Flagstaff  Tower  is  interesting  from  the  fact  that  it  was  here  the 
residents  from  the  cantonment  of  Delhi  assembled  to  make  a stand, 
on  hearing  that  the  rebels  from  Meerut  were  murdering  the  British 
officers  on  duty  within  the  city,  that  the  three  Native  regiments  and 
battery  of  Field  Artillery  had  joined  the  mutineers,  and  that  at  any 
moment  they  themselves  might  expect  to  be  attacked.  The  tower  was 
150  feet  high,  with  a low  parapet  running  round  the  top,  approached 
by  a narrow  winding  staircase.  Here  the  men  of  the  party  proposed 
to  await  the  attack.  The  ladies,  who  behaved  with  the  utmost  coolness 
and  presence  of  mind,  were,  with  the  waves  and  children  of  the  few' 
European  non-commissioned  officers,  placed  for  their  greater  safety  on 
the  stairs,  where  they  were  all  but  suffocated  by  the  stifling  heat  in 
such  a confined  space.  The  little  party  on  the  roof  consisted  of  some 
tw'enty  British  officers,  the  same  number  of  half-caste  buglers  and 
drummers,  and  half  a dozen  European  soldiers.  Not  a drop  of  water, 
not  a particle  of  food,  wras  to  be  had.  No  help  appeared  to  be  coming 
from  Meerut,  in  the  direction  of  which  place  many  a longing  and 
expectant  glance  had  been  cast  during  the  anxious  hours  of  that 
miserable  11th  May.  Constant  and  heavy  firing  was  heard  from  the 
city  and  suburbs,  and  the  Cavalry  wrere  reported  to  be  advancing  cn 
the  cantonment. 

Before  evening  the  weary  w'atchers  realized  that  their  position  was 
untenable,  and  that  their  only  possible  chance  of  escaping  the  fate 
which  had  befallen  the  officers  within  the  city  (whose  dead  bodies  had 
been  inhumanly  sent  in  a cart  to  the  Tower)  lay  in  flight.  Shortly 
before  dark  the  move  was  made,  the  women  and  children  were  crowded 
into  the  few  vehicles  available,  and  accompanied  by  the  men,  some  on 
foot  and  some  on  horseback,  they  got  away  by  the  road  leading 
towards  Umballa.  They  were  only  just  in  time,  for  before  the  last  of 
the  party  were  out  of  sight  of  the  cantonment,  crowds  of  Natives 
poured  into  it,  burning,  plundering,  and  destroying  everything  they 
could  find. 

Amongst  the  fugitives  from  Delhi  was  Captain  Tytler,  of  the  38th 
Native  Infantry,  who,  after  a variety'  of  vicissitudes,  reached  Umballa 
safely  with  his  wife  and  children.  When  Anson’s  force  was  being 
formed  for  the  advance  on  Delhi,  Tytler  was  placed  in  charge  of  the 
military  treasure  chest,  and  through  some  unaccountable  negligence 
Mrs.  Tytler  was  allowed  to  accompany  him.  I believe  that,  when 
Mrs.  Tytler’s  presence  became  known  to  the  authorities,  she  would  have 
been  sent  out  of  camp  to  some  safe  place,  but  at  that  time  she  was  not 
in  a fit  state  to  travel,  and  on  the  21st  June,  a few  day's  after  the  force 
took  up  its  position  under  a heavy  cannonade,  she  gave  birth  to  a son  in 


88 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


the  waggon  in  which  she  was  accommodated.  The  infant,  who  was 
christened  Stanley  Delhi  Force,  seems  to  have  been  looked  upon  by 
the  soldiery  with  quite  a superstitious  feeling,  for  the  father  tells  us 
that  soon  after  its  birth  he  overheard  a soldier  say ; ‘Now  we  shall  get 
our  reinforcements ; this  camp  was  formed  to  avenge  the  blood  of 
innocents,  and  the  first  reinforcement  sent  to  us  is  a new-born  infant.’ 
Reinforcements  did  actually  arrive  the  nest  day. 

It  was  on  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  June  that  the  British  force  was 
placed  in  position  on  the  Ridge.  The  main  piquet  was  established  at 
Hindu  Rao’s  house,  a large  stone  building,  in  former  days  the  country 
residence  of  some  Mahratta  Chief.  About  one  hundred  and  eighty 
yards  further  to  the  left  was  the  observatory,  near  which  our  heavy 
gun  battery  was  erected.  Beyond  the  observatory  was  an  old  Pathan 
mosque,  in  which  was  placed  an  Infantry  piquet  with  two  field-guns. 
Still  further  to  the  left  came  the  Flagstaff  Tower,  held  by  a party  of 
Infantry  with  two  more  field  guns.  At  the  extreme  right  of  the 
Ridge,  overlooking  the  trunk  road,  there  was  a strong  piquet  with  a 
heavy  battery. 

This  was  the  weak  point  of  our  defence.  To  the  right,  and  somewhat 
to  the  rear,  was  the  suburb  of  Sabzi  Mandi  (vegetable  market),  a succes- 
sion of  houses  and  walled  gardens,  from  which  the  rebels  constantly 
threatened  our  flank.  To  protect  this  part  of  the  position  as  much  as 
possible,  a battery  of  three  18-pounders  and  an  Infantry  piquet  was 
placed  on  what  was  known  as  the  General’s  Mound,  with  a Cavalry 
piquet  and  two  Horse  Artillery  guns  immediately  below.  In  front  of 
the  Ridge  the  ground  was  covered  with  old  buildings,  enclosures,  and 
clumps  of  trees,  which  afforded  only  too  perfect  shelter  to  the  enemy 
when  making  their  sorties. 

As  described  by  the  Commanding  Engineer,  ‘ the  eastern  face  of 
Delhi  rests  on  the  Jumna,  and  at  the  season  of  the  year  during  which 
our  operations  were  carried  on,  the  stream  may  be  described  as  wash- 
ing the  face  of  the  walls.  The  river  front  was  therefore  inacces- 
sible to  the  besieging  force,  while  at  the  same  time  the  mutineers 
and  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  could  communicate  freely  across  the 
river  by  means  of  the  bridge  of  boats  and  ferries.  This  rendered  it 
impossible  for  us  to  invest  Delhi,  even  if  there  had  been  a sufficient 
number  of  troops  for  the  purpose.  We  were  only  able,  indeed,  to 
direct  our  attack  against  a small  portion  of  the  city  wall,  while  through- 
out the  siege  the  enemy  could  freely  communicate  with,  and  procure 
supplies  from,  the  surrounding  country. 

‘ On  the  river  front  the  defences  consisted  of  an  irregular  wall  with 
occasional  bastions  and  towers,  and  about  one  half  of  the  length  of  this 
face  was  occupied  by  the  palace  of  the  King  of  Delhi  and  its  outwork, 
the  old  Moghul  fort  of  Selimgarh. 

‘ The  remaining  defences  consisted  of  a succession  of  bastioned 


i»57] 


THE  DEFENCES  OF  DELHI 


89 


fronts,  the  connecting  curtains  being  very  long,  and  the  outworks 
limited  to  one  crown -work  at  the  Ajmir  gate,  and  Martello  towers 
mounting  a single  gun,  at  the  points  where  additional  Hanking  fire  to 
that  given  by  the  bastions  themselves  was  required.’* 

The  above  description  will  give  some  idea  of  the  strength  of  the 
great  city  which  the  British  force  had  come  to  capture.  For  more  than 
two  months,  however,  our  energies  were  devoted  not  to  capturing  the 
city,  but  to  defending  ourselves,  having  to  be  ever  on  the  watch  to 
guard  our  communication  with  the  Punjab,  and  to  repel  the  enemy’s 
almost  daily  sorties. 

The  defences  of  Delhi,  which  remain  almost  unaltered  up  to  the 
present  day,  were  modernized  forms  of  the  ancient  works  that  existed 
when  the  city  fell  before  Lord  Lake’s  army  in  1803.  These  works  had 
been  strengthened  and  improved  some  years  before  the  Mutiny  by 
Lieutenant  Robert  Napier,  f How  thoroughly  and  effectually  that 
talented  and  distinguished  Engineer  performed  the  duty  entrusted  to 
him,  we  who  had  to  attack  Delhi  could  testify  to  our  ccst. 

Barnard  was  not  left  long  in  doubt  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  rebels, 
who,  the  very  afternoon  on  which  he  occupied  the  Ridge,  attacked 
Hindu  Rao’s  house,  where  the  Sirmur  battalion,  two  companies  of  the 
60th  Rifles,  and  two  of  Scott’s  guns  had  been  placed.  The  enemy 
were  driven  off  before  dark.  The  following  day  they  began  to  can- 
nonade from  the  city  walls,  and  in  the  afternoon  repeated  their 
attack. 

That  same  morning  a welcome  reinforcement  reached  camp,  the 
famous  Corps  of  Guides  having  arrived  as  fresh  as  if  they  had  returned 
from  an  ordinary  field  dajr,  instead  of  having  come  off  a march  of 
nearly  600  miles,  accomplished  in  the  incredibly  short  time  of  twenty- 
two  days,  at  the  most  trying  season  of  the  year.  The  General,  having 
inspected  them,  said  a few  words  of  encouragement  to  the  men,  who 
begged  their  gallant  Commandant  to  say  how  proud  they  were  to 
belong  to  the  Delhi  Force.  Their  usefulness  was  proved  that  same 

* The  bastions  were  small,  eacli  mounting  from  ten  to  fourteen  pieces  of 
Artillery  ; they  were  provided  with  masonry  parapets  about  12  feet  in  thick- 
ness, and  were  about  16  feet  high.  The  curtain  consisted  of  a simple  masonry 
wall  or  rampart  16  feet  in  height,  11  feet  thick  at  top,  and  14  or  15  feet  at 
bottom.  This  main  wall  carried  a parapet  loopholed  for  musketry  8 feet  in 
height  and  3 feet  in  thickness.  The  whole  of  the  land  front  was  covered  by  a 
faussebraye  of  varying  thickness,  ranging  from  16  to  30  feet,  and  having  a 
vertical  scarp  wall  8 feet  high  ; exterior  to  this  was  a dry  diteh  about  25  feet 
in  width.  The  counterscarp  was  simply  an  earthen  slope,  easy  to  descend. 
The  glacis  was  very  narrow,  extending  only  50  or  60  yards  from  the  counter- 
scarp, and  covering  barely  one-half  of  the  walls  from  the  besiegers’  view. 
These  walls  were  about  seven  miles  in  circumference,  and  included  an  area 
of  about  three  square  miles  (see  Colonel  Baird-Smith’s  report,  dated 
September  17,  1857). 

t The  late  Field  Marshal  Lord  Napier  of  Magdala,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I. 


go  FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

afternoon,  when,  in  support  of  the  piquets,  they  engaged  the  enemy  in 
a hand-to-hand  contest,  and  drove  them  back  to  the  city. 

It  was  close  up  to  the  walls  that  Quintin  Battye,  the  dashing  Com- 
mander of  the  Guides  Cavalry,  received  his  mortal  wound.  He  was 
the  brightest  and  cheeriest  of  companions,  and  although  only  a sub- 
altern of  eight  years’  service,  he  was  a great  loss.  I spent  a few  hours 
with  him  on  my  way  to  Delhi,  and  I remember  how  his  handsome  face 
glowed  when  he  talked  of  the  opportunities  for  distinguishing  them- 
selves in  store  for  the  Guides.  Proud  of  his  regiment,  and  beloved  by 
his  men,  who,  grand  fellows  themselves,  were  captivated  by  his  many 
soldierly  qualities,  he  had  every  prospect  before  him  of  a splendid 
career,  but  he  was  destined  to  fall  in  his  first  fight.  He  was  curiously 
fond  of  quotations,  and  the  last  words  he  uttered  were  1 Dulcc  et 
decorum  est  pro  patria  mori.' 

While  our  Infantry  and  Field  Artillery  were  busily  engaged  with  the 
enemy,  the  few  heavy  guns  we  had  were  put  in  position  on  the  Ridge. 
Great  things  were  hoped  from  them,  but  it  was  soon  found  that  they 
were  not  powerful  enough  to  silence  the  enemy’s  fire,  and  that  our 
small  supply  of  ammunition  was  being  rapidly  expended.*  The  rebels’ 
guns  were  superior  in  number  and  some  in  calibre  to  ours,  and  were 
well  served  by  the  Native  Artillerymen  whom  we  had  been  at  such 
pains  to  teach.  Barnard  discovered,  too,  that  his  deficiencies  in  men 
and  materiel  prevented  regular  approaches  being  made.  There  were 
only  150  Native  Sappers  and  Miners  with  our  force,  and  Infantry 
could  not  be  spared  for  working  parties. 

On  the  10th  June  another  determined  attack  was  made  on  Hindu 
Rao’s  house,  which  was  repulsed  by  the  Sirmur  battalion  of  Gurkhas 
under  its  distinguished  Commandant.  Major  Reid.f  The  mutineers 
quite  hoped  that  the  Gurkhas  would  join  them,  and  as  they  were 
advancing  they  called  out : * We  are  not  firing ; we  want  to  speak  to 
you;  we  want  you  to  join  us.’  The  little  Gurkhas  replied,  ‘Oh  yes; 
we  arc  coming,’  on  which  they  advanced  to  within  twenty  paces  of 
the  rebels,  and,  firing  a well  - directed  volley,  killed  nearly  thirty 
of  them. 

The  next  day  the  insurgents  made  a third  attack,  and  were  again 
repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  They  knew  that  Hindu  Rao's  house 
was  the  key  of  our  position,  and  throughout  the  siege  they  made  the 
most  desperate  attempts  to  capture  it.  But  Barnard  had  entrusted 
this  post  of  danger  to  the  Gurkhas,  and  all  efforts  to  dislodge  them  were 
unavailing.  At  first  Reid  had  at  his  command  only  his  own  battalion 
and  two  companies  of  the  60th  Rifles ; but  on  the  arrival  of  the  Guides 

* So  badly  off  were  we  for  ammunition  for  the  heavy  guns  at  this  time, 
that  it  was  found  necessary  to  use  the  shot  fired  at  us  by  the  enemy,  and  a 
reward  was  offered  for  overy  24-pounder  shot  brought  into  the  Artillery  Park. 

+ Now  General  Sir  Charles  Reid,  G.C.  R. 


1857] 


THE  GALLANT  LITTLE  GURKHAS 


9i 


their  Infantry  were  also  placed  at  his  disposal,  and  whenever  he 
sounded  the  alarm  he  was  reinforced  by  two  more  companies  of  the  60th. 
Hindu  ltao’s  house  was  within  easy  range  of  nearly  all  the  enemy's 
heavy  guns,  and  was  riddled  through  and  through  with  shot  and  shell. 
Keid  never  quitted  the  Ridge  save  to  attack  the  enemy,  and  never  once 
visited  the  camp  until  carried  into  it  severely  wounded  on  the  day  of  the 
final  assault.  Hindu  Kao’s  house  was  the  little  Gurkhas’  hospital  as 
well  as  their  barrack,  for  their  sick  and  wounded  begged  to  he  left  with 
their  comrades  instead  of  being  taken  to  camp.* 

Failing  in  their  attempts  on  the  centre  of  the  position,  the  mutineers 
soon  after  daylight  on  the  12th,  having  concealed  themselves  in  the 
ravines  adjoining  Metcalfe  House,  attacked  the  Flagstaff  Tower,  the 
piquet  of  which  was  composed  of  two  Horse  Artillery  guns  and  two 
companies  of  the  75tli  Foot,  under  the  command  of  Captains  Dunbar 
and  Knox.  A heavy  fog  and  thick  mist  rolling  up  from  the  low 
ground  near  the  Jumna  completely  enveloped  the  Kidge  and  the  left 
front  of  our  position,  hiding  everything  in  the  immediate  vicinity. 
The  piquet  was  on  the  point  of  being  relieved  by  a detachment  of  the 
2nd  Bengal  Fusiliers,  when  a large  body  of  the  enemy,  who  had  crept 
up  unobserved,  made  a rush  at  the  Flagstaff  Tower,  and  as  nearly  as 
possible  captured  the  guns.  The  piquet  was  hardly  pressed,  Knox  and 
several  men  were  killed,  and  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  two  com- 
panies of  the  60th,  the  rebels  would  have  gained  the  day. 

This  engagement  was  scarcely  over,  when  masses  of  insurgents 
advanced  from  the  Sabzi  Mandi  upon  Hindu  Rao’s  house,  and  into  the 
gardens  on  the  right  flank  of  the  camp,  threatening  the  Mound  piquet. 
Reserves  were  called  up,  these  attacks,  in  then  turn,  were  repulsed  and 
the  rebels  were  pursued  for  some  distance.  It  was  most  fortunate  that 
both  attacks  did  not  take  place  simultaneously,  as  was  the  obvious 
intention  of  the  enemy,  for  our  strength  would  not  have  been  sufficient 
to  repel  them  both  at  the  same  moment. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  mutineers  from  coming  to  such  close  quarters 
again,  a piquet  was  placed  in  Metcalfe’s  House,  and  the  Mound  to  the 
rear  of  the  ridge  facing  the  Sabzi  Mandi  was  strengthened.  These 
precautions  ought  to,  and  would,  have  been  taken  before,  but  for  the 
want  of  men.  Our  soldiers  were  scarcely  ever  off  duty,  and  this  fresh 
demand  made  it  impossible  at  times  to  provide  a daily  relief  for  the 
several  piquets. 

Our  resources  in  siege  guns  and  ammunition  were  so  limited,  daily 
sorties,  disease,  and  heat  were  making  such  ravages  amongst  our  small 
force,  there  was  so  little  hope  of  receiving  any  considerable  reinforce- 
ments, and  it  appeared  to  be  of  such  paramount  importance  to  capture 

* Forrest’s  ‘Indian  Mutiny’  and  Norman’s  ‘Narrative  of  the  Siege  of 
Delhi,’  two  interesting  accounts  from  which  I shall  often  quote. 


92  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

Delhi  without  further  delay,  that  Barnard  agreed  to  a proposal  for 
taking  it  by  a coup  de  main. 

The  particular  details  of  the  project  and  disposition  of  the  troops 
were  worked  out  by  three  young  officers  of  Engineers,  under  the 
direct  orders  of  the  General,  and  were  kept  a profound  secret ; even  the 
Commanding  Engineer  was  not  made  acquainted  with  them.  Secrecy 
was,  of  course,  of  vital  importance,  but  that  the  officers  who  ought  to 
have  been  chiefly  concerned  were  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  scheme, 
shows  there  was  little  of  that  confidence  so  essential  to  success  existing 
between  the  Commander  and  those  who  were  in  the  position  of  his 
principal  advisers.  Practically  the  whole  force  was  to  be  engaged, 
divided  into  three  columns — one  to  enter  by  the  Kashmir  gate,  the 
second  by  the  Lahore  gate,  and  the  third  was  to  attempt  an  escalade. 
The  three  columns,  if  they  succeeded  in  effecting  an  entrance,  were  to 
work  their  way  to  the  centre  of  the  city,  and  there  unite. 

It  was  intended  that  these  columns  should  move  off  from  camp  so  os 
to  arrive  at  the  walls  just  before  daybreak  ; accordingly,  at  one  o’clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  13th  .Tune  the  troops  were  suddenly  paraded  and 
ammunition  served  out,  and  then  for  the  first  time  the  Commanders  of 
the  three  columns  and  the  staff  were  made  acquainted  with  the 
General’s  intentions.  It  so  happened  that  the  75th  Foot,  which  had 
followed  the  enemy  into  the  grounds  of  Metcalfe  House  after  the 
repulse  on  the  Flagstaff  Tower  the  previous  morning,  had  through 
some  oversight  never  been  recalled  ; their  absence  was  only  discovered 
when  the  order  was  given  for  the  regiment  to  turn  out,  and  a consider- 
able time  was  wasted  in  sending  for  it  and  bringing  it  back  to  camp. 
Day  was  breaking  when  this  regiment  received  its  ammunition,  and  all 
hope  of  an  unperceived  advance  to  the  walls  had  to  be  given  up.  The 
troops  were  therefore  dismissed,  and  allowed  to  turn  in,  having  been 
uselessly  disturbed  from  their  much-needed  rest. 

The  failure  to  give  effect  to  the  young  Engineer  officers’  plan  may  be 
looked  upon  as  a merciful  dispensation  of  Providence,  which  saved  us 
from  what  would  almost  certainly  have  been  an  irreparable  disaster. 
When  we  think  of  the  hard  fighting  encountered  when  the  assault  did 
take  place  under  much  moro  favourable  circumstances,  and  how  the 
columns  at  the  end  of  that  day  were  only  just  able  to  get  inside  the 
city,  those  who  had  practical  knowledge  of  the  siege  can  judge  what 
chance  there  would  have  been  of  these  smaller  columns  accomplishing 
their  object,  even  if  they  had  been  able  to  take  the  enemy  by  surprise. 

The  13th  and  14th  passed  in  comparative  quiet ; but  early  on  the 
15th  a strong  force  advanced  from  Delhi  against  the  Metcalfe  House 
piquet,  with  the  object  of  turning  our  left  flank,  but  it  was  driven  back 
with  considerable  loss. 

On  tho  17th  we  were  attacked  from  almost  every  direction — a 
manoeuvre  intended  to  prevent  ouv  observing  a battery  which  was 


•857] 


THE  BESIEGERS  BESIEGED 


93 


being  constructed  close  to  an  Idgah,*  situated  on  a hill  to  our  right, 
from  which  to  enfilade  our  position  on  the  Ridge.  As  it  was  very  im- 
portant to  prevent  the  completion  of  this  battery,  Barnard  ordered  it  to 
be  attacked  by  two  small  columns,  one  commanded  by  Tombs,  of  the 
Bengal  Horse  Artillery,  the  other  by  Ileid.  Tombs,  with  400  of  the  60th 
Rifles  and  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers,  30  of  the  Guides  Cavalry,  20  Sappers 
and  Miners,  and  his  own  troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  moved  towards  the 
enemy’s  left,  while  Reid,  with  four  companies  of  the  60th  and  some  of 
his  own  Gurkhas,  advanced  through  Kishenganj  against  their  right. 
Tombs  drove  the  rebels  through  a succession  of  gardens  till  they 
reached  the  Idgah,  where  they  made  an  obstinate  but  unavailing  re- 
sistance. The  gates  of  the  mosque  were  blown  open,  and  thirty-nine 
of  its  defenders  were  killed.  Tombs  himself  was  slightly  wounded, 
and  had  two  horses  killed,  making  five  which  had  been  shot  under  this 
gallant  soldier  since  the  commencement  of  the  campaign.  Reid's 
attack  was  equally  successful.  He  completely  destroyed  the  battery, 
and  inflicted  heavy  loss  on  the  enemy. 

The  next  day  but  one  the  rebels  issued  from  the  city  in  great  force, 
and  threatened  nearly  every  part  of  our  position.  The  fighting  was 
severe  throughout  the  afternoon,  the  piquets  having  again  and  again  to 
be  reinforced.  Towards  evening,  while  nearly  all  the  Infantry'  were 
thus  engaged,  a large  party  of  the  insurgents,  passing  unperceived 
through  the  suburbs  and  gardens  on  our  right,  reappeared  about  a mile 
and  a half  to  our  rear.  Very  few  troops  were  left  in  camp,  and  all 
Hope  Grant,  who  was  in  command  at  the  time,  could  collect  was  four 
or  five  squadrons  of  Cavalry  and  twelve  guns.  He  found  the  enemy 
in  a strong  position,  against  which  his  light  guns  could  make  but  little 
impression,  while  tbeir  Artillery  and  well-placed  Infantry  did  us  con- 
siderable damage.  Tombs’s  troop  especially  suffered,  and  at  one  time 
his  guns  were  in  imminent  danger  of  being  captured.  Just  at  this 
moment  some  of  the  Guides  Cavalry  rode  up.  ‘ Daly,  if  you  do  not 
charge,’ called  out  Tombs,  ‘my  guns  are  taken.’  Daly  spurred  into 
the  bushes,  followed  by  about  a dozen  of  his  gallant  Guides.  He 
returned  with  a bullet  through  his  shoulder,  but  the  momentary  diver- 
sion saved  the  guns.f 

As  long  as  it  was  light  the  steady'  fire  of  the  Artillery'  and  the  dashing 
charges  of  the  Cavalry  kept  the  rebels  in  check ; but  in  the  dusk  of  the 
evening  their  superior  numbers  told  : they  very  nearly  succeeded  in  turn- 
ing our  flank,  and  for  some  time  the  guns  were  again  in  great  jeopardy ; 
the  9th  Lancers  and  Guides,  bent  on  saving  them  at  all  hazards, 
charged  the  enemy ; but,  with  a ditch  and  houses  on  each  side,  their 
action  was  paralyzed,  and  their  loss  severe.  All  was  now  in  confusion, 
the  disorder  increasing  as  night  advanced,  when  a small  body  of 

* A Mahomedan  place  of  worship  and  sacrifice. 

f ‘ Siege  of  Delhi  ; by'  an  Officer  who  served  there.’ 


94  FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

Infantry  (about  300  of  the  60th  Rifles)  came  up,  dashed  forward,  and, 
cutting  a lane  through  the  rebels,  rescued  the  guns.* 

Our  loss  in  this  affair  amounted  to  3 officers  and  17  men  killed,  and 
7 officers  and  70  men  wounded.  Among  the  latter  was  Hope  Grant, 
who  had  his  horse  shot  under  him  in  a charge,  and  was  saved  by  the 
devotion  of  two  men  of  his  own  regiment  (the  9th  Lancers)  and  a 
Mahomedan  sowar  of  the  4th  Irregular  Cavalry. 

It  was  nearly  midnight  before  the  troops  returned  to  camp.  The 
enemy  had  been  frustrated  in  their  attempt  to  force  our  rear,  but  they 
had  not  been  driven  back  ; we  had,  indeed,  been  only  just  able  to  hold 
our  own.  The  result  of  the  day  added  considerably  to  the  anxiety  of 
the  Commander.  He  saw  that  the  rebels  had  discovered  our  weak 
point,  and  that  if  they  managed  to  establish  themselves  in  our  rear,  our 
communication  with  the  Punjab  would  be  cut  off,  our  small  force  would 
be  invested,  and  without  supplies  and  reinforcements  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  maintain  our  position  against  the  daily  increasing  strength 
of  the  insurgents.  Great  was  the  despondency  in  camp  when  the 
result  of  the  day’s  fighting  was  known ; but  the  fine  spirit  which 
animated  the  force  throughout  the  siege  soon  asserted  itself,  and  our 
men  cheerfully  looked  forward  to  the  next  encounter  with  the  enemy. 

At  daybreak  Grant  was  again  upon  the  ground,  but  found  it 
abandoned.  Many  dead  men  and  horses  were  lying  about,  and  a 
9-pounder  gun,  left  by  the  enemy,  was  brought  into  camp. 

The  troops  had  scarcely  got  back,  hoping  for  a little  rest,  when  the 
enemy  again  resumed  their  attack  on  the  rear,  and  opened  fire  at  so 
short  a distance  that  their  shot  came  right  through  the  camp.  But  on 
this  occasion  they  made  no  stand,  and  retreated  as  soon  as  our  troops 
showed  themselves. 

In  order  to  strengthen  our  position  in  rear  a battery  of  two 
18-pounders  was  constructed,  supported  by  Cavalry  and  Infantry 
piquets,  and  most  of  the  bridges  over  the  drain  from  the  Najafgarh 
jhil  were  destroyed. 

For  two  days  after  the  events  I have  just  described  the  hard-worked 
little  body  of  troops  had  comparative  rest,  but  our  spies  informed  us 
that  the  enemy  were  being  largely  reinforced,  and  that  wo  might 
expect  to  be  hotly  attacked  on  the  23rd. 

For  some  time  an  idea  had  been  prevalent  amongst  the  Natives  that 
the  English  raj  was  not  destined  to  survive  its  hundredth  year,  and 
that  the  centenary  of  Clive’s  victory  on  the  field  of  Flassy  on  the  23rd 
June,  1757,  would  see  its  downfall.  This  idea  was  strengthened  in  the 
Native  mind  by  the  fact  that  the  23rd  June,  1857,  was  a dato  propitious 
alike  for  Hindus  and  Mahomedans ; the  Jattsa,  a Hindu  religious 
festival,  was  to  take  place  on  that  day,  and  there  was  also  to  be  a new 


Forrest’s  ‘The  Indian  Mutiny.' 


THE  CENTENARY  OF  PL  ASSY 


95 


1857] 

moon,  which  the  Mahomedans  looked  upon  as  a lucky  omen ; the 
astrologers,  therefore,  declared  that  the  stars  in  their  courses  would 
fight  for  the  mutineers.  If,  however,  prophecies  and  omens  alike 
appeared  to  favour  the  rebels,  fortune  was  not  altogether  unkind  to  us, 
for  on  the  22nd  a reinforcement  reached  Rhai,  twenty-two  miles  from 
Delhi,  consisting  of  six  Horse  Artillery  guns,  a small  party  of  British 
Infantry,  a squadron  of  the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  the  Hcad- 
Quarters  of  the  4th  Sikhs,  numbering  in  all  about  850  men. 

A staff  officer  was  sent  at  once  to  Rhai  to  hurry  on  the  force  and 
tell  them  how  urgently  their  assistance  was  required  in  camp ; this 
appeal  was  responded  to  with  the  utmost  alacrity,  and  early  the  next 
evening  the  welcome  reinforcement  made  its  appearance. 

It  had  scarcely  arrived  before  the  Artillery  on  the  city  walls  opened 
fire,  while  guns,  which  had  been  brought  into  the  suburbs,  enfiladed 
our  right  and  concentrated  a heavy  fire  on  Hindu  Rao’s  house  which 
the  few  guns  we  had  in  position  were  quite  unable  to  silence.  The 
rebel  Infantry  occupied  Kishenganj  and  Sabzi  Mandi  in  force,  and 
threatened  to  advance  on  the  Mound  battery,  W’hile  a constant 
musketry  fire  was  maintained  upon  the  Ridge.  Reid  reported  that  the 
mutineers  made  a desperate  attack  at  about  twelve  o’clock,  and  that  no 
men  could  have  fought  better ; they  charged  the  Rifles,  the  Guides, 
and  the  Gurkhas  again  and  again.  The  cannonade  raged  fast  and 
furious,  and  at  one  time  it  seemed  as  though  the  day  must  be  lost. 
Thousands  were  brought  against  a mere  handful  of  men ; but  Reid 
knew  the  importance  of  his  position,  and  was  determined  at  all 
hazards  to  bold  it  until  reinforcements  arrived.* 

The  mutineers  were  checked,  but  not  driven  off.  The  first  attempt 
from  the  Mound  battery  failed  to  repulse  them,  and  Colonel  Welch- 
man, who  was  in  command,  was  dangerously  wounded.  Every 
available  man  in  camp  had  been  engaged,  and  as  a last  resource  the 
2nd  Fusiliers  and  the  4th  Sikhs,  who  had  just  arrived  from  Rhai, 
■were  sent  to  the  front.  Showers  was  placed  in  command,  and  shortly 
before  the  day  closed  he  succeeded  in  forcing  the  enemy  to  retire.  So 
the  anniversary  of  Plassy  saw  us,  though  hardly  pressed,  undefeated, 
and  the  enemy’s  hopes  unfulfilled.  They  lost  over  1,000  men.  Our 
casualties  were  1 officer  and  38  men  killed,  and  3 officers  and  118  men 
wounded.  The  heat  all  the  while  was  terrific,  and  several  of  our  men 
were  knocked  over  by  the  sun. 

The  lesson  taught  us  by  this  severe  fighting  was  the  importance  of 
occupying  the  Sabzi  Mandi,  and  thus  preventing  the  enemy  from 
approaching  too  close  to  the  camp  and  enfilading  the  Ridge.  This 
entailed  more  constant  duty  upon  our  already  overworked  soldiers,  but 
Barnard  felt  that  it  would  not  do  to  run  the  risk  of  another  such  struggle. 


Reid’s  own  report. 


96 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

A piquet  of  180  Europeans  was  accordingly  placed  in  the  Sabzi  Mandi, 
part  in  a serai  on  one  side  of  the  Grand  Trunk  Road,  and  the  rest  in 
a Hindu  temple  on  the  opposite  side.  These  posts  were  connected  by 
a line  of  breastworks  with  the  Hindu  Rao  piquets,  and  added  con- 
siderably to  the  strength  of  our  position. 

After  the  23rd  there  were  real  or  threatened  attacks  daily ; but  we 
were  left  fairly  undisturbed  until  the  27th  June,  when  the  Metcalfe 
and  Sabzi  Mandi  piquets  were  assaulted,  and  also  the  batteries  on  the 
Ridge.  These  attempts  were  defeated  without  any  very  great  loss, 
only  13  of  our  men  being  killed,  and  1 officer  and  48  men  wounded. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

I will  now  continue  my  story  from  the  29th  June,  the  morning  after 
my  arrival  in  camp,  when  I awoke  full  of  excitement,  and  so  eager  to 
hear  all  my  old  friend  Norman  could  tell  me,  that  I am  afraid  he  must 
have  been  considerably  bored  with  my  questions. 

It  is  impossible  for  me  to  describe  my  pleasure  at  finding  myself  a 
member  of  a force  which  had  already  gained  imperishable  fame.  I 
longed  to  meet  and  know  the  men  whose  names  were  in  everyone’s 
mouth.  The  hero  of  the  day  was  Harry  Tombs,  of  the  Bengal  Horse 
Artillery,  an  unusually  handsome  man  and  a thorough  soldier.  His 
gallantry  in  the  attack  on  the  Idgah,  and  wherever  he  had  been 
engaged,  was  the  general  talk  of  the  camp.  I had  always  heard  of 
Tombs  as  one  of  the  best  officers  in  the  regiment,  and  it  was  with 
feelings  of  respectful,  admiration  that  I made  his  acquaintance  a few 
days  later. 

Jemmy  Hills,*  one  of  the  subalterns  in  Tombs’s  troop,  was  an  old 
Addiscombe  friend  of  mine ; he  delighted  in  talking  of  his  Commander, 
in  dilating  on  his  merits  as  a soldier  and  his  skill  in  handling  each  arm 
of  the  service.  As  a cool,  bold  leader  of  men  Tombs  was  unsurpassed: 
no  fire,  however  hot,  and  no  crisis,  however  unexpected,  could  take 
him  by  surprise ; he  grasped  the  situation  in  a moment,  and  issued  his 
orders  without  hesitation,  inspiring  all  ranks  with  confidence  in  his 
power  and  capacity.  He  was  somewhat  of  a martinet,  and  was  more 
feared  than  liked  by  his  men  until  they  realized  what  a grand  leader 
he  was,  when  they  gave  him  their  entire  confidence,  and  were  ready  to 
follow  him  anywhere  and  everywhere. 

Another  very  distinguished  officer  of  my  regiment,  whom  I now  met 
for  the  first  time,  and  for  whom  I ever  afterwards  entertained  the 
warmest  regard,  was  Edwin  Johnson, f Assistant-Adjutant-General  of 

* Now  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Janies  Hills-Johnes,  V.O.,  G.C.B. 
f The  late  General  Sir  Edwin  Johnson,  G.C.B, 


LIEUTEXAXT-GENERAL  SIR  JAMES  HILLS-JOHNES,  Y.C..  G.C.B. 


From 

a photograph  by  Messrs.  Bourne  and  Shepherd. 


A NEW  APPOINTMENT 


97 


1857] 

the  Bengal  Artillery,  in  which  capacity  ho  had  accompanied  Brigadier 
Wilson  from  Meerut.  He  had  a peculiarly  bright  intellect — somewhat 
caustic,  but  always  clever  and  amusing.  He  was  a delightful 
companion,  and  invariably  gained  the  confidence  of  those  with  whom 
he  worked. 

Johnson  was  the  first  person  on  whom  I called  to  report  my  arrival 
and  to  find  out  with  which  troop  or  battery  I was  to  do  duty.  He  told 
me  that  the  Quartermaster  General  wished  to  keep  me  in  his  depart- 
ment. So,  after  visiting  General  Chamberlain,'*'  who  I knew  would  be 
anxious  to  hear  all  that  had  been  going  on  in  the  Movable  Column 
since  his  departure,  I made  my  way  to  Colonel  Becher,  whom  1 found 
suffering  from  the  severe  wound  he  had  received  a few  days  before, 
and  asked  him  what  was  to  be  my  fate.  He  replied  that  the  question 
had  been  raised  of  appointing  an  officer  to  help  the  Assistant-Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Delhi  Field  Force,  who  found  it  impossible  to  carry  on 
the  daily  increasing  work  single-handed,  and  that  Chamberlain  had 
thought  of  me  for  this  post.  Had  Chamberlain's  wish  been  carried 
out  my  career  might  have  been  quite  changed,  but  while  he  was 
discussing  the  question  with  Sir  Henry  Barnard,  Donald  Stewart 
unexpectedly  arrived  in  camp. 

I was  waiting  outside  Sir  Henry  Barnard’s  tent,  anxious  to  hear 
what  decision  had  been  come  to,  when  two  men  rode  up,  both  looking 
greatly  fatigued  and  half  starved  ; one  of  them  being  Stewart.  He 
told  me  they  had  had  a most  adventurous  ride  ; but  before  waiting  to 
hear  his  story, f I asked  Norman  to  suggest  Stewart  for  the  new 
appointment — a case  of  one  word  for  Ste%vart  and  two  for  myself,  I am 
afraid,  for  I had  set  my  heart  on  returning  to  the  Quartermaster- 
General’s  department.  And  so  it  was  settled,  to  our  mutual  satisfac- 
tion, Stewart  becoming  the  D.A.A.G.  of  the  Delhi  Field  Force,  and  I 
the  D.A.Q.M.G.  with  the  Artillery. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

That  my  readers  may  better  understand  our  position  at  the  time  I 
joined  the  Delhi  Field  Force,  I might,  I think,  quote  with  advantage 
from  a letter^  written  the  very  day  of  my  arrival  by  General  Barnard 
to  Sir  John  Lawrence,  in  which  he  describes  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation,  hitherto  met  by  the  troops  with,the  most  determined  courage 
and  endurance,  but  to  which  no  end  could  be  seen.  "When  he  took 

* Chamberlain  had  beeu  given  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General  on  his  arrival 
at  Delhi. 

t The  account  of  this  adventurous  ride  is  given  in  the  Appendix. 

7 See  Kaye's  ‘History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny.’ 

7 


98 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


over  the  command,  he  wrote,  he  was  expected  to  be  able  to  silence  at 
once  the  fire  from  the  Mori  and  Kashmir  bastions,  and  then  to  bring 
his  heavy  guns  into  play  on  the  walls  and  open  a way  into  the  city, 
after  which,  it  was  supposed,  all  would  be  plain  sailing.  But  this 
programme,  so  plausible  in  theory,  was  absolutely  impossible  to  put 
into  practice.  In  spite  of  every  effort  on  our  part,  not  a single  one  of 
the  enemy’s  guns  was  silenced ; they  had  four  to  our  one,  while  the 
distance  from  the  Ridge  to  the  city  walls  was  too  great  to  allow  of  our 
comparatively  light  guns  making  any  impression  on  them.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  only  thing  to  be  done  was  to  construct  batteries 
nearer  to  the  city,  but  before  these  could  be  begun,  entrenching  tools, 
sandbags,  and  other  necessary  materials,  of  which  the  Engineers  were 
almost  entirely  destitute,  had  to  be  collected.  The  troops  were  being 
worn  out  by  constant  sanguinary  combats,  and  the  attacks  to  which 
they  were  exposed  required  every  soul  in  camp  to  repel  them.  It  was 
never  certain  where  the  enemy  intended  to  strike,  and  it  was  only  by 
the  most  constant  vigilance  that  their  intentions  could  be  ascertained, 
and  the  men  were  being  incessantly  withdrawn  during  the  scorching 
heat  of  the  day  from  one  place  to  another.  General  Barnard  concluded 
as  follows  : ‘ You  may  ask  why  we  engage  in  these  constant  combats. 
The  reason  simply  is  that  when  attacked  we  must  defend  ourselves, 
and  that  to  secure  our  camp,  our  hospitals,  our  stores,  etc.,  every  living 
being  has  to  be  employed.  The  whole  thing  is  too  gigantic  for  the  force 
brought  against  it.’ 

Soon  after  Barnard  wrote  these  lines  reinforcements  began  to  arrive, 
and  our  position  was  gradually  improved.  By  the  3rd  July  the  follow- 
ing troops  had  reached  Delhi : four  Horse  Artillery  guns  (two  British 
and  two  Native),  a detachment  of  European  Foot  Artillery,  the  Head- 
Quarters  of  Her  Majesty’s  8th  and  61st  Foot,  one  squadron  of  the 
5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry,  and  some  newly-raised 
Sikh  Sappers  and  Artillery.  The  strength  of  the  force  was  thus  in- 
creased to  nearly  6,600  men  of  all  arms.  The  enemy’s  reinforcements, 
however,  were  out  of  all  proportion  to  ours — mutineers  from  Jullundur, 
Nasirabad,  Nimach,  Kotah,  Gwalior,  Jhansi,  and  Rohilkand  arrived 
about  this  time.  Those  from  Rohilkand  crossed  by  the  bridge  of  boats 
and  entered  the  city  by  the  Calcutta  gate  ; we  could  distinctly  see 
them  from  the  Ridge,  marching  in  perfect  formation,  with  their  bands 
playing  and  colours  flying.  Indeed,  throughout  the  siege  the  enemy’s 
numbers  were  constantly  being  increased,  while  they  had  a practically 
unlimited  number  of  guns,  and  the  well-stocked  magazine  furnished 
them  with  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  ammunition. 

I found  myself  under  fire  for  the  first  time  on  the  30th  June,  when 
an  attack  was  mado  on  the  Sabzi  Mandi  piquet  and  Hindu  Rao's  house. 
Eight  of  our  men  were  killed  and  thirty  wounded  ; amongst  the  latter 
were  Yorke  and  l’acke,  both  attached  to  the  4th  Sikhs.  It  appeared 


FIELD-MARSHAL  SIR  DONALD  MARTIN  STEWART,  BART., 
G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I..  C.I.E. 


From 

photograph  by  Messrs.  Elliott  and  Fry. 


AN  ASSAULT  AGAIN  PROPOSED 


99 


1857] 

certain  that  these  two  officers  were  wounded  by  the  Hindustanis  of 
their  own  regiment ; Packe,  who  was  shot  through  the  ankle,  being  so 
close  up  to  the  breastwork  that  it  was  scarcely  possible  for  the  bullet 
which  hit  him  to  have  come  from  the  front.  Consequently  all  the 
Hindustanis  in  the  4th  Sikhs  were  disarmed  and  turned  out  of  camp, 
as  it  was  manifestly  undesirable  to  have  any  but  the  most  loyal  soldiers 
in  our  ranks. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  I was  ordered  to  accompany  a 
column  under  Brigadier  Showers,  sent  on  reconnoitring  duty  towards 
the  Idgah,  where  we  heard  that  tho  enemy  were  again  constructing  a 
battery.  It  had  not  been  commenced,  but  the  intention  to  build  one 
was  evident,  for  we  found  a number  of  entrenching  tools,  and  a quantity 
of  sandbags. 

The  question  of  attempting  to  take  the  city  by  a coup  tic  main  was 
now  again  discussed.  It  was  urged  that  our  numbers,  already  small, 
were  being  daily  reduced  by  casualties  and  sickness  ; that  the  want  of 
proper  equipment  rendered  it  impossible  to  undertake  regular  siege 
operations  ; and  that  a rising  in  the  Punjab  was  imminent.  The  chances 
of  success  were  certainly  more  favourable  than  they  were  on  the 
13th  June.  The  force  to  be  employed  was  stronger  ; all  concerned — 
the  staff,  commanders,  and  troops— were  fully  apprised  of  what  was 
intended,  and  of  the  part  they  would  have  to  play  ; above  all,  the 
details  of  the  scheme,  which  was  drawn  up  on  much  the  same  lines 
as  the  former  one,  were  carefully  worked  out  by  Lieutenant  Alex. 
Taylor,*  who  had  recently  come  into  camp,  and  was  acting  temporarily 
as  Commanding  Engineer. 

Of  the  supreme  importance  of  regaining  possession  of  Delhi  there 
can  be  no  doubt  whatever.  But  nevertheless  the  undertaking  would, 
at  that  time,  have  been  a most  desperate  one,  and  only  to  be  justified 
by  the  critical  position  in  which  we  were  placed.  In  spite  of  the  late 
reinforcements,  we  were  a mere  handful  compared  with  the  thousands 
within  the  walls.  Success,  therefore,  depended  on  the  completeness  of 
the  surprise  ; and,  as  we  could  make  no  movement  without  its  being 
perceived  by  the  enemy,  surprise  was  impossible.  Another  strong 
reason  against  assaulting  at  that  time  was  the  doubtful  attitude  of  some 
of  the  Hindustani  Cavalry  still  with  us  ; the  whole  of  the  effective 
troops,  too,  would  have  to  be  employed,  and  the  sick  and  wounded — a 
large  number — left  to  the  mercy  of  the  Native  followers. 

General  Barnard  carefully  weighed  all  the  arguments  for  and  against 
the  proposal,  and  at  last  reluctantly  consented  to  the  attack  being 
made,  but  the  discovery  of  a conspiracy  amongst  the  Natives  in  camp 
caused  it  to  be  countermanded — a great  disappointment  to  many,  and 
there  was  much  cavilling  and  discontent  on  the  part  of  some,  who 

* Now  General  Sir  Alexander  Taylor,  G.C.B. 

7—2 


FORTY -OS E YEARS  IS  ISDIA 


ioo 


[>857 


could  not  have  sufficiently  appreciated  the  difficulties  and  risks  of  the 
undertaking,  or  the  disastrous  consequences  of  a repulse. 

On  the  morning  of  the  day  on  which  it  had  been  arranged  that  the 
assault  should  be  made,  the  staff  at  Delhi  received  a most  valuable 
addition  in  the  person  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Baird-Smith,  of  the  Bengal 
Engineers.  Summoned  from  Rurki  to  take  the  place  cf  the  Chief 
Engineer,  whose  health  had  broken  down,  Baird-Smith  was  within 
sixty  miles  of  Delhi  on  the  2nd  July,  when  news  of  the  intended  move- 
ment reached  him.  He  started  at  once,  and  arrived  in  camp  early  on 
the  3rd,  but  only  to  find  that  the  assault  had  been  postponed. 

O11  the  afternoon  of  the  3rd  July  the  enemy  came  out  in  force  (5,000 
or  6,000  strong  with  several  guns),  and  occupied  the  suburbs  to  our  light. 
The  troops  were  turned  out,  but  instead  of  attacking  us  and  returning 
to  the  city  as  usual  when  it  became  dark,  the  rebels  moved  off  in  the 
direction  of  Alipur,  where  we  had  an  outpost,  which  was  held  by 
Younghusband’s  squadron  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry.  They  reached 
Alipur  about  midnight,  and  had  they  attacked  the  serai  at  once  with 
Infantry,  Youngliusband  and  his  men  could  hardly  have  escaped,  but 
fortunately  they  opened  upon  it  with  Artillery.  This  gave  the  sowars 
time  to  mount  and  fall  back  on  Rhai,  the  next  post,  ten  miles  to  the 
rear,  which  was  garrisoned  by  the  friendly  troops  of  the  Jhind  Raja. 
The  sound  of  the  guns  being  heard  in  camp,  a column  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major  Coke  was  got  ready  to  pursue  should  the  insurgents 
push  up  the  Trunk  Road,  or  to  cut  them  off  should  they  try  to  make 
their  way  back  to  the  city.  Besides  his  own  corps  (the  1st  Punjab 
Infantry),  Coke  was  given  a wing  of  the  61st  Foot,  six  Horse  and  six 
Field  Artillery  guns,  one  squadron  of  the  Carabineers,  one  squadron  of 
the  9th  Lancers,  and  the  Guides  Cavalry  ; in  all  about  800  Infantry, 
300  Cavalry,  and  12  guns,  and  I was  sent  with  him  as  staff  officer. 

It  was  generally  believed  that  the  enemy  wex-e  on  the  look-out  for 
treasure  coming  from  the  Punjab,  which  was  known  to  be  under  the 
charge  of  a Native  guard,  and  we  quite  expected  to  have  a long  chase 
after  them ; we  were,  therefore,  surprised  to  see  them,  as  day  broke, 
crossing  our  front  on  their  way  back  to  Delhi. 

The  rebels  were  moving  on  fairl\  .ligh  ground,  but  between  us  and 
them  was  a swamp  rendered  almost  impassable  by  recent  heavy  rain. 
It  extended  a considerable  distance  on  either  side,  and  as  there  was  no 
other  way  of  getting  at  the  rapidly  retreating  foe,  it  had  to  be  crossed. 
Our  Artillery  opened  fire,  and  Coke  advanced  with  the  Cavalry  and 
Infantry.  The  swamp  proved  to  be  very  difficult ; in  it  men  and 
horses  floundered  hopelessly,  and  before  wc  were  clear  the  enemy  had 
got  away  with  their  guns ; they  were  obliged,  however,  to  leave  behind 
all  tho  plunder  taken  from  Alipur,  and  a considerable  quantity  of  ammu- 
nition. My  share  of  the  loot  was  a nice-looking,  white,  country-bred 
pony,  which  I found  tied  to  a tree.  I promptly  annexed  it,  glad  to 


DEATH  OE  GENERAL  BARNARD 


IOI 


i857l 


save  my  own  horse,  and  I congratulated  myself  on  having  made  a 
most  useful  addition  to  my  small  stud.  It  did  not,  however,  remain 
long  in  my  possession,  for  a few  days  afterwards  it  was  claimed  by  its 
rightful  owner,  Lieutenant  Younghusband. 

The  heat  was  great,  and  as  the  soldiers  were  much  distressed,  having 
been  under  arms  for  ten  hours,  Coke  halted  the  Infantry  portion  on 
the  banks  of  the  Western  Jumna  Canal  instead  of  returning  direct  to 
camp.  While  we  were  enjoying  a much-needed  rest  we  were  un- 
expectedly attacked  by  some  fresh  troops  (including  about  800  Cavalry) 
which  had  hurried  out  from  the  city.  I was  startled  from  a sound 
sleep  by  heavy  firing,  and  saw  the  enemy  advancing  within  a few 
hundred  yards  of  our  halting-place.  Coke  formed  his  Infantry  along 
the  bank  of  the  canal,  and  sent  a mounted  officer  to  recall  the  Cavalry 
and  Artillery.  The  enemy  came  on  very  boldly  at  first,  but  the  steady 
fire  of  our  Infantry  kept  them  at  bay,  and  when  the  guns  arrived  we 
had  no  difficulty  in  driving  them  off.  They  left  80  dead  on  the  field  ; 
we  had  on  our  side  3 killed  and  23  wounded,  besides  losing  several 
British  soldiers  from  sunstroke. 

Major  Coke  was  much  grieved  by  the  loss  in  this  engagement  of  a 
Native  friend  of  his,  a Chief  of  the  Kohat  border,  byname  Mir  MubaVak 
Shah.  He  was  a grand  specimen  of  a frontier  Khan,*  and  on  hearing 
that  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry  was  ordered  to  Delhi  expressed  his  deter- 
mination to  accompany  it.  He  got  together  a troop  of  eighty  of  his 
own  followers,  and  leaving  Kohat  on  the  1st  June,  overtook  Coke  at 
Kurnal  on  the  27th,  a distance  of  nearly  600  miles.  A day  or  two 
afterwards  Coke's  men  were  approached  by  the  Hindustanis  of  the 
2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  some  Native  officers  of  the  9th  Irregulars, 
who  tried  to  induce  them  to  join  in  the  rebellion.  Advances  were  made 
in  the  first  instance  to  Mir  Mubarak  Shah  and  Mir  Jaffir,  the  Subadar- 
Major  of  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry,  who  at  once  informed  Coke  of  what 
was  going  on.  As  soon  as  the  regiment  reached  Delhi  the  matter  was 
investigated,  and  the  Native  officers  who  had  endeavoured  to  tamper 
with  the  men  were  identified,  tried,  and  executed. 

About  noon  on  the  5th  July  we  heard  the  woeful  tidings  that  General 
Barnard  was  seized  with  cholera.  The  army  had  never  been  free  from 
that  terrible  scourge  since  the  Commander-in-Chief  fell  a victim  to  it 
on  the  26th  May,  and  now  it  had  attacked  his  successor,  who  was 
carried  off  after  a few  hours’  illness.  The  feeling  of  sadness  amongst 
the  troops  at  the  loss  of  their  General  was  universal.  Throughout  the 
six  trying  weeks  he  had  been  in  command  of  the  force  he  had  never 
spared  himself.  At  work  from  morning  till  night  in  and  about  the 
trenches,  he  personally  attended  to  every  detail,  and  had  won  the 
respect  and  regard  of  all  in  camp. 


* Maliomedans  of  good  family  are  so  styled  in  northern  India. 


102 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[>857 

Few  Commanders  were  ever  placed  in  a more  difficult  position  than 
Barnard.  He  arrived  at  Umballa  when  the  Native  troops,  to  whose 
characteristics  and  peculiarities  (as  I have  already  remarked)  he  was  a 
complete  stranger,  were  thoroughly  disaffected,  and  within  a week  of  his 
taking  over  the  command  of  the  Sirhind  division  the  Mutiny  broke  out. 
Without  any  previous  knowledge  of  Indian  warfare,  he  found  himself 
in  front  of  Delhi  with  a force  altogether  too  weak  to  effect  the  object 
for  which  it  was  intended  and  without  any  of  the  appliances  to  ensure 
success ; while  those  who  did  not  realize  the  extreme  risk  involved 
never  ceased  clamouring  at  a delay  which  was  unavoidable,  and  urging 
the  General  to  undertake  a task  which  was  impossible. 

Barnard  has  been  blamed,  and  not  unjustly,  for  mistrusting  his 
own  judgment  and  for  depending  upon  others  for  advice  about  matters 
on  which  an  experienced  Commander  ought  to  have  been  the  best  able 
to  decide.  But  every  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  position  he  was 
so  unexpectedly  called  upon  to  fill  and  the  peculiar  nature  of  his  sur- 
roundings. Failing  health,  too,  probably  weakened  the  self-reliance 
which  a man  who  had  satisfactorily  performed  the  duties  of  Chief  of 
the  Staff  in  the  Crimea  must  at  one  time  have  possessed. 

On  the  death  of  Sir  Henry  Barnard,  General  Reed  assumed  com- 
mand. He  had  joined  the  force  on  the  morning  of  the  action  of  Badli- 
ki-Serai,  but  though  senior  to  Barnard,  he  was  too  much  knocked  up 
by  the  intense  heat  of  the  long  journey  from  Peshawar  to  take  part  in 
the  action,  and  he  had  allowed  Barnard  to  continue  in  command. 

For  the  next  few  days  we  had  a comparatively  quiet  time,  of  which 
advantage  was  taken  to  render  our  position  more  secure  towards  the 
rear.  The  secrecy  and  rapidity  with  which  the  enemy  had  made  their 
way  to  Alipur  warned  the  authoi'ities  how  easily  our  communication 
with  the  Punjab  might  be  cut  off.  Baird-Smith  saw  the  necessity  for 
remedying  this,  and,  acting  on  his  advice,  Reed  had  all  the  bridges 
over  the  Western  Jumna  Canal  destroyed  for  several  miles,  except  one 
required  for  our  own  use.  The  Phulchudder  aqueduct,  which  carried 
the  canal  water  into  the  city,  and  along  which  horsemen  could  pass  to 
the  rear  of  our  camp,  was  blown  up,  as  was  also  the  Bussye  bridge 
over  the  drain  from  the  Naj  afgarh  jhil,  about  eight  miles  from  camp. 

We  were  not  left  long  in  peace,  for  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  July 
the  enemy  moved  out  of  the  city  in  great  force,  and  for  several  hours 
kept  up  an  incessant  cannonade  on  our  front  and  right  flank. 

The  piquet  below  the  General’s  Mound  happened  to  be  held  this  day 
by  two  guns  of  Tombs’s  troop,  commanded  by  Second  Lieutenant 
James  Hills,  and  by  thirty  men  of  the  Carabineers  under  Lieutenant 
Stillman.  A little  beyond,  and  to  the  right  of  this  piquet,  a Native 
officer’s  party  of  the  9th  Irregular  Cavalry  had  been  placed  to  watch 
the  Trunk  Road.  These  men  were  still  supposed  to  be  loyal ; the 
regiment  to  which  they  belonged  had  a good  reputation,  and  as 


i857] 


TWO  V.C.'S 


*03 


Christie’s  Horse  had  done  excellent  service  in  Afghanistan,  where 
Neville  and  Crawford  Chamberlain  had  served  with  it  as  subalterns. 
It  was,  therefore,  believed  at  the  Mound  piquet  that  ample  warning 
would  be  given  of  any  enemy  coming  from  the  direction  of  the  Trunk 
Road,  so  that  the  approach  of  some  horsemen  dressed  like  the  men  of 
the  9th  Irregulars  attracted  little  notice. 

Stillman  and  Hills  were  breakfasting  together,  when  a sowar  from 
the  Native  officers’  party  rode  up  and  reported  that  a body  of  the 
enemy’s  Cavalry  were  in  sight.  Hills  told  the  man  to  gallop  to  Head- 
Quarters  with  the  report,  and  to  warn  Tombs  as  he  passed  his  tent. 
Hills  and  Stillman  then  mounted  their  men,  neither  of  them  having 
the  remotest  idea  that  the  news  of  the  enemy’s  advance  had  been  pur- 
posely delayed  until  there  was  not  time  to  turn  out  the  troops.  They 
imagined  that  the  sowar  was  acting  in  good  faith  and  had  given  them 
sufficient  notice,  and  while  Hills  moved  his  guns  towards  the  position 
from  which  he  could  command  the  Trunk  Road,  Stillman  proceeded  to 
the  top  of  the  Mound  in  order  to  get  a better  view  of  the  ground  over 
which  the  enemy  were  said  to  be  advancing.  The  troop  of  the  Cara- 
bineers was  thus  left  by  itself  to  receive  the  first  rush  of  the  rebel 
Cavalry ; it  was  composed  of  young  soldiers,  some  of  them  quite 
untrained,  who  turned  and  broke. 

The  moment  Hills  saw  the  enemy  he  shouted,  ‘Action  front !’  and, 
in  the  hope  of  giving  his  men  time  to  load  and  fire  a round  of  grape,  he 
gallantly  charged  the  head  of  the  column  single-handed,  cut  down  the 
leading  man,  struck  the  second,  and  then  was  then  ridden  down  him- 
self. It  had  been  raining  heavily,  so  Hills  wore  his  cloak  ; which 
probably  saved  his  life,  for  it  was  cut  through  in  many  places,  as  were 
his  jacket  and  even  his  shirt. 

As  soon  as  the  body  of  the  enemy  had  passed  on,  Hills,  extricating 
himself  from  his  horse,  got  up  and  searched  for  his  sword,  which  he 
had  lost  in  the  melee.  He  had  just  found  it  when  he  was  attacked  by 
three  men,  two  of  whom  were  mounted ; he  fired  at  and  wounded  the 
first  man  ; then  caught  the  lance  of  the  second  in  his  left  hand,  and 
ran  him  through  the  body  with  his  sword.  The  first  assailant  coming 
on  again,  Hills  cut  him  down,  upon  which  he  was  attacked  by  the 
third  man  on  foot,  wTho  succeeded  in  wrenching  his  sword  from  him. 
Hills  fell  in  the  struggle,  and  must  have  been  killed,  if  Tombs,  who 
had  been  duly  warned  by  the  sowar,  and  had  hurried  out  to  the  piquet, 
had  not  come  to  the  rescue  and  saved  his  plucky  subaltern’s  life.* 

Notwithstanding  Hills's  gallant  attempt  to  stop  the  sowars,  his  men 
had  not  time  to  fire  a single  round  before  they  were  upon  them.  Their 
object,  however,  was  not  to  capture  these  two  guns,  but  to  induce  the 
Native  Horse  Artillery  to  join  them,  and  galloping  past  the  piquet,  they 

* Tombs  and  Hills  both  received  the  Victoria  Cross  for  their  gallantly. 


104 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


made  straight  for  the  troop,  and  called  upon  the  men  to  bring  away 
their  guns.  The  Native  Artillerymen  behaved  admirably : they  not 
only  refused  to  respond  to  the  call,  but  they  begged  the  men  of  the 
European  troop,  which  was  unlimbered  close  by,  to  fire  through  them 
on  the  mutineers. 

Knowing  nothing  of  what  was  happening,  I was  standing  by  my  tent, 
watching  my  horses,  which  had  just  arrived  from  Philour,  as  they 
crossed  the  bridge  over  the  canal  cut  which  ran  at  the  rear  of  our 
camp,  when  the  enemy’s  Cavalry  galloped  over  the  bridge,  and  for  a 
few  moments  my  animals  seemed  in  considerable  danger ; the  sowars, 
however,  having  lost  more  than  one-third  of  their  number,  and  having 
failed  in  their  attempt  to  get  hold  of  the  Native  Horse  Artillery  guns, 
were  bent  upon  securing  their  retreat  rather  than  upon  plunder.  My 
servants  gave  a wonderful  account  of  the  many  perils  they  had  en- 
countered— somewhat  exaggerated,  I dare  say — but  they  had  done  me 
a real  good  service,  having  marched  200  miles  through  a very  disturbed 
country,  and  arriving  with  animals  and  baggage  in  good  order.  Indeed, 
throughout  the  Mutiny  my  servants  behaved  admirably.  The  khid- 
matgar  (table  attendant)  never  failed  to  bring  me  my  food  under  the 
hottest  fire,  and  the  saices  (grooms)  were  always  present  with  the 
horses  whenever  they  were  required,  apparently  quite  indifferent  to  the 
risks  they  often  ran.  Moreover,  they  became  imbued  with  such  a 
warlike  spirit  that,  when  I was  invalided  in  April,  1858,  four  of  them 
enlisted  in  a regiment  of  Bengal  Cavalry.  The  khidmatgar  died  soon 
after  the  Mutiny,  but  two  of  his  brothers  were  afterwards  in  my 
service ; one,  who  was  with  me  during  the  Lushai  expedition  and  the 
whole  of  the  Afghan  war,  never  left  me  for  more  than  twenty  years, 
and  we  parted  with  mutual  regret  at  Bombay  on  board  the  P.  and  0. 
steamer  in  which  I took  my  final  departure  from  India  in  April,  1898. 

Mine  was  not  a solitary  instance ; not  only  the  officers’  servants,  but 
the  followers  belonging  to  European  regiments,  such  as  cook-boys, 
saices  and  bhisties  (water-carriers),  as  a rule,  behaved  in  the  most 
praiseworthy  manner,  faithful  and  brave  to  a degree.  So  much  was 
this  the  case,  that  when  the  troopers  of  the  9th  Lancers  were  called 
upon  to  name  the  man  they  considered  most  worthy  of  the  Victoria 
Cross,  an  honour  which  Sir  Colin  Campbell  purposed  to  confer  upon 
the  regiment  to  mark  his  appreciation  of  the  gallantry  displayed  by  all 
ranks  during  the  campaign,  they  unanimously  chose  the  head  bhistie  ! 
Considering  the  peculiar  position  we  were  in  at  the  time,  it  is  some- 
what remarkable  that  the  conduct  of  the  Native  servants  should  have 
been  so  generally  satisfactory.  It  speaks  as  well,  I think,  for  the 
masters  as  the  servants,  and  proves  (what  I have  sometimes  heard 
denied)  that  Native  servants  are,  as  a rule,  kindly  and  considerately 
treated  by  their  European  masters. 

To  return  to  my  story.  The  cannonade  from  within  and  without  the 


TREACHERY  IN  CAMP 


'857] 


105 


city  continued  unceasing,  and  the  enemy  had  again  to  be  driven  out  of 
the  near  suburbs.  This  duty  was  entrusted  to  General  Chamberlain, 
whom  I accompanied  as  one  of  his  staff  officers.  His  column  consisted 
of  about  800  Infantry  and  six  guns,  a few  more  men  joining  us  as  we 
passed  the  Ridge.  This  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  I had 
witnessed  fighting  in  gardens  and  walled  enclosures,  and  I realized 
how  difficult  it  was  to  dislodge  men  who  knew  how  to  take  advantage 
of  the  cover  thus  afforded.  Our  soldiers,  as  usual,  fought  well  against 
very  heavy  odds,  and  before  we  were  able  to  force  the  enemy  back  into 
the  city  we  had  lost  1 officer  and  40  men  killed,  and  8 officers  and  168 
men  wounded,  besides  11  poor  fellows  missing:  every  one  of  whom 
must  have  been  murdered.  The  enemy  had  nearly  500  men  killed,  and 
considerably  more  than  that  number  wounded. 

The  result  of  the  day’s  experience  was  so  far  satisfactory  that  it 
determined  General  Reed  to  get  rid  of  all  the  Hindustani  soldiers  still 
remaining  in  camp.  It  was  clear  that  the  Native  officers’  party  near 
the  Mound  piquet  had  been  treacherous ; none  of  them  were  ever  seen 
again,  and  it  was  generally  believed  that  they  had  joined  the  enemy  in 
their  dash  through  the  camp.  The  other  Native  soldiers  did  not 
hesitate  to  denounce  their  Hindustani  comrades  as  traitors  ; the  latter 
were  consequently  all  sent  away,  except  a few  men  of  the  4th  Irregular 
Cavalry  who  were  deprived  of  their  horses  and  employed  solely  as 
orderlies.  It  was  also  thought  advisable  to  take  the  guns  from  the 
Native  troop  of  Horse  Artillery.  A few  of  the  younger  men  belonging 
to  it  deserted,  but  the  older  soldiers  continued  faithful,  and  did  good 
work  in  the  breaching  batteries. 

There  was  a short  lull  after  our  fight  on  the  9th — a sure  sign  that  the 
enemy’s  loss  was  heavier  than  they  had  calculated  upon.  When  the 
mutineers  received  reinforcements  we  were  certain  to  be  attacked 
within  a few  hours,  but  if  no  fresh  troops  arrived  on  the  scene  we  could 
generally  depend  upon  a day  or  two’s  respite. 

Our  next  fight  was  on  the  14th  July.  The  rebels  came  out  on  that 
morning  in  great  numbers,  attacking  Hindu  Rao’s  house  and  the  Sabzi 
Mandi  piquets,  and  supported  by  a continuous  fire  of  Artillery  from  the 
walls.  For  some  hours  wre  remained  on  the  defensive,  but  as  the 
enemy's  numbers  increased,  and  we  were  greatly  harassed  by  their  fire, 
a column  wras  formed  to  dislodge  them.  It  was  of  about  the  usual 
strength,  viz.,  800  Infantry  and  six  Horse  Artillery  guns,  with  the 
addition  of  a few  of  the  Guides  Cavalry  and  of  Hodson’s  newly-raised 
Horse.  The  command  wras  given  to  Brigadier  Showers,  and  I was  sent 
as  his  staff  officer  ; Reid  joined  in  at  the  foot  of  the  Ridge  with  all  the 
men  that  could  be  spared,  and  Brigadier-General  Chamberlain  also 
accompanied  the  column. 

We  moved  on  under  a very  heavy  fire  until  we  reached  an  enclosure 
the  wall  of  which  was  lined  with  the  enemy.  The  troops  stopped  short, 


io6 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


when  Chamberlain,  seeing  that  they  hesitated,  called  upon  them  to 
follow  him,  and  gave  them  a splendid  example  by  jumping  his  horse 
over  the  wall.  The  men  did  follow  him,  and  Chamberlain  got  a ball  in 
his  shoulder. 

We  had  great  difficulty  in  driving  the  enemy  back ; they  contested 
every  inch  of  the  ground,  the  many  serais  and  walled  gardens  affording 
them  admirable  cover  ; but  our  troops  were  not  to  be  withstood ; 
position  after  position  was  carried  until  we  found  ourselves  in  sight  of 
the  Lahore  gate  and  close  up  to  the  walls  of  the  city.  In  our  eagerness 
to  drive  the  enemy  back  we  had,  however,  come  too  far.  It  was  im- 
possible to  remain  where  we  were.  Musketry  from  the  walls  and  grape 
from  the  heavy  guns  mounted  on  the  Mori  and  other  bastions  com- 
mitted terrible  havoc.  Men  were  falling  on  all  sides,  but  the  getting 
back  was  hazardous  to  the  last  degree.  Numerous  as  the  enemy  were, 
they  had  not  the  courage  to  stand  against  us  as  long  as  we  advanced, 
but  the  first  sign  of  retreat  was  the  signal  for  them  to  leave  their  shelter 
and  press  us  the  whole  way  to  camp. 

When  the  retirement  commenced  I was  with  the  two  advanced  guns 
in  action  on  the  Grand  Trunk  Road.  The  subaltern  in  charge  was 
severely  wounded,  and  almost  at  the  same  moment  one  of  his  sergeants, 
a smart,  handsome  fellow,  fell,  shot  through  the  leg.  Seeing  some 
men  carrying  him  into  a hut  at  the  side  of  the  road,  I shouted  : ‘ Don't 
put  him  there ; he  will  be  left  behind  ; get  a doolie  for  him,  or  put  him 
on  the  limber.’  But  what  with  the  incessant  fire  from  the  enemy’s 
guns,  the  bursting  of  shells,  the  crashing  of  shot  through  the  branches 
of  the  trees,  and  all  the  din  and  hubbub  of  battle,  I could  not  have 
been  heard,  for  the  poor  fellow  with  another  wounded  man  was  left  in 
the  hut,  and  both  were  murdered  by  the  mutineers.  So  many  of  the 
men  with  the  two  guns  were  hors  de  combat,  and  the  horses  were  so 
unsteady  (several  of  them  being  wounded),  that  there  was  great 
difficulty  in  limbering  up,  and  I was  helping  the  drivers  to  keep  the 
horses  quiet,  when  I suddenly  felt  a tremendous  blow  on  my  back  which 
made  me  faint  and  sick,  and  I was  afraid  I should  not  be  able  to 
remain  on  my  horse.  The  powerless  feeling,  however,  passed  off,  and 
I managed  to  stick  on  until  I got  back  to  camp.  I had  been  hit  close 
to  the  spine  by  a bullet,  and  the  wound  would  probably  have  been  fatal 
but  for  the  fact  that  a leather  pouch  for  caps,  which  I usually  wore  in 
front  near  my  pistol,  had  somehow  slipped  round  to  the  back ; the  bullet 
passed  through  this  before  entering  my  body,  and  was  thus  prevented 
from  penetrating  very  deep. 

The  enemy  followed  us  closely  right  up  to  our  piquets,  and  but  for 
the  steadiness  of  the  retirement  our  casualties  must  have  been  even 
more  numerous  than  they  were.  As  it  was,  they  amounted  to  15  men 
killed,  16  officers  and  177  men  wounded,  and  2 men  missing. 


1857]  SUFFERINGS  OF  THE  SICK  AND  WOUNDED 


07 


The  enemy’s  loss  was  estimated  at  1,000.  For  hours  they  were  seen 
carrying  the  dead  in  carts  back  to  the  city. 

My  wound,  though  comparatively  slight,  kept  me  on  the  sick-list  for 
a fortnight,  and  for  more  than  a month  I could  not  mount  a horse  or 
put  on  a sword-belt.  I was  lucky  in  that  my  tent  was  pitched  close  to 
that  of  John  Campbell  Brown,  one  of  the  medical  officers  attached  to 
the  Artillery.  He  had  served  during  the  first  Afghan  war,  with  Sale's 
force,  at  Jalalabad,  and  throughout  both  the  campaigns  in  the  Punjab, 
and  had  made  a great  reputation  for  himself  as  an  army  surgeon.  He 
looked  after  me  while  I was  If  id  up,  and  I could  not  have  been  in 
better  hands. 

The  Delhi  Force  was  fortunate  in  its  medical  officers.  Some  of  the 
best  in  the  army  were  attached  to  it,  and  all  that  was  possible  to  be 
done  for  the  sick  and  wounded  under  the  circumstances  was  done. 
But  the  poor  fellows  had  a bad  time  of  it.  A few  of  the  worst  cases 
were  accommodated  in  the  two  or  three  houses  in  the  cantonment  that 
had  escaped  destruction,  but  the  great  majority  had  to  put  up  with 
such  shelter  from  the  burning  heat  and  drenching  rain  as  an  ordinary 
soldiers’  tent  could  provide.  Those  who  could  bear  the  journey  and 
were  not  likely  to  be  fit  for  duty  for  some  time  were  sent  away  to 
Meerut  and  Umballa ; but  even  with  the  relief  thus  afforded,  the  hos- 
pitals throughout  the  siege  were  terribly  overcrowded.  Anaesthetics 
were  freely  used,  but  antiseptics  were  practically  unknown,  conse- 
quently many  of  the  severely  wounded  died,  and  few  amputation 
cases  survived. 

A great  aggravation  to  the  misery  and  discomfort  in  hospital  was  the 
plague  of  flies.  Delhi  is  at  all  times  noted  for  having  more  than  its 
share  of  these  drawbacks  to  life  in  the  East,  but  during  the  siege  they 
were  a perfect  pest,  and  for  the  short  time  I was  laid  up  I fully 
realized  the  suffering  which  our  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  had  to 
endure.  At  night  the  inside  of  my  tent  was  black  with  flies.  At  the 
first  ray  of  light  or  the  smallest  shake  to  the  ropes,  they  were  all  astir, 
and  for  the  rest  of  the  day  there  was  no  peace ; it  was  even  difficult  to 
eat  without  swallowing  one  or  more  of  the  loathsome  insects.  I had  to 
brush  them  away  with  one  hand  while  I put  the  food  into  my  mouth 
with  the  other,  and  more  than  once  I had  to  rush  from  the  table,  a 
fly  having  eluded  all  my  efforts  to  prevent  his  going  down  my  throat. 

As  soon  as  I could  get  about  a little,  but  before  I was  able  to  perform 
my  legitimate  work,  I was  employed  in  helping  to  look  after  the  con- 
servancy of  the  camp  and  its  surroundings — an  extremely  disagreeable 
but  most  important  duty,  for  an  Indian  army  must  always  have  a 
large  following,  for  which  sanitary  arrangements  are  a difficulty.  Then, 
large  convoys  of  camels  and  bullock-carts  arrived  daily  with  supplies 
and  stores,  and  a considerable  number  of  transport  animals  had  to  be 
kept  in  readiness  to  follow  up  the  enemy  with  a suitably  sized  force, 


io8 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


whenever  we  could  drive  them  out  of  the  city.  'Without  any  shelter, 
and  often  with  insufficient  food,  deaths  amongst  the  animals  were 
of  constant  occurrence,  and,  unless  their  carcases  could  at  once  be 
removed,  the  stench  became  intolerable.  Every  expedient  was  resorted 
to  to  get  rid  of  this  nuisance.  Some  of  the  carcases  were  dragged  to  a 
distance  from  camp,  some  were  buried,  and  some  were  burnt,  but,  not- 
withstanding all  our  efforts,  many  remained  to  be  gradually  devoured 
by  the  jackals  which  prowled  about  the  camp,  and  by  the  innumer- 
able birds  of  prey  which  instinct  had  brought  to  Delhi  from  the 
remotest  parts  of  India.* 

At  a time  when  the  powers  of  each  individual  were  taxed  to  the 
uttermost,  the  strain  on  the  Commander  of  the  force  was  terribly 
severe.  Mind  and  body  were  incessantly  at  work.  Twice  in  the  short 
space  of  six  weeks  had  the  officer  holding  this  responsible  position 
succumbed,  and  now  a third  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  down. 
Major-General  Reed’s  health,  never  very  strong,  completely  failed,  and 
on  the  17th  July,  only  twelve  days  after  succeeding  Sir  Henry  Bar- 
nard, he  had  to  give  up  the  command  and  leave  the  camp  on  sick 
certificate. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

General  Reed  was  succeeded  by  Brigadier  Archdale  \\  ilson,  the 
officer  who  commanded  the  Meerut  column  at  the  beginning  of  the 
campaign,  and  who  was  so  successful  in  the  fights  on  the  Hindun. 
Though  a soldier  of  moderate  capacity,  Wilson  was  quite  the  best  of 
the  senior  officers  present,  three  of  whom  were  superseded  by  his 
selection.  Two  of  these,  Congreve,  Acting-Adjutant-Gencral  of  Queen’s 
troops,  and  Graves,  who  had  been  Brigadier  at  Delhi  when  the  Mutiny 
broke  out,  left  the  camp  on  being  passed  over  ; the  third,  Longfield, 
took  Wilson’s  place  as  Brigadier. 

Wilson’s  succession  to  the  command  gave  great  relief  to  the  troops 
on  account  of  the  systematic  manner  in  which  he  arranged  for  the 
various  duties,  and  the  order  and  method  he  introduced.  The  com- 
parative rest  to  the  troops,  as  well  as  the  sanitary  improvements  he 
effected,  did  a good  deal  for  the  health  of  the  force.  Wilson  also  took 
advantage  of  the  reinforcements  we  had  received  to  strengthen  our 
position.  As  far  as  possible  ho  put  a stop  to  the  practice  of  following 
up  the  enemy  closo  to  the  city  walls  when  they  were  driven  oil  after 
an  attack  (a  practice  which  had  cost  us  many  valuable  lives),  content- 
ing himself  with  preventing  the  rebels  from  remaining  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  our  advanced  posts. 

* 1 Adjutants,’  never  seen  in  ordinary  times  further  north  than  Bengal, 
appeared  in  hundreds,  and  were  really  useful  scavengers. 


1857] 


ARCH  DALE  WILSON  ASSUMES  COMMAND 


109 


The  day  after  Heed’s  departure  another  sharp  and  prolonged  attack 
was  made  upon  the  Eidge  batteries  and  Sabzi  Mandi  piquets,  and  in 
the  afternoon  a column  was  sent  to  drive  the  enemy  away.  It  con- 
sisted of  four  Horse  Artillery  guns,  750  Infantry,  and  the  Guides 
Cavalry.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jones,  of  the  60th  Hides,  commanded 
the  column,  and,  having  gained  experience  from  the  lesson  we  had 
received  on  the  14th,  he  took  care  not  to  approach  too  near  to  the  city 
walls,  but  cleared  the  Sabzi  Mandi,  and  took  up  a good  position,  where 
he  remained  for  some  little  time.  This  unusual  procedure  seemed  to 
disconcert  the  enemy,  most  of  whom  returned  to  the  city,  while  those 
who  remained  to  fight  did  not  come  to  such  close  quarters  as  on  pre- 
vious occasions.  Nevertheless,  we  had  1 officer  and  12  men  killed, 
3 officers  and  66  men  wounded,  and  2 men  were  missing. 

The  four  following  days  passed  without  any  serious  attack  being 
made,  but  an  unfortunate  accident  occurred  about  this  time  to  a cousin 
of  mine,  Captain  Greensill,  of  the  24th  Foot.  He  was  attached  to  the 
Engineer  department,  and  was  ordered  to  undertake  some  reconnoit- 
ring duty  after  dark.  On  nearing  the  enemy’s  position  he  halted  his 
escort,  in  order  not  to  attract  attention,  and  proceeded  alone  to  examine 
the  ground.  The  signal  which  he  had  arranged  to  give  on  his  return 
was  apparently  misunderstood,  for  as  he  approached  the  escort  fired  ; 
he  was  mortally  wounded,  and  died  in  great  agony  the  next  morning. 

The  last  severe  contest  took  place  in  the  Sabzi  Mandi  on  the  18th, 
for  bj-  this  time  the  Engineers'  incessant  labour  had  resulted  in  the 
clearing  away  of  the  old  serais  and  walled  gardens  for  some  distance 
round  the  posts  held  by  our  piquets  in  that  suburb.  The  ‘ Sammy 
House  ’ piquet,  to  the  right  front  of  Hindu  Eao’s  house,  was  greatly 
strengthened,  and  cover  was  provided  for  the  men  occupying  it — a 
very  necessary  measure,  exposed  as  the  piquet  was  to  the  guns  on  the 
Burn  and  Mori  bastions,  and  within  grape  range  of  the  latter,  while 
the  enemy’s  Infantry  were  enabled  to  creep  close  up  to  it  unperceived. 

The  improvements  we  had  made  in  this  part  of  our  position  were, 
no  doubt,  carefully  watched  and  noted  by  the  rebels,  who,  finding  that 
all  attempts  to  dislodge  us  on  the  right  ended  in  their  own  discomfi- 
ture, determined  to  try  whether  our  left  was  not  more  vulnerable 
than  they  had  found  it  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  siege.  Accordingly 
early  on  the  23rd  they  sallied  forth  from  the  Kashmir  gate,  and,  occu- 
pying Ludlow  Castle  and  its  neighbourhood,  shelled  Metcalfe  House, 
the  stable  piquet,  and  the  mosque  piquet  on  the  Eidge.  As  all  attempts 
to  silence  the  enemy’s  guns  with  our  Artillery  proved  unavailing,  and 
it  was  feared  that  if  not  dislodged  they  would  establish  a battery  at 
Ludlow  Castle,  a small  column  under  Brigadier  Showers  moved  out  by 
a cutting  through  the  Ridge  on  our  left,  its  object  being  (in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  Metcalfe  House  piquets)  to  turn  the  enemy’s  right  and 
capture  their  guns. 


no 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[>837 


The  troops  detailed  for  this  duty  consisted  of  six  Horse  Artillery 
guns,  400  British  Infantry,  360  of  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry,  and  a party 
of  the  Guides  Cavalry,  in  addition  to  250  men  detached  from  the 
Metcalfe  House  piquets.  The  advance  of  the  column  up  the  road  lead- 
ing towards  the  Kashmir  gate  appeared  to  be  unnoticed  until  it  arrived 
close  to  the  enemy,  who  then  opened  with  grape.  Our  troops  pressed 
on,  and  in  their  eagerness  to  capture  the  guns,  which  were  being  with- 
drawn, got  too  near  the  city  walls.  Here  Showers  was  wounded,  and 
the  command  devolved  on  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jones,  of  the  60th,  who 
skilfully  conducted  the  retirement.  Our  loss  was  1 officer  and  11  men 
killed,  5 officers  and  34  men  wounded.  Captain  Law,  one  of  my  two 
companions  on  the  mail-cart  from  Umballa,  was  the  officer  killed. 

The  enemy  were  fairly  quiet  between  the  23rd  and  31st  July,  on 
which  date  they  moved  out  of  the  city  in  considerable  strength,  with 
the  intention  of  making  a temporary  bridge  across  the  cut  in  the 
swampy  ground  I have  before  described,  and  so  threatening  our  rear. 
A column  under  Coke  was  sent  to  the  other  side  of  the  cut  to  intercept 
the  enemy  should  they  succeed  in  getting  across ; this  column  was 
joined  at  Alipur  by  the  Kumaon  battalion  (composed  of  Gurkhas  and 
hill-men),  about  400  strong,  which  had  just  arrived  from  the  Punjab 
as  escort  to  a large  store  of  ammunition.  The  services  of  these  troops 
were,  however,  not  required,  for  the  rain,  which  had  been  coming  down 
in  torrents  for  some  hours,  had  caused  such  a rush  of  water  that  the 
bridge  was  carried  away  before  it  was  completed.  The  enemy  then 
retired  towards  the  city.  On  reaching  the  suburbs  they  were  re- 
inforced by  a large  body  of  Infantry,  and  a most  determined  attack 
was  made  on  the  right  of  our  position.  This  occurred  about  sunset, 
and  all  night  the  roar  of  musketry  and  artillery  was  kept  up  without  a 
moment’s  cessation. 

The  next  day  was  the  anniversary  of  a great  Mahomedan  festival, 
when  it  was  the  custom  for  the  King  to  pray  and  make  sacrifice  at  the 
Idgah,  in  commemoration  of  Abraham’s  intended  offering  up  of 
Ishmai).*  On  this  particular  occasion,  however,  the  sacrifices  were  to 
be  dispensed  with  in  deference  to  Hindu  prejudices,!  and  in  their  stead 
a tremendous  united  effort  was  to  be  made  by  Hindus  and  Mussulmans 
to  exterminate  the  Feringhis.  All  the  morning  of  the  1st  August 
mosques  and  Hindu  temples  were  crowded  with  worshippers  offering 
up  prayers  for  the  success  of  the  great  attempt,  and  in  the  afternoon 
the  rebels,  mad  with  excitement  and  fanaticism,  issued  in  countless 
numbers  from  the  city  gates,  and,  shouting  the  Moslem  battle-cry, 
advanced  and  threw  themselves  on  our  defences.  They  were  driven 
back  by  our  deadly  volleys,  but  only  for  a moment ; they  quickly  re- 

* According  to  the  religion  of  Islam,  Ishmail,  not  Isaac,  was  to  have  been 
offered  up  by  Ahraliam. 

t Forrest’s  ‘ The  Indian  Mutiny.  ’ 


iS57]  EFFORTS  TO  EXTERMINATE  THE  FF.RINGHIS  ill 

formed  and  made  a fresh  attack,  to  be  stopped  again  by  our  steady, 
uncompromising  fire.  Time  after  time  they  rallied  and  hurled  them- 
selves against  our  breastworks.  All  that  night  and  well  on  into  the 
next  day  the  fight  continued,  and  it  was  past  noon  before  the  devoted 
fanatics  became  convinced  that  their  gods  had  deserted  them,  that 
victory  was  not  for  them,  and  that  no  effort,  however  heroic  on  then- 
part,  could  drive  us  from  the  Ridge.  The  enemy’s  loss  was  heavy, 
ours  trifling,  for  our  men  were  admirably  steady,  well  protected  by 
breastworks,  and  never  allowed  to  show  themselves  except  when  the 
assailants  came  close  up.  We  had  only  1 officer  and  9 men  killed  and 
36  men  wounded. 

The  officer  was  Lieutenant  Eaton  Travers,  of  the  1st  Punjab 
Infantry.  He  had  been  seven  years  with  the  regiment,  and  had  been 
present  with  it  in  nearly  all  the  many  frontier  fights  in  which  it  had  been 
engaged.  He  was  a bright,  happy  fellow,  and  a great  friend  of  mine. 
As  Major  Coke,  his  commanding  officer,  published  in  regimental 
orders  : ‘ This  gallant  soldier  and  true-hearted  gentleman  was  beloved 
and  respected  by  the  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment.  His  loss  is  an 
irreparable  one.’ 

The  enemy  were  much  depressed  by  the  failure  of  the  Bakhra  Id 
attack,  from  which  they  had  expected  great  things.  They  began  to 
despair  of  being  able  to  drive  us  from  our  position  on  the  Ridge,  which 
for  seven  weeks  had  been  so  hotly  contested.  They  heard  that 
Nicholson  with  his  Movable  Column  was  hastening  to  our  assistance, 
and  they  felt  that,  unless  they  could  gain  some  signal  victory  before 
reinforcements  reached  us,  we  should  take  our  place  as  the  besiegers, 
instead  of  being,  as  hitherto,  the  besieged.  Disaffection  within  the 
city  walls  was  on  the  increase ; only  the  semblance  of  authority 
remained  to  the  old  and  well-nigh  impotent  King,  while  some  of  his 
sons,  recognizing  their  perilous  position,  endeavoured  to  open  negotia- 
tions with  us.  Many  of  the  sepoys  were  reported  to  be  going  off  to 
their  homes,  sick  and  weary  of  a struggle  the  hopelessness  of  winch 
they  had  begun  to  realize. 

Our  work,  however,  was  far  from  being  finished.  Notwithstanding 
losses  from  death  and  desertion,  the  enemy  still  outnumbered  us  by 
about  eight  or  nine  to  one. 

All  this  time  our  communication  with  the  Punjab  was  maintained, 
and  we  regularly  received  letters  and  newspapers  from  England  by 
the  northern  route ; but  for  several  weeks  we  had  had  no  news  from 
the  south.  Rumours  of  disasters  occasionally  reached  us,  but  it  was 
not  until  the  second  week  in  July  that  we  heard  of  the  fight  at  Agra, 
the  retirement  of  our  troops,  and  the  flight  of  all  the  residents  into 
the  fort. 

These  scraps  of  intelligence,  for  they  were  mere  scraps,  written  often 
in  Greek  character,  some  screwed  into  a quill,  some  sewn  between  th^ 


I 12 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


double  soles  of  a man’s  shoe,  and  some  twisted  up  in  the  messenger's 
hair,  were  eagerly  looked  for,  and  as  eagerly  deciphered  when  they 
came.  It  was  cheering  to  learn  that  Allahabad  was  safe,  that  Lucknow 
was  still  holding  out,  that  troops  from  Madras,  Ceylon,  and  the 
Mauritius  had  reached  Calcutta,  and  that  Lord  Elgin,  taking  a states- 
manlike view  of  the  situation,  had  diverted  to  India*  the  force  intended 
for  the  China  expedition,  and  we  fondly  hoped  that  some  of  the  six 
British  regiments  reported  by  one  messenger  to  have  arrived  at  Cawn- 
pore  would  be  sent  to  the  assistance  of  the  Delhi  Force. 

Strangely  enough,  we  knew  nothing  of  the  death  of  Sir  Henry  Law- 
rence or  General  "Wheeler,  and  had  not  even  heard  for  certain  that 
Cawnpore  had  fallen  and  that  Lucknow  was  besieged,  while  there  were 
constant  reports  that  Wheeler  was  marching  up  the  Trunk  Road. 
Being  most  anxious  to  get  some  authentic  intelligence,  Normanf  on 
the  15th  July  wrote  a letter  in  French  addressed  to  General  Wheeler  at 
Cawnpore,  or  whoever  might  be  in  command  between  that  place  and 
Delhi,  giving  an  account  of  our  position  at  Delhi,  and  expressing  a 
hope  that  troops  would  soon  march  to  our  assistance.  The  letter  was 
entrusted  to  two  sepoys  of  the  Guides,  who  carried  out  their  difficult 
task  most  faithfully,  and  on  the  3rd  August  returned  with  the  follow- 
ing reply  from  General  Havelock,  addressed  to  Major-General  Reed: 

‘ Cawnpore,  left  bank  of  the  Ganges, 

‘ 25 th  July,  1857. 

‘ My  dear  General, 

‘ Yesterday  I saw  Captain  Norman’s  letter  of  the  15th  instant 
from  Delhi,  addressed  to  Sir  Hugh  Wheeler.  That  gallant  officer  and 
the  whole  of  his  force  were  destroyed  on  the  27th  June  by  a base  act  of 
treachery.  Sir  Henry  Somerset  is  Commander-in-Chief  in  India  and 
Sir  Patrick  Grant  in  Bengal.  Under  the  orders  of  the  supreme 
Government  I have  been  sent  to  retrieve  affairs  here.  I have  specific 
instructions  from  which  I cannot  depart.  I have  sent  a duplicate  of 
your  letter  to  Sir  P.  Grant.  In  truth,  though  most  anxious  to  march 
on  Delhi,  I have  peremptory  orders  to  relieve  Lucknow.  I have, 

* Since  writing  the  above  it  has  been  brought  to  my  notice  that  the 
promptitude  with  which  the  troops  were  diverted  to  India  was  due  in  a great 
measure  to  the  foresight  of  Sir  George  Grey,  the  Governor  of  the  Cape,  who, 
on  hearing  of  the  serious  state  of  affairs  in  India,  immediately  ordered  all 
transports  which  touched  at  the  Cape  on  their  way  to  take  part  in  the  China 
Expeditionary  Force,  to  proceed  directly  to  Calcutta  instead  of  to  Singapore, 
lie  also  despatched  as  many  of  the  Ca]>e  garrison  as  he  could  spare,  with 
stores,  etc.,  to  India.  It  is  right,  therefore,  that  he  should  share  with  Lord 
Elgin  the  credit  of  having  so  quickly  grasped  the  magnitude  of  the  crisis 
through  which  India  was  passing. 

t Owing  to  Brigadier-General  Chamberlain  having  been  placed  hors  de 
cvmbal  by  the  severe  wound  he  received  the  previous  day,  Norman  was 
carrying  on  the  duties  of  Adjutant-General. 


NEWS  OF  HENRY  LAWRENCE'S  DEATH 


•13 


iS57] 

thank  God,  been  very  successful.  I defeated  the  enemy  at  Futtehpore 
on  the  12th,  and  I’andu  Naddi  on  the  loth,  and  this  place,  which  I re- 
captured on  the  16th.  On  each  occasion  I took  all  the  guns.  Immense 
reinforcements  are  coming  from  England  and  China.  Sir  Patrick 
Grant  will  soon  be  in  the  field  himself.  Lucknow  holds  out.  Agra  is 
free  for  the  present.  I am  sorry  to  hear  you  are  not  quite  well.  I beg 
that  you  will  let  me  hear  from  you  continually.’ 

Two  days  afterwards  another  letter  was  received ; this  time  from 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Fraser-Tvtler,  A.Q.M.G.,  with  Havelock’s  force. 
It  was  addressed  to  Captain  Earle,  A.Q.M.G.,  Meerut,  and  ran  as 
follows : 

1 Cawnpore,  July  27th. 

‘ General  Havelock  has  crossed  the  river  to  relieve  Lucknow,  which 
will  be  effected  four  days  hence.  He  has  a strong  force  with  him,  and 
he  has  already  thrashed  the  Nana  and  completely  dispersed  his  force. 
"We  shall  probably  march  to  Delhi  with  four  or  five  thousand 
Europeans  and  a heavy  Artillery,  in  number,  not  in  weight.  The 
China  force  is  in  Calcutta,  5,000  men.  More  troops  expected  imme- 
diately. We  shall  soon  be  with  you.’ 

These  sanguine  expectations  were  never  fulfilled!  Instead  of  Luck- 
now being  relieved  in  four  days,  it  was  nearly  four  months  before  that 
result  was  achieved,  and  instead  of  troops  from  Cawnpore  coming  to 
help  us  at  Delhi,  the  troops  from  Delhi  formed  the  chief  part  of  the 
force  which  relieved  Lucknow. 

While  we  were  rejoicing  at  the  prospect  of  being  reinforced  by  a large 
number  of  British  soldiers,  a gloom  was  cast  over  the  whole  camp  by 
the  rumour  that  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  was  dead.  As  the  first  British 
Euler  of  the  Punjab,  Henry  Lawrence  was  known  by  reputation  to,  and 
respected  by,  every  man  belonging  to  the  Delhi  Force,  and  all  realized 
what  a serious  loss  his  death  would  be  to  the  beleaguered  garrison  of 
Lucknow.  Much  time,  however,  was  not  given  us  for  lamentation,  for 
at  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  August  another  attempt  was  made  to 
drive  us  from  the  Metcalfe  House  piquets.  Guns  were  again  brought 
out  through  the  Kashmir  gate,  and  posted  at  Ludlow  Castle  and  the 
Kudsiabagh  ; at  the  same  time  a number  of  Infantry  skirmishers  kept 
up  an  almost  constant  fire  from  the  jungle  in  front  of  our  position. 
The  losses  at  the  piquets  themselves  were  not  heavy,  good  cover  having 
been  provided  ; but  the  communications  between  the  piquets  and  our 
main  position  were  much  exposed  and  extremely  hazardous  for  the 
reliefs.  It  was  felt  that  the  enemy  could  not  be  allowed  to  remain  in 
such  close  proximity  to  our  outposts,  and  Showers  (who  had  recovered 
from  his  slight  wound)  was  again  ordered  to  drive  them  off,  for  which 
purpose  he  was  given  a strong  body  of  Infantry,  composed  of  Europeans, 

8 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


114 


t<857 


Sikhs,  and  Gurkhas,  a troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  a squadron  of  the  9th 
Lancers,  and  the  Guides  Cavalry.  The  result  was  a very  brilliant  little 
affair.  The  orders  on  this  occasion  were  to  ‘ move  up  silently  and  take 
the  guns  at  Ludlow  Castle.’  The  small  column  proceeded  in  the 
deepest  silence,  and  the  first  sound  heard  at  dawn  on  the  12th  August 
was  the  challenge  of  the  enemy’s  sentry,  ‘ Ho  come  dar  V (Who  comes 
there  T).  A bullet  in  his  body  was  the  reply.  A volley  of  musketry 
followed,  and  effectually  awoke  the  sleeping  foe,  who  succeeded  in 
letting  off  two  of  their  guns  as  our  men  rushed  on  the  battery.  An 
Irish  soldier,  named  Reegan,  springing  forward,  prevented  the  discharge 
of  the  third  gun.  He  bayoneted  the  gunner  in  the  act  of  applying  the 
port-fire,  and  was  himself  severely  wounded.  The  rebel  Artillerymen 
stood  to  their  guns  splendidly,  and  fought  till  they  were  all  killed.  The 
enemy’s  loss  was  severe ; some  250  men  were  killed,  and  four  guns 
were  captured.  On  our  side  1 officer  and  19  men  were  killed,  7 officers 
and  85  men  wounded,  and  5 men  missing.  Amongst  the  wounded  was 
the  gallant  Commander  of  the  column,  and  that  fine  soldier,  Major 
John  Coke,  the  Commandant  of  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry.  The  return 
to  camp  was  a stirring  sight : the  captured  guns  were  brought  home  in 
triumph,  pushed  along  by  the  soldiers,  all  madly  cheering,  and  the 
horses  ridden  by  men  carrying  their  muskets  with  bayonets  fixed. 

The  following  morning  the  Punjab  Movable  Column  arrived. 
Nicholson  had  preceded  it  by  a few  days,  and  from  him  I heard  all 
about  his  fight  with  the  Sialkot  mutineers  at  Trimmu  Ghat  and  the 
various  marches  and  counter-marches  which  he  had  made  since  I left 
him  at  Philour. 

The  column  was  a most  welcome  addition  to  our  force.  It  now 
consisted  of  the  52nd  Light  Infantry,  a wing  of  the  61st  Foot,  a Field 
Battery,  a wing  of  the  1st  Baluch  Regiment,  and  the  2nd  Punjab 
Infantry,  beside  200  newly-raised  Multani  Cavalry  and  400  military 
police.  This  brought  up  our  effective  force  to  about  8,000  rank  and 
file  of  all  arms.*  A more  powerful  siege-train  than  we  had  hitherto 
possessed  was  on  its  way  from  Ferozepore,  and  three  companies  of  the 
8th  Foot,  detachments  of  Artillery  and  the  60tli  Rifles,  the  4th  Punjab 
Infantry,  and  about  100  recruits  for  the  4th  Sikhs  were  also  marching 
towards  Delhi.  In  addition,  a small  contingent  from  Kashmir  and  a 
few  of  the  Jhind  Raja’s  troops  were  shortly  expected,  after  the  arrival 
of  which  nothing  in  the  shape  of  reinforcements  could  be  looked  for 
from  the  north. 

Nor  could  we  hope  for  any  help  from  the  south,  for  no  definite  news 
had  been  received  from  Havelock  since  his  letter  of  the  25th  of  July, 
and  rumours  had  reached  us  that,  finding  it  impossible  to  force  his  way 
to  Lucknow,  he  had  been  obliged  to  retire  upon  Cawnpore.  It  was  felt, 

* There  were  besides  in  camp  at  this  time  1,536  sick  and  wounded,  not- 
withstanding that  several  hundred  men  had  been  sent  away. 


1857] 


THE  6/sr  FOOT  AT  NAJAFGARH 


1 *5 

therefore,  that  if  Delhi  were  to  be  taken  at  all,  it  must  be  taken 
quickly,  before  our  augmented  numbers  should  be  again  diminished  by 
sickness  and  casualties. 

The  enemy  knew  our  position  as  well  as  we  did,  and  appreciating 
the  great  value  the  siege-train  would  be  to  us,  they  decided  on  making 
a supreme  effort  to  intercept  it.  A few  days  before  they  had  been 
foiled  by  Hodson  in  an  attempt  to  cut  off  our  communication  with  the 
Punjab,  and  were  determined  to  ensure  success  on  this  occasion  by 
employing  a really  formidable  force.  This  force  left  Delhi  on  the 
24th  August,  and  proceeded  in  the  direction  of  the  Najafgarh  jhil. 

At  daybreak  the  following  morning  Nicholson  started  with  sixteen 
Horse  Artillery  guns,  1,600  Infantry  and  450  Cavalry,  his  orders  being 
to  overtake  the  enemy  and  bring  them  to  action.  I hoped  to  have 
been  of  the  party,  but  Nicholson’s  request  to  have  me  as  his  staff 
officer  was  refused,  as  I had  not  been  taken  off  the  sick-list,  though  I 
considered  my  wound  was  practically  healed. 

It  proved  a most  difficult  march.  The  rain  fell  in  torrents,  and  the 
roads  were  mere  quagmires.  In  the  first  nine  miles  two  swamps  had 
to  be  got  through,  on  crossing  which  Nicholson  heard  that  the 
insurgents  were  at  Najafgarh,  twelve  miles  further  off.  He  deter- 
mined to  push  on,  and  at  4 p.m.  he  found  them  occupying  a strong 
position  about  a mile  and  three-quarters  in  length.  In  front  was  an 
old  serai  which  was  held  in  force  with  four  guns,  and  on  either  side 
and  in  rear  of  the  serai  was  a village  equally  strongly  held ; while 
running  round  the  enemy’s  right  and  rear  was  a huge  drainage  cut, 
swollen  by  the  heavy  rain.  This  cut,  or  nulla,  was  crossed  by  a 
bridge  immediately  behind  the  rebels’  position.  Nicholson  advanced 
from  a side-road,  which  brought  him  on  their  right  with  the  nulla 
flowing  between  him  and  them.  Even  at  the  ford  the  water  was 
breast-high,  and  it  was  with  much  difficulty  and  not  without  a good 
deal  of  delay  that  our  troops  crossed  under  a heavy  fire  from  the  serai. 
It  was  getting  late,  and  Nicholson  had  only  time  to  make  a hasty 
reconnaissance.  He  decided  to  attack  the  serai,  drive  out  the 
mutineers,  and  then,  changing  front  to  the  left,  to  sweep  down  their 
line  and  get  possession  of  the  bridge. 

As  the  Infantry  we're  about  to  advance,  Nicholson  thus  addressed 
them:  ‘Men  of  the  61st,  remember  what  Sir  Colin  Campbell  said  at 
Chilian wala,  and  you  have  heard  that  he  said  the  same  to  his  gallant 
Highland  Brigade  at  the  Alma.  I have  the  same  request  to  make  of 
you  and  the  men  of  the  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers.  Hold  your  fire  until 
within  twenty  or  thirty  yards,  then  fire  and  charge,  and  the  serai  is 
yours.’  Our  brave  soldiers  followed  these  directions  to  the  letter,  and, 
under  cover  of  Artillery  fire,  carried  the  serai.  Front  was  then 
changed  to  the  left  as  had  been  arranged,  and  the  line  swept  along  the 
enemy’s  defences,  the  rebels  flying  before  them  over  the  bridge.  They 

8—2 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


1 16 


t>8?7 


confessed  to  a loss  of  more  than  800  men,  and  they  left  in  our  hands 
thirteen  field-pieces  and  a large  quantity  of  ammunition,  besides  all 
their  camp  equipage,  stores,  camels,  and  horses.  Our  casualties  were 
2 officers  and  23  men  killed,  and  3 officers  and  68  men  wounded — two 
of  the  officers  mortally,  the  third  dangerously. 

The  enemy  in  the  city,  imagining  from  the  size  of  the  force  sent 
with  Nicholson  that  we  could  not  have  many  troops  left  in  camp, 
attacked  us  in  great  strength  on  the  following  morning  (26th),  but 
were  beaten  off  with  a loss  on  our  side  of  only  8 killed  and 
13  wounded. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

By  the  6th  September  all  the  reinforcements  that  could  be  expected, 
including  the  siege  train  (consisting  of  thirty-two  pieces  of  ordnance 
with  ample  ammunition)  had  arrived  in  camp,  and  the  time  had  now 
come  when  it  was  necessary  for  Wilson  to  determine  whether  Delhi 
was  to  be  assaulted,  or  whether  the  attempt  must  be  given  up.  Long 
exposure  to  sun  and  rain  began  to  tell  terribly  on  the  troops ; sickness 
increased  to  an  alarming  extent,  and  on  the  31st  August  there  were 
2,368  men  in  hospital — a number  which,  six  days  later,  had  risen  to 
2,977. 

Norman,  on  whose  figures  implicit  reliance  can  be  placed,  states 
that  on  this  date  the  total  number  of  effective  rank  and  file  of  all 
arms,  Artillery,  Engineers,  Cavalry,  and  Infantry,  including  gun- 
Lascars,  Native  drivers,  newly-raised  Sikh  Pioneers,  and  recruits  for 
the  Punjab  regiments,  was  8,748. 

The  strength  of  the  British  troops  was  3,217,  composed  of 
530  Artillery,  443  Cavalry,  and  2,294  Infantry.  The  Infantry  corps 
were  mere  skeletons,  the  strongest  being  only  409  effective  rank  and 
lile.  The  52nd,  which  had  arrived  three  weeks  before  with  600  healthy 
men,  had  already  dwindled  to  242  fit  for  duty. 

The  above  numbers  are  exclusive  of  the  Kashmir  Contingent  of 
2,200  men  and  four  guns,  which  had  by  this  time  reached  Delhi ; and 
several  hundred  men  of  the  Jhind  troops  (previously  most  usefully 
employed  in  keeping  open  our  communication  with  Kurnal)  were,  at 
the  Raja’s  particular  request,  brought  in  to  share  in  the  glory  of  the 
capture  of  Delhi,  the  Raja  himself  accompanying  them. 

No  one  was  more  alive  than  the  Commander  of  the  Delhi  Field 
Force  to  the  fact  that  no  further  aid  could  be  expected,  and  no  one 
realized  more  keenly  than  he  did  that  the  strength  of  the  little  army 
at  his  disposal  was  diminishing  day  by  day.  But  Wilson  had  never 
been  sanguine  as  to  the  possibility  of  capturing  Delhi  without  aid  from 


SKETCH  TO  ILLUSTRATE  THE  ENGAGEMENT  AT  NAJAFGARH  IN  AUGUST,  1857. 


iS57] 


IVILSON’S  DIFFICULTIES 


117 

the  south.  In  a letter  to  Baird-Smith  dated  the  20th  August,  he  dis- 
cussed at  length  his  reasons  for  not  being  in  a position  to  ‘ hold  out 
any  hope  of  being  able  to  take  the  place  until  supported  by  the  force 
from  below.’  He  now  was  aware  that  no  troops  could  be  expected 
from  the  south,  and  Sir  John  Lawrence  plainly  told  him  that  he  had 
sent  him  the  last  man  he  could  spare  from  the  Punjab.  On  the  29th 
August  Lawrence  wrote  to  Wilson : ‘ There  seem  to  be  very  strong 
reasons  for  assaulting  as  soon  as  practicable.  Every  day’s  delay  is 
fraught  with  danger.  Every  day  disaffection  and  mutiny  spread. 
Every  day  adds  to  the  danger  of  the  Native  Princes  taking  part 
against  us.’  But  Wilson  did  not  find  it  easy  to  make  up  his  mind  to 
assault.  He  was  ill.  Responsibility  and  anxiety  had  told  upon  him. 
He  had  grown  nervous  and  hesitating,  and  the  longer  it  was  delayed 
the  more  difficult  the  task  appeared  to  him. 

Fortunately  for  the  continuance  of  our  rule  in  India,  Wilson  had 
about  him  men  who  understood,  as  he  was  unable  to  do,  the  impossi- 
bility of  our  remaining  any  longer  as  we  were.  They  knew  that 
Delhi  must  either  be  taken  or  the  army  before  it  withdrawn.  The 
man  to  whom  the  Commander  first  looked  for  counsel  under  these 
conditions — Baird-Smith,  of  the  Bengal  Engineers — proved  himself 
worthy  of  the  high  and  responsible  position  in  which  he  was  placed. 
He  too  was  ill.  Naturally  of  a delicate  constitution,  the  climate  and 
exposure  had  told  upon  him  severely,  and  the  diseases  from  which  he 
was  suffering  were  aggravated  by  a wound  he  had  received  soon  after 
his  arrival  in  camp.  He  fully  appreciated  the  tremendous  risks  which 
an  assault  involved,  but,  in  his  opinion,  they  were  less  than  were  those 
of  delay.  Whether  convinced  or  not  by  his  Chief  Engineer’s  argu- 
ments, Wilson  accepted  his  advice  and  directed  him  to  prepare  a plan 
of  attack. 

Baird-Smith  was  strongly  supported  by  Nicholson,  Chamberlain, 
Daly,  Norman,  and  Alex.  Taylor.  They  were  one  and  all  in  com- 
munication with  the  authorities  in  the  Punjab,  and  they  knew  that  if 
‘ Delhi  were  not  taken,  and  that  speedily,  there  would  be  a struggle 
not  only  for  European  dominion,  but  even  for  European  existence 
within  the  Punjab  itself.’* 

Our  position  in  that  province  was,  indeed,  most  critical.  An 
attempted  conspiracy  of  Mahomedan  tribes  in  the  Murree  Hills,  and 
an  insurrection  in  the  Gogaira  district,  had  occurred.  Both  these 
affairs  were  simply  attempts  to  throw  off  the  British  yoke,  made  in  the 
behef  that  our  last  hour  was  come.  The  feeling  that  prompted  them 
was  not  confined  to  the  Mahomedans ; amongst  all  classes  and  races  in 
the  Punjab  a spirit  of  restlessness  was  on  the  increase ; even  the  most 
loyally  disposed  were  speculating  on  the  chances  of  our  being  able  to 

* Punjab  Administration  Report,  1857-58. 


i8 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[‘857 


hold  our  own,  and  doubting  the  advisability  of  adhering  to  our  cause. 
On  the  part  of  the  Sikhs  of  the  Manjha*  there  was  an  unwillingness  to 
enlist,  and  no  good  recruits  of  this  class  could  be  obtained  until  after 
Delhi  had  fallen. 

It  was  under  these  critical  circumstances  that  a council  of  war  was 
convened  to  decide  definitely  whether  the  assault  should  take  place 
or  not. 

Nicholson  was  not  a man  of  many  intimacies,  but  as  his  staff  officer 
I had  been  fortunate  enough  to  gain  his  friendship.  I was  constantly 
with  him,  and  on  this  occasion  I was  sitting  in  his  tent  before  he  set 
out  to  attend  the  council.  He  had  been  talking  to  me  in  confidential 
terms  of  personal  matters,  and  ended  by  telling  me  of  his  intention 
to  take  a very  unusual  step  should  the  council  fail  to  arrive  at  any 
fixed  determination  regarding  the  assault.  ‘ Delhi  must  be  taken,’  he 
said,  ‘ and  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  this  should  be  done  at  once  ; 
and  if  Wilson  hesitates  longer,  I intend  to  propose  at  to-day’s  meeting 
that  he  should  be  superseded.’  I was  greatly  startled,  and  ventured  to 
remark  that,  as  Chamberlain  was  hors  de  combat  from  his  wound, 
Wilson’s  removal  would  leave  him,  Nicholson,  senior  officer  with  the 
force.  He  smiled  as  he  answered  : 1 1 have  not  overlooked  that  fact. 
I shall  make  it  perfectly  clear  that,  under  the  circumstances,  I could 
not  possibly  accept  the  command  myself,  and  I shall  propose  that  it  be 
given  to  Campbell,  of  the  5'2nd  ; I am  prepared  to  serve  under  him  for 
the  time  being,  so  no  one  can  ever  accuse  me  of  being  influenced  by 
personal  motives.’ 

Happily,  Nicholson  was  not  called  upon  to  take  so  unusual  a step. 
I walked  with  him  to  the  Head-Quarters  camp,  waited  in  great  excite- 
ment until  the  council  of  war  was  over,  and,  when  Nicholson  issued 
from  the  General’s  tent,  learnt,  to  my  intense  relief,  that  Wilson  had 
agreed  to  the  assault. 

That  Nicholson  would  have  carried  out  his  intention  if  the  council 
had  come  to  a different  conclusion  I have  not  the  slightest  doubt,  and 
I quite  believe  that  his  masterful  spirit  would  have  effected  its  purpose 
and  borne  down  all  opposition.  Whether  his  action  would  have  been 
right  or  wrong  is  another  question,  and  one  on  which  there  is  always 
sure  to  be  great  difference  of  opinion.  At  the  time  it  seemed  to  me  that 
he  was  right.  The  circumstances  were  so  exceptional — Wilson  would 
have  proved  himself  so  manifestly  unfit  to  cope  with  them  had  he 
decided  on  further  delay — and  the  consequences  of  such  delay  would 
have  been  so  calamitous  and  far-reaching,  that  even  now,  after  many 
years  have  passed,  and  after  having  often  thought  over  Nicholson’s 
intended  action  and  discussed  the  subject  with  other  men,  I have  not 
changed  my  opinion. 


The  tract  of  country  between  the  Sutlej  and  Ravi  rivers. 


>857] 


ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  THE  ASSAULT 


M9 


In  anticipation  of  an  attack  on  Delhi,  preparations  had  been  com- 
menced early  in  September,  one  of  the  first  of  these  being  to  form  a 
trench  to  the  left  of  the  ‘ Sammy  House,’  at  the  end  of  which  a battery 
was  constructed  for  four  9-pounders  and  two  24  pouuder  howitzers. 
The  object  of  this  battery  was  to  prevent  sorties  from  the  Lahore  or 
Kabul  gates  passing  round  the  city  wall  to  annoy  our  breaching  batteries, 
and  also  to  assist  in  keeping  down  the  fire  from  the  Mori  bastion.* 
This  battery,  moreover,  led  the  enemy  to  believe  that  we  should  attack 
them  from  our  right,  whereas  it  had  been  resolved  to  push  the  main 
attack  from  our  left,  where  we  could  approach  nearer  to  the  walls  under 
cover,  and  where  our  flank  was  completely  protected  by  the  river. 
The  Engineers  had  also  employed  themselves  in  getting  ready  10,000 
fascines,  as  many  gabions,  and  100,000  sand-bags,  besides  field  maga- 
zines, scaling-ladders,  and  spare  platforms. 

On  the  7th  September  Wilson  issued  an  order  informing  the  force 
that  arrangements  for  the  assault  would  be  commenced  at  once.  He 
dwelt  upon  the  hardships  and  fatigue  which  had  been  cheerfully  borne 
by  officers  and  men,  and  expressed  his  hope  that  they  would  be  re- 
warded for  their  past  labours,  ‘ and  for  a cheerful  endurance  of  still 
greater  fatigue  and  exposure.’  He  reminded  the  troops  of  the  reasons 
for  the  deadly  struggle  in  which  they  were  engaged,  and  he  called  upon 
all  ranks  to  co-operate  heart  and  soul  in  the  arduous  work  now  before 
them. 

Ground  was  broken  that  evening.  Unfortunately  Baird-Smith  was 
not  able  to  personally  superintend  the  construction  of  the  breaching 
batteries,  but  he  had  in  his  second-in-command,  Alex.  Taylor,  a 
thoroughly  practical  Engineer,  who  not  only  knew  how  to  work  him- 
self, but  how  to  get  work  out  of  others.  Ever  alert  and  cheerful,  he 
was  trusted  and  looked  up  to  by  all  his  subordinates,  and  was  of  all 
others  the  very  man  to  be  placed  in  charge  of  such  a difficult  and 
dangerous  duty. 

The  first  battery,  known  as  No.  l,was  traced  out  in  two  parts,  about 
700  yards  from  the  Mori  bastion,  which  the  right  half,  with  its  five 
18-pounders  and  one  8-inch  howitzer,  was  intended  to  silence  ; while 
the  left  half,  with  its  four  24-pounders,  was  to  hold  the  Kashmir 
bastion  in  check. 

All  night  the  Engineers  worked  at  the  battery,  but  although  before 
day  broke  it  was  nearly  finished  and  armed,  it  was  not  ready  to  open 
fire  until  close  on  sunrise.  The  enemy  did  not  fail  to  take  advantage 
of  this  chance.  They  poured  in  round  after  round  of  shot  and  grape, 
causing  many  casualties.  Their  fire  slackened  as  our  guns  were  gradu- 
ally able  to  make  themselves  felt,  and  by  the  afternoon  it  was  silenced. 
Nothing  remained  of  the  Mori  bastion  but  a heap  of  ruins.  No.  1 


Nonnan’s  narrative. 


120 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[i»57 

battery  was  commanded  by  Major  James  Brind,*  the  bravest  of  the 
brave.  It  was  said  of  him  that  he  ‘ never  slept  ’ ; and  Reid  (of  1 Hindu 
Rao  ’ fame)  wrote  of  him : ‘ On  all  occasions  the  exertions  of  this 
noble  officer  were  indefatigable.  He  was  always  to  be  found  where  his 
presence  was  most  required ; and  the  example  he  set  to  officers  and 
men  was  beyond  all  praise.’ 

No.  2 battery  was  next  taken  in  hand.  This  was  erected  in  front  of 
Ludlow  Castle,  and  about  500  yards  from  the  Kashmir  gate.  Like 
No.  1,  it  was  formed  in  two  parts,  the  right  half  being  intended  for 
seven  heavy  howitzers  and  two  18-pounders,  and  the  left  for  nine 
24-pounders,  commanded  respectively  by  Majors  Kaye  and  Campbell. 
All  these  guns  were  intended  to  breach  the  Kashmir  bastion,  where 
the  main  assault  was  to  be  made. 

Up  till  this  time  the  enemy  had  imagined  that  the  attack  would  be 
delivered  from  our  right,  and  they  were  quite  taken  by  surprise  when, 
on  the  evening  of  the  8th  September,  we  occupied  Ludlow  Castle. 

Baird-Smith  showed  his  grasp  of  the  situation  in  attacking  from  our 
left,  notwithstanding  the  greater  distance  of  this  part  of  our  position 
from  the  city  wall.  No  counter-attack  could  be  made  on  that  Hank, 
and  the  comparatively  open  ground  between  the  Kashmir  and  Mori 
bastions  would  assist  us  in  protecting  the  assaulting  columns. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  discovered  their  mistake,  they  did  their  utmost 
to  prevent  our  batteries  being  constructed ; but  the  Engineers  were  not 
to  be  deterred.  By  the  morning  of  the  11th  No.  2 battery  was  com- 
pleted, armed,  and  unmasked,  and  No.  3 and  No.  4 batteries  were 
marked  out  in  the  Kudsiabagh.  No.  3,  commanded  by  Major  Scott, 
was  constructed  for  six  18-pounders,  and  twelve  5i-inch  mortars  under 
Captain  Blunt.  Norman  in  his  narrative  says  : ‘ The  establishment  of 
Major  Scott’s  battery  within  180  yards  of  the  wall,  to  arm  which  heavy 
guns  had  to  be  dragged  from  the  rear  under  a constant  fire  of  musketry, 
was  an  operation  that  could  rarely  have  been  equalled  in  war.’  During 
the  first  night  of  its  construction  39  men  were  killed  and  wounded  ; but 
with  rare  courage  the  workmen  continued  their  task.  They  were 
merely  unarmed  pioneers  ; and  with  that  passive  bravery  so  character- 
istic of  Natives,  as  man  after  man  was  knocked  over,  they  would  stop 
a moment,  weep  a little  over  a fallen  friend,  place  his  body  in  a row 
along  with  the  rest,  and  then  work  on  as  before. f 

No.  4 battery,  armed  with  ten  heavy  mortars,  and  commanded  by 
Major  Tombs,  was  placed  under  the  shelter  of  an  old  building,  about 
half-way  between  No.  2 and  No.  3 batteries. J 

* The  late  General  Sir  Janies  Brind,  G.C.  B. 

f ‘The  Indian  Mutiny,’  by  Forrest. 

i When  his  Royal  Highness  the  Prince  of  Wales  was  coming  to  India  in 
1875,  I obtained  permission  from  Lord  Napier  of  Magdala,  who  was  then 
C'ommander-in-Chief,  to  erect  miniature  embrasures  to  mark  the  gun  of 
direction  of  eacli  of  the  breaching  batteries  ; and  on  these  embrasures  are 
recorded  the  number,  armament,  and  object  of  the  batteries. 


1S57]  NICHOLSON  EXPRESSES  HIS  SATISFACTION  121 

I was  posted  to  the  left  half  of  No.  2 battery,  and  had  charge  of  the 
two  right  guns.  At  eight  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  Septem- 
ber we  opened  fire  on  the  Kashmir  bastion  and  the  adjoining  curtain, 
and  as  the  shots  told  and  the  stones  flew  into  the  air  and  rattled  down, 
a loud  cheer  burst  from  the  Artillerymen  and  some  of  the  men  of  the 
Carabineers  and  9tli  Lancers  who  had  volunteered  to  work  in  the 
batteries.  The  enemy  had  got  our  range  with  wonderful  accuracy,  and 
immediately  on  the  screen  in  front  of  the  right  gun  being  removed,  a 
round  shot  came  through  the  embrasure,  knocking  two  or  three  of  us 
over.  On  regaining  my  feet,  I found  that  the  young  Horse  Artillery- 
man who  was  serving  the  vent  while  I was  laying  the  gun  had  had  his 
right  arm  taken  off. 

In  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  when,  wearied  with  hard  work  and 
exhausted  by  the  great  heat,  we  were  taking  a short  rest,  trusting  to  the 
shelter  of  the  battery  for  protection,  a shower  of  grape  came  into  us, 
severely  wounding  our  commander,  Campbell,  whose  place  was  taken 
by  Edwin  Johnson.  We  never  left  the  battery  until  the  day  of  the 
assault— the  14th — except  to  go  by  turns  into  Ludlow  Castle  for  our 
meals.  Night  and  day  the  overwhelming  fire  was  continued,  and  the 
incessant  boom  and  roar  of  guns  and  mortars,  with  the  ceaseless  rain 
of  shot  and  shell  on  the  city,  warned  the  mutineers  that  their  punish- 
ment was  at  hand.  We  were  not,  however,  allowed  to  have  it  all  our 
own  way.  Unable  to  fire  a gun  from  any  of  the  three  bastions  we  were 
breaching,  the  enemy  brought  guns  into  the  open  and  enfiladed  our 
batteries.  They  sent  rockets  from  their  martello  towers,  and  they 
maintained  a perfect  storm  of  musketry  from  their  advanced  trench 
and  from  the  city  walls.  No  part  of  the  attack  was  left  unsearched  by 
their  fire,  and  though  three  months’  incessant  practice  had  made  our 
men  skilful  in  using  any  cover  they  had,  our  losses  were  numerous, 
327  officers  and  men  being  killed  and  wounded  between  the  7th  and 
14th  September. 

On  the  evening  of  the  13th  September  Nicholson  came  to  see  whether 
we  gunners  had  done  our  work  thoroughly  enough  to  warrant  the 
assault  being  made  the  next  morning.  He  was  evidently  satisfied,  for 
when  he  entered  our  battery  he  said : ‘ I must  shake  hands  with  you 
fellows;  you  have  done  your  best  to  make  my  work  easy  to-morrow.’ 

Nicholson  was  accompanied  by  Taylor,  who  had  to  make  certain  that 
the  breaches  were  practicable,  and  for  this  purpose  he  detailed  four 
subaltern  officers  of  Engineers  to  go  to  the  walls  as  soon  as  it  was  dark, 
and  report  upon  the  condition  they  were  in.  Greathed  and  Home 
were  told  off  for  the  Wa'  3r  bastion  breach,  and  Medley  and  Lang*  for 
that  of  the  Kashmir  bas  Lang  asked  to  be  allowed  to  go  wffiile  it 
was  yet  daylight ; Taylor  agreed,  and  with  an  escort  of  four  men  of 
the  60th  Rifles  he  crept  to  the  edge  of  the  cover  in  the  Kudsiabagh, 
* Colonel  Arthur  Lang  is  the  only  one  of  the  four  now  alive. 


122 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[«857 


and  then,  running  up  the  glacis,  sat  on  top  of  the  counterscarp  for 
a few  seconds  studying  the  ditch  and  the  two  breaches.  On  his  return 
Lang  reported  the  breaches  to  be  practicable  ; as,  however,  it  was 
desirable  to  ascertain  whether  ladders  would  be  necessary,  he  was  sent 
again  after  dark,  in  company  with  Medley.  They  took  a ladder  and  a 
measuring-rod  with  them,  and  were  escorted  by  an  officer  and  twenty- 
four  riflemen,  of  whom  all  but  six  were  left  under  cover  in  the  Kudsia- 
bagh.  Lang  slipped  into  the  ditch,  which  he  found  to  be  sixteen  feet 
deep.  Medley  handed  him  the  ladder  and  rod,  and  followed  him  with 
two  riflemen,  the  other  four  remaining  on  the  crest  of  the  glacis  to 
cover  their  retreat.  With  the  help  of  the  ladder  they  ascended  the 
berm  and  measured  the  height  of  the  wall.  Two  minutes  more,  and 
they  would  have  reached  the  top  of  the  breach,  but,  quiet  as  they  had 
been,  their  movements  had  attracted  attention,  and  several  of  the 
enemy  were  heard  running  towards  the  breach.  The  whole  party  re- 
ascended as  rapidly  as  possible,  and,  throwing  themselves  on  the  grass, 
waited  in  breathless  silence,  hoping  the  sepoys  would  go  away,  and  that 
they  might  be  able  to  make  another  attempt  to  reach  the  top  of  the 
breach.  The  rebels,  however,  gave  no  signs  of  retiring,  and  as  all  needful 
information  had  been  obtained,  they  determined  to  run  for  it.  A volley 
was  fired  at  the  party  as  they  dashed  across  the  open,  but  no  one  was  hit. 

Greathed  and  Home  had  been  equally  successful,  and  by  midnight 
Baird- Smith  was  able  to  report  to  General  Wilson  that  both  breaches 
were  practicable. 

Baird-Smith  urged  the  importance  of  attacking  without  delay.  He 
pointed  out  the  impossibility  of  continuing  the  high  pressure  at  which 
nearly  every  man*  in  the  force  had  been  working  during  the  past  few  days ; 

* Nearly  every  man  was  on  duty.  The  daily  state  of  the  several  corps 
must  have  been  very  similar  to  the  following  one  of  the  75th  Foot. 

DAILY  STATE 

OK 

H.M.’S  75th  REGIMENT. 


Camp  Delhi,  13th  September,  1857. 


Sergeants. 

Drummers. 

• 

Rank  and  File. 

Fit  to  turn  out  - 

- 

1 

5 

37 

On  duty 

- 

29 

6 

361 

(Sd.)  E.  Courtenay, 

True  copy.  Sergt. -Major, 

(Sd.)  R.  Barter,  Lieut. -Adj.,  75th  Regt. 

76th  Regiment. 


ORDERS  FOR  THE  ASSAULT  ISSUED 


123 


i8.S7l 

that  the  tension  was  becoming  too  severe  to  last ; and  that  every  hour 
that  passed  without  assaulting  was  a loss  to  us  and  a gain  to  the  enemy. 

Before  Wilson  and  Baird-Smith  separated,  orders  had  been  issued 
for  the  attack  to  be  made  at  daybreak  the  next  morning,  the  14th. 

It  was  arranged  that  there  were  to  be  four  assaulting  columns  and 
one  reserve  column. 

The  first,  second  and  third  columns,  which  were  to  operate  on  our 
left,  were  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Nicholson,  who 
personally  led  No.  1 column.  It  consisted  of : 


Her  Majesty’s  75th  Foot 

MKN. 
- 300 

1st  Bengal  Fusiliers 

- 250 

2nd  Punjab  Infantry 

- 450 

Total  - 

- 1.000 

and  was  meant  to  storm  the  breach  near  the  Kashmir  bastion. 

I am  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  Mrs.  Barter,  the  widow  of  my  gallant 
friend  and  comrade.  General  Richard  Barter,  C.B.,  who  served  throughout 
the  Mutiny  with  the  75th  Foot,  first  as  Adjutant  and  afterwards  as  Captain,  for 
the  above  ‘ Daily  State  ’ and  for  the  following  extract  from  that  officer's  diary  : 

1 In  the  evening  the  order  was  published  for  the  storming  of  Delhi  a little 
before  daybreak  the  next  morning,  September  14,  and  we  each  of  us  looked 
carefully  to  the  reloading  of  our  pistols,  tilling  of  flasks,  and  getting  as  good 
protection  as  possible  for  our  heads,  which  would  be  exposed  so  much  going 
up  the  ladders.  I wound  two  puggris  or  turbans  round  my  old  forage  cap, 
with  the  last  letter  from  the  hills  [Mrs.  Barter  was  then  at  Kasanli,  in  the 
Himalayas]  in  the  top,  and  committed  myself  to  the  care  of  Providence. 
There  was  not  much  sleep  that  night  in  our  camp.  I dropped  off  now  and 
then,  but  never  for  long,  and  whenever  I woke  1 could  see  that  there  was  a 
light  in  more  than  one  of  the  officers’  tents,  and  talking  was  going  on  in  a low 
tone  amongst  the  men,  the  snapping  of  a lock  or  springing  of  a ramrod  sound- 
ing far  in  the  still  air,  telling  of  preparation  for  the  coming  strife.  A 
little  after  midnight  we  fell  in  as  quietly  as  possible,  and  by  the  light  of  a 
lantern  the  orders  for  the  assault  were  then  read  to  the  men.  They  were  to 
the  following  purport : Any  officer  or  man  who  might  be  wounded  was  to  be 
left  where  he  fell ; no  one  was  to  step  from  the  ranks  to  help  him,  as  there 
were  no  men  to  spare.  If  t he  assault  were  successful  he  would  be  taken  away 
in  the  doolies,  or  litters,  and  carried  to  the  rear,  or  wherever  he  could  best 
receive  medical  assistance.  If  we  failed,  wounded  and  sound  should  be 
prepared  to  bear  the  worst.  There  was  to  be  no  plundering,  but  all  prize 
taken  was  to  be  put  into  a common  stock  for  fair  division  after  all  was  over. 
No  prisoners  were  to  be  made,  as  we  had  no  one  to  guard  them,  and  care  was  to 
be  taken  that  no  women  or  children  were  injured.  To  this  the  men  answered 
at  once,  by  “No  fear,  sir.”  The  officers  now  pledged  their  honours  on  their 
swords  to  abide  by  these  orders,  and  the  men  then  promised  to  follow  their 
example.  At  this  moment,  just  as  the  regiment  was  about  to  march  off, 
Father  Bertrand  came  up  in  his  vestments,  and,  addressing  the  Colonel,  begged 
for  permission  to  bless  the  regiment,  saying:  “We  may  differ  some  of  us  in 
matters  of  religion,  but  the  blessing  of  an  old  man  and  a clergyman  can  do 
nothing  but  good.”  The  Colonel  at  once  assented,  and  Father  Bertrand, 
lifting  his  hands  to  Heaven,  blessed  the  regiment  in  a most  impressive 
manner,  ottering  up  at  the  same  time  a prayer  for  our  success  and  for  mercy 
on  the  souls  of  those  soon  to  die.’ 


124 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 


No.  2 column,  under  Brigadier  Jones,  of  Her  Majesty’s  61st  Foot, 
consisted  of : 

MEN. 

Her  Majesty’s  8th  Foot  - 

- 250 

2nd  Bengal  Fusiliers 

250 

4th  Sikhs 

350 

Total 

- 850 

and  was  intended  for  the  storming  of  the 
bastion. 

breach  near  the  Water 

No.  3 column,  under  Colonel  Campbell,  of  Her  Majesty’s  52nd  Light 
Infantry,  consisted  of : 

MEN. 

Her  Majesty’s  52nd  Light  Infantry 

200 

Kumaon  Battalion 

- 250 

1st  Punjab  Infantry 

- 500 

Total 

- 950 

and  was  told  off  to  enter  the  Kashmir  gate  after  it  had  been  blown  in. 

No.  4 column  was  to  operate  on  our  right.  It  was  commanded  by 
Major  Reid,  of  the  Sirmur  battalion,  and  was  composed  of  that 
regiment,  the  Guides  Infantry,  and  such  men  from  the  piquets  (Euro- 
pean and  Native)  as  could  be  spared.  Its  strength  was  860  men, 
besides  1,200  of  the  Kashmir  Contingent,  and  its  orders  were  to  attack 
the  suburbs  of  Kisenganj  and  Paharipur,  and  support  the  main  attack 
by  effecting  an  entrance  at  the  Kabul  gate. 

The  Reserve  column,  under  Brigadier  Longfield,  Her  Majesty’s 
8th  Foot,  was  told  to  await  the  result  of  the  attack,  and  afford  assist- 
ance wherever  required.  It  consisted  of  ; 


MEN. 

Her  Majesty’s  61st  Foot-  - - - 250 

4th  Punjab  Infantry  ....  4f,o 
Wing  Balucli  battalion  ....  300 

Total  - - 1,000 


with  300  of  the  Jhind  Contingent. 

There  were  besides  200  of  the  60th  Rifles,  who  were  to  cover  the 
advance  of  Nicholson’s  columns,  and  join  the  reserve  as  soon  as  the 
assaults  had  been  carried  out. 

In  order  to  provide  these  five  columns,  in  all  hardly  5,000  strong,  the 
services  of  every  man  who  could  bear  arms  had  to  be  put  into  requisi- 
tion. Piquets  were  weakened  to  a dangerous  extent,  and  many  of  the 
sick  and  wounded  who  ought  to  have  been  in  hospital  were  utilized  for 
the  protection  of  the  camp. 


DELHI  STORMED 


125 


1S57] 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

It  was  intended,  as  I have  before  said,  that  the  assault  should  be 
delivered  at  break  of  day,  but  many  of  the  men  belonging  to  the  regi- 
ments of  the  storming  force  had  been  on  piquet  all  night,  and  it  took 
some  time  for  them  to  rejoin  their  respective  corps.  A further  delay 
was  caused  by  our  having  to  destroy  the  partial  repairs  to  the  breaches 
which  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  effecting  during  the  night,  notwith- 
standing the  steady  fire  we  had  kept  up. 

While  we  were  thus  engaged,  the  Infantry  were  ordered  to  he  down 
under  cover.  Standing  on  the  crenellated  wall  which  separated 
Ludlow  Castle  from  the  road,  I saw  Nicholson  at  the  head  of  his 
column,  and  wondered  what  was  passing  through  his  mind.  Was  he 
thinking  of  the  future,  or  of  the  wonderful  part  he  had  played  during 
the  past  four  months  ? At  Peshawar  he  had  been  Edwardes’s  right 
hand.  At  the  head  of  the  Movable  Column  he  had  been  mainly 
instrumental  in  keeping  the  Punjab  quiet,  and  at  Delhi  everyone  felt 
that  during  the  short  time  he  had  been  with  us  he  was  our  guiding 
star,  and  that  but  for  his  presence  in  the  camp  the  assault  which  he 
was  about  to  lead  would  probably  never  have  come  off.  He  was 
truly  ‘ a tower  of  strength.’  Any  feeling  of  reluctance  to  serve  under 
a Captain  of  the  Company’s  army,  which  had  at  first  been  felt  by 
some,  had  been  completely  overcome  by  his  wonderful  personality. 
Each  man  in  the  force,  from  the  General  in  command  to  the  last- joined 
private  soldier,  recognized  that  the  man  whom  the  wild  people  on  the 
frontier  had  deified — the  man  of  whom  a little  time  before  Edwardes 
had  said  to  Lord  Canning,  ‘ You  may  rely  upon  this,  that  if  ever  there 
is  a desperate  deed  to  be  done  in  India,  John  Nicholson  is  the  man  to 
do  it  ’ — was  one  who  had  proved  himself  beyond  all  doubt  capable  of 
grappling  with  the  crisis  through  which  we  were  passing — one  to  follow 
to  the  death.  Faith  in  the  Commander  who  had  claimed  and  been 
given  the  post  of  honour  was  unbounded,  and  every  man  was  prepared 
1 to  do  or  die  ’ for  him. 

The  sun  had  risen  high  in  the  heavens,  when  the  breaching  guns 
suddenly  ceased,  and  each  soldier  felt  he  had  but  a brief  moment  in 
which  to  brace  himself  for  the  coming  conflict.  Nicholson  gave  the 
signal.  The  60th  Rifles  with  a loud  cheer  dashed  to  the  front  in 
skirmishing  order,  while  at  the  same  moment  the  heads  of  the  first 
and  second  columns  appeared  from  the  Ivudsiabagh  and  moved  steadily 
towards  the  breaches. 

No  sooner  were  the  front  ranks  seen  by  the  rebels  than  a storm  of 
bullets  met  them  from  every  side,  and  officers  and  men  fell  thick  on 
the  crest  of  the  glacis.  Then,  for  a few  seconds,  amidst  a blaze  of 


126 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

musketry,  the  soldiers  stood  at  the  edge  of  the  ditch,  for  only  one  or 
two  of  the  ladders  had  come  up,  the  rest  having  been  dropped  by  their 
killed  or  wounded  carriers.  Dark  figures  crowded  on  the  breach,  hurl- 
ing stones  upon  our  men  and  daring  them  to  come  on.  More  ladders 
were  brought  up,  they  were  thrown  into  the  ditch,  and  our  men,  leap- 
ing into  it,  raised  them  against  the  escarp  on  the  other  side.  Nicholson, 
at  the  head  of  a part  of  his  column,  was  the  first  to  ascend  the  breach 
in  the  curtain.  The  remainder  of  his  troops  diverged  a little  to  the 
right  to  escalade  the  breach  in  the  Kashmir  bastion.  Here  Lieutenants 
Barter  and  Fitzgerald,  of  the  75th  Foot,  were  the  first  to  mount,  and 
here  the  latter  fell  mortally  wounded.  The  breaches  were  quickly 
filled  with  dead  and  dying,  but  the  rebels  were  hurled  back,  and  the 
ramparts  which  had  so  long  resisted  us  were  our  own. 

The  breach  at  the  Water  bastion  was  carried  by  No.  2 column.  No 
sooner  was  its  head  seen  emerging  from  the  cover  of  the  old  Custom- 
house than  it  was  met  by  a terrible  discharge  of  musketry.  Both  the 
Engineer  officers  (Greathed  and  Hovenden)  who  were  leading  it  fell 
severely  wounded,  and  of  the  thirty-nine  men  who  carried  the  ladders 
twenty-nine  were  killed  or  wounded  in  as  many  seconds.  The  ladders 
were  immediately  seized  by  their  comrades,  who,  after  one  or  two  vain 
attempts,  succeeded  in  placing  them  against  the  escarp.  Then,  amidst 
a shower  of  stones  and  bullets,  the  soldiers  ascended,  rushed  the  breach, 
and,  slaying  all  before  them,  drove  the  rebels  from  the  walls. 

No.  3 column  had  in  the  meanwhile  advanced  towards  the  Kashmir 
gate  and  halted.  Lieutenants  Home  and  Salkeld,  with  eight  Sappers 
and  Miners  and  a bugler  of  the  52nd  Foot,  went  forward  to  blow  the 
gate  open.  The  enemy  were  apparently  so  astounded  at  the  audacity 
of  this  proceeding  that  for  a minute  or  two  they  offered  but  slight 
resistance.  They  soon,  however,  discovered  how  small  the  party  was 
and  the  object  for  which  it  had  come,  and  forthwith  opened  a deadly 
fire  upon  the  gallant  little  band  from  the  top  of  the  gateway,  from  the 
city  wall,  and  through  the  open  wicket. 

The  bridge  over  the  ditch  in  front  of  the  gateway  had  been  destroyed, 
and  it  was  with  some  difficulty  that  the  single  beam  which  remained 
could  be  crossed.  Home  with  the  men  carrying  the  powder-bags  got 
over  first.  As  the  bags  were  being  attached  to  the  gate,  Sergeant 
Carmichael  was  killed  and  Havildar  Madhoo  wounded ; the  rest  then 
slipped  into  the  ditch  to  allow  the  firing  party  which  had  come  up 
under  Salkeld  to  carry  out  its  share  of  the  duty. 

While  endeavouring  to  fire  the  charge,  Salkeld,  being  shot  through 
the  leg  and  arm,  handed  the  slow-match  to  Corporal  Burgess,  who  fell 
mortally  wounded,  but  not  until  he  had  successfully  performed  his  task. 

As  soon  as  the  explosion  had  taken  place,  Bugler  Hawthorne  sounded 
the  regimental  call  of  the  52nd.  Meeting  with  no  response,  he  sounded 
twice  again.  The  noise  of  firing  and  shouting  was  so  great  that  neither 


THE  SCENE  AT  THE  KASHMIR  GATE 


127 


1857] 

the  sound  of  the  bugle  nor  that  of  the  explosion  reached  the  column, 
but  Campbell,  after  allowing  the  firing  party  what  he  thought  was 
sufficient  time,  gave  the  order  to  advance.  Captain  Crosse,  of  the  52nd, 
was  the  first  to  reach  the  gate,  followed  closely  by  Corporal  Taylor  of 
his  own  company,  and  Captain  Synge  of  the  same  regiment,  who  was 
Campbell’s  Brigade-Major.  In  single  file  along  the  narrow  plank  they 
crossed  the  ditch  in  which  lay  the  shattered  remnant  of  the  gallant  little 
band ; they  crept  through  the  wicket,  which  was  the  only  part  blown 
in,  and  found  the  interior  of  the  gateway  blocked  by  an  lH-pounder 
gun,  under  which  were  lying  the  scorched  bodies  of  two  or  three  sepoys, 
who  had  evidently  been  killed  by  the  explosion.  The  rest  of  the  column 
followed  as  rapidly  as  the  precarious  crossing  would  admit,  and  when 
Campbell  got  inside  he  found  himself  face  to  face  with  both  Nicholson's 
and  Jones’s  columns,  which,  after  mounting  the  three  breaches,  poured 
in  a mingled  crowd  into  the  open  space  between  the  Kashmir  gate  and 
the  church. 

No.  4 column  advanced  from  the  Sabzi  Mandi  towards  Kisenganj 
and  Paharipur.  Reid,  the  commander,  was  unfortunately  wounded 
early  in  the  day.  Several  other  officers  were  either  killed  or  wounded, 
and  for  a little  time  a certain  amount  of  confusion  existed  owing  to 
some  misconception  as  to  whether  the  command  of  the  column  should 
be  exercised  by  the  senior  officer  with  the  regular  troops,  or  by  the 
political  officer  with  the  Kashmir  Contingent.  The  fighting  was  very 
severe.  The  enemy  were  in  great  numbers,  and  strongly  posted  on  the 
banks  of  the  canal — indeed,  at  one  time  there  appeared  to  be  a likeli- 
hood of  their  breaking  into  our  weakly-guarded  camp  or  turning  the 
flank  of  our  storming  parties.  The  guns  at  Hindu  Rao’s  house,  how- 
ever, prevented  such  a catastrophe  by  pouring  shrapnel  into  the  ranks 
of  the  rebels  ; and  just  at  the  critical  moment  Hope  Grant  brought  up 
the  Cavalry  brigade,  which  had  been  covering  the  assaulting  columns. 
The  Horse  Artillery  dashed  to  the  front  and  opened  fire  upon  the 
enemy.  From  the  gardens  and  houses  of  Kisenganj,  only  two  or  three 
hundred  yards  off,  the  mutineers  poured  a deadly  fire  of  musketry  on 
our  men,  and  from  the  bastion  near  the  Lahore  gate  showers  of  grape 
caused  serious  losses  amongst  them.  Owing  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground  the  Cavalry  could  not  charge.  Had  they  retired  the  guns  would 
have  been  captured,  and  had  the  guns  been  withdrawn  the  position 
would  have  been  lost.  For  two  hours  the  troopers  drawn  up  in  battle 
array  sat  motionless,  while  their  ranks  were  being  cruelly  raked.  Not 
a man  wavered.  Hope  Grant  and  four  of  his  staff  had  their  horses 
killed  under  them  ; two  of  them  were  wounded,  and  Hope  Grant  him- 
self was  hit  by  a spent  shot.  In  Tombs’s  troop  of  Horse  Artillery 
alone,  25  men  out  of  50  were  wounded,  and  17  horses  either  killed  or 
wounded.  The  9th  Lancers  had  38  casualties  amongst  the  men,  and 
lost  71  horses.  ‘ Nothing  daunted,’  wrote  Hope  Grant,  ‘ those  gallant 


9 


128 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  JN  INDIA 


[1857 

soldiers  held  their  trying  position  with  patient  endurance  ; and  on  my 
praising  them  for  their  good  behaviour,  they  declared  their  readiness  to 
stand  the  fire  as  long  as  I chose.  The  behaviour  of  the  Native  Cavalry,’ 
he  added,  ‘was  also  admirable.  Nothing  could  be  steadier;  nothing 
could  be  more  soldierlike  than  their  bearing.’ 

The  bold  front  shown  by  the  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry  enabled 
No.  4 column  to  retire  in  an  orderly  manner  behind  Hindu  Rao’s  house, 
and  also  assisted  the  Kashmir  Contingent  in  its  retreat  from  the  Idgah, 
where  it  was  defeated  with  the  loss  of  four  guns.  The  repulse  of  this 
column  added  considerably  to  our  difficulties  by  freeing  many  hundreds 
to  take  part  in  the  fight  which  was  being  fiercely  carried  on  within  the 
city. 

Meanwhile  the  three  assaulting  columns  had  made  good  their  lodg- 
ment on  the  walls.  The  guns  in  the  Kashmir  and  Water  bastions  had 
been  turned  so  as  to  allow  of  their  being  used  against  the  foe,  and  pre- 
parations were  made  for  the  next  move. 

Nicholson’s  orders  were  to  push  his  way  to  the  Ajrnir  gate,  by  the 
road  running  inside  the  city  wall,  and  to  clear  the  ramparts  and  bastions 
as  he  went.  Jones  was  to  make  for  the  Kabul  gate,  and  Campbell  for 
the  Jama  Masjid. 

These  three  columns  reformed  inside  the  Kashmir  gate,  from  which 
point  the  first  and  second  practically  became  one.  Nicholson,  being 
accidentally  separated  from  his  own  column  for  a short  time,  pushed 
on  with  Campbell’s  past  the  church,  in  the  direction  of  the  Jama 
Masjid,  while  the  amalgamated  column  under  Jones’s  leadership  took 
the  rampart  route  past  the  Kabul  gate  (on  the  top  of  which  Jones  had 
planted  a British  flag),  capturing  as  they  advanced  all  the  guns  they 
found  on  the  ramparts,  and  receiving  no  check  until  the  Burn  bastion 
was  reached  by  some  of  the  more  adventurous  spirits.  Here  the  enemy, 
taking  heart  at  seeing  but  a small  number  of  opponents,  made  a stand. 
They  brought  up  a gun,  and,  occupying  all  the  buildings  on  the  south 
side  of  the  rampart  with  Infantry,  they  poured  forth  such  a heavy  fire 
that  a retirement  to  the  Kabul  gate  had  to  be  effected. 

It  was  at  this  point  that  Nicholson  rejoined  his  own  column.  His 
haughty  spirit  could  not  brook  the  idea  of  a retirement ; however  slight 
the  check  might  be,  he  knew  that  it  would  restore  to  the  rebels  the 
confidence  of  which  our  hitherto  successful  advance  had  deprived  them, 
and,  believing  that  there  was  nothing  that  brave  men  could  not  achieve, 
he  determined  to  make  a fresh  attempt  to  seize  the  Burn  bastion. 

The  lane  which  was  again  to  be  traversed  was  about  200  yards  long, 
with  the  city  wall  and  rampart  on  the  right,  and  on  the  left  flat-roofed 
houses  with  parapets,  affording  convenient  shelter  for  the  enemy’s 
sharp-shooters. 

As  the  troops  advanced  up  this  lane  the  mutineers  opened  upon  them 
a heavy  and  destructive  fire.  Again  and  again  they  were  checked,  and 


HlCHOLSON  WOUNDEb 


129 


»&57] 

again  and  again  they  reformed  and  advanced.  It  was  in  this  lane  that 
Major  Jacob,  the  gallant  Commander  of  the  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers,  fell, 
mortally  wounded.  His  men  wanted  to  carry  him  to  ihe  rear,  but  he 
would  not  allow  them  to  remain  behind  for  him,  and  refused  their  help, 
urging  them  to  press  forward  against  the  foe.  The  officers,  leading  far 
ahead  of  their  men,  were  shot  down  one  after  the  other,  and  the  men, 
seeing  them  fall,  began  to  waver.  Nicholson,  on  this,  sprang  forward, 
and  called  upon  the  soldiers  to  follow  him.  He  was  instantly  shot 
through  the  chest. 

A second  retirement  to  the  Kabul  gate  was  now  inevitable,  and 
there  all  that  was  left  of  the  first  and  second  columns  remained  for 
the  night. 

Campbell’s  column,  guided  by  Sir  Theophilus  Metcalfe,  who  from  his 
intimate  acquaintance  with  the  city  as  Magistrate  and  Collector  of 
Delhi  was  able  to  conduct  it  by  the  route  least  exposed  to  the  enemy’s 
fire,  forced  its  way  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Jama  Masjid,  where  it 
remained  for  half  an  hour,  hoping  that  the  other  columns  would  come 
to  its  assistance.  They,  however,  as  has  been  shown,  had  more  than 
enough  to  do  elsewhere,  and  Campbell  (who  was  wounded),  seeing  no 
chance  of  being  reinforced,  and  having  no  Artillery  or  powder-bags  with 
which  to  blow  in  the  gates  of  the  Jama  Masjid,  fell  back  leisurely  and 
in  order  on  the  church,  where  he  touched  what  was  left  of  the  Reserve 
column,  which  had  gradually  been  broken  up  to  meet  the  demands  of 
the  assaulting  force,  until  the  4tli  Punjab  Infantry  alone  remained  to 
represent  it. 

While  what  I have  just  described  was  taking  place,  I myself  was 
with  General  Wilson.  Edwin  Johnson  and  I,  being  no  longer  required 
with  the  breaching  batteries,  had  been  ordered  to  return  to  our  staff 
duties,  and  we  accordingly  joined  the  General  at  Ludlow  Castle,  where 
he  arrived  shortly  before  the  assaulting  columns  moved  from  the  cover 
of  the  Kudsiabagh. 

Wilson  watched  the  assault  from  the  top  of  the  house,  and  when  he 
was  satisfied  that  it  had  proved  successful,  he  rode  through  the  Kash- 
mir gate  to  the  church,  where  he  remained  for  the  rest  of  the  day. 

He  was  ill  and  tired  out,  and  as  the  day  wore  on  and  he  received 
discouraging  reports,  he  became  more  and  more  anxious  and  depressed. 
He  heard  of  Reid’s  failure,  and  of  Reid  himself  having  been  severely 
wounded;  then  came  the  disastrous  news  that  Nicholson  had  fallen, 
and  a report  (happily  false)  that  Hope  Grant  and  Tombs  were  both 
killed.  All  this  greatly  agitated  and  distressed  the  General,  until  at 
last  he  began  seriously  to  consider  the  advisability  of  leaving  the  city 
and  falling  back  on  the  Ridge. 

I was  ordered  to  go  and  find  out  the  truth  of  these  reports,  and  to 
ascertain  exactly  what  had  happened  to  No.  4 column  aud  the  Cavalry 
on  our  right. 


9—2 


130 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


t«857 

Just  after  starting  on  my  errand,  while  riding  through  the  Kashmir 
gate,  I observed  by  the  side  of  the  road  a doolie,  without  bearers,  and 
with  evidently  a wounded  man  inside.  I dismounted  to  see  if  I could 
be  of  any  use  to  the  occupant,  when  I found,  to  my  grief  and  conster- 
nation, that  it  was  John  Nicholson,  with  death  written  on  his  face.  He 
told  me  that  the  bearers  had  put  the  doolie  down  and  gone  off  to 
plunder ; that  he  was  in  great  pain,  and  wished  to  be  taken  to  the 
hospital.  He  was  lying  on  his  back,  no  wound  was  visible,  and  but  for 
the  pallor  of  his  face,  always  colourless,  there  was  no  sign  of  the  agony 
he  must  have  been  enduring.  On  my  expressing  a hope  that  he  was 
not  seriously  wounded,  he  said : ‘ I am  dying ; there  is  no  chance  for 
me.’  The  sight  of  that  great  man  lying  helpless  and  on  the  point  of 
death  was  almost  more  than  I could  bear.  Other  men  had  daily  died 
around  me,  friends  and  comrades  had  been  killed  beside  me,  but  I never 
felt  as  I felt  then — to  lose  Nicholson  seemed  to  me  at  that  moment  to 
lose  everything. 

I searched  about  for  the  doolie-bearers,  who,  with  other  camp- 
followers,  were  busy  ransacking  the  houses  and  shops  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood, and  carrying  off  everything  of  the  slightest  value  they  could 
lay  their  hands  on.  Having  with  difficulty  collected  four  men,  I put 
them  in  charge  of  a sergeant  of  the  61st  Foot.  Taking  down  his  name, 
I told  him  who  the  wounded  officer  was,  and  ordered  him  to  go  direct 
to  the  field  hospital. 

That  was  the  last  I saw  of  Nicholson.  I found  time  to  ride  several 
times  to  the  hospital  to  inquire  after  him,  but  I was  never  allowed  to 
see  him  again. 

Continuing  my  ride,  I soon  came  up  with  Hope  Grant’s  brigade.  It 
had  shortly  before  been  relieved  from  its  perilous  and  unpleasant 
position  as  a target  for  the  enemy  by  the  timely  arrival  of  the  Guides 
Infantry  and  a detachment  of  the  Baluch  battalion.  I was  rejoiced  to 
find  Tombs  alive  and  unhurt,  and  from  him  and  other  officers  of  my 
regiment  I learnt  the  tremendous  peppering  they  had  undergone. 
Ilodson  was  also  there  with  his  newly-raised  regiment,  some  officers 
of  the  9th  Lancers,  and  Dighton  Probyn,  Watson,  and  Younghusband, 
of  the  Punjab  Cavalry.  Probyn  was  in  great  spirits,  having  fallen 
temporarily  into  the  command  of  his  squadron,  owing  to  Charles 
Nicholson  (John  Nicholson’s  younger  brother)  having  been  selected  to 
take  Coke’s  place  with  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry.  Probyn  retained 
his  command  throughout  the  campaign,  for  Charles  Nicholson  was 
wounded  that  very  morning  while  gallantly  leading  his  regiment. 
His  right  arm  was  being  amputated  when  his  heroic  brother  was 
carried  mortally  wounded  into  the  same  hospital,  and  laid  on  the  bed 
next  to  him. 

It  seemed  so  important  to  acquaint  the  General  without  delay  that 
Hope  Grant  and  Tombs  were  both  alive,  that  the  Cavalry  had  been 


WILSON  WAVERS 


i8S7] 


131 


relieved  from  theu  exposed  position,  and  that  there  was  no  need  for 
further  anxiety  aboui  Reid's  column,  that  I galloped  back  to  the  church 
as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  news  I was  able  to  give  for  the  moment  somewhat  cheered  the 
General,  but  did  not  altogether  dispel  his  gloomy  forebodings ; and  the 
failure  of  Campbell’s  column  (which  just  at  that  juncture  returned  to 
the  church),  the  hopelessness  of  Nicholson’s  condition,  and,  above  all, 
the  heavy  list  of  casualties  he  received  later,  appeared  to  crush  all 
spirit  and  energy  out  of  him.  His  dejection  increased,  and  lie  became 
more  than  ever  convinced  that  his  wisest  course  was  to  withdraw  from 
the  city.  He  would,  I think,  have  carried  out  this  fatal  measure,  not- 
withstanding that  every  officer  on  his  staff  was  utterly  opposed  to  any 
retrograde  movement,  had  it  not  been  his  good  fortune  to  have  beside 
him  a man  sufficiently  bold  and  resolute  to  stimulate  his  flagging 
energies.  Baird  Smith’s  indomitable  courage  and  determined  perse- 
verance were  never  more  conspicuous  than  at  that  critical  moment, 
when,  though  suffering  intense  pain  from  his  wound,  and  weakened  by 
a wasting  disease,  he  refused  to  be  put  upon  the  sick-list ; and  on 
Wilson  appealing  to  him  for  advice  as  to  whether  he  should  or  should 
not  hold  on  to  the  position  we  had  gained,  the  short  but  decisive  answer, 
‘ We  must  hold  on,’  was  given  in  such  a determined  and  uncompro- 
mising tone  that  it  put  an  end  to  all  discussion. 

Neville  Chamberlain  gave  similar  advice.  Although  still  suffering 
from  his  wound,  and  only  able  to  move  about  with  difficulty,  he  had 
taken  up  his  position  at  Hindu  Rao’s  house,  from  which  he  exercised, 
as  far  as  his  physical  condition  would  allow,  a general  supervision  and 
control  over  the  events  that  took  place  on  the  right  of  the  Ridge.  He 
was  accompanied  by  Daly  and  a very  distinguished  Native  officer  of 
the  Guides,  named  Khan  Sing  Rosa,  both  of  whom,  like  Chamberlain, 
were  incapacitated  by  wounds  from  active  duty.  From  the  top  of 
Hindu  Rao’s  house  Chamberlain  observed  the  first  successes  of  the 
columns,  and  their  subsequent  checks  and  retirements,  and  it  was 
while  he  was  there  that  he  received  two  notes  from  General  Wilson. 
In  the  first,  written  after  the  failure  of  the  attacks  on  the  Jama  Masjid 
and  the  Lahore  gate,  the  General  asked  for  the  return  of  the  Baluch 
battalion,  which,  at  Chamberlain’s  request,  had  been  sent  to  reinforce 
Reid’s  column,  and  in  it  he  expressed  the  hope  that  ‘ we  shall  be  able 
to  hold  what  we  have  got.’  In  the  second  note,  written  at  four  o’clock 
in  the  afternoon,  the  General  asked  whether  Chamberlain  ‘ could  do 
anything  from  Hindu  Rao’s  house  to  assist,’  adding,  ‘ our  numbers  are 
frightfully  reduced,  and  we  have  lost  so  many  senior  officers  that  the 
men  are  not  under  proper  control ; indeed,  I doubt  if  they  could  be 
got  to  do  anything  dashing.  I want  your  advice.  If  the  Hindu 
Rao’s  piquet  cannot  be  moved,  I do  not  think  we  shall  be  strong 
enough  to  take  the  city.’  Chamberlain  understood  General  Wilson’s 


132 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


ti857 

second  note  to  imply  that  he  contemplated  withdrawing  the  troops 
from  the  city,  and  he  framed  his  reply  accordingly.  In  it  he  urged 
the  necessity  for  holding  on  to  the  last ; he  pointed  out  the  advantages 
already  gamed,  and  the  demoralization  thereby  inflicted  upon  the 
enemy.  The  dying  Nicholson  advocated  the  same  course  with  almost 
his  latest  breath.  So  angry  and  excited  was  he  when  he  was  told  of 
the  General’s  suggestion  to  retire,  that  he  exclaimed,  1 Thank  God  I 
have  strength  yet  to  shoot  him,  if  necessary.’  There  was  no  resisting 
such  a consensus  of  responsible  and  reliable  opinion,  and  Wilson  gave 
up  all  idea  of  retreating. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  Norman,  Johnson,  and  I,  at  the 
General’s  desire  and  for  his  information,  visited  every  position  occupied 
by  our  troops  within  the  city  walls.  In  some  places  there  was  great 
confusion  —men  without  their  officers,  and  officers  without  their  men — 
all  without  instructions,  and  not  knowing  what  was  going  on  in  their 
immediate  neighbourhood,  the  inevitable  result  of  the  rapid  advance 
We  did  what  we  could  to  remedy  matters,  and  were  able  to  report  to 
Wilson  that  our  troops  were  holding  the  wall  from  the  Water  bastion 
to  the  Kabul  gate  in  sufficient  strength.  But  this  was  all  the  comfort 
we  could  give  him.  The  fact  is,  too  much  had  been  attempted  on  that 
eventful  morning.  We  should  have  been  satisfied  with  gaining  pos- 
session of  the  Kashmir  and  Water  bastions,  and  getting  a lodgment 
within  the  city  walls.  This  was  as  much  as  three  such  weak  columns 
should  have  tried,  or  been  asked  to  accomplish.  No  one  who  was 
present  on  that  occasion,  and  experienced  the  difficulty,  indeed  im- 
possibility, of  keeping  soldiers  in  hand  while  engaged  in  fighting  along 
narrow  streets  and  tortuous  lanes,  would  ever  again  attempt  what  was 
expected  of  the  assaulting  columns. 

While  engaged  in  this  duty  we  (Norman,  Johnson  and  I)  were 
attacked  by  a party  of  the  enemy  who  had  been  hiding  in  considerable 
numbers  in  a side-lane  watching  for  a chance.  A fight  ensued ; we 
had  only  a small  guard  with  us,  but,  fortunately,  the  firing  was  heard 
by  the  men  of  a near  piquet,  some  of  whom  came  to  our  help.  With 
their  assistance  we  drove  off  the  sepoys,  but  in  the  scrimmage  my  poor 
mare  was  shot.  She  was  a very  useful  animal,  and  her  death  was  a 
great  loss  to  me  at  the  time. 

At  sunset  on  the  14th  of  September  only  a very  small  portion  of  the 
walls  of  Delhi  was  in  our  possession.  The  densely-populated  city  re- 
mained to  be  conquered.  The  magazine,  the  palace,  and  the  Fort  of 
Selimgarh,  all  strongly  fortified,  were  still  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
The  narrow  strip  of  ground  we  had  gained  had  been  won  at  severe  loss- 
Three  out  of  the  four  officers  who  commanded  the  assaulting  columns 
had  been  disabled,  and  66  officers  and  1,104  men  had  been  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  night  of  the  14th  was  spent  by  the  General  and  staff  in 


‘CHEER,  130 YS,  CHEER!' 


33 


i8S7] 

‘ Skinner's  house,’*  close  to  the  church.  Rest  was  badly  needed,  for 
almost  everyone  in  the  force,  officers  and  men  alike,  had  been  hard  at 
work,  night  and  day,  for  a week.  That  night,  luckily,  we  were  allowed 
to  be  at  peace,  for  whether  it  was  that  the  rebels  were  as  tired  as  we 
were,  or  that  they  were  busy  making  preparations  for  further  resistance, 
they  did  not  disturb  us ; and  when  day  broke  we  were  all  refreshed 
and  ready  to  continue  the  struggle.  At  one  time,  indeed,  early  in  the 
evening,  the  enemy  appeared  from  their  movements  to  be  preparing  to 
attack  us,  but  just  at  that  moment  the  band  of  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry 
struck  up  ‘ Cheer,  Boys,  Cheer !’  upon  which  the  men  of  the  regiment 
did  cheer,  most  lustily,  and  other  regiments  caught  up  and  continued 
the  inspiriting  hurrahs,  which  apparently  had  the  effect  of  disconcerting 
the  mutineers  and  keeping  them  quiet. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

On  the  morning  of  the  loth  the  situation  was  reviewed,  and  prepara- 
tions made  for  the  conquest  of  the  city.  Order  was  restored  amongst 
the  troops,  who,  as  I have  shown,  had  become  somewhat  demoralized 
by  the  street  fighting.  Regiments  and  brigades  were  got  together ; 
raids  were  made  on  all  the  store  shops  within  reach,  and  every  bottle 
of  beer  and  spirits  was  broken,  f Some  of  the  liquor  would  doubtless 
have  been  of  great  use  in  the  hospitals,  but  there  was  no  means  of  re- 
moving it,  and  the  General  wisely  determined  that  it  was  best  to  put 
temptation  out  of  the  men’s  way.  Guns  and  mortars  were  placed  into 

* The  house  belonged  to  the  Skinner  family,  and  was  originally  built  by 
James  Skinner,  a Eurasian,  who  served  the  Moghul  Emperor  with  great  dis- 
tinction towards  the  end  of  the  last  century.  When  Lord  Lake  broke  up  that 
Mahomedan  Prince’s  power,  Skinner  entered  the  service  of  the  East  India 
Company  and  rose  to  the  rank  of  Major.  He  was  also  a C.B.  He  raised  the 
famous  Skinner’s  Horse,  now  the  1st  Bengal  Cavalry.  His  father  was  an 
officer  in  one  of  His  Majesty’s  regiments  of  Foot,  and  after  one  of  Lord  Clive’s 
battles  married  a Rajput  lady  of  good  family,  who  with  her  father  and  mother 
had  been  taken  prisoners.  Skinner  himself  married  a Mahomedan,  so  that 
he  had  an  interest  in  the  three  religions,  Christian,  Hindu,  and  Mahomedan, 
aud  on  one  occasion,  when  left  on  the  ground  severely  wounded,  he  made  a 
vow  that  if  his  life  were  spared  he  would  build  three  places  of  worship — a 
church,  a temple,  and  a mosque.  He  fulfilled  his  vow,  and  a few  years  later 
he  built  the  church  at  Delhi,  and  the  temple  and  mosque  which  are  in  close 
proximity  to  it.  (See  Note  at  end  of  volume.) 

t A report  was  circulated  that  a large  number  of  our  men  had  fallen  into 
the  trap  laid  for  them  by  the  Native  shopkeepers,  and  were  disgracefully 
drunk.  I heard  that  a few  men,  overcome  by  heat  and  hard  work,  had  given 
way  to  temptation,  but  I did  not  see  a single  drunken  man  throughout  the 
day  of  the  assault,  although,  as  I have  related,  I visited  every  position  held 
by  our  troops  within  the  walls  of  the  city. 


134 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

position  for  shelling  the  city  and  palace,  and  a few  houses  near,  where 
the  enemy’s  sharpshooters  had  established  themselves,  were  seized  and 
occupied.  We  soon,  however,  gave  up  attacking  such  positions,  for  we 
found  that  street  fighting  could  not  be  continued  without  the  loss  of 
more  men  than  we  had  to  spare,  and  that  the  wisest  plan  would  be  to 
keep  the  soldiers  under  cover  as  much  as  possible  while  we  sapped 
from  house  to  house.  A battery  commanding  Selimgarh  and  part  of 
the  palace  was  constructed  in  the  college  gardens,  and  a breach  was 
made  in  the  wall  of  the  magazine,  which  was  captured  the  next  morn- 
ing with  but  slight  loss. 

On  the  16th,  and  again  on  the  18th,  Chamberlain  took  command  of 
the  troops  inside  the  city  while  the  General  rested  for  a few  hours. 
He  was,  as  he  expressed  himself  in  a note  to  Chamberlain,  ‘ completely 
done.’ 

The  enemy  now  began  to  draw  in  their  line.  The  suburbs  were 
evacuated,  and  riding  through  the  Sabzi  Mandi,  Kisenganj  and 
Paharipur,  we  gazed  with  wonder  at  the  size  and  strength  of  the  works 
raised  against  us  by  the  mutineers,  in  attacking  which  we  had  ex- 
perienced such  heavy  loss  during  the  early  days  of  the  siege,  and  from 
which  No.  4 column  had  been  obliged  to  retire  on  the  day  of  the  assault. 

The  smaller  the  position  that  had  to  be  defended,  the  greater  became 
the  numbers  concentrated  in  our  immediate  front,  and  every  inch  of 
our  way  through  the  city  was  stoutly  disputed  ; but  the  advance, 
though  slow,  was  steady,  and  considering  the  numbers  of  the  insurgents, 
and  the  use  they  made  at  close  quarters  of  their  Field  Artillery,  our 
casualties  were  fewer  than  could  have  been  expected. 

I had  been  placed  under  the  orders  of  Taylor,  Baird-Smith’s  inde- 
fatigable Lieutenant,  who  directed  the  advance  towards  the  Lahore 
gate.  We  worked  through  houses,  courtyards,  and  lanes,  until  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  19th  we  found  ourselves  in  rear  of  the  Burn  bastion, 
the  attempt  to  take  which  on  the  14th  had  cost  the  life  of  the  gallant 
Nicholson  and  so  many  other  brave  men.  We  had  with  us  fifty 
European  and  fifty  Native  soldiers,  the  senior  officer  of  the  party  being 
Captain  Gordon,  of  the  75th  Foot.  A single  door  separated  us  from 
the  lane  which  led  to  the  Burn  bastion.  Lang,  of  the  Engineers,  burst 
this  door  open,  and  out  dashed  the  party.  Rushing  across  the  lane 
and  up  the  ramp,  the  guard  was  completely  surprised,  and  the  bastion 
was  seized  without  our  losing  a man. 

Early  the  next  day  wo  were  still  sapping  our  way  towards  tho 
Lahore  gate,  when  we  suddenly  found  ourselves  in  a courtyard  in  which 
were  huddled  together  some  forty  or  fifty  banias,*  who  were  evidently 
as  much  in  terror  of  the  sepoys  as  they  were  of  us.  The  men  of  our 
party  nearly  made  an  end  of  these  unfortunates  before  their  officers 


Sellers  of  grain  and  lenders  of  money. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  LAHORE  GATE 


135 


>857] 

could  interfere,  for  to  the  troops  (Native  and  European  alike)  every 
man  inside  the  walls  of  Delhi  was  looked  upon  as  a rebel,  worthy  of 
death.  These  people,  however,  were  unarmed,  and  it  did  not  require  a 
very  practised  eye  to  see  that  they  were  inoffensive.  We  thought, 
however,  that  a good  fright  would  do  them  no  harm,  and  might 
possibly  help  us,  so  for  a time  we  allowed  them  to  believe  that  they 
were  looked  upon  as  traitors,  but  eventually  told  them  their  lives 
would  be  spared  if  they  would  take  us  in  safety  to  some  place  from 
which  we  might  observe  how  the  Lahore  gate  was  guarded.  After 
considerable  hesitation  and  consultation  amongst  themselves  they 
agreed  to  two  of  their  party  guiding  Lang  and  me,  while  the  rest  re- 
mained as  hostages,  with  the  understanding  that,  if  we  did  not  return 
within  a given  time,  they  would  be  shot. 

Our  trembling  guides  conducted  us  through  houses,  across  court- 
yards, and  along  secluded  alleys,  without  our  meeting  a living  creature, 
until  we  found  ourselves  in  an  upper  room  of  a house  looking  out  on 
the  Chandni  Chauk,*  and  within  fifty  yards  of  the  Lahore  gate. 

From  the  window  of  this  room  we  could  see  beneath  us  the  sepoys 
lounging  about,  engaged  in  cleaning  their  muskets  and  other  occupa- 
tions, while  some,  in  a lazy  sort  of  fashion,  were  acting  as  sentries 
over  the  gateway  and  two  guns,  one  of  which  pointed  in  the  direction 
of  the  Sabzi  Mandi,  the  other  down  the  lane  behind  the  ramparts 
leading  to  the  Burn  bastion  and  Kabul  gate.  I could  see  from  the 
number  on  their  caps  that  these  sepoys  belonged  to  the  5th  Native 
Infantry. 

Having  satisfied  ourselves  of  the  feasibility  of  taking  the  Lahore 
gate  in  rear,  we  retraced  our  steps. 

The  two  banias  behaved  well  throughout,  but  were  in  such  a terrible 
fright  of  anything  happening  to  us  that  they  would  not  allow  us  to 
leave  the  shelter  of  one  house  until  they  had  carefully  reconnoitred  the 
way  to  the  next,  and  made  sure  that  it  was  clear  of  the  enemy.  This 
occasioned  so  much  delay  that  our  friends  had  almost  given  us  up,  and 
were  on  the  point  of  requiring  the  hostages  to  pay  the  penalty  for  the 
supposed  treachery  of  our  guides,  when  we  reappeared  on  the  scene. 

We  then  discussed  our  next  move,  and  it  was  decided  to  repeat  the 
manoeuvre  which  had  been  so  successful  at  the  Bum  bastion.  The 
troops  were  brought  by  the  route  we  had  just  traversed,  and  drawn  up 
behind  a gateway  next  to  the  house  in  which  we  had  been  concealed. 
The  gate  was  burst  open,  and  rushing  into  the  street,  we  captured  the 
guns,  and  killed  or  put  to  flight  the  sepoys  whom  we  had  watched 
from  our  upper  chamber  a short  time  before,  without  losing  a man 
ourselves. 

This  was  a great  achievement,  for  we  were  now  in  possession  of  the 

* ‘ Silver  Bazaar,  ’ the  main  street  of  Delhi,  in  which  were,  and  still  are, 
situated  all  the  principal  jewellers’  and  cloth-merchants’  shops. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


136 


[1857 


main  entranoe  to  Delhi,  and  the  street  of  the  city  leading  direct  from 
the  Lahore  gate  to  the  palace  and  Jama  Masjid.  We  proceeded  up 
this  street,  at  first  cautiously,  but  on  finding  it  absolutely  empty,  and 
the  houses  on  either  side  abandoned,  we  pushed  on  until  we  reached 
the  Delhi  Bank.  Here  there  was  firing  going  on,  and  round  shot 
flying  about  from  a couple  of  guns  placed  just  outside  the  palace.  But 
this  was  evidently  an  expiring  effort.  The  great  Mahomedan  mosque 
had  just  been  occupied  by  a column  under  the  command  of  Major 
James  Brind;  while  Ensign  McQueen,*  of  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry, 
with  one  of  his  own  men  had  pluckily  reconnoitred  up  to  the  chief 
gateway  of  the  palace,  and  reported  that  there  were  but  few  men  left 
in  the  Moghul  fort. 

The  honour  of  storming  this  last  stronghold  was  appropriately 
reserved  for  the  60th  Rifles,  the  regiment  which  had  been  the  first  to 
engage  the  enemy  on  the  banks  of  the  Hindun,  nearly  four  months 
before,  and  which  throughout  the  siege  had  so  greatly  distinguished 
itself. 

Home,  of  the  Engineers,  the  hero  of  the  Kashmir  gate  exploit,  first 
advanced  with  some  Sappers  and  blew  in  the  outer  gate.  At  this,  the 
last  struggle  for  the  capture  of  Delhi,  I wished  to  be  present,  so 
attached  myself  for  the  occasion  to  a party  of  the  60th  Rifles,  under 
the  command  of  Ensign  Alfred  Heathcote.  As  soon  as  the  smoke  of 
the  explosion  cleared  away,  the  60th,  supported  by  the  4th  Punjab 
Infantry,  sprang  through  the  gateway ; but  we  did  not  get  far,  for 
there  was  a second  door  beyond,  chained  and  barred,  which  was  with 
difficulty  forced  open,  when  the  whole  party  rushed  in.  The  recesses 
in  the  long  passage  which  led  to  the  palace  buildings  were  crowded 
with  wounded  men,  but  there  was  very  little  opposition,  for  only  a few 
fanatics  still  held  out.  One  of  these — a Mahomedan  sepoy  in  the 
uniform  of  a Grenadier  of  the  37th  Native  Infantry —stood  quietly 
about  thirty  yards  up  the  passage  with  his  musket  on  his  hip.  As  we 
approached  he  slowly  raised  his  weapon  and  fired,  sending  the  bullet 
through  McQueen’s  helmet.  The  brave  fellow  then  advanced  at  the 
charge,  and  was,  of  course,  shot  down.  So  ended  the  20th  September, 
a day  I am  never  likely  to  forget. 

At  sunrise  on  the  21st  a royal  salute  proclaimed  that  we  were  again 
masters  in  Delhi,  and  that  for  the  second  time  in  the  century  the  great 
city  had  been  captured  by  a British  force. 

Later  in  the  day  General  Wilson  established  his  Head-Quarters  in 
the  Dewan-i-khas  (the  King’s  private  hall  of  audience),  and,  as  was  in 
accordance  with  the  fitness  of  things,  the  60th  Rifles  and  the  Sirmur 
battalion  of  Gurkhasf  were  the  first  troops  of  Her  Majesty’s  army  to 

* Now  Lieutenant-General  Sir  John  McQueen,  K.C.B. 

t The  Gurkhas  became  such  friends  with  the  men  of  the  1st  Battalion 
60th  Rifles  during  the  siege — the  admiration  of  brave  men  for  brave  men  — 


857]  HODSON  CAPTURES  THE  KING  OF  DELHI 


1.37 


garrison  the  palace  of  the  Moghuls,  in  which  the  traitorous  and 
treacherous  massacre  of  English  men,  women  and  children  had  been 
perpetrated. 

The  importance  of  securing  the  principal  members  of  the  Royal 
Family  was  pressed  upon  the  General  by  Chamberlain  and  Hodson, 
who  both  urged  that  the  victory  would  be  incomplete  if  the  King  and 
his  male  relatives  were  allowed  to  remain  at  large.  Wilson  would  not 
consent  to  any  force  being  sent  after  them,  and  it  was  with  considerable 
reluctance  that  he  agreed  to  Hodson  going  on  this  hazardous  duty  with 
some  of  his  own  men  only.  The  last  of  the  Moghul  Emperors  had 
taken  refuge  in  Humayun’s  tomb,  about  seven  miles  from  Delhi, 
where,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st,  he  surrendered  to  Hodson  on 
receiving  a promise  from  that  officer  that  his  own  life  and  the  lives  of 
his  favourite  wife  and  her  son  should  be  spared.  Hodson  brought 
them  all  into  Delhi  and  placed  them  under  a European  guard  in  a 
house  in  the  Chandni  Chauk,  thus  adding  one  more  to  the  many 
valuable  services  he  had  rendered  throughout  the  siege. 

I went  with  many  others  the  next  day  to  see  the  King ; the  old  man 
looked  most  wretched,  and  as  he  evidently  disliked  intensely  being 
stared  at  by  Europeans,  I quickly  took  my  departure.  On  my  way 
back  I was  rather  startled  to  see  the  three  lifeless  bodies  of  the  King’s 
two  sons  and  grandson  lying  exposed  on  the  stone  platform  in  front  of 
the  Kotwali.  On  enquiry  I learnt  that  Hodson  had  gone  a second 
time  to  Humayun’s  tomb  that  morning  with  the  object  of  capturing 
these  Princes,  and  on  the  way  back  to  Delhi  had  shot  them  with  his 
own  hand — an  act  which,  whether  necessary  or  not,  has  undoubtedly 
cast  a blot  on  his  reputation.  His  own  explanation  of  the  circum- 
stance was  that  he  feared  they  would  be  rescued  by  the  mob,  who 
could  easily  have  overpowered  his  small  escort  of  100  sowars,  and  it 
certainly  would  have  been  a misfortune  had  these  men  escaped.  At 
the  time  a thirst  for  revenge  on  account  of  the  atrocities  committed 
within  the  walls  of  Delhi  was  so  great  that  the  shooting  of  the  Princes 
seemed  to  the  excited  feelings  of  the  army  but  an  act  of  justice ; and 
there  were  some  men,  whose  opinions  were  entitled  to  the  greatest 
respect,  who  considered  the  safety  of  the  British  force  would  have 
been  endangered  by  the  escape  of  the  representatives  of  the  house  of 
Tairnur,  and  that  for  this  reason  Hodson’s  act  was  justified. 

My  own  feeling  on  the  subject  is  one  of  sorrow  that  such  a brilliant 
soldier  should  have  laid  himself  open  to  so  much  adverse  criticism. 
Moreover,  I do  not  think  that,  under  any  circumstances,  he  should 
have  done  the  deed  himself,  or  ordered  it  to  be  done  in  that  summary 

that  they  made  a special  request  to  be  allowed  to  wear  the  same  uniform  as 
their  ‘brothers’  in  the  Rifles.  This  was  acceded  to,  and  the  2nd  Gurkhas 
are  very  proud  of  the  little  red  line  on  their  lacings. 


138  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

manner,  unless  there  had  been  evident  signs  of  an  attempt  at  a 
rescue. 

But  it  must  be  understood  that  there  was  no  breach  of  faith  on 
Hodson’s  part,  for  he  steadily  refused  to  give  any  promise  to  the 
Princes  that  their  lives  should  be  spared ; he  did,  however,  un- 
doubtedly by  this  act  give  colour  to  the  accusations  of  blood-thirstiness 
which  his  detractors  were  not  slow  to  make. 

The  news  that  we  had  occupied  the  palace,  and  were  in  complete 
possession  of  the  city  of  Delhi,  consoled  Nicholson  on  his  deathbed. 
From  the  first  there  was  little  hope  that  this  valuable  life  could  be 
saved.  He  was  taken  into  hospital  in  a fainting  condition  from 
internal  hemorrhage,  and  he  endured  excruciating  agony ; but,  wrote 
General  Chamberlain,  ‘ throughout  those  nine  days  of  suffering  he 
bore  himself  nobly ; not  a lament  or  sigh  ever  passed  his  lips.’  His 
every  thought  was  given  to  his  country,  and  to  the  last  he  materially 
aided  the  military  authorities  by  his  clear-sighted,  sound,  and  reliable 
advice.  His  intellect  remained  unclouded  to  the  end.  With  liis  latest 
breath  he  sent  messages  of  tender  farewell  to  his  mother,  hoping  she 
would  be  patient  under  his  loss,  and  to  his  oldest  and  dearest  friend, 
Herbert  Edwardes.  After  his  death  some  frontier  Chiefs  and  Native 
officers  of  the  Multani  Horse  were  permitted  to  see  him,  and  I was 
told  that  it  was  touching  beyond  expression  to  see  these  strong  men 
shed  tears  as  they  looked  on  all  that  was  left  of  the  leader  they  so 
loved  and  honoured. 

Thus  ended  the  great  siege  of  Delhi,  and  to  no  one  could  the  tidings 
of  its  fall  have  brought  more  intense  relief  and  satisfaction  than  to  the 
Chief  Commissioner  of  the  Punjab.  Although  in  the  first  instance  Sir 
John  Lawrence  certainly  under-estimated  the  strength  of  the  Delhi 
defences  and  the  difficulties  with  which  General  Anson  had  to  contend, 
he  fully  realized  them  later,  and  even  at  the  risk  of  imperilling  the 
safety  of  his  own  province  by  denuding  it  of  troops,  he  provided  the 
means  for  the  capture  of  the  rebel  stronghold,  and  consequently  tho 
army  of  Delhi  felt  they  owed  him  a deep  debt  of  gratitude. 

Like  Norman  when  writing  his  narrative  of  the  siege,  I feel  I cannot 
conclude  my  brief  account  of  it  without  paying  my  small  tribute  of 
praise  and  admiration  to  the  troops  who  bore  themselves  so  nobly  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end.  Their  behaviour  throughout  was  beyond  all 
praise,  their  constancy  was  unwearied,  their  gallantry  most  con- 
spicuous; in  thirty- two  different  fights  they  were  victorious  over  long 
odds,  being  often  exposed  to  an  enemy  ten  tunes  their  number,  who, 
moreover,  had  the  advantage  of  ground  and  superior  Artillery ; they 
fought  and  worked  as  if  each  one  felt  that  on  his  individual  exertions 
alone  depended  the  issue  of  tho  day ; they  willingly,  nay,  cheerfully, 
endured  such  trials  os  few  armies  have  ever  been  exposed  to  for  so 


>857] 


GALLANTRY  OF  THE  TROOPS 


>39 


long  a time.  For  three  months,  day  after  day,  and  for  the  greater 
part  of  the  day,  every  man  had  to  be  constantly  under  arms,  exposed 
to  a scorching  Indian  sun,  which  was  almost  as  destructive  as,  and 
much  harder  to  bear  than,  the  enemy’s  never-ceasing  fire.  They  saw 
their  comrades  struck  down  by  cholera,  sunstroke,  and  dysentery, 
more  dispiriting  a thousand  times  than  the  daily  casualties  in  action. 
They  beheld  their  enemies  reinforced  while  their  own  numbers  rapidly 
decreased.  Yet  they  never  lost  heart,  and  at  last,  when  it  became 
evident  that  no  hope  of  further  reinforcements  could  be  entertained, 
and  that  if  Delhi  were  to  be  taken  at  all  it  must  be  taken  at  once,  they 
advanced  to  the  assault  with  as  high  a courage  and  as  complete  a 
confidence  in  the  result,  as  if  they  were  attacking  in  the  first  flush  and 
exultation  of  troops  at  the  commencement  of  a campaign,  instead  of 
being  the  remnant  of  a force  worn  out,  by  twelve  long  weeks  of 
privation  and  suffering,  by  hope  deferred  (which  truly  ‘rnaketh  the 
heart  sick  ’),  and  by  weary  waiting  for  the  help  which  never  came. 
Batteries  were  thrown  up  within  easy  range  of  the  walls,  than  which 
a more  heroic  piece  of  work  was  never  performed ; and  finally,  these 
gallant  few,  of  whom  England  should  in  very  truth  be  everlastingly 
proud,  stormed  in  the  face  of  day  a strong  fortress  defended  by 

30.000  desperate  men,  provided  with  everything  necessary  to  defy 
assault. 

The  list  of  killed  and  wounded  bears  witness  to  the  gallantry  of  all 
arms  of  the  service.  The  effective  force  at  Delhi  never  amounted  to 

10.000  men.  Of  these  992  were  killed  and  2,845  wounded,  besides 
hundreds  who  died  of  disease  and  exposure.  Where  all  behaved  nobly, 
it  is  difficult  to  particularize ; but  it  will  not,  I hope,  be  considered 
invidious  if  I specially  draw  my  readers’  attention  to  the  four  corps 
most  constantly  engaged  : the  60th  Rifles,  the  Sirmur  battalion  of 
Gurkhas,  the  Guides,  and  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry.  Placed  in  the  very 
front  of  the  position,  they  were  incessantly  under  fire,  and  their  losses 
in  action  testify  to  the  nature  of  the  service  they  performed.  The 
60th  Rifles  left  Meerut  with  440  of  all  ranks ; a few  days  before  the 
assault  they  received  a reinforcement  of  nearly  200,  making  a total  of 
640 ; their  casualties  were  389.  The  Sirmur  battalion  began  with 
450  men,  and  were  joined  by  a draft  of  90,  making  a total  of  540  ; their 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  amounted  to  319.  The  strength  of  the 
Guides  when  they  joined  was  550  Cavalry  and  Infantry,  and  their 
casualties  were  303.  The  1st  Punjab  Infantry  arrived  in  Delhi  with 
3 British  officers  and  664  Natives  of  all  ranks.  Two  of  the  British 
officers  were  killed,  and  the  third  severely  wounded,  and  of  the 
Natives,  8 officers*  and  200  men  were  killed  and  wounded  ; while  out 

* Amongst  the  Native  officers  killed  was  Subadar  Ruttun  Sing,  who  fell 
mortally  wounded  in  the  glacis.  He  was  a Patiala  Sikh,  and  had  been 
invalided  from  the  service.  As  the  1st  Punjab  Infantry  neared  Delni,  Major 


140 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


ti8$7 

of  the  British  officers  attached  to  the  regiment  during  the  siege  1 was 
killed  and  4 wounded.  Further,  it  is  a great  pleasure  to  me  to  dwell 
on  the  splendid  service  done  by  the  Artillery  and  Engineers.  The 
former,  out  of  their  small  number,  had  365  killed  or  disabled,  and  the 
latter  two-thirds  of  their  officers  and  293  of  their  men.  I cannot  more 
appropriately  conclude  this  chapter  than  by  quoting  the  words  of  Lord 
Canning,  who,  as  Governor-General  of  India,  wrote  as  follows  in  giving 
publication  to  the  Delhi  despatches : ‘ In  the  name  of  outraged 
humanity,  in  memory  of  innocent  blood  ruthlessly  shed,  and  in  acknow- 
ledgment of  the  first  signal  vengeance  inflicted  on  the  foulest  treason, 
the  Governor- General  in  Council  records  his  gratitude  to  Major-General 
Wilson  and  the  brave  army  of  Delhi.  He  does  so  in  the  sure  conviction 
that  a like  tribute  awaits  them,  not  in  England  only,  but  wherever 
within  the  limits  of  civilization  the  news  of  their  well  earned  triumph 
shall  reach.’ 


CHAPTER  XX. 

The  fall  of  Delhi  was  loudly  proclaimed,  and  the  glad  tidings  spread 
like  wildfire  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  India,  bringing 
intense  relief  to  Europeans  everywhere,  but  more  especially  to  those 
in  the  Punjab,  who  felt  that  far  too  great  a strain  was  being  put  upon 
the  loyalty  of  the  people,  and  that  failure  at  Delhi  would  probably 
mean  a rising  of  the  Sikhs  and  Punjabis.  Salutes  were  fired  in  honour 


Coke  saw  the  old  man  standing  in  the  road  with  two  swords  on.  He  begged 
to  be  taken  back  into  the  service,  and  when  Coke  demurred  he  said  : ‘ What ! 
my  old  corps  going  to  fight  at  Delhi  without  me  ! I hope  you  will  let  me 
lead  my  old  Sikh  company  into  action  again.  I will  break  these  two  swords 
in  your  cause.’  Coke  acceded  to  the  old  man’s  wish,  and  throughout  the 
siege  of  Delhi  he  displayed  the  most  splendid  courage.  At  the  great  attack 
on  the  1 Sammy  House  ’ on  the  1st  and  2nd  August,  when  Lieutenant  Travers 
of  his  regiment  was  killed,  Ruttun  Sing,  amidst  a shower  of  bullets,  jumped 
on  to  the  parapet  and  shouted  to  the  enemy,  who  were  storming  the  piquet : 
1 If  any  man  wants  to  fight,  let  him  come  here,  and  not  stand  firing  like  a 
coward  ! I am  Ruttun  Sing,  of  Patiala.’  He  then  sprang  down  among  the 
enemy,  followed  by  the  men  of  his  company,  and  drove  them  off  with 
heavy  loss. 

On  the  morning  of  the  assault  the  regiment  had  marched  down  to  the 
rendezvous  at  Ludlow  Castle,  ‘left  in  front.’  While  waiting  for  the  Artillery 
to  fire  a few  final  rounds  at  the  breaches,  the  men  sat  down,  and,  falling  in 
again,  wore  doing  so  ‘right  in  front.’  Ruttun  Sing  came  up  to  Lieutenant 
Charles  Nicholson,  who  was  commanding  the  regiment,  and  said  : ‘ We  ought 
to  fall  in  “ left  in  front,”  ’ thereby  making  his  own  company  the  leading  one 
in  the  assault.  In  a few  minutes  more  Ruttun  Sing  was  mortally  wounded, 
and  Dal  Sing,  the  Jemadar  of  his  company,  a man  of  as  great  courage  as 
Ruttun  Sing,  but  not  of  the  same  excitable  nature,  was  killed  outright. 


A Plan  to  illustrate  the 

SIEGE  OF  DELHI 

1857- 


Signs  and  Abbreviations. 


Ga  rat  ni 

Motqucs  

TtMph  1 

Breach  in  the  Kashmir  Bastion 
Breach  in  the  Water  Bastion 
Spot  where  Nicholson  fell 


A. 

0 

(U. 


Walker  O'  // 


9L. 


d 

h 


NECESSITY  FOE  FURTHER  ACTION 


Ml 


1857] 

of  the  victory  at  all  the  principal  stations,  but  the  Native  population  of 
the  Punjab  could  not  at  first  be  made  to  believe  that  the  Moghul 
capital,  with  its  hordes  of  defenders,  could  have  been  captured  by  the 
small  English  army  they  saw  marching  through  their  province  a few 
months  before.  Even  at  that  time  it  seemed  all  too  small  for  the  task 
before  it,  and  since  then  they  knew  it  had  dwindled  down  to  less  than 
half  its  numbers.  It  was  not,  indeed,  until  they  had  ocular  demonstra- 
tion of  our  success,  in  the  shape  of  the  loot  which  some  of  the  Native 
followers  belonging  to  the  besieging  force  took  back  to  their  homes, 
that  they  became  convinced  of  the  reality  of  our  victory. 

Sir  John  Lawrence  being  painfull y alive  to  the  weakness  of  our 
position  in  the  Punjab,  as  compared  to  the  great  strength  of  the  Sikhs, 
on  hearing  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Delhi,  begged  General  Wilson 
to  send  back  at  once  a British  regiment  as  a practical  proof  that  our 
triumph  was  complete,  and  that  he  no  longer  needed  so  many  troops. 
But  though  the  city  was  in  our  possession,  a great  deal  remained  to  be 
done  before  a single  soldier  could  be  spared.  Above  all  things,  it  was 
necessary  to  open  up  communication  with  Cawnpore  and  Lucknow,  in 
order  to  ascertain  exactly  the  state  of  affairs  in  that  part  of  the  country. 
We  had  heard  of  the  failure  of  Havelock’s  attempts  to  reach  Lucknow, 
and  of  his  having  been  obliged  in  the  end  to  retire  to  Cawnpore  and 
wait  for  reinforcements,  but  we  had  not  been  able  to  learn  whether 
such  reinforcements  had  reached  him,  or  how  long  the  beleaguered 
garrison  of  Lucknow  was  likely  to  hold  out. 

No  time  was  wasted  at  Delhi.  On  the  21st  September,  the  very  day 
after  the  palace  was  occupied,  it  was  decided  to  despatch  a column  to 
Cawnpore ; but,  on  account  of  the  weakened  condition  of  the  whole 
force,  there  was  considerable  difficulty  in  detailing  the  troops  for  its 
composition.  The  total  strength  of  the  corps*  eventually  selected 
amounted  to  750  British  and  1,900  Native  soldiers,  with  sixteen  field- 
guns. 

No  officer  of  note  or  high  rank  being  available,  the  command  of  t) 
column  should  have  been  given  to  the  senior  regimental  officer  serving 

* Two  troops  of  Horse  Artillery,  with  four  guns  and  one  howitzer  eaci  , 
commanded  respectively  by  Captains  Remmington  and  Blunt.  One  Fie'  1 
Battery,  with  six  guns,  commanded  by  Captain  Bourchier.  One  Britisn 
Cavalry  regiment,  the  9th  Lancers,  reduced  to  300  men,  commanded  by  Major 
Ouvry.  Two  British  Infantry  regiments  (the  8th  and  75th  Foot),  commanded 
respectively  by  Major  Hinde  and  Captain  Gordon,  which  could  only  number 
between  them  450  men.  Detachments  of  three  Punjab  Cavalry  regiments, 
the  1st,  2nd  and  5th,  commanded  by  Lieutenants  John  Watson,  Dighton 
Probyn  and  George  Younghusband,  numbering  in  all  320  men.  A detach- 
ment of  Hodson’s  Horse,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Hugh  Gough,  and  con- 
sisting of  180  men.  Two  Punjab  Infantry  regiments,  commanded  by  Captains 
Green  and  Wilde,  each  about  600  men  ; and  200  Sappers  and  Miners,  with 
whom  were  Lieutenants  Home  and  Lang. 


142 


FORTY. ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 


with  it,  viz.,  Colonel  Hope  Grant,  of  the  9th  Lancers ; but  for  some 
unexplained  motive  Lieutenant-Colonel  Greathed,  of  the  8th  Foot,  was 
chosen  by  General  Wilson.  Captain  Bannatyne,  of  the  same  regiment, 
was  appointed  his  Brigade-Major,  and  I was  sent  with  the  column  as 
Deputy  Assistant  Quartermaster- General.  On  the  fall  of  Delhi  the 
whole  of  the  Head-Quarters  staff  returned  to  Simla,  except  Henry 
Norman,  whose  soldierly  instincts  made  him  prefer  accompanying  the 
column,  in  order  that  he  might  be  ready  to  join  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  the 
newly-appointed  Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  shortly  before  arrived 
in  India. 

Nicholson’s  funeral  was  taking  place  as  we  marched  out  of  Delhi,  at 
daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  24th  September.  It  was  a matter  of 
regret  to  me  that  I was  unable  to  pay  a last  tribute  of  respect  to  my 
loved  and  honoured  friend  and  Commander  by  following  his  body  to 
the  grave,  but  I could  not  leave  the  column.  That  march  through 
Delhi  in  the  early  morning  light  was  a gruesome  proceeding.  Our  way 
from  the  Lahore  gate  by  the  Chandni  Chauk  led  through  a veritable  city 
of  the  dead ; not  a sound  was  to  be  heard  but  the  falling  of  our  own 
footsteps ; not  a living  creature  was  to  be  seen.  Dead  bodies  were 
strewn  about  in  all  directions,  in  every  attitude  that  the  death-struggle 
had  caused  them  to  assume,  and  in  every  stage  of  decomposition.  We 
marched  in  silence,  or  involuntarily  spoke  in  whispers,  as  though  fear- 
ing to  disturb  those  ghastly  remains  of  humanity.  The  sights  we 
encountered  were  horrible  and  sickening  to  the  last  degree.  Here  a 
dog  gnawed  at  an  uncovered  limb ; there  a vulture,  disturbed  by  our 
approach  from  its  loathsome  meal,  but  too  completely  gorged  to  fly, 
fluttered  away  to  a safer  distance.  In  many  instances  the  positions  of 
the  bodies  were  appallingly  life-like.  Some  lay  with  their  arms  up- 
lifted as  if  beckoning,  and,  indeed,  the  whole  scene  was  weird  and 
terrible  beyond  description.  Our  horses  seemed  to  feel  the  horror  of  it 
as  much  as  we  did,  for  they  shook  and  snorted  in  evident  terror.  The 
atmosphere  was  unimaginably  disgusting,  laden  as  it  was  with  the 
most  noxious  and  sickening  odours. 

It  is  impossible  to  describe  the  joy  of  breathing  the  pure  air  of  the 
open  country  after  such  a horrible  experience  ; but  we  had  not  escaped 
untainted.  That  night  we  had  several  cases  of  cholera,  one  of  the 
victims  being  Captain  Wilde,  the  Commandant  of  the  4th  Punjab 
Infantry.  He  was  sent  back  to  Delhi  in  a hopeless  condition,  it  was 
thought,  but  he  recovered,  and  did  excellent  work  at  the  head  of  his 
fine  regiment  during  the  latter  part  of  the  campaign. 

After  a march  of  eleven  miles  we  reached  Ghazi-uddinnagar,  to  find 
the  place  deserted.  We  halted  the  next  day.  The  baggage  animals 
were  out  of  condition  after  their  long  rest  at  Delhi ; and  it  was  neces- 
sary to  overhaul  their  loads  and  get  rid  of  the  superfluous  kit  and 
plunder  which  the  followers  had  brought  away  with  them.  We  were 


18571 


ACTION  AT  BULANDSHAHR 


1 43 


accompanied  on  our  march  by  a few  enterprising  civilians,  who  had 
found  their  way  into  Delhi  the  day  after  we  took  possession  of  the 
palace.  Amongst  them  was  Alfred  Lyall,*  a schoolfellow  of  mine  at 
Eton.  He  was  on  his  way  to  tako  up  the  appointment  of  Assistant- 
Magistrate  at  Bulandshahr,  where  he  was  located  when  the  Mutiny 
broke  out.  As  we  rode  along  he  gave  me  a most  interesting  little 
history  of  his  personal  experiences  during  the  early  days  of  May,  from 
the  time  when  the  first  symptoms  of  the  coming  storm  were  felt,  until 
that  when  the  surrounding  country  rose  en  masse,  and  he  and  those 
with  him  had  to  seek  shelter  at  Meerut.  I should  like  to  repeat  his 
story  for  the  benefit  of  my  readers,  but  I refrain,  as  it  would  lose  so 
much  by  my  telling  ; and  I hope  that  some  day  Sir  Alfred  Lyall  may 
be  induced  to  tell  his  own  story  in  the  picturesque  and  attractive 
language  which  is  so  well  known  and  so  much  appreciated  by  the 
reading  public. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  Norman,  Lyall,  and  I,  marching 
with  Watson’s  Cavalry,  two  or  three  miles  in  advance  of  the  column, 
arrived  at  cross-roads,  one  leading  to  Bulandshahr,  the  other  to  Mala- 
garh,  a fort  belonging  to  a Mahomedan  of  the  name  of  Walidad  Khan, 
who,  when  the  British  rule  was  in  abeyance,  assumed  authority  over 
the  district  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor  of  Delhi.  We  halted,  and, 
having  put  out  our  piquets,  lay  down  and  waited  for  the  dawn.  From 
information  obtained  by  the  civil  officers  with  the  column,  we  sus- 
pected that  large  numbers  of  mutineers  were  collected  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood. 

We  were  not  left  long  in  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of  our  surmisings, 
for  we  were  soon  rudely  awakened  by  the  rattle  of  shots  exchanged 
between  our  vedettes  and  those  of  the  enemy.  Information  was  sent 
back  at  once  to  the  advance  guard  and  to  our  Commander,  while  we 
set  to  work  to  ascertain  the  enemy’s  exact  position  ; this  proved  to  be 
at  Bulandshahr,  and  we  were  within  a couple  of  miles  of  the  main 
body. 

As  we  advanced  the  rebel  Cavalry  fell  back,  and  when  we  got  under 
fire  of  their  guns,  our  Horse  Artillery  came  into  action ; our  Infantry 
coming  up,  found  the  enemy  occupying  an  extremely  strong  position, 
in  the  gaol  and  a walled  serai  at  the  entrance  to  the  town,  their  left 
being  covered  by  the  enclosed  gardens  and  ruined  houses  of  the  deserted 
civil  station,  within  which  they  were  collected  in  considerable  force. 
From  these  points  they  were  driven  by  the  75th  Foot,  who,  in  a most 
dashing  manner,  captured  two  9-pounder  guns,  while  a third  was  taken 
by  the  Cavalry.  The  rebels  then  began  to  retreat,  and  were  followed 
up  by  a small  body  of  Cavalry,  under  Drysdale,f  of  the  9th  Lancers, 

* Afterwards  Sir  Alfred  Lyall,  G.C.I.E.,  K.C.B.,  Lieutenant-Governor  of 
the  North-West  Provinces,  and  now  a member  of  the  Indian  Council. 

t Now  General  Sir  William  Drysdale  K.C.B. 


10 


144 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

with  whom  were  Sarel,  of  the  same  regiment,  Augustus  Anson  of  the 
84th  Foot,  and  myself.  We  soon  became  entangled  in  narrow  streets, 
but  at  last  found  ourselves  in  a gateway  leading  out  of  the  town,  which 
was  crowded  with  bullock-carts,  flying  townspeople,  and  a number  of 
the  enemy,  some  on  horseback,  some  on  foot.  There  we  had  hard 
fighting ; Sarel  was  wounded  in  the  act  of  running  a sepoy  through 
the  body,  the  forefinger  of  his  right  hand  being  taken  off  by  a bullet, 
which  then  passed  through  his  left  arm ; Anson  was  surrounded  by 
mutineers,  and  performed  prodigies  of  valour,  for  which  he  was 
rewarded  with  the  Victoria  Cross.  I was  riding  a Waziri  horse,  which 
had  belonged  to  John  Nicholson,  and  as  it  had  been  a great  favourite 
of  his,  I had  commissioned  a friend  to  buy  him  for  me  at  the  sale  of 
Nicholson’s  effects.  He  was  naturally  impetuous,  and,  being  now 
greatly  excited  by  the  firing  and  confusion,  plunged  about  a good  deal. 
He  certainly  was  not  a comfortable  mount  on  that  day,  but  all  the 
same  he  saved  my  fife.  In  the  midst  of  the  melee  I observed  a sepoy 
taking  deliberate  aim  at  me,  and  tried  to  get  at  him,  but  the  crowd 
between  him  and  me  prevented  my  reaching  him.  He  fired;  my 
frightened  animal  reared,  and  received  in  his  head  the  bullet  which  was 
intended  for  me.* 

The  work  fell  chiefly  on  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery.  Major 
Ouvry,  who  commanded  them,  must  have  been  a proud  man  that  day, 
for  they  behaved  splendidly.  Two  of  Blunt’s  guns  also,  under  an  old 
Addiscombe  friend  of  mine  named  Cracklow,  did  excellent  service.  The 
9th  Lancers,  under  Drysdale,  performed  wonders ; and  the  three 
squadrons  of  Punjab  Cavalry,  under  their  gallant  young  leaders, 
Probyn,  Watson,  and  Younghusband,  and  the  squadron  of  Hodson's 
Horse,  under  Hugh  Gough,  showed  of  what  good  stuff  they  were  made. 
Our  casualties  were  6 men  killed,  6 officers  and  35  men  wounded.  The 
enemy’s  loss  was  300.  A large  quantity  of  ammunition  and  baggage 
fell  into  our  hands,  including  many  articles  plundered  from  European 
men  and  women. 

After  the  fight  was  over,  the  column  passed  through  the  town,  and 
our  camp  was  pitched  about  a mile  beyond,  on  the  banks  of  the  Kali 
Naddi.  The  same  afternoon  Malagarh  was  reconnoitred,  but  was 
found  to  be  deserted,  a satisfactory  result  of  the  morning's  action,  for 
the  fort,  if  defended,  would  have  given  us  some  trouble  to  take. 
Walidad  Khan  evidently  hoped  to  become  a power  in  the  district,  for 
he  had  begun  to  make  gun-carriages,  and  we  found  roughly-cast  guns 
on  the  lathes  ready  for  boring  out.  It  was  decided  that  Malagarh 
Fort,  which  was  full  of  articles  of  every  description  taken  from  the 
English  residents,  should  be  destroyed.  Its  demolition,  however,  took 

* The  horse,  although  badly  hurt,  was  not  killed,  and  eventually  did  me 
good  service. 


LIEUTENANT  HOME'S  DEATH 


145 


1857] 

some  time  to  effect,  and  as  we  could  not  move  till  transport  came 
from  Meerut  to  convey  our  wounded  officers  and  men  back  to  that 
place,  the  column  halted  at  Bulandshahr  for  four  days. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  October  the  fort  was  blown  up,  and  most 
unfortunately,  while  superintending  the  operation,  Lieutenant  Home 
was  killed.*  The  mine  had  been  laid  and  the  slow-match  lighted,  but 
the  explosion  not  following  as  quickly  as  was  expected,  Home  thought 
the  match  must  have  gone  out,  and  went  forward  again  to  relight  it. 
At  that  moment  the  mine  blew  up.  His  death  was  greatly  felt  in 
camp,  happening  as  it  did  when  all  the  excitement  of  battle  was  over. 

We  left  Bulandshahr,  and  said  good-bye  to  Lyall  on  the  3rd  October, 
feeling  that  he  was  being  placed  in  a position  of  considerable  risk, 
thrown  as  he  was  on  his  own  resources,  with  general  instructions  to 
re-establish  the  authority  of  the  British  Government.  He  was  not, 
however,  molested,  and  after  two  or  three  days  he  was  joined  by  a 
small  body  of  troops  from  Meerut.  During  the  months  that  followed 
he  and  his  escort  had  several  alarms  and  some  smart  skirmishes ; for 
Rohilkand,  a large  tract  of  country  to  the  east  of  Bulandshahr,  was 
held  by  the  rebels  until  the  following  spring,  and  Lyall’s  district  was 
constantly  traversed  by  bodies  of  mutinous  sepoys. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  we  reached  Khurja,  a fair-sized 
Mahomedan  town,  from  which  some  of  our  Cavalry  soldiers  were 
recruited.  The  first  thing  that  met  our  eyes  on  arrival  at  this  place 
was  a skeleton,  ostentatiously  placed  against  the  side  of  a bridge  leading 
to  the  encamping-ground ; it  was  headless,  and  the  bones  were  hacked 
and  broken.  It  was  pronounced  by  more  than  one  doctor  to  be  the 
skeleton  of  a European  woman.  This  sight  maddened  the  soldiery, 
who  demanded  vengeance,  and  at  one  time  it  seemed  that  the  town  of 
Khurja  would  have  to  pay  the  penalty  for  the  supposed  crime.  The 
whole  force  was  greatly  excited.  At  length  calmer  counsels  prevailed. 
The  people  of  the  town  protested  their  innocence,  and  expressed  their 
anxiety  to  be  our  humble  servants ; they  were,  as  a whole,  given  the 
benefit  of  the  doubt,  but  some  soldiers  found  in  the  town,  belonging  to 
regiments  which  had  mutinied,  were  tried,  and  hanged  or  acquitted 
according  to  the  evidence  given. 

Some  excitement  was  caused  on  reaching  camp  by  the  appearance  of 
a fakir  seated  under  a tree  close  to  where  our  tents  were  pitched.  The 
man  was  evidently  under  a vow  of  silence,  which  Hindu  devotees  often 
make  as  a penance  for  sin,  or  to  earn  a title  to  more  than  a fair  share 
of  happiness  in  a future  life.  On  our  addressing  him,  the  fakir  pointed 
to  a small  wooden  platter,  making  signs  for  us  to  examine  it.  The 
platter  had  been  quite  recently  used  for  mixing  food  in,  and  at  first 

* This  was  the  Engineer  officer  who  had  such  a miraculous  escape  when  he 
blew  in  the  Kashmir  gate  at  Delhi,  for  which  act  of  gallantry  he  had  been 
promised  the  Victoria  Cross. 


10-2 


146 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 


there  seemed  to  be  nothing  unusual  about  it.  On  closer  inspection, 
however,  we  discovered  that  a detachable  square  of  wood  had  been  let 
in  at  the  bottom,  on  removing  which  a hollow  became  visible,  and  in  it 
lay  a small  folded  paper,  that  proved  to  be  a note  from  General  Have- 
lock, written  in  the  Greek  character,  containing  the  information  that 
he  was  on  his  way  to  the  relief  of  the  Lucknow  garrison,  and  begging 
any  Commander  into  whose  hands  the  communication  might  fall  to 
push  on  as  fast  as  possible  to  his  assistance,  as  he  sorely  needed  rein- 
forcements, having  few  men  and  no  carriage  to  speak  of.  This  decided 
Greathed  to  proceed  with  as  little  delay  as  might  be  to  Cawnpore. 

Just  before  we  left  Bulandshahr,  a spy  reported  to  me  that  an 
English  lady  was  a prisoner  in  a village  some  twenty  miles  off,  and 
that  she  was  anxious  to  be  rescued.  As  on  cross-examination,  how- 
ever, the  story  did  not  appear  to  me  to  be  very  reliable,  I told  the  man 
he  must  bring  me  some  proof  of  the  presence  of  the  lady  in  the  village. 
Accordingly,  on  the  arrival  of  the  column  at  Khurja,  he  appeared  with 
a piece  of  paper  on  which  was  written  * Miss  Martindale.’  This 
necessitated  the  matter  being  inquired  into,  and  I obtained  the 
Brigadier's  permission  to  make  a detour  to  the  village  in  question.  I 
started  off,  accompanied  by  Watson  and  Probyn,  with  their  two 
squadrons  of  Cavalry.  We  timed  our  march  so  as  to  reach  our  desti- 
nation just  before  dawn  ; the  Cavalry  surrounded  the  village,  and  with 
a small  escort  we  three  proceeded  up  the  little  street  to  the  house  where 
the  guide  told  us  the  lady  was  confined.  Not  only  was  the  house 
empty,  but,  with  the  exception  of  a few  sick  and  bedridden  old  people, 
there  was  not  a soul  in  the  village.  There  had  evidently  been  a hasty 
retreat,  which  puzzled  me  greatly,  as  I had  taken  every  precaution  to 
ensure  secrecy,  for  I feared  that  if  our  intention  to  rescue  the  lady 
became  known  she  would  be  carried  off.  As  day  broke  we  searched 
the  surrounding  crops,  and  found  the  villagers  and  some  soldiers  hidden 
amongst  them.  They  one  and  all  denied  that  there  was  the  slightest 
truth  in  the  story,  and  as  it  appeared  a waste  of  time  to  further  prose- 
cute the  fruitless  search,  we  were  on  the  point  of  starting  to  rejoin  our 
camp,  when  there  was  a cry  from  our  troopers  of  ‘ Mem  sahib  hai  !' 
(Here  is  the  lady),  and  presently  an  excessively  dusky  girl  about 
sixteen  years  of  age  appeared,  clad  in  Native  dress.  We  had  some 
difficulty  in  getting  the  young  woman  to  tell  us  what  had  happened  ; 
but  on  assuring  her  that  no  harm  should  be  done  to  those  with  whom 
she  was  living,  she  told  us  that  she  was  the  daughter  of  a clerk  in  the 
Commissioner’s  office  at  Sitapur ; that  all  her  family  had  been  killed 
when  the  rising  took  place  at  that  station,  and  that  she  had  been 
carried  off  by  a sowar  to  his  home.  We  asked  her  if  she  wished  to  come 
away  with  us.  After  some  hesitation  she  declined,  saying  the  sowar 
had  married  her  (after  the  Mahomedan  fashion),  and  was  kind  to  her, 
and  she  had  no  friends  and  relations  to  go  to.  On  asking  her  why  she 


1857] 


FIGHT  AT  ALIGARH 


•47 


had  sent  to  let  us  know  she  was  there,  she  replied  that  she  thought 
she  would  like  to  join  the  British  force,  which  she  heard  was  in  the 
neighbourhood,  but  on  further  reflection  she  had  come  to  the  con- 
clusion it  was  best  for  her  to  remain  where  she  was.  After  talking  to 
her  for  some  time,  and  making  quite  sure  she  was  not  likely  to  change 
her  mind,  we  rode  away,  leaving  her  to  her  sowar,  with  whom  she  was 
apparently  quite  content.*  I need  hardly  say  we  got  unmercifully  chaffed 
on  our  return  to  camp,  when  the  result  of  our  expedition  leaked  out. 

At  Somna,  where  we  halted  for  the  night,  we  heard  that  the 
Mahomedan  insurgents,  the  prisoners  released  from  gaol,  and  the  rebel 
Rajputs  of  the  neighbourhood,  were  prepared  to  resist  our  advance  on 
Aligarh,  and  that  they  expected  to  be  aided  by  a large  number  of 
mutineers  from  Delhi.  We  came  in  sight  of  Aligarh  shortly  before 
daybreak  on  the  5tli  October.  Our  advance  was  stopped  by  a motley 
crowd  drawn  up  before  the  walls,  shouting,  blowing  horns,  beating 
drums,  and  abusing  the  Feringhis  in  the  choicest  Hindustani ; but,  so 
far  as  we  could  see,  there  were  no  sepoys  amongst  them.  The  Horse 
Artillery  coming  up,  these  valiant  defenders  quickly  fled  inside  the  city 
and  closed  the  gates,  leaving  two  guns  in  our  possession.  Thinking  we 
should  be  sure  to  attack  and  take  the  place,  they  rushed  through  it  to 
the  other  side,  and  made  for  the  open  country.  But  we  had  had 
enough  of  street  fighting  at  Delhi.  Our  Cavalry  and  Artillery  were 
divided  into  two  parties,  which  moved  round  the  walls,  one  to  the 
right  and  the  other  to  the  left,  and  united  in  pursuit  of  the  fugitives  at 
the  further  side.  We  followed  them  for  several  miles.  Some  had 
concealed  themselves  in  the  high  crops,  and  were  discovered  by  the 
Cavalry  on  their  return  march  to  camp.  Ouvry  formed  a long  line, 
and  one  by  one  the  rebels,  starting  up  as  the  troopers  rode  through  the 
fields,  were  killed,  while  our  loss  was  trifling. 

The  inhabitants  of  Aligarh  had  apparently  had  a bad  time  of  it 
under  the  rebel  rule,  for  they  expressed  much  joy  at  the  result  of  the 
morning’s  work,  and  were  eager  in  then-  proffers  to  bring  in  supplies 
for  our  troops  and  to  otherwise  help  us 

111  as  we  could  afford  to  weaken  our  column,  it  was  so  nececsary  to 
keep  the  main  line  of  communication  open,  and  put  a stop  to  the  dis- 
order into  which  the  country  had  fallen,  that  it  was  decided  to  leave 
two  companies  of  Punjabis  at  Aligarh,  as  a guard  to  the  young  civilian 
who  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  district. 

Fourteen  miles  from  Aligarh  on  the  road  to  Cawnpore  there  lived 
two  Rajputs,  twin  brothers,  who  had  taken  such  a prominent  part  in 
the  rebellion  that  a price  had  been  put  on  their  heads,  and  for  the 

* A few  years  afterwards  she  communicated  with  the  civil  authorities  of  the 
district,  anil  made  out  such  a pitiful  story  of  ill-treatment  by  her  ilaliomedan 
husband,  that  she  was  sent  to  Calcutta,  where  some  ladies  were  good  enough 
to  look  after  her. 


i48 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


Ci857 

future  peace  of  the  district  it  was  considered  necessary  to  capture  them.  ' 
In  order  to  surprise  them  the  more  completely,  it  was  given  out  that 
the  column  was  to  march  towards  Agra,  from  which  place  disquieting 
news  had  been  received,  while  secret  orders  were  issued  to  proceed 
towards  Cawnpore.  The  Cavalry  went  on  in  advance,  and  while  it  was 
still  dark,  succeeded  in  surrounding  the  village  of  Akrabad,  where  dwelt 
the  brothers.  In  attempting  to  escape  they  were  both  killed,  and  three 
small  guns  were  found  in  their  house  loaded  and  primed,  but  we  had 
arrived  too  suddenly  to  admit  of  their  being  used  against  us.  We  dis- 
covered besides  a quantity  of  articles  which  must  have  belonged  to 
European  ladies — dresses,  books,  photographs,  and  knick-knacks  of 
every  description — which  made  us  feel  that  the  twins  had  richly 
deserved  their  fate. 

We  halted  on  the  7th,  and  on  the  8th  marched  across  country  to 
Bryjgarh  (a  prettily  situated  village  under  a fortified  hill),  our  object 
being  to  get  nearer  to  Agra,  the  reports  from  which  place  had  been 
causing  us  anxiety,  and  likewise  to  put  ourselves  in  a position  to  inter- 
cept the  Rohilkand  mutineers,  who  we  were  told  were  on  their  way  to 
Lucknow. 

No  sooner  had  we  got  to  Bryjgarh  than  we  received  information 
that  the  detachment  we  had  left  behind  at  Aligarh  was  not  likely  to  be 
left  undisturbed,  and  at  the  same  time  an  urgent  call  for  assistance 
came  from  Agra,  where  a combined  attack  by  insurgents  from  Gwalior, 
Mhow,  and  Delhi  was  imminent.  Fifty  of  Hodson’s  Horse,  under  a 
European  officer,  and  a sufficient  number  of  Infantry  to  make  the 
detachment  we  had  left  there  up  to  200,  were  at  once  despatched  to 
Aligarh.  It  was  clear,  too,  that  the  appeal  from  Agra  must  be  re- 
sponded to,  for  it  was  an  important  place,  the  capital  of  the  North- 
West  Provinces  ; the  troops  and  residents  had  been  shut  up  in  the  fort 
for  more  than  three  months,  and  the  letters,  which  followed  each  other 
in  quick  succession,  showed  that  the  authorities  were  considerably 
alarmed.  It  was  felt,  therefore,  that  it  was  imperative  upon  us  to  turn 
our  steps  towards  Agra,  but  it  entailed  our  marching  forty-eight  miles 
out  of  our  way,  and  having  to  give  up  for  the  time  any  idea  of  aiding 
Havelock  in  the  relief  of  Lucknow. 

The  column  marched  at  midnight  on  the  8th  October,  the  Horse 
Artillery  and  Cavalry,  which  I accompanied,  pushing  on  as  fast  as 
possible.  We  had  done  thirty-six  miles,  when  we  were  advised  from 
Agra  that  there  was  no  need  for  so  much  haste,  as  the  enemy,  having 
heard  of  our  approach,  were  retiring ; we  accordingly  halted,  nothing 
loath,  till  the  Infantry  came  up. 

Early  the  next  morning,  the  10th  October,  we  reached  Agra.  Cross- 
ing the  Jumna  by  a bridge  of  boats,  we  passed  under  the  walls  of  the 
picturesque  old  fort  built  by  the  Emperor  Akbar  nearly  300  years 
before. 


149 


1857]  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  AGRA  ADMINISTRATION 

The  European  residents  who  had  been  prisoners  within  the  walls  of 
the  fort  for  so  long  streamed  out  to  meet  and  welcome  us,  overjoyed 
at  being  free  at  last.  We  presented,  I am  afraid,  but  a sorry  appear- 
ance, as  compared  to  the  neatly-dressed  ladies  and  the  spick-and-span 
troops  who  greeted  us,  for  one  of  the  fair  sex  was  overheard  to  remark, 
‘ Was  ever  such  a dirty-looking  lot  seen  ?’  Our  clothes  were,  indeed, 
worn  and  soiled,  and  our  faces  so  bronzed  that  the  white  soldiers  were 
hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  their  Native  comrades. 

Our  questions  as  to  what  had  become  of  the  enemy,  who  we  had 
been  informed  had  disappeared  with  such  unaccountable  celerity  on 
hearing  of  the  advance  of  the  column,  were  answered  by  assurances 
that  there  was  no  need  to  concern  ourselves  about  them,  as  they  had 
fled  across  the  Kari  Naddi,  a river  thirteen  miles  away,  and  were  in 
full  retreat  towards  Gwalior.  It  was  a little  difficult  to  believe  in  the 
complete  dispersion  of  the  formidable  rebel  army,  the  mere  rumoured 
approach  of  which  had  created  such  consternation  in  the  minds  of  the 
Agra  authorities,  and  had  caused  the  many  urgent  messages  imploring 
us  to  push  on. 

Our  doubts,  however,  were  met  with  the  smile  of  superior  knowledge. 
We  were  informed  that  the  rebels  had  found  it  impossible  to  get  their 
guns  across  to  the  Agra  side  of  the  stream,  and  that,  feeling  themselves 
powerless  without  them  to  resist  our  column,  they  had  taken  them- 
selves off  with  the  least  possible  delay.  We  were  asked  with  some 
indignation,  ‘ Had  not  the  whole  country  round  been  scoured  by 
thoroughly  trustworthy  men  without  a trace  of  the  enemy  being  dis- 
covered ?’  And  we  were  assured  that  we  might  take  our  much-needed 
rest  in  perfect  confidence  that  we  were  not  likely  to  be  disturbed.  We 
were  further  told  by  those  who  were  responsible  for  the  local  Intelli- 
gence Department,  and  who  were  repeatedly  questioned,  that  they  had 
no  doubt  whatever  their  information  was  correct,  and  that  there  was 
no  need  to  follow  up  the  enemy  until  our  troops  were  rested  and 
refreshed. 

We  were  then  not  aware  of  what  soon  became  painfully  apparent, 
that  neither  the  information  nor  the  opinions  of  the  heads  of  the  civil 
and  military  administration  at  Agra  were  to  be  relied  upon.  That  admini- 
stration had,  indeed,  completely  collapsed ; there  was  no  controlling 
authority ; the  crisis  had  produced  no  one  in  any  responsible  position 
who  understood  the  nature  of  the  convulsion  through  which  we  were 
passing ; and  endless  discussion  had  resulted  (as  must  always  be  the 
case)  in  fatal  indecision  and  timidity. 

We  could  hardly  have  been  expected  to  know  that  the  government 
of  so  great  a province  was  in  the  hands  of  men  who  were  utterly  unfit 
to  cope  with  the  difficulties  of  an  emergency  such  as  had  now  arisen, 
although  in  quieter  times  they  had  filled  their  positions  "with  credit  to 
themselves  and  advantage  to  the  State. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


153 


[1857 


That  this  was  the  case  can  be  proved  beyond  a doubt,  but  I do  not 
give  it  as  an  excuse  for  our  being  caught  napping  by  the  enemy,  which 
we  certainly  were.  We  ought,  of  course,  to  have  reconnoitred  the  sur- 
rounding country  for  ourselves,  and  posted  our  piquets  as  usual ; and 
we  ought  not  to  have  been  induced  to  neglect  these  essential  military 
precautions  by  the  confident  assertion  of  the  Agra  authorities  that  the 
enemy  were  nowhere  in  our  neighbourhood. 

The  Brigadier  gave  orders  for  our  camp  to  be  pitched  as  soon  as  the 
tents  should  arrive,  but  he  saw  no  necessity  for  posting  piquets  until 
the  evening.  Accordingly,  I marked  out  the  camp  on  the  brigade 
parade-ground,  which  had  been  selected  as  best  suited  for  the  purpose 
— a grassy,  level,  open  spot,  a mile  and  a half  from  the  fort.  On  the 
left  and  rear  were  the  ruined  lines  of  the  two  Native  Infantry  regiments 
which  had  been  disarmed  and  sent  to  their  homes,  and  the  charred 
remains  of  the  British  officers'  houses.  To  the  right  and  front  there 
was  cultivation,  and  the  high  crops,  ahnost  ready  to  be  reaped,  shut  out 
the  view  of  the  country  beyond. 

As  the  tents  and  baggage  could  not  arrive  for  some  time,  I got  leave 
to  go  with  Norman,  Watson,  and  a few  others  to  breakfast  in  the  fort. 
We  had  scarcely  sat  down,  bent  on  enjoying  such  an  unusual  event  as 
a meal  in  ladies’  society,  when  we  were  startled  by  the  report  of  a gun, 
then  another  and  another.  Springing  to  our  feet,  there  was  a general 
exclamation  of,  ‘What  can  it  mean?  Not  the  enemy,  surely  1’  But 
the  enemy  it  was,  as  we  were  soon  convinced  by  our  host,  who,  having 
gone  to  a point  from  which  he  could  get  a view  of  the  surrounding 
country,  came  back  in  hot  haste,  to  tell  us  that  an  action  was  taking 
place. 

We  who  belonged  to  the  column  hurried  down  the  stairs,  jumped  on 
our  horses,  and  galloped  out  of  the  fort  and  along  the  road  in  the 
direction  of  the  firing.  We  had  got  but  half-way  to  camp,  when  we 
were  met  and  almost  borne  down  by  an  enormous  crowd,  consisting  of 
men,  women,  and  children  of  every  shade  of  colour,  animals  and 
baggage  all  mixed  up  in  inextricable  confusion.  On  they  rushed, 
struggling  and  yelling  as  if  pursued  by  demons. 

The  refugees  from  the  fort,  tired  of  their  long  imprisonment,  had 
taken  advantage  of  the  security  which  they  thought  was  assured  by  the 
arrival  of  the  column  to  visit  their  deserted  homes.  Two-thirds  of  the 
150,000  inhabitants  of  tho  city  had  also  flocked  out  to  see  the  troops 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  capture  of  Delhi  (the  report  of  which 
achievement  was  still  universally  disbelieved),  to  watch  our  camp  being 
pitched,  and  to  sec  what  was  going  on  generally.  All  this  varied 
crowd,  in  terror  at  the  first  sound  of  firing,  made  for  the  fort  and  city, 
and  were  mot  in  their  flight  by  the  heavy  baggage  of  the  column  on  its 
way  to  camp.  Instantly,  elephants,  camels,  led  horses,  doolie-bearers 
carrying  the  sick  and  wounded,  bullocks  yoked  to  heavily-laden  carts, 


TAKEN  BY  SURPRISE 


*5» 


IS57] 

all  becoming  panic-stricken,  turned  round  and  joined  in  the  stampede. 
Elephants,  as  terrified  as  their  mahouts,*  shuttled  along,  screaming 
and  trumpeting;  drivers  twisted  the  tails  of  their  long-suffering  bullocks 
with  more  than  usual  energy  and  heartlessness,  in  the  vain  hope  of 
goading  them  into  a gallop ; and  camels  had  their  nostrils  rent  asunder 
by  the  men  in  charge  of  them,  in  their  unsuccessful  endeavours  to  urge 
their  phlegmatic  animals  into  something  faster  than  their  ordinary 
stately  pace. 

Into  this  surging  multitude  wo  rushed,  but  for  a time  our  progress 
was  completely  checked.  Eventually,  however,  by  dint  of  blows, 
threats,  and  shouts,  we  managed  to  force  our  way  through  the  motley 
crowd  and  reach  the  scene  of  action.  What  a sight  was  that  we  came 
upon  ! I seem  to  see  it  now  as  distinctly  as  I did  then.  Independent 
fights  were  going  on  all  over  the  parade-ground.  Here,  a couple  of 
Cavalry  soldiers  were  charging  each  other.  There,  the  game  of  bayonet 
versus  sword  was  being  carried  on  in  real  earnest.  Further  on,  a 
party  of  the  enemy’s  Cavalry  were  attacking  one  of  Blunt’s  guns 
(which  they  succeeded  in  carrying  off  a short  distance).  Just  in  front, 
the  75th  Foot  (many  of  the  men  in  their  shirt-sleeves)  were  forming 
square  to  receive  a body  of  the  rebel  horse.  A little  to  the  left  of  the 
75th,  Kemmington’s  troop  of  Horse  Artillery  and  Bourchier’s  battery 
had  opened  fire  from  the  park  without  waiting  to  put  on  their  accoutre- 
ments, while  the  horses  were  being  hastily  harnessed  by  the  Native 
drivers  and  saices.  Still  further  to  the  left,  the  9th  Lancers  and 
Gough’s  squadron  of  Hodson’s  Horse  were  rapidly  saddling  and  falling 
in.  On  the  right  the  8th  Foot  and  the  2nd  and  4th  Punjab  Infantry 
were  busy  getting  under  arms,  while  beyond,  the  three  squadrons  of 
Punjab  Cavalry,  under  Probyn  and  Younghusband,  were  hurrying  to 
get  on  the  enemy’s  flank. 

Watson  galloped  off  to  take  command  of  the  Punjab  Cavalry,  and 
Norman  and  I rode  in  different  directions  to  search  for  the  Brigadier. 
While  thus  employed,  I was  stopped  by  a dismounted  soivar,  who 
danced  about  in  front  of  me,  waving  his  pagri\  before  the  eyes  of  my 
horse  with  one  hand,  and  brandishing  his  sword  with  the  other.  I 
could  not  get  the  frightened  animal  near  enough  to  use  my  sword,  and 
my  pistol  (a  Deane  and  Adams  revolver),  with  which  I tried  to  shoot 
my  opponent,  refused  to  go  off,  so  I felt  myself  pretty  well  at  his 
mercy,  when,  to  my  relief,  I saw  him  fall,  having  been  run  through 
the  body  by  a man  of  the  9th  Lancers  who  had  come  to  my  rescue. 

Being  unable  to  find  the  Brigadier,  I attached  myself  to  the  next 
senior  officer,  Major  Frank  Turner,  who  commanded  the  Artillery. 
Gradually  the  enemy  were  beaten  off,  and  the  troops  formed  them- 
selves up  ready  for  pursuit,  or  whatever  they  might  be  called  upon  to 
do.  At  this  juncture  Greathed  appeared  on  the  ground. 

* Men  in  charge  of  the  elephants.  t Turban. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


152 


[»857 


With  less  experienced  troops  the  surprise — and  a thorough  surprise 
it  was— would  in  all  probability  have  had  serious  results.  Most  of  the 
men  were  asleep  under  the  few  tents  which  had  already  arrived,  or 
such  shelter  as  could  be  obtained  near  at  hand,  when  first  one  round 
shot,  then  another,  came  right  into  their  midst  from  a battery  con- 
cealed in  the  high  crops  to  our  right  front.  At  the  same  time  half  a 
dozen  rebels,  one  of  them  playing  the  nagara  * rode  quietly  up  to  the 
Quarter-Guard  of  the  9th  Lancers  and  cut  down  the  sentry.  Being 
dressed,  like  Probyn’s  men,  in  red,  they  were  mistaken  for  them,  and 
were  thus  enabled  to  get  close  to  the  guard.  This  act  was  quickly 
followed  by  a general  rush  of  the  enemy’s  Cavalry,  which  brought 
about  the  series  of  fights  that  were  going  on  when  we  appeared  on  the 
scene.  The  Commander  was  not  to  be  found ; no  one  knew  who  was 
the  senior  officer  present ; consequently  each  regiment  and  battery  had 
to  act  according  to  its  own  discretion.  The  troops  got  ready  with  in- 
credible rapidity,  and  set  to  work  to  drive  the  enemy  off  the  ground. 
The  Artillery  replied  to  the  insurgents’  guns ; the  Infantry  did  what 
they  could,  but  were  hampered  by  the  fear  of  doing  more  injury  to  their 
friends  than  their  foes,  and  thus  the  brunt  of  the  work  fell  upon  the 
Cavalry.  The  9th  Lancers  made  a succession  of  brilliant  charges.  One 
troop  especially  distinguished  itself  by  recovering  Blunt’s  captured 
gun ; the  Captain  (French)  was  killed,  and  the  subaltern  (Jones), 
covered  with  wounds,  was  left  on  the  ground  for  dead.  Watson, 
Probyn,  and  Younghusband,  with  their  three  squadrons,  cleared  our 
right  flank,  capturing  two  guns  and  some  standards;  and  Hugh  Gough, 
with  his  squadron,  performed  a similar  duty  on  the  left. 

Probyn  greatly  distinguished  himself  on  this  occasion.  In  one  of 
the  charges  he  got  separated  from  his  men,  and  was  for  a time 
surrounded  by  the  enemy,  two  of  whom  he  slew.  In  another  charge 
he  captured  a standard.  For  these  and  numerous  acts  of  gallantry 
during  the  Mutiny,  he  was,  to  the  great  delight  of  his  many  friends  in 
the  column,  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross. 

When  Greathed  arrived,  the  order  for  a general  advance  was  given, 
and  we  were  just  moving  off  in  pursuit  of  the  rebels,  when  the  3rd 
European  Begiment  and  a battery  of  Field  Artillery  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Cotton  arrived  from  the  fort.  This  officer,  being  senior  to 
our  Brigadier,  took  command  of  the  force,  and  untimely  delay  was 
caused  while  he  learnt  the  details  of  our  position.  Having  satisfied 
himself  that  the  enemy  must  be  followed  up,  he  endorsed  Greathcd’s 
order,  and  off  we  again  started. 

We  soon  overtook  the  retreating  foe,  who  every  now  and  then  turned 
and  made  an  ineffectual  stand.  At  the  end  of  about  four  miles  we 
came  upon  their  camp ; it  covered  a considerable  space,  and  must  have 


Native  kettle-drum. 


AN  EXCITING  CHASE 


i S3 


■ 857] 

taken  a long  time  to  transport  and  pitch  — a circumstance  which  made 
the  ignorance  on  the  part  of  the  Agra  authorities  as  to  the  close 
proximity  of  the  enemy  appear  even  more  unaccountable  than  before. 

Our  Infantry  were  now  pretty  well  done  up ; they  had  been  on  the 
move,  with  one  or  two  short  intervals,  for  nearly  sixty  hours,  and  the 
3rd  Europeans  were  not  in  trim  for  a long  and  hot  day’s  work  after 
such  a lengthened  period  of  inactivity  in  the  fort,  and  clad,  as  they 
were,  in  thick  scarlet  uniform.  The  enemy,  however,  could  not  be 
allowed  to  carry  off  their  guns;  so,  leaving  the  Infantry  to  amuse 
themselves  by  making  hay  in  the  rebels’  camp,  we  pushed  forward 
with  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery.  It  was  a most  exciting  chase. 
Property  of  all  sorts  and  descriptions  fell  into  our  hands,  and  before 
we  reached  the  Kari  Naddi  we  had  captured  thirteen  guns,  some  of 
them  of  large  calibre,  and  a great  quantity  of  ammunition.  The 
enemy’s  loss  on  this  occasion  was  not  very  great,  owing  to  the  extra- 
ordinary facility  with  which  Native  troops  can  break  up  and  disappear, 
particularly  when  crops  are  on  the  ground. 

While  watching  a few  of  the  rebel  Cavalry  making  their  escape 
along  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Kari  Naddi,  I noticed  about  a dozen 
men  belonging  to  the  2nd  and  4th  Punjab  Infantry  quenching  their 
thirst  in  the  stream.  Carried  away  by  excitement,  they  had  managed 
to  keep  up  with  the  pursuit,  never  thinking  of  the  inevitable  trudge 
back  to  Agra,  which  meant  that,  by  the  time  they  arrived  there,  they 
would  have  accomplished  a march  of  not  less  than  70  miles  without  a 
halt,  besides  having  had  a severe  fight  with  an  enemy  greatly  superior 
in  numbers. 

Our  casualties  were  slight : 12  officers  and  men  were  killed, 

54  wounded,  and  2 missing,  besides  some  20  camp-followers  killed  and 
wounded. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  were  almost  as  much  taken  by  sur- 
prise as  we  were.  They  knew  that  we  were  on  our  way  from  Aligarh, 
and  had  arranged  (as  we  afterwards  heard)  with  the  people  of  the  city 
to  destroy  the  bridge  of  boats  in  time  to  prevent  our  crossing.  But 
our  movements  were  sufficiently  rapid  to  prevent  their  carrying  their 
intention  into  effect ; and  although  the  insurgents  were  informed  that 
we  had  actually  crossed  the  river  they  refused  to  believe  the  report, 
and,  it  was  said,  hanged  the  man  who  brought  it.  Their  incredulity 
was  strengthened  by  the  small  dimensions  of  the  ground  taken  up  for 
our  camp,  and  the  few  tents  which  were  pitched,  and  they  made  up 
their  minds  that  these  were  only  being  prepared  for  the  troops 
belonging  to  the  Agra  garrison,  and  so  anticipated  an  easy  victory. 
Their  astonishment  first  became  known  when  they  were  repulsed  by 
the  75th  Foot,  and  were  heard  to  say  to  one  another,  ‘ Arrah  bhai!  ye 
Dilitvhale  hainl’  (I  say,  brother!  these  are  the  fellows  from  Delhi!). 

We  halted  at  Agra  on  the  11th,  12th,  and  13th  October,  partly  to 


i5+ 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 


rest  the  men  and  transport  animals,  but  chiefly  on  account  of  the 
difficulty  we  had  in  getting  out  of  the  clutches  of  the  North-West 
Provinces  Government,  the  local  authorities  not  caring  to  be  left  to 
their  own  resources.  Our  wounded  were  taken  to  the  fort,  and  lodged 
in  the  Moti  Masjid,*  which  exquisite  little  building  had  been  turned 
into  a hospital.  The  men  were  well  taken  care  of  by  the  ladies,  who 
seemed  to  think  they  could  never  do  enough  for  the  Delhi  column. 

I now  for  the  first  time  saw  the  lovely  Taj  Mahal — that  beautiful, 
world-famed  memorial  of  a man's  devotion  to  a woman,  a husband’s 
undying  love  for  a dead  wife.  I will  not  attempt  to  describe  the 
indescribable.  Neither  words  nor  pencil  could  give  to  the  most 
imaginative  reader  the  slightest  idea  of  the  all- satisfying  beauty  and 
purity  of  this  glorious  conception.  To  those  who  have  not  already 
seen  it,  I would  say:  ‘ Go  to  India.  The  Taj  alone  is  well  worth  the 
journey.’ 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

During  our  three  days’  halt  at  Agra  we  were  told  the  story  of  all  that 
had  happened  before  we  came,  and  a sad  story  it  was  of  incapacity  and 
neglected  opportunity.  The  Lieutenant-Governor,  an  able,  intelligent 
man  under  ordinary  circumstances,  had,  unfortunately,  no  firmness  of 
character,  no  self-reliance.  Instead  of  acting  on  his  own  convictions, 
he  allowed  himself  to  be  entirely  led  by  men  about  him,  who  had  not 
sufficient  knowledge  of  Natives  to  enable  them  to  grasp  how  com- 
pletely the  latter’s  attitude  towards  us  had  been  changed  by  the  loss  of 
our  military  hold  over  the  country,  t 

Deaf  to  warnings  from  those  who  did  understand  the  magnitude  of 
the  danger,  the  Lieutenant-Governor  refused  to  listen  to  the  Maharaja 
Scindia,  who,  influenced  by  the  wise  counsels  of  his  astute  and 
enlightened  minister,  Dinkar  Rao,  told  him  that  the  whole  Native 
army  was  disloyal,  and  that  the  men  of  his  own  (the  Gwalior) 
Contingent^  were  as  bad  as  the  rest.  The  authorities  refused  to  allow 
* Pearl  Mosque. 

t ‘ They  regarded  the  Mutiny  as  a military  revolt ; the  rural  disturbances  as 
the  work  of  the  mobs.  The  mass  of  the  people  they  considered  as  thoroughly 
loyal,  attached  to  our  rule  as  well  from  gratitude  as  from  self-interest,  being 
thoroughly  conscious  of  the  benefits  it  had  conferred  upon  them.  Holding 
these  opinions,  they  did  not  comprehend  either  the  nature  or  the  magnitude 
of  the  crisis.  To  their  inability  to  do  so,  many  lives  and  much  treasure  were 
needlessly  sacrificed.' — ‘The  Indian  Mutiny,’  Thornhill. 

t The  Gwalior  Contingent  was  raised  in  1844,  after  the  battles  of  Punniar 
and  Maharajpore,  to  replace  the  troops  of  Maharaja  Scindia  ordered  to  be 
reduced.  It  consisted  of  five  batteries  of  Artillery,  two  regiments  of  Cavalry, 
and  seven  regiments  of  Infantry,  officered  by  British  officers  belonging  to  the 
Indian  Army,  and  paid  for  out  of  the  revenues  of  districts  transferred  to 
British  management. 


S57]  INFATUATION  OF  THE  AUTHORITIES  AT  AGRA 


55 


the  ladies  and  children  at  Gwalior  to  bo  sent  into  Agra  for  safety;  they 
objected  to  arrangements  being  made  for  accommodating  the  non- 
combatants  inside  the  walls  of  the  fort,  because,  forsooth,  such 
precautions  would  show  a want  of  confidence  in  the  Natives!  and  the 
sanction  for  supplies  being  stored  in  the  fort  was  tardily  and 
hesitatingly  accorded.  It  was  not,  indeed,  until  the  mutinous  sepoys 
from  Nimach  .and  Nasirabad  were  within  sixty  miles  of  Agra  that 
orders  were  given  to  put  the  fort  in  a state  of  defence  and  provision  it, 
and  it  was  not  until  they  had  reached  Futtehpore  Sikri,  twenty-three 
miles  from  Agra,  that  the  women  and  children  were  permitted  to  seek 
safety  within  the  stronghold.* 

Fortunately,  however,  notwithstanding  the  intermittent  manner  in 
which  instructions  were  issued,  there  was  no  scarcity  of  supplies,  for, 
owing  to  the  foresight  and  energy  of  Lieutenant  Henry  Chalmers,  the 
executive  Commissariat  officer,  assisted  by  that  prince  of  contractors, 
Lalla  Joti  Persad,  and  ably  supported  by  Mr.  Reade,  the  civilian  next 
in  rank  to  the  Lieutenant-Governor,  food  was  stored  in  sufficient 
quantities,  not  only  for  the  garrison,  but  for  all  the  refugees  from  the 
surrounding  districts,  f 

Mr.  Drummond,  the  magistrate  of  the  district,  who  had  from  the 
first  been  the  chief  opponent  of  precautionary  measures  for  the 
security  of  the  residents,  had  the  audacity  to  set  the  Lieutenant- 
Governor’s  order  for  victualling  the  fort  at  defiance.  He  forbad  grain 
or  provisions  being  sold  to  the  Commissariat  contractor,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  collect  supplies,  and  positively  imprisoned  one  man  for 
responding  to  the  contractor’s  demands.  It  was  at  this  official's 
instigation  that  the  Native  police  force  was  largely  increased,  instead 
of  being  done  away  with  altogether,  as  would  have  been  the  sensible 
course ; and  as  there  was  an  insufficiency  of  weapons  wherewith  to 
arm  the  augmentation,  a volunteer  corps  of  Christians,  lately  raised, 
was  disbanded,  and  their  arms  distributed  amongst  the  Mahomedan 
police.  So  far  was  this  infatuated  belief  in  the  loyalty  of  the  Natives 
carried  that  it  was  proposed  to  disarm  the  entire  Christian  population, 
on  the  pretext  that  their  carrying  weapons  gave  offence  to  the 
Mahomedans  1 It  was  only  on  the  urgent  remonstrance  of  some  of 
the  military  officers  that  this  preposterous  scheme  was  abandoned.  | 
The  two  Native  regiments  stationed  at  Agra  were  not  disarmed  until 
one  of  the  British  officers  with  them  had  been  killed  and  another 
wounded.  The  gaol,  containing  5,000  prisoners,  was  left  in  charge  of 
a Native  guard,  although  the  superintendent,  having  reliable  infor- 

* ‘The  Indian  Mutiny,’  Thornhill. 

t Throughout  the  campaign  the  Commissariat  Department  never  failed  ; 
the  troops  were  invariably  well  supplied,  and,  even  during  the  longest 
marches,  fresh  bread  was  issued  almost  daily. 

+ ‘The  Indian  Mutiny,’  Thornhill. 


156  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

mation  that  the  sepoys  intended  to  mutiny,  begged  that  it  might  be 
replaced  by  European  soldiers.  The  Lieutenant-Governor  gave  his 
consent  to  this  wise  precaution,  but  afterwards  not  only  allowed 
himself  to  be  persuaded  to  let  the  Native  guard  remain,  but  authorized 
the  removal  of  the  European  superintendent,  on  the  plea  of  his  being 
an  alarmist.* 

On  the  4th  July  Mr.  Colvin,  the  Lieutenant-Governor,  whose  health 
had  been  very  indifferent  for  some  time,  was  induced,  much  against 
his  will,  to  retire  to  the  fort,  and  for  the  time  being  the  management 
of  affairs  passed  into  the  hands  of  Brigadier  Polwhele.  There  was 
little  improvement — indecision  reigned  supreme.  Notwithstanding 
that  the  gradual  approach  of  the  mutineers  from  Gwalior  and 
Nasirabad  was  well  known,  no  preparations  were  made,  no  plan  of 
action  decided  upon.  Polwhele,  who  was  a brave  old  soldier,  and  had 
seen  a great  deal  of  service,  had,  indeed,  wisely  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  rebels  would  never  venture  to  attack  a fort  like  Agra, 
and  that,  if  left  alone,  they  would  in  all  probability  continue  their 
march  towards  Delhi.  The  available  troops  numbered  less  than 

1.000  effective  men,  and  Polwhele  felt  that,  by  going  out  to  attack  the 
enemy,  there  would  be  a grave  risk  of  the  seat  of  government  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  disaffected  police  and  city  people. 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  Brigadier  allowed  himself  to  be  over- 
ruled, and  when  the  mutineers  were  reported  to  have  arrived  at 
Shahganj,  four  miles  from  Agra,  he  gave  way  to  the  cry  to  ‘Go  out 
and  do  something ! ’ and  issued  orders  for  the  troops  to  fall  in. 

A series  of  mishaps  then  occurred.  It  was  one  o’clock  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  5th  July  before  the  columnf  was  ready  to  start;  the 
men  in  their  thick  red  uniform  suffered  greatly  from  the  heat  and 
thirst ; the  enemy,  9,000  strong,  with  twelve  guns,  instead  of  being  at 
Shahganj,  were  found  to  be  strongly  entrenched  at  Sarsia,  some 
distance  farther  off.  A protracted  engagement  then  took  place,  and 
our  troops,  having  expended  all  their  ammunition,  were  obliged  to 
retreat,  leaving  many  dead  and  a gun  on  the  field. 

Meanwhile  the  city  and  cantonment  were  in  a state  of  uproar.  The 
first  gun  was  the  signal  for  the  guard  at  the  gaol  to  release  the 

5.000  prisoners,  who,  as  they  appeared  in  the  streets,  still  wearing 
their  fetters,  caused  a perfect  panic  amongst  the  respectable  in- 
habitants ; while  the  evil-disposed  made  for  the  cantonment,  to 
plunder,  burn,  and  murder.  Some  of  the  residents  who  had  not 
sought  shelter  in  the  fort,  confident  that  our  troops  would  gain  an  easy 

* ‘The  Indian  Mutiny,’  Thornhill. 

f It  consisted  of  the  3rd  European  Regiment,  568  strong,  a battery  of  Field 
Artillery,  with  Native  drivers  and  a few  European  Artillerymen,  and  about 
100  mounted  Militia  and  Volunteers,  composed  of  officers,  civilians  and  others 
who  had  taken  refuge  in  Agra. 


i8S7]  RESULT  OF  INDECISION  AND  INCAPACITY 


157 


victory,  on  hearing  of  their  defeat  hurried  with  all  speed  to  that  place 
of  refuge,  and  for  the  most  part  succeeded  in  reaching  it ; hut  a few 
were  overtaken  and  killed  by  the  mob,  aided  by  the  trusted  police,  who 
had  early  in  the  day  broken  into  open  mutiny.* 

With  one  or  two  exceptions  the  officials,  military  and  civil  alike, 
were  utterly  demoralized  by  all  these  disastrous  occurrences,  the 
result  of  their  own  imbecility.  For  two  days  no  one  was  allowed  to 
leave  the  fort  or  approach  from  the  outside.  Within  was  dire 
confusion ; without,  the  mob  had  it  all  their  own  way. 

Early  in  August  a despatch  was  received  from  the  Governor-General 
acknowledging  the  receipt  of  the  report  on  the  fight  of  the  5th  July, 
and  directing  that  Brigadier  Polwhele  should  be  removed  from  the 
command  of  his  brigade.  On  the  9th  September  Mr.  Colvin  died  ; ho 
never  recovered  the  shock  of  the  Mutiny.  As  a Lieutenant-Governor 
in  peace-time  he  was  considered  to  have  shown  great  ability  in  the 
management  of  his  province,  and  he  was  highly  respected  for  his 
uprightness  of  character.  One  cannot  but  feel  that  it  was  in  a great 
measure  due  to  his  failing  health  that,  when  the  time  of  trial  came,  he 
was  unable  to  accept  the  responsibility  of  directing  affairs  himself,  or 
to  act  with  the  promptitude  and  decision  which  were  demanded  from 
all  those  occupying  prominent  positions  in  1857. 

Mr.  Reade,  the  next  senior  civilian,  assumed  charge  of  the  govern- 
ment on  Mr.  Cohan’s  death,  until  orders  were  received  from  the 
Government  of  India  vesting  the  supreme  authority  in  a military 
officer,  and  appointing  Colonel  Hugh  Fraser,  of  the  Bengal  Engineers, 
to  be  Mr.  Cohan’s  successor  with  the  rank  and  position  of  a Chief 
Commissioner.  Lord  Canning  was  doubtless  induced  to  make  this 
selection  in  consequence  of  the  courage  and  ability  Colonel  Fraser  had 
displayed  during  the  Burmese  War,  and  also  on  account  of  the  sound 
advice  he  had  given  to  the  Lieutenant-Governor  in  the  early  days  of 
the  outbreak — advice  which  unfortunately  was  ignored.  Mr.  Reade, 
who  had  proved  himself  worthy  of  his  high  position,  gave  Colonel 
Fraser  his  cordial  and  unqualified  support,  but  that  officer,  like  his 
predecessor,  was  in  bad  health,  and  found  it  difficult  to  exercise  the 
much-needed  control.  A constant  state  of  panic  continued  to  exist, 
and  no  reliable  information  could  be  obtained  of  what  was  going  on 
even  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood.  The  relief  afforded  by  the 
news  of  the  fall  of  Delhi  was  great,  but  short-lived,  for  it  was  quickly 
followed  by  a report  that  the  whole  rebel  army  had  fled  from  Delhi 
and  was  hastening  towards  Agra,  and  that  the  mutineers  from  Gwalior 
and  Central  India  were  advancing  to  attack  the  fort.  Again  all  was 
confusion.  Reports  as  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy  were  never 
he  same  for  two  days  together ; at  last  what  appeared  to  be  authentic 

* The  police  were  suspected  of  having  invited  the  insurgents  who  defeated 
Polwhele  to  Agra. 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 


158 

intelligence  was  received : the  Gwalior  troops  were  said  to  be  close  at 
hand,  and  those  urgent  appeals  for  assistance  which  were  sent  to 
Greathed  caused  us  to  turn  our  steps  towards  Agra. 

Our  object  having  been  attained,  we  were  all  anxious  to  depart.  The 
Chief  Commissioner,  however,  was  quite  as  anxious  that  we  should 
remain ; firmly  believing  that  the  Gwalior  troops  would  reappear,  he 
suggested  that  we  should  follow  them  up  at  least  as  far  as  Dholpur ; 
but  this  proposal  Greathed  firmly  refused  to  accede  to.  The  orders  he 
had  received  were  to  open  up  the  country*  between  the  Jumna  and 
the  Ganges,  and  he  had  not  forgotten  the  little  note  from  Havelock 
discovered  in  the  fakir’s  platter. 

At  last  the  column  was  allowed  to  leave.  The  evening  before  our 
departure  Norman  and  I called  on  the  Chief  Commissioner  to  say 
good-bye.  We  found  Colonel  Fraser  greatly  depressed,  and  inclined  to 
take  a most  gloomy  view  of  the  situation,  evidently  thinking  the 
restoration  of  our  rule  extremely  doubtful.  His  last  words  to  us  were, 
‘ We  shall  never  meet  again. ’f  He  looked  extremely  ill,  and  his  state 
of  health  probably  accounted  for  his  gloomy  forebodings.  We,  on  the 
contrary,  were  full  of  health  and  hope.  Having  assisted  at  the 
capture  of  Delhi,  the  dispersion  of  the  enemy  who  had  attempted  to 
oppose  us  on  our  way  through  the  Doab,  and  the  troops  we  were 
serving  with  having  recently  achieved  a decisive  victory  at  Agra  over  a 
foe  four  times  their  number,  we  never  doubted  that  success  would 
attend  us  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  and  we  were  now  only  anxious 
to  join  hands  with  Havelock,  and  assist  in  the  relief  of  the  sufferers 
besieged  in  Lucknow. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

On  the  14th  October  we  moved  camp  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Jumna, 
where  we  were  joined  by  a small  party  of  Artillerymen  with  two 
18-pounder  guns,  and  some  convalescents  belonging  to  the  regiments 
with  us,  who  had  been  left  behind  at  Delhi — 300  in  all.  Our  camp 
was  pitched  in  a pretty  garden  called  the  Rambagh,  only  a short 
distance  from  Agra,  where  we  gave  a picnic  to  the  ladies  who  had  been 
so  kind  to  our  wounded  men — a rough  sort  of  entertainment,  as  may 
be  imagined,  but  much  enjoyed  by  the  easily- pleased  people  who  had 
been  prisoners  for  so  long,  to  whom  the  mere  getting  away  from  the 
fort  for  a few  hours  was  a relief. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  we  commenced  our  march  towards 
Mainpuri,  a small  station  seventy  miles  from  Agra,  which  we  reached 
* Known  as  the  Doab. 

f Colonel  Fraser  died  within  nine  months  of  our  leaving  Agra. 


'59 


i8s7l  ADVANTAGE  OF  BEING  A GOOD  HORSEMAN 

on  the  18th.  While  on  our  way  there,  Hope  Grant,  Colonel  of  the 
9th  Lancers,  arrived  in  camp  to  take  over  the  command  of  the  column. 
He  had  remained  at  Delhi  when  superseded  by  Greathed,  and  being 
naturally  indignant  at  the  treatment  he  had  received,  he  protested 
against  it,  and  succeeded  in  getting  the  order  appointing  Greathed  to 
the  command  cancelled. 

Had  an  officer  been  specially  selected  on  account  of  his  possessing  a 
more  intimate  acquaintance  with  Native  soldiers  and  a longer  ex- 
perience of  India,  Hope  Grant  would  no  doubt  have  accepted  the 
inevitable.  But  Greathed  did  not  know  as  much  of  the  country  and 
Native  troops  as  Hope  Grant  did;  he  had  seen  no  service  before  he 
came  to  Delhi,  and  while  there  had  no  opportunity  of  showing  that  he 
possessed  any  particular  qualification  for  command ; he  certainly  did 
not  exhibit  any  while  in  charge  of  the  column,  and  everyone  in  the 
force  was  pleased  to  welcome  Hope  Grant  as  its  leader. 

The  Baja  of  Mainpuri,  who  had  openly  joined  the  rebels,  fled  the 
day  before  we  marched  in,  leaving  behind  him  several  guns  and  a 
quantity  of  powder.  We  halted  on  the  20th,  blew  up  his  fort  and 
destroyed  the  powder.  The  European  part  of  the  station  was  in  ruins, 
but  a relation  of  the  Baja  had  been  able  to  prevent  the  Government 
treasury  from  being  plundered,  and  he  made  over  to  us  two  and  a 
half  lakhs  of  rupees. 

The  civilians  of  the  Mainpuri  district  were  amongst  the  refugees  at 
Agra,  and  took  advantage  of  our  escort  to  return  to  their  station.  We 
had  also  been  joined  by  some  officers  whom  the  mutiny  of  their 
regiments  had  left  without  employment;  they  were  a welcome 
addition  to  our  Punjab  regiments,  as  the  limited  number  of  British 
officers  attached  to  these  corps  bad  been  considerably  reduced  by  the 
constantly  recurring  casualties.  One  of  these  officers  was  a Captain 
Care}-,  whose  story,  as  he  told  it  to  me,  of  his  escape  from  the 
massacre  at  Cawnpore  and  his  subsequent  experiences  is,  I think, 
worth  repeating. 

In  the  month  of  May  Carey  went  into  Wheeler’s  entrenchment 
with  the  rest  of  the  garrison ; a few  days  before  the  investment, 
however,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  sent  his  Military  Secretary,  Captain 
Fletcher  Hayes,  to  Cawnpore,  to  report  on  what  course  events  were 
taking  at  that  place,  and,  if  possible,  to  communicate  with  Delhi.  His 
escort  was  the  2nd  Oudh  Irregular  Cavalry.  Hayes  had  already  made 
Carey’s  acquaintance,  and,  on  finding  him  at  Cawnpore,  asked  him  to 
accompany  him  to  Delhi,  which  invitation  Carey  gladly  accepted. 
M hen  they  got  close  to  Bewar,  where  the  road  to  Mainpuri  branched 
off,  Hayes,  wishing  to  gain  information  from  the  civil  authorities  as  to 
the  state  of  the  country  through  which  their  route  to  Delhi  lay,  rode 
off  to  the  latter  place  with  Carey,  having  first  ordered  the  escort  to 
proceed  towards  Delhi,  and  having  arranged  with  the  British  officers 


11 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


160 


Ci857 


to  catch  them  up  at  the  end  of  the  next  day’s  march.  The  following 
day,  as  the  two  friends  approached  the  encamping  ground  where  they 
were  to  overtake  the  escort,  they  beheld  the  regiment  marching 
steadily  along  the  road  in  regular  formation ; there  was  nothing  to 
warn  them  that  it  had  revolted,  for  as  there  were  only  three  British 
officers  with  the  corps,  whose  dress  was  almost  the  same  as  the  men’s, 
their  absence  was  not  noticed. 

Suddenly,  when  they  had  got  within  two  or  three  hundred  yards  of 
the  regiment,  the  troopers  with  one  accord  broke  into  shouts  and  yells, 
and,  brandishing  their  swords,  galloped  towards  Hayes  and  Carey,  who, 
turning  their  horses,  made  with  all  possible  speed  back  towards  Main- 
puri.  Hayes,  who  was  an  indifferent  rider,  was  soon  overtaken  and 
cut  to  pieces,  while  Carey,  one  of  the  best  horsemen  in  the  army,  and 
beautifully  mounted,  escaped ; the  sowars  followed  him  for  some  dis- 
tance, but  a wide  irrigation  cut,  which  he  alone  was  able  to  clear,  put 
an  end  to  the  pursuit.  Carey  reached  his  destination  in  safety,  and, 
with  the  other  Europeans  from  Mainpuri,  sought  refuge  in  the  Agra 
fort,  where  he  spent  the  following  five  months.  It  was  afterwards 
ascertained  that  the  three  British  officers  with  the  escort  had  been 
murdered  by  the  sowars  shortly  before  Hayes  and  Carey  came  in  sight. 

On  the  21st  October  we  reached  Bewar,  the  junction  of  the  roads 
from  Meerut,  Agra,  Fatehgarh,  and  Cawnpore,  at  which  point  the 
Brigadier  received  a communication  from  Sir  James  Outram,  written 
in  Greek  character,  from  the  Lucknow  Residency,  begging  that  aid 
might  be  sent  as  soon  as  possible,  as  provisions  were  running  short.* 
The  note  was  rolled  up  inside  a quill,  which  the  Native  messenger  had 
cunningly  concealed  in  the  heart  of  his  thick  walking-stick.  Outram’s 
urgent  summons  determined  the  Brigadier  to  push  on.  So  the  next 
day  we  made  a march  of  twenty-eight  miles  to  Goorsahaigunj,  and  on 
the  23rd  we  reached  Miran-ki- Serai,  close  to  the  ruined  Hindu  city  of 
Kanoj. 

The  same  day  I went  on  as  usual  with  a small  escort  to  reconnoitre, 

* No  account  of  the  quantity  and  description  of  supplies  stored  in  the 
Residency  had  been  kept,  or,  if  kept,  it  was  destroyed  when  the  Mutiny  broke 
out.  Captain  James,  the  energetic  Commissariat  officer,  on  receiving  Sir 
Henry  Lawrence’s  order  to  provision  the  Residency,  spent  his  time  riding 
about  the  country  buying  supplies  of  all  descriptions,  which  were  stored 
wherever  room  could  be  found  for  them.  James  was  very  severely  wounded 
at  the  fight  at  Chinhut,  and  was  incapacitated  the  greater  part  of  the  siege. 
It  was  only  by  degrees  that  some  of  the  supplies  were  discovered  ; no  one 
knew  how  much  had  been  collected,  and  no  record  of  the  quantities  issued 
from  day  to  day  could  be  kept.  When  Outram  joined  hands  with  Inglis,  his 
first  question  was,  ‘ How  much  food  is  there  ?’  Thanks  to  Sir  Henry 
Lawrence’s  foresight,  there  was  an  ample  supply,  not  only  for  the  original 
garrison,  but  for  the  numbers  by  which  it  was  augmented  on  the  arrival  of 
the  relieving  force.  Of  this,  however,  Outram  must  have  been  ignorant  when 
he  despatched  the  little  note  to  which  1 have  alluded  in  the  text. 


CA  WNPORE 


161 


1857] 

and  had  passed  through  the  town,  when  I was  fired  upon  by  a party  of 
the  rebels,  consisting  of  some  300  Cavalry,  500  Infantry,  and  four 
guns,  who,  having  heard  of  the  approach  of  the  column,  were  trying  to 
get  away  before  it  arrived.  Their  Cavalry  and  Infantry  were  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  a fairly  wide  stream,  called  the  Kali  Naddi,  through 
which  were  being  dragged  some  heavy  pieces  of  cannon.  I retired  a 
short  distance,  and  sent  back  word  to  the  advance  guard,  which 
hastened  to  my  assistance.  A few  rounds  from  our  Artillery  caused  the 
enemy  to  abandon  their  guns,  the  Infantry  dispersed  and  disappeared, 
the  Cavalry  fled,  and  we,  crossing  the  stream,  had  a smart  gallop  after 
them  for  about  four  miles  over  a fine  grassy  plain.  On  we  flew, 
Probyn’s  and  Watson’s  squadrons  leading  the  way  in  parallel  lines, 
about  a mile  apart.  I was  with  the  latter,  and  we  had  a running 
fight  till  we  reached  the  Ganges,  into  which  plunged  those  of  the 
sowars  whom  we  had  not  been  able  to  overtake  ; we  reined  up,  and 
saw  the  unlucky  fugitives  struggling  in  the  water,  men  and  horses 
rolling  over  each  other  ; they  were  gradually  carried  down  by  the  swiftly 
running  stream,  and  but  a very  few  reached  the  opposite  bank. 

Our  casualties  were  trifling,  only  some  half-dozen  men  wounded, 
while  my  horse  got  a gash  on  his  quarter  from  a sabre.  Watson  had 
the  forefinger  of  his  right  hand  badly  cut  in  an  encounter  with  a young 
sowar ; I chaffed  him  at  allowing  himself  to  be  nearly  cut  down  by  a 
mere  boy,  upon  which  he  laughingly  retorted  : ‘ Well,  boy  or  not,  he 
was  bigger  than  you.’ 

It  was  on  this  occasion  that  I first  recognized  the  advantage  of 
having  the  carbine  slung  on  the  trooper’s  back  while  in  action,  instead 
of  being  carried  in  the  bucket,  as  is  the  custom  with  our  British 
Cavalry.  Several  of  the  enemy’s  loose  horses  were  going  about  with 
carbines  on  their  saddles,  while  their  dismounted  riders  were  at  an 
enormous  disadvantage  in  trying  to  defend  themselves  from  their 
mounted  adversaries  with  only  their  swords.  I saw,  too,  one  of 
Watson’s  men  saved  from  a fierce  cut  across  the  spine  by  having  his 
carbine  on  his  back.  More  recent  experience  has  quite  satisfied  me 
that  this  is  the  only  way  this  weapon  should  be  carried  when  actual 
fighting  is  going  on. 

Three  more  marches  brought  us  to  Cawnpore,  where  we  arrived  on 
the  26th  October. 

We  now  for  the  first  time  heard  the  miserable  ‘ story  of  Cawnpore.’ 
We  were  told  how,  owing  to  Sir  Hugh  Wheeler’s  misplaced  belief  in 
the  loyalty  of  the  sepoys,  with  whom  he  had  served  for  upwards  of 
half  a century,  and  to  the  confiding  old  soldier’s  trust  in  the  friendship 
of  the  miscreant  Nana,  and  in  the  latter’s  ability  to  defend  him  until 
succour  should  arrive,  he  had  neglected  to  take  precautionary  measures 
for  laying  in  supplies  or  for  fortifying  the  two  exposed  barracks  which, 
for  some  unaccountable  reason,  had  been  chosen  as  a place  of  refuge, 

11—2 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


162 


ti8S7 


instead  of  the  easily  defensible  and  well-stored  magazine.  Oar  visit  to 
this  scene  of  suffering  and  disaster  was  more  harrowing  than  it  is  in  the 
power  of  words  to  express ; the  sights  which  met  our  eyes,  and  the 
reflections  they  gave  rise  to,  were  quite  maddening,  and  could  not  but 
increase  tenfold  the  feelings  of  animosity  and  desire  for  vengeance 
which  the  disloyalty  and  barbarity  of  the  mutineers  in  other  places  had 
aroused  in  the  hearts  of  our  British  soldiers.  Tresses  of  hair,  pieces  of 
ladies’  dresses,  books  crumpled  and  torn,  bits  of  work  and  scraps  of 
music,  just  as  they  had  been  left  by  the  wretched  owners  on  the  fatal 
morning  of  the  27th  June,  when  they  started  for  that  terrible  walk  to 
the  boats  provided  by  the  Nana  as  the  bait  to  induce  them  to  capitulate.* 
One  could  not  but  picture  to  one’s  self  the  awful  suffering  those  thou- 
sand Christian  souls  of  both  sexes  and  of  all  ages  must  have  endured 
during  twenty-one  days  of  misery  and  anxiety,  their  numbers  hourly 
diminished  by  disease,  privation,  the  terrific  rays  of  a June  sun,  and 
the  storm  of  shot,  shell,  and  bullets  which  never  ceased  to  be  poured 
into  them.  When  one  looked  on  the  ruined,  roofless  barracks,  with 
their  hastily  constructed  parapet  and  ditch  (a  mere  apology  for  a 
defence),  one  marvelled  how  465  men,  not  more  than  half  of  them 
soldiers  by  profession,  could  have  held  out  for  three  long  weeks  against 
the  thousands  of  disciplined  troops  and  hordes  of  armed  retainers  whom 
the  Nana  was  able  to  bring  to  the  attack. 

It  is  impossible  to  describe  the  feelings  with  which  we  looked  on  the 
Sati-Choura  Ghat,  where  was  perpetrated  the  basest  of  all  the  Nana’s 
base  acts  of  perfidy  ;f  or  the  intense  sadness  and  indignation  which 


* On  the  25th  June,  after  twenty-one  day3  of  intense  suffering — with  his 
numbers  so  reduced  as  to  render  further  defence  scarcely  possible,  with 
starvation  staring  him  in  the  face,  and  with  no  hope  of  succour— Sir  Hugh 
Wheeler  most  reluctantly  consented  to  capitulate.  The  first  overtures  were 
made  by  the  Nana,  who,  despairing  of  being  able  to  capture  the  position,  and 
with  disaffection  in  his  own  camp,  sent  the  following  message  to  the  General  : 

‘ All  those  who  are  in  no  way  connected  with  the  acts  of  Lord  Dalhousie,  and 
are  willing  to  lay  down  their  arms,  shall  receive  a safe  passage  to  Allahabad.’ 
This  missive,  which  was  without  signature,  was  in  the  handwriting  of  Azimula 
Khan,  a Mahomedan  who  had  been  employed  by  the  Nana  as  his  Agent  in 
England,  and  was  addressed,  ‘To  the  subjects  of  Her  Most  Gracious  Majesty 
Queen  Victoria.’  General  Wheeler  agreed  to  give  up  the  fortification,  the 
treasure,  and  the  Artillery,  on  condition  that  each  man  should  be  allowed  to 
carry  his  arms  and  sixty  rounds  of  ammunition,  that  carriages  should  be 
provided  for  the  conveyance  of  the  wounded,  the  women,  and  the  children, 
and  that  boats,  with  a sufficiency  of  flour,  should  be  ready  at  the  neighbouring 
ghat  (landing-place).  The  Nana  accepted  these  conditions,  and  three  officers 
of  the  garrison  were  deputed  to  go  to  the  river  and  see  that  the  boats  were 
properly  prepared.  They  found  about  forty  boats  moored,  and  apparently 
ready  for  departure,  and  in  their  presence  a show  of  putting  supplies  on  board 
was  made. 

+ The  Nana  never  intended  that  one  of  the  garrison  should  leave  Cawnpore 
alive,  and  during  the  night  of  the  26th  June  he  arranged  with  Tautia  Topi  to 


HEART- RENDING  SCENES 


1857] 


'63 


overpowered  us  as  we  followed  the  road  along  which  121  women  and 
children  (many  of  them  well  born  and  delicately  nurtured)  wended 
their  weary  way,  amidst  jeers  and  insults,  to  meet  the  terrible  fate 
awaiting  them.  After  their  husbands  and  protectors  had  been  slain, 
the  wretched  company  of  widows  and  orphans  were  first  taken  to  the 
Savada  house,  and  then  to  the  little  Native  hut,  where  they  were 
doomed  to  live  through  two  more  weeks  of  intensest  misery,  until  at 
length  the  end  came,  and  the  last  scene  in  that  long  drama  of  foulest 
treachery  and  unequalled  brutality  was  enacted.  Our  unfortunate 
countrywomen,  with  their  little  children,  as  my  readers  will  remember, 
were  murdered  as  the  sound  of  Havelock’s  avenging  guns  was  heard. 

We  found  at  Cawnpore  some  men  who  had  fought  their  way  from 
Allahabad  with  Havelock’s  force,  from  whom  we  heard  of  the  diffi- 
culties they  had  encountered  on  their  way,  and  the  subsequent  hard- 
ships the  gallant  little  force  had  to  endure  in  its  attempts  to  reach 
Lucknow.  They  also  told  us  that  Havelock  and  Outram,  with  only 
3,179  men  of  all  arms,  and  14  guns,  had  succeeded  in  forcing  their 
way  through  that  great  city  with  a loss  of  700,  but  only  to  be  them- 
selves immediately  surrounded  by  the  vast  multitude  of  the  enemy, 
who  for  three  whole  months  had  vainly  endeavoured  to  overpower 
the  heroic  defenders  of  the  Residency. 

At  Cawnpore  there  were  very  few  troops.  T-he  Head- Quarters  of 
the  64th  Foot,  under  Colonel  Wilson,  and  some  recovered  invalids 
belonging  to  regiments  which  had  gone  to  Lucknow,  had  held  it  for 
more  than  a month,  within  an  entrenchment  thrown  up  on  the  river 
bank  to  protect  the  bridge  of  boats.  Just  before  we  arrived  four 
companies  of  the  93rd  Highlanders  had  marched  in.  It  was  the  first 
time  I had  seen  a Highland  regiment,  and  I was  duly  impressed  by 
their  fine  physique,  and  not  a little  also  by  their  fine  dress.  They 
certainly  looked  splendid  in  their  bonnets  and  kilts — a striking  contrast 


have  soldiers  and  guns  concealed  at  the  Sati-Choura  Ghat  to  open  fire  upon 
the  Europeans  he  had  been  unable  to  conquer  as  soon  as  the  embarkation  had 
been  effected  and  they  could  no  longer  defend  themselves  and  their  helpless 
companions  in  misery.  The  river  was  low  and  the  boats  were  aground,  having 
been  purposely  drawn  close  to  the  shore.  When  the  last  man  had  stepped  on 
board,  at  a given  signal  the  boatmen  jumped  into  the  water  and  waded  to  the 
bank.  They  had  contrived  to  secrete  burning  charcoal  in  the  thatch  of  most 
of  the  boats  ; this  soon  blazed  up,  and  as  the  flames  rose  and  the  dry  wood 
crackled,  the  troops  in  ambush  on  the  shore  opened  fire.  Officers  and  men 
tried  in  vain  to  push  off  the  boats  ; three  only  floated,  and  of  these  two  drifted 
to  the  opposite  side,  where  sepoys  were  waiting  to  murder  the  passengers. 
The  third  boat  floated  down  the  stream,  and  of  the  number  on  board  four 
eventually  escaped — Lieutenants  Thomson  and  Delafosse,  both  of  the  53rd 
Native  Infantry,  Private  Murphy  of  the  84th  Foot,  and  Gunner  Sullivan,  of 
the  Bengal  Artillery.  The  rest  of  the  officers  and  men  were  killed  or  drowned, 
and  the  women  and  children  who  escaped  were  carried  oft'  as  prisoners. 


164 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[•857 

to  my  war-worn,  travel-stained  comrades  of  the  Movable  Column.  An 
avant  courier  of  the  Naval  Brigade  had  also  come  in,  sent  on  by 
Captain  William  Peel,  of  H.M.S.  Shannon,  to  arrange  for  the  rest  of 
the  blue-jackets  who  were  about  to  arrive — the  first  naval  officer,  I 
imagine,  who  had  ever  been  sent  on  duty  so  far  up  the  country  as 
Cawnpore. 

Other  troops  were  rapidly  being  pushed  up,  and  officers  who  had 
been  on  leave  to  England  were  daily  arriving,  having  hurried  out  to 
join  their  different  regiments  in  various  parts  of  India.  Amongst 
these  was  an  old  friend  and  brother  subaltern  of  mine,  Augustus  Otway 
Mayne,  whom,  greatly  to  my  satisfaction,  Hope  Grant  appointed 
D.A.Q.M.G.  to  help  me,  for  there  was  now  more  work  to  be  done  than 
I could  well  get  through. 

The  day  after  our  arrival  at  Cawnpore  we  heard  that  the  new 
Commander-in-Chief,  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  was  to  leave  Calcutta  that 
evening  to  take  command  of  the  force  with  which  he  hoped  to  effect 
the  relief  of  the  Lucknow  garrison,  and  with  this  news  came  an  order 
to  Hope  Grant  from  Sir  Colin  to  get  into  communication  with  the 
Alambagh,  a small  garden-house  not  quite  two  miles  from  the  city  of 
Lucknow,  built  by  one  of  the  Begums  of  the  ex-King  of  Oudh,  in 
which  the  sick  and  wounded,  tents  and  spare  stores,  had  been  left 
in  charge  of  a small  detachment,  when  Outram  and  Havelock  advanced 
towards  the  Residency  on  the  25th  September. 

On  the  30th  October  we  left  Cawnpore,  and  crossed  the  Ganges  into 
Oudh,  taking  with  us  the  four  companies  of  the  93rd  Highlanders,  and 
the  men  belonging  to  Havelock’s  force,  whom  I have  mentioned  as 
having  been  left  behind  on  account  of  sickness. 

On  the  31st  we  were  at  Bani  bridge,  more  than  half-way  to  the 
Alambagh,  when  a telegram  reached  the  Brigadier  directing  him  to 
halt  until  Sir  Colin  Campbell  (who  had  got  as  far  as  Cawnpore)  should 
arrive. 

Hope  Grant  did  not  think  the  ground  we  were  on  well  adapted  for  a 
prolonged  halt ; that  afternoon,  therefore,  I went  off  with  Mayne  to 
reconnoitre  the  country  for  a more  suitable  place.  We  fixed  upon 
an  open  plain  at  the  village  of  Bhantira,  about  three  miles  nearer 
Lucknow.  We  met  with  no  opposition  that  day,  but  the  country 
people  in  the  neighbourhood  had  shown  marked  hostility  by  killing  one 
or  two  soldiers  and  every  camp-follower  who  had  strayed  from  the 
main  road  ; so  we  were  careful  to  examine  Bhantira  and  all  the 
neighbouring  villages,  but  were  unable  to  discover  the  slightest  sign  of 
an  enemy. 

As  the  next  day’s  march  was  such  a very  short  one,  we  did  not 
start  until  7 a.m.,  instead  of  before  daybreak  as  usual.  Mayne  and  I 
rode  on  ahead  with  a couple  of  noivars,  and  reached  the  site  we  had 
chosen  for  the  camp  without  meeting  a single  suspicious  - looking 


AN  EXCITING  ADVENTURE 


.65 


1857] 

individual.  We  then  sent  back  the  escort  to  bring  up  the  camp  colour- 
men,  and  while  waiting  for  them,  we  entered  into  conversation  with 
some  passing  pilgrims,  who  told  us  they  were  on  their  way  to  Benares 
to  procure  holy  water  from  the  Ganges.  Suddenly  a bullet  whizzed 
over  our  heads,  fired  from  the  direction  from  which  we  had  just 
come.  Looking  back,  to  our  amazement  we  saw  a crowd  of  armed 
men  at  a distance  of  between  three  and  four  hundred  yards,  completely 
cutting  us  off  from  the  column.  The  whole  plain  was  alive  with  them. 
When  they  saw  they  were  observed,  they  advanced  towards  us,  shout- 
ing and  firing.  Fortunately  for  us,  we  had  made  ourselves  perfectly 
acquainted  with  the  country  the  previous  day,  and  instantly  realized 
that  escape  by  our  right  (as  w’e  faced  Lucknow)  was  impossible,  because 
of  a huge  impassable  jliil.  There  was  another  jhil  to  our  left  front,  but 
at  some  little  distance  off,  and  our  only  chance  seemed  to  be  in  riding 
hard  enough  to  get  round  the  enemy’s  Hank  before  they  could  get 
close  enough  to  this  jhil  to  stop  us. 

Accordingly,  we  put  spurs  to  our  horses  and  galloped  as  fast  as  they 
could  carry  us  to  our  left;  the  enemy  turned  in  the  same  direction,  and 
made  for  a village  we  must  pass,  and  which  we  could  see  was  already 
occupied.  The  firing  got  hotter  and  more  uncomfortable  as  we  neared 
this  village,  the  walls  of  which  we  skirted  at  our  best  possible  pace. 
We  cleared  the  village,  and  hoped  we  had  distanced  the  rebels,  when 
suddenly  we  came  upon  a deep  nulla.  Mayne  got  safely  to  the  other 
side,  but  my  horse  stumbled  and  rolled  over  with  me  into  the  water  at 
the  bottom.  In  the  fall  my  hand  was  slightly  cut  by  my  sword,  which 
I had  drawn,  thinking  we  might  have  to  fight  for  our  lives  ; the  blood 
flowed  freely,  and  made  the  reins  so  slippery  when  I tried  to  remount, 
that  it  was  with  considerable  difficulty  I got  into  the  saddle.  The 
enemy  were  already  at  the  edge  of  the  nulla,  and  preparing  to  fire,  so 
there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  I struggled  through  the  water  and  up  the 
opposite  bank,  and  ducking  my  head  to  avoid  the  shots,  now  coming 
thick  and  fast,  galloped  straight  into  some  high  cultivation  in  which 
Mayne  had  already  sought  shelter.  Finally  we  succeeded  in  making 
our  way  to  the  main  body  of  the  force,  where  we  found  Hope  Grant  in 
great  anxiety  about  us,  as  he  had  heard  the  firing  and  knew  we  were 
ahead.  The  dear  old  fellow  evinced  his  satisfaction  at  our  safe  return 
by  shaking  each  of  us  heartily  by  the  hand,  repeating  over  and  over 
again  in  his  quick,  quaint  way,  ‘Well,  my  boys,  well,  my  boys,  very 
glad  to  have  you  back  ! never  thought  to  see  you  again.’  The  column 
now  moved  on,  and  we  found  ourselves  opposed  to  a vast  body  of  men, 
not  soldiers,  but  country  people,  who  in  those  days  were  all  armed 
warriors,  and  who  spent  their  time  chiefly  in  fighting  with  each  other. 
As  we  approached  the  crowd  turned,  opened  out,  and  fled  in  every 
direction,  spreading  over  the  plain  and  concealing  themselves  in  the 
long  grass.  We  gave  chase  and  killed  many,  but  a large  proportion 


1 66 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[•§57 


escaped.  Favoured  by  the  high  crops,  they  disappeared  with  that 
marvellous  celerity  with  which  Natives  can  almost  instantly  become 
invisible,  leaving  in  our  possession  a 9-pounder  brass  gun.  On  this 
occasion  we  had  thirty  killed  and  wounded. 

We  could  not  at  the  time  understand  where  the  men  had  sprung 
from  who  so  suddenly  attacked  us  ; but  it  afterwards  transpired  that 
some  powerful  zemindars * in  the  neighbourhood  had  collected  all  the 
forces  they  could  get  together,  and  estabhshed  them  after  dark  in  the 
very  villages  we  had  so  carefully  examined  the  previous  afternoon  and 
had  found  completely  deserted,  with  the  intention  of  falling  upon  the 
column  as  it  passed  in  the  early  morning.  The  unusually  late  hour 
at  which  the  march  was  made,  however,  disconcerted  their  little  plan, 
and  giving  up  all  hope  of  the  force  coming  that  day,  they  consoled 
themselves  by  trying  to  get  hold  of  Mayne  and  myself. 

We  halted  on  the  3rd  and  4th  November.  On  the  5th,  Hope  Grant 
sent  a force  to  the  Alambagh  for  the  purpose  of  escorting  a long  line  of 
carts  and  camels  laden  with  provisions  and  ammunition,  which  the 
Commander-in  Chief  was  desirous  of  having  near  at  hand,  in  case  the 
relief  of  the  Lucknow  garrison  should  prove  a more  prolonged  opera- 
tion than  he  hoped  or  anticipated  it  was  likely  to  be. 

As  we  neared  the  Alambagh  the  enemy’s  guns  opened  on  us  from 
our  right,  while  their  Cavalry  threatened  us  on  both  flanks.  They  were 
easily  disposed  of,  and  we  deposited  the  stores,  receiving  in  exchange  a 
number  of  sick  and  wounded  who  were  to  be  sent  back  to  Cawnpore. 

A curious  incident  happened  at  the  Alambagh.  I was  employed 
inside  the  enclosure,  when  all  at  once  I heard  a noise  and  commotion 
some  little  distance  off.  Getting  on  to  the  roof,  I looked  over  the 
plain,  and  saw  our  troops  flying  in  every  direction  ; there  was  no 
firing,  no  enemy  in  sight,  but  evidently  something  was  wrong ; so  I 
mounted  my  horse  and  rode  to  the  scene  of  confusion,  where  I found 
that  the  ignominious  flight  of  our  troops  was  caused  by  infuriated  bees 
which  had  been  disturbed  by  an  officer  of  the  9th  Lancers  thought- 
lessly thrusting  a lance  into  their  nest.  There  were  no  serious  conse- 
quences, but  the  Highlanders  were  heard  to  remark  on  the  unsuitability 
of  their  dress  for  an  encounter  with  an  enemy  of  that  description. 

On  the  9th  November  Sir  Colin  Campbell  joined  the  column,  accom- 
panied by  his  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Brigadier-General  Mansfield. f 

The  following  morning  we  were  surprised  to  hear  that  a European 
from  the  Lucknow  garrison  had  arrived  in  camp.  All  were  keen  to  see 
him,  and  to  hear  how  it  was  faring  with  those  who  had  been  shut  up 
in  the  Residency  for  so  long ; but  the  new-comer  was  the  bearer  of 

* Permanent  occupiers  of  the  land,  either  of  the  landlord  class,  as  in 
Bengal,  Oudh,  and  the  North-West  Provinces,  or  of  the  yeoman  class,  as  in 
the  Punjab. 

t Afterwards  General  Lord  Sandhurst,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I. 


LORDS  CLYDE  AND  SANDHURST. 

(silt  COLIN  CAMPBELL  AND  Silt  WILLIAM  MANSFIELD.) 

From 

a photograph  taken  in  India. 


PLANS  FOR  THE  ADVANCE 


1857] 


167 


very  important  information  from  Sir  James  Outram,  and  to  prevent 
any  chance  of  its  getting  about,  the  Commander-in-Chief  kept  the 
messenger,  Mr.  Kavanagh,  a close  prisoner  in  his  own  tent. 

Outram,  being  anxious  that  the  officer  in  command  of  the  relieving 
force  should  not  follow  the  same  route  taken  by  himself  and  Havelock, 
and  wishing  to  communicate  his  ideas  more  at  length  than  was  possible 
in  a note  conveyed  as  usual  by  a spy,  Kavanagh,  a clerk  in  an  office  in 
Lucknow,  pluckily  volunteered  to  carry  a letter.  It  was  an  offer  which 
appealed  to  the  heart  of  the  ‘ Bayard  of  the  East,’  as  Outram  has  been 
appropriately  called,  and  just  such  an  errand  as  he  himself,  had  he 
been  in  a less  responsible  position,  would  have  delighted  to  undertake. 
Outram  thoroughly  understood  the  risk  of  the  enterprise,  and  placed  it 
clearty  before  the  brave  volunteer,  who,  nothing  daunted,  expressed  his 
readiness  to  start  at  once,  and  his  confidence  in  being  able  to  reach 
the  British  camp. 

Disguised  as  a Native,  and  accompanied  by  a man  of  Oudh,  on  whose 
courage  and  loyalty  he  was  convinced  he  could  rely,  Kavanagh  left  the 
Residency  after  dark  on  the  9th  and  got  safely  across  the  Gumti.  He 
and  his  guide  remained  in  the  suburbs  mixing  with  the  people  until  the 
streets  might  be  expected  to  be  pretty  well  empty,  when  they  re-crossed 
the  river  and  got  safely  through  the  city.  They  were  accosted  more 
than  once  on  their  way,  but  were  saved  by  the  readiness  of  the  Native, 
who  it  had  been  arranged  should  answer  all  inquiries,  though  Kavanagh, 
having  been  bom  and  bred  in  the  country,  could  himself  speak  the 
language  fluently.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th  they  made  themselves 
known  to  a piquet  of  Punjab  Cavalry  on  duty  near  the  Alambagh. 

Outram,  profiting  by  his  own  experience,  wished  the  relieving 
column  to  be  spared  having  to  fight  its  way  through  the  streets  of 
Lucknow.  This  was  all  the  more  necessary  because  the  enemy,  calcu- 
lating on  our  following  the  same  route  as  before,  had  destroyed  the 
bridge  over  the  canal  and  made  extensive  preparations  to  oppose  our 
advance  in  that  direction.  Outram  explained  his  views  most  clearly, 
and  sent  with  his  letter  a plan  on  which  the  line  he  proposed  we  should 
take  was  plainly  marked.  He  recommended  that  the  advance  should 
be  made  by  the  Dilkusha*  and  Martiniere,f  and  that  the  canal  should 

* The  Dilkusha  house  was  built  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  by  a king 
of  Oudh  as  a hunting-box  and  country  residence,  and  close  to  it  he  cleared 
away  the  jungle  and  laid  out  a large  park,  which  he  stocked  with  herds  of 
deer  and  other  game. 

t The  Martiniere  was  built  by  Claude  Martin,  a French  soldier  of  fortune, 
who  came  out  to  India,  under  Count  de  Lally,  in  the  stirring  days  of  1757. 
In  1761  he  was  taken  prisoner  by  the  English  at  Pondicherry  and  sent  to 
Bengal.  After  the  conclusion  of  the  war  he  enlisted  in  the  English  Army, 
and  on  attaining  the  rank  of  Captain  he  got  permission  to  attach  himself  to 
the  Court  of  the  King  of  Oudh,  where  he  soon  obtained  supreme  influence, 
and  became  to  all  practical  purposes  Prime  Minister.  He  remained  an  officer 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


168 

be  crossed  by  the  bridge  nearest  the  Gumti.  Outram  showed  his 
military  acumen  in  suggesting  this  route,  as  our  right  flank  would  be 
covered  by  the  river,  and  therefore  could  only  be  molested  by  a com- 
paratively distant  fire.  Sir  Colin,  appreciating  all  the  advantages 
pointed  out,  readily  accepted  and  strictly  adhered  to  this  plan  of 
advance,  except  that,  instead  of  crossing  the  canal  by  the  bridge,  we 
forded  it  a little  nearer  the  river,  a wise  divergence  from  Outram’s 
recommendation,  and  one  which  he  would  assuredly  have  advised  had 
he  been  aware  that  the  canal  was  fordable  at  this  spot,  as  it  kept  us 
altogether  clear  of  the  streets. 

Outram  did  not  touch  in  his  despatch  upon  any  question  but  the  all- 
important  one  of  how  the  junction  between  his  own  and  the  relieving 
forces  could  best  be  effected.  Many  other  matters,  however,  claimed 
the  earnest  consideration  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  before  he  could 
proceed.  He  had  to  determine  what  was  to  be  done  to  secure  the 
safety  of  the  women  and  children  in  the  Residency,  after  the  first  most 
pressing  duty  of  relieving  the  garrison  had  been  accomplished.  Cawn- 
pore  was  again  in  great  danger  from  the  Gwalior  mutineers,  who, 
foiled  at  Agra,  and  finding  that  the  Maharaja  Sindhia  would  not 
espouse  their  cause,  had  placed  themselves  under  the  orders  of  the 
Rani  of  Jhansi  and  Tantia  Topi,  the  vile  Mahratta  whom  the  Nana 
made  use  of  to  carry  out  the  massacre  of  the  Sati-Choura  Ghat ; led  by 
this  man  the  rebels  were  seriously  threatening  Cawnpore,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  take  steps  for  its  security.  Then  again  the  city  of 
Lucknow  had  to  be  thought  of ; its  capture  and  the  restoration  of 
British  authority  were  alike  essential,  but  our  Chief  knew  that  he  had 
neither  the  time  nor  the  means  at  his  disposal  to  undertake  this  im- 
portant operation  at  once.  He  therefore  made  up  his  mind  that  so 
soon  as  the  Residency  had  been  relieved  he  would  withdraw  altogether 
from  Lucknow,  and  place  a force  at  the  Cawnpore  side  of  the  city,  to 
form  the  nucleus  of  the  army  with  which  he  hoped  later  on  to  take  the 
place,  and  to  keep  open  communication  with  his  Head-Quarters,  while 
he  himself  should  hurry  back  to  Cawnpore,  taking  with  him  all  the 
non-combatants  and  the  sick  and  wounded. 


of  the  East  India  Company’s  Service,  and  at  the  time  of  his  death  held  the 
rank  of  Major-General.  He  amassed  a large  fortune,  and  by  his  will  founded 
colleges  at  Lucknow,  Calcutta,  and  Lyons,  the  place  of  his  birth.  His 
directions  that  his  house  at  the  former  place  should  never  be  sold,  but  should 
‘serve  as  a college  for  educating  children  and  men  in  the  English  language 
and  religion,’  wore  carried  out  by  the  British  Government,  and  Martin  lies 
buried  in  its  vault. 


SIR  COLIN'S  PREPARATIONS 


169 


1857] 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

The  next  morning,  the  11th,  I had  the  honour  of  making  the  Com- 
mander-in-Cliief’s  acquaintance.  The  manner  of  my  introduction  was 
peculiarly  unceremonious.  I had  left  my  own  tent  to  be  repaired  at 
Cawnpore,  and  was  sharing  one  with  Norman,  who  was  well  known  to, 
and  greatly  believed  in  by,  His  Excellency,  whose  Brigade-Major  he 
had  been  at  Peshawar.  Before  we  were  out  of  bed  we  heard  Sir 
Colin's  voice  outside.  He  had  come  to  speak  to  Norman  about  his 
plans  for  the  future,  and  as  the  conversation  seemed  likely  to  be  of  a 
very  confidential  nature,  and  it  was  too  dark  for  him  to  see  me,  I asked 
Norman  to  make  my  presence  known.  Sir  Colin  said  to  Norman 
somewhat  roughly,  ‘ Who  is  he  ?’  and  on  my  name  being  mentioned, 
he  asked  if  I were  to  be  trusted.  Norman  having  vouched  for  my 
discretion,  the  old  Chief  was  apparently  satisfied,  and  then  ensued  an 
intensely  interesting  discussion  on  Outram’s  letter,  Kavanagli’s  descrip- 
tion of  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Residency,  and  the  manner  in  which 
it  was  best  to  carry  out  Outram's  recommendations. 

That  same  afternoon  the  Commander-in-Chief  reviewed  the  column, 
which  now  amounted  to  about  600  Cavalry  and  3,500  Infantry,  with 
42  guns.*  The  parade  was  under  the  command  of  Hope  Grant,  who 
had  been  given  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General,  and  put  in  executive 
command  of  the  whole  force. 

Sir  Cohn  spoke  a few  inspiriting  words  to  each  regiment  and  battery, 
being  particularly  appreciative  and  complimentary  in  his  remarks  to 

* Besides  the  troops  from  Delhi,  the  force  consisted  of  Peel’s  Naval  Brigade, 
with  eight  heavy  guns  and  howitzers  ; Middleton’s  Field  Battery  of  Royal 
Artillery  (the  first  that  had  ever  served  in  India),  and  two  companies  of 
garrison  Royal  Artillery,  under  Travers  and  Longden,  equipped  with  heavy 
guns  and  mortars  ; a company  of  Royal  Engineers  under  Lieutenant  Lennox, 
V.C.  -,1  a few  Bengal,  and  two  newly-raised  companies  of  Punjab  Sappers  ; the 
93rd  Highlanders,  Head- Quarters  and  wing  of  the  23rd  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers, 
and  of  the  53rd  Foot  ; part  of  the  82nd  Foot,  and  detachments  of  the  5th 
Fusiliers,  64th,  78th,  84tli,  and  90th  Foot,  and  Madras  Fusiliers,  regiments 
winch  had  gone  into  the  Residency  with  Outram  and  Havelock.  The  Infantry 
was  brigaded  as  follows  : 

Wing  53rd  Foot  1 

93rd  Highlanders  I Commanded  by  Brigadier  the  Hon.  Adrian 

Battalion  of  detachments  j Hope,  93rd  Highlanders. 

4th  Punjab  Infantry  J 

8th  Foot  4 

Battalion  of  detachments  J-  Commanded  by  Brigadier  Greathed,  8th  Foot- 
2nd  Punjab  Infantry 

Wing  23rd  Fusiliers  \ Commanded  by  Brigadier  D.  Russell,  84th 
Two  companies  82nd  Foot  / Foot. 


1 Afterwards  General  Sir  Wilbraham  Lennox,  V.C.,  K.C.B. 


170 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


the  Delhi  troops,  who  certainly  looked  the  picture  of  workmanlike 
soldiers ; and,  considering  what  they  had  accomplished,  there  was 
nothing  invidious  in  the  Chief’s  singling  them  out.  The  Bengal 
Artillery  came  in  for  a large  share  of  praise  ; he  had  a strong  liking  for 
them,  having  been  with  them  on  service,*  and  seen  of  what  good  stuff 
they  were  made.  He  recognized  several  old  acquaintances  amongst 
the  officers,  and  freely  expressed  his  satisfaction  at  having  such  reliable 
batteries  to  help  him  in  the  hazardous  operation  he  was  about  to  under- 
take. He  was  careful  also  to  say  a few  words  of  commendation  to  the 
four  squadrons  of  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  the  two  regiments  of  Punjab 
Infantry,  the  only  Native  troops,  except  the  Sappers,  with  the  column. 

That  evening  orders  were  issued  for  a march  to  the  Alambagh  the 
following  morning.  It  may  perhaps  seem  as  if  Sir  Colin  was  rather 
leisurely  in  his  movements,  but  he  had  ascertained  that  the  Lucknow 
garrison  was  in  no  immediate  want  of  food,  as  had  been  reported,  and 
he  was  determined  to  leave  nothing  undone  to  ensure  the  success  of 
the  undertaking.  He  personally  attended  to  the  smallest  detail,  and 
he  had  to  arrange  for  the  transport  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  the 
women  and  children,  shut  up  in  the  Residency,  numbering  in  all  not 
less  than  fifteen  hundred  souls. 

Everything  being  ready,  we  began  our  march  towards  Lucknow, 
one  and  all  eager  to  have  a share  in  the  rescue  of  our  suffering 
countrywomen  and  their  children  from  a most  perilous  position,  and 
in  relieving  soldiers  who  had  so  long  and  so  nobly  performed  the  most 
harassing  duty,  while  they  cheerfully  endured  the  greatest  privations. 

We  had  proceeded  but  a short  distance,  when  the  advance  guard  was 
fired  upon  by  some  guns  in  position  on  our  right,  near  the  old  fort  of 
Jalalabad.  An  extensive  swamp  protected  the  enemy’s  right  flank, 
while  on  their  left  were  a number  of  water-cuts  and  broken  ground. 
The  Infantry  and  Artillery  wheeled  round  and  attacked  the  battery  in 
front,  while  Hugh  Gough  pushed  on  with  his  squadron  of  Cavalry  to 
see  if  he  could  find  a way  through  the  apparently  impassable  swamp 
to  the  enemy’s  right  and  rear.  Bourchier’s  battery  coming  up  in  the 
nick  of  time,  the  hostile  guns  were  soon  silenced,  and  Gough,  having 
succeeded  in  getting  through  the  jhil,  made  a most  plucky  charge,  in 
which  he  captured  two  guns  and  killed  a number  of  the  enemy.  For 
his  gallant  conduct  on  this  occasion  Gough  was  awarded  the  Victoria 
Cross,  the  second  of  two  brothers  to  win  this  much- coveted  dis- 
tinction. 

The  next  morning  Adrian  Hope,  who  commanded  a brigade,  was 
ordered  to  seize  the  Jalalabad  fort,  but  finding  it  evacuated,  he  blew  up 
one  of  the  walls,  and  so  rendered  it  indefensible. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  13th  I accompanied  the  Commander-in- 

* Sir  Colin  Campbell  had  served  throughout  the  Punjab  Campaign  and  on 
the  Peshawar  frontier. 


«857] 


THE  ALAMBAGH 


I7i 


Chief  in  a reconnaissance  towards  the  Charbagh  bridge  and  the  left 
front  of  the  Alambagh,  a ruse  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  real  line 
of  our  advance.  'When  riding  along  he  told  me,  to  my  infinite  pride 
and  delight,  that  I was  to  have  the  honour  of  conducting  the  force  to 
the  Dilkuslia.  The  first  thing  I did  on  returning  to  camp  was  to  find 
a good  guide.  We  had  only  about  five  miles  to  go ; but  it  was 
necessary  to  make  sure  that  the  direction  taken  avoided  obstacles 
which  might  impede  the  passage  of  the  Artillery.  I was  fortunate  in 
finding  a fairly  intelligent  Native,  who,  after  a great  deal  of  persuasion, 
agreed,  for  a reward,  to  take  me  by  a track  over  which  guns  could 
travel.  I never  let  this  man  out  of  my  sight,  and  made  him  show  me 
enough  of  the  road  to  convince  me  he  knew  the  way  and  meant  fair 
dealing. 

The  Alambagh  now  proved  most  useful ; all  our  camp  equipage  was 
packed  inside  the  enclosure,  for  we  took  no  tents  with  us,  and  all  our 
spare  stores  were  left  there.  A rough  description  of  semaphore,  too, 
was  constructed  on  the  highest  point  of  the  building,  by  means  of 
which  we  were  able  to  communicate  with  the  Residency.  It  was  put 
in  Orders  that  the  troops  were  to  breakfast  early  the  next  morning, 
and  that  they  were  to  take  three  days’  rations  in  their  haversacks ; 
while  sufficient  for  fourteen  days  was  to  be  carried  by  the  Com- 
missariat. 

Just  before  we  started  on  the  14th  November  we  were  strengthened 
by  the  arrival  of  200  of  the  Military  Train  equipped  as  Cavalry,  two 
Madras  Horse  Artillery  guns,  and  another  company  of  Madras 
Sappers. 

Captain  Moir,  of  the  Bengal  Artillery,  was  placed  in  charge  of  the 
Alambagh,  with  a garrison  consisting  of  the  75th  Foot,  50  of  the 
regiment  of  Ferozepore>*  and  a few  Artillerymen.  The  75th  was  the 
first  regiment  to  move  down  from  the  hills  when  the  news  of  the  out- 
break at  Meerut  reached  Head-Quarters  ; it  had  done  grand  service,  had 
suffered  heavily  during  the  siege  of  Delhi,  and  had  well  earned,  and 
badly  needed,  a rest.  It  was  now  only  300  strong,  and  had  lost  in  six 
months  9 officers,  in  action  and  from  disease,  besides  12  wounded. 
The  officers  were  all  friends  of  mine,  and  I was  very  sorry  to  leave 
them  behind,  particularly  Barter,  the  Adjutant,  a jolly,  good-hearted 
Irishman,  and  an  excellent  officer. 

"We  marched  at  9 a.m.,  keeping  to  the  south  of  the  Alambagh  and 
the  Jalalabad  fort.  "We  then  struck  across  the  fields  to  the  ground  now 
occupied  by  the  Native  Cavalry  lines,  and  on  to  the  open  space  upon 
which  the  present  race-course  is  marked  out.  On  reaching  this  point 
the  Dilkusha  came  in  sight  about  a mile  in  front.  As  we  approached, 
a few  shots  were  fired  at  us ; but  the  enemy  rapidly  disappeared  as  the 

* Now  the  14th  (Sikhs)  Bengal  Infantry 


!72 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 

Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery,  followed  by  the  Infantry  of  the  advance 
guard,  in  skirmishing  order,  passed  through  an  opening  which  had 
been  hastily  made  in  the  wall  of  the  enclosure. 

The  gallop  across  the  Dilkusha  park  was  quite  a pretty  sight : deer, 
which  had  been  quietly  browsing,  bounded  away  on  all  sides, 
frightened  by  our  approach  and  the  rattle  of  the  guns;  while  the 
routed  sepoys  flew  down  the  grassy  slope  leading  to  the  Martiniere. 
We  reined  up  for  a few  seconds  to  look  at  the  view  which  opened  out 
before  us.  In  front  rose  the  fluted  masonry  column  of  the  Martiniere, 
123  feet  high ; directly  behind,  the  picturesque  building  itself,  and  in 
the  distance  the  domes  and  minarets  of  the  mosques  and  palaces 
within  the  city  of  Lucknow;  all  looked  bright  and  fair  in  the 
morning  sun. 

We  could  see  that  the  Martiniere  was  occupied ; a crowd  of  sepoys 
were  collected  round  the  building ; and  as  we  showed  ourselves  on 
the  brow  of  the  hill,  a number  of  round  shot  came  tumbling  in 
amongst  us. 

Remmington’s  troop  of  Horse  .Artillery,  Bourchier's  battery,  and  a 
heavy  howitzer  brought  up  by  Captain  Hardy,  now  came  into  action, 
and  under  cover  of  their  fire  the  8th  Foot  and  1st  battalion  of 
Detachments  attacked  and  drove  the  enemy  out  of  the  Martiniere, 
while  the  Cavalry  pursued  them  as  far  as  the  canal. 

On  this  occasion  my  friend  Watson  greatly  distinguished  himself. 
Entirely  alone  he  attacked  the  enemy’s  Cavalry,  and  was  at  once 
engaged  with  its  leader  and  six  of  the  front  men ; he  fought  gallantly, 
but  the  unequal  contest  could  not  have  lasted  much  longer  had  not 
Probyn,  who,  with  his  own  and  Watson’s  squadrons,  was  only  about 
300  yards  off,  become  aware  of  his  comrade’s  critical  position,  and 
dashed  to  his  assistance.  For  this  ‘ and  gallantry  on  many  other 
occasions,’  Hope  Grant  recommended  Watson  for  the  Victoria  Cross, 
which  he  duly  received.* 

By  noon  on  the  14th  we  had  occupied  the  Dilkusha  and  Martiniere, 
and  placed  our  outposts  along  the  right  bank  of  the  canal  from  the 
river  to  the  point  immediately  opposite  Banks’s  house.  The  left  bank 
was  held  in  force  by  the  rebels.  Early  in  the  afternoon  I went  with 
Hope  Grant,  accompanied  by  a small  force  of  Cavalry,  to  ascertain 
whether  it  would  be  possible  to  ford  the  canal  somewhere  close  to  the 
river,  and  we  succeeded  in  finding  a place  by  which  the  whole  force 
crossed  two  days  later.  Our  movements  were  fortunately  not  noticed 
by  the  enemy,  whose  attention  was  concentrated  on  the  roads  leading 
direct  to  the  city  from  the  Dilkusha  and  Martiniere,  by  which  they 
expected  our  advance  to  be  made. 

* During  one  of  Watson’s  many  reconnaissances  be  received  a cut  on  the 
face  from  a sabre.  One  of  the  2nd  Punjab  Cavalrymen,  seeing  what  had 
happened,  rushed  to  Probyn,  and  said:  ‘Watson  sahib  has  got  a wound 
which  is  worth  a lakh  of  rupees  !’ 


1857] 


THE  DILKUSHA  AND  MARTINIERE 


173 


Sir  Colin,  meanwhile,  had  fixed  his  Head-Quarters  in  the  Martiniere, 
on  the  topmost  pinnacle  of  which  he  caused  a semaphore  to  be  erected 
for  communication  with  Outram.  From  this  post  of  vantage 
Kavanagh  was  able  to  point  out  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  the 
different  objects  of  most  interest  to  him— the  positions  taken  up  by 
the  enemy;  the  group  of  buildings,  of  which  the  Chatta  Manzil*  was 
the  most  conspicuous,  then  occupied  by  the  gallant  troops  led  by 
Outram  and  Havelock,  who,  by  overwhelming  numbers  alone,  had 
been  prevented  from  carrying  their  glorious  enterprise  to  a successful 
issue ; the  Residency,  where,  thanks  to  Sir  Henry  Lawrence’s  fore- 
sight and  admirable  arrangements,  a handful  of  heroic  Britons  had 
been  able  to  defy  the  hordes  of  disciplined  soldiers  and  armed  men 
who,  for  nearly  three  months,  day  and  night,  had  never  ceased  to 
attack  the  position ; and  the  Kaisarbagh,  that  pretentious,  garish 
palace  of  the  Kings  of  Oudh,  the  centre  of  every  kind  of  evil  and 
debauchery. 

Later  in  the  day  the  enemy  made  a determined  attack  on  our  centre, 
which  was  checked  by  Brigadier  Little  advancing  with  the  9th  Lancers 
and  some  guns.  On  a few  rounds  being  fired,  they  retired  from  the 
immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  canal,  and  in  the  belief  that  there 
would  be  no  further  trouble  that  day,  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery 
returned  to  the  Martiniere ; but  the  guns  -were  hardly  unlimbered 
before  heavy  firing  was  heard  from  the  direction  of  Banks’s  house. 

I galloped  off  with  Mayne  to  ascertain  the  cause.  Some  little 
distance  from  the  canal  we  separated,  Mayne  going  to  the  left,  I to  the 
right.  I found  the  piquets  hotly  engaged,  and  the  officer  in  command 
begged  me  to  get  him  some  assistance.  I returned  to  Hope  Grant  to 
report  what  was  going  on,  but  on  the  way  I met  the  supports  coming 
up,  and  presently  they  were  followed  by  the  remainder  of  Hope’s  and 
Russell’s  brigades.  Russell  had,  early  in  the  day,  •with  soldierly 
instinct,  seized  two  villages  a little  above  the  bridge  to  the  north  of 
Banks’s  house ; this  enabled  him  to  bring  a fire  to  bear  upon  the 
enemy  as  they  advanced,  and  effectually  prevented  their  turning  our 
left.  Hope  opened  fire  with  Remmington’s  troop,  Bourchier’s  battery, 
and  some  of  Peel’s  24-pounders,  and  as  soon  as  he  found  it  had  taken 
effect  and  the  rebels  were  shaken,  he  proceeded  to  push  them  across 
the  canal  and  finally  drove  them  off  with  considerable  loss. 

Hope’s  and  Russell’s  united  action,  by  which  our  left  flank  was 
secured,  was  most  timely,  for  had  it  been  turned,  our  long  line  of 
camels,  laden  with  ammunition,  and  the  immense  string  of  carts 
carrying  supplies,  would  in  all  probability  have  been  captured.  As  it 

* Built  by  a king  of  Oudh  for  the  ladies  of  his  harem.  It  takes  its  name 
from  the  gilt  umbrella  (Chatta)  with  which  it  is  adorned.  Xow  the  Lucknow 
Club. 


174 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

was,  the  rear  guard,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewart,*  of  the  93rd 
Highlanders,  had  a hot  time  of  it ; it  was  frequently  attacked,  and  its 
progress  was  so  slow  that  it  was  more  than  twenty-four  hours  between 
the  Alambagh  and  the  Dilkusha. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  fight  I heard,  with  great  grief,  that  my  poor 
friend  Mayne  had  been  killed,  shot  through  the  breast  a few  seconds 
after  he  had  left  me.  He  was  seen  to  turn  his  horse,  and,  after  going 
a short  distance,  fall  to  the  ground ; when  picked  up  he  was  quite 
dead.  This  was  all  I could  learn.  No  one  was  able  to  tell  me  where 
his  body  had  been  taken,  and  I looked  for  it  myself  all  that  evening 
in  vain. 

At  daybreak  the  next  morning,  accompanied  by  Arthur  Bunny,  the 
cheery  Adjutant  of  Horse  Artillery,  I began  my  search  afresh,  and  at 
length  we  discovered  the  body  inside  a doolie  under  the  wall  of  the 
Martiniere.  As  there  was  no  knowing  how  soon  our  services  might  be 
required,  we  decided  to  bury  the  poor  fellow  at  once.  I chose  a spot 
close  by  for  his  grave,  which  was  dug  with  the  help  of  some  gunners, 
and  then  Bunny  and  I,  aided  by  two  or  three  brother  officers,  laid  our 
friend  in  it  just  as  he  was,  in  his  blue  frock-coat  and  long  boots,  his 
eyeglass  in  his  eye,  as  he  always  carried  it.  The  only  thing  I took 
away  was  his  sword,  which  I eventually  made  over  to  his  family.  It 
was  a sad  little  ceremony.  Overhanging  the  grave  was  a young  tree, 
upon  which  I cut  the  initials  ‘ A.  O.  M.’ — not  very  deep,  for  there  was 
little  time : they  were  quite  distinct,  however,  and  remained  so  long 
enough  for  the  grave  to  be  traced  by  Mayne’s  friends,  who  erected  the 
stone  now  to  be  seen. 

The  whole  of  that  day  (the  15th)  was  spent  in  preparing  for  the 
advance.  The  Dilkusha  was  turned  into  a general  depot,  where  the 
sick  and  wounded  were  placed,  also  the  Ordnance  park  and  stores  of 
every  description.  A rough  defence  was  thrown  up  round  the  building, 
and  a garrison  was  left  to  protect  it,  consisting  of  five  Field  guns,  half 
the  9th  Lancers,  the  Military  Train,  a squadron  of  Punjab  Cavalry, 
and  the  8th  Foot,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  Little,  the  Brigadier 
of  Cavalry. 

In  the  afternoon  Sir  Colin  made  a feint  to  the  left  of  our  position  for 
the  purpose  of  diverting  tho  attention  of  the  enemy  from  the  real  line 
of  advance.  He  massed  the  Artillery  in  this  direction,  and  ordered  a 
constant  mortar  fire  to  be  kept  up  during  the  night  on  tho  Begum 
palace  and  the  barracks.  To  further  strengthen  the  belief  that  opera- 
tions would  be  carried  on  from  our  left,  some  of  the  piquets  on  our 
right  were  drawn  in ; this  induced  the  enemy  to  make  a slight  demon- 
stration in  that  direction.  They  crossed  the  canal,  but  were  speedily 
driven  back  by  the  Madras  Horse  Artillery  guns.  They  then  opened 


Now  General  Sir  John  Ewart,  K.C.  13. 


A TALL  TALK  STORY 


<75 


1857] 

fire  with  a 12-pounder  howitzer  from  the  west  side  of  the  Gumti,  when 
a really  most  extraordinary  incident  happened,  which  I am  not  sure  I 
should  have  the  courage  to  relate,  were  it  not  that  Sir  Pighton  Probyn 
and  Sir  John  Watson,  who  were  close  by  and  saw  what  took  place,  are 
able  to  vouch  for  the  accuracy  of  my  story. 

A shell,  fortunately  a blind  one,  from  the  enemy’s  howitzer  came 
into  Watson’s  squadron,  which  was  drawn  up  under  the  bank  of  the 
Martiniere  tank ; it  struck  a trooper’s  saddle  in  front,  and  must  have 
lifted  the  man  partly  out  of  it,  for  it  passed  between  his  thigh  and  the 
horse,  tearing  the  saddle*  to  shreds,  and  sending  one  piece  of  it  high 
into  the  air.  The  horse  was  knocked  down,  but  not  hurt ; the  man's 
thigh  was  only  badly  bruised,  and  he  was  able  to  ride  again  in  a few 
days.  One  of  Watson’s  officers,  Captain  Cosserat,  having  examined 
the  man  and  horse,  came  up  and  reported  their  condition  to  Watson, 
who,  of  course,  was  expecting  to  be  told  they  were  both  dead,  and 
added  : * I think  we  had  better  not  tell  this  story  in  England,  for  no 
one  would  believe  it.’  I myself  was  close  to  the  squadron,  and  dis- 
tinctly saw  what  happened.  + 

All  that  day  (the  15th)  I had  been  very  hard  at  work,  and  was 
greatly  looking  forward  to  what  I hoped  would  be  a quiet  night,  when 
an  Aide-de-camp  appeared,  who  informed  me  that  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  desired  my  presence  at  the  Martiniere. 

On  reporting  myself  to  His  Excellency,  he  told  me  that  he  was  not 
satisfied  that  a sufficient  reserve  of  small-arm  ammunition  had  been 
brought  with  the  force,  and  that  the  only  chance  of  getting  more  in 
time  was  to  send  back  to  the  Alambagh  for  it  that  night,  adding  that 
he  could  neither  afford  the  time  nor  spare  the  troops  which  would  be 
required,  -were  the  business  of  fetching  the  additional  supply  to  be  post- 
poned until  the  following  day.  Sir  Colin  then  asked  me  if  I thought  I 
could  find  my  way  back  to  the  Alambagh  in  the  dark.  I answered, 
‘ I am  sure  I can.’  I might  have  hesitated  to  speak  so  confidently  had 
I not  taken  the  precaution  of  placing  the  man  who  had  acted  as  my 
guide  on  the  14th  in  charge  of  some  Afghan  cliuprassies%  attached  to 
the  Quartermaster-General’s  department,  with  strict  orders  not  to  lose 

It  was  a Native  saddle,  such  as  Irregular  Cavalry  used  in  those  days, 
made  of  felt  without  a tree. 

T On  one  occasion,  when  I was  telling  this  story  to  General  Sir  Samuel 
Browne,  V.C..  he  said  that  something  similar  happened  at  the  battle  of 
Sadnlapur  on  December  2,  1848.  He  (Browne)  was  Adjutant  of  his  regiment 
(the  46th  Native  Infantry),  whi.h  was  drawn  up  in  line,  v.  ith  a troop  of  Horse 
Artillery,  commanded  by  Major  Kinleside,  on  its  right  flank.  Seeing  that 
something  unusual  had  occurred,  Browne  rode  up  to  the  troop,  and  found 
that  one  of  the  men  had  had  his  saddle  carried  away  from  under  him  by  a 
small  round  shot.  The  man,  who  happened  at  the  moment  to  be  standing 
up  in  his  stirrups,  escaped  with  a bruise,  as  did  the  horse. 

t A kind  of  more  or  less  responsible  servant  or  messenger,  so  called  from 
wearing  a chuprass,  or  badge  of  office. 


12 


176 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


sight  of  him.  I thought,  therefore,  I would  have  him  to  depend  upon 
if  my  own  memory  failed  me.  The  Commander-in-Chief  impressed 
very  strongly  upon  me  the  great  necessity  for  caution,  and  told  me  I 
could  take  what  escort  I thought  necessary,  but  that,  whatever  hap- 
pened, I must  be  back  by  daybreak,  as  he  had  signalled  to  Outram  that 
the  force  would  advance  on  the  morrow.  Sir  Colin  desired  that  the 
Ordnance  officer,  whose  fault  it  was  that  sufficient  ammunition  had  not 
been  brought,  should  go  back  with  me  and  be  left  at  the  Alambagh. 

It  was  then  dusk,  and  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  In  the  first 
instance  I went  to  my  General,  and  reporting  the  orders  I had  received 
from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  consulted  him  about  my  escort.  Hope 
Grant  strongly  urged  my  taking  with  me  a troop  of  the  9th  Lancers, 
as  well  as  some  Native  Cavalry,  but  for  a night  trip  I thought  it  would 
be  better  to  employ  Natives  only.  I knew  that  my  one  chance  of 
success  depended  on  neither  being  seen  nor  heard,  and  Native  Cavalry 
move  more  quietly  than  British,  chiefly  because  their  scabbards  are  of 
wood,  instead  of  steel.  I felt,  too,  that  if  we  came  across  the  enemy, 
which  was  not  improbable,  and  got  scattered,  Natives  would  run  less 
risk,  and  be  better  able  to  look  after  themselves.  All  this  I explained 
to  the  General,  but  in  the  kindness  of  his  heart  he  pressed  me  to  take 
the  Lancers,  telling  me  he  would  feel  happier  about  me  if  I had  my 
own  countrymen  with  me  ; but  I stuck  to  my  own  opinion,  and  it  was 
arranged  that  I was  to  be  accompanied  by  Younghusband  and  Hugh 
Gough,  with  their  respective  squadrons  of  Native  Cavalry.  I took 
leave  of  my  kind  and  considerate  General,  and  hurried  off  first  to  warn 
the  two  Cavalry  officers,  then  to  the  Dilkusha  to  tell  Lieutenant  Tod 
Brown,  in  charge  of  the  Ordnance  depot,  that  his  assistant  was  to  go 
with  me,  and  lastly  to  arrange  with  the  Commissariat  officer  for  camels 
upon  which  to  bring  back  the  ammunition. 

It  was  quite  dark  before  I got  to  the  place  where  my  servants  had 
collected,  and  where  I expected  to  find  my  guide.  What  was  my 
horror  to  hear  that  he  had  disappeared  ! He  had  made  his  escape  in 
the  confusion  consequent  on  the  enemy’s  attacks  the  previous  after- 
noon. What  was  to  be  done  now  ? I was  in  despair — and  became 
more  and  more  doubtful  of  my  ability  to  find  the  Alambagh  in  the 
dark.  By  daylight,  and  with  the  aid  of  a compass,  which  I always 
carried  about  me,  I should  have  had  little  difficulty,  even  though  the 
country  we  had  to  get  over  was  intersected  by  ravines  and  water- 
courses, not  to  speak  of  the  uncompromising  jhil  near  the  Jalalabad 
fort.  However,  go  I must.  I could  not  possibly  tell  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  that  I was  unable  to  carry  out  a duty  for  which  he  had 
selected  me — there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  trust  to  my  own  recollec- 
tion of  the  route  and  hope  for  the  best. 

Everything  having  been  put  in  train,  I returned  to  the  Artillery 
bivouac,  managed  a hasty  dinner,  mounted  a fresh  horse,  and,  about 


A NIGHT  MARCH 


'77 


1857] 

9 p.m.,  started  off,  accompanied  by  Younghusband,  Hugli  Gough,  the 
unlucky  Ordnance  officer,  two  squadrons  of  Cavalry,  and  150  camels. 

We  got  on  well  enough  until  we  reached  the  broken  ground  near  the 
present  Native  Cavalry  lines,  when  we  lost  the  road,  or  rather  track, 
for  road  there  was  none.  We  could  see  nothing  but  the  lights  of  the 
enemy’s  piquets  at  an  uncomfortably  short  distance  to  our  right.  I 
struck  a match,  and  made  out  from  the  compass  the  right  direction ; 
but  that  did  not  help  us  to  clear  the  ravines,  which,  in  our  efforts  to 
turn  or  get  through  them,  made  our  way  appear  interminable.  At 
length  we  found  ourselves  upon  open  ground ; but,  alas ! having 
edged  off  too  much  to  our  right  we  were  in  close  proximity  to  the 
enemy’s  piquets,  and  could  distinctly  hear  their  voices.  We  halted  to 
collect  the  long  string  of  camels,  and  as  soon  as  they  were  got  in  order 
started  off  again.  I led  the  way,  every  few  minutes  striking  a light  to 
see  how  the  compass  was  pointing,  and  to  take  an  anxious  look  at  my 
watch,  for  I was  beginning  to  fear  I should  not  be  able  to  accomplish 
my  task  by  the  given  time.  Our  pace  was  necessarily  slow,  and  our 
halts  frequent,  for  the  little  party  had  to  be  carefully  kept  together. 

At  last  the  Jalalabad  fort  was  reached  and  passed.  I then  told 
Hugh  Gough,  whose  squadron  was  hi  front,  that  we  had  better  halt, 
for  we  could  not  be  far  from  the  Alambagh,  and  I was  afraid  that  if  we 
approached  in  a body  we  should  be  fired  upon,  in  which  case  the 
c.unel-drivers  would  assuredly  run  away,  there  would  be  a stampede 
amongst  the  camels,  and  we  might  find  it  difficult  to  make  ourselves 
known.  I decided  it  would  be  best  for  me  to  go  on  alone,  and 
arranged  with  Gough  that  he  should  remain  where  he  was  until  I 
returned. 

The  Alambagh  proved  to  be  farther  off  than  I calculated,  and  I was 
beginning  to  fear  I had  lost  my  way,  when  all  at  once  a great  wall 
loomed  in  front  of  me,  and  I could  just  make  out  the  figure  of  the 
sentry  pacing  up  and  down.  I hailed  him,  and  ordered  him  to  ask  the 
sergeant  of  the  guard  to  summon  the  officer  on  duty.  “When  the 
latter  appeared,  I explained  to  him  my  object  in  coming,  and  begged 
him  to  have  the  ammunition  boxes  ready  for  lading  by  the  time  I 
returned  with  the  camels.  I then  rode  back  to  where  I had  left  Gough, 
and  the  whole  procession  proceeded  to  the  Alambagh. 

Already  half  the  night  was  gone  ; but  beyond  the  time  required  for 
loading  the  camels  there  was  no  delay ; the  utmost  assistance  was 
afforded  us,  and  ere  long  we  started  on  our  return  journey. 

Day  had  dawned  before  we  came  in  sight  of  the  Dilkusha,  and  by 
the  time  I had  made  the  ammunition  over  to  the  Ordnance  officer  it 
was  broad  daylight.  As  I rode  up  to  the  Martiniere  I could  see  old 
Sir  Colin,  only  partially  dressed,  standing  on  the  steps  in  evident 
anxiety  at  my  non-arrival. 

He  was  delighted  when  at  last  I appeared,  expressed  himself  very 

12—2 


i78 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[■857 


pleased  to  see  me,  and,  having  made  many  kind  and  complimentary 
remarks  as  to  the  success  of  the  little  expedition,  he  told  me  to  go  off 
and  get  something  to  eat  as  quickly  as  possible,  for  we  were  to  start 
directly  the  men  had  breakfasted.  That  was  a very  happy  moment  for 
me,  feeling  that  I had  earned  my  Chief’s  approbation  and  justified  his 
selection  of  me.  I went  off  to  the  Artillery  camp,  and  refreshed  the 
inner  man  with  a steak  cut  off  a gun  bullock  which  had  been  killed  by 
a round  shot  on  the  14th. 

At  8 a.m.  the  troops  moved  off.  I was  ordered  to  go  with  the 
advance  guard.*  Hope’s  and  Bussell's  brigades  came  next,  with 
Travers’s  Heavy  battery,  Peel’s  Naval  Brigade,  and  Middleton’s  Field 
battery. 

Greathed's  brigade  (except  the  8th  Foot  left  at  the  Dilkusha),  with 
Bourchier's  battery,  remained  to  guard  our  left  flank  until  mid-day, 
when  it  was  ordered  to  follow  the  column  and  form  its  rear  guard. 

The  offer  of  a Native  who  volunteered  to  guide  us  was  accepted,  and 
Sir  Colin,  who  rode  just  behind  the  advance  guard,  had  Kavanagh 
with  him,  whose  local  knowledge  proved  very  valuable. 

The  enemy  had  been  so  completely  taken  in  by  the  previous  day’s 
reconnaissance  that  they  had  not  the  slightest  suspicion  we  should 
advance  from  our  right,  the  result  being  that  we  were  allowed  to  cross 
the  canal  without  opposition,  f IVe  kept  close  along  the  river  bank,  our 
left  being  partially  concealed  by  the  high  grass.  About  a mile  beyond 
the  canal  we  turned  sharp  to  the  left,  and  passed  through  the  narrow 
street  of  a small  village,  coming  immediately  under  fire  from  some 
houses  on  our  right,  and  from  the  top  of  a high  wall  above  and 
beyond  them,  which  turned  out  to  be  the  north-east  corner  of  the 
Sikandarbagh. 

The  greatest  confusion  ensued,*  and  for  a time  there  was  a complete 
block.  The  Cavalry  in  advance  were  checked  by  a fierce  fire  poured 
directly  on  them  from  the  front : they  were  powerless,  and  the  only 
thing  for  them  to  do  was  to  force  their  way  back,  down  the  confined 

* It  consisted  of  Blunt’s  troop  of  Horse  Artillery,  the  wing  of  the  53rd 
Foot,  and  Gough’s  squadron  of  Hodson’s  Horse. 

+ We  had  not,  however,  gone  far,  when  a body  of  rebel  Infantry,  about 
2,000  strong,  managing  to  elude  Greathed’s  brigade,  crossed  the  canal,  and, 
creeping  quietly  up,  rushed  the  Martiniere.  Sir  Colin  had  left  Lieutenant 
Patrick  Stewart,  an  unusually  promising  officer  of  the  Bengal  Engineers,  on 
the  top  of  the  Martiniere  to  keep  Outram  informed  of  our  movements  by 
means  of  the  semaphore,  and  while  Stewart  was  sending  a message  he  and 
Watson  (who  was  with  him)  observed  the  enemy  close  up  to  the  building. 
They  flew  down  the  staircase,  jum|>cd  on  their  horses,  amt,  joining  Watson’s 
squadron  and  the  two  Madras  Native  Horse  Artillery  guns,  rode  to  the  city 
side  of  the  Martiniere  to  try  and  cut  off  the  enemy,  who,  finding  no  one  inside 
the  building,  and  seeing  their  line  of  retreat  threatened,  made  the  best  of  their 
way  back  to  the  city.  Several  were  killed  by  the  Horse  Artillery,  which 
opened  upon  them  with  grape,  and  by  Watson's  sowars. 


1857] 


SIR  COLIN  WOUNDED 


179 


lane  we  had  just  passed  up,  which  by  this  time  was  crammed  with 
Infantry  and  Artillery,  making  ‘ confusion  worse  confounded.’  As  soon 
as  the  Cavalry  had  cleared  out,  the  53rd  lined  the  bank  which  ran 
along  the  side  of  the  lane  nearest  the  Sikandarbagh,  and  by  their  fire 
caused  all  those  of  the  rebels  who  had  collected  outside  the  walls  to 
retire  within  the  enclosure.  This  opened  a road  for  Blunt,  who,  lend- 
ing his  guns  up  the  bank  with  a splendid  courage,  unlimbered  and 
opened  fire  within  sixty  yards  of  the  building. 

Blunt  found  himself  under  a heavy  fire  from  three  different  directions 
— on  the  right  from  the  Sikandarbagh  ; on  the  left  and  left  front  from 
the  barracks,  some  huts  (not  twenty  yards  off),  and  a serai;  and  in 
front  from  the  mess-house,  Ivaisarbagh,  and  other  buildings.  In  these 
three  directions  he  pointed  his  guns,  regardless  of  deadly  fire,  especially 
from  the  huts  on  the  left. 

It  would,  however,  have  been  impossible  for  the  advance  guard  to 
have  held  its  ground  much  longer,  so  it  was  with  a feeling  of  the 
utmost  relief  that  I beheld  Hope’s  brigade  coming  up  the  lane  to  our 
assistance.  A company  of  the  53rd,  in  the  most  brilliant  manner, 
forced  the  enemy  from  the  position  they  held  on  our  left  front,  and 
the  Highlanders,  without  a moment’s  hesitation,  climbed  on  to  the 
huts — the  point,  as  I have  already  said,  from  which  the  heaviest  fire 
proceeded;  they  tore  off  the  roofs,  and,  leaping  into  the  houses,  drove 
the  enemy  before  them  right  through  the  serai  and  up  to  the  barracks, 
which  they  seized,  and  for  the  remainder  of  the  operations  these 
barracks  were  held  by  the  93rd. 

This  action  on  the  part  of  the  Highlanders  was  as  serviceable  as  it 
was  heroic,  for  it  silenced  the  fire  most  destructive  to  the  attacking 
force ; but  for  all  that,  our  position  was  extremely  critical,  and 
Sir  Colin,  perceiving  the  danger,  at  once  decided  that  no  further  move 
could  be  attempted  until  we  had  gained  possession  of  the  Sikandar- 
bagh. It  was,  indeed,  a formidable-looking  place  to  attack,  about 
130  yards  square,  surrounded  by  a thick  brick  wall  twenty  feet  high, 
carefully  loopholed,  and  flanked  at  the  coiners  by  circular  bastions. 
There  was  only  one  entrance,  a gateway  on  the  south  side,  protected 
by  a traverse  of  earth  and  masonry,  over  which  was  a double-storied 
guard-room.  Close  to  the  north  side  of  the  enclosure  was  a pavilion 
with  a flat  roof  prepared  for  musketry,  and  from  the  whole  place  an 
incessant  fire  was  being  kept  up. 

Sir  Colin,  in  order  to  get  a better  view  of  the  position,  and  thus  be 
able  to  decide  in  what  direction  the  attack  could  most  advantageously 
be  made,  rode  up  the  bank  and  placed  himself  close  to  one  of  Blunt’s 
guns.  Mansfield  and  Hope  Grant  were  on  either  side,  and  Augustus 
Anson  and  I were  directly  behind,  when  I heard  the  Commander  in- 
Chief  exclaim,  ‘ I am  hit.’  Luckily  it  was  only  by  a spent  bullet, 
which  had  passed  through  a gunner  (killing  him  on  the  spot)  before  it 


i8o 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

struck  Sir  Colin  on  the  thigh,  causing  a severe  contusion,  but  nothing 
more.  It  was  a moment  of  acute  anxiety  until  it  was  ascertained  that 
no  great  damage  had  been  done. 

By  this  time  one  of  Travers’s  guns  and  a howitzer,  which  with  con- 
siderable difficulty  had  been  dragged  up  the  bank,  opened  fire  on  the 
point  selected  by  Sir  Colin  for  the  breach — the  south-east  corner  of  the 
wall  surrounding  the  Sikandarbagh.*  Instantly  Hardy  (Captain  of  the 
battery)  was  killed  and  the  senior  Subaltern  wounded : Blunt’s  charger 
was  shot,  and  of  the  few  men  under  his  command  14  Europeans  and 
6 Gun  Lascars  were  killed  or  wounded ; 20  of  the  troop-horses  were 
also  knocked  over.f 

While  the  heavy  guns  were  at  work  on  the  breach,  Adrian  Hope, 
with  the  53rd,  cleared  off  a body  of  the  enemy  who  had  collected  on 
our  left  front,  and  connected  the  barracks  with  the  main  attack  by  a 
line  of  skirmishers. 

In  less  than  half  an  hour  an  opening  three  feet  square  and  three  feet 
from  the  ground  had  been  made  in  the  wall.  It  would  have  been 
better  had  it  been  larger,  but  time  was  precious ; Sir  Colin  would  not 
wait,  and  ordered  the  assault  to  begin.  The  Infantry  had  been  lying 
down,  under  such  slight  cover  as  was  available,  impatiently  awaiting 
for  this  order.  The  moment  it  reached  them,  up  they  sprang  with  one 
accord,  and  with  one  voice  uttered  a shout  which  must  have  fore- 
shadowed defeat  to  the  defenders  of  the  Sikandarbagh.  The  93rd 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewart,  and  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry  under 
Lieutenant  Paul,  led  the  way,  closely  followed  by  the  53rd  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Gordon^  of  the  93rd  Highlanders,  and  one  of  the 
battalions  of  Detachments  under  Major  Roger  Barnston. 

* This  wall  has  long  since  been  built  up,  and  the  whole  place  is  so  over- 
grown with  jungle  that  it  was  with  difficulty  I could  trace  the  actual  site  of 
the  breach  when  I last  visited  Lucknow  in  1893. 

f Blunt’s  troop,  when  it  left  Uraballa  in  May,  1857,  consisted  of  93 
Europeans  and  20  Native  Gun  Lascars.  It  suffered  so  severely  at  Delhi  that 
only  live  guns  could  be  manned  when  it  marched  from  there  in  September, 
and  after  the  fight  at  Agra  its  total  loss  amounted  to  12  killed  and  25 
wounded.  Four  guns  could  then  with  difficulty  he  manned.  When  Blunt 
left  the  troop  in  January,  1858,  to  take  command  of  Bourchier’s  Field  Battery, 
69  out  of  the  113  men  with  whom  he  had  commenced  the  campaign  had  been 
killed  or  wounded  ! The  troop  would  have  been  unserviceable,  had  men  not 
volunteered  for  it  from  other  corps,  and  drivers  been  posted  to  it  from  the 
Royal  Artillery.  At  the  commencement  of  the  Mutiny  Blunt  was  a subaltern, 
and  in  ten  months  he  found  himself  a Lieutenant-Colonel  and  a C.  B.  Quick 
promotion  and  great  rewards  indeed,  but  nothing  more  than  he  richly  deserved  ; 
for  seldom,  if  ever,  has  a battery  and  its  commander  had  a grander  record 
to  show. 

X Captain  Walton  was  the  senior  officer  of  the  regiment  present,  and  took 
a conspicuous  part  in  leading  it,  but  as  in  Sir  Colin  Campbell’s  opinion  he 
was  too  junior  to  be  in  command,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gordon  was  appointed 
as  a temporary  measure. 


HEROIC  DEEDS 


181 


1857] 

It  was  a magnificent  sight,  a sight  never  to  be  forgotten — that  glorious 
struggle  to  be  the  first  to  enter  the  deadly  breach,  the  prize  to  the 
winner  of  the  race  being  certain  death ! Highlanders  and  Sikhs, 
Punjabi  Mahomedans,  Dograsf'  and  Pathans,  all  vied  with  each  other 
in  the  generous  competition. f 

A Highlander  was  the  first  to  reach  the  goal,  and  was  shot  dead  as 
he  jumped  into  the  enclosure  ; a man  of  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry  came 
nest,  and  met  the  same  fate.  Then  followed  Captain  Burroughs  and 
Lieutenant  Cooper,  of  the  93rd,  and  immediately  behind  them  their 
Colonel  (Ewart),  Captain  Lumsden,  of  the  30th  Bengal  Infantry, J and 
a number  of  Sikhs  and  Highlanders  as  fast  as  they  could  scramble 
through  the  opening.  A drummer-boy  of  the  93rd  must  have  been  one 
of  the  first  to  pass  that  grim  boundary  between  life  and  death,  for  when 
I got  in  I found  him  just  inside  the  breach,  lying  on  his  back  quite  dead 
— a pretty,  innocent-looking,  fair-haired  lad,  not  more  than  fourteen 
years  of  age. 

The  crush  now  became  so  great  in  the  men’s  eagerness  to  get  through 
the  opening  and  join  the  conflict  within,  that  a regular  block  was  the 
consequence,  which  every  minute  became  more  hopeless.  One  party 
made  for  the  gateway  and  another  for  a barred  window§  close  by, 
determined  to  force  an  entrance  by  them.  The  traverse  having  been 
rushed  by  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry  gallantly  led  by  a Dogra  Subadar,|| 
a Punjabi  Mahomedan  of  this  distinguished  corps  behaved  with  the 
most  conspicuous  bravery.  The  enemy,  having  been  driven  out  of  the 
earthwork,  made  for  the  gateway,  the  heavy  doors  of  which  were  in  the 
act  of  being  closed,  when  the  Mahomedan  (Mukarrab  Khan  by  name) 
pushed  his  left  arm,  on  which  he  carried  a shield,  between  them,  thus 
preventing  then-  being  shut ; on  his  hand  being  badly  wounded  by  a 
sword-cut,  he  drew  it  out,  instantly  thrusting  in  the  other  arm,  when 
the  right  hand  was  all  but  severed  from  the  wrist.  But  he  gained  his 

* The  word  1 Dogra’  was  originally  applied  to  the  Rajput  clans  in  the  hills 
and  sub-montane  tracts  to  the  north  of  the  Ravi.  In  later  years  it  included 
hill  Rajputs  south  of  the  Ravi,  and  in  military  parlance  all  these  Rajputs  who 
enlisted  in  our  ranks  came  to  be  called  Dogras. 

+ In  consequence  of  the  behaviour  of  the  4tli  Punjab  Infantry  on  this 
occasion,  and  in  other  engagements  in  which  they  served  with  the  93rd  High- 
landers, the  officers  and  men  of  the  latter  corps  took  a great  liking  to  the 
former  regiment,  and  some  years  after  the  Mutiny  two  officers  of  the  93rd, 
who  were  candidates  for  the  Staff  Corps,  specially  applied  to  be  posted  to  the 
4th  Punjab  Infantry. 

$ Attached  as  Interpreter  to  the  93rd  Highlanders. 

§ It  was  here  Captain  Walton,  of  the  53rd,  was  severely  wounded. 

Subadar  Gokal  Sing  was  mentioned  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  in 
despatches  for  his  conduct  on  this  occasion. 

r For  this  act  of  heroism  Mukarrab  Khan  was  given  the  Order  of  Merit,  the 
Indian  equivalent  to  the  Victoria  Cross,  but  carrying  with  it  an  increase  of 
pay.  At  the  end  of  the  campaign  Mukarrab  Khan  left  the  service,  but  when 
his  old  Commanding  officer,  Colonel  Wilde,  went  to  the  Umbeyla  expedition 


182  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

object — the  doors  could  not  be  closed,  and  were  soon  forced  open 
altogether,  upon  which  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry,  the  53rd,  93rd,  and 
some  of  the  Detachments,  swarmed  in. 

This  devoted  action  of  Mukarrab  Khan  I myself  witnessed,  for,  with 
Augustus  Anson,  I got  in  immediately  behind  the  storming  party.  As 
we  reached  the  gateway,  Anson  was  knocked  off  his  horse  by  a bullet, 
which  grazed  the  base  of  the  skull  just  behind  the  right  ear,  and  stunned 
him  for  a moment — the  next,  he  was  up  and  mounted  again,  but  was 
hardly  in  the  saddle  when  his  horse  was  shot  dead. 

The  scene  that  ensued  requires  the  pen  of  a Zola  to  depict.  The 
rebels,  never  dreaming  that  we  should  stop  to  attack  such  a formidable 
position  had  collected  in  the  Sikandarbagh  to  the  number  of  upwards 
of  2,000,  with  the  intention  of  falling  upon  our  right  flank  so  soon  as 
we  should  become  entangled  amongst  the  streets  and  houses  of  the 
Hazratganj.*  They  were  now  completely  caught  in  a trap,  the  only 
outlets  being  by  the  gateway  and  the  breach,  through  which  our  troops 
continued  to  pour.  There  could  therefore  be  no  thought  of  escape,  and 
they  fought  with  the  desperation  of  men  without  hope  of  mercy,  and 
determined  to  sell  their  lives  as  dearly  as  they  could.  Inch  by  inch 
they  were  forced  back  to  the  pavilion,  and  into  the  space  between  it  and 
the  north  wall,  where  they  were  all  shot  or  bayoneted.  There  they  lay 
in  a heap  as  high  as  my  head,  a heaving,  surging  mass  of  dead  and 
dying  inextricably  entangled.  It  was  a sickening  sight,  one  of  those 
which  even  in  the  excitement  of  battle  and  the  flush  of  victory  make 
one  feel  strongly  what  a horrible  side  there  is  to  war.  The  wretched 
wounded  men  could  not  get  clear  of  their  dead  comrades,  however 
great  their  struggles,  and  those  near  the  top  of  this  ghastly  pile  of 
writhing  humanity  vented  their  rage  and  disappointment  on  every 
British  officer  who  approached  by  showering  upon  him  abuse  of  the 
grossest  description. 

The  firing  and  fighting  did  not  cease  altogether  for  some  time  after 
the  main  body  of  the  rebels  were  destroyed.  A few  got  up  into  the 
guard-room  above  the  gateway,  and  tried  to  barricade  themselves  in ; 
others  sought  shelter  in  the  bastions,  but  none  escaped  the  vengeance 
of  the  soldiers.  There  were  some  deadly  combats  between  the  mutinous 
sepoys  and  the  Sikhs.  Eventually  all  the  rebels  were  killed,  save  three 
or  four  who  dropped  over  the  wall  on  the  city  side.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
they  lived  to  tell  the  talc  of  the  dauntless  courage  which  carried  every- 
thing before  it. 

Considering  the  tremendous  odds  which  those  who  first  entered 
through  the  breach  were  exposed  to,  and  the  desperate  nature  of  the 

in  1863,  Mukarrab  Khan  turned  up  and  insisted  on  serving  with  him  as  an 
orderly. 

* One  of  the  principal  thoroughfares  of  Lucknow. 


THE  FOURTH  PUNJAB  INFANTRY 


i857] 


183 


fighting,  our  losses  were  astonishingly  small.  The  93rd  had  2 officers 
and  23  men  (including  the  Sergeant-Major)  killed,  and  7 officers  and 
61  men  wounded. 

The  4th  Punjab  Infantry  went  into  action  with  four  British  officers, 
of  whom  two  were  killed  and  one  was  severely  wounded.  Sixty-nine 
of  the  Native  officers  and  men  were  also  killed  or  wounded.* 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

The  operation  which  I have  tried  to  describe  in  the  last  chapter  was 
not  completed  until  well  on  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  movement 
towards  the  Residency  was  at  once  proceeded  with.  To  the  left  as  w’e 
advanced  the  ground  was  fairly  open  (with  the  exception  of  quite  a 
small  village)  for  about  1,100  yards  in  the  direction  of  the  British 
Infantry  mess-house.  To  the  right  also,  for  about  300  yards,  there  was 
a clear  space,  then  a belt  of  jungle  intersected  by  huts  and  small 
gardens  extending  for  about  400  yards  further,  as  far  as  the  Shah 
Najaf.f  a handsome  white-domed  tomb,  surrounded  by  a court-yard,  and 
enclosed  by  high  masom-y  loopholed  walls  ; and  beyond  the  Shah  Najaf 
rose  the  Kadam  Rasul,  J another  tomb  standing  on  a slight  eminence. 

But  little  opposition  was  experienced  from  the  village,  which  was 
carried  by  the  Infantry,  while  the  Artillery  were  brought  up  to  open  fire 
on  the  Shah  Najaf  and  Kadam  Rasul.  The  latter  was  soon  occupied 
by  the  2nd  Punjab  Infantry,  belonging  to  Greathed’s  brigade,  which 
had  by  this  time  joined  the  main  body ; but  the  Shah  Najaf  proved  a 
harder  nut  to  crack.  This  building  was  almost  concealed  by  dense 

* Lieutenant  Paul,  the  Commandant,  was  killed.  Lieutenant  Oldfield 
mortally,  and  Lieutenant  McQueen  severely,  wounded.  Lieutenant  Willoughby, 
who  brought  the  regiment  out  of  action,  was  quite  a lad,  and  was  killed  at 
Ruhiya  the  following  April.  Both  he  and  McQueen  were  recommended  for 
the  Y.C.  for  their  gallantry  on  this  occasion.  After  the  fight  was  over,  one 
of  the  Native  officers,  bemoaning  the  loss  of  the  British  officers,  asked  me  who 
would  be  sent  to  replace  them.  He  added  : ‘ Sahib,  ham  log  lo.rai  men  bahut 
lez  hain  magar  jang  lea  bandobast  nahin  jante  ’ (‘  Sir,  we  can  fight  well,  but  we 
do  not  understand  military  arrangements  ’).  What  the  old  soldier  intended 
to  convey  to  me  was  his  sense  of  the  inability  of  himself  and  his  comrades  to 
do  without  the  leadership  and  general  management  of  the  British  officers. 

T Shah  Najaf  is  the  tomb  of  Ghazi-ud  din  Haidar,  first  King  of  Oudh. 
built  by  himself.  It  derives  its  name  from  Najaf,  the  hill  on  which  is  built 
the  tomb  of  Ali,  the  son-in-law  of  Mahomed,  and  of  which  tomb  this  is  said  to 
be  a copy. 

X The  Kadam  Rasnl,  or  Prophet’s  footprint,  a Mahomedan  place  of  worship, 
which  contained  a stone  bearing  the  impress  of  the  foot  of  the  Prophet,  brought 
from  Arabia  by  a pilgrim.  During  the  Mutiny  the  holystone  was  carried  off. 


1 84  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

jungle,  and  its  great  strength  therefore  remained  unsuspected  until  we 
got  quite  close  up  to  it. 

Barnston’s  battalion  of  Detachments  advanced  in  skirmishing  order, 
under  cover  of  our  guns.  One  of  the  shells  most  unfortunately  burst 
prematurely,  wounding  Major  Barnston  so  severely  that  he  died  soon 
afterwards.  Whether  it  was  that  the  men  were  depressed  by  the  loss  of 
their  leader,  or  that  they  were  not  prepared  for  the  very  damaging  fire 
which  suddenly  poured  upon  them,  I know  not,  but  certain  it  is  that 
they  wavered,  and  for  a few  minutes  there  was  a slight  panic.  The 
Commander-in-Chief,  with  Hope  Grant,  Mansfield,  Adrian  Hope,  and 
their  respective  staffs,  were  sitting  on  their  horses  anxiously  awaiting 
the  result  of  the  attack,  when  all  at  once  it  became  apparent  that  there 
was  a retrograde  movement  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  men,  who  were 
emerging  from  the  belt  of  jungle  and  hastening  towards  us.  Norman 
was  the  first  to  grasp  the  situation.  Putting  spurs  to  his  horse,  he 
galloped  into  their  midst,  and  called  on  them  to  pull  themselves 
together ; the  men  rallied  at  once,  and  advanced  into  the  cover  from 
which  they  had  for  the  moment  retreated.  I had  many  opportunities 
for  noting  Norman’s  coolness  and  presence  of  mind  under  fire.  On  this 
particular  occasion  these  qualities  were  most  marked,  and  his  action 
was  most  timely. 

More  Infantry  were  brought  up,  but  without  avail.  The  enemy 
evidently  were  determined  to  prevent  the  capture  of  the  Shah  Najaf. 
Fire  was  now  opened  upon  us  from  a heavy  gun  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Gumti  (the  first  shot  from  which  blew  up  one  of  the  ammunition 
waggons  belonging  to  the  Naval  Brigade),  and  all  the  cannon  that 
were  collected  at  the  Kaisarbagh  and  mess-house  were  brought  to  bear 
upon  us.  The  musketry  fire  was  incessant,  and  Peel’s  men  suffered  so 
severely  that  one  of  his  guns  could  not  be  worked. 

Sir  Colin  was  beginning  to  get  extremely  anxious,  and  no  wonder — 
the  position  was  most  uncomfortable,  and  the  prospect  very  gloomy. 
Three  hours  since  the  attack  began  ! The  day  was  rapidly  drawing  to 
a close,  and  we  were  no  nearer  our  object;  on  the  contrary,  the 
opposition  became  every  moment  stronger,  and  the  fire  more  deadly. 
A retreat  was  not  to  be  thought  of ; indeed,  our  remaining  so  long 
stationary  had  been  an  encouragement  to  the  enemy,  and  every  one 
felt  that  the  only  chance  for  the  little  British  army  fighting  against 
.‘SO, 000  desperate  mutineers,  with  every  advantage  of  position  and 
intimate  knowledge  of  locality  in  their  favour,  was  to  continue  to 
advance  at  all  hazards ; and  this  our  gallant  old  Chief  decided  to  do. 
Placing  himself  at  the  head  of  the  93rd,  he  explained  to  the  only  too 
eager  Highlanders  the  dangerous  nature  of  the  service,  and  called  on 
them  to  follow  him.  There  was  no  mistaking  the  response ; cheer 
after  cheer  rent  the  air  as  they  listened  to  the  words  of  the  Chief  they 
knew  so  well,  and  believed  in  so  thoroughly,  assuring  him  of  their 


1857] 


THE  SHAH  NAJAF 


185 

readiness  to  follow  whithersoever  he  should  lead,  do  whatever  he 
should  direct.  They  moved  off,  followed  by  Peel’s  guns  dragged  by 
sailors  and  some  of  the  Madras  Fusiliers,  the  advance  of  the  party 
being  covered  by  Middleton’s  Field  battery,  which  dashed  to  the  front 
and  opened  with  grape. 

Almost  instantaneously  the  narrow  path  along  which  we  were 
proceeding  was  choked  with  wounded  officers  and  dead  and  struggling 
horses.  It  was  here  that  Sir  Archibald  Alison,  Sir  Colin’s  Aide-de- 
camp,  lost  his  arm,  and  his  brother  (another  Aide-de-camp)  was 
wounded.  Adrian  Hope’s  horse  was  shot  dead — indeed,  very  few 
escaped  injury,  either  to  themselves  or  their  horses.  I was  one  of  the 
lucky  few.  On  reaching  the  wall  of  the  Shah  Najaf  enclosure,  it  was 
found  to  be  twenty  feet  high,  no  entrance  could  be  seen,  and  there 
were  no  scaling-ladders  available,  so  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to 
endeavour  to  breach  the  massive  wall.*  The  24-pounders  hammered 
away  at  it  for  some  time,  but  proved  quite  unequal  to  the  task ; though 
only  a few  yards  off,  they  made  no  impression  whatever,  and  it  seemed 
as  if  the  attempt  to  take  the  position  must  be  abandoned.  Peel  was, 
therefore,  ordered  to  withdraw  his  guns  under  cover  of  some  rockets, 
which  were  discharged  into  the  enclosure,  and  Hope  was  directed  to 
retire  as  soon  as  he  could  collect  the  killed  and  wounded. 

Captain  Allgood,  Sir  Cohn’s  trusted  Assistant  Quartermaster-General, 
was  the  bearer  of  the  order.  He  and  Hope,  after  consulting  together, 
determined  that  before  the  latter  obeyed  they  would  try  to  discover  if 
there  did  not  exist  an  opening  in  some  other  part  of  the  walls. 
Assisted  by  a sergeant  of  the  93rd,  they  set  about  their  search,  and 
actually  did  find  a narrow  gap,  through  which  they  could  see  that  the 
enemy,  terrified  and  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  exploding  rockets 
falling  amongst  them,  were  fast  abandoning  the  building.  The  two 
friends  helped  each  other  through  the  gap,  and,  followed  by  some 
Highlanders,  they  proceeded  across  the  now  deserted  enclosure  to 
secure  the  only  gateway,  which  was  on  the  opposite  side  to  that  which 
we  had  attacked ; and  Allgood  had  the  great  pleasure  of  announcing  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief  that  there  was  no  need  to  retire,  for  the 
formidable  position  was  in  our  possession. 

It  was  getting  dark  when  at  length  we  occupied  the  Shah  Najaf ; 
some  of  us  got  on  to  the  top  of  the  building  to  take  a look  round. 
There  was  just  fight  enough  to  showT  us  a sepoy  sauntering  uncon- 
cernedly up  to  the  gate,  evidently  in  happy  ignorance  of  what  had 
happened.  He  soon  discovered  that  his  comrades  were  no  longer 
masters  of  the  situation,  and,  letting  his  musket  fall,  he  made  all 

* Lieutenant  Salmon,  R.N.  (now  Admiral  Sir  Nowell  Salmon,  K.C.B.), 
climbed  up  a tree  overhanging  this  wall,  in  order  to  see  what  was  going  on 
behind  it  ; he  succeeded  in  obtaining  useful  information,  but  on  being  per- 
ceived, was  fired  at  and  badly  wounded.  He  received  the  V.C. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


1 86 


[1857 


haste  to  the  river,  into  which  he  dropped,  and  swam  10  the  other 

side. 

Sir  Colin  and  my  General  took  up  their  quarters  in  the  Shah  Najaf, 
but  only  nominally,  for  after  a scratch  dinner  we  all  joined  the  troops, 
who  bivouacked  where  they  stood. 

The  force  was  disposed  in  a semicircle,  extending  from  the  Shah 
Najaf  to  the  barracks.  The  wounded  were  placed  in  the  huts  near  the 
Sikandarbagh,  where  they  passed  a most  comfortless  night,  for  when 
the  sun  set  it  rapidly  got  cold,  and  the  hospital  arrangements  were 
necessarily  on  a very  limited  scale. 

By  this  time  I was  dead  beat,  having  been  for  sixty  hours  continually 
in  the  saddle,  except  when  I lay  down  for  a short  nap  on  the  night  of 
the  14th. 

We  were  not  allowed,  however,  to  have  a very  long  night’s  rest. 
Hours  before  dawn  on  the  17th  we  were  roused  by  the  beating  of 
drums  and  ringing  of  bells  (an  impotent  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
rebel  leaders  to  excite  the  enthusiasm  of  their  followers),  which  caused 
the  troops  to  prepare  for  an  attack  and  stand  to  their  arms.  But  the 
enemy  were  not  in  a mood  to  encounter  us  in  the  open,  small  as  our 
numbers  were ; they  had  suffered  heavily  the  day  before,  and  they 
must  have  begun  to  realize  that  then-  strongest  positions  were  in- 
adequate against  British  pluck  and  determination. 

The  mess-house  was  the  next  point  to  be  carried,  but  the  Com- 
mander- in -Chief  thought  it  would  be  prudent  to  make  our  left  quite 
secure  in  the  first  instance.  The  duty  of  occupying  the  houses  and 
gardens  situated  between  the  barracks  and  Banks’s  house  was 
entrusted  to  Brigadier  Bussell.  Four  bungalows,*  in  which  the 
officers  of  the  32nd  Foot  had  lived,  were  first  seized.  Bussell  then 
pushed  on  towards  Banks’s  house,  which  it  was  necessary  to  occupy,  as 
it  commanded  the  crossing  over  the  canal,  by  which  we  communicated 
with  the  Dilkusha,  and  by  which  it  was  thought  that  the  people  rescued 
from  the  Besidency  would  have  to  be  brought  away.  Bussell, 
avoiding  the  main  road,  advanced  under  cover  of  his  Artillery,  and 
forced  the  rebels  to  vacate  this  important  position,  and  Banks’s  house 
was  held  during  the  remainder  of  the  operations  by  50  men  of  the 
2nd  Punjab  Infantry,  under  Lieutenant  F.  Keen.f 

In  the  meantime  a heavy  fire  from  Peel’s  guns  had  been  opened  on 
the  mess-house — a double-storied  building,  situated  on  slightly  rising 
ground,  surrounded  by  a ditch  12  feet  broad,  and  beyond  that  at  some 
little  distance  by  a loop  holed  wall. 

Our  losses  on  the  previous  day  had  been  very  severe,  and  Sir  Colin, 

* Marked  D on  the  map. 

f Now  Major-General  Keen,  C.  15.  It  was  an  extremely  responsible  charge 
for  so  young  an  officer  with  such  a small  party,  as  it  was  very  isolated  and 
exposed  to  attack. 


1857 


PLANTING  THE  FLAG 


187 

anxious  to  spare  his  men  as  much  as  possible,  decided  to  batter  the 
place  freely  with  Artillery  before  permitting  it  to  be  attacked.  Peel’s 
guns  and  Longden’s  mortars  were  therefore  brought  to  bear  upon  it, 
and  kept  up  a continual  fire  until  3 p.m.,  when  the  enemy  seemed  to 
think  they  had  had  enough,  their  musketry  fire  slackened  off,  and  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  considering  the  assault  might  safely  be  made, 
gave  the  order  to  advance.  The  attacking  party  was  commanded  by 
Brevet-Major  Wolseley,*  of  the  90th  Light  Infantry,  and  consisted  of 
a company  of  his  own  regiment,  a piquet  of  the  53rd  Foot  under 
Captain  Hopkins,  and  a few  men  of  the  2nd  Punjab  Infantry  under 
Captain  Towlett,  supported  by  Barnston’s  Detachments,  under  Captain 
Guise,  of  the  90th. 

The  building  and  its  many  outhouses  were  carried  with  a rush,  and 
the  enemy,  who  hastily  retreated  to  the  Moti  Mahal, f were  followed 
across  the  road,  where  our  troops  were  stopped  by  the  high  wall  which 
enclosed  that  building.  Wolseley  then  sent  for  some  Sappers,  who 
quickly  opened  out  a space  through  which  they  all  passed.  The  Moti 
Mahal  was  hotly  defended,  but  without  avail,  and  ere  the  sun  set  the 
last  position  which  separated  the  relieved  from  the  relieving  forces  was 
in  our  possession. 

As  the  party  moved  off  to  attack  the  mess-house,  Sir  Colin,  who,  on 
his  white  horse,  was  interestedly  watching  the  proceedings,  ordered 
me  to  procure  a regimental  colour  and  place  it  on  one  of  the  turrets  of 
the  building,  that  Outram  might  be  able  to  judge  how  far  we  had 
advanced.  I rode  off  accordingly  to  the  2nd  Punjab  Infantry,  stand- 
ing close  by,  and  requested  the  Commandant,  Captain  Green,  to  let  me 
have  one  of  his  colours.  He  at  once  complied,  and  I galloped  with  it 
to  the  mess-house.  As  I entered,  I was  met  by  Sir  David  Baird  (one 
of  Sir  Colin’s  Aides-de-camp),  and  Captain  Hopkins,  of  the  53rd  Foot, 
by  both  of  whom  I was  assisted  in  getting  the  flag  with  its  long  staff 
up  the  inconveniently  narrow  staircase,  and  in  planting  it  on  the 
turret  nearest  the  Kaisarbagh,  which  was  about  850  yards  off.  No  sooner 
did  the  enemy  perceive  what  we  were  about,  than  shot  after  shot  was 
aimed  at  the  colour,  and  in  a very  few  minutes  it  was  knocked  over, 
falling  into  the  ditch  below.  I ran  down,  picked  it  up,  and  again 
placed  it  in  position,  only  for  it  to  be  once  more  shot  down  and  hurled 
into  the  ditch,  just  as  Norman  and  Lennox  (who  had  been  sent  by 
Sir  Colin  to  report  what  was  going  on  in  the  interior  of  the  Kaisar- 
bagh) appeared  on  the  roof.  Once  more  I picked  up  the  colour,  and 
found  that  this  time  the  staff  had  been  broken  in  two.  Notwithstand- 
ing, I managed  to  prop  it  up  a third  time  on  the  turret,  and  it  was  not 
again  hit,  though  the  enemy  continued  to  fire  at  it  for  some  time. 

* Now  Field- Marshal  Viscount  Wolseley,  K.P.,  Conmiander-in-Cbicf. 

f Called  the  Pearl  Palace  from  the  fancied  resemblance  of  one  of  its  domes 
(since  destroyed)  to  the  curve  of  a pearl. 


1 88  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

Outram,  unwilling  to  risk  unnecessary  loss  of  men,  did  not  greatly 
extend  his  position  until  he  was  sure  we  were  close  at  hand,  but  he 
was  not  idle.  While  Sir  Cohn  was  slowly  working  his  way  towards 
him  on  the  16th,  he  had  gradually  occupied  such  buildings  as  lay  in 
the  direction  of  our  advance.  From  the  mess-house  we  could  see  the 
British  flag  flying  on  the  top  of  the  engine-house,  only  a short  distance 
beyond  the  Moti  Mahal,  which  satisfactory  piece  of  intelligence  Nor- 
man went  down  to  report  to  Sir  Colin,  who,  with  his  Chief  of  the  Staff', 
had  just  arrived.  I followed  Norman,  and  we  two  made  our  way  to 
the  western  wall  of  the  Pearl  Palace  enclosure,  outside  which  Outram 
and  Havelock  were  standing  together.  They  had  run  the  gauntlet  of 
the  enemy’s  fire  in  coming  from  the  engine-house ; Colonel  Robert 
Napier  and  two  other  officers  who  accompanied  them,  having  been 
wounded,  had  to  be  carried  back.  Some  of  Lennox’s  Sappers  set  to 
work,  and  soon  made  a hole  in  the  wall*  large  enough  for  these  two 
distinguished  men  to  pass  through. 

I had  never  before  met  either  of  them.  In  Afghanistan  Outram  had 
been  a friend  of  my  father,  who  had  often  spoken  to  me  about  him  in 
terms  of  the  warmest  admiration,  and  his  courage  and  chivalry  were 
known  and  appreciated  throughout  India.  It  was  therefore  with  feel- 
ings of  the  most  lively  interest  that  I beheld  this  man,  whose  character 
I so  greatly  admired.  He  was  then  fifty-four  years  of  age,  strong 
and  broad-shouldered,  in  no  way  broken  down  by  the  heavy  load  of 
responsibility  and  anxiety  he  had  had  to  bear,  or  the  hardships  he  had 
gone  through.  Havelock,  the  hero  of  a hundred  fights,  on  the  contrary, 
looked  ill,  worn  and  depressed,  but  brightened  up  a little  when  Norman 
told  him  he  had  been  made  a K.C.B. 

Sir  Colin  waited  to  receive  these  two  heroes  on  the  ground  sloping 
down  from  the  mess-house,  and  it  was  there  that  the  meeting  between 
the  three  veterans  took  place.  A most  impressive  and  memorable 
scene  was  that  meeting,  which  has  been  well  depicted  in  the  historical 
picture  by  Barker. 

As  if  to  show  the  rage  and  disappointment  of  the  enemy  at  this  evi- 
dence of  the  success  of  our  operations,  every  gun  in  the  Kaisarbagh  was 
turned  upon  us,  and  it  was  under  a shower  of  shot  and  shell  that  the 
interview  was  held  ; it  did  not  last  long,  for  it  was  neither  the  time 
nor  the  place  to  discuss  plans  for  the  future.  All  Sir  Colin  could  then 
say  was  that  the  troops  should  be  removed  outside  Lucknow  as  soon 
as  the  women  and  children  had  been  brought  away,  and  he  expressed 
his  ‘thankfulness  that  the  relief  of  the  garrison  had  been  accomplished.’ 

Norman  and  I obtained  permission  to  accompany  Outram  and  Have- 
lock back  to  the  Residency.  It  was  intensely  but  painfully  interesting 
to  visit  this  scene  of  so  many  acts  of  heroism,  and  of  so  much  suffer- 

* A slab  let  into  the  south-west  corner  of  the  wall  marks  the  spot. 


MA JOE-GENERAL  SIR  JAMES  Ol'TRAM.  G.C.B. 
From 

a painting  by  Thomas  Brigstocke,  R.A. 


THE  RESIDENCY 


189 


1857] 

ing  endured  with  unexampled  fortitude.  We  first  went  to  the  posts 
occupied  by  Havelock's  force  in  the  Chatta  Manzil,  and  in  other  build- 
ings which  have  long  since  disappeared.  At  one  of  these  we  stopped  to 
watch  the  Artillery  trying  to  silence  the  enemy's  guns  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river.  We  talked  to  the  men,  who  were  keen  to  hear  news 
from  the  outer  world  and  the  story  of  our  advance.  It  was  some  little 
time  before  we  discovered  in  one  of  them  the  Commander  of  the 
battery,  Captain  William  Olpherts,*  for  in  his  soiled  and  torn  summer 
clothing,  his  face  thin,  worn,  and  begrimed  with  smoke,  it  was  difficult 
to  distinguish  the  officer  from  his  men,  and  it  was  under  these  level- 
ling circumstances  that  I had  the  honour  of  making  the  acquaintance 
of  my  distinguished  brother  officer,  whose  audacious  courage  on  the 
occasion  of  Havelock’s  advance  over  the  Charbagh  bridge  had  won  the 
admiration  of  everyone  in  the  force,  and  gained  for  him  the  Victoria 
Cross. 

We  next  came  to  the  Bailey-guard;  and  as  we  looked  at  the  battered 
walls  and  gateway,  not  an  inch  without  a mark  from  a round  shot  or 
bullet,  we  marvelled  that  Aitken  and  Loughman  could  have  managed 
to  defend  it  for  nearly  five  months.  There  was  plenty  of  evidence  on 
all  the  surrounding  buildings  of  the  dangerous  nature  of  the  service 
which  they  and  their  gallant  Native  comrades  had  so  admirably  per- 
formed. Although  we  were  pressed  for  time,  we  could  not  resist 
stopping  to  speak  to  some  of  the  Native  officers  and  sepoys,  whose 
magnificent  loyalty  throughout  the  siege  was  one  of  the  most  gratifying 
features  of  the  Mutiny. 

At  length  we  came  to  the  Residency  itself,  where  we  met  a few  old 
friends  and  acquaintances,  who  welcomed  us  with  the  most  touching 
enthusiasm.  Mrs.  (afterwards  Lady)  Inglis  and  the  Rev.  J.  P.  Harris 
and  his  wife  I had  known  at  Peshawar  ; there  were  also  Mrs.  Fletcher 
Hayes,  the  widow  of  the  poor  fellow  whose  murder  by  the  men  of  his 
own  escort  near  Mainpuri  I have  related,  and  Mrs.  Case,  the  widow'  of 
the  brave  Major  of  the  32nd,  who  lost  his  life  at  the  affair  of  Chinhut. 
Mrs.  Inglis  showed  us  the  tiny  room  which  she  and  her  children  had 
shared  with  Mrs.  Case  all  through  the  siege  ; but  it  was  difficult  to  get 
any  of  them  to  speak  of  their  miserable  experiences,  w'hich  were  too  sad 
and  terrible,  and  too  recent  to  be  talked  about,  and  they  naturally  pre- 
ferred to  dwell  on  their  thankfulness  for  the  relief  that  had  come  at 
last,  and  to  listen  to  our  account  of  what  had  happened  in  other  places. 

It  was  too  late  then  to  go  round  the  position  ; that  had  to  be  left  for 
another  day ; indeed,  it  was  quite  dark  when  we  returned  to  Head- 
Quarters,  established  by  our  Chief  in  the  open,  his  soldierly  instincts 
prompting  him  to  remain  with  his  troops. 

* Now  General  Sir  William  Olpherts,  Y.C. , K.C.B. 


190 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

The  night  of  the  17th  passed  off  quietly.  Before  daybreak  the  next 
morning  the  troops  were  under  arms.  Thousands  of  the  enemy  had 
collected  in  the  Kaisarbagh,  and  for  the  protection  of  the  mess-house, 
the  Tara  Koti,  about  200  yards  to  the  south-west,  was  seized  and  held, 
as  from  this  position  a flanking  fire  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  any 
enemy  advancing  from  the  Kaisarbagh. 

The  most  difficult  part  of  Sir  Cohn’s  task  had  yet  to  be  accomplished 
— the  bringing  away  of  the  women  and  children,  and  the  sick  and 
wounded,  from  the  Residency — and  the  question  of  how  this  could  best 
be  done  was  one  which  caused  the  Commander-in-Chief  much  anxious 
thought.  Many,  amongst  whom  were  Outram  and  Hope  Grant,  pressed 
him  to  attack  the  Kaisarbagh  and  capture  the  city  in  the  first  instance ; 
but  45  officers  and  496  men  out  of  our  small  force  had  been  killed  or 
wounded  ; Sir  Colin,  therefore,  decided  that  it  would  be  to  the  last 
degree  imprudent  to  attempt  such  an  undertaking  with  his  reduced 
numbers,  and  became  more  than  ever  determined  to  confine  his  opera- 
tions to  the  relief  of  the  garrison. 

That  the  Chief  was  right  there  can  be  no  room  for  doubt.  This  force 
was  barely  strong  enough  for  the  service  it  had  to  perform.  Every  man 
was  on  duty  day  and  night ; there  was  no  reserve  to  fall  back  upon ; 
and  had  he  listened  to  these  proposals,  and  allowed  himself  to  be 
drawn  into  complications  in  the  city,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  those 
he  had  come  to  succour  would  have  been  sacrificed.  The  wisdom  of  his 
decision  was  fully  proved  by  subsequent  events,  and  unreservedly 
acknowledged  by  Hope  Grant  and  others  who  at  the  time  differed  from 
him  in  their  ideas  of  the  course  which  should  be  adopted. 

From  the  Dilkusha  to  the  Residency  was  not  less  than  five  miles ; 
every  yard  of  the  way  had  to  be  guarded,  and  the  garrison  at  the 
former  place  was  so  attenuated  that  it  had  to  be  reinforced  by  the 
withdrawal  of  part  of  the  75th  Foot  from  the  Alambagh.  Fortunately 
this  could  be  done  without  dangerously  weakening  that  post,  as  it  had 
been  lately  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  a small  body  of  troops  from 
Cawnpore. 

It  had  now  to  be  settled  whether  the  evacuation  should  be  effected 
by  the  route  we  had  ourselves  followed,  which  was  circuitous  and  in 
places  difficult  for  the  wheeled  vehicles  necessary  for  the  conveyance 
of  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  the  women  and  children ; Qr  by  the  way 
past  the  barracks  and  Banks’s  house,  which  was  shorter  and  had  the 
advantage  of  a metalled  road  throughout.  But  unless  Russell,  whose 
brigade  was  in  position  at  the  barracks,  could  make  the  latter  line 
secure,  it  would  be  too  hazardous  to  adopt,  and  up  to  the  present  the 
reports  from  Russell  had  not  been  very  promising.  He  had  been 


SIR  COLIN  S I VISE  DECISION 


1857] 


191 


hardly  pressed  on  the  17th,  and  had  sent  word  that  he  could  make  no 
impression  on  the  enemy  without  heavy  guns.  Colonel  Biddulph,  the 
Deputy-Quartermaster-General,  was  therefore  ordered  to  proceed  to  the 
barracks  to  ascertain  how  guns  could  best  be  sent  to  Russell’s  assist- 
ance, and  report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  whole  situation. 
I was  told  to  go  with  him  and  bring  back  the  required  information. 

We  found  Russell  in  a very  uncomfortable  position,  exposed  to  a hot 
fire  and  closely  surrounded  by  the  enemy,  who  were  holding  the  British 
Infantry  hospital  and  other  buildings  within  a few  yards  of  him. 

I remained  with  Russell  while  Biddulph  reconnoitred  the  ground 
between  the  barracks,  the  canal,  and  the  Sikandarbagh.  It  was  found 
covered  with  villages  and  walled  enclosures,  but  he  discovered  a path 
secure  from  the  enemy’s  fire,  along  which  he  was  able  to  bring  to 
Russell's  assistance  a 9-pounder  gun,  a 24 -pounder  howitzer,  and  four 
5i-inch  mortars.  As  the  9-pounder  was  fired,  a round  shot  from  one 
of  the  enemy’s  18-pounders  struck  the  mud  wall  immediately  in  front 
of  it,  scattering  great  clods  of  earth,  which  knocked  over  Bourchier 
and  another  officer ; the  round  shot  then  hit  Brigadier  Russell,  just 
grazing  the  back  of  his  neck,  actually  cutting  his  watch-chain  in  two, 
and  causing  partial  paralysis  of  the  lower  limbs  for  some  days. 

Russell  being  for  the  time  hors  de  combat,  Biddulph  assumed 
command,  and  ordered  me  to  return  to  Head-Quarters,  report  what 
had  happened,  and  inform  Sir  Colin  that  he  intended  to  attack  the 
hospital  and  endeavour  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  his  immediate 
neighbourhood. 

I never  saw  Biddulph  again.  I had  scarcely  delivered  my  message 
to  the  Chief  when  heavy  firing  was  heard  from  the  direction  of  the 
barracks,  and  shortly  afterwards  a determined  attack  was  made  by  the 
rebels  on  the  piquets  placed  between  the  Sikandarbagh  and  the 
barracks,  which  was  repulsed  by  Remmington’s  troop  of  Horse 
Artillery,  with  two  companies  of  Infantry  belonging  to  the  23rd  and 
53rd  Foot,  brought  up  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  himself,  who 
expressed  to  Remmington  his  warm  approval  of  the  brilliant  manner 
in  which  his  troop  had  come  into  action. 

Sir  Colin  now  received  information  that  Biddulph  was  killed,  and 
that  Hale,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  brigade,  had  attacked 
and  taken  the  hospital,  but  had  been  forced  to  abandon  it,  as  the 
thatched  roof  had  been  set  on  fire  by  the  shells  showered  upon  it  by 
the  enemy,  who  were  keeping  our  troops  constantly  on  the  alert.  This 
decided  Sir  Cohn  to  give  up  the  idea  of  withdrawing  the  relieved 
garrison  by  Banks’s  house. 

Early  on  the  following  morning,  the  19th,  I was  sent  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  the  Residency  with  a note  for  Sir  James 
Outrain,  containing  the  information  that  arrangements  for  the  with- 
drawal were  now  complete,  and  that  conveyances  for  the  women, 

13 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


192 


[i8S7 


children,  sick,  and  wounded  would  be  sent  as  soon  as  they  arrived 
from  the  Dilkusha. 

When  he  had  read  the  note  Sir  James  questioned  me  as  to  the  road, 
and  asked  me  particularly  if  I had  noticed  the  openings  made  in  the 
walls  of  houses  and  enclosures,  and  whether  I thought  they  were  large 
enough  for  the  guns,  carts,  and  carriages  to  get  through.  I replied 
that  I had  not  observed  them  very  particularly,  but  I was  inclined  to 
think  some  of  them  were  certainly  rather  small.  My  answer,  to  my 
astonishment,  roused  the  ire  of  a wounded  officer  lying  on  a couch  at 
the  end  of  the  room,  for  he  wrathfully  asked  me  whether  I had 
measured  the  openings,  and  on  my  saying  I had  not,  he  added  : ‘ You 
had  better  wait  to  give  your  opinion  until  you  know  what  you  are 
talking  about ; those  openings  were  made  by  my  orders,  and  I am 
quite  sure  they  are  the  necessary  size.’  The  officer  was  no  other  than 
Colonel  Robert  Napier,  who,  as  I have  already  stated,  was  badly 
wounded  on  the  17th.  I felt  myself  considerably  snubbed,  but  Sir 
James  kindly  came  to  the  rescue,  and  explained  that  I had  merely 
answered  his  question  and  had  not  offered  any  opinion  of  my  own : 
Colonel  Napier,  however,  was  not  to  be  appeased,  and  I could  plainly 
see  that  I had  incurred  his  displeasure,  and  that  he  thought  me  a very 
bumptious  youngster.  I do  not  know  whether  the  Chief  of  the  Staff* 
ever  heard  of  it,  but  it  was  some  satisfaction  to  me  to  find  afterwards 
that  I was  right  in  my  estimation  of  the  size  of  those  apertures,  some 
of  which  had  to  be  enlarged  before  the  guns  and  carriages  could  pass 
through. 

By  sunset  that  day  the  women  and  children  had  been  brought  away 
and  collected  in  the  Sikandarbagh.  Not  a very  agreeable  resting- 
place,  for  though  the  2,000  dead  mutineers  had  been  got  out  of  sight, 
they  were  merely  slightly  covered  over  in  a ditch  which  they  themselves 
had  recently  dug  outside  the  north  wall  to  strengthen  the  defences. 
The  survivors  of  the  siege,  however,  had  become  too  inured  to  horrors 
of  all  kinds,  and  were  too  thankful  for  their  deliverance  from  the  fate 
which  for  months  had  constantly  threatened  them,  to  be  over- 
sensitive. 

It  was  a sad  little  assemblage ; all  were  more  or  less  broken  down 
and  out  of  health,  while  many  were  widows  or  orphans,  having  left 
their  nearest  and  dearest  in  the  Residency  burial-ground.  Officers  and 
men  accorded  them  a respectful  welcome,  and  by  their  efforts  to  help 
them  showed  how  deeply  they  felt  for  their  forlorn  condition,  while 
our  old  Chief  had  a comfortable  tea  prepared  for  them.  When  night 
set  in,  the  road  having  been  carefully  reconnoitred  beforehand,  the 
melancholy  convoy  with  its  guard  of  soldiers  started  for  the  Dilkusha, 
where  it  arrived  in  safety,  and  was  warmly  received  by  the  officers  of 

* Colonel  Napier  was  Chief  of  the  Staff  to  Sir  James  Outram. 


1857]  IMPRESSIONS  ON  VISITING  THE  RESIDENCY  193 

the  9th  Lancers  and  the  rest  of  the  garrison,  who  did  all  that  circum- 
stances would  allow  to  make  the  ladies  and  children  comfortable. 

During  the  20th,  21st,  and  22nd,  everything  that  was  worth 
removing  and  for  which  carriage  could  be  provided  was  brought  away. 
Such  a miscellaneous  collection  it  was — jewels  and  other  valuables 
belonging  to  the  ex-royal  family,  twenty-five  lakhs  of  treasure,  stores 
of  all  kinds,  including  grain,  and  as  many  of  the  200  guns  discovered 
in  the  palace  as  were  considered  likely  to  be  of  use. 

The  troops  were  not  moved  away  from  the  Residency  till  midnight 
on  the  22nd,  and  I had  several  opportunities  before  then  of  going  over 
the  position,  to  every  point  of  which  some  thrilling  story  was  attached, 
and  of  renewing  acquaintance  with  many  of  the  garrison  whom  I had 
known  before.  Amongst  them  was  Sam  Lawrence,  of  the  32nd  Foot, 
a friend  of  Peshawar  days,  who,  for  his  gallant  defence  of  the  Redan, 
was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross.  I was  shown  Innes’s  advanced  post, 
named  after  McLeod  Innes,*  a talented  Engineer  officer,  who  also 
subsequently  gained  that  coveted  reward ; the  Cawnpore  battery,  where 
so  many  valuable  lives  had  been  sacrificed,  and  the  room  where  Sir 
Henry  Lawrence  received  his  mortal  wound ; then  I climbed  up  to  the 
tower,  from  which  a good  view  of  the  city  and  the  posts  held  by  the 
enemy  could  be  obtained. 

The  more  I saw,  the  more  I wondered  at  what  had  been  achieved  by 
such  a mere  handful  of  men  against  such  vast  numbers.  It  was 
specially  pleasant  to  me  to  listen  to  the  praises  bestowed  on  the  officers 
of  my  own  regiment,  of  whom  nine  were  present  when  the  siege  com- 
menced, and  only  one  escaped  to  the  end  unwounded,  while  five  were 
killed  or  died  of  their  injuries.  Of  the  other  three,  one  was  wounded 
three  different  times,  and  both  the  others  once. 

All  were  loud,  too,  in  their  praises  of  the  Engineer  officers.  During 
the  latter  part  of  the  siege  the  rebels,  finding  they  could  not  carry  the 
position  by  assault,  tried  hard  to  undermine  the  defences ; but  our 
Engineers  were  ever  on  the  watch,  and  countermined  so  successfully 
that  they  were  able  to  frustrate  the  enemy’s  designs  on  almost  every 
occasion. 

The  wonderful  manner  in  which  the  Hindustani  soldiers  held  their 
ground,  notwithstanding  that  they  were  incessantly  taunted  by  their 
mutinous  comrades  for  aiding  the  Feringhis  against  then-  own  people, 
was  also  much  dilated  upon. 

The  casualties  during  the  siege  were  extremely  heavy.  When  it 
commenced  on  the  1st  of  July,  the  strength  of  the  garrison  was 
927  Europeans  and  765  Natives.  Of  the  former,  163  were  civilians — 
brave  and  useful,  but  untrained  to  arms;  of  the  latter,  118  were 
pensioners,  many  of  whom  were  old  and  decrepit.  Up  to  the  arrival 

* Now  Lieutenant-General  McLeod  Innes,  V.C. 

13-2 


194 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[i857 

of  Outram  and  Havelock  (a  period  of  eighty-seven  days),  350  Europeans 
and  133  natives  were  either  killed  or  died  of  wounds  and  disease.  Of 
the  noble  and  unselfish  conduct  of  the  ladies  and  soldiers’  wives, 
everyone  spoke  in  the  highest  terms  and  with  the  warmest  appreciation. 
They  suffered,  without  a murmur,  the  most  terrible  hardships;  they 
devoted  themselves  to  the  sick  and  wounded  in  the  hospital,  and  were 
ever  ready  to  help  in  any  way  that  was  useful.  Two  ladies  were 
killed,  and  nine  died,  during  the  siege. 

The  contemplation  of  the  defence  of  Lucknow,  and  the  realization  of 
the  noble  qualities  it  called  forth  in  the  defenders,  cannot  but  excite  in 
the  breast  of  every  British  man  and  woman,  as  it  did  in  mine,  feelings 
of  pride  and  admiration.  But  what  impressed  me  more  than  even  the 
glorious  defence  was  the  foresight  and  ability  of  the  man  who  made  that 
defence  possible. 

Henry  Lawrence  was,  apparently,  the  only  European  in  India  who, 
from  the  very  first,  formed  an  accurate  estimate  of  the  extent  of  the 
danger  which  threatened  our  rule  in  the  early  part  of  1857,  and  who, 
notwithstanding  his  thorough  appreciation  of  the  many  good  qualities 
of  Native  soldiers,  was  not  misled  into  a mistaken  belief  in  the  abso- 
lute loyalty  of  the  Native  army.  Fourteen  years  before  Lawrence  had 
predicted  the  Mutiny*  and  the  course  it  would  take,  and  when  events 
shaped  themselves  as  he  had  foreseen,  he  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that 
the  disaffection  would  be  general  and  widespread.  But  while  his  inti- 
mate knowledge  of  Native  character  led  him  to  this  conviction,  so  great 
was  his  influence  with  Natives — perhaps  hy  reason  of  that  knowledge 
—that  he  was  able  to  delay  the  actual  outbreak  at  Lucknow  until  his 
measures  for  the  defence  of  the  Residency  were  completed,  and  he 
persuaded  a considerable  number  of  sepoys,  not  only  to  continue  in  their 
allegiance,  but  to  share  with  their  European  comrades  the  dangers  and 
privations  of  the  siege — a priceless  service,  for  without  their  aid  the 
defence  could  not  have  been  made. 


* Calcutta  Review,  1843.  After  commenting  on  the  habitual  carelessness 
of  Government  and  its  disregard  of  ordinary  military  precautions  and  prepara- 
tions, Henry  Lawrence  had  shown  how  possible  it  was  that  a hostile  party 
might  seize  Delhi,  and,  if  the  outbreak  were  not  speedily  suppressed,  what 
grave  consequences  might  ensue.  ‘ Let  this  happen,’  he  said,  ‘ on  June  2,  and 
does  any  sane  man  doubt  that  twenty-four  hours  would  swell  the  hundreds  of 
rebels  into  thousands,  and  in  a week  every  ploughshare  in  the  Delhi  States 
would  be  turned  into  a sword  ? And  when  a sufficient  force  had  been  mustered, 
which  could  not  be  effected  within  a month,  should  we  not  then  have  a more 
difficult  game  to  play  than  Clive  at  Plassy  or  Wellington  at  Assaye  ? We 
should  then  be  literally  striking  for  our  existence  at  the  most  inclement 
season  of  the  year,  with  the  prestige  of  our  name  tarnished.’  Going  on  to 
suggest  that  Meerut,  Umballa,  and  Agra  might  say  that  they  had  no  troops 
to  spare  from  their  own  necessities,  or  that  they  had  no  carriage,  1 Should  we 
not,  then,’  he  wrote,  ‘ have  to  strike  anew  for  our  ludiau  Empire  V 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  SIR  HENRY  LAWRENCE,  K.C..B. 

From 

a photograph  taken  at  Lucknow. 


I8S7J  LAWRENCE  AS  STATESMAN  AND  RULER  195 

In  no  part  of  India  was  there  greater  need  for  the  services  of  a 
strong,  enlightened,  and  sympathetic  Ruler  and  Statesman.  Difficult 
as  were  the  positions  in  which  many  men  in  authority  were  placed  in 
1857,  none  was  more  difficult  than  that  in  which  Henry  Lawrence 
found  himself  when  he  took  over  the  Chief  Comniissionership  of  Oudh 
in  the  spring  of  that  year.  His  colleagues  in  the  administration  were 
at  feud  with  each  other,  and  by  their  ignorance  of  the  proper  methods 
of  dealing  with  the  people  they  had  succeeded  in  alienating  all  classes. 

While  Lawrence  was  engaged  in  pouring  oil  on  these  troubled  waters, 
and  in  earning  the  gratitude  of  the  people  by  modifying  the  previous 
year’s  undue  assessment,  signs  appeared  of  the  disaffection,  which  bad 
begun  amongst  the  troops  at  Barraekpore,  having  spread  to  the  canton- 
ments in  Oudh.  Sir  Henry  met  this  new  trouble  in  the  same  intelli- 
gent and  conciliatory  spirit  as  that  in  which  he  had  dealt  with  his  civil 
difficulties.  He  summoned  to  a durbar  some  Native  officers  who  had 
displayed  a very  proper  feeling  of  loyalty  by  arresting  several  fanatics 
who  had  tried  to  tamper  with  the  soldiery,  and  he  liberally  rewarded 
them,  pointing  out  at  the  same  time  in  forcible  language  the  disgrace  to 
a soldier  of  being  faithless  to  his  salt.  But  while  doing  everything  in 
his  power  to  keep  the  Natives  loyal,  and  with  a certain  amount  of 
success,  he  did  not  neglect  to  take  every  possible  precaution. 

When  first  he  heard  of  the  outbreak  at  Meerut,  he  telegraphed  to 
the  Governor-General  advising  him  to  send  for  British  troops  to  China 
and  Ceylon,  and  to  call  on  the  Nepalese  to  assist ; at  the  same  time  he 
applied  to  Lord  Canning  for,  and  obtained,  the  rank  of  Brigadier- 
General,  which  gave  him  military  as  well  as  civil  control — a very 
necessary  measure,  for  none  of  the  senior  military  officers  in  Oudh 
were  men  to  be  relied  upon ; indeed,  as  in  so  many  other  places,  they 
had  to  be  effaced  when  the  troubles  began. 

Very  early  in  the  day  Henry  Lawrence  commenced  his  preparations 
for  the  defence  of  the  Residency  ; he  cleared  the  ground  of  all  cover  in 
its  immediate  vicinity,  as  far  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so  ; he  fortified 
it,  mounted  guns,  stored  ammunition,  powder,  and  firewood;  arranged 
for  a proper  supply  of  water ; collected  food,  which  proved  sufficient, 
not  only  for  the  original  number  of  refugees,  but  for  the  3,000  addi- 
tional mouths  belonging  to  Outram  and  Havelock’s  force  ; in  fact,  he 
did  everything  which  forethought  and  ingenuity  could  suggest  to 
enable  the  garrison  to  hold  out  in  what  he  foresaw  would  be  a long  and 
deadly  struggle  against  fearful  odds.  There  was  no  fort,  as  there  was 
at  Agra,  capable  of  sheltering  every  European  in  Oudh,  and  strong 
enough  to  defy  any  number  of  mutineers,  nor  was  there,  as  at  Cawn- 
pore,  a well-stocked  and  strongly- fortified  magazine  to  depend  upon. 
But  Henry  Lawrence  was  not  cast  down  by  the  difficulties  which 
surrounded  him ; he  was  fully  alive  to  the  danger,  but  he  recognized 
that  his  best,  indeed,  his  only,  chance  of  delaying  the  inevitable 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


196 


li857 


rebellion  until  (as  he  hoped)  assistance  might  arrive,  was  to  show  a 
bold  front. 

On  the  27th  May  Lawrence  wrote  to  Lord  Canning  as  follows : 
‘Hitherto  the  country  has  been  kept  quiet,  and  we  have  played  the 
Irregulars  against  the  line  regiments ; but  being  constituted  of  exactly  the 
same  material,  the  taint  is  fast  pervading  them,  and  in  a few  weeks,  if 
not  days — unless  Delhi  be  in  the  interim  captured — there  will  be  but 
one  feeling  throughout  the  army,  a feeling  that  our  prestige  is  gone, 
and  that  feeling  will  be  more  dangerous  than  any  other.  Religion,  fear, 
hatred,  one  and  all  have  their  influence  ; but  there  is  still  a reverence 
for  the  Company’s  ikbdl* — when  it  is  gone  we  shall  have  few  friends 
indeed.  The  tone  and  talk  of  many  have  greatly  altered  during  the 
last  few  days,  and  we  are  now  asked,  almost  in  terms  of  insolence, 
whether  Delhi  is  captured,  or  when  it  will  be.  It  was  only  just  after 
the  Kabul  massacre,  and  when  we  hesitated  to  advance  through  the 
Khyber,  that,  in  my  memory,  such  a tone  ever  before  prevailed.’ f 

Feeling  all  this  so  strongly,  it  is  the  more  remarkable  that  Henry 
Lawrence  never  lost  heart,  but  struggled  bravel}7  on  ‘ to  preserve  the 
soldiery  to  their  duty  and  the  people  to  their  allegiance,’  while  at  the 
same  time  he  was,  as  I have  shown,  making  every  conceivable  prepara- 
tion to  meet  the  outbreak  whenever  it  should  come. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Henry  Lawrence  was  a very  remarkable  man ; 
his  friendly  feeling  for  Natives,  and  his  extraordinary  insight  into  their 
character,  together  with  his  military  training  and  his  varied  political 
experience,  peculiarly  fitted  him  to  be  at  the  head  of  a Government  at 
such  a crisis.  J 

All  this,  however,  is  a digression  from  my  narrative,  to  which  I must 
now  return. 

While  the  withdrawal  was  being  effected,  Peel’s  guns  distracted  the 
enemy’s  attention  from  the  proceedings  by  keeping  up  a perpetual  and 
destructive  fire  on  the  Kaisarbagh,  thus  leading  the  rebels  to  believe 
that  our  whole  efforts  were  directed  to  taking  that  place.  By  the  even- 
ing of  the  22nd  three  large  breaches  had  been  made,  and  the  enemy 
naturally  expected  an  assault  to  take  place  the  next  morning.  But  the 

* Prestige,  or,  rather,  good  luck.  f ‘Life  of  Sir  Henry  Lawrence.’ 

I In  Sir  Henry  Lawrence’s  ‘ Life  ’ two  memoranda  appear,  one  by  Lieutenant 
(now  Lieutenant-General)  McLeod  limes,  Assistant  Engineer  at  Lucknow  in 
1857,  the  other  by  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  himself.  They  are  worthy  of  perusal, 
and  will  give  the  reader  some  insight  into  Lawrence’s  character  ; they  will 
also  exemplify  how  necessary  it  is  for  anyone  placed  in  a position  of  authority 
in  India  to  study  the  peculiarities  of  the  people  and  gain  their  contidonce  by 
kindness  and  sympathy,  to  which  they  readily  respond,  and,  above  all,  to  he 
firm  and  decided  in  his  dealings  with  them.  Firmness  and  decision  are 
qualities  which  are  appreciated  more  than  all  others  by  Natives  ; they  expect 
them  in  their  Rulers,  and  without  them  no  European  can  have  any  power 
over  them,  or  ever  hope  to  gain  their  respect  and  esteem. 


S57] 


EVACUATION  OF  THE  RESIDENCY 


197 


object  of  that  heavy  fire  had  already  been  accomplished ; the  women 
and  children,  the  sick  and  wounded,  were  all  safe  in  the  Dilkusha ; no 
one  was  left  in  the  Residency  but  the  garrison,  on  duty  for  the  last  time 
at  the  posts  they  had  so  long  and  so  bravely  defended,  and  they  were  to 
leave  at  midnight. 

As  the  clock  struck  twelve,  in  the  deepest  silence  and  with  the 
utmost  caution,  the  gallant  little  band  evacuated  the  place,  and  passed 
down  the  long  line  of  posts,  first  those  held  by  Outram’s  and  Havelock’s 
men,  and  then  those  occupied  by  the  relieving  force,  until  they  reached 
the  Martiniere  Park.  As  they  moved  on,  Outram’s  and  Havelock’s 
troops  fell  in  behind,  and  were  followed  by  the  relieving  force,  which 
brought  up  the  rear.  The  scheme  for  this  very  delicate  movement  had 
been  most  carefully  considered  beforehand  by  General  Mansfield,  the 
clever  Chief  of  the  Staff,  who  clearly  explained  to  all  concerned  the 
parts  they  had  to  play,  and  emphatically  impressed  upon  them  that 
success  depended  on  his  directions  being  followed  to  the  letter,  and  on 
their  being  carried  out  without  the  slightest  noise  or  confusion. 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  and  Hope  Grant,  surrounded  by  their  respective 
staffs,  watched  the  movement  from  a position  in  front  of  the  Sikandar- 
bagh,  where  a body  of  Artillery  and  Infantry  were  held  in  readiness 
for  any  emergency.  When  the  time  arrived  for  the  advanced  piquets 
to  be  di-awn  in,  the  enemy  seemed  to  have  become  suspicious,  for  they 
suddenly  opened  fire  with  guns  and  musketry  from  the  Kaisarbagh, 
and  for  a moment  we  feared  our  plans  had  been  discovered.  Fortu- 
nately, one  of  Peel’s  rocket-carts  was  still  in  position  beyond  the  Moti 
Mahal,  and  the  celerity  with  which  the  officer  in  charge  replied  to  this 
burst  of  fire  apparently  convinced  the  enemy  we  were  holding  our 
ground,  for  the  firing  soon  ceased,  and  we  breathed  again. 

Mansfield  had  taken  the  precaution  to  have  with  him  an  officer  from 
Hale’s  brigade,  which  was  on  the  left  rear  of  our  line  of  posts,  that  he 
might  go  back  and  tell  his  Brigadier  when  the  proper  time  came  for 
the  latter  to  move  off  in  concert  with  the  rest  of  the  force ; but  this 
officer  had  not,  apparently,  understood  that  he  would  have  to  return  in 
the  dark,  and  when  Mansfield  directed  him  to  carry  out  the  duty  for 
which  he  had  been  summoned,  he  replied  that  he  did  not  think  he 
could  find  his  way.  Mansfield  was  very  angry,  and  with  reason,  for 
it  was  of  supreme  importance  that  the  retirement  should  be  simul- 
taneous, and  turning  to  me,  he  said : ‘ You  have  been  to  Hale’s 
position:  do  you  think  you  could  find  your  way  there  now?’  I 
answered:  ‘I  think  I can.’  Upon  which  he  told  me  to  go  at  once, 
and  ordered  the  officer  belonging  to  the  brigade  to  accompany  me.  I 
then  asked  the  General  whether  he  wished  me  to  retire  with  Hale’s 
party  or  return  to  him.  He  replied : ‘ Return  to  me  here,  that  I may 
be  sure  the  order  has  been  received.’ 

I rode  off  with  my  companion,  ai.d  soon  found  I had  undertaken  to 


198  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

perform  a far  from  easy,  and  rather  hazardous  duty.  I had  only  been 
over  the  ground  twice — going  to  and  returning  from  the  position  on 
the  18th — and  most  of  the  villages  then  standing  had  since  been 
burnt.  There  was  no  road,  but  any  number  of  paths,  which  seemed 
to  lead  in  every  direction  but  the  right  one ; at  last,  however,  we 
arrived  at  our  destination,  I delivered  the  order  to  Colonel  Hale,  and 
set  out  on  my  return  journey  alone.  My  consternation  was  great  on 
reaching  the  Sikandarbagh,  where  I had  been  ordered  to  report  myself 
to  Mansfield,  to  find  it  deserted  by  the  Generals,  their  staffs,  and  the 
troops  ; not  a creature  was  to  be  seen.  I then  began  to  understand 
what  a long  time  it  had  taken  me  to  carry  out  the  errand  upon  which 
I had  been  sent,  much  longer,  no  doubt,  than  Mansfield  thought 
possible.  I could  not  help  feeling  that  I was  not  in  at  all  a pleasant 
position,  for  any  moment  the  enemy  might  discover  the  force  had 
departed,  and  come  out  in  pursuit.  As  it  turned  out,  however,  happily 
for  me,  they  remained  for  some  hours  in  blissful  ignorance  of  our 
successful  retirement,  and,  instead  of  following  in  our  wake,  continued 
to  keep  up  a heavy  fire  on  the  empty  Residency  and  other  abandoned 
posts.  Turning  my  horse’s  head  in  the  direction  I knew  the  troops 
must  have  taken,  I galloped  as  fast  as  he  could  carry  me  until  I 
overtook  the  rear  guard  just  as  it  was  crossing  the  canal,  along  the 
right  bank  of  which  the  greater  part  of  the  force  had  been  placed  in 
position.  When  I reported  myself  to  Mansfield,  he  confessed  that  he 
had  forgotten  all  about  me,  which  somewhat  surprised  me,  for  I had 
frequently  noticed  how  exactly  he  remembered  the  particulars  of  any 
order  he  gave,  no  matter  how  long  a time  it  took  to  execute  it. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

The  Relief  of  the  Lucknow  garrison  was  now  accomplished — a grand 
achievement  indeed,  of  which  any  Commander  might  well  be  proud, 
carried  out  as  it  had  been  in  every  particular  as  originally  planned, 
thus  demonstrating  with  what  care  each  detail  had  been  thought  out, 
and  how  admirably  movement  after  movement  had  been  executed. 

November  the  23rd  was  spent  in  arranging  for  the  march  to 
Cawnpore,  and  in  organizing  the  division  which  was  to  be  left  in 
position,  under  Outram,  in  and  about  the  Alambagh ; it  was  to  be 
strong  enough  to  hold  its  own,  and  to  keep  open  communication  with 
Head-Quarters. 

My  time  was  chiefly  occupied  in  asristing  in  the  distribution  of 
transport,  and  in  carrying  out  Hope  Grant’s  directions  as  to  the  order 
in  which  the  troops  were  to  march.  Round  the  Dilkusha  the  scene  of 
confusion  was  bewildering  in  the  extreme;  women,  children,  sick  and 


THE  RELIEF  OF  LUCKNOW. 


November, 


Musa  Bagh, 


'Ali.Naki  Khans  Hu~jh 


I^B;6/ioo/7(cc 


JAchpu 


Jaifia 


I’jrS.irildr  flit./ 


' !>>'<■  dshah 

Bagh 


Im'tiabara 


'ShXhjNajpj, 


iMa  hal  ■ 


'Rasul 


ajuvilj' 


SharkpitrQ' 


ImaaiU 


'■ Jugraon 


'Rutnpur  Q 


^Vy-^ 

Btyliulia  h5 

D i I k u s li  a f*a  r h 


>Qr>\n  th,  . 

Home sNp 


^ ’ «';x‘  \&6ibia/n 
Bibia'p u ti°iii>t 


Reference. 


Trees  

Marsh 

Vegetation. 
Mosque ... 
Drnhjc 


& Uandah 


‘Alambagh 


w» 

Sonic. 

oo  6<yjo  Feet 

* * it 

i Mile 

VE3... 

& 

;0» 

r— > Ganj 

i - 1 

Walker  &»  Boutall  sc . 


DEATH  OF  GENERAL  HAVELOCK 


199 


1857] 

wounded  men,  elephants,  camels,  bullocks  and  bullock-carts,  grass- 
eutters’  ponies,  and  doolies  with  their  innumerable  bearers,  all  crowded 
together.  To  marshal  these  incongruous  elements  and  get  them 
started  seemed  at  first  to  be  an  almost  hopeless  task.  At  last  the 
families  were  got  off  in  two  bodies,  each  under  a married  officer  whose 
wife  was  of  the  party,  and  through  whom  all  possible  arrangements 
for  their  comfort  were  to  be  made,  and  their  place  on  the  line  of 
march,  position  in  camp,  etc.,  determined. 

In  the  afternoon  the  force  was  gratified  by  the  issue  of  a General 
Order  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  thanking  the  troops  for  the  manner 
in  which  the  very  difficult  and  harassing  service  of  the  Relief  had  been 
performed.  Alluding  to  the  withdrawal,  he  said  it  was  a model  of 
discipline  and  exactitude,  the  result  of  which  was  that  the  rebels  were 
completely  thrown  off  their  guard,  and  the  retirement  had  been 
successfully  carried  out  in  the  face  of  50,000  of  the  enemy  along  a 
most  inconveniently  narrow  and  tortuous  lane — the  only  line  of  retreat 
open. 

The  following  merning  Hope  Grant’s  division  marched  to  the 
Alambagh.  On  arrival  there,  our  transport  was  sent  back  for  Outram’s 
division,  which  joined  us  the  morning  after,  bringing  with  it  General 
Havelock's  dead  body.  He  had  died  the  previous  day — ‘ a martyr  to 
duty,’  as  the  Commander-in-Chief  expressed  it  in  his  General  Order. 
The  brave  old  soldier,  who  had  served  with  distinction  in  four 
campaigns  before  the  Mutiny — Burma,  Afghanistan,  Gwalior,  and  the 
Sutlej — was  buried  inside  the  Alambagh  enclosure,  respected  and 
honoured  by  the  whole  army,  but  more  especially  by  those  who  had 
shared  in  his  noble  efforts  to  rescue  the  Lucknow  garrison. 

A wash  and  change  of  clothes,  in  which  we  were  now  able  to 
indulge,  were  much  appreciated  luxuries.  From  the  time  we  had  left 
the  Alambagh  every  officer  and  man  had  been  on  duty  without 
cessation,  and  slept,  if  they  slept  at  all,  on  the  spot  where  the  close  of 
day  found  them  fighting. 

It  was  a rough  experience,  but,  notwithstanding  the  exposure,  hard 
work,  and  a minimum  of  sleep,  there  was  no  great  sickness  amongst 
the  troops.  The  personal  interest  which  every  man  in  the  force  felt  in 
the  rescue  of  his  countrymen  and  countrywomen,  in  addition  to  the 
excitement  at  all  times  inseparable  from  war,  was  a stimulant  which 
enabled  all  ranks  to  bear  up  in  a marvellous  manner  against  long- 
continued  privations  and  hardships — for  body  and  mind  are  equally 
affected  by  will — and  there  was  no  doubt  about  the  will  in  this  instance 
to  endure  anything  that  was  necessary  for  the  speedy  achievement  of 
the  object  in  view.  Personally,  I was  in  the  best  of  health,  and 
though  I almost  lived  on  horseback,  I never  felt  inconvenience  or 
fatigue. 

The  25th  and  26th  were  busy  days,  spent  in  allotting  camp  equipage 


200  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1857 

and  making  the  necessary  arrangements  for  fitting  out  Outram’s  force 
— 4,000  strong,  Math  25  guns  and  howitzers  and  10  mortars. 

At  11  a.m.  on  the  27th  we  started  on  our  return  march  towards 
Cawnpore.*  It  was  a strange  procession.  Everything  in  the  shape  of 
wheeled  carriage  and  laden  animals  had  to  keep  to  the  road,  which 
was  narrow,  and  for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  raised,  for  the  country 
at  that  time  of  the  year  was  partly  under  water,  and  jhite  were 
numerous.  Thus,  the  column  was  about  twelve  miles  in  length,  so  that 
the  head  had  almost  reached  the  end  of  the  march  before  the  rear 
could  start.  Delays  were  constant  and  unavoidable,  and  the  time 
each  day’s  journey  occupied,  as  well  as  the  mode  of  conveyance — 
country  carts  innocent  of  springs— must  have  been  most  trying  to 
delicate  women  and  wounded  men.  Fortunately  there  was  no  rain ; 
but  the  sun  was  still  hot  in  the  daytime,  causing  greater  sensitiveness 
to  the  bitter  cold  at  night. 

My  place  was  with  the  advance  guard,  as  I had  to  go  on  ahead  to 
mark  out  the  camp  and  have  ramps  got  ready  to  enable  the  carts  to  be 
taken  off  the  raised  roads.  Soon  after  leaving  the  Alambagh  we  heard 
the  sound  of  guns  from  the  direction  of  Cawnpore,  and  when  we 
reached  Bani  bridge  (about  thirteen  miles  on,  where  a small  post  had 
been  established)  the  officer  in  command  told  us  that  there  had  been 
heavy  firing  all  that  day  and  the  day  before. 

Camp  was  pitched  about  two  miles  further  on  late  in  the  afternoon ; 
but  my  work  was  not  over  till  midnight,  when  the  rear  guard  arrived, 
for  it  took  all  that  time  to  form  up  the  miscellaneous  convoy. 

Next  morning  we  made  an  early  start,  in  order  to  reach  our  destina- 
tion, if  possible,  before  dark.  Having  received  no  information  from 
Cawnpore  for  more  than  ten  days,  the  Commander  in-Chief  was 
beginning  to  feel  extremely  anxious,  and  the  firing  we  had  heard  the 
previous  day  had  greatly  increased  his  uneasiness,  for  there  seemed 
little  room  for  doubt  that  the  Gwalior  rebels  were  making  an  attack 
on  that  place.  The  probability  that  this  would  happen  had  been  fore- 
seen by  Sir  Colin,  and  was  one  of  his  reasons  for  determining  to  limit 
the  operations  at  Lucknow  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrison. 

* Our  force  consisted  of  the  troops  which  Sir  Colin  bad  reviewed  on  the 
AlamDagh  plain  on  the  11th  instant,  with  the  exception  of  the  75th  Foot, 
which  was  transferred  to  Outrani’s  division.  We  had,  however,  in  their 
place,  the  survivors  of  the  32nd  Foot,  and  of  the  Native  regiments  who  hail 
behaved  so  loyally  during  the  siege.  These  latter  were  formed  into  one 
battalion,  called  the  Regiment  of  Lucknow — the  present  16th  Bengal  Infantry. 
The  32nd  Foot,  which  was  not  up  to  full  strength  (1,067)  when  the  Mutiny 
broke  out,  had  in  1857-58  no  less  than  610  men  killed  and  wounded,  exclusive 
of  169  who  died  from  disease.  We  had  also  with  us,  and  to  them  was  given 
an  honoured  place,  ‘ the  remnant  of  the  few  faithful  pensioners  who  had  alone, 
of  many  thousands  in  Oudli,  responded  to  the  call  of  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  to 
come  in  to  aid  the  cause  of  those  whose  salt  they  had  eateu.’ — Lecture  on  the 
Relief  of  Lucknow,  by  Colonel  II.  W.  Norman. 


APPEALS  FROM  CAWNPORE 


20 1 


i»S7] 

We  had  not  proceeded  far,  when  firing  was  again  heard,  and  by  noon 
all  doubt  as  to  its  meaning  was  ended  by  a Native  who  brought  a note 
marked  ‘ Most  urgent,’  written  in  Greek  character,  and  addressed  to 
‘ General  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  or  any  officer  commanding  troops  on  the 
Lucknow  road.’  This  turned  out  to  be  a communication  from  General 
Windham,  who  had  been  placed  in  command  at  Cawnpore  when  the 
Commander-in-Chief  left  for  Lucknow  on  the  9th  of  November.  It  was 
dated  two  days  earlier,  and  told  of  an  attack  having  been  made,  that 
there  had  been  hard  fighting,  and  that  the  troops  were  sorely  pressed  ; 
in  conclusion  Windham  earnestly  besought  the  Chief  to  come  to  his 
assistance  with  the  least  possible  delay. 

Two  other  letters  followed  in  quick  succession,  the  last  containing 
the  disappointing  and  disheartening  intelligence  that  Windham,  with 
the  greater  pai-t  of  his  troops,  had  been  driven  into  the  entrenchment, 
plainly  showing  that  the  city  and  cantonment  were  in  the  possession  of 
the  enemy,  and  suggesting  the  possibility  of  the  bridge  of  boats  having 
been  destroyed. 

Sir  Colin,  becoming  impatient  to  learn  the  exact  state  of  the  case, 
desired  me  to  ride  on  as  fast  as  I could  to  the  river ; and  if  I found  the 
bridge  broken,  to  return  at  once,  but  if  it  were  still  in  existence  to  cross 
over,  try  and  see  the  General,  and  bring  back  all  the  information  I 
could  obtain. 

I took  a couple  of  sowars  with  me,  and  on  reaching  the  river  I 
found,  under  cover  of  a hastily-constructed  iete-de-pont,  a guard  of 
British  soldiers,  under  Lieutenant  Budgen,  of  the  82nd  Foot,  whose 
delight  at  seeing  me  was  most  effusively  expressed.  He  informed  me 
that  the  bridge  was  still  intact,  but  that  it  was  unlikely  it  would  long 
remain  so,  for  Windham  was  surrounded  except  on  the  river  side,  and 
the  garrison  was  ‘ at  its  last  gasp.’ 

I pushed  across  and  got  into  the  entrenchment,  which  was  situated 
on  the  river  immediately  below  the  bridge  of  boats.  The  confusion 
inside  was  great,  and  I could  hardly  force  my  way  through  the  mass  of 
men  who  thronged  round  my  horse,  eager  to  learn  when  help  might  be 
expected;  they  were  evidently  demoralized  by  the  ill-success  which  had 
attended  the  previous  days’  operations,  and  it  was  not  until  I reassured 
them  with  the  news  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  was  close  at  hand 
that  I managed  to  get  through  the  crowd  and  deliver  my  message  to 
the  General. 

The  ‘ hero  of  the  Redan,’  whom  I now  saw  for  the  first  time,  though 
the  fame  of  his  achievement  had  preceded  him  to  India,  was  a hand- 
some, cheery-looking  man  of  about  forty-eight  years  of  age,  who 
appeared,  in  contrast  to  the  excited  multitude  I had  passed,  thoroughly 
calm  and  collected ; and  notwithstanding  the  bitter  disappointment  it 
must  have  been  to  him  to  be  obliged  to  give  up  the  city  and  retire  with 
his  wholly  inadequate  force  into  the  entrenchment,  he  was  not  dispirited, 


202 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[>8:7 


and  had  all  his  wits  about  him.  In  a few  words  he  told  me  what  had 
happened,  and  desired  me  to  explain  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  that, 
although  the  city  and  cantonment  had  to  be  abandoned,  he  was  still 
holding  the  enemy  in  check  round  the  assembly-rooms  (which  were 
situated  outside  and  to  the  west  front  of  the  entrenchment),  thus  pre- 
venting their  approaching  the  bridge  of  boats  near  enough  to  injure  it. 

I was  about  to  start  back  to  Head-Quarters,  when  suddenly  loud 
cheers  broke  from  the  men,  caused  by  the  appearance  in  their  midst  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief  himself.  After  I had  left  him,  Sir  Colin 
became  every  minute  more  impatient  and  fidgety,  and  ere  long  started 
off  after  me,  accompanied  by  Mansfield  and  some  other  staff  officers. 
He  was  recognized  by  the  soldiers,  some  of  whom  had  known  him  in 
the  Crimea,  and  they  at  once  surrounded  him,  giving  enthusiastic  ex- 
pression to  their  joy  at  seeing  him  again. 

The  Chief  could  now  judge  for  himself  as  to  how  matters  stood,  so, 
as  there  was  plenty  of  work  in  camp  for  me,  I started  back  to  rejoin  my 
own  General.  On  my  way  I stopped  to  speak  to  Budgen,  whom  I 
found  in  a most  dejected  frame  of  mind.  Unfortunately  for  him,  he 
had  used  exactly  the  same  words  in  describing  the  situation  at  Cawn- 
pore  to  Sir  Colin  as  he  had  to  me,  which  roused  the  old  Chief’s  indig- 
nation, and  he  flew  at  the  wretched  man  as  he  was  sometimes  apt  to 
do  when  greatly  put  out,  rating  him  soundly,  and  asking  him  how 
he  dared  to  say  of  Her  Majesty’s  troops  that  they  were  ‘ at  their  last 
gasp.’ 

I found  Hope  Grant  about  four  miles  from  the  river  bank,  where  the 
camp  was  being  pitched.  Sir  Colin  did  not  return  till  after  dark,  when 
we  were  told  that  the  rest  of  Windham’s  troops  had  been  driven  inside 
the  entrenchment,  which  only  confirmed  what  we  had  suspected,  for 
flames  were  seen  mounting  high  into  the  air  from  the  direction  of  the 
assembly-rooms,  which,  it  now  turned  out,  had  been  set  on  fire  by  the 
enemy — an  unfortunate  occurrence,  as  in  them  had  been  stored  the 
camp  equipage,  kits,  clothing,  etc.,  belonging  to  most  of  the  regiments 
which  had  crossed  the  Ganges  into  Oudh.  But  what  was  more  serious 
still  was  the  fact  that  the  road  was  now  open  for  the  rebels’  heavy 
guns,  which  might  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  bridge  of  boats  at  any 
moment. 

Owing  to  the  length  of  the  march  (thirty-two  or  thirty-three  miles), 
some  of  the  carts  and  the  heavy  guns  did  not  arrive  till  daybreak. 
Scarcely  had  the  bullocks  been  unyoked,  before  the  guns  were  ordered 
on  to  the  river  bank,  where  they  formed  up,  and  so  effectually  plied  the 
enemy  with  shot  and  shell  that  the  passage  of  the  river  was  rendered 
comparatively  safe  for  our  troops. 

When  the  men  had  breakfasted,  the  order  was  given  to  cross  over. 
Sir  Colin  accompanied  the  column  as  far  as  the  bridge,  and  then 
directed  Hope  Grant,  with  the  Horse  Artillery  and  most  of  the  Cavalry, 


THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  GAUGES 


203 


1857] 

Bourchier's  battery  anil  Adrian  Hope’s  brigade,  to  move  to  the  south- 
east of  the  city  and  take  up  a position  on  the  open  ground-  which 
stretched  from  the  river  to  the  Grand  Trunk  Road,  with  the  canal  be- 
tween us  and  the  enemy.  By  this  arrangement  communication  with 
Allahabad,  which  had  been  temporarily  interrupted,  was  restored,  a 
very  necessary  measure,  for  until  the  road  was  made  safe,  reinforce- 
ments, which  on  account  of  the  paucity  of  transport  had  to  be  sent  up 
in  small  detaclnnents,  could  not  reach  us,  nor  could  the  families  and 
sick  soldiers  be  sent  down  country. 

The  passage  of  the  huge  convoy  over  the  bridge  of  boats,  under  the 
protection  of  Greathed’s  brigade,  was  a most  tedious  business,  occupy- 
ing thirty  hours,  from  3 p.m.  on  the  29th  till  about  9 p.m.  on  the  30th, 
when  Inglis  brought  over  the  rear  guard.  During  its  transit  the  enemy 
fired  occasionally  on  the  bridge,  and  tried  to  destroy  it  by  floating 
fire-rafts  down  the  river;  fortunately  they  did  not  succeed,  and  the 
convoy  arrived  without  accident  on  the  ground  set  apart  for  it  in  the 
rear  of  our  camp. 

For  the  three  first  days  of  December  I was  chiefly  employed  in 
reconnoitring  with  the  Native  Cavalry  the  country  to  our  left  and  rear, 
to  make  sure  that  the  rebels  had  no  intention  of  attempting  to  get  round 
that  flank,  and  in  making  arrangements  for  the  despatch  of  the  families, 
the  sick,  and  the  wounded,  to  Allahabad  en  route  to  Calcutta.  We  im- 
provised covers  for  some  of  the  carts,  in  which  we  placed  the  women 
and  children  and  the  worst  cases  amongst  the  men ; but  with  all  our 
efforts  to  render  them  less  unfit  for  the  purpose,  these  carts  remained 
but  rough  and  painful  conveyances  for  delicate  women  and  suffering 
men  to  travel  in. 

We  were  not  left  altogether  unmolested  by  the  enemy  during  these 
days.  Round  shot  kept  continually  falling  in  our  midst,  particularly 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Commander-in-Chief’s  tent,  the  exact  posi- 
tion of  which  must  have  somehow  been  made  known  to  the  rebels, 
otherwise  they  could  not  have  distinguished  it  from  the  rest  of  the 
camp,  as  it  w-as  an  unpretentious  hill  tent,  such  as  was  then  used  by 
subaltern  officers. 

Until  the  women  left  camp  on  the  night  of  the  3rd  December,  wTe 
were  obliged  to  act  on  the  defensive,  and  were  not  able  to  stop  the 
enemy’s  fire  completely,  though  we  managed  to  keep  it  under  control 
by  occupying  the  point  called  Generalganj,  and  strengthening  the 
piquets  on  our  right  and  left  flank.  On  the  4th  a second  unsuccessful 
attempt  was  made  to  destroy  the  bridge  of  boats  by  means  of  fire-rafts, 
and  on  the  5th  there  were  several  affairs  at  the  outposts,  all  of  w'hich 
ended  in  the  discomfiture  of  the  rebels  without  any  great  loss  to  our- 
selves; Lieutenant -Colonel  Ewart  of  the  93rd  Highlanders,  who  lost 
his  arm  on  the  1st,  and  Captain  Crutchley  of  the  same  regiment,  who 
was  severely  wounded,  being  the  only  casualties  amongst  the  officers. 


204 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

The  time  had  now  arrived  to  give  the  Gwalior  troops  a repetition  of 
the  lesson  taught  them  at  Agra  on  the  10th  October.  They  had  had 
it  all  their  own  way  since  then ; and  having  proved  too  strong  for 
Windham,  they  misunderstood  the  Commander-in-Chief  remaining  for 
so  long  on  the  defensive,  and  attributed  his  inaction  to  fear  of  their 
superior  prowess. 

Sunday,  the  6th  December,  was  one  of  those  glorious  days  in  which 
the  European  in  northern  India  revels  for  a great  part  of  the  winter, 
clear  and  cool,  with  a cloudless  sky.  I awoke  refreshed  after  a good 
night’s  rest,  and  in  high  spirits  at  the  prospect  before  us  of  a satis- 
factory day’s  work  ; for  we  hoped  to  drive  the  enemy  from  Cawnpore, 
and  to  convince  those  who  had  witnessed,  if  not  taken  part  in,  the 
horrible  brutalities  perpetrated  there,  that  England’s  hour  had  come  at 
last. 

The  42nd  Highlanders,  a battery  of  Royal  Artillery,  and  detach- 
ments of  several  different  corps,  had  quite  lately  been  added  to  the 
force,  so  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  now  at  his  disposal  about 
5,000  Infantry,  600  Cavalry,  and  35  guns.  The  Infantry  were  divided 
into  four  brigades,  commanded  respectively  by  Greathed,  Adrian  Hope, 
Inglis,  and  Walpole.*  The  Cavalry  brigade,  consisting  of  the  same 
regiments  which  had  come  with  us  from  Delhi,  was  commanded  by 
Brigadier  Little,  the  Artilleryt  by  Major-General  Dupuis,  and  the 
Engineers  by  Colonel  Harness,  General  Windham  being  placed  in 
charge  of  the  entrenchments. 

Opposed  to  this  force  there  were  25,000  men,  with  40  guns,  not  all 
disciplined  soldiers,  but  all  adepts  in  the  use  of  arms,  and  accustomed 
to  fighting.  They  were  divided  into  two  distinct  bodies,  one  composed 
of  the  Gwalior  Contingent,  the  Rani  of  Jhansi’s  followers,  and  the 
mutinous  regiments  which  had  been  stationed  in  Bundelkand,  Central 
India,  and  Rajputana,  which  occupied  the  right  of  the  enemy’s 
position,  covering  their  line  of  retreat  by  the  Kalpi  road.  The  other 
consisted  of  the  troous — regular  and  irregular — which  had  attached 
themselves  to  the  Nana,  and  held  the  city  and  the  ground  which  lay 
between  it  and  the  Ganges,  their  line  of  retreat  being  along  the  Grand 

* Greathed’s  brigade  consisted  of  the  8th  and  64th  Foot  and  2nd  Punjab 
Infantry.  Adrian  Hope’s  brigade  consisted  of  the  53rd  Foot,  42nd  and  93rd 
Highlanders,  and  4th  Punjab  Infantry.  Inglis’s  brigade  consisted  of  the 
23rd  Fusiliers,  32nd  and  82nd  Foot.  Walpole’s  brigade  consisted  of  the  2nd 
and  3rd  Battalions  Rifle  Brigade  and  a detachment  of  the  38tli  Foot. 

f The  Artillery  consisted  of  Peel's  Naval  Brigade,  Blunt’s,  Bridge’s  and 
Reinmington’s  troops  of  Horse  Artillery,  Bourchier’s,  Middleton’s,  and  Smith's 
Field  batteries,  and  Longden’s  Heavy  battery. 


THE  FIGHT  AT  C AWN  PORE 


205 


■857] 

Trunk  Road  to  Bithur.  Tantia  Topi  was  in  command  of  the  whole 
force,  while  the  Nana  remained  with  his  own  people  on  the  left  Hank. 

On  the  centre  and  left  the  enemy  were  very  strongly  posted,  and 
could  only  be  approached  through  the  city  and  by  way  of  the  difficult 
broken  ground,  covered  with  ruined  houses,  stretching  along  the  river 
bank. 

While  the  men  were  eating  their  breakfasts,  and  the  tents  were 
being  struck,  packed,  and  sent  to  the  rear,  Sir  Colin  carefully  explained 
his  plan  of  operations  to  the  Commanding  officers  and  the  staff ; this 
plan  was,  to  make  a feint  on  the  enemy’s  left  and  centre,  but  to  direct 
the  real  attack  on  their  right,  hoping  thus  to  be  able  to  dispose  of  this 
portion  of  Tantia  Topi’s  force,  before  assistance  could  be  obtained  from 
any  other  part  of  the  line. 

With  this  view  Windham  was  ordered  to  open  with  every  gun  within 
the  entrenchment  at  9 a.m. ; while  Greathed,  supported  by  Walpole, 
threatened  the  enemy’s  centre.  Exactly  at  the  hour  named,  the  roar 
of  Windham’s  Artillery  was  heard,  followed  a few  minutes  later  by  the 
rattle  of  Greathed’s  musketry  along  the  bank  of  the  canal.  Mean- 
while, Adrian  Hope’s  brigade  was  drawn  up  in  fighting  formation 
behind  the  Cavalry  stables  on  our  side  of  the  Trunk  Road,  and  Inglis’s 
brigade  behind  the  racecourse  on  the  other  side.  At  eleven  o’clock  the 
order  was  given  to  advance.  The  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery  moved 
to  the  left  with  instructions  to  cross  the  canal  by  a bridge  about  two 
miles  off,  and  to  be  ready  to  fall  upon  the  enemy  as  they  retreated 
along  the  Kalpi  road.  Walpole’s  brigade,  covered  by  Smith’s  Field 
battery,  crossed  the  canal  by  a bridge  immediately  to  the  left  of 
Generalganj,  cleared  the  canal  bank,  and,  by  hugging  the  wall  of  the 
city,  effectually  prevented  reinforcements  reaching  the  enemy’s  right. 

Peel’s  and  Longden’s  heavy  guns,  and  Bourchier’s  and  Middleton’s 
Field  batteries,  now  opened  on  some  brick-kilns  and  mounds  which  the 
enemy  were  holding  in  strength  on  our  side  of  the  canal,  and  against 
which  Adrian  Hope’s  and  Inglis’s  brigades  advanced  in  parallel  lines, 
covered  by  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry  in  skirmishing  order. 

It  was  a sight  to  be  remembered,  that  advance,  as  we  watched  it 
from  our  position  on  horseback,  grouped  round  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  Before  us  stretched  a fine  open  grassy  plain  ; to  the  right  the 
dark  green  of  the  Rifle  Brigade  battalions  revealed  where  Walpole’s 
brigade  was  crossing  the  canal.  Nearer  to  us,  the  53rd  Foot,  and  the 
42nd  and  93rd  Highlanders  in  their  bonnets  and  kilts,  marched  as  on 
parade,  although  the  enemy's  guns  played  upon  them  and  every  now 
and  then  a round  shot  plunged  through  their  ranks  or  ricocheted  over 
their  heads ; on  they  went  without  apparently  being  in  the  least  dis- 
concerted, and  without  the  slightest  confusion. 

As  the  brick-kilns  were  neared,  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry,  supported 
by  the  53rd  Foot,  charged  the  enemy  in  grand  style,  and  drove  them 


206 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[•857 

across  the  canal.  Here  there  occurred  a slight  check.  The  rebels, 
having  been  reinforced,  made  a stand,  and  bringing  guns  to  bear  upon 
the  bridge  within  grape  range,  they  must  have  done  us  great  damage 
but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  Peel  and  his  sailors  with  a heavy  gun. 
This  put  new  life  into  the  attacking  party ; with  a loud  cheer  they 
dashed  across  the  bridge,  while  Peel  poured  round  after  round  from  his 
24-pounder  on  the  insurgents  with  most  salutary  effect.  The  enemy 
faced  about  and  retired  with  the  utmost  celerity,  leaving  a 9-pounder 
gun  in  our  possession. 

The  whole  of  Hope’s  brigade,  followed  by  Inglis’s,  now  arrived  on 
the  scene  and  proceeded  to  cross  the  canal,  some  by  the  bridge,  while 
others  waded  through  the  water.  Having  got  to  the  other  side,  both 
brigades  re-formed,  and  moved  rapidly  along  the  Kalpi  road.  We  (the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Hope  Grant,  and  their  respective  staffs)  accom- 
panied this  body  of  troops  for  about  a mile  and  a half,  when  the  rebels’ 
camp  came  in  sight.  A few  rounds  were  fired  into  it,  and  then  it  was 
rushed. 

We  were  evidently  unexpected  visitors;  wounded  men  were  lying 
about  in  all  directions,  and  many  sepoys  were  surprised  calmly  cooking 
their  frugal  meal  of  unleavened  bread.  The  tents  were  found  to  be 
full  of  property  plundered  from  the  city  and  cantonment  of  Cawnpore 
— soldiers’  kits,  bedding,  clothing,  and  every  description  of  miscel- 
laneous articles  ; but  to  us  the  most  valuable  acquisition  was  a quantity 
of  grain  and  a large  number  of  fine  bullocks,  of  which  those  best  suited 
for  Ordnance  purposes  were  kept,  and  the  rest  were  made  over  to  the 
Commissariat. 

That  portion  of  the  rebel  force  with  which  we  had  been  engaged 
was  now  in  full  retreat,  and  Sir  Colin  wished  to  follow  it  up  at  once ; 
but  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery  had  not  arrived,  so  that  consider- 
able delay  occurred ; while  we  were  waiting  the  Chief  arranged  to  send 
Mansfield  with  a small  force*  round  to  the  north  of  Cawnpore,  and,  by 
thus  threatening  the  road  along  which  the  Nana’s  troops  must  retreat, 
compel  them  to  evacuate  the  city.  The  23rd  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers 
and  a detachment  of  the  38th  Foot  were  to  be  left  to  look  after  the 
deserted  camp,  and  Inglis’s  brigade  was  to  move  along  the  Kalpi  road 
in  support  of  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery.  But  where  were  the 
much-needed  and  anxiously-expected  mounted  troops?  It  was  not 
like  them  to  be  out  of  the  way  when  their  services  were  required ; 
but  it  was  now  nearly  two  o’clock,  they  had  not  appeared,  and  the 
days  were  very  short.  What  was  to  be  done  ? The  enemy  could  not 
be  allowed  to  carry  off  their  guns  and  escape  punishment.  Suddenly 
the  old  Chief  announced  that  he  had  determined  to  follow  them  up 
himself  with  Bourchier’s  battery  and  his  own  escort. 

* Mansfield  was  given  the  two  Rifle  Brigade  battalions,  the  93rd  High- 
landers, Longden’s  Heavy,  and  Middleton's  Field  battery. 


A LONG  CHASE 


207 


1857] 

What  a chase  we  had ! We  went  at  a gallop,  only  pulling  up 
occasionally  for  the  battery  to  come  into  action,  ‘ to  clear  our  front  and 
flanks.’  We  came  up  with  a goodly  number  of  stragglers,  and  captured 
several  guns  and  carts  laden  with  ammunition.  But  we  were  by  this 
time  overtaking  large  bodies  of  the  rebels,  and  they  were  becoming  too 
numerous  for  a single  battery  and  a few  staff  officers  to  cope  with.  We 
had  outstripped  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  Hope  Grant  decided  to 
halt,  hoping  that  the  missing  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery  might  soon 
turn  up.  We  had  not  to  wait  long.  In  about  a quarter  of  an  hour 
they  appeared  among  some  trees  to  our  left,  even  more  put  out  than  we 
were  at  their  not  having  been  to  the  front  at  such  a time.  Their  guide 
had  made  too  great  a detour,  but  the  sound  of  our  guns  showed  them 
his  mistake,  and  they  at  once  altered  their  course  and  pushed  on  in  the 
direction  of  the  firing.  Sir  Colin  had  also  come  up,  so  off  we  started 
again,  and  never  drew  rein  until  we  reached  the  Pandu  Naddi,  fourteen 
miles  from  Cawnpore.  The  rout  was  complete.  Finding  themselves 
pressed,  the  sepoys  scattered  over  the  country,  throwing  away  their 
arms  and  divesting  themselves  of  their  uniform,  that  they  might  pass 
for  harmless  peasants.  Nineteen  guns,  some  of  them  of  large  calibre, 
were  left  in  our  hands.  Our  victory  was  particularly  satisfactory  in 
that  it  was  achieved  with  but  slight  loss  to  ourselves,  the  casualties 
being  2 officers  and  11  men  killed,  and  9 officers  and  76  men  wounded. 

Hope  Grant  now  desired  me  to  hurry  back  to  Cawnpore  before  it  got 
too  dark,  and  select  the  ground  for  the  night’s  bivouac.  As  there  was 
some  risk  in  going  alone,  Augustus  Anson  volunteered  to  accompany 
me.  We  had  got  about  half-way,  when  we  came  across  the  dead  body 
of  Lieutenant  Salmond,  who  had  been  acting  Aide-de-camp  to  my 
General,  and  must  have  got  separated  from  us  in  the  pursuit.  His 
throat  was  cut,  and  he  had  a severe  wound  on  the  face.  Soon  after  we 
met  Inglis’s  brigade,  which,  in  accordance  with  my  instructions,  I 
turned  back.  On  reaching  the  Gwalior  Contingent  camp,  we  heard 
that  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  recapture  it,  which  had  been  re- 
pulsed by  the  troops  left  in  charge. 

It  was  dusk  by  the  time  we  reached  the  junction  of  the  Kalpi  and 
Grand  Trunk  roads,  and  we  agreed  that  this  would  be  a good  place  for 
a bivouac,  the  city  being  about  a mile  in  front,  and  Mansfield’s  column 
less  than  two  miles  to  the  left.  I marked  out  the  ground,  and  showed 
each  corps  as  it  came  up  the  position  it  was  to  occupy.  When  all  this 
was  over  I was  pretty  well  tired  out  and  ravenously  hungry  ; but  food 
there  was  none,  so  I had  made  up  my  mind  to  lie  down,  famished  as  I 
was.  Just  then  I came  across  some  sleeping  men,  who  to  my  joy 
turned  out  to  be  Dighton  Probyn  and  the  officers  of  the  2nd  Punjab 
Cavalry,  who  were  magnanimous  enough  to  forgive  the  abrupt  inter- 
ruption to  their  slumbers,  and  to  supply  me  with  some  cold  mutton, 
bread,  and  a bottle  of  beer.  Never  was  man  more  grateful  for  a meal, 

14 


208 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


['857 


and  never  was  a meal  more  thoroughly  enjoyed.  I lay  down  beside  my 
friends  and  was  soon  fast  asleep,  in  spite  of  the  bitter  eold  and  being 
much  troubled  about  my  horse  ; neither  for  him  nor  myself  was  there 
a vestige  of  covering  to  be  found. 

The  next  morning  I was  astir  by  cockcrow.  Patrols  who  had  been 
sent  forward  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  a rumour  which  had  reached  the 
Commander-in-Chief  the  previous  evening,  to  the  effect  that  the  city 
had  been  evacuated,  returned  with  confirmation  of  the  report ; but  the 
news  in  other  respects  was  far  from  satisfactory.  Mansfield's  move- 
ment had  caused  the  enemy  to  retire,  but  they  had  got  away  without 
loss,  and  had  succeeded  in  carrying  off  all  their  guns ; so  that  only 
one  half  of  Tantia  Topi’s  force  had  really  been  dealt  with ; the  other 
half  still  remained  to  be  disposed  of,  and  to  Hope  Grant’s  great  satis- 
faction and  my  delight,  the  duty  of  following  them  up  was  entrusted 
to  him. 

His  orders  were  to  go  to  Bithur,  as  it  was  thought  likely  that  the 
Nana’s  troops  would  retire  on  that  place.  But  as  the  news  was  not 
very  reliable,  Hope  Grant  was  told  to  use  his  own  discretion,  and  act 
according  to  circumstances. 

For  several  days  I had  been  trying  unsuccessfully  to  get  hold  of  some 
Natives  upon  whom  I could  rely  to  bring  me  trustworthy  information 
as  to  the  enemy’s  movements.  It  is  always  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  a Quartermaster-General  on  service  should  have  the  help  of  such 
men,  and  I was  now  more  than  ever  in  need  of  reliable  intelligence.  In 
this  emergency  I applied  to  Captain  Bruce,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
Intelligence  Department  which  had  been  established  at  Cawnpore  for 
the  purpose  of  tracing  the  whereabouts  of  those  rebels  who  had  taken  a 
prominent  part  in  the  atrocities.  I was  at  once  supplied  with  a first- 
rate  man,  Unjur  Tiwari  by  name,*  who  from  that  moment  until  I left 

* Unjur  Tiwari’s  career  was  a very  remarkable  one.  A sepoy  in  the 
1st  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  lie  was  at  Banda  when  the  Mutiny  broke  out, 
and  during  the  disturbances  at  that  place  he  aided  a European  clerk  and  his 
wife  to  escape,  and  showed  his  disinterestedness  by  refusing  to  take  a gold 
ring,  the  only  reward  they  had  to  offer  him.  He  then  joined  Havelock’s 
force,  and  rendered  excellent  service  as  a spy  ; and  although  taken  prisoner 
more  than  once,  and  on  one  occasion  tortured,  he  never  wavered  in  his  loyalty 
to  us.  Accompanying  Outram  to  Lucknow,  he  volunteered  to  carry  a letter 
to  Cawnpore,  and  after  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  and  being  cruelly 
ill-treated  by  th?m,  he  effected  his  escape,  and  safely  delivered  Outram’s 
message  to  Sir  Coi,.rt  Campbell.  He  then  worked  for  me  most  faithfully,  pro- 
curing information  which  I could  always  thoroughly  rely  upon  ; and  I was 
much  gratified  when  he  was  rewarded  by  a grant  of  Rs.  3,000,  presented  with 
a sword  of  honour,  and  invested  with  the  Order  of  British  India,  with  the 
title  of  Sirdar  Bahadur.  I was  proportionately  distressed  some  years  later  to 
find  that,  owing  to  misrepresentations  of  enemies  when  he  was  serving  in  the 
Oudh  Military  Police,  Unjur  Tiwari  had  been  deprived  of  his  rewards,  and 
learning  he  was  paralyzed  and  in  want,  I begged  I/ird  Napier  to  interest 


Co  Shi  raj  pur) 


ll'alker  Gr  Boutall sr. 


UNjfUR  TIWARI 


209 


1857] 

India  for  England  in  April,  1858,  rendered  me  most  valuable  service. 
He  was  a Brahmin  by  caste,  and  belonged  to  the  1st  Native  Infantry. 
In  a few  words  I explained  what  I required  of  him,  and  he  started  at 
once  for  Bithur,  promising  to  meet  me  the  next  day  on  the  line  of 
inarch. 

Early  on  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  we  marched  out  of  Cawnpore,  and 
at  sunset  UnjurTiwari,  true  to  his  promise,  made  his  appearance  at  the 
point  where  the  road  turns  off  to  Bithur.  He  told  me  that  the  Nana 
had  slept  at  that  place  the  night  before,  but  hearing  of  our  approach, 
had  decamped  with  all  his  guns  and  most  of  his  followers,  and  was  now 
ft  a ferry  some  miles  up  the  river,  trying  to  get  across  and  make  his 
way  to  Oudh.  We  had  come  thirteen  miles,  and  had  as  many  more  to 
go  before  we  could  get  to  the  ferry,  and  as  there  was  nothing  to  be 
gained  by  arriving  there  in  the  dark,  a halt  was  ordered  for  rest  and 
refreshment.  At  midnight  we  started  again,  and  reached  Sheorajpur 
(three  miles  from  the  ferry)  at  daybreak.  Here  we  left  our  impedi- 
menta, and  proceeded  by  a cross-country  road.  Presently  a couple  of 
mounted  men  belonging  to  the  enemy,  not  perceiving  who  we  were, 
galloped  straight  into  the  escort.  On  discovering  their  mistake,  they 
turned  and  tried  to  escape,  but  in  vain ; one  was  killed,  the  other 
captured,  and  from  him  we  learnt  that  the  rebels  were  only  a short  dis- 
tance ahead.  We  pushed  on,  and  soon  came  in  sight  of  them  and  of  the 
river ; crowds  were  collected  on  the  banks,  and  boats  were  being 
hurriedly  laden,  some  of  the  guns  having  already  been  placed  on  board. 
Our  troops  were  ordered  to  advance,  but  the  ground  along  the  river  bank 
was  treacherous  and  very  heavy.  Notwithstanding,  the  Artillery 
managed  to  struggle  through,  and  when  the  batteries  had  got  to  within 
1,000  yards  of  the  ferry,  the  enemy  appeared  suddenly  to  discover  our 
presence,  and  opened  upon  us  with  their  Artillery.  Our  batteries  gal- 
loped on,  and  got  considerably  nearer  before  they  returned  the  fire  ; 
after  a few  rounds  the  rebels  broke  and  fled.  The  ground  was  so  un- 
fa voui'able  for  pursuit,  being  full  of  holes  and  quicksands,  that  nearly  all 
escaped,  except  a few  cut  up  by  the  Cavalry.  Fifteen  guns  were 
captured,  with  one  single  casualty  on  our  side— the  General  himself — 
who  was  hit  on  the  foot  by  a spent  grape-shot,  without,  happily,  being 
much  hurt. 

Hope  Grant’s  successful  management  of  this  little  expedition  con- 
siderably enhanced  the  high  opinion  the  Commander-in-Chief  had 
already  formed  of  his  ability.  He  was  next  ordered  to  proceed  to 
Bithur  and  complete  the  destruction  of  that  place,  which  had  been 


himself  in  the  matter,  the  result  being  that  the  brave  old  man  was  given  a 
yearly  pension  of  Rs.  1.200  for  his  life.  He  was  alive  when  I left  India,  and 
although  he  resided  some  distance  from  the  railway  he  always  had  himself 
carried  to  See  me  whenever  I travelled  in  his  direction. 


14—2 


210 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1857 

begun  by  Havelock  in  July.  We  found  the  palace  in  good  order — there 
was  little  evidence  that  it  had  been  visited  by  an  avenging  force,  and 
in  one  of  the  rooms  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  treacherous  Azi- 
mula  Khan,  I came  across  a number  of  letters,  some  unopened,  and 
some  extremely  interesting,  to  which  I shall  have  to  refer  later  on. 

We  left  Adrian  Hope’s  brigade  at  Bithur  to  search  for  treasure  re- 
ported to  have  been  buried  near  the  palace,  and  returned  to  Cawnpore, 
where  we  remained  for  about  ten  days,  not  at  all  sorry  for  the  rest. 

During  this  time  of  comparative  idleness,  I went  over  the  ground 
where  the  troops  under  Windham  had  been  engaged  for  three  days,  and 
heard  many  comments  on  the  conduct  of  the  operations.  All  spoke  in 
high  terms  of  Windham’s  dash  and  courage,  but  as  a Commander  he 
was  generally  considered  to  have  failed. 

Windham  was  without  doubt  placed  in  an  extremely  difficult  posi- 
tion. The  relief  of  the  garrison  at  Lucknow  was  of  such  paramount 
importance  that  Sir  Colin  Campbell  was  obliged  to  take  with  him  every 
available  man,*  and  found  it  necessary  to  order  Windham  to  send  all 
reinforcements  after  him  as  soon  as  they  arrived,  although  it  was 
recognized  as  probable  that  Tantia  Topi,  with  the  large  force  then 
assembled  near  Kalpi,  would  advance  on  Cawnpore  as  soon  as  the 
Commander-in-Chief  was  committed  to  his  difficult  undertaking.  Wind- 
ham’s orders  were  to  improve  the  defences  of  the  entrenchment ; to 
carefully  watch  the  movements  of  the  Gwalior  army  ; and  to  make  as 
much  display  as  possible  of  the  troops  at  his  command  by  encamping 
them  in  a conspicuous  position  outside  the  city ; but  he  was  not  on  any 
account  to  move  out  to  attack,  unless  compelled  to  do  so  in  order  to 
prevent  the  bombardment  of  the  entrenchment.  The  safety  of  this 
entrenchment  was  of  great  importance,  for  it  contained  a number  of 
guns,  quantities  of  ammunition  and  other  warlike  stores,  and  it  covered, 
as  already  shown,  the  bridge  of  boats  over  the  Ganges. 

Windham  loyally  carried  out  his  instructions,  but  he  subsequently 
asked  for  and  obtained  leave  to  detain  any  troops  arriving  at  Cawnpore 
after  the  14th  of  November,  as  he  did  not  feel  himself  strong  enough,  with 
the  force  at  his  disposal,  to  resist  the  enemy  if  attacked.  But  even  after 
having  received  this  sanction  he  twice  despatched  strong  reinforcements 
to  Lucknow,  thus  weakening  himself  considerably  in  order  to  give 
Sir  Colin  all  possible  help. 

* The  garrison  left  at  Cawnpore  consisted  of : 

Four  companies  of  the  64th  Foot,  and  small 

detachments  of  other  regiments  450  men. 

Sailors  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  47  men. 

Total  ...  ...  ...  497 

With  a hastily  organized  bullock  battery  of  four  field  guns,  manned  partly  by 
Europeans  and  partly  by  Sikhs. 


WINDHAM  AT  CAWNPORE 


21  i 


1857] 

Windham  eventually  had  at  his  disposal  about  1,700  Infantry  and 
eight  guns,  the  greater  part  of  which  were  encamped  as  directed,  out- 
side the  city,  close  to  the  junction  of  the  Delhi  and  Kalpi  roads,  while 
the  rest  were  posted  in  and  around  the  entrenchment.  Meanwhile  the 
rebels  were  slowly  approaching  Cawnpore  in  detachments,  with  the 
evident  intention  of  surrounding  the  place.  On  the  17th  two  bodies  of 
troops  were  pushed  on  to  Shuli  and  Shirajpur,  within  fifteen  miles  of 
the  city,  and  a little  less  than  that  distance  from  each  other.  Windham 
thought  that  if  he  could  manage  to  surprise  either  of  these,  he  could 
prevent  the  enemy  from  concentrating,  and  he  drew  up  a scheme  for 
giving  effect  to  this  plan,  which  he  submitted  for  the  approval  of  the 
Commander-in  Chief.  No  reply  came,  and  after  waiting  a week  he  gave 
up  all  idea  of  attempting  to  surprise  the  detachments,  and  determined 
to  try  and  arrest  the  rebels’  advance  by  attacking  the  main  body,  still 
some  distance  off.  Accordingly  he  broke  up  his  camp,  and  marched 
six  miles  along  the  Kalpi  road,  on  the  same  day  that  the  Gwalior  force 
moved  some  distance  nearer  to  Cawnpore.  The  next  morning,  the  25th, 
the  enemy  advanced  to  Pandu  Naddi,  within  three  miles  of  Windham’s 
camp. 

Windham  now  found  himself  in  a very  critical  position.  With  only 
1,200  Infantry*  and  eight  light  guns,  he  was  opposed  to  Tantia  Topi 
with  an  army  of  25,000  men  and  forty  guns.  He  had  to  choose 
whether  he  would  fight  these  enormous  odds  or  retire ; he  decided  that 
to  fight  was  the  least  of  the  two  evils,  and  he  was  so  far  successful  that 
he  drove  back  that  portion  of  the  opposing  force  immediately  in  his 
front,  and  captured  three  guns ; but  being  unable  to  press  his  advantage 
on  account  of  the  paucity  of  men  and  the  total  absence  of  Cavalry,  he 
had  perforce  to  fall  back — a grievous  necessity.  He  was  followed  the 
whole  way,  insulted  and  jeered  at,  by  the  rebel  horsemen.  The  result 
of  the  day  was  to  give  confidence  to  the  wily  Mahratta  leader ; he 
pushed  on  to  Cawnpore,  and  attacked  Windham  with  such  vehemence 
that  by  nightfall  on  the  28th  the  British  troops  were  driven  inside  the 
entrenchment,  having  had  315  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  having 
lost  all  their  baggage  and  camp  equipage. 

Windham  undoubtedly  laid  himself  open  to  censure.  His  defence 
was  that,  had  he  received  the  Commander-in-Chief’s  authority  to  carry 
out  his  plan  for  surprising  the  rebels,  he  would  certainly  have  broken 
up  their  army,  and  the  disaster  could  not  have  occurred.  But  surely 
when  he  decided  that  circumstances  had  so  changed  since  Sir  Colin’s 
orders  were  given  as  to  justify  him  in  disregarding  them,  he  should 
have  acted  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  taken  such  steps  as  appeared 

* The  force  was  composed  of  the  34th  Foot,  and  portions  of  the  82nd  and 
88th  Foot,  and  2nd  Battalion  Rifle  Brigade  ; with  four  9 pounders,  manned 
partly  by  Royal  and  Bengal  gunners  and  partly  Ly  Sikhs ; and  four  6-pounders, 
manned  by  Madras  Native  gunners. 


212 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 


to  him  best,  instead  of  applying  for  sanction  to  a Commander  far  from 
the  scene  of  action,  and  so  entirely  ignorant  of  the  conditions  under 
which  the  application  was  made,  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  him  to 
decide  whether  such  sanction  should  be  given.  The  march  which 
Windham  made  towards  the  enemy  on  the  24th  was  quite  as  grave  a 
disobedience  of  orders  as  would  have  been  the  surprise  movement  he 
contemplated  on  the  17th;  but  while  the  former  placed  him  in  a most 
dangerous  position,  and  one  from  which  it  was  impossible  to  deal  the 
enemy  a decisive  blow,  the  latter,  if  successful,  would  have  deserved, 
and  doubtless  would  have  received,  the  highest  praise. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

Our  stay  at  Cawnpore  was  more  prolonged  than  the  Commander-in  - 
Chief  intended  or  wished  it  to  be,  but  want  of  transport  made  it  im- 
possible for  us  to  move  until  the  carts  returned  which  had  gone  to 
Allahabad  with  the  women  and  children  and  the  sick  soldiers.  We 
were  thus  delayed  until  the  23rd  December,  on  which  date  we  com- 
menced our  march  towards  Fatehgarh. 

At  Chobipur,  two  marches  from  Cawnpore,  where  we  spent  Christmas 
Day,  we  were  joined  by  the  troops  who  had  been  left  behind  at  Bithur  ; 
they  had  not  succeeded  in  discovering  any  considerable  quantity  of 
treasure,  some  silver  vessels  of  various  kinds  being  the  only  result  of 
their  labours. 

The  Commander-in-Chief’s  object  in  moving  on  Fatehgarh  was  to 
restore  order  throughout  the  Doab  and  open  communication  between 
the  Punjab  and  Bengal. 

A brigade  under  Brigadier  Walpole  had  been  despatched  on  the  16th, 
with  orders  to  clear  the  country  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Jumna  up 
to  Mainpuri,  where  he  was  to  be  joined  by  Brigadier  Seaton  with  a 
strong  column  from  Delhi,  and  whence  the  united  force  was  to  advance 
on  Fatehgarh. 

We  reached  Gursahaiganj,  where  the  road  turns  off  to  Fatehgarh, 
on  the  31st,  and  here  the  main  body  of  the  army  halted  on  New 
Year’s  Day,  1858 ; but  information  having  been  received  that  5,000 
rebels  under  the  Nawab  of  Farakabad  had  partly  destroyed  the  sus- 
pension bridge  over  the  Kali  Naddi,  about  five  miles  ahead,  and  had 
then  gone  off  towards  Fatehgarh,  Adrian  Hope’s  brigade  was  sent  for- 
ward to  repair  the  damage  and  watch  the  bridge. 

Early  the  following  morning  Sir  Colin,  with  Mansfield  and  the  rest 
of  his  staff,  went  on  to  inspect  progress,  leaving  orders  for  the  rest  of 
the  force  to  follow  later  in  the  day.  Very  soon,  however,  Hope  Grant 
eceived  an  urgent  message  from  the  Chief  of  the  Staff,  telling  him  to 


THE  FIGHT  AT  KHUDAGANJ 


1858] 


213 


push  on  the  troops  with  all  possible  speed,  as  the  enemy  had  returned, 
and  were  now  in  strength  on  the  other  side  of  the  Kali  Naddi. 

We  (Sir  Hope  and  his  staff)  started  off  with  the  Horse  Artillery  and 
Cavalry,  and  found,  on  reaching  the  bridge,  that  the  rebels  were 
occupying  tho  village  of  Khudaganj,  just  across  the  river,  and  only 
about  300  yards  off,  from  which  advantageous  position  they  were 
pouring  a heavy  fire  on  Hope’s  brigade.  Our  piquets  on  the  further 
side  of  the  stream  had  been  strengthened  by  a wing  of  the  53rd  Foot, 
and  a wing  of  the  93rd  Highlanders  had  been  placed  in  reserve  behind 
the  bridge  on  the  nearer  side,  the  rest  of  the  regiment  having  been 
despatched  to  watch  a ford  some  distance  down  the  river,  while  a 
battery  of  Field  Artillery  had  been  brought  into  action  in  reply  to  the 
enemy’s  guns.  Immediately  on  the  arrival  of  the  main  body,  three  of 
Peel’s  guns,  under  Vaughan,  his  First  Lieutenant,  were  pushed  across 
the  bridge  to  the  further  side,  and  getting  under  shelter  of  a convenient 
building,  opened  fire  on  the  village,  and  on  a toll-bar  directly  in  its 
front,  about  which  the  enemy  were  collected  in  considerable  numbers. 
Our  Infantry  now  crossed  over,  followed  by  the  Cavalry  and  Horse 
Artillery — a tedious  operation,  as  there  had  not  been  time  to  fully  repair 
the  bridge,  and  in  one  place  planks  had  only  been  laid  for  half  its  width, 
necessitating  horses  being  led,  and  Infantry  passing  over  in  sections. 
Moreover,  the  enemy  had  got  the  exact  range,  and  several  casualties 
occurred  at  this  spot ; one  round  shot  alone  killed  and  wounded  six 
men  of  the  8th  Foot.  Vaughan  at  last  succeeded  in  silencing  the  gun 
which  had  troubled  us  most,  and  preparations  were  made  for  an  attack 
on  the  village.  While  we  were  watching  the  proceedings,  the  Inter- 
preter to  the  Naval  Brigade,  Henry  Hamilton  Maxwell,  a brother 
officer  of  mine  who  had  been  standing  close  to  me,  was  very  badly 
wounded  in  the  leg,  and  both  Sir  Colin  and  Sir  Hope  were  hit  by  spent 
bullets,  luckily  without  being  much  hurt. 

There  was  a feeling  throughout  the  army  that  Sir  Colin  was  inclined 
to  favour  Highlanders  unduly  ; and  a rumour  got  about  that  the  93rd 
were  to  be  allowed  the  honour  of  delivering  the  assault  on  Khudaganj, 
which  was  highly  resented  by  the  53rd,  and  they  determined  that  on 
this  occasion,  at  any  rate,  the  Highlanders  should  not  have  it  all  their 
own  way.  The  53rd  was  composed  of  a remarkably  fine  set  of  fellows, 
chiefly  Irish,  and  it  was  Mansfield’s  own  regiment ; wishing,  therefore, 
to  do  an  old  comrade  a good  turn,  he  had  placed  Major  Payn,*  one  of 
the  senior  officers,  in  command  of  the  piquets.  Payn  was  a fine  dash- 
ing soldier,  and  a great  favourite  with  the  men,  who  calculated  on  his 
backing  them  up  if  they  upset  Sir  Colin’s  little  plan.  Whether  what 
happened  was  with  or  without  Pawn’s  permission,  I cannot  say,  but 
we  were  all  waiting  near  the  bridge  for  the  attacking  party  to  form, 

* The  late  General  Sir  William  Payn,  K.C.B. 


214 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

when  suddenly  the  ‘ advance  ’ was  sounded,  then  the  ‘ double,’  followed 
by  a tremendous  cheer,  and  we  saw  the  53rd  charge  the  enemy.  Sir 
Colin  was  very  angry,  but  the  53rd  could  not  be  brought  back,  and 
there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  support  them.  Hope’s  and  Greathed’s 
troops  were  instantly  pushed  on,  and  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery 
were  ordered  to  mount. 

The  ground  gradually  sloped  upwards  towards  Khudaganj,  and  the 
regiments  moving  up  to  the  attack  made  a fine  picture.  The  93rd 
followed  the  impulsive  53rd,  while  Greathed’s  brigade  took  a line  to  the 
left,  and  as  they  neared  the  village  the  rebels  hastily  limbered  up  their 
guns  and  retired.  This  was  an  opportunity  for  mounted  troops  such  as 
does  not  often  occur  ; it  was  instantly  seized  by  Hope  Grant,  who  rode  to 
the  Cavalry,  drawn  up  behind  some  sand  hills,  and  gave  the  word  of 
command,  ‘ Threes  left,  trot,  march.’  The  words  had  hardly  left  his  lips 
before  we  had  started  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  by  this  time  half  a mile 
ahead,  the  9th  Lancers  leading  the  way,  followed  by  Younghusband's, 
Gough’s,  and  Probyn’s  squadrons.  "When  within  300  yards  of  the 
fugitives,  the  ‘ charge  ’ was  sounded,  and  in  a few  seconds  we  were  in 
their  midst.  A regular  melee  ensued,  a number  of  the  rebels  were 
killed,  and  seven  guns  captured  in  less  than  as  many  minutes.  The 
General  now  formed  the  Cavalry  into  a long  line,  and,  placing  himself 
at  the  head  of  his  own  regiment  (the  9th  Lancers),  followed  up  the 
flying  foe.  I rode  a little  to  his  left  with  Younghusband’s  squadron, 
and  next  to  him  came  Tyrrell  Ross,  the  doctor.*  As  we  galloped  along, 
Younghusband  drew  my  attention  with  great  pride  to  the  admirable 
manner  in  which  his  men  kept  their  dressing. 

On  the  line  thundered,  overtaking  groups  of  the  enemy,  who  every 
now  and  then  turned  and  fired  into  us  before  they  could  be  cut  down, 
or  knelt  to  receive  us  on  their  bayonets  before  discharging  their 
muskets.  The  chase  continued  for  nearly  five  miles,  until  daylight 
began  to  fail  and  we  appeared  to  have  got  to  the  end  of  the  fugitives, 
when  the  order  was  given  to  wheel  to  the  right  and  form  up  on  the  road. 
Before,  however,  this  movement  could  be  carried  out,  we  overtook  a 
batch  of  mutineers,  who  faced  about  and  fired  into  the  squadron  at 
close  quarters.  I saw  Younghusband  fall,  but  I could  not  go  to  his 
assistance,  as  at  that  moment  one  of  his  sowars  was  in  dire  peril  from 
a sepoy  who  was  attacking  him  with  his  fixed  bayonet,  and  had  I not 

* Tyrrell  Ross  was  well  known  as  a skilful  surgeon,  and  much  esteemed  as 
a staunch  friend.  He  had  just  returned  from  England,  and  had  that  very 
morning  been  placed  in  medical  charge  of  the  Cavalry  Brigade.  When  the 
order  to  mount  was  given,  Ross  asked  the  General  where  he  wished  him  to  be, 
pointing  out  that  he  would  not  be  of  much  use  in  the  rear  if  there  were  a 
pursuit  across  country.  Hope  Grant  replied  : ‘Quite  so;  I have  heard  that 
you  are  a good  rider  and  can  use  your  sword.  Ride  on  my  left,  and  help  to 
look  after  my  third  squadron.’  This  Ross  did  as  well  as  any  Cavalry  otlicer 
could  have  done. 


Bowra 


O Umrowli 


Khudaganj 


oBhysapur 


Pandi 


Raepur 


Gursahaiganj  Cciuwpor£ 


Shairp 


Serai 


Gurgaspur(\ 


Ismunpur 


Husnapur 


O . r O 

Brahimpur  Jahangirpur 


o \ 

Mohona 

Mallikpur 


Sundim  Cj 


Plan  of  the  Engagement 

on  the  Banks  of  the 

KALI  NADI 

at 

KHUDAGANJ 

January  2nd.  1858. 


Scale  of  Miles 

? ^ ¥ « i 


Walker  CtP. entail  sc. 


AWARDED  THE  VICTORIA  CROSS 


215 


1858] 

helped  the  man  and  disposed  of  his  opponent,  he  must  have  been 
killed.  The  next  moment  I descried  in  the  distance  two  sepoys  making 
off  with  a standard,  which  I determined  must  be  captured,  so  I rode 
after  the  rebels  and  overtook  them,  and  while  wrenching  the  stall'  out 
of  the  hands  of  one  of  them,  whom  I cut  down,  the  other  put  his 
musket  close  to  my  body  and  fired  ; fortunately  for  me  it  missed  fire, 
and  I carried  off  the  standard.* 

Tyrrell  Ross,  attracted  by  a party  of  men  in  the  rear  of  the  squadron 
bending  over  the  fallen  Younghusband,  now  came  up,  and,  to  everyone’s 
great  grief,  pronounced  the  wound  to  be  mortal.  From  the  day  that  I 
had  annexed  Youngliusband’s  pony  at  the  siege  of  Delhi  we  had  been 
so  much  together,  and  had  become  such  fast  friends,  that  it  was  a great 
shock  to  me  to  be  told  that  never  again  would  my  gallant  comrade  lead 
the  men  in  whom  he  took  such  soldierly  pride. f 

When  the  wounded  had  been  attended  to,  we  returned  to  camp, 
where  we  found  Sir  Colin  waiting  to  welcome  us,  and  we  received  quite 
an  ovation  from  our  comrades  in  the  Infantry  and  Artillery.  We  must 
have  presented  a curious  spectacle  as  we  rode  back,  almost  every  man 
carrying  some  trophy  of  the  day,  for  the  enemy  had  abandoned  every- 
thing in  their  flight,  and  we  found  the  road  strewn  with  laden  carts 
and  palankins,  arms,  Native  clothing,  etc.  Our  losses  were  surprisingly 
small — only  10  men  killed,  and  30  men  and  2 officers  wounded. 

The  next  day  the  column  marched  to  Fatehgarh,  which  we  found 
deserted.  The  rebels  had  fled  so  precipitately  that  they  had  left  the 
bridge  over  the  Ganges  intact,  and  had  not  attempted  to  destroy  the 
valuable  gun-carriage  factory  in  the  fort,  which  was  then  placed  in  the 
charge  of  Captain  H.  Legeyt  Bruce.  £ 

We  remained  a whole  month  at  Fatehgarh,  and  loud  were  the  com- 
plaints in  camp  at  the  unaccountable  delay.  It  was  the  general  opinion 
that  we  ought  to  move  into  Eohilkand,  and  settle  that  part  of  the 
country  before  returning  to  Lucknow ; this  view  was  very  strongly  held 
by  Sir  Cohn  Campbell,  and  those  who  accused  him  of  “ indecision, 
dilatoriness,  and  wasting  the  best  of  the  cold  weather  ” could  not  have 
known  how  little  he  deserved  their  censure.  The  truth  was,  that  the 
Governor-General  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  were  not  in  accord  as 

* For  these  two  acts  I was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross. 

f Younghusband  met  with  an  extraordinary  accident  during  the  fight  at 
Agra.  While  pursuing  one  of  the  Gwalior  rebels,  he  fell  with  his  horse  into 
a disused  well,  fifty  feet  deep,  and  was  followed  by  two  of  his  men,  also 
mounted.  Ropes  were  brought,  and  the  bodies  were  hauled  up,  when,  to  the 
astonishment  of  everyone,  Younghusband  was  found  to  be  alive,  and,  beyond 
being  badly  bruised,  uninjured.  He  had  fallen  to  the  bottom  in  a sitting 
position,  his  back  resting  against  the  side  of  the  well,  and  his  legs  stretched 
out  in  front  of  him,  while  his  horse  fell  standing  and  across  him.  He  was 
thus  protected  from  the  weight  of  the  other  two  horses  and  their  riders,  who 
were  all  killed. 

J Now  Major-General  H.  L.  Bruce,  C.B. 


216 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

to  the  order  in  which  the  several  military  operations  should  be  taken 
in  hand ; the  latter  urged  that  Rohilkand  should  be  dealt  with  first, 
and  settled  before  the  end  of  the  cold  weather ; he  thought  that  the 
troops  would  then  be  the  better  for  a rest,  and  that  Lucknow  could  very 
well  wait  till  the  following  autumn.  Lord  Canning  opined,  on  the  other 
hand  (and  I entirely  agree  with  him),  that,  while  it  was  most  desirable 
that  order  should  be  restored  in  Rohilkand,  and  indeed  throughout  the 
whole  of  the  North-West  Provinces,  the  possession  of  Lucknow  was  of 
* far  greater  value.’  ‘ Every  eye,’  Lord  Calming  wrote,  ‘ is  upon  Oudh 
as  it  was  upon  Delhi : Oudh  is  not  only  the  rallying-place  of  the  sepoys, 
the  place  to  which  they  all  look,  and  by  the  doings  in  which  their  own 
hopes  and  prospects  rise  or  fall ; but  it  represents  a dynasty ; there  is  a 
king  of  Oudh  “ seeking  his  own.”  ’ He  pointed  out  that  there  was  an 
uneasy  feeling  amongst  the  Chiefs  of  Native  States,  who  were  intently 
watching  our  attitude  with  regard  to  Lucknow,  and  that  even  in  ‘ far- 
off  Burma  ’ news  from  Lucknow  was  anxiously  looked  for.  The 
Governor- General  laid  great  stress  also  upon  the  advisability  of 
employing  as  soon  and  as  close  to  then  own  country  as  possible  the 
troops  from  Nepal  which,  at  Sir  Henry  Lawrence’s  suggestion,  had 
been  applied  for  to,  and  lent  us  by,  the  Nepalese  Government. 

The  visit  of  Jung  Bahadur  (the  Prime  Minister  of  Nepal)  to  England 
a few  years  before  had  opened  his  eyes  to  our  latent  power,  and  he  had 
been  able  to  convince  his  people  that  time  alone  was  required  for  us  to 
recover  completely  from  the  blow  which  had  been  dealt  us  by  the 
Mutiny,  and  that  it  was  therefore  to  their  advantage  to  side  with  us. 
Lord  Canning  wisely  judged,  however,  that  it  would  be  highly 
imprudent  to  allow  the  province  immediately  adjoining  Nepal  to 
continue  in  a state  of  revolt,  and  he  felt  that  neither  Jung  Bahadur 
nor  his  Gurkhas  would  be  satisfied  unless  they  were  allowed  to  take  an 
active  part  in  the  campaign. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Our  prolonged  stay  at  Fatehgarh  was  not  altogether  without  advantage. 
Such  a large  force  being  concentrated  in  the  neighbourhood  secured  the 
safety  of  the  Doab  for  the  time  being,  and  as  Fatehgarh  was  equally 
conveniently  situated  for  an  advance,  either  into  Rohilkand  or  upon 
Lucknow,  the  rebels  were  kept  in  a state  of  uncertainty  as  to  the 
direction  of  our  next  move. 

At  length  it  was  decided  that  Lucknow  was  to  be  our  first  objective, 
and  Sir  Colin  at  once  communicated  with  Outram  and  Napier  as  to  the 
best  means  of  conducting  the  siege.  Then,  leaving  Hope  Grant  to  take 
the  division  across  the  Ganges,  the  Chief  went  to  Allahabad,  the 


MIANGANJ 


217 


.858] 


temporary  Head-Quarters  of  the  supreme  Government,  to  discuss  the 
situation  with  the  Governor-General. 

We  marched  through  Cawnpore,  and  on  the  8th  February  reached 
Unao,  where  we  found  encamped  the  7th  Hussars,  a troop  of  Royal 
Horse  Artillery,  the  38th  Foot  and  the  79th  Highlanders. 

Sir  Colin  on  his  return  from  Allahabad  on  the  10th  issued  a General 
Order  detailing  the  regiments,  staff,  and  Commanders  who  were  to  take 
part  in  the  ‘ Siege  of  Lucknow.'*  Hope  Grant,  who  had  been  made  a 
Major-General  for  the  ‘ Relief  of  Lucknow,’  was  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  Cavalry  division,  and  I remained  with  him  as 
D.A.Q.M.G. 

Rumours  had  been  flying  about  that  the  Nana  was  somewhere  in  the 
neighbourhood,  but  ‘ Wolf ! ’ had  been  cried  so  often  with  regard  to 
him,  that  but  little  notice  was  taken  of  the  reports,  until  my  faithful 
spy,  Unjur  Tiwari,  brought  me  intelligence  that  the  miscreant  really 
was  hiding  in  a small  fort  about  twenty-five  miles  from  our  camp. 
Hope  Grant  started  off  at  once,  taking  with  him  a compact  little  force, 
and  reached  the  fort  early  next  morning  (17th  February),  just  too  late 
to  catch  the  Nana,  who,  we  were  told,  had  fled  precipitately  before  day- 
break. We  blew  up  the  fort,  and  for  the  next  few  days  moved  by  short 
marches  towards  Lucknow,  clearing  the  country  as  we  went  of  rebels, 
small  parties  of  whom  we  frequently  encountered.  On  the  23rd  we 
reached  Mianganj,  a small  fortified  town  on  the  old  Cawnpore  and 
Lucknow  road,  where  some  2,000  of  the  enemy  had  ensconced  them- 
selves. Our  advance  guard  having  been  fired  upon  as  we  approached, 
the  column  was  halted  and  the  baggage  placed  in  safety,  while  Hope 
Grant  reconnoitred  the  position  in  order  to  see  where  it  could  most 
advantageously  be  attacked.  We  found  the  town  enclosed  by  a high 

* The  Infantry  portion  of  the  army  was  divided  into  three  divisions,  com- 
manded respectively  by  Outram,  Lugard,  and  Walpole.  This  was  exclusive 
of  Franks’s  column,  which  joined  at  Lucknow  and  made  a fourth  division.  The 
Artillery  was  placed  under  Archdale  Wilson,  and  the  Engineers  under  Robert 
Napier.  Sir  Colin’s  selection  of  Commanders  caused  considerable  heart- 
burnings, especially  amongst  the  senior  officers  who  had  been  sent  out  from 
England  for  the  purpose  of  being  employed  in  the  field.  But,  as  the  Chief 
explained  to  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  the  selection  had  been  made  with  the 
greatest  care,  it  having  been  found  that  1 an  officer  unexperienced  in  war  in 
India  cannot  act  for  himself  . . . it  is  quite  impossible  for  him  to  be  able  to 
weigh  the  value  of  intelligence  ...  he  cannot  judge  what  are  the  resources 
of  the  country,  and  he  is  totally  unable  to  make  an  estimate  for  himself  of  the 
resistance  the  enemy  opposed  to  him  is  likely  to  offer.’  Sir  Colin  wound  up 
his  letter  as  follows  : ‘ I do  not  wish  to  undervalue  the  merits  of  General  or 
other  officers  lately  arrived  from  England,  but  merely  to  indicate  to  your 
Royal  Highness  the  difficulties  against  which  they  have  to  contend.  What 
is  more,  the  state  of  things  at  present  does  not  permit  of  trusting  anything  to 
chance,  or  allowing  new-comers  to  learn,  except  under  the  command  of  others.’ 
— Sliadwell’s  ‘ Life  of  Lord  Clyde.’ 


2 1 8 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 


loop-holed  wall  with  circular  bastions  at  the  four  corners  and  at  regular 
intervals  along  the  sides,  the  whole  being  surrounded  by  a wet  ditch, 
while  the  gateways  had  been  strengthened  by  palisades.  Large  bodies 
of  the  enemy’s  Cavalry  hovered  about  our  reconnoitring  party,  only  to 
retire  as  we  advanced,  apparently  not  liking  the  look  of  the  7th 
Hussars  and  9th  Lancers,  who  formed  the  General’s  escort. 

After  a careful  inspection,  Hope  Grant  decided  to  breach  the  north- 
west angle  of  the  wall,  as  from  a wood  near  the  Infantry  could  keep 
down  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  sharpshooters,  and  the  heavy  guns  would 
be  in  a measure  protected  while  the  walls  were  being  bombarded.  A 
sufficiently  good  breach  was  made  in  about  two  hours,  and  the 
53rd  Regiment,  having  been  selected  for  the  honour  of  leading  the 
assault,  was  told  to  hold  itself  in  readiness.  Hope  Grant  then  spoke  a 
few  words  of  encouragement  to  the  men,  and  their  Colonel  (English) 
replied  on  their  behalf  that  they  might  be  depended  upon  to  do  their 
duty.  The  signal  was  given ; the  Horse  Artillery,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Frank  Turner,  galloped  to  within  grape  range  of  the  town,  and 
covered  by  their  fire  the  53rd  marched  on  steadily  until  they  got 
within  100  yards  of  the  walls,  when,  with  a ringing  cheer,  they  dashed 
through  the  water  in  the  ditch  and  entered  the  breach.  Hopkins,  the 
plucky  Captain  of  the  light  company,  was  the  first  inside  the  walls, 
followed  closely  by  Augustus  Anson  and  an  adventurous  Post-Captain 
of  the  Royal  Navy,  who,  being  unemployed,  came  to  see  what  ‘ a 
winter’s  campaign  in  India  ’ was  like.*  There  was  a good  deal  of 
hand-to-hand  fighting,  and  the  enemy  lost  about  500  men,  those  who 
tried  to  escape  being  cut  down  by  the  Cavalry  outside  the  walls.  We 
took  about  the  same  number  of  prisoners,  but  as  none  of  these  were 
soldiers,  and  vowed  they  had  been  forced  to  take  up  arms  against  us, 
the  General,  as  much  to  their  astonishment  as  to  their  delight,  ordered 
them  to  be  set  free.  Our  losses  were  small. 

Next  day  we  halted  while  the  walls  were  being  destroyed  and  the 
place  rendered  indefensible.  As  I was  superintending  the  work  of 
destruction,  the  horrors  of  war  were  once  more  brought  very  forcibly 
before  me  by  the  appearance  of  an  infirm  old  man,  who  besought  me 
to  spare  his  house,  saying:  ‘ Yesterday  I was  the  happy  father  of  five 
sons : three  of  them  lie  there  ’ (pointing  to  a group  of  dead  bodies) ; 
‘ where  the  other  two  are,  God  only  knows.  I am  old  and  a cripple,  and 
if  my  house  is  burned  there  is  nothing  left  for  me  but  to  die.’  Of  course 
I took  care  that  his  house  and  property  were  left  untouched. 

On  the  25th  February  we  marched  to  Mohan,  a picturesquely  situated 
village  on  the  bank  of  the  Sai  Naddi,  which  stream  we  crossed  the  next 
day  and  encamped  on  a fine  grassy  plain,  there  to  remain  until  it 
should  be  time  to  join  the  army  before  Lucknow. 

* The  late  Captain  Oliver  Jones,  who  published  his  experiences  under  that 
title. 


CURIOUS  EFFECT  OF  A MIRAGE 


210 


.858] 

While  we  were  halting  at  this  place,  Watson  and  I had  rather  a 
curious  adventure.  During  a morning’s  ride  my  greyhound  put  up  a 
nilghai * so  close  to  us  that  Watson,  aiming  a blow  at  him  with  his 
sword,  gashed  his  quarter.  Off  he  started,  and  we  after  him  at  full 
speed ; the  chase  continued  for  some  miles  without  our  getting  much 
nearer,  when,  all  at  once,  we  beheld  moving  towards  us  from  our  right 
front  a body  of  the  enemy’s  Cavalry.  We  were  in  an  awkward  posi- 
tion ; our  horses  were  very  nearly  dead  beat,  and  we  could  hardly  hope 
to  get  away  if  pursued.  We  pulled  up,  turned  round,  and  trotted 
back,  very  quietly  at  first,  that  our  horses  might  recover  their  breath 
before  the  enemy  got  to  closer  quarters  and  we  should  have  to  ride  for 
our  lives.  Every  now  and  then  we  looked  back  to  see  whether  they 
were  gaining  upon  us,  and  at  last  we  distinctly  saw  them  open  out  and 
make  as  if  to  charge  down  upon  us.  We  thought  our  last  hour  was 
come.  We  bade  each  other  good-bye,  agreeing  that  each  must  do  his 
best  to  escape,  and  that  neither  was  to  wait  for  the  other,  when  lo ! 
as  suddenly  as  they  had  appeared,  the  horsemen  vanished,  as  though  the 
ground  had  opened  and  swallowed  them  ; there  was  nothing  to  be  seen 
but  the  open  plain,  where  a second  before  there  had  been  a crowd  of 
mounted  men.  We  could  hardly  believe  our  eyes,  or  comprehend  at 
first  that  what  we  had  seen  was  simply  a mirage,  but  so  like  reality 
that  anyone  must  have  been  deceived.  Our  relief,  on  becoming  con- 
vinced that  we  had  been  scared  by  a phantom  enemy,  was  considerable; 
but  the  apparition  had  the  good  effect  of  making  us  realize  the  folly  of 
having  allowed  ourselves  to  be  tempted  so  far  away  from  our  camp 
without  escort  of  any  kind  in  an  enemy’s  country,  and  we  determined 
not  to  risk  it  again. f 

While  we  were  occupied  in  clearing  the  country  to  the  north  of  the 
Cawnpore-Lucknow  road,  the  main  body  of  the  army,  with  the  siege- 
train,  Engineer  park,  Naval  Brigade, t ammunition,  and  stores  of  all 
kinds,  had  gradually  been  collecting  at  Bhantira,  to  which  place  we 
were  ordered  to  proceed  on  the  1st  March.  We  had  a troublesome 
march  across  country,  and  did  not  reach  the  Head-Quarters  camp  until 
close  on  midnight.  There  was  much  difficulty  in  getting  the  guns 
through  the  muddy  nullas  and  up  the  steep  banks,  and  but  for  the 
assistance  of  the  elephants  the  task  could  hardly  have  been  accom- 
plished. It  was  most  curious  and  interesting  to  see  how  these  sagacious 
creatures  watched  for  and  seized  the  moment  when  their  help  was 
needed  to  get  the  guns  up  the  steep  inclines ; they  waited  till  the 

* Literally  * blue  cow,’  one  of  the  bovine  antelopes. 

t A few  days  afterwards,  when  we  were  some  miles  from  the  scene  of  our 
adventure,  I was  awakened  one  morning  by  the  greyhound  licking  my  face  ; 
she  had  cleverly  found  me  out  in  the  midst  of  a large  crowded  camp. 

J Peel  had  changed  his  24-pounders  for  the  more  powerful  64-pounders 
belonging  to  H.M.S.  Shannon. 


220 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

horses  dragging  the  gun  could  do  no  more  and  were  coming  to  a stand- 
still, when  one  of  them  would  place  his  forehead  against  the  muzzle 
and  shove  until  the  gun  was  safely  landed  on  the  top  of  the  bank. 

We  started  early  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd  for  Lucknow,  Hope 
Grant  taking  command  of  the  Cavalry  division  for  the  first  time. 

On  nearing  the  Alambagh,  we  bore  to  our  right  past  the  Jalalabad 
fort,  where  Outram’s  Engineers  were  busily  engaged  in  constructing 
fascines  and  gabions  for  the  siege,  and  preparing  spars  and  empty  casks 
for  bridging  the  Gumti.  As  we  approached  the  Mahomedbagh  we 
came  under  the  fire  of  some  of  the  enemy’s  guns  placed  in  a grove  of 
trees  ; but  no  sooner  had  the  Artillery  of  our  advance  guard  opened  fire 
than  the  rebels  retired,  leaving  a gun  in  our  hands.  We  moved  on  to 
the  Dilkusha,  which  we  found  unoccupied.  The  park  had  been  greatly 
disfigured  since  our  last  visit,  most  of  the  finest  trees  having  been  cut 
down. 

My  General  was  now  placed  in  charge  of  the  piquets,  a position 
for  which  he  was  admirably  fitted  and  in  which  he  delighted.  He 
rode  well,  without  fatigue  to  himself  or  his  horse,  so  that  any  duty 
entailing  long  hours  in  the  saddle  was  particularly  congenial  to  him. 
I invariably  accompanied  him  in  his  rounds,  and  in  after-years  I often 
felt  that  I owed  Hope  Grant  a debt  of  gratitude  for  the  practical 
lessons  he  gave  me  in  outpost  duty. 

Strong  piquets  with  heavy  guns  were  placed  in  and  around  the  Dil- 
kusha, as  well  as  in  the  Mahomedbagh.  The  main  body  of  the  army 
was  encamped  to  the  rear  of  the  Dilkusha,  its  right  almost  on  the 
Gumti,  while  its  left  stretched  for  two  miles  in  the  direction  of  the 
Alambagh.  Hope  Grant,  wishing  to  be  in  a convenient  position  in 
case  of  an  attack,  spent  the  night  in  the  Mahomedbagh  piquet,  and 
Anson,  the  D.A.A.G.,  and  I kept  him  company. 

On  the  3rd  some  of  the  troops  left  at  Bhantira  came  into  camp,  and 
on  the  5th  General  Franks  arrived.  His  division,  together  with  the 
Nepalese  Contingent,  9,000  strong,  brought  the  numbers  at  the  Corn- 
mander-in-Chief’s  disposal  up  to  nearly  31,000  men,  with  164  guns  ;* 
not  a man  too  many  for  the  capture  of  a city  twenty  miles  in  circum- 
ference, defended  by  120,000  armed  men,  who  for  three  months  and  a 
half  had  worked  incessantly  at  strengthening  the  defences,  which  con- 


* Naval  Brigade  ...  ...  ...  ...  431 

Artillery  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,745 

Engineers  ...  ...  ...  ...  865 

Cavalry  ...  ..  ...  ...  3,169 

Infantry  ...  ...  ..  ...  12,498 

Franks’s  Division  ...  ...  ...  2,880 

Nepalese  Contingent  ...  ..  ...  9,000 


30,588 


PASSAGE  OF  THE  GUMT1 


221 


18581 

sisted  of  three  lines,  extending  lengthwise  from  the  Charbagh  bridge  to 
the  Gumti,  and  in  depth  from  the  canal  to  the  Ivaisarbagh. 

In  Napier’s  carefully  prepared  plan,  which  Sir  Colin  decided  to  adopt, 
it  was  shown  that  the  attack  should  be  made  on  the  east,  as  that  side 
offered  the  smallest  front,  it  afforded  ground  for  planting  our  Artillery, 
which  the  west  side  did  not,  and  it  was  the  shortest  approach  to  the 
Kaisarbagh,  a place  to  which  the  rebels  attached  the  greatest  import- 
ance ; more  than  all,  we  knew  the  east  side,  and  were  little  acquainted 
with  the  west.  Napier  further  recommended  that  the  attack  should 
be  accompanied  by  a flank  movement  on  the  north,  with  the  object 
of  taking  in  reverse  the  first  and  second  lines  of  the  enemy’s  defences.* 
A division  was  accordingly  sent  across  the  Gumti  for  this  purpose,  and 
the  movement,  being  entirely  successful,  materially  aided  in  the  capture 
of  the  city.  The  passage  of  the  river  was  effected  by  means  of  two 
pontoon  bridges  made  of  empty  barrels,  and  thrown  across  the  stream 
a little  below  the  Dilkusha.  They  were  completed  by  midnight  on  the 
5th  March,  and  before  day  broke  the  troops  detailed  for  this  service 
had  crossed  over. 

Outram,  who,  since  the  ‘ Relief  of  Lucknow,’  had  been  maintaining 
his  high  reputation  by  keeping  the  enemy  in  check  before  the  Alam- 
bagh,  commanded  this  division,  with  Hope  Grant  as  his  second  in 
command.  As  soon  as  it  was  light  we  moved  away  from  the  river  to 
be  out  of  reach  of  the  Martiniere  guns,  and  after  marching  for  about 
two  miles  we  came  in  view  of  the  enemy ; the  Artillery  of  the  advance 
guard  got  to  within  a thousand  yards  and  opened  fire,  upon  which  the 
rebels  broke  and  fled.  The  Bays  pursued  them  for  a short  distance, 
but  with  very  little  result,  the  ground  being  intersected  with  nullas, 
and  the  enemy  opening  upon  them  with  heavy  guns,  they  had  to  retire 
precipitately,  with  the  loss  of  their  Major,  Percy  Smith,  whose  body, 
unhappily,  had  to  be  abandoned. 

About  noon  we  encamped  close  to  Chinhut,  and  Hope  Grant  took 
special  care  that  day  to  see  the  piquets  were  well  placed,  for  the  rebels 
were  in  great  numbers,  and  we  were  surrounded  by  ravines  and  wooded 
enclosures.  It  was  thought  by  some  that  he  was  unnecessarily  anxious 
and  careful,  for  he  rode  several  times  over  the  ground ; but  the  next 
morning  proved  how  right  he  was  to  leave  nothing  to  chance. 

While  we  were  at  breakfast,  information  was  brought  in  that  the 
enemy  were  advancing  in  force,  and  directly  afterwards  half  a dozen 

* Kaye,  in  his  ‘History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,’  gives  the  credit  for 
originating  this  movement  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  himself ; but  the 
present  Lord  Napier  of  Magdala  has  letters  in  his  possession  which  clearly 
prove  that  the  idea  was  his  father’s,  and  there  is  a passage  in  General  Porter’s 
History  of  the  Royal  Engineers,’  vol.  ii.,  p.  476,  written  after  he  had  read 
Napier’s  letters  to  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  which  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  as  to 
my  version  being  the  correct  one. 


222 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 


round  shot  were  sent  into  our  camp  ; the  troops  fell  in,  the  Infantry 
moved  out,  and  Hope  Grant  took  the  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry  to 
our  right  flank,  where  the  mutineers  were  collected  in  considerable 
numbers.  In  less  than  an  hour  we  had  driven  them  off,  but  we  were 
not  allowed  to  follow  them  up,  as  Outram  did  not  wish  to  get  entangled 
in  the  suburbs  until  heavy  guns  had  arrived.  The  piquets  were 
strengthened  and  pushed  forward,  affording  another  opportunity  for  a 
useful  lesson  in  outpost  duty. 

All  that  day  and  the  next  I accompanied  my  General  in  his  recon- 
naissance of  the  enemy’s  position,  as  well  as  of  the  ground  near  the 
Gumti,  in  order  to  determine  where  the  heavy  guns  could  best  be 
placed,  so  as  effectually  to  enfilade  the  enemy’s  first  line  of  defences 
along  the  bank  of  the  canal.  On  returning  to  report  progress  to 
Outram  at  mid-day  on  the  8th,  we  found  Sir  Colin  Campbell  and 
Mansfield  with  him,  arranging  for  a joint  attack  the  following  day ; 
after  their  consultation  was  over,  they  all  rode  with  us  to  see  the  site 
Hope  Grant  had  selected  for  the  battery.  It  was  a slightly  elevated 
piece  of  ground  about  half  a mile  north  of  the  Kokrel  nulla,  fairly  con- 
cealed by  a bend  of  the  river ; but  before  it  could  be  made  use  of  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  clear  the  rebels  out  of  the  position  they  were 
occupying  between  the  nulla  and  the  iron  bridge,  the  key  to  which  was 
the  Chakar  Kothi,  and  Outram  was  directed  to  attack  this  point  the 
next  morning. 

At  2 a.m.  on  the  9th  the  heavy  guns,  escorted  by  the  1st  Bengal 
Fusiliers,  were  sent  forward  to  within  600  yards  of  the  enemy.  The 
troops  then  moved  off  in  two  parties,  that  on  the  right  being  com- 
manded by  Hope  Grant.  We  marched  along  the  Fyzabad  road,  the 
two  Rifle  Brigade  battalions  leading  the  way  in  skirmishing  order,  with 
the  Cavalry  well  away  to  the  right.  The  rebels  retired  as  we  advanced, 
and  Walpole,  commanding  one  of  our  brigades,  by  wheeling  to  his  left 
on  reaching  the  opposite  bank  of  the  nulla,  was  enabled  to  enfilade 
their  position.  The  column  was  then  halted,  and  I was  sent  to  inform 
Outram  as  to  our  progress. 

When  I had  delivered  my  message,  and  was  about  to  return,  Outram 
desired  me  to  stay  with  him  until  the  capture  of  the  Chakar  Kothi 
(which  he  was  just  about  to  attempt)  should  be  accomplished,  that  I 
might  then  convey  to  Hope  Grant  his  orders  as  to  what  further  action 
would  be  required  of  him  ; meanwhile  Outram  sent  a messenger  to  tell 
my  General  what  he  was  about  to  do,  in  view  of  his  co-operating  on 
the  right.* 

* Outranks  division  consisted  of  the  23rd  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers,  79th 
Highlanders,  2nd  and  3rd  battalions  of  the  Rifle  Brigade.  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers, 
2nd  Punjab  Infantry,  D’Aguilar’s.  Remniington’s  and  Mackinnon’s  troops  of 
Horse  Artillery,  Gibbon's  and  Middleton's  Field  Batteries,  and  some  Heavy 
gUU8i  2nd  Dragoon  Guards,  9th  Lancers,  2nd  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  Watson's 
and  Sandtord  s squadrons  of  the  1st  and  5th  Punjab  Cavalry. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  CHAKAR  KOTHl 


223 


1858] 

The  Chakar  Kothi  was  attacked  and  taken,  and  the  enemy,  appar- 
ently having  lost  heart,  tied  precipitately.  One  of  the  1st  Bengal 
Fusiliers’  colours  was  placed  on  the  top  of  this  three-storied  building 
by  Ensign  Jervis  to  show  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  it  was  in  our 
possession,  and  that  the  time  had  come  for  him  to  attack  the  first  line 
of  the  enemy’s  defences.  We  then  continued  our  advance  to  the  river, 
where  the  parties  united,  and  I rejoined  Hope  Grant. 

It  was  now  only  2 p.m.,  and  there  was  plenty  of  time  to  place  the 
heavy  guns  in  position  before  dark.  Major  Lothian  Nicholson,* 
Outram’s  Commanding  Engineer,  was  superintending  this  operation, 
when  he  thought  he  perceived  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  their 
first  line,  but  he  could  not  be  quite  sure.  It  was  most  necessary  to 
ascertain  for  certain  whether  this  was  the  case,  as  the  Infantry  of 
Hope’s  brigade,  which  had  attacked  and  driven  the  rebels  out  of  the 
Martiniere,  could  be  seen  preparing  to  assault  the  works  at  the  other 
side  of  the  river.  A discussion  ensued  as  to  how  this  knowledge  could 
be  obtained,  and  a young  subaltern  of  the  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers,  named 
Butler, f offered  to  swim  across  the  Gumti,  and,  if  he  found  the  enemy 
had  retired,  to  communicate  the  fact  to  Hope’s  men.  This  feat  was 
successfully  accomplished  by  the  plucky  young  volunteer ; he  found 
the  enemy  had  retired,  and,  on  giving  the  information  to  Hope,  the 
brigade  advanced,  and  before  nightfall  the  whole  of  the  enemy’s  first 
line  was  in  our  possession — a success  which  had  been  achieved  with 
but  slight  loss  to  us,  the  chief  casualty  during  the  day  being  William 
Peel,  the  gallant  Commander  of  the  Naval  Brigade,  who  had  been 
seriously  wounded  while  in  command  of  a battery  near  the  Dilkusha. 

The  next  day,  the  10th,  Outranks  camp  was  moved  close  up  to  the 
Gumti,  and  batteries  were  constructed  from  which  fire  could  be  poured 
on  the  mess-house  and  the  Kaisarbagh.  For  the  protection  of  these 
works,  and  to  prevent  an  attack  in  force  being  made  on  the  main  part 
of  the  column,  Hope  Grant  kept  moving  about  with  the  Horse  Artillery 
and  Cavalry  between  the  river  and  the  Sitapur  road,  our  reconnaissance 
extending  beyond  the  old  cantonment.  We  had  several  little  fights,  in 
one  of  which  a very  promising  officer  named  Sandford,  who  had 
succeeded  Younghusband  in  command  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry 
squadron,  was  killed. 

At  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  the  batteries  opened  fire  on 
the  enemy’s  second  line  of  defence ; at  the  same  time  Outram  himself 
led  a strong  body  of  Infantry  along  the  river  with  the  object  of  securing 
the  approaches  to  the  bridges.  On  reaching  the  Fyzabad  road,  about 
half  a mile  from  the  iron  bridge,  Outram  placed  the  1st  Bengal  Fusiliers 
in  a mosque,  with  orders  to  entrench  themselves  and  hold  the  post, 

* The  late  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Lothian  Nicholson,  K.C.  B. 

+ Now  Colonel  Thomas  Butler,  Y.C. 


15 


224 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 


while  he  pushed  on  to  the  stone  bridge  about  a mile  away.  Outram’s 
advance  was  covered  by  Hope  Grant’s  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry, 
but  we  had  to  keep  at  some  distance  away  to  the  right,  in  order  to 
avoid  houses  and  walled  enclosures.  Soon  after  crossing  the  Sitapur 
road  we  heard  guns  to  our  left,  and  proceeding  at  a smart  trot,  came  up 
with  Outram  just  as  he  was  about  to  attack  a large  body  of  the  rebels, 
who,  finding  themselves  in  an  awkward  position,  with  the  river  in  their 
rear  and  their  retreat  by  the  iron  bridge  cut  off,  made  but  a feeble 
resistance  before  they  broke  and  fled.  Some  few  escaped  by  the  stone 
bridge,  but  the  greater  number,  including  the  whole  of  the  mutinous 
15th  Irregular  Cavalry,  made  for  the  old  cantonment.  We  pursued 
with  our  Cavalry,  and  very  few  of  them  got  away.  A couple  of  guns 
and  a quantity  of  plunder  were  left  behind  by  the  enemy,  who 
evidently  had  not  expected  us  and  were  quite  unprepared  for  our 
attack.  Outram  pushed  on  to  the  stone  bridge,  but  finding  he  was 
losing  men  from  the  fire  poured  upon  us  by  the  rebels  from  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river,  he  fell  back  to  the  mosque  where  he  had  left  the 
Fusiliers. 

That  afternoon,  as  there  was  nothing  particular  for  the  Cavalry  to 
do,  the  General,  Anson,  and  I rode  across  the  river  to  see  how  matters 
were  progressing  on  the  left  of  the  attack.  We  reached  the  Head- 
Quarters  camp  just  as  Sir  Colin  was  about  to  receive  a visit  of  cere- 
mony from  the  Nepalese  General,  the  famous  Jung  Bahadur.  Our  old 
Chief,  in  honour  of  the  occasion,  had  doffed  his  usual  workman-like 
costume,  and  wore  General’s  full-dress  uniform,  but  he  was  quite 
thrown  into  the  shade  by  the  splendour  of  the  Gurkha  Prince,  who  was 
most  gorgeously  attired,  with  magnificent  jewels  in  his  turban,  round 
his  neck,  and  on  his  coat. 

I looked  at  Jung  Bahadur  with  no  small  interest,  for  his  deeds  of 
daring  had  made  him  conspicuous  amongst  probably  the  bravest  race 
of  men  in  the  world,  and  the  fact  that  a high-born  Hindu,  such  as  he 
was,  should,  fifty  years  ago,  have  so  far  risen  superior  to  caste  prejudice 
as  to  cross  the  sea  and  visit  England,  proved  him  to  be  a man  of 
unusually  strong  and  independent  mind.  He  was  about  five  feet 
eight  inches  high — tall  for  a Gurkha — with  a well-knit,  wiry  figure,  a 
keen,  dauntless  eye,  and  a firm,  determined  mouth — in  every  respect 
a typical,  well-bred  Nepalese.  The  interview  did  not  last  long,  for  Sir 
Colin  disliked  ceremonial,  and,  shortly  after  the  Nepalese  Prince  had 
taken  his  seat,  news  was  brought  in  that  the  assault  on  the  Begum 
Kothi  had  been  successfully  completed,  upon  which  Sir  Colin  made  the 
necessity  for  attending  to  business  an  excuse  for  taking  leave  of  his 
distinguished  visitor,  and  the  interview  came  to  an  end. 

I then  obtained  leave  to  go  to  the  scene  of  the  recent  fight,  and. 
galloping  across  the  canal  by  the  bridge  near  Banks’s  house,  soon 
found  myself  at  the  Begum  Kothi.  There  I was  obliged  to  dismount, 


1858] 


HODSON  MORTALLY  WOUNDED 


225 


for  even  on  foot  it  was  a difficult  matter  to  scramble  over  the  breach. 
The  place  was  most  formidable,  and  it  was  a marvel  that  it  had  been 
taken  with  comparatively  so  little  loss  on  our  side.  The  bodies  of  a 
number  of  Highlanders  and  Punjabis  were  lying  about,  and  a good 
many  wounded  men  were  being  attended  to,  but  our  casualties  were 
nothing  in  proportion  to  those  of  the  enemy,  600  or  700  of  whom  were 
buried  the  next  day  in  the  ditch  they  had  themselves  dug  for  their  own 
protection.  A very  determined  stand  had  been  made  by  the  sepoys 
when  they  found  there  was  no  chance  of  getting  away.  There  were 
many  tales  of  hair-breadth  escapes  and  desperate  struggles,  and  on  all 
sides  I heard  laments  that  Hodson  should  have  been  one  of  those 
dangerously,  if  not  mortally,  wounded  in  the  strife.  Hodson  had  been 
carried  to  Banks’s  house,  and  to  the  inquiry  I made  on  my  way  back 
to  camp,  as  to  his  condition,  the  answer  was,  ‘ Little,  if  any,  hope.’ 

A great  stride  in  the  advance  had  been  made  on  this  day.  Outram 
had  accomplished  all  that  was  expected  of  him,  and  he  was  now  busy 
constructing  additional  batteries  for  the  bombardment  of  the  Kaisar- 
bagh ; while  Lugard,*  from  his  newly-acquired  position  at  the  Begum 
Kothi,  was  also  able  to  bring  fire  to  bear  upon  that  doomed  palace. 

Hodson  died  the  following  day  (the  12th).  As  a soldier,  I had  a very 
great  admiration  for  him,  and,  in  common  with  the  whole  army,  I 
mourned  his  early  death. f 

On  the  13th  Lugard’s  division  was  relieved  by  Franks’s,  and  to 
Jung  Bahadur  and  his  Gurkhas,  only  too  eager  for  the  fray,  was 
entrusted  the  conduct  of  operations  along  the  line  of  the  canal  between 
Banks’s  house  and  the  Charbagh  bridge.  On  our  side  of  the  river 
nothing  of  importance  occurred. 

* Now  General  the  Right  Hon.  Sir  Edward  Lugard,  G.C.B. 

t It  was  current  in  camp,  and  the  story  has  often  been  repeated,  that 
Hodson  was  killed  in  the  act  of  looting.  This  certainly  was  not  the  case. 
Hodson  was  sitting  with  Donald  Stewart  in  the  Head-Quarters  camp,  when 
the  signal-gun  announced  that  the  attack  on  the  Begum  Kothi  was  about  to 
take  place.  Hodson  immediately  mounted  his  horse,  and  rode  off  in  the 
direction  of  the  city.  Stewart,  who  had  been  ordered  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  accompany  the  troops,  and  send  an  early  report  to  his  Excellency  of 
the  result  of  the  assault,  had  his  horse  ready,  and  followed  Hodson  so  closely 
that  he  kept  him  in  sight  until  within  a short  distance  of  the  fighting,  when 
Stewart  stopped  to  speak  to  the  officer  in  charge  of  Peel’s  guns,  which  had 
been  covering  the  advance  of  the  troops.  This  delayed  Stewart  for  a few 
minutes  only,  and  as  he  rode  into  the  court-yard  of  the  palace  a Highland 
soldier  handed  him  a pistol,  saying,  ‘ This  is  your  pistol,  sir ; but  I thought 
you  were  carried  away  mortally  wounded  a short  time  ago  ?’  Stewart  at  once 
conjectured  that  the  man  had  mistaken  him  for  Hodson.  In  face  they  were 
not  much  alike,  but  both  were  tall,  well  made  and  fair,  and  Native  soldiers 
had  frequently  saluted  one  for  the  other.  It  is  clear  from  this  account  that 
Hodson  could  not  have  been  looting,  as  he  was  woimded  almost  as  soon  as  he 
reached  the  palace. 

^ 15—2 


226 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

The  capture  of  the  Imambara  (a  mosque  situated  between  the  Begum 
Kothi  and  the  Kaisarbagh)  was  accomphshed  early  nest  morning.  The 
assault  was  led  by  Brasyer’s  Sikhs  and  a detachment  of  the  10th  Foot, 
supported  by  the  remainder  of  that  regiment  and  the  90th  Light 
Infantry.  Alter  a short  but  very  severe  struggle,  the  enemy  were 
forced  to  retire,  and  were  so  closely  pursued  that  the  storming  party 
suddenly  found  themselves  in  a building  immediately  overlooking  the 
Kaisarbagh. 

It  had  not  been  intended  to  advance  that  day  beyond  the  Imambara, 
but,  recognizing  the  advantage  of  the  position  thus  gained,  and  the 
demoralized  condition  of  the  rebels,  Franks  wisely  determined  to  follow 
up  his  success.  Reinforcements  were  hurried  forward,  the  troops 
holding  the  Sikandarbagh  and  the  Shah  Najaf  were  ordered  to  act  in 
concert,  and  before  nightfall  the  Kaisarbagh,  the  mess-house,  and  the 
numerous  buildings  situated  between  those  places  and  the  Residency, 
were  in  our  possession. 

By  means  of  the  field  telegraph,  Outram  was  kept  accurately 
informed  as  to  the  movements  of  Franks’s  division,  and  he  could  have 
afforded  it  valuable  assistance  had  he  been  allowed  to  cross  the  Gumti 
with  his  three  brigades  of  Infantry.  Outram,  with  his  soldierly 
instinct,  felt  that  this  was  the  proper  course  to  pursue ; but  in  reply  to 
his  request  to  be  allowed  to  push  over  the  river  by  the  iron  bridge,  he 
received  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  through  Mansfield  the  un- 
accountably strange  order  that  he  must  not  attempt  it,  if  it  would 
entail  his  losing  1 a single  man.’  Thus  a grand  opportunity  was  lost. 
The  bridge,  no  doubt,  was  strongly  held,  but  with  the  numerous  guns 
which  Outram  could  have  brought  to  bear  upon  its  defenders  its 
passage  could  have  been  forced  without  serious  loss ; the  enemy’s 
retreat  would  have  been  cut  off,  and  Franks’s  victory  would  have  been 
rendered  complete,  which  it  certainly  was  not,  owing  to  Outram’s 
hands  having  been  so  effectually  tied. 

Lucknow  was  practically  in  our  hands  on  the  evening  of  the  14th 
March,  but  the  rebels  escaped  with  comparatively  slight  punishment, 
and  the  campaign,  which  should  have  then  come  to  an  end,  was 
protracted  for  nearly  a year  by  the  fugitives  spreading  themselves  over 
Oudh,  and  occupying  forts  and  other  strong  positions,  from  which  they 
were  able  to  offer  resistance  to  our  troops  until  towards  the  end  of 
May,  1859,  thus  causing  the  needless  loss  of  thousands  of  British 
soldiers.*  Sir  Colin  saw  his  mistake  when  too  late.  The  next  day 
orders  were  issued  for  the  Cavalry  to  follow  up  the  mutineers,  who 
were  understood  to  have  fled  in  a northerly  direction.  One  brigade 
under  Campbell  (the  Colonel  of  the  Bays)  was  directed  to  proceed  to 

* In  the  month  of  May,  1858,  alone,  not  less  than  a thousand  British 
soldiers  died  of  sunstroke,  fatigue  and  disease,  and  about  a hundred  were 
killed  in  action. 


A LOST  OPPORTUNITY 


227 


!85S] 

Sandila,  and  another,  under  Hope  Grant,  towards  Sitapur.  But  the 
enemy  was  not  seen  by  either.  As  usual,  they  had  scattered  them- 
selves over  the  country  and  entirely  disappeared,  and  many  of  the 
rebels  who  still  remained  in  the  city  seized  the  opportunity  of  the 
Cavalry  being  absent  to  get  away. 

Outram’s  command  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Gumti  was  now  broken 
up,  with  the  view  to  his  completing  the  occupation  of  the  city. 
Accordingly,  on  the  16th,  he  advanced  from  the  Kaisarbagh  with 
Douglas's  brigade*  and  Middleton’s  battery,  supported  by  the  20th 
Foot  and  Brasyer’s  Sikhs,  and  occupied  in  quick  succession,  and  with 
but  slight  resistance,  the  Residency,  the  Machi  Bhawan,  and  the  great 
Imambara,  thus  taking  in  reverse  the  defences  which  had  been  thrown 
up  by  the  enemy  for  the  protection  of  the  two  bridges.  As  Outram 
pushed  on,  the  rebels  retreated,  some  across  the  stone  bridge  towards 
Fyzabad,  and  some  through  the  city  towards  the  Musabagh.  They 
made  two  attacks  to  cover  their  retirement,  one  on  Walpole’s  piquets, 
which  enabled  a large  number  (20,000  it  was  said)  to  get  away  in  the 
Fyzabad  direction,  and  another  on  the  Alambagh,  which  was  much 
more  serious,  for  the  garrison  had  been  reduced  to  le  :s  than  a thousand 
men,  and  the  rebels’  force  was  considerable,  consisting  of  Infantry, 
Cavalry  and  Artillery.  They  attacked, with  great  determination,  and 
fought  for  four  hours  and  a half  before  they  were  driven  off. 

It  was  not  a judicious  move  on  Sir  Colin’s  part  to  send  the  Cavalry 
miles  away  from  Lucknow  just  when  they  could  have  been  so  usefully 
employed  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city.  This  was  also  appreciated  when 
too  late,  and  both  brigades  were  ordered  to  return,  which  they  did  on 
the  17th.  Even  then  the  Cavalry  were  not  made  full  use  of,  for  instead 
of  both  brigades  being  collected  on  the  Lucknow  bank  of  the  river, 
which  was  now  the  sole  line  of  retreat  left  open  to  the  enemy  (the 
bridges  being  in  our  possession),  one  only  (Campbell’s)  was  sent  there 
Hope  Grant  being  directed  to  take  up  his  old  position  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  Gumti,  from  which  we  had  the  mortification  of  watching 
the  rebels  streaming  into  the  open  country  from  the  Musabagh,  without 
the  smallest  attempt  being  made  by  Campbell  to  stop  cr  pursue  them. 
His  brigade  had  been  placed  on  the  enemy’s  line  of  retreat  on  purpose 
to  intercept  them,  but  he  completely  failed  to  do  what  was  expected  of 
him.  We,  on  our  side,  could  do  nothing,  for  an  unfordable  river  flowed 
between  us  and  the  escaping  mutineers,  f 

* Consisting  of  the  23rd  Fusiliers,  79th  Highlanders,  and  1st  Bengal 
Fusiliers. 

t Captain  Wale,  a gallant  officer  who  commanded  a newly  raised  corps  of 
Sikh  Cavalry,  lost  his  life  on  this  occasion.  He  persuaded  Campbell  to  let 
him  follow  up  the  enemy,  and  was  shot  dead  in  a charge.  His  men  behaved 
extremely  well,  and  one  of  them,  by  name  Ganda  Sing,  saved  the  life  of  the 
late  Sir  Robert  Sandeman,  who  was  a subaltern  in  the  regiment.  The  same 


228 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

There  was  one  more  fight  in  Lucknow.  The  Moulvie* *  of  Fyzabad 
(who  from  the  first  was  one  of  the  prominent  leaders  of  the  rebellion) 
had  returned  at  the  head  of  a considerable  force,  and  had  placed  him- 
self in  a strongly-fortified  position  in  the  very  centre  of  the  city.  It 
was  not  without  a severe  struggle  that  he  was  dislodged  by  the  93rd 
Highlanders  and  4th  Punjab  Infantry  under  Lugard.  The  brunt  of 
the  fighting  fell  upon  the  last-named  regiment,  the  gallant  Commander 
(Wilde)  of  which,  and  his  second  in  command,!  were  severely  wounded. 
The  Moulvie  made  his  escape,  but  his  followers  were  pursued,  and 
many  of  them  were  cut  up.  Thus  at  last  the  city  was  cleared  of  rebels, 
and  we  were  once  more  masters  in  Lucknow. 

On  the  22nd  March  Hope  Grant  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Kursi,  a 
small  town  about  twenty-five  miles  off  between  the  Sitapur  and 
Fyzabad  roads,  reported  to  be  occupied  in  force  by  the  enemy. 

We  started  at  midnight  with  a brigade  of  Infantry,  1,000  Cavalry, 
two  troops  of  Horse  Artillery,  and  eight  heavy  guns  and  mortars.  We 
were  delayed  some  hours  by  the  heavy  guns  and  their  escort  (the  53rd 
Foot)  taking  a wrong  turn  when  leaving  the  city,  which  resulted  in  the 
enemy  being  warned  of  our  approach  in  time  to  clear  out  before  wre 
arrived. 

On  hearing  they  had  gone,  Hope  Grant  pushed  on  with  the  mounted 
portion  of  the  force,  and  we  soon  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy  in  full 
retreat.  The  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Captain  Browne,!  was  ordered 
to  pursue.  It  consisted  of  Browne’s  own  regiment  (the  2nd  Punjab 
Cavalry),  a squadron  of  the  1st  Punjab  Cavalry  under  Captain  Cosserat, 
and  three  Horse  Artillery  guns.  At  the  end  of  two  miles,  Browne 
came  upon  a body  of  the  mutineers  formed  up  on  an  open  plain.  The 


man,  two  years  later,  saved  the  late  Sir  Charles  Maegregor’s  life  during  the 
China  war,  and  when  1 was  Commander-in-Chief  in  India  I had  the  pleasure 
of  appointing  him  to  be  my  Native  Aide-de-Camp.  Granda  Sing,  who  has 
now  the  rank  of  Captain  and  the  title  of  Sirdar  Bahadur,  retired  last  year 
with  a handsome  pension  and  a small  grant  of  land. 

* A Mahomedan  Priest. 

f Now  General  Cockburn  Hood,  C.B. 

X Now  General  Sir  Samuel  Browne,  V.C.,  G.C.B.  This  popular  and 
gallant  officer,  well  known  to  every  Native  in  Upper  India  as  ‘Sam  Brfin 
Sahib,’  and  to  the  officers  of  the  whole  of  Her  Majesty’s  army  as  the  inventor 
of  the  sword-belt  universally  adopted  on  service,  distinguished  himself  greatly 
in  the  autumn  of  1858.  With  230  sabres  of  his  own  regiment  and  350  Native 
Infantry,  he  attacked  a party  of  rebels  who  had  taken  up  a position  at  Nuria, 
a village  at  the  edge  of  the  Terai,  about  ten  miles  from  Pilibhit.  Browne 
managed  to  get  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy  without  being  discovered  ; a hand-to- 
hand  fight  then  ensued,  in  which  he  got  two  severe  wounds — one  on  the  knee, 
from  which  he  nearly  bled  to  death,  the  other  on  the  left  shoulder,  cutting 
right  through  the  arm.  The  enemy  were  completely  routed,  and  fled,  leaving 
their  four  guns  and  300  dead  on  the  ground.  Browne  was  deservedly  rewarded 
with  the  V.C. 


GENERAL  SIR  SAMUEL  BROWNE,  V.C..  fr.C.B.,  K.C.S.I. 
From 

a photograph  by  Messrs.  Elliott  and  Fry. 


DEATH  OF  MACDONNELL 


229 


1858] 

Cavalry  charged  through  them  three  times,  each  time  thinning  their 
ranks  considerably,  but  they  never  wavered,  and  in  the  final  charge 
avenged  themselves  by  killing  Macdonnell  (the  Adjutant  of  the  2nd 
Punjab  Cavalry),  and  mortally  wounding  Cosserat.  I arrived  on  the 
ground  with  Hope  Grant  just  in  time  to  witness  the  last  charge  and 
the  fall  of  these  two  officers,  and  deplorable  as  we  felt  their  loss  to  be, 
it  was  impossible  not  to  admire  the  gallantry  and  steadiness  of  the 
sepoys,  every  one  of  whom  fought  to  the  death. 

As  soon  as  Browne  could  get  his  men  together,  the  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  was  continued ; no  further  opposition  was  met  with,  and 
fourteen  guns  fell  into  our  hands. 

On  the  24th  we  retraced  our  steps,  halting  for  the  night  at  the  old 
cantonment  of  Muriao,  where  we  buried  poor  MacdonnelL  On  the 
25th  we  crossed  the  Gumti,  and  pitched  our  camp  near  the  Dilkusha. 

Lucknow  was  now  completely  in  our  possession,  and  our  success 
had  been  achieved  with  remarkably  slight  loss,  a result  which  was 
chiefly  due  to  the  scientific  manner  in  which  the  siege  opei’ations  had 
been  carried  on  under  the  direction  of  our  talented  Chief  Engineer, 
Robert  Napier,  ably  assisted  by  Colonel  Harness  ; and  also  to  the  good 
use  which  Sir  Colin  Campbell  made  of  his  powerful  force  of  Artillery. 
Our  casualties  during  the  siege  amounted  to  only  16  British  officers, 
3 Native  officers,  and  108  men  killed;  51  British  officers,  4 Native 
officers,  and  540  men  wounded,  while  13  men  were  unaccounted  for. 

The  capture  of  Lucknow,  though  not  of  such  supreme  importance  in 
its  consequences  as  the  taking  of  Delhi,  must  have  convinced  the 
rebels  that  their  cause  was  now  hopeless.  It  is  true  than  Jhansi  had 
not  yet  fallen,  and  that  the  rest  of  Oudh,  Rohilkand,  and  the  greater 
part  of  Central  India  remained  to  be  conquered,  but  there  was  no  very 
important  city  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  the  subjugation  of  the 
country  was  felt  to  be  merely  a matter  of  time.  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  after 
a brilliant  campaign,  had  arrived  before  Jhansi,  columns  of  our  troops 
were  traversing  the  country  in  every  direction,  and  the  British  Army 
had  been  so  largely  increased  that,  on  the  1st  of  April,  1858,  there  were 
96,000  British  soldiers  in  India,  besides  a large  body'  of  reliable  Native 
troops,  some  of  whom,  although  hurriedly  raised,  had  already7  shown 
that  they  were  capable  of  doing  good  service — a very  different  state  of 
affairs  from  that  which  prevailed  six  months  before. 

For  some  time  I had  been  feeling  the  ill  effects  of  exposure  to  the 
climate  and  hard  work,  and  the  doctor,  Campbell  Browne,  had  been 
urging  me  to  go  on  the  sick-list ; that,  of  course,  was  out  of  the  ques- 
tion until  Lucknow  had  fallen.  Now,  however,  I placed  myself  in 
Browne’s  hands,  hoping  that  a change  to  the  Hills  was  all  that  was 
needed  to  set  me  up  ; but  the  doctors  insisted  on  a trip  to  England.  It 
was  a heavy  blow  to  me  to  have  to  leave  while  there  was  still  work  to 
be  done,  but  I had  less  hesitation  than  I should  have  had  if  most  of  my 


230 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

own  immediate  friends  had  not  already  gone,  Several  had  been 
killed,  others  had  left  sick  or  wounded  ; Watson  had  gone  to  Lahore, 
busily  engaged  in  raising  a regiment  of  Cavalry  ;*  Probyn  was  on  his 
way  home,  invalided  ; Hugh  Gough  had  gone  to  the  Hills  to  recover 
from  his  wounds;  and  Norman  and  Stewart  were  about  to  leave 
Lucknow  with  Army  Head- Quarters. 

On  the  1st  April,  the  sixth  anniversary  of  my  arrival  in  India,  I made 
over  my  office  to  Wolseley,  who  succeeded  me  as  Deputy-Assistant 
Quartermaster-General  on  Hope  Grant’s  staff,  and  towards  the  middle 
of  the  month  I left  Lucknow. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  was  most  kind  and  complimentary  when 
I took  leave  of  him,  and  told  me  that,  in  consideration  of  my  services, 
he  would  bestow  upon  me  the  first  permanent  vacancy  in  the  Quarter- 
master-General’s Department,  and  that  he  intended  to  recommend  that 
I should  be  given  the  rank  of  Brevet  Major  so  soon  as  I should  be 
qualified  by  becoming  a regimental  Captain.  I was,  of  course,  much 
gratified  by  his  appreciative  words  and  kindly  manner ; but  the  brevet 
seemed  a long  way  off,  for  I had  only  been  a First  Lieutenant  for  less 
than  a year,  and  there  were  more  than  a hundred  officers  in  the  Bengal 
Artillery  senior  to  me  in  that  rank  ! 

I marched  to  Cawnpore  with  Army  Head- Quarters.  Sir  William 
Peel,  who  was  slowly  recovering  from  his  wound,  was  of  the  party. 
We  reached  Cawnpore  on  the  17th,  and  the  next  day  I said  good-bye 
to  my  friends  on  the  Chief's  staff.  Peel  and  I dined  together  on  the 
19th,  when  to  all  appearances  he  was  perfectly  well,  but  on  going  into 
his  room  the  next  morning  I found  he  was  in  a high  fever,  and  had 
some  suspicious  looking  spots  about  his  face.  I went  off  at  once  in 
search  of  a doctor,  and  soon  returned  with  one  of  the  surgeons  of  the 
5th  Fusiliers,  who,  to  my  horror — for  I had  observed  that  Peel  was 
nervous  about  himself — exclaimed  with  brutal  frankness  the  moment 
he  entered  the  room,  ‘ You  have  got  small-pox.’  It  was  only  too  true. 
On  being  convinced  that  this  was  the  case,  I went  to  the  chaplain,  the 
liev.  Thomas  Moore,  and  told  him  of  Peel’s  condition.  Without  an 
instant’s  hesitation,  he  decided  the  invalid  must  come  to  his  house  to 
be  taken  care  of.  That  afternoon  I had  the  poor  fellow  carried  over, 
and  there  I left  him  in  the  kind  hands  of  Mrs.  Moore,  the  padre's  wife, 
who  had,  as  a special  case,  been  allowed  to  accompany  her  husband  to 
Cawnpore.  Peel  died  on  the  27th.  On  the  4th  May  I embarked  at 
Calcutta  in  the  P.  and  0.  steamer  Nubia,  without,  alas ! the  friend 
whose  pleasant  companionship  I had  hoped  to  have  enjoyed  on  the 
voyage. 


The  present  13th  Bengal  Lancers. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LUCKNOW, 
March,  1858. 


Mum  Bdgh, 


Scale. 


TjfcljJJaki  Khans  Hujg 


'^j^Glioorhe  c 


Slush 

pA  i 


i r7ri  1 rrr; 


JaihznMasjid* 


Sir  J.Outram’s  Camp 
6th. March  1850  I mall 
FT] 

• t 


MAJ?  GEN] 


[BAttshah 


/(«  /aVo<K— -j 


/'  - - •, 


1 


"Ujrcaor 


'■  .rr' 


L.i-Martinio: 


1 BRIDGE  Or 
1 CASKS 


11; 


> **8ibiapur 
1 House  . 


Reference. 


7rees 

Marsh 

Vegetation. 

Mosque  

Bridge.  ... 


Sikandarp  1 


/£/s/i  Camp 
iMarch  1858 

® Bandah 


’Alambagh 


'Dure!  a 


IV'alker  &•  Uuutall  sc . 


WHAT  BROUGHT  ABOUT  THE  MUTINY > 


231 


1S5S] 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

‘ What  brought  about  the  Mutiny  ?’  and  ‘ Is  there  any  chance  of  a 
similar  rising  occurring  again  ?’  are  questions  which  are  constantly 
being  put  to  me  ; I will  now  endeavour  to  answer  them,  though  it  is 
not  a very  easy  task — for  I feel  that  my  book  will  be  rendered  more 
interesting  and  complete  to  many  if  I endeavour  to  give  them  some 
idea  of  the  circumstances  which,  in  my  opinion,  led  to  that  calamitous 
crisis  in  the  history  of  our  rule  in  India,  and  then  try  to  show  how  I 
think  a repetition  of  such  a disaster  may  best  be  guarded  against. 

The  causes  which  brought  about  the  Mutiny  were  so  various,  and 
some  of  them  of  such  long  standing,  that  it  is  difficult  to  point  them 
out  as  concisely  as  I could  wish  ; but  I will  be  as  brief  as  possible. 

During  the  first  years  of  our  supremacy  in  India,  Hindus  and 
Mabomedans  alike  were  disposed  to  acquiesce  in  our  rule — the  blessings 
of  rest  and  peace  after  a long  reign  of  strife  and  anarchy  were  too  real 
not  to  be  appreciated ; but  as  time  went  by,  a new  generation  sprang 
up  by  whom  past  miseries  were  forgotten,  and  those  who  had  real 
grievances,  or  those  who  were  causelessly  discontented,  were  all  ready 
to  lay  the  blame  for  their  real  or  fancied  troubles  on  their  foreign 
rulers.  Mahomedans  looked  back  to  the  days  of  their  Empire  in 
India,  but  failed  to  remember  how  completely,  until  we  broke  the 
Mahratta  power,  the  Hindus  had  got  the  upper  hand.  Their  Moulvies 
taught  them  that  it  was  only  lawful  for  true  Mussulmans  to  submit  to 
the  rule  of  an  infidel  if  there  was  no  possibility  of  successful  revolt, 
and  they  watched  for  the  chance  of  again  being  able  to  make  Islam 
supreme.  The  Hindus  had  not  forgotten  that  they  had  ousted  the 
Mahomedans,  and  they  fancied  that  the  fate  of  the  British  raj  might 
also  be  at  their  mercy. 

The  late  Sir  George  Campbell,  in  his  interesting  memoirs,  says : ‘ The 
Mutiny  was  a sepoy  revolt,  not  a Hindu  rebellion.’  I do  not  altogether 
agree  with  him  ; for,  although  there  was  no  general  rising  of  the  rural 
population,  the  revolt,  in  my  judgment,  would  never  have  taken  place 
had  there  not  been  a feeling  of  discontent  and  disquiet  throughout  that 
part  of  the  country  from  which  our  Hindustani  sepoys  chiefly  came, 
and  had  not  certain  influential  people  been  thoroughly  dissatisfied  with 
our  system  of  government.  This  discontent  and  dissatisfaction  were 
produced  by  a policy  which,  in  many  instances,  the  Rulers  of  India 
were  powerless  to  avoid  or  postpone,  forced  upon  them  as  it  was  by  the 
demands  of  civilization  and  the  necessity  for  a more  enlightened  legis- 
lation. Intriguers  took  advantage  of  this  state  of  affairs  to  further 
their  own  ends.  Their  plan  of  action  was  to  alienate  the  Native  army, 
and  to  increase  the  general  feeling  of  uneasiness  and  suspicion,  by 
spreading  false  reports  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  authorities  in  regard 


2J2 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

to  the  various  measures  which  had  been  adopted  to  promote  the  welfare 
and  prosperity  of  the  masses.  It  can  hardly  be  questioned  that  these 
measures  were  right  and  proper  in  themselves,  but  they  were  on  that 
account  none  the  less  obnoxious  to  the  Brahmin  priesthood,  or  dis- 
tasteful to  the  Natives  generally.  In  some  cases  also  they  were 
premature,  and  in  others  they  were  not  carried  out  as  judiciously  as 
they  might  have  been,  or  with  sufficient  regard  to  the  feelings  and 
prejudices  of  the  people. 

The  prohibition  of  sati  (burning  widows  on  the  funeral  pyres  of 
their  husbands)  ; the  putting  a stop  to  female  infanticide  ; the  execu- 
tion of  Brahmins  for  capital  offences ; the  efforts  of  missionaries  and 
the  protection  of  their  converts  ; the  removal  of  all  legal  obstacles  to 
the  remarriage  of  widows ; the  spread  of  western  and  secular  educa- 
tion generally ; and,  more  particularly,  the  attempt  to  introduce  female 
education,  were  causes  of  alarm  and  disgust  to  the  Brahmins,  and  to 
those  Hindus  of  high  caste  whose  social  privileges  were  connected 
with  the  Brahminical  religion.  Those  arbiters  of  fate,  who  were  until 
then  all-powerful  to  control  every  act  of  their  co-religionists,  social, 
religious  or  political,  were  quick  to  perceive  that  their  influence  was 
menaced,  and  that  their  sway  would  in  time  be  wrested  from  them, 
unless  they  could  devise  some  means  for  overthrowing  our  Govern- 
ment. They  knew  full  well  that  the  groundwork  of  this  influence  was 
ignorance  and  superstition,  and  they  stood  aghast  at  what  they  foresaw 
would  be  the  inevitable  result  of  enlightenment  and  progress.  Rail- 
ways and  telegraphs  were  specially  distasteful  to  the  Brahmins  : these 
evidences  of  ability  and  strength  were  too  tangible  to  be  pooh-poohed 
or  explained  away.  Moreover,  railways  struck  a direct  blow  at  the 
system  of  caste,  for  on  them  people  of  every  caste,  high  and  low,  were 
bound  to  travel  together. 

The  fears  and  antagonism  of  the  Brahmins  being  thus  aroused,  it 
was  natural  that  they  should  wish  to  see  our  rule  upset,  and  they 
proceeded  to  poison  the  minds  of  the  people  with  tales  of  the  Govern- 
ment’s determination  to  force  Christianity  upon  them,  and  to  make 
them  believe  that  the  continuance  of  our  power  meant  the  destruction 
of  all  they  held  most  sacred. 

Nor  was  opportunity  wanting  to  confirm,  apparently,  the  truth  of 
their  assertions.  In  the  gaols  a system  of  messing  had  been  estab- 
lished which  interfered  with  the  time-honoured  custom  of  every  man 
being  allowed  to  provide  and  cook  his  own  food.  This  innovation  was 
most  properly  introduced  as  a matter  of  gaol  discipline,  and  due  care 
was  taken  that  the  food  of  the  Hindu  prisoners  should  be  prepared  by 
cooks  of  the  same  or  superior  caste.  Nevertheless,  false  reports  were 
disseminated,  and  the  credulous  Hindu  population  was  led  to  believe 
that  the  prisoners’  food  was  in  future  to  be  prepared  by  men  of  inferior 
caste,  with  the  object  of  defiling  and  degrading  those  for  whom  it  was 


RELIGIOUS  FEARS  OF  THE  PEOPLE 


233 


1858] 

prepared.  The  news  of  what  was  supposed  to  have  happened  in  the 
gaols  spread  from  town  to  town  and  from  village  to  village,  the  belief 
gradually  gaining  ground  that  the  people  were  about  to  be  forced  to 
embrace  Christianity. 

As  the  promiscuous  messing  story  did  not  greatly  concern  the 
Mahomedans,  other  cries  were  made  use  of  to  create  suspicion  and 
distrust  amongst  the  followers  of  the  Prophet.  One  of  these,  which 
equally  affected  the  Hindu  and  Mahomedan,  was  the  alleged  unfair- 
ness of  what  was  known  in  India  as  the  land  settlement,  under  which 
system  the  right  and  title  of  each  landholder  to  his  property  was 
examined,  and  the  amount  of  revenue  to  be  paid  by  him  to  the  para- 
mount Power,  as  owner  of  the  soil,  was  regulated. 

The  rapid  acquisition  of  territory  by  the  East  India  Company,  and 
the  establishment  of  its  supremacy  as  the  sovereign  Tower  throughout 
India,  were  necessarily  effected  by  military  operations ; but  as  peace 
and  order  were  established,  the  system  of  land  revenue,  which  had 
been  enforced  in  an  extremely  oppressive  and  corrupt  manner  under 
successive  Native  Eulers  and  dynasties,  had  to  be  investigated  and 
revised.  'With  this  object  in  view,  surveys  were  made,  and  inquiries 
instituted  into  the  rights  of  ownership  and  occupancy,  the  result  being 
that  in  many  cases  it  was  found  that  families  of  position  and  influence 
had  either  appropriated  the  property  of  their  humbler  neighbours,  or 
evaded  an  assessment  proportionate  to  the  value  of  their  estates. 
Although  these  inquiries  were  carried  out  with  the  best  intentions, 
they  were  extremely  distasteful  to  the  higher  classes,  while  they  failed 
to  conciliate  the  masses.  The  ruling  families  deeply  resented  our 
endeavours  to  introduce  an  equitable  determination  of  rights  and 
assessment  of  land  revenue.  They  saw  that  it  would  put  an  end  to 
the  system  of  pillage  and  extortion  which  had  been  practised  from  time 
immemorial ; they  felt  that  their  authority  was  being  diminished,  and 
that  they  would  no  longer  be  permitted  to  govern  their  estates  in  the 
same  despotic  manner  as  formerly.  On  the  other  hand,  although  the 
agricultural  population  generally  benefited  materially  by  our  rule,  they 
could  not  realize  the  benevolent  intentions  of  a Government  which 
tried  to  elevate  their  position  and  improve  then-  prospects.  Moreover, 
there  were  no  doubt  mistakes  made  in  the  valuation  of  land,  some  of 
it  being  assessed  at  too  high  a rate,  while  the  revenue  was  sometimes 
collected  in  too  rigid  a manner,  sufficient  allowance  not  being  made  for 
the  failure  of  crops.  Then  the  harsh  law  for  the  sale  of  proprietary 
rights  in  land  to  realize  arrears  of  land-tax  was  often  enforced  by  care- 
less revenue  authorities  in  far  too  summary  a manner.  The  peasantry 
of  India  were,  and  still  are,  ignorant  and  apathetic.  Accustomed  from 
the  earliest  days  to  spoliation  and  oppression,  and  to  a periodical 
change  of  masters,  they  had  some  reason  to  doubt  whether  the  rule 
of  the  Feringhis  would  be  more  permanent  than  that  of  the  Moghuls 


234 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

or  the  Mahrattas.  Much  as  a just  and  tolerant  Government  would 
have  boon  to  their  advantage,  they  were  unable  to  appreciate  it,  and  if 
they  had  appreciated  it,  they  were  too  timid  and  too  wanting  in 
organization  to  "ive  it  their  open  support.  Under  these  social  and 
political  conditions,  the  passive  attitude  of  the  rural  population  failed 
to  counterbalance  the  active  hostility  of  a large  section  of  the  upper 
classes,  and  of  their  predatory  followers,  who  for  centuries  had  lived 
by  plunder  and  civil  war. 

Another  weighty  cause  of  discontent,  chiefly  affecting  the  wealthy 
and  influential  classes,  and  giving  colour  to  the  Brahmins’  accusation 
that  we  intended  to  upset  the  religion  and  violate  the  most  cherished 
customs  of  the  Hindus,  was  Lord  Dalhousie’s  strict  enforcement  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  lapse  of  property  in  the  absence  of  direct  or  collateral 
heirs,  and  the  consequent  appropriation  of  certain  Native  States,  and 
the  resumption  of  certain  political  pensions  by  the  Government  of 
India.  This  was  condemned  by  the  people  of  India  as  grasping,  and 
as  an  unjustifiable  interference  with  the  institutions  of  the  country, 
and  undoubtedly  made  us  many  enemies.* 

Later  on,  the  annexation  of  Oudh,  which  was  one  of  those  measures 
forced  on  the  Rulers  of  India  in  the  interests  of  humanity  and  good 
government,  and  which  could  hardly  have  been  longer  delayed,  created 
suspicion  and  apprehension  amongst  all  the  Native  States.  For  more 
than  sixty  years  Governor- General  after  Governor-General  had  pointed 
out  the  impossibility  of  a civilized  Government  tolerating  in  the  midst 
of  its  possessions  the  misrule,  disorder,  and  debauchery  which  were 
desolating  one  of  the  most  fertile  and  thickly-populated  districts  in 
India. 

As  early  as  1801  Lord  Wellesley  wrote  : ‘ I am  satisfied  that  no 
effectual  security  can  be  provided  against  the  ruin  of  the  province  of 
Oudh  until  the  exclusive  management  of  the  civil  and  military  govern - 

* In  this  matter  it  seems  to  me  that  Lord  Dalhousie’s  policy  has  been 
unfairly  criticized.  The  doctrine  of  lapse  was  no  new-fangled  theory  of  the 
Governor-General,  but  had  been  recognized  and  acted  upon  for  many  years  by 
the  Native  dynasties  which  preceded  the  East  India  Company.  Under  the 
Company’s  rule  the  Court  of  Directors  had  investigated  the  subject,  and  in  a 
series  of  des patches  from  1834  to  1846  had  laid  down  that,  in  certain  cases, 
the  selection  and  adoption  of  an  heir  by  a N tive  Ruler  was  an  incontestable 
right,  subject  only  to  t he  formal  sanction  of  the  suzerain  Power,  while  in  other 
cases  such  a procedure  was  optional,  and  could  only  be  permitted  as  a special 
favour.  Lord  Dalhousie  concurred  in  the  view  that  each  ease  should  be  con- 
sidered and  decided  on  its  merits.  Ilis  words  were : ‘The  Government  is 
bound  in  duty,  as  well  as  in  policy,  to  act  on  every  such  occasion  with  the 
purest  integrity,  and  in  the  most  scrupulous  observance  of  good  faith.  Where 
even  a shadow  of  doubt  can  be  ^hown,  the  claim  should  at  once  be  abandoned. 
But  where  the  right  to  territory  by  lapse  is  clear,  the  Government  is  bound 
to  take  that  which  is  justly  and  legally  its  due,  and  to  extend  to  that  territory 
the  benefits  of  our  sovereignty,  present  and  prospective.' 


THE  ANNEXATION  OF  OUDH 


1858] 


23S 


ment  of  that  country  shall  be  transferred  to  the  Company  under 
suitable  provisions  for  the  Nawab  and  his  family.’ 

In  1831  Lord  William  Bentinck  warned  the  King  of  Oudh  that, 
unless  he  would  consent  to  rule  his  territories  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  good  government  and  the  interest  of  the  people,  the  East 
India  Company  would  assume  the  entire  administration  of  the  province, 
and  would  make  him  a state  prisoner. 

In  1847  Lord  Hardinge  went  in  person  to  Lucknow  and  solemnly 
reiterated  the  warning,  giving  the  King  two  years  to  reform  his 
administration. 

In  1351  Colonel  Sleeman,  the  Resident  at  Lucknow,  whose  sympathy 
with  the  Eulers  of  Native  States  was  thought  to  be  even  too  great,  and 
who  was  the  last  person  to  exaggerate  the  misrule  existing  in  Oudh, 
reported  to  Lord  Dalhousie  that  the  state  of  things  had  become  intoler- 
able, and  that,  if  our  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Oudh,  the  land- 
holders would  in  one  month’s  time  overrun  the  province  and  pillage 
Lucknow.  It  is  true  Sleeman,  with  his  Native  proclivities,  did  not 
contemplate  annexation ; his  advice  was  to  1 assume  the  administra- 
tion,’ but  not  to  ‘ grasp  the  revenues  of  the  country.’  The  same  mode 
of  procedure  had  been  advocated  by  Henry  Lawrence  six  years  before 
in  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  Calcutta  Beviciv.  His  words  were : 
‘Let  Oudh  be  at  last  governed,  not  for  one  man,  the  King,  but  for  the 
King  and  his  people.  Let  the  administration  of  the  country  be  Native ; 
let  not  one  rupee  come  into  the  Company’s  coffers.’ 

Sleeman  was  followed  in  1854  by  Colonel  Outram,  than  whom  he 
could  not  have  had  a more  admirable  successor,  or  one  less  likely  to 
be  unnecessarily  hard  upon  a State  which,  with  all  its  shortcomings, 
had  been  loyal  to  us  for  nearly  a century.  Colonel  Outram,  neverthe- 
less, fully  endorsed  the  views  of  his  predecessor.  General  Low,  the 
then  Military  Member  of  Council,  who  twenty  years  before,  when 
Resident  at  Lucknow,  had  deprecated  our  assuming  even  temporarily 
the  administration  of  Oudh,  thinking  our  action  would  be  misunder- 
stood by  the  people,  now  also  stated  his  conviction  that  ‘ it  was  the 
paramount  duty  of  the  British  Government  to  interfere  at  once  for  the 
protection  of  the  people  of  Oudh. 

In  summing  up  the  case,  Lord  Dalhousie  laid  three  possible  courses 
of  action  before  the  authorities  in  England.  The  King  of  Oudh  might 
be  forced  to  abdicate,  his  province  being  incorporated  in  the  British 
dominions ; or  he  might  be  maintained  in  his  royal  state  as  a sub- 
sidized Prince,  the  actual  government  being  permanently  transferred 
to  the  East  India  Company ; or  the  transfer  of  the  government  to  the 
East  India  Company  might  be  for  a limited  period  only.  The  Governor- 
General  recommended  the  second  course,  but  the  Court  of  Directors 
and  Her  Majesty’s  Ministers  decided  to  adopt  the  first,  and  requested 
Lord  Dalhousie  to  carry  out  the  annexation  before  he  resigned  his  office. 


236 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[•858 

This  measure,  so  long  deferred  and  so  carefully  considered,  could 
hardly,  in  my  opinion,  have  been  avoided  by  a civilized  and  civilizing 
Government.  It  was  at  last  adopted  with  the  utmost  reluctance,  and 
only  after  the  experiment  of  administering  a province  for  the  benefit  of 
the  Natives,  without  annexing  it,  had  been  tried  in  the  Punjab  and  had 
signally  failed.  To  use  Lord  Dalhousie’s  words,  it  was  amply  justified 
on  the  ground  that  ‘ the  British  Government  would  be  guilty  in  the 
sight  of  God  and  man  if  it  were  any  longer  to  aid  in  sustaining  by  its 
countenance  an  administration  fraught  with  suffering  to  millions.’ 
But  the  Natives  generally  could  not  understand  the  necessity  for  the 
measure,  or  believe  in  the  reasons  which  influenced  us ; many  of  them, 
therefore,  considered  it  an  unprovoked  usurpation,  and  each  Ruler  of  a 
Native  State  imagined  that  his  turn  might  come  next. 

Thus,  the  annexation  of  Oudh  in  one  sense  augmented  that  weakness 
in  our  position  as  an  eastern  Power  which,  so  to  speak,  had  its  source 
in  our  strength.  So  long  as  there  was  a balance  of  power  between 
ourselves  and  Native  States— Mahratta,  Rajput,  Sikh,  or  Mahomedan 
— they  were  prevented  by  their  mutual  jealousies  and  religious  differ- 
ences from  combining  against  us  ; but  when  that  balance  was  destroyed 
and  we  became  the  paramount  Power  in  India,  the  period  of  danger  to 
us  began,  as  was  prophesied  by  the  far-seeing  Malcolm  in  the  early 
days  of  our  first  conquests.  We  had  now  become  objects  of  suspicion 
and  dread  to  all  the  lesser  Powers,  who  were  ready  to  sink  their  own 
disputes  in  the  consideration  of  the  best  means  to  check  the  extension 
of  our  rule  and  overthrow  our  supremacy ; while  we,  inflated  by  our 
power  and  satisfied  with  our  apparent  security,  became  more  dogmatic 
and  uncompromising  in  enforcing  principles  which,  though  sound  and 
just  in  themselves,  were  antipathetic  to  Native  ideas  and  traditions. 
By  a great  many  acts  and  measures  we  made  them  feel  how  completely 
our  ideas  differed  from  theirs.  They  preferred  their  own,  and  strongly 
resented  our  increasing  efforts  to  impose  ours  upon  them.  Even  those 
amongst  the  Native  Princes  who  were  too  enlightened  to  believe  that 
we  intended  to  force  our  religion  upon  them  and  change  all  their 
customs,  felt  that  their  power  was  now  merely  nominal,  and  that  every 
substantial  attribute  of  sovereignty  would  soon  disappear  if  our  notions 
of  progress  continued  to  be  enforced. 

At  a time  when  throughout  the  country  there  existed  these  feelings 
of  dissatisfaction  and  restless  suspicion,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that 
the  most  discontented  and  unfriendly  of  the  Native  Rulers  would  not 
seize  the  opportunity  to  work  us  mischief.  The  most  prominent  of 
these  amongst  the  Mahomedans  were  the  royal  family  of  Delhi  and 
the  ex-King  of  Oudh,  and,  amongst  the  Hindus,  Dundu  Pant,  better 
known  by  English  people  as  the  1 Nana  Sahib.’ 

All  three  considered  themselves  badly  treated,  and  no  doubt,  from 
their  point  of  view,  their  grievances  were  not  altogether  groundless. 


THE  DELHI  ROYAL  FAMILY 


237 


1858] 

The  King  of  Oudh’s  I have  already  indicated,  and  when  his  province 
was  annexed,  he  was  removed  to  Calcutta.  Having  refused  the  yearly 
pension  of  twelve  lakhs*  of  rupees,  offered  to  him,  and  declined  to  sign 
the  treaty  by  which  his  territory  was  made  over  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, he  sent  his  mother,  his  son,  and  his  brother  to  England  to  plead 
his  cause  for  him. 

The  most  influential  of  the  three  discontented  liulers,  or,  at  all 
events,  the  one  whom  the  rebellious  of  all  castes  and  religions  were 
most  inclined  to  put  forward  as  their  nominal  leader,  was  the  head  of 
the  Delhi  royal  family,  by  name  Bahadur  Shah.  He  was  eighty  years 
old  in  1857,  and  had  been  on  the  throne  for  twenty  years.  His  par- 
ticular grievance  lay  in  the  fact  of  our  decision  that  on  his  death  the 
title  of  King,  which  wo  had  bestowed  on  the  successors  of  the  Moghul 
Emperor,  should  be  abolished,  and  his  family  removed  from  Delhi. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  century  Lord  Wellesley  pointed  out  the 
danger  of  allowing  a Mahomedan  Prince,  with  all  the  surroundings  of 
royalty,  to  remain  at  the  seat  of  the  old  Moghul  government,  but  the 
question  was  allowed  to  remain  in  abeyance  until  1849,  when  Lord 
Dalhousie  reconsidered  it,  and  obtained  the  sanction  of  the  authorities 
in  England  to  the  removal  of  the  Court  from  Delhi  to  a place  about 
fourteen  miles  off,  where  the  Kutub  tower  stands.  At  the  same  time 
the  Heir  Apparent  was  to  be  told  that  on  his  father’s  death  the  title  of 
King  of  Delhi  would  cease. 

Lord  Dalhousie  had  been  only  a short  time  in  India  when  he  took 
up  this  question,  and  he  could  not  properly  have  appreciated  the  esti- 
mation in  which  the  Natives  held  the  King  of  Delhi,  for  he  wrote  in 
support  of  his  proposals  ‘ that  the  Princes  of  India  and  its  people  had 
become  entirely  indifferent  to  the  condition  of  the  King  or  his  position.' 
But  when  the  decision  of  the  British  Government  on  the  subject 
reached  India,  he  had  been  more  than  two  years  in  the  country,  and 
although  his  views  as  to  the  desirability  of  the  measure  remained  un- 
changed, the  experience  he  had  gained  enabled  him  to  gauge  more 
accurately  the  feelings  of  the  people,  and,  with  the  advice  of  his  Council, 
he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  wiser  to  let  affairs  remain 
in  statu  quo  during  Bahadur  Shah’s  lifetime.  The  royal  family  were 
iuformed  accordingly,  and  an  agreement  was  drawn  up,  signed,  sealed, 
and  witnessed,  by  which  the  Heir  Apparent  accepted  the  conditions  to 
be  imposed  upon  him  on  the  death  of  his  father,  wiio  was  to  be  allowed 
to  remain  in  Delhi  during  his  lifetime,  with  all  the  paraphernalia 
of  royalty. 

However  satisfactory  this  arrangement  might  be  to  the  Government 
of  India,  to  every  member  of  the  Delhi  royal  family  it  must  have 
seemed  oppressive  and  humiliating  to  the  last  degree.  Outwardly 

* In  those  days  £120,000. 


238 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

they  appeared  to  accept  the  inevitable  quietly  and  submissively,  but 
they  were  only  biding  their  time,  and  longing  for  an  opportunity  to 
throw  off  the  hated  English  yoke.  The  war  with  Persia  in  1856 
seemed  to  offer  the  chance  they  wanted.  On  the  pretence  that  the 
independence  of  Herat  was  threatened  by  the  Amir  of  Kabul,  the 
Persians  marched  an  army  to  besiege  that  place.  As  this  act  was  a 
violation  of  our  treaty  with  Persia  made  three  years  before,  Her 
Majesty’s  Government  directed  that  an  army  should  be  sent  from 
India  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  troops  had  scarcely  left  Bombay 
before  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  North-West  Provinces  was 
warned  by  a Native  correspondent  that  the  King  of  Delhi  was  intriguing 
with  the  Shah  of  Persia.  At  the  same  time  a proclamation  was  posted 
on  the  walls  of  the  Jama  Masjid  (Shah  Jehan’s  famous  mosque  at 
Delhi),  to  the  effect  that  a Persian  army  was  coming  to  relieve  India 
from  the  presence  of  the  English,  and  calling  on  all  true  believers  to 
rise  and  fight  against  the  heretics.  Reports  were  also  diligently  cir- 
culated of  our  being  defeated  on  the  shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  and 
the  people  were  made  to  believe  that  their  opportunity  had  arrived,  and 
that  the  time  was  now  favourable  for  a successful  rebellion. 

Of  the  three  principal  movers  in  the  events  which  immediately  pre- 
ceded the  Mutiny,  the  Nana  Sahib  was  by  far  the  most  intelligent,  and 
had  mixed  most  with  Europeans.  He  was  the  adopted  son  and  heir 
of  the  last  of  the  Peshwas,  the  Chiefs  of  the  Mahratta  confederacy. 
His  cause  of  dissatisfaction  was  the  discontinuance  to  him  of  a pension 
which,  at  the  close  of  the  Mahratta  war  in  1818,  was  granted  to  the 
Peshwa,  on  the  clear  understanding  that  it  was  to  cease  at  his  death. 
The  Peshwa  died  in  1851,  leaving  the  Nana  an  enormous  fortune  ; but 
he  was  not  content.  The  lapse  of  the  pension,  to  which  he  was  not 
entitled,  rankled  in  his  breast,  and  when  all  his  efforts  to  get  it  restored 
to  him  proved  of  no  avail,  he  became  thoroughly  disgusted  and  dis- 
affected. After  failing  to  obtain  in  India  a reconsideration  of  the 
decision  of  the  Government  on  the  subject,  he  sent  to  England  as  con- 
fidential agent  a Mahomedan  of  the  name  of  Azimula  Khan,  who 
remained  three  years  in  Europe,  residing  for  the  most  part  in  London  ; 
but  he  also  visited  Paris,  Constantinople,  and  the  Crimea,  arriving  at 
the  latter  place  when  we,  in  alliance  with  the  French,  were  besieging 
Sebastopol.  He  was  a man  of  no  rank  or  position  in  his  own  country, 
a mere  agent  of  the  Nana’s,  but  he  was  received  into  the  best  English 
society,  was  everywhere  treated  as  a royal  Prince,  and  became  engaged 
to  a young  English  girl,  who  agreed  to  follow  him  to  India  to  be 
married.  All  this  was  revealed  by  the  correspondence  to  which  I have  re- 
ferred as  having  been  found  in  the  Nana’s  palace  of  Bithur.  The  greater 
number  of  these  letters  were  from  people  in  England — not  a few  from 
ladies  of  rank  and  position.  One  elderly  dame  called  him  her  dear 
eastern  son.  There  were  numerous  letters  from  his  English  fiancee , 


THE  NANA  SAHIB 


239 


1858] 

and  two  from  a Frenchman  of  the  name  of  Lafont,*  relating  to  some 
business  with  the  French  settlement  of  Chandernagore,  with  which  he 
had  been  entrusted  by  Azimula  Khan,  acting  for  the  Nana.  Written, 
as  these  letters  were,  immediately  before  the  Mutiny,  in  which  the 
Nana  was  the  leading  spirit,  it  seems  probable  that  ‘ lea  principalcs 
choses,'  to  which  Lafont  hopes  to  bring  satisfactory  answers,  wero 
invitations  to  the  disaffected  and  disloyal  in  Calcutta,  and  perhaps  the 
French  settlers  at  Chandernagore,  to  assist  in  the  effort  about  to  be 
made  to  throw  off  the  British  yoke.  A portion  of  the  correspondence 
was  unopened,  and  there  were  several  letters  in  Azimula’s  own  hand- 
writing which  had  not  been  despatched.  Two  of  these  were  to  Omar 
Pasha  at  Constantinople,  and  told  of  the  sepoys’  discontent  and  tho 
troubled  state  of  India  generally.  That  the  Nana  was  intriguing  with 
the  King  of  Delhi,  the  Nawab  of  Oudh,  and  other  great  personages, 
has  been  proved  beyond  a doubt,  although  at  the  time  he  was  looked 
upon  by  the  British  residents  at  Cawnpore  as  a perfectly  harmless 
individual,  in  spite  of  its  being  known  that  he  considered  himself 


* ‘ Benares, 

‘ April  4,  1857. 

‘Mon  cher  Azimula  Khan, 

‘Je  suis  parti  de  Cawnpore  le  premier  du  mois  et  suis  arrive  iei  ce 
matin,  je  partirai  ce  soir  et  serai  It  Chandernagore  le  7 au  matin,  dans  la 
journee  je  ferai  line  visite  au  Gouverneur  et  le  lendemain  irai  5 Calcutta,  je 
verrai  notre  Consul  General.  Ecrivez-moi  et  adressez-moi  vos  lettres,  No.  123, 
Dhurumtollah.  Je  voudrais  que  vous  puissiez  m’envoyer  des  fonds  au  moins 
5 ou  600  Rs.  sans  retard,  car  je  ne  resterai  5 Calcutta  que  le  temps  necessaire 
pour  tout  arranger  et  le  bien  arranger.  Je  suppose  48  heures  k Calcutta  et 
deux  ou  trois  jours  au  plus  k Chandernagore,  ne  perdez  pas  de  temps  mais 
repondez  de  suite.  Pour  toutes  les  principales  choses  les  reponses  seraient 
satisfaisantes,  soyez  en  assure. 

‘ Faites  en  sorte  de  me  repoudre  sans  de’ai  afiu  que  je  ne  sois  pas  reteuu  a 
Calcutta. 

‘ Presentez  mes  compliments  respectueux. 

‘ Rappelez-moi  au  souvenir  de  Baba  Sahib,  et  croyez  moi, 

‘ V'otre  bien  devoue 

‘A.  Lafont. 

‘Mon  adresse  a Chandernagore,  “Care  of  Mesdames  Albert.” 

‘ N.B. — Mais  ecrivez-moi  a Calcutta,  car  je  serai  chaque  jour  la,  en  cbemin 
de  fer,  je  fais  le  trajet  en  20  minutes.  Si  vous  avez  quelque  chose  de  presse  5 
me  communiquer  vous  le  pouvez  faire  par  telegraph  en  Anglais  seulement. 

‘A.  L.’ 


‘ Chandernagore, 

‘ April  9,  1857. 

‘Mon  cher  Azimula  Khan, 

‘J’ai  tout  arrange,  j'apporlerai  une  letlre,  et  elle  sera  satis faisante 
cette  letlre  me  sera  donnee  le  14  et  le  15  je  partirai  pour  Cawnpore.  Mes 
respects  k son  Altesse. 


‘ Votre  tout  devoue 

‘A.  Lafont.’ 


16 


240 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

aggrieved  on  account  of  his  having  been  refused  the  continuance  of  the 
pension,  and  because  a salute  of  guns  (such  as  it  is  the  custom  to  give 
to  Native  Princes  on  entering  British  territory)  had  not  been  accorded 
to  him. 

While  the  spirit  of  rebellion  was  thus  being  fostered  and  stirred  into 
active  existence  throughout  the  country,  it  was  hardly  to  be  hoped  that 
the  Native  army  would  be  allowed  to  remain  unaffected  by  a movement 
which  could  not  easily  attain  formidable  proportions  without  the  assist- 
ance of  the  Native  soldiers,  who  themselves,  moreover,  had  not  remained 
unmoved  spectators  of  all  that  had  happened  during  the  previous  thirty 
or  forty  years.  The  great  majority  of  the  sepoys  were  drawn  from  the 
agricultural  classes,  especially  in  the  province  of  Oudh,  and  were  there- 
fore directly  interested  in  all  questions  connected  with  rights  of  property, 
tenure  of  land,  etc. ; and  questions  of  religion  and  caste  affected  them 
equally  with  the  rest  of  the  population. 

Quietly,  but  surely,  the  instigators  of  rebellion  were  preparing  the 
Native  army  for  revolt.  The  greatest  cunning  and  circumspection  were, 
however,  necessary  to  success.  There  were  so  many  opposing  interests 
to  be  dealt  with,  Mahomedans  and  Hindus  being  as  violently  hostile  to 
each  other,  with  regard  to  religion  and  customs,  as  they  were  to  us. 
Soldiers,  too,  of  all  ranks  had  a great  stake  in  their  profession.  Some 
had  nearly  served  their  time  for  their  pensions,  that  greatest  of  all 
attractions  to  the  Native  to  enter  the  army,  for  the  youngest  recruit 
feels  that,  if  he  serves  long  enough,  he  is  sure  of  an  income  sufficient 
to  enable  him  to  sit  in  the  sun  and  do  nothing  for  the  rest  of  his  days — 
a Native’s  idea  of  supreme  happiness.  The  enemies  of  our  rule  generally, 
and  the  fanatic  in  particular,  were,  however,  equal  to  the  occasion.  They 
took  advantage  of  the  widespread  discontent  to  establish  the  belief  that 
a systematic  attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  faith  and  habits  of  the  people, 
whether  Hindu  or  Mahomedan,  and,  as  a proof  of  the  truth  of  their 
assertions,  they  alleged  that  the  Enfield  cartridges  which  had  been 
recently  issued  to  the  army  were  greased  with  a mixture  of  cows’  fat 
and  lard,  the  one  being  as  obnoxious  to  the  Hindu  as  the  other  is  to 
the  Mahomedan.  The  news  spread  throughout  the  Bengal  Presidency ; 
the  sepoys  became  alarmed,  and  determined  to  suffer  any  punishment 
rather  than  pollute  themselves  by  biting  the  contaminating  cartridge, 
as  their  doing  so  would  involve  loss  of  caste,  which  to  the  Hindu  sepoy 
meant  the  loss  of  everything  to  him  most  dear  and  sacred  in  this  world 
and  the  next.  He  and  his  family  would  become  outcasts,  his  friends 
and  relations  would  look  on  him  with  horror  and  disgust,  while  eternal 
misery,  he  believed,  would  be  his  doom  in  the  world  to  come. 

It  has  been  made  quite  clear  that  a general  belief  existed  amongst 
the  Hindustani  sepoys  that  the  destruction  of  their  caste  and  religion 
had  been  finally  resolved  upon  by  the  English,  as  a menns  of  forcing 
them  to  become  Christians,  and  it  seems  extraordinary  that  the  English 


GREASED  CARTRIDGES 


241 


1858] 

officers  with  Native  regiments  were  so  little  aware  of  the  strength  of  this 
impression  amongst  their  men. 

The  recent  researches  of  Mr.  Forrest  in  the  records  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  prove  that  the  lubricating  mixture  used  in  preparing  the 
cartridges  was  actually  composed  of  the  objectionable  ingredients,  cows’ 
fat  and  lard,  and  that  incredible  disregard  of  the  soldiers’  religious 
prejudices  was  displayed  in  the  manufacture  of  these  cartridges.  When 
the  sepoys  complained  that  to  bite  them  would  destroy  their  caste,  they 
were  solemnly  assured  by  their  officers  that  they  had  been  greased  with 
a perfectly  unobjectionable  mixture.  These  officers,  understanding,  as 
all  who  have  come  in  contact  with  Natives  arc  supposed  to  understand, 
then-  intense  abhorrence  of  touching  the  flesh  or  fat  of  the  sacred  cow 
or  the  unclean  pig,  did  not  believe  it  possible  that  the  authorities  could 
have  been  so  regardless  of  the  sepoys’  feelings  as  to  have  allowed  it  to 
be  used  in  preparing  their  ammunition : they  therefore  made  this 
statement  in  perfect  good  faith.  But  nothing  was  easier  than  for  the 
men  belonging  to  the  regiments  quartered  near  Calcutta  to  ascertain, 
from  the  low-caste  Native  workmen  employed  in  manufacturing  the 
cartridges  at  the  Fort  William  arsenal,  that  the  assurances  of  then- 
officers  were  not  in  accordance  with  facts,  and  they  were  thus  prepared 
to  credit  the  fables  which  the  sedition-mongers  so  sedulously  spread 
abroad,  to  the  effect  that  the  Government  they  served  and  the  officers 
who  commanded  them  had  entered  into  a deliberate  conspiracy  to 
undermine  their  religion. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  evil  influence  brought  to  bear  on  the  Native 
army,  I do  not  think  that  the  sepoys  would  have  proved  such  ready 
instruments  in  the  hands  of  the  civilian  intriguers,  had  that  army  been 
organized,  disciplined,  and  officered  in  a satisfactory  manner,  and  had 
there  been  a sufficient  proportion  of  British  troops  in  India  at  the 
time.  To  the  great  preponderance  of  Native,  as  compared  with  British, 
troops  may  be  attributed  the  fact  that  the  sepoys  dared  to  break  into 
open  mutiny.  Moreover,  the  belief  of  the  Natives  in  the  invincibility 
of  the  British  soldier,  which  formerly  enabled  small  numbers  of 
Europeans  to  gain  victories  over  large  Native  armies,  had  been  seriously 
weakened  by  the  lamentable  occurrences  at  Kabul  during  the  first 
Afghan  war,  terminating  in  the  disastrous  retreat  in  the  winter  of 
1841-42. 

To  add  to  the  exalted  idea  the  sepoys  were  beginning  to  entertain  of 
their  own  importance,  they  were  pampered  by  their  officers  and  the 
civil  Government  to  a most  absurd  extent,  being  treated  under  all 
circumstances  -with  far  greater  consideration  than  the  European 
soldiers.  For  instance,  in  the  time  of  Lord  William  Bentinck  flogging 
was  abolished  in  the  Native  army,*  while  still  in  full  swing  amongst 

Flogging  was  re-introduced  in  1845. 

16—2 


242 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 

British  soldiers,  and  sepoys  were  actually  allowed  to  witness  the 
humiliation  of  their  white  comrades  when  this  degrading  form  of 
punishment  was  inflicted  upon  them. 

In  the  early  days  of  our  connexion  with  India,  we  had  no  need  for 
an  army.  Living,  as  we  were,  on  sufferance  in  a foreign  land  for 
commercial  purposes,  armed  men  were  only  required  to  guard  the 
factories.  As  these  factories  increased  in  size  and  importance,  these 
armed  men  were  given  a semi-military  organization,  and  in  tune  they 
were  formed  into  levies  as  a reserve  to  the  few  Europeans  entertained 
by  the  merchants,  to  enable  them  to  hold  their  own  against  the  French, 
who  were  then  beginning  to  dispute  with  us  for  supremacy  in  southern 
India.  When  employed  in  the  field,  the  Native  troops  were  associated 
with  a varying  proportion  of  British  soldiers,  but  the  number  of  the 
latter  was  limited  by  the  expense  of  their  maintenance,  the  difficulty  of 
supplying  them  from  England,  and  the  unadvisability  of  locking  up  a 
part  of  the  British  army  in  distant  stations,  which  at  that  time  were 
very  inaccessible  and  generally  unhealthy.  Native  troops  were  therefore 
raised  in  continually  increasing  numbers,  and  after  the  battle  of  Plassey 
the  Native  army  was  rapidly  augmented,  especially  in  the  Bengal  Presi- 
dency ; and,  trained  and  led  as  it  was  by  British  officers,  it  achieved 
remarkable  successes. 

During  the  thirteen  years  preceding  the  Mutiny,  the  Native  army, 
numbering  217,000  men  and  176  guns,  was  increased  by  40,000  men 
and  40  guns,  but  no  addition  was  made  to  the  small  British  force  of 
38,000  until  1853,  when  one  regiment  was  added  to  each  Presidency,  or 
less  than  3,000  soldiers  in  all.  This  insignificant  augmentation  was 
subsequently  more  than  neutralized  by  the  withdrawal  of  six  British 
regiments  from  India  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Crimean  and 
Persian  wars.  Lord  Dalhousie,  Governor- General  in  1854,  saw  the 
danger  of  this  great  preponderance  of  Native  troops.  He  represented 
that  the  annexations  and  conquests  which  had  taken  place  during  his 
tenure  of  office  necessitated  a proportional  increase  of  British  soldiers ; 
he  protested  against  the  withdrawal  of  a single  European  regiment, 
either  on  account  of  the  war  with  Russia  or  for  operations  in  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  he  solemnly  warned  Her  Majesty’s  Government  that 
the  essential  element  of  our  strength  in  India  was  the  presence  of  a 
large  number  of  British  troops. 

No  attention,  however,  was  paid  to  Lord  Dalhousie’s  representations 
by  the  authorities  in  England,  who  doubtless  thought  they  understood 
the  requirements  of  India  better  than  the  Governor-General,  with  his 
more  than  six  years’  experience  of  the  country.  In  spite  of  his  remon- 
strances, two  regiments  were  ordered  to  England,  and  four  were  sent 
later  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  with  the  result  which  I have  already 
stated. 

When  the  Mutiny  broke  out,  the  whole  effective  British  force  in 


OBJECT  I OS  10  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


243 


1858] 

India  only  amounted  to  36,000  men,  against  267,000  Native  soldiers,* 
a fact  which  was  not  likely  to  be  overlooked  by  those  who  hoped  and 
strived  to  gain  to  their  own  side  this  preponderance  of  numerical 
strength,  and  winch  was  calculated  to  inflate  the  minds  of  the  sepoys 
with  a most  undesirable  sense  of  independence.  An  army  of  Asiatics, 
such  as  we  maintain  in  India,  is  a faithful  servant,  but  a treacherous 
master ; powerfully  influenced  by  social  and  religious  prejudices  with 
which  we  are  imperfectly  acquainted,  it  requires  the  most  careful 
handling ; above  all,  it  must  never  be  allowed  to  lose  faith  in  the 
prestige  or  supremacy  of  the  governing  race.  When  mercenaries  feel 
that  they  are  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  that  authority  which 
they  have  no  patriotic  interest  in  upholding,  they  begin  to  consider 
whether  it  would  not  be  more  to  then  advantage  to  aid  in  overthrowing 
that  authority,  and  if  they  decide  that  it  would  be,  they  have  little 
scruple  in  transferring  their  allegiance  from  the  Government  they  never 
loved,  and  have  ceased  to  fear,  to  the  power  more  in  accordance  with 
their  own  ideas,  and  from  which,  they  are  easily  persuaded,  they  will 
obtain  unlimited  benefits. 

A fruitful  cause  of  dissatisfaction  in  our  Native  army,  and  one  which 
pressed  more  heavily  upon  it  year  by  year,  as  our  acquisitions  of  terri- 
tory in  northern  India  became  more  extended,  was  the  sepoy’s  liability 
to  service  ha  distant  parts  of  India,  entailing  upon  him  a life  amongst 
strangers  differing  from  him  in  religion  and  in  all  then-  customs,  and 
far  away  from  his  home,  his  family,  and  his  congenial  surroundings — 
a liability  which  he  had  never  contemplated  except  in  the  event  of 
war,  when  extra  pay,  free  rations  and  the  possibility  of  loot,  would  go 
far  to  counterbalance  the  disadvantages  of  expatriation.  Service  in 
Burma,  which  entailed  crossing  the  sea,  and,  to  the  Hindu,  consequent 
loss  of  caste,  was  especially  distasteful.  So  great  an  objection,  indeed, 
had  the  sepoys  to  this  so-called  ‘ foreign  service,’  and  so  difficult  did  it 
become  to  find  troops  to  relieve  the  regiments,  in  consequence  of  the 
bulk  of  the  Bengal  army  not  being  available  for  service  beyond  the  sea, 
that  the  Court  of  Directors  sanctioned  Lord  Canning’s  proposal  that, 
after  the  1st  September,  1856,  ‘ no  Native  recruit  shall  be  accepted 
who  does  not  at  the  time  of  his  enlistment  undertake  to  serve  beyond 
the  sea  whether  within  the  territories  of  the  Company  or  beyond 
them.’  This  order,  though  absolutely  necessary,  caused  the  greatest 
dissatisfaction  amongst  the  Hindustani  sepoys,  who  looked  upon  it  as 
one  of  the  measures  introduced  by  the  Sirkar  for  the  forcible,  or  rather 
fraudulent,  conversion  of  all  the  Natives  to  Christianity,  t 

* This  does  not  include  the  bodies  of  armed  and  trained  police,  nor  the 
lascars  attached  to  the  Artillery  as  fighting  men.  These  amounted  to  many 
thousands. 

t In  a letter  to  Lord  Canning,  which  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  wrote  on  the 
9th  May,  1857,  he  gave  an  interesting  account  of  a conversation  he  had  had 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


244 


[1858 


That  the  long-existing  discontent  and  growing  disloyalty  in  our 
Native  army  might  have  been  discovered  sooner,  and  grappled  with  in 
a sufficiently  prompt  and  determined  manner  to  put  a stop  to  the 
Mutiny,  had  the  senior  regimental  and  staff  officers  been  younger, 
more  energetic,  and  intelligent,  is  an  opinion  to  which  I have  always 
been  strongly  inclined.  Their  excessive  age,  due  to  a strict  system  of 
promotion  by  seniority  which  entailed  the  employment  of  Brigadiers 
of  seventy,  Colonels  of  sixty,  and  Captains  of  fifty,  must  necessarily 
have  prevented  them  performing  their  military  duties  with  the  energy 
and  activity  which  are  more  the  attributes  of  younger  men,  and  must 
have  destroyed  any  enthusiasm  about  their  regiments,  in  which  there 
was  so  little  hope  of  advancement  or  of  individual  merit  being  recog- 
nized. Officers  who  displayed  any  remarkable  ability  were  allowed  to 
be  taken  away  from  their  own  corps  for  the  more  attractive  and  better- 
paid  appointments  appertaining  to  civil  employ  or  the  Irregular  service. 
It  was,  therefore,  the  object  of  every  ambitious  and  capable  young 
officer  to  secure  one  of  these  appointments,  and  escape  as  soon  as 
possible  from  a service  in  which  ability  and  professional  zeal  counted 
for  nothing.* * 

So  far  as  I understand  the  causes  which  led  to  the  rebellion  of  1857, 
I have  now  answered  the  question,  ‘ What  brought  about  the  Mutiny?’ 
The  reply  to  the  second  question, 1 Is  there  any  chance  of  a similar  rising 
occurring  again  ?’  must  be  left  to  another  chapter. 


with  a Brahmin  Native  officer  of  the  Oudh  Artillery,  who  was  most  persistent 
in  his  belief  that  the  Government  was  determined  to  make  the  people  of  India 
Christians.  He  alluded  especially  to  the  new  order  about  enlistment,  our 
object  being,  he  said,  to  make  the  sepoys  go  across  the  sea  in  order  that  they 
might  be  obliged  to  eat  what  we  liked  ; and  he  argued  that,  as  we  had  made 
our  way  through  India,  had  won  Bhartpur,  Lahore,  etc.,  by  fraud,  so  it  might 
be  possible  that  we  would  mix  bone-dust  with  grain  sold  to  Hindus.  Sir 
Henry  Lawrence  was  quite  unable  to  convince  the  Native  officer  ; he  would 
give  us  credit  for  nothing,  and  although  he  would  not  say  that  he  himself  did 
or  did  not  believe,  he  kept  repeating,  ‘ I tell  you  Natives  are  all  like  sheep  ; 
the  leading  one  tumbles,  and  down  all  the  rest  roll  over  him.’ 

* It  is  curious  to  note  how  nearly  every  military  officer  who  held  a command 
or  high  position  on  the  staff  in  Bengal  when  the  Mutiny  broke  out,  dis- 
appeared from  the  scene  within  the  first  few  weeks,  and  was  never  heard  of 
officially  again.  Some  were  killed,  some  died  of  disease,  but  the  great 
majority  failed  completely  to  fulfil  the  duties  of  the  positions  they  held,  and 
were  consequently  considered  unfit  for  further  employment.  Two  Generals  of 
divisions  wore  removed  from  their  commands,  seven  Brigadiers  were  found 
wanting  in  the  hour  of  need,  and  out  of  the  seventy-three  regiments  of  Regular 
Cavalry  and  Infantry  which  mutinied,  only  four  Commanding  officers  were 
given  other  commands,  younger  officers  being  selected  to  raise  and  command 
the  new  regiments. 


DISCONTENT  OF  THE  NATIVES 


245 


1858] 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

The  India  of  to-day  is  altogether  a different  country  from  the  India  of 
1857.  Much  has  been  done  since  then  to  improve  the  civil  administra- 
tion, and  to  meet  the  legitimate  demands  of  the  Native  races.  India  is 
more  tranquil,  more  prosperous,  and  more  civilized  than  it  was  bcforo 
the  Mutiny,  and  the  discipline,  efficiency,  and  mobility  of  the  Native 
army  have  been  greatly  unproved.  Much,  however,  still  remains  to  bo 
done,  and  a good  deal  might  with  advantage  be  undone,  to  secure  the 
contentment  of  the  Natives  with  our  rule. 

Our  position  has  been  materially  strengthened  by  the  provision  of 
main  and  subsidiary  lines  of  communication  by  road  and  railway  ; by 
the  great  network  of  telegraphs  which  now  intersects  the  country  ; and 
by  the  construction  of  canals.  These  great  public  works  have  largely 
increased  the  area  of  land  under  cultivation,  minimized  the  risk  of 
famine,  equalized  the  prices  of  agricultural  produce,  and  developed  a 
large  and  lucrative  export  trade.  Above  all,  while  our  troops  can  now 
be  assembled  easily  and  rapidly  at  any  centre  of  disturbance,  the 
number  of  British  soldiers  has  been  more  than  doubled  and  the  number 
of  Native  soldiers  has  been  materially  reduced.  Moreover,  as  regards 
the  Native  equally  with  the  British  army  of  India,  I believe  that  a 
better  feeling  never  existed  throughout  all  ranks  than  exists  at  present. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  signs  that  the  spirit  of  unrest  and  discontent 
which  sowed  the  seeds  of  the  Mutiny  is  being  rerived.  To  some  extent 
this  state  of  things  is  the  natural  result  of  our  position  in  India,  and  is 
so  far  unavoidable,  but  it  is  also  due  to  old  faults  reappearing — faults 
which  require  to  be  carefully  watched  and  guarded  against,  for  it  is 
certain  that,  however  well  disposed  as  soldiers  the  men  in  our  ranks 
may  be,  their  attitude  will  inevitably  be  influenced  by  the  feelings  of 
the  people  generally,  more  especially  should  their  hostility  be  aroused 
by  any  question  connected  with  religion. 

For  a considerable  time  after  the  Mutiny  we  became  more  cautious 
and  conciliatory  in  administrative  and  legislative  matters,  more  intent 
on  doing  what  would  keep  the  Chiefs  and  Rulers  satisfied,  the  masses 
contented,  and  the  country  quiet,  than  on  carrying  out  our  own  ideas. 
Gradually  this  wholesome  caution  is  being  disregarded.  The  Govern- 
ment has  become  more  and  more  centralized,  and  the  departmental 
spirit  very  strong.  Each  department,  in  its  laudable  wish  for  progress 
and  advancement,  is  apt  to  push  on  measures  which  are  obnoxious  to 
the  Natives,  either  from  their  not  being  properly  understood,  or  from 
their  being  opposed  to  their  traditions  and  habits  of  life,  thus  entailing 
the  sacrifice  of  many  cherished  customs  and  privileges.  Each  depart- 
ment admits  in  theory  the  necessity  for  caution,  but  in  practice  presses 
for  liberty  of  action  to  further  its  owrn  particular  schemes. 


246 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1858 


Of  late  years,  too,  the  tendency  has  been  to  increase  the  number  of 
departments  and  of  secretariat  offices  under  the  supreme  Government, 
and  this  tendency,  while  causing  more  work  to  devolve  on  the  supreme 
Government  than  it  can  efficiently  perform,  results  in  lessening  the 
responsibility  of  provincial  Governments  by  interference  in  the  manage- 
ment of  local  concerns.  It  is  obvious  that  in  a country  like  India,  com- 
posed as  it  is  of  great  provinces  and  various  races  differing  from  one 
another  in  interests,  customs,  and  religions,  each  with  its  own  peculiar 
and  distinct  necessities,  administrative  details  ought  to  be  left  to  the 
people  on  the  spot.  The  Government  of  India  would  then  be  free  to 
exercise  a firm  and  impartial  control  over  the  Empire  and  Imperial 
interests,  while  guiding  into  safe  channels,  without  unduly  restraining, 
intelligent  progress. 

In  tunes  of  peace  the  administration  is  apt  to  fall  too  exclusively  into 
the  hands  of  officials  whose  ability  is  of  the  doctrinaire  type  ; they  work 
hard,  and  can  give  logical  and  statistical  reasons  for  the  measures  they 
propose,  and  are  thus  able  to  make  them  attractive  to,  and  believed  in 
by,  the  authorities.  But  they  lack  the  more  perfect  knowledge  of 
human  nature,  and  the  deeper  insight  into,  and  greater  sympathy  with, 
the  feelings  and  prejudices  of  Asiatics,  which  those  possessed  in  a 
remarkable  degree  who  proved  by  their  success  that  they  had  mastered 
the  problem  of  the  best  form  of  government  for  India.  I allude  to  men 
like  Thomas  Munro,  Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  John  Malcolm,  Charles 
Metcalfe,  George  Clerk,  Henry  and  John  Lawrence,  William  Sleeman, 
James  Outram,  Herbert  Edwardes,  John  Nicholson,  and  many  others. 
These  administrators,  while  fully  recognizing  the  need  for  a gradual 
reform,  understood  the  peculiarities  of  our  position  in  the  east,  the 
necessity  for  extreme  caution  and  toleration,  and  a ‘ live  and  let  live  ’ 
policy  between  us  and  the  Natives.  The  sound  and  broad  views  of  this 
class  of  public  servant  are  not  always  appreciated  either  in  India  or 
England,  and  are  too  often  put  aside  as  unpractical,  obstructive,  and 
old-fashioned. 

Amongst  the  causes  which  have  produced  discontent  of  late  years, 
I would  mention  our  forest  laws  and  sanitary  regulations,  our  legisla- 
tive and  fiscal  systems  —measures  so  necessary  that  no  one  interested 
in  the  prosperity  of  India  could  cavil  at  their  introduction,  but  which 
are  so  absolutely  foreign  to  Native  ideas,  that  it  is  essential  they  should 
be  applied  with  the  utmost  gentleness  and  circumspection. 

I think,  also,  that  the  official  idea  of  converting  the  young  Princes 
and  Nobles  of  India  into  English  gentlemen  by  means  of  English 
tutors  and  English  studies  should  be  carried  out  with  great  care  and 
caution.  It  has  not  hitherto  invariably  succeeded,  and  the  feeling  in 
many  States  is  strongly  opposed  to  it.  The  danger  of  failure  lies  in 
the  wholesome  restraint  of  the  tutor  being  suddenly  removed,  and  in 
the  youug  Trince  being  left  at  too  early  an  age  to  select  his  advisers 


PATERNAL  DESPOTISM 


247 


1858] 

and  companions.  The  former,  perhaps  not  unnaturally,  arc  interested 
in  proving  that  the  training  of  their  young  Ruler  by  his  European 
governor  or  tutor  has  not  resulted  in  good  either  to  himself  or  his 
people,  while  the  latter  are  too  often  of  the  lowest  class  of  European 
adventurers. 

The  proceedings  and  regulations  of  the  Forest  Department,  desirable 
as  they  may  be  from  a financial  and  agricultural  point  of  view,  have 
provoked  very  great  irritation  in  many  parts  of  India.  People  who 
have  been  accustomed  from  time  immemorial  to  pick  up  sticks  and 
graze  their  cattle  on  forest  lands,  cannot  understand  why  they  should 
now  be  forbidden  to  do  so,  nor  can  they  realize  the  necessity  for  pre- 
serving the  trees  from  the  chance  of  being  destroyed  by  fire,  a risk  to 
which  they  were  frequently  exposed  from  the  Native  custom  of  making 
use  of  their  shelter  while  cooking,  and  of  burning  the  undergrowth  to 
enrich  the  grazing. 

The  action  taken  by  the  Government  in  sanitary  matters  nas  also 
aroused  much  ill-feeling  and  apprehension.  Sanitary  precautions  are 
entirely  ignored  in  eastern  countries.  The  great  majority  of  the  people 
can  see  no  good  in  them,  and  no  harm  in  using  the  same  tank  for 
drinking  purposes  and  for  bathing  and  washing  their  clothes.  The 
immediate  surroundings  of  their  towns  and  villages  are  most  offensive, 
being  used  as  the  general  receptacles  for  dead  animals  and  all  kinds  of 
filth.  Cholera,  fever,  and  other  diseases,  which  carry  off  hundreds  of 
thousands  every  year,  are  looked  upon  as  the  visitation  of  God,  from 
which  it  is  impossible,  even  were  it  not  impious  to  try,  to  escape  ; and 
the  precautionary  measures  insisted  upon  by  us  in  our  cantonments, 
and  at  the  fairs  and  places  of  pilgrimage,  are  viewed  with  aversion  and 
indignatibn.  Only  those  who  have  witnessed  the  personal  discomfort 
and  fatigue  to  which  Natives  of  all  age6  and  both  sexes  willingly 
submit  in  their  struggle  to  reach  some  holy  shrine  on  the  occasion  of  a 
religious  festival,  while  dragging  their  weary  limbs  for  many  hundreds 
of  miles  along  a hot,  dusty  road,  or  being  huddled  for  hours  together 
in  a crammed  and  stifling  railway  carriage,  can  have  any  idea  of  the 
bitter  disappointment  to  the  pilgrims  caused  by  their  being  ordered  to 
disperse  when  cholera  breaks  out  at  such  gatherings,  without  being 
given  the  opportunity  of  performing  their  vows  or  bathing  in  the 
sacred  waters.* 

* Few  acts  have  been  more  keenly  resented  than  the  closing  of  the  great 
Hurdwar  Fair  in  the  autumn  of  1892,  on  account  of  a serious  outbreak  of 
cholera.  It  was  looked  upon  by  the  Natives  as  a direct  blow  aimed  at  their 
religion,  and  as  a distinct  departure  from  the  religious  tolerance  promised  in 
Her  Majesty’s  proclamation  of  1858.  The  mysterious  mud  marks  on  mango- 
trees  in  Behar  have  been  attributed  by  some  to  a self-interested  motive  on  the 
part  of  certain  priests  to  draw  the  attention  of  Hindus  to  the  srnctity  of  some 
temple  outside  the  limits  of  British  jurisdiction,  where  the  devotees  would  be 


248 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[.858 

Further,  our  legislative  system  is  based  on  western  ideas,  its  object 
being  to  mete  out  equal  justice  to  the  rich  and  poor,  to  the  Prince  and 
peasant.  But  our  methods  of  procedure  do  not  commend  themselves 
to  the  Indian  peoples.  Eastern  races  are  accustomed  to  a paternal 
despotism,  and  they  conceive  it  to  be  the  proper  function  of  the  local 
representatives  of  the  supreme  Power  to  investigate  and  determine  on 
the  spot  the  various  criminal  and  civil  cases  which  come  under  the 
cognizance  of  the  district  officials.  Legal  technicalities  and  references 
to  distant  tribunals  confuse  and  harass  a population  which,  with  com- 
paratively few  exceptions,  is  illiterate,  credulous,  and  suspicious  of 
underhand  influence.  An  almost  unlimited  right  of  appeal  from  one 
court  to  another,  in  matters  of  even  the  most  trivial  importance,  not 
only  tends  to  impair  the  authority  of  the  local  magistrate,  but  gives  an 
unfair  advantage  to  the  wealthy  litigant  whose  means  enable  him  to 
secure  the  services  of  the  ablest  pleader,  and  to  purchase  the  most 
conclusive  evidence  in  support  of  his  claims.  For  it  must  be  remem- 
bered than  in  India  evidence  on  almost  any  subject  can  be  had  for  the 
buying,  and  the  difficulty,  in  the  administration  of  justice,  of  dis- 
criminating between  truth  and  falsehood  is  thereby  greatly  increased. 
Under  our  system  a horde  of  unscrupulous  pleaders  has  sprung  up, 
and  these  men  encourage  useless  litigation,  thereby  impoverishing 
their  clients,  and  creating  much  ill-feeling  against  our  laws  and 
administration. 

Another  point  worthy  of  consideration  is  the  extent  to  which,  under 
the  protection  of  our  legal  system,  the  peasant  proprietors  of  India  are 
being  oppressed  and  ruined  by  village  shop-keepers  and  money-lenders. 
These  men  advance  money  at  a most  exorbitant  rate  of  interest,  taking 
as  security  the  crops  and  occupancy  rights  of  the  cultivators  of  the  soil. 
The  latter  are  ignorant,  improvident,  and  in  some  matters,  such  as  the 
marriage  ceremonies  of  their  families,  inordinately  extravagant.  The 
result  is  that  a small  debt  soon  swells  into  a big  one,  and  eventually  the 
aid  of  the  law  courts  is  invoked  to  oust  the  cultivator  from  a holding 
which,  in  many  cases,  has  been  in  the  possession  of  his  ancestors  for 
hundreds  of  years.  The  money-lender  has  his  accounts  to  produce, 
and  these  can  hardly  be  disputed,  the  debtor  as  a rule  being  unable  to 
keep  accounts  of  his  own,  or,  indeed,  to  read  or  write.  Before  the 
British  dominion  was  established  in  India,  the  usurer  no  doubt  existed, 
but  his  opportunities  were  fewer,  his  position  more  precarious,  and  his 
operations  more  under  control  than  they  are  at  present.  The  money- 
lender then  knew  that  his  life  would  not  be  safe  if  he  exacted  too  high 


at  liberty  to  assemble  in  any  numbers  without  being  troubled  by  officious 
inspectors,  and  where  they  could  remain  as  long  as  they -pleased,  irrespective 
of  the  victims  daily  claimed  by  cholera,  that  unfailing  avenger  of  the  neglect 
o."  sanitary  laws  in  the  east. 


1858] 


MONEY  LENDERS  AND  THE  PRESS 


249 


interest  for  the  loans  with  which  he  accommodated  his  customers,  and 
that  if  he  became  too  rich,  some  charge  or  other  would  be  trumped  up 
against  him,  which  would  force  him  to  surrender  a large  share  of  his 
wealth  to  the  officials  of  the  State  in  which  he  was  living.  I do  not 
say  that  the  rough-and-ready  methods  of  Native  justice  in  dealing  with 
money-lenders  were  excusable  or  tolerable,  but  at  the  same  time  I am 
inclined  to  think  that,  in  granting  these  men  every  legal  facility  for 
enforcing  their  demands  and  carrying  on  their  traffic,  we  may  have 
neglected  the  interests  of  the  agriculturists,  and  that  it  might  be 
desirable  to  establish  some  agency  under  the  control  of  Government, 
which  would  enable  the  poorer  landholders  to  obtain,  at  a moderate 
rate  of  interest,  advances  proportionate  to  the  security  they  had  to 
offer.* 

Another  danger  to  our  supremacy  in  India  is  the  license  allowed  to 
the  Native  press  in  vilifying  the  Government  and  its  officials,  and  per- 
sistently misrepresenting  the  motives  and  policy  of  the  ruling  Power. 
In  a free  country,  where  the  mass  of  the  population  is  well  educated, 
independent,  and  self-reliant,  a free  press  is  a most  valuable  institution, 
representing  as  it  does  the  requirements  and  aspirations  of  important 
sections  of  the  community,  and  bringing  to  light  defects  and  abuses  in 
the  social  and  political  system.  In  a country  such  as  Great  Britain, 
which  is  well  advanced  in  the  art  of  self-government,  intolerant  and 
indiscriminate  abuse  of  public  men  defeats  its  own  object,  and  mis- 
statements of  matters  of  fact  can  be  at  once  exposed  and  refuted. 
Like  most  of  the  developments  of  civilization  which  are  worth  any- 
thing, the  English  press  is  a plant  of  indigenous  growth,  whereas  in 
India  the  Native  press  is  an  exotic  which,  under  existing  conditions, 
supplies  no  general  want,  does  nothing  to  refine,  elevate,  or  instruct  the 
people,  and  is  used  by  its  supporters  and  promoters  —an  infinitesimal 
part  of  the  population— as  a means  of  gaining  its  selfish  ends,  and  of 
fostering  sedition,  and  racial  and  religious  animosities.  There  are, 
I am  afraid,  very  few  Native  newspapers  actuated  by  a friendly  or 
impartial  spirit  towards  the  Government  of  India,  and  to  Asiatics  it 
seems  incredible  that  we  should  permit  such  hostile  publications  to  be 
scattered  broadcast  over  the  country,  unless  the  assertions  were  too 
true  to  be  disputed,  or  unless  we  were  too  weak  to  suppress  them. 
We  gain  neither  credit  nor  gratitude  for  our  tolerant  attitude  towards 
the  Native  press — our  forbearance  is  misunderstood ; and  while  the 
well-disposed  are  amazed  at  our  inaction,  the  disaffected  rejoice  at 
being  allowed  to  promulgate  baseless  insinuations  and  misstatements 

* The  proposal  would  seem  to  be  quite  a practical  one,  for  I read  in  the 
Times  of  the  28th  November,  1894,  that  the  Government  of  New  Zealand 
invited  applications  for  Consols  in  connexion  with  the  scheme  for  granting 
loans  at  a reasonable  rate  of  interest  to  farmers  on  the  security  of  their 
holdings. 


250  FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1858 

which  undermine  our  authority,  and  thwart  our  efforts  to  gain  the 
goodwill  and  confidence  of  the  Native  population. 

Yet  another  danger  to  the  permanence  of  our  rule  in  India  lies  in 
the  endeavours  of  well-intentioned  faddists  to  regulate  the  customs  and 
institutions  of  eastern  races  in  accordance  with  their  own  ideas.  The 
United  Kingdom  is  a highly  civilized  country,  and  our  habits  and  con- 
victions have  been  gradually  developed  under  the  influences  of  our 
religion  and  our  national  surroundings.  Fortunately  for  themselves, 
the  people  of  Great  Britain  possess  qualities  which  have  made  them 
masters  of  a vast  and  still  expanding  Empire.  But  these  qualities 
have  their  defects  as  well  as  their  merits,  and  one  of  the  defects  is  a 
certain  insularity  of  thought,  or  narrow-mindedness — a slowness  to 
recognize  that  institutions  which  are  perfectly  suitable  and  right  for  us 
may  be  quite  unsuited,  if  not  injurious,  to  other  races,  and  that  what 
may  not  be  right  for  us  to  do  is  not  necessarily  wrong  for  people  of  a 
different  belief,  and  with  absolutely  different  traditions  and  customs. 

Gradually  the  form  of  Government  in  the  United  Kingdom  has 
become  representative  and  democratic,  and  it  is  therefore  assumed  by 
some  people,  who  have  little,  if  any,  experience  of  the  east,  that  the 
Government  of  India  should  be  guided  by  the  utterances  of  self- 
appointed  agitators  who  pose  as  the  mouth -pieces  of  an  oppressed 
population.  Some  of  these  men  are  almost  as  much  aliens*  as  our- 
selves, while  others  are  representatives  of  a class  which,  though 
intellectually  advanced,  has  no  influence  amongst  the  races  in  whom 
lies  the  real  strength  of  India.  Municipal  self-government  has  been 
found  to  answer  well  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  it  is  held,  therefore, 
that  a similar  system  must  be  equally  successful  in  India.  We  in 
England  consume  animal  food  and  alcoholic  liquors,  but  have  no  liking 
for  opium  ; an  effort  has  accordingly  been  made  to  deprive  our  Asiatic 
fellow-subjects,  who,  as  a rule,  are  vegetarians,  and  either  total 
abstainers  or  singularly  abstemious  in  the  matter  of  drink,  of  a small 
and  inexpensive  stimulant,  which  they  find  necessary  to  their  health 
and  comfort.  British  institutions  and  ideas  are  the  embodiment  of 
what  long  experience  has  proved  to  us  to  be  best  for  ourselves ; but 
suddenly  to  establish  these  institutions  and  enforce  these  ideas  on  a 
community  which  is  not  prepared  for  them,  does  not  want  them,  and 
cannot  understand  them,  must  only  lead  to  suspicion  and  discontent. 
The  Government  of  India  should,  no  doubt,  be  progressive  in  its  policy, 
and  in  all  things  be  guided  by  the  immutable  principles  of  right,  truth, 
and  justice ; but  these  principles  ought  to  be  applied,  not  necessarily  as 
we  should  apply  them  in  England,  but  with  due  regard  to  the  social 
peculiarities  and  religious  prejudices  of  the  people  whom  it  ought  to  be 
our  aim  to  make  better  and  happier. 

* I allude  to  the  Parsis,  who  came  from  Persia,  and  whose  religion  and 
customs  are  as  distinct  from  those  of  the  Natives  of  India  as  are  our  own. 


CARDINAL  POINTS 


25' 


1858] 

It  will  be  gathered  from  what  I have  written  that  our  administra- 
tion, in  my  opinion,  suffers  from  two  main  defects.  First,  it  is 
internally  too  bureaucratic  and  centralizing  in  its  tendencies ; and, 
secondly,  it  is  liable  to  be  forced  by  the  external  pressure  of  well- 
meaning  but  irresponsible  politicians  and  philanthropists  to  adopt 
measures  which  may  be  disapproved  of  by  the  authorities  on  the  spot, 
and  opposed  to  the  wishes,  requirements,  and  interests  of  the  people. 
It  seems  to  me  that  for  many  years  to  come  the  best  form  of  govern- 
ment for  India  will  be  the  intelligent  and  benevolent  despotism  which 
at  present  rules  the  country.  On  a small  scale,  and  in  matters  of 
secondary  importance,  representative  institutions  cannot  perhaps  do 
much  harm,  though  I am  afraid  they  will  effect  but  little  good.  On  a 
large  scale,  however,  such  a system  of  government  would  be  quite  out 
of  place  in  view  of  the  fact  that  ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  of 
the  population  are  absolutely  devoid  of  any  idea  of  civil  responsibility, 
and  that  the  various  races  and  religious  sects  possess  no  bond  of 
national  union. 

In  reply,  then,  to  the  question,  ‘ Is  there  any  chance  of  a Mutiny 
occurring  again  ?’  I would  say  that  the  best  way  of  guarding  against 
such  a calamity  is — 

By  never  allowing  the  present  proportion  of  British  to  Native 
soldiers-  to  be  diminished  or  the  discipline  and  efficienc}'  of  the  Native 
army  to  become  slack. 

By  taking  care  that  men  are  selected  for  the  higher  civil  and 
military  posts  whose  self  reliance,  activity,  and  resolution  are  not 
impaired  by  age,  and  who  possess  a knowledge  of  the  country  and  the 
habits  of  the  peoples. 

By  recognizing  and  guarding  against  the  dogmatism  of  theorists  and 
the  dangers  of  centralization. 

By  rendering  our  administration  on  the  one  hand  firm  and  strong, 
on  the  other  hand  tolerant  and  sympathetic ; and  last,  but  not  least, 
by  doing  all  in  our  power  to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  various  races, 
and  by  convincing  them  that  we  have  not  only  the  determination,  but 
the  ability  to  maintain  our  supremacy  in  India  against  all  assailants. 

If  these  cardinal  points  are  never  lost  sight  of,  there  is,  I believe, 
little  chance  of  any  fresh  outbreak  disturbing  the  stability  of  our  rule 
in  India,  or  neutralizing  our  efforts  to  render  that  country  prosperous, 
contented,  and  thoroughly  loyal  to  the  British  Crown. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

I travelled  home  via  Corfu,  Trieste,  Venice,  and  Switzerland,  arriving 
in  England  towards  the  end  of  June.  The  intense  delight  of  getting 
‘ home  ’ after  one’s  first  term  of  exile  can  hardly  be  exaggerated,  and 


252 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1S59 


certainly  cannot  be  realized,  save  by  those  who  have  gone  through  the 
exile,  and  been  separated,  as  I had  been  for  years,  from  all  that  made 
the  happiness  of  my  early  life.  Every  English  tree  and  flower  one 
comes  across  on  first  landing  is  a distinct  and  lively  pleasure,  while 
the  greenness  and  freshness  are  a delicious  rest  to  the  eye,  wearied 
with  the  deadly  whitey-brown  sameness  of  dried-up  sandy  plains,  or 
the  all-too  gorgeous  colouring  of  eastern  cities  and  pageants. 

My  people  were  living  in  Ireland,  in  the  county  of  Waterford,  so 
after  only  a short  sojourn  in  London,  for  the  very  necessary  re-equip- 
ment of  the  outer  man,  I hastened  over  there.  I found  my  father  well 
and  strong  for  a man  of  seventy-four,  and  to  all  appearance  quite 
recovered  from  the  effects  of  his  fifty  years  of  Indian  service,  and,  to 
my  great  joy,  my  mother  was  looking  almost  as  young,  and  quite  as 
beautiful,  as  I had  left  her  six  years  before.  My  little  sister,  too, 
always  an  invalid,  was  very  much  as  when  I had  parted  from  her — 
full  of  loving-kindness  for  everyone,  ana,  though  unable  to  move  with- 
out help,  perfectly  happy  in  the  many  resources  she  had  within  herself, 
and  the  good  she  was  able  to  do  in  devoting  those  resources  to  the 
benefit  of  others. 

There,  too,  I found  my  fate,  in  the  shape  of  Nora  Bews,  a young 
lady  living  with  a married  sister  not  far  from  my  father’s  place,  who 
a few  months  later  consented  to  accompany  me  on  my  return  to  India. 
The  greater  part  of  my  leave  was,  therefore,  spent  in  Ireland. 

During  the  winter  months  I hunted  with  the  Curraghmore  hounds, 
and  was  out  with  them  the  day  before  Lord  Waterford  was  killed. 
We  had  no  run,  and  at  the  end  of  the  day,  when  wishing  us  good-bye, 
he  said : ‘ I hope,  gentlemen,  we  shall  have  better  luck  next  time.’ 
‘ Next  time  ’ there  was  ‘ better  luck  ’ as  regarded  the  hunting,  but  the 
worst  of  all  possible  luck  for  Lord  Waterford’s  numerous  friends ; in 
returning  home  after  a good  run,  and  having  killed  two  foxes,  his  horse 
stumbled  over  quite  a small  ditch,  throwing  his  rider  on  his  head  ; the 
spinal  cord  was  snapped  and  the  fine  sportsman  breathed  his  last  in  a 
few  moments. 

I was  married  on  the  17th  May,  1859,  in  the  parish  church  of 
Waterford.  While  on  our  wedding  tour  in  Scotland,  I received  a 
command  to  be  present  on  the  8th  June  at  Buckingham  Palace,  when 
the  Queen  proposed  to  honour  the  recipients  of  the  Victoria  Cross  by 
presenting  the  decoration  with  Her  Majesty’s  own  hands. 

Being  anxious  that  my  wife  should  be  spared  the  great  heat  of  a 
journey  to  India  in  July,  the  hottest  month  of  the  year  in  the  Red  Sea, 
and  the  doctors  being  very  decided  in  their  opinion  that  I should  not 
return  so  soon,  I had  applied  for  a three  months’  extension  of  leave, 
and  quite  calculated  on  getting  it,  so  our  disappointment  was  great 
when  the  answer  arrived  and  I found  that,  if  I took  the  extension,  I 
should  lose  my  appointment  in  the  Quartermaster-General’s  Depart- 


LADY  ROBERTS 

(WIFE  OF  SIR  ABRAHAM  ROBERTS). 


From 

a sketch  by  Carpenter. 


BACK  IN  INDIA 


253 


1859] 

ment.  This,  we  agreed,  was  not  to  be  thought  of,  so  there  was  nothing 
for  it  but  to  face  the  disagreeable  necessity  as  cheerfully  as  we  could. 
We  made  a dash  over  to  Ireland,  said  good-bye  to  our  relations,  and 
started  for  India  on  the  27th  June. 

The  heat  in  the  Red  Sea  proved  even  worse  than  I had  anticipated. 
Our  captain  pronounced  it  '.he  hottest  trip  he  had  ever  made.  Twice 
was  the  ship  turned  round  to  steam  against  the  wind  for  a short  time 
in  order  to  revive  some  of  the  passengers,  who  were  almost  suffocated. 

We  passed  the  wreck  of  the  Alma , a P.  and  O.  vessel  which  had 
struck  on  a coral  reef  not  far  from  Mocha.  The  wreck  had  happened 
in  the  dead  of  night,  and  there  had  been  only  time  to  get  the  passengers 
into  the  boats,  in  which  they  were  rowed  to  another  reef  near  at  hand ; 
there  they  had  remained  for  eighty  hours  in  their  scanty  night  garments, 
and  without  the  smallest  shelter,  until  rescued  by  a friendly  steamer. 
The  officers  and  crew  were  still  on  the  rock  when  we  passed,  endeavour- 
ing to  get  up  the  mails  and  the  passengers’  property.  We  supplied 
them  with  provisions  and  water,  of  which  they  were  badly  in  need, 
and  then  had  to  leave  them  in  their  extremely  uncomfortable  position. 

We  could  not  complain  of  lack  of  air  after  we  passed  Aden,  for  we 
forthwith  encountered  the  south-west  monsoon,  then  at  its  height,  and 
on  entering  the  Bay  of  Bengal  we  experienced  something  very  nearly 
akin  to  a cyclone.  We  broke  our  rudder;  the  lightships,  on  which  a 
certain  number  of  pilots  were  always  to  be  found,  had  all  been  blown 
out  to  sea;  and  as  we  had  only  just  sufficient  coal  to  take  us  up  the 
Hugh  when  the  pilot  should  appear,  we  did  not  dare  to  keep  up  steam. 
Thus  we  had  to  remain  at  the  mercy  of  the  winds  and  waves  for  some 
days,  until  at  length  a brig  with  a pilot  on  board  was  sent  to  look  for 
us,  and  eventually  we  arrived  in  Calcutta,  in  rather  a dilapidated 
condition,  on  the  30th  July. 

We  were  not  cheered  by  the  orders  I found  awaiting  me,  which  were 
to  proceed  to  Morar  and  join  Brigadier- General  Sir  Robert  Napier, 
then  in  command  of  the  Gwalior  district.  Morar  in  the  month  of 
August  is  one  of  the  hottest  places  in  India,  and  my  wife  was  consider- 
ably the  worse  for  our  experiences  at  sea.  However,  a Calcutta  hotel 
never  has  many  attractions,  and  at  that  time  of  year  was  depressing 
and  uncomfortable  to  the  last  degree  ; in  addition,  I had  rather  a 
severe  attack  of  my  old  enemy,  Peshawar  fever,  so  we  started  on  our 
journey  ‘ up  country  ’ with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

The  railway  at  that  time  was  not  open  further  than  Raniganj ; thence 
we  proceeded  for  a hundred  miles  in  a ‘ dak  - ghari,’  when,  changing 
into  doolies,  we  continued  our  journey  to  Hazaribagh,  a little  canton- 
ment about  twenty  miles  off  the  main  road,  where  some  relations  of 
mine  were  living  ; but  a day  or  two  after  our  arrival  at  their  hospitable 
house,  I was  ordered  back  to  Calcutta. 

I left  my  wife  with  our  kind  friends,  and  retraced  my  steps  in  con- 


254 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[•859 

siderable  elation  of  spirits,  for  the  China  expedition  was  even  then 
being  talked  about,  and  I hoped  this  sudden  summons  might  possibly 
mean  that  I was  to  be  sent  with  it  imsome  capacity.  On  reaching  Cal- 
cutta, however,  I was  told  that  I had  been  appointed  to  organize  and 
take  charge  of  the  large  camp  to  be  formed  for  the  triumphal  progress 
which  Lord  Canning  proposed  to  make  through  Oudh,  the  North-West 
Provinces,  and  the  Punjab,  with  the  view  of  meeting  the  principal 
feudatory  Chiefs,  and  rewarding  those  who  had  been  especially  loyal 
during  the  rebellion.  I was  informed  that  the  tents  were  in  store  in  the 
arsenal  at  Allahabad,  and  that  the  camp  must  be  ready  at  Cawnpore 
on  the  15th  October,  on  which  date  the  Viceroy  would  arrive,  and  a day 
or  two  later  commence  his  stately  procession  towards  Lucknow. 

While  I was  in  England  a Royal  Proclamation  had  announced  to  the 
people  of  India  that  the  Queen  had  taken  over  the  government  of  their 
country,  which  had  hitherto  been  held  in  trust  for  Her  Majesty  by  the 
Honourable  East  India  Company.  This  fact  had  been  publicly  pro- 
claimed, with  befitting  ceremony,  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  land,  on  the  1st  November,  1858.  At  the  same  time  it  was 
announced  that  Her  Majesty’s  representative  in  India  was  henceforth 
to  be  styled  Viceroy  and  Governor-General  of  India,  and  it  was  with  the 
object  of  emphasizing  this  Proclamation,  and  impressing  the  Native 
mind  with  the  reality  of  Queen  Victoria’s  power  and  authority,  that 
Lord  Canning  decided  on  undertaking  this  grand  tour. 

While  in  Calcutta  on  this  occasion,  I was  offered  a post  in  the  Revenue 
Survey  Department.  I refused  it,  for,  although  as  a married  man  the 
higher  pay  was  a tempting  bait,  the  recollection  of  the  excitement  and 
variety  of  the  year  of  the  Mutiny  was  still  fresh  upon  me,  and  I had  no 
wish  to  leave  the  Quartermaster-General’s  Department.  I therefore 
started  for  Allahabad,  picking  up  my  wife  cn  route. 

It  was  then  the  middle  of  the  rains,  and  the  bridge  of  boats  over  the 
Jumna  had  been  taken  down,  so  we  had  to  cross  in  feny- boats— dak  - 
gharis,  horses,  and  all— rather  a perilous-looking  proceeding,  for  the 
river  was  running  at  a tremendous  pace,  and  there  was  some  difficulty 
in  keeping  the  boat’s  head  straight.  At  Allahabad  we  stayed  with  a 
brother  officer  of  mine  in  the  fort,  while  I was  getting  the  camp  equip- 
age out  of  store,  and  the  tents  pitched  for  inspection.  There  had  not 
been  a large  camp  for  many  years,  and  everything  in  India  deteriorates 
so  rapidly,  that  I found  most  of  the  tents  in  such  a state  of  mildew  and 
decay  as  to  render  it  necessary  to  renew  them  almost  entirely  before 
they  could  be  used  for  such  a splendid  occasion  as  that  of  the  first 
Viceroy’s  first  march  through  the  re- conquered  country. 

From  Allahabad  we  proceeded  to  Cawnpore,  where  I had  a busy  time 
arranging  for  the  multifarious  requirements  of  such  an  enormous  camp; 
and  sometimes  I despaired  of  its  being  completed  by  the  appointtd 
date.  However,  completed  it  was  ; and  on  the  15th  October  Lord  and 


7 HE  VICEROY'S  CAMP 


255 


185^ 

Lady  Canning  arrived,  and  expressed  themselves  so  pleased  with  all  the 
arrangements,  and  were  so  kindly  appreciative  of  the  exertions  I had 
made  to  be  ready  for  them  by  the  appointed  time,  that  1 felt  myself 
fully  rewarded  for  all  my  trouble. 

The  next  day  I took  my  wife  to  call  upon  Lady  Canning,  whose 
unaffected  and  simple,  yet  perfectly  dignified  manner  completely 
charmed  her,  and  from  that  day  she  was  devoted,  in  common  with 
everyone  who  was  at  all  intimately  associated  with  Lady  Canning,  to 
the  gentle,  gracious  lady,  who  was  always  kindness  itself  to  her. 

On  the  18th  the  Viceroy  made  his  first  march  towards  Lucknow.  The 
camp  equipage  was  in  duplicate,  so  that  everyone  on  arriving  at  the 
new  halting-place  found  things  exactly  the  same  as  in  the  tents  they 
had  left. 

The  camp  occupied  a considerable  space,  for,  in  addition  to  the 
Viceroy’s  large  entourage,  ground  had  to  be  provided  for  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  and  the  officers  of  Army  Head-Quarters,  who  were 
marching  with  us ; then  there  were  the  post-office,  telegraph,  work- 
shops, toskikhana*  commissariat,  and  a host  of  other  offices  to  be 
accommodated,  beside  the  escort,  which  consisted  of  a battery  of  Horse 
Artillery,  a squadron  of  British  Cavalry,  a regiment  of  British  Infantry, 
a regiment  of  Native  Cavalry,  a regiment  of  Native  Infantry,  and  the 
Viceroy’s  Bodyguard.  For  the  Viceroy,  his  staff,  guests,  and  secre- 
taries alone,  150  large  tents  were  pitched  in  the  main  street,  and  when 
we  came  to  a station  the  duplicate  tents  were  also  pitched.  For  the 
transport  of  this  portion  of  the  camp  equipage  80  elephants  and  500 
camels  were  required,  f 

It  is  very  difficult  to  give  any  idea  of  the  extraordinary  spectacle  a 
big  camp  like  this  presents  on  the  line  of  march.  The  followers,  as  a 
rule,  are  accompanied  by  their  wives  and  families,  who  are  piled  upon 
the  summits  of  laden  carts,  or  perched  on  the  loads  borne  by  the  bag- 
gage animals.  In  the  two  camps  marching  together  (Lord  Canning’s 
and  Lord  Clyde’s)  there  could  not  have  been  less  than  20,000  men, 
women,  and  children — a motley  crowd  streaming  along  about  four-and- 
twenty  miles  of  road,  for  the  day’s  march  was  usually  about  twelve 
miles,  and  before  every  one  had  cleared  out  of  the  camp  occupied  the 
night  before,  the  advance  guard  had  begun  to  arrive  on  the  ground  to 

* The  depository  for  jewels  aud  other  valuables  kept  for  presentation  to 
Native  Chiefs  at  durbars. 

t The  following  details  wifi  give  some  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  the  arrange- 
ments required  for  the  Viceroy's  camp  alone.  Besides  those  above  mentioned 
there  were  500  camels,  500  bullocks  and  100  bullock  carts  for  transport  of 
camp  equipage,  40  sowari  (riding)  elephants,  527  coolies  to  carry  the  glass 
windows  belonging  to  the  larger  tents,  100  bhisties,  and  40  sweepers  for 
watering  and  keeping  the  centre  street  clean.  These  were  in  addition  to  the 
private  baggage  animals,  servants,  and  numberless  riding  and  driving  horses, 
for  all  of  which  space  and  shelter  had  to  be  provided. 


17 


256 


FORTY. ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1859 

be  occupied  the  next  day.  The  strictest  discipline  had  to  be  maintained, 
or  this  moving  colony  would  have  been  a serious  calamity  to  the 
peasantry,  for  the  followers  would  have  spread  themselves  over  the 
country  like  a flight  of  locusts',  and  taken  anything  they  could  lay  their 
hands  on,  representing  themselves  as  Mulk-i-Lord-Sahib-Ke-Naukar,* 
whom  according  to  immemorial  tradition  it  was  death  to  resist.  The 
poor,  frightened  country-people,  therefore,  hardly  ventured  to  remon- 
strate at  the  mahouts  walking  off  with  great  loads  of  their  sugar-cane, 
or  to  object  to  the  compulsory  purchase  of  their  farm  produce  for  half 
its  value.  There  was  a great  deal  of  this  kind  of  raiding  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  march,  and  I was  constantly  having  complaints 
made  to  me  by  the  villagers ; but  after  I had  inflicted  on  the  offenders 
a few  summary  and  tolerably  severe  punishments,  and  made  the 
peasants  to  understand  it  was  not  the  Mulk  i- Lord- Sahib’s  wish  that 
they  should  submit  to  such  treatment  from  his  servants,  order  was 
established,  and  I had  very  rarely  any  trouble. 

Our  first  halt  was  at  Lucknow.  Sir  Hope  Grant  was  commanding 
the  division,  and  had  established  himself  very  comfortably  in  the  Dil- 
kusha.  He  had  written  asking  me  to  bring  my  wife  straight  there  and 
stay  with  him  during  the  Viceroy’s  visit,  as  it  was  still  very  hot  in  tents 
during  the  day.  An  invitation  which  I gladly  accepted,  for  it  was 
pleasant  to  think  of  being  with  my  old  General  again,  and  I wanted  to 
introduce  him  to  my  wife. 

The  next  day,  the  22nd  October,  the  state  entry  was  made  into 
Lucknow.  It  must  have  been  an  imposing  sight,  that  long  array  of 
troops  and  guns,  with  Lord  Canning  in  the  centre,  accompanied  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  and  surrounded  by  their  respective  staffs  in  full 
uniform.  Lord  Canning,  though  at  that  time  not  given  to  riding, 
looked  remarkably  well  on  horseback  ; for  he  had  a fine  head  and 
shoulders,  and  sat  his  horse  well ; on  foot,  his  height,  not  being  quite 
in  proportion,  rather  detracted  from  the  dignity  of  his  presence. 

I headed  the  procession,  leading  it  across  the  Charbagh  bridge,  the 
scene  of  Havelock’s  fiercest  encounter,  past  the  Machi  Bhawan,  and 
the  Residency,  to  the  Kaisarbagh,  in  front  of  which  were  drawn  up  in 
a body  the  Talukdars  of  Oudh,  who  had  with  difficulty  been  persuaded 
to  come  and  make  their  obeisance,  for,  guiltily  conscious  of  their  dis- 
loyalty during  the  rebellion,  they  did  not  feel  at  all  sure  that  the 
rumours  that  it  was  intended  to  blow  them  all  away  from  guns,  or  to 
otherwise  summarily  dispose  of  them,  were  not  true.  They  salaamed 
respectfully  as  the  Viceroy  passed,  and  the  cavalcade  proceeded  to  the 
Martiniere  park,  where  the  camp,  which  I had  pitched  the  previous 
day,  lay  spread  before  us,  in  all  the  spotless  purity  of  new  white  tents 
glistening  in  a flood  of  brilliant  sunshine.  The  streets  through  which 

* Servants  of  the  Lord  of  the  Country,  or  Goveraor-Gener  il. 


1859] 


STATE  ENTRY  INTO  LUCKNOW 


257 


we  passed  were  crowded  with  Natives,  who — cowed,  but  not  tamed — 
looked  on  in  sullen  defiance,  very  few  showing  any  sign  of  respect  for 
the  Viceroy. 

Sir  William  and  Lady  Mansfield,  and  several  other  people  from  our 
camp  were  also  staying  with  Sir  Hope  Grant,  and  that  evening  the 
whole  Dilkusha  party  went  to  a state  dinner  given  by  Lord  and  Lady 
Canning.  The  latter  was  a delightful  hostess ; the  shyest  person  was 
set  at  ease  by  her  kindly,  sympathetic  manner,  and  she  had  the  happy 
knack  of  making  her  guests  feel  that  her  entertainments  were  a 
pleasure  to  herself — the  surest  way  of  rendering  them  enjoyable  to 
those  she  entertained. 

I made  use  of  the  next  week,  which  was  for  me  a comparatively  idle 
time,  to  take  my  wife  over  the  ground  by  which  we  had  advanced  two 
years  before,  and  explain  to  her  the  different  positions  held  by  the 
enemy.  She  was  intensely  interested  in  visiting  the  Sikandarbagh,  the 
Shah  Najaf,  the  mess-house,  and,  above  all,  that  glorious  memorial  of 
almost  superhuman  courage  and  endurance,  the  Residency,  ruined, 
roofless,  and  riddled  by  round  shot  and  bullets.  Very  little  had  then 
been  done  towards  opening  out  the  city,  and  the  surroundings  of  the 
Residency  were  much  as  they  had  been  dining  the  defence — a labyrinth 
of  streets  and  lanes ; it  was  therefore  easier  for  the  stranger  to  realize 
exactly  what  had  taken  place  than  it  is  now  that  the  landmarks  have 
been  cleared  away,  and  well-laid-out  gardens  and  broad  roads  have 
taken  the  place  of  jungle  and  narrow  alleys. 

On  the  26th  the  Viceroy  held  a grand  durbar  for  the  reception  of  the 
Talukdars.  It  was  the  first  function  of  the  sort  I had  witnessed,  and 
was  an  amusing  novelty  to  my  wife,  who,  with  Lady  Canning  and  some 
of  the  other  ladies  in  camp,  viewed  the  proceedings  from  behind  a semi- 
transparent screen,  it  not  being  considered  at  that  time  the  thing  for 
ladies  to  appear  at  ceremonials  when  Natives  were  present.  The 
whole  scene  was  very  impressive,  though  not  as  brilliant  in  colour- 
ing as  it  would  have  been  in  any  other  part  of  India,  owing  to  the 
Chiefs  of  Oudh  being  clad  in  simple  white,  as  is  the  custom  amongst 
Rajputs. 

The  Talukdars,  to  the  number  of  one  hundred  and  sixty,  were 
ushered  to  their  places  in  strict  order  of  seniority,  the  highest  in  rank 
being  the  last  to  arrive.  They  were  arranged  in  a half  semicircle  on 
the  right  of  the  Viceroy’s  chair  of  state,  while  on  the  left  the  Europeans 
were  seated  according  to  their  official  rank.  When  all  was  ready,  the 
words  ‘ Attention ! Royal  salute  ! Present  arms !’  were  heard  without, 
warning  those  within  of  the  Viceroy’s  approach,  and,  as  the  bugles 
sounded  and  the  guns  thundered  forth  their  welcome,  Lord  Canning, 
accompanied  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  preceded  by  their  staffs, 
entered  the  tent. 

Everyone  rose,  and  remained  standing  until  the  great  man  took  his 

17—2 


258 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1859 

seat,  when  the  Foreign  Secretary  came  forward,  and,  making  a low 
bow,  informed  His  Excellency  that  all  who  had  been  summoned  to 
attend  the  durbar  were  present.  The  Chiefs  were  then  brought  up  and 
introduced  to  the  Viceroy  one  by  one ; each  made  a profound  obeisance, 
and,  as  a token  of  allegiance,  presented  an  offering  of  gold  rnohurs, 
which,  according  to  etiquette,  the  Viceroy  just  touched  by  way  of 
acknowledgment.  The  presents  from  the  Government  to  the  Chiefs 
were  then  handed  in  on  trays,  and  placed  on  the  ground  in  front  of 
each,  the  value  of  the  present  being  regulated  according  to  the  rank 
and  position  of  the  recipient.  This  part  of  the  ceremony  being  over, 
the  Viceroy  rose  and  addressed  the  Talukdars. 

After  expressing  his  pleasure  at  meeting  them  in  their  own  country, 
he  gave  them  an  assurance  that,  so  long  as  they  remained  faithful  to 
the  Government,  they  should  receive  every  consideration ; he  told 
them  that  a new  era  had  commenced  in  Oudh,  and  that  henceforth 
they  would  be  allowed  to  revert  to  the  conditions  under  which  they 
had  held  their  estates  prior  to  the  annexation  of  the  province.  When 
Lord  Canning  had  finished  speaking,  a translation  of  his  address  in 
Urdu  was  read  to  the  Talukdars  by  Mr.  Beadon,  the  Foreign  Secretary; 
atar  and  pan*  were  then  handed  round,  and  the  Viceroy  took  his 
departure  with  the  same  formalities  as  those  with  which  the  durbar 
had  been  opened. 

There  is  some  excuse  to  be  made  for  the  attitude  of  the  Talukdars, 
who,  from  their  point  of  view,  had  little  reason  to  be  grateful  to  the 
British  Government.  These  powerful  Chiefs,  whose  individual  revenues 
varied  from  £10,000  to  £15,000  a year,  and  who,  in  their  jungle  fast- 
nesses, often  defied  their  sovereign’s  troops,  had  suddenly  been  deprived 
of  all  the  authority  which  in  the  confusion  attending  a long  period  of 
misgovernment  they  had  gradually  usurped,  as  well  as  of  a consider- 
able proportion  of  the  landed  property  which,  from  time  to  time,  they 
had  forcibly  appropriated.  The  conversion  of  feudal  Chiefs  into 
ordinary  law-abiding  subjects  is  a process  which,  however  beneficial  to 
the  many,  is  certain  to  be  strenuously  resisted  by  the  few. 

In  March,  1858,  when  Lucknow  was  captured,  a Proclamation  was 
issued  by  the  Government  of  India  confiscating  the  proprietary  rights 
in  the  soil.  The  object  in  view  was  not  merely  to  punish  contumacious 
Chiefs,  but  also  to  enable  the  Government  to  establish  the  revenue 
system  on  a sounder  and  firmer  footing.  Talukdars  who  submitted 
were  to  receive  their  possessions  as  a free  gift  direct  from  the  Govern- 
ment ; while  those  who  had  done  good  service,  whether  men  of  Oudh 
or  strangers,  might  be  rewarded  by  grants  of  confiscated  property. 

The  Proclamation  was  considered  in  many  influential  quarters  too 

* A few  drops  of  attar  of  roses  are  given  to  each  person,  and  a small  packet 
of  pan,  which  is  composed  of  slices  of  betel-nut  smeared  with  lime  and 
wrapped  in  a leaf  of  the  betel-tree. 


LOYALTY  OF  THE  TALUKDARS 


259 


1859] 

arbitrary  and  sweeping  a measure  ; Outram  protested  against  it,  and 
Lord  Ellenborough  (the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control)  condemned 
it ; but  Lord  Canning  was  backed  up  by  the  British  public,  and  Lord 
Ellenborough  resigned  to  save  his  Cabinet  from  being  wrecked.  That 
Outram  and  Ellenborough  took  the  right  view  of  the  case  is,  I think, 
shown  by  the  fact  that  Lord  Canning  cancelled  the  Proclamation  on 
his  first  visit  to  Lucknow.  By  that  tune  he  had  come  to  recognize 
that  the  Talukdars  had  reasonable  grounds  for  their  discontent,  and  he 
wisely  determined  to  take  a step  which  not  only  afforded  them  the 
greatest  relief  and  satisfaction,  but  enlisted  their  interest  on  the  side  of 
Government.  From  that  day  to  this,  although,  from  time  to  time, 
subsequent  legislation  has  been  found  necessary  to  save  the  peasantry 
from  oppression,  the  Chiefs  of  Oudh  have  been  amongst  the  most 
loyal  of  Her  Majesty’s  Indian  subjects. 

We  remained  a few  days  longer  at  Lucknow.  Lord  and  Lady 
Caiming  entertained  all  the  residents,  while  a ball  was  given  by  the 
latter  in  the  Chatta  Manzil  to  the  strangers  in  camp,  and  the  city  and 
principal  buildings  were  illuminated  in  the  Viceroy’s  honour  with  those 
curious  little  oil-lamps  which  are  the  most  beautiful  form  of  illumina- 
tion, the  delineation  of  every  line,  point,  and  pinnacle  with  myriads  of 
minute  fights  producing  a wonderfully  pretty  effect. 

On  the  29th  the  first  march  was  made  on  the  return  journey  to 
Cawnpore.  My  duty  was  to  go  on  ahead,  select  the  best  site  for  the 
next  day’s  camping- ground,  and  make  all  necessary  arrangements  for 
supplies,  etc.  I waited  till  the  Viceroy  had  given  his  orders,  and  then 
my  wife  and  I started  off,  usually  in  the  forenoon ; sometimes  we 
remained  till  later  in  the  day,  lunching  with  one  or  other  of  our  friends 
in  camp,  and  on  very  rare  occasions,  such  as  a dinner-party  at  the 
Viceroy’s  or  the  Commander-in-Chief's,  we  drove  on  after  dinner  by 
moonlight.  But  that  was  not  until  we  had  been  on  the  march  for 
some  time  and  I felt  that  the  head  Native  in  charge  of  the  camp  was 
to  be  trusted  to  make  no  mistake.  It  was  a fife  of  much  interest  and 
variety,  and  my  wife  enjoyed  the  novelty  of  it  all  greatly. 

Lord  Canning  held  his  second  durbar  at  Cawnpore  on  the  3rd  Novem- 
ber, when  he  received  the  principal  Chiefs  of  Bundelkand,  the  Maharaja 
of  Rewa,  the  Maharaja  of  Benares,  and  a host  of  lesser  dignitaries. 

It  was  on  this  occasion  that,  in  accordance  with  the  Proclamation 
which  had  already  announced  that  the  Queen  had  no  desire  to  extend 
her  territorial  possessions,  and  that  the  estates  of  Native  Princes  were 
to  be  scrupulously  respected,  the  Chiefs  were  informed  that  the  right 
of  adoption  was  conceded  to  them.  This  meant  that,  in  default  of 
male  issue,  they  were  to  be  allowed  to  adopt  sons  according  to  the 
Indian  custom  of  adoption,  and  that  the  British  Government  would 
recognize  the  right  of  the  chosen  heir  to  succeed  as  Ruler  of  the  State 
as  well  as  to  inherit  the  personal  property  of  the  Chief  by  whom  he 


260 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1859 

had  been  adopted.  There  had  been  no  clear  rule  on  this  point  pre- 
viously, each  case  having  been  considered  on  its  own  merits,  but  the 
doctrine  that  adoption  should  not  be  recognized,  and  that,  in  de- 
fault of  natural  heirs,  the  State  should  lapse  and  be  annexed  by  the 
supreme  Government,  had  been  enforced  in  a good  many  instances. 
Lord  Canning’s  announcement  therefore  caused  the  liveliest  satisfaction 
to  certain  classes  throughout  India,  and  did  more  than  any  other 
measure  to  make  the  feudatory  Princes  believe  in  the  sincerity  of  the 
amnesty  Proclamation.* 

Our  next  move  was  to  Fatehgarh,  eight  marches  from  Cawnpore, 
where,  on  the  15th  November,  a third  durbar  was  held,  at  which  was 
received,  amongst  other  leading  men  of  Rohilkand  whose  services 
were  considered  worthy  of  acknowledgment,  the  Nawab  of  Rampur, 
who  had  behaved  with  distinguished  loyalty  in  our  time  of  trouble. 
This  Mahomedan  Nobleman’s  conduct  was  the  more  meritorious  in  that 
the  surrounding  country  swarmed  with  rebels,  and  was  the  home  of 
numbers  of  the  mutinous  Irregular  Cavalry,  while  the  close  proximity 
of  Rampur  to  Delhi,  whence  threats  of  vengeance  were  hurled  at  the 
Nawab  unless  he  espoused  the  King’s  cause,  rendered  his  position 
extremely  precarious. 

From  Fatehgarh  we  proceeded  to  Agra,  nine  marches,  only  halting 
on  Sundays,  and  consequently  everyone  appreciated  being  stationary 
there  for  a few  days.  The  camp  was  pitched  on  the  parade-ground, 
the  scene  of  the  fight  of  the  10th  October,  1857.  Here  the  Viceroy 

* The  question  of  Native  Rulers  having  the  right  to  adopt  heirs  was  first 
brought  to  Lord  Canning’s  notice  by  the  three  Phulkian  chiefs — Patiala, 
Jhind  and  Nabha — who  jointly  requested  in  1858  that  the  right  of  adoption 
might  be  accorded  to  them  as  a reward  for  the  services  they  had  rendered 
during  the  Mutiny.  The  request  was  refused  at  the  time  on  the  ground  that 
it  had  never  been  the  custom  of  the  country,  though  it  had  occasionally  been 
done.  Since  then,  however,  Lord  Canning  had  come  to  see  that  the  un- 
certainty which  prevailed  as  to  the  rights  of  succession  was  harassing  to  the 
owners  of  land,  and  undesirable  in  many  ways,  and  he  urged  upon  the 
Secretary  of  State  that  some  distinct  rule  on  the  subject  might  with  advantage 
be  laid  down.  He  wrote  as  follows  : ‘ The  crown  of  England  stands  forth  the 
unquestioned  Ruler  and  paramount  Power  in  all  India,  and  is  now  for  the  first 
time  brought  face  to  face  with  its  feudatories.  There  is  a reality  in  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Sovereign  of  England  which  has  never  existed  before,  which 
is  not  only  felt,  but  eagerly  acknowledged  by  the  Chiefs.  A great  convulsion 
has  been  followed  by  such  a manifestation  of  our  strength  as  India  has  never 
seen  ; and  if  this  in  its  turn  be  followed  by  an  act  of  general  and  substantial 
grace,  over  and  above  the  special  rewards  which  have  already  been  given  to 
those  whose  services  deserve  them,  the  measure  will  be  seasonable  and 
appreciated.’  Lord  Canning’s  proposals  met  with  the  cordial  approval  of  Her 
Majesty’s  Government,  and  liis  announcement  at  Cawnpore  rejoiced  the  hearts 
of  the  Chiefs,  one  of  whom,  the  Maharaja  of  Rewa,  was  a leper  and  had  no 
son.  He  said,  on  hearing  the  Viceroy’s  words,  ‘ They  dispel  au  evil  wind 
which  has  long  been  blowing  upon  me.  ’ 


1859] 


THE  AGRA  DURBAR 


261 

received  some  of  the  bigger  potentates, "who  were  accompanied  by  large 
retinues,  and,  as  far  as  the  spectacle  went,  it  was  one  of  the  grandest 
and  most  curious  gatherings  we  had  yet  witnessed. 

The  occasions  are  rare  on  which  a Viceroy  has  the  opportunity  of 
receiving  in  durbar  the  great  vassals  of  our  Indian  Empire,  but  when 
these  assemblies  can  be  arranged  they  have  a very  useful  effect,  and 
should  not  be  looked  upon  as  mere  empty  ceremonials.  This  was 
especially  the  case  at  a time  when  the  country  had  so  recently  been 
convulsed  by  intestine  war,  and  when  the  Native  Princes  were  anxiously 
considering  how  their  prospects  would  be  affected  bv  Her  Majesty’s 
assumption  of  the  administration  of  India. 

The  Chief  of  highest  rank  on  this  occasion  was  the  Maharaja  of 
Gwalior,  who,  as  I have  already  stated,  influenced  by  his  courageous 
Minister,  Dinkar  Eao,  had  remained  faithful  to  us.  Like  most  Mahratta 
Princes  of  that  time,  he  was  very  imperfectly  educated.  Moreover,  he 
was  possessed  of  a most  wayward  disposition,  frequently  threatening, 
when  thwarted  in  any  way,  to  throw  up  the  reins  of  government,  and 
take  refuge  in  the  jungle ; manners  he  had  none. 

Next  came  the  enlightened  head  of  the  Princely  house  of  Jaipur,  the 
second  in  importance  of  the  great  Chiefs  of  Eajputana. 

He  was  succeeded  by  the  Karaoli  Eaja,  whose  following  was  the 
most  quaint  of  all.  Amongst  the  curious  signs  of  his  dignity  he  had 
on  his  escort  four  tigers,  each  chained  on  a separate  car,  and  guarded 
by  strange-looking  men  in  brass  helmets. 

The  Maharao  Eaja  of  Ulwar  was  the  next  to  arrive,  seated  on  a superb 
elephant,  eleven  feet  high,  magnificently  caparisoned  with  cloth-of-gold 
coverings,  and  chains  and  breastplates  of  gold.  He  was  a promising 
looking  lad  who  had  succeeded  to  his  estate  only  two  years  before ; but 
he  soon  fell  into  the  hands  of  low  intriguers,  who  plundered  his 
pominions  and  so  oppressed  his  people  that  the  British  Government 
had  to  take  over  the  management  of  his  State. 

After  Ulwar  came  the  Nawab  of  Tonk,  the  descendant  of  an 
adventurer  from  Swat,  on  the  Peshawar  border,  who  had  become 
possessed  of  considerable  territory  in  Eajputana.  The  Nawab  stood  by 
us  in  the  Mutiny,  when  his  capital  was  plundered  by  Tantia  Topi. 

The  sixth  in  rank  was  the  Jat  Euler  of  Dholpur,  a bluff,  coarse - 
looking  man,  and  a very  rude  specimen  of  his  race. 

Last  of  all  arrived  the  Nawab  of  Jaora,  a handsome,  perfectly- 
dressed  man  of  considerable  refinement  of  manner,  and  with  all  the 
courtesy  of  a well-bred  Mahomedan.  Though  a feudatory  of  the 
rebellious  Holkar  of  Indore,  he  kept  aloof  from  all  Mahratta  intrigues, 
and  behaved  well  to  us. 

Some  of  the  highest  of  the  Eajput  Chiefs  declined  to  attend, 
alleging  as  an  excuse  the  distance  of  their  capitals  from  Agra ; but  the 
truth  is  that  these  Eulers,  the  best  blood  of  India,  had  never  bowed 


26  2 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1859 

their  heads  to  any  Power,  not  even  that  of  the  Moghul,  and  they  con- 
sidered it  would  be  derogatory  to  their  dignity  to  obey  the  summons  of 
the  representative  of  a sovereign,  of  whom  they  considered  themselves 
the  allies  and  not  the  mere  feudatories  * 

Those  of  the  Chieftains  attending  this  durbar  who  had  shown  con- 
spicuous loyalty  during  the  rebellion  were  not  allowed  to  leave  without 
receiving  substantial  rewards.  Sindhia  had  territory  bestowed  on  him 
to  the  value  of  ±'30,000  a year.  Jaipur  was  given  the  confiscated 
property  of  Kot  Kasim,  yielding  ±5,000  a year,  while  others  were 
recompensed  according  to  the  importance  of  the  services  rendered. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

We  remained  at  Agra  until  the  9th  December.  There  was  so  much  of 
beauty  and  interest  in  and  around  the  place,  that  Lady  Canning  found 
a wealth  of  subjects  for  her  facile  pencil,  and  was  well  content  to 
remain  there.  There  were  the  usual  banquets  to  the  residents,  and 
entertainments  given  by  the  Agra  people  to  those  in  camp,  one  of  them 
being  a party  in  the  Taj  gardens,  to  give  us  an  opportunity  of  seeing 
the  tomb  by  moonlight,  when  it  certainly  looks  its  loveliest.  My  wife 
was  more  delighted  even  than  I had  anticipated  with  the  perfect  beauty 
of  the  Taj  and  the  exquisite  little  mosque  in  the  fort,  the  Moti-Masjid. 
I greatly  enjoyed  showing  her  all  that  was  worth  seeing,  and  witnessing 
her  pleasure  on  first  viewing  these  wonderful  works  of  art. 

There  was  no  halt  again,  except  the  usual  one  on  Sunday,  until  we 
reached  Meerut  on  the  21st  December. 

Three  marches  from  Agra  a fire  broke  out  in  Lady  Canning’s  tent 
soon  after  she  had  retired  for  the  night,  caused  by  the  iron  pipe  of  the 
stove,  which  passed  through  the  side  of  the  tent,  becoming  over-heated. 
Lady  Canning’s  tents  were  on  one  side  of  the  big  dining-tent,  and  the 
Viceroy’s  on  the  other.  Immediately  on  perceiving  the  fire,  Lady 
Canning  ran  across  to  awaken  her  husband,  but  the  Native  sentry,  who 
did  not  know  her  or  understand  a word  of  what  she  was  saying,  would 
not  let  her  in,  and,  in  despair  of  being  able  to  make  anyone  hear,  she 
rushed  off  to  the  tent  of  Sir  Edward  Campbell,  the  Military  Secretary, 
which  was  nearest  her  own.  She  succeeded  in  awaking  him,  and  then 
flew  back  to  trjT  and  save  some  of  her  own  treasures.  The  first  thing 
she  thought  of  was  her  portfolio  of  drawings,  which  she  dragged  out- 

* These  Rajput  Chiefs,  however,  accepted  Lord  Lytton’s  invitation  to 
attend  tho  Imperial  Assemblage  at  Delhi  on  the  1st  January,  1877,  and  having 
once  given  their  allegiance  to  the  ‘ Empress  of  India,’  they  have  since  been  the 
most  devotedly  loyal  of  Her  Majesty’s  feudatory  Princes. 


18593  DELHI  UNDER  A DIFFERENT  ASPECT  263 

side ; but  it  had  already  been  partially  burned,  and  most  of  the  valuable 
and  characteristic  sketches  she  had  made  at  the  different  durbars  were 
destroyed.  She  next  tried  to  rescue  her  jewels,  many  of  which  she 
had  worn  the  night  before ; her  pearls  were  lying  on  the  dressing-table, 
and  she  was  only  just  in  time  to  save  them ; one  of  the  strings  had 
caught  fire,  and  several  of  the  pearls  were  blackened.  She  swept  them 
off  the  table  into  a towel,  and  threw  them  into  a tub  of  water  standing 
outside.  Her  wardrobe  was  completely  destroyed.  More  damage 
would  have  been  done  had  not  the  Private  Secretary,  Mr.  Lewin 
Bowring,  on  the  alarm  being  given,  hurried  to  the  dining-tent,  and, 
with  great  presence  of  mind,  ordered  the  Native  Cavalry  sentry  to  cut 
the  ropes,  causing  it  to  fall  at  once,  and  preventing  the  fire  from 
spreading.  Some  office  boxes  and  records  were  destroyed,  but  nothing 
more.  We  were  as  usual  in  the  advance  camp,  and  did  not  hear  what 
had  happened  until  next  morning,  when  Lady  Canning  arrived  dressed 
in  Lady  Campbell’s  clothes ; and  as  Lady  Canning  was  tall,  and  Lady 
Campbell  was  short,  the  effect  was  rather  funny. 

Christmas  was  spent  at  Meerut,  where  I met  several  of  my  brother 
officers,  amongst  others  my  particular  friend  Edwin  Johnson,  whom  I 
had  the  great  pleasure  of  introducing  to  my  wife.  With  scarcely  an 
exception,  my  friends  became  hers,  and  this  added  much  to  the 
happiness  of  our  Indian  life. 

Delhi,  our  next  halting-place,  was  certainly  not  the  least  interesting 
in  our  tour.  Lord  Canning  was  anxious  to  understand  all  about  the 
siege,  and  visited  the  different  positions ; the  Ridge  and  its  surround- 
ings, the  breaches,  and  the  palace,  were  the  chief  points  of  interest. 
There  were  two  ‘ Delhi  men  ’ besides  myself  to  explain  everything  to 
him,  Sir  Edward  Campbell,  who  was  with  the  60th  Rifles  throughout, 
and  one  of  the  best  officers  in  the  regiment,  and  Jemmy  Hills,  who  had 
now  become  the  Viceroy’s  Aide-de-camp  ; while  in  Lord  Clyde’s  camp 
there  were  Norman,  Stewart,  and  Becher. 

I had,  of  course,  taken  my  wife  to  the  scenes  of  the  fights  at  Agra, 
Aligarh,  and  Bulandshalir.  but  Delhi  had  the  greatest  fascination  for 
her.  It  is  certainly  an  extraordinarily  attractive  place,  setting  aside 
the  peculiar  interest  of  the  siege.  For  hundreds  of  years  it  had  been 
the  seat  of  Government  under  Rulers  of  various  nationalities  and 
religions ; few  cities  have  the  remains  of  so  much  pomp  and  glory,  and 
very  few  bear  the  traces  of  having  been  besieged  so  often,  or  could  tell 
of  so  much  blood  spilt  in  then-  defence,  or  of  such  quantities  of  treasure 
looted  from  them.  When  Tamerlane  captured  Delhi  in  1398  the  city 
was  given  over  to  massacre  for  five  days,  ‘ some  streets  being  rendered 
impassable  by  heaps  of  dead  ’;  and  in  1739  the  Persian  conqueror, 
Nadir  Shah,  after  sacking  the  place  for  fifty-eight  days  and  massacring 
thousands  of  its  inhabitants,  carried  off  thirty-two  millions  sterling  of 
booty. 


264 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[i860 


Although  the  fierce  nature  of  the  struggle  that  Delhi  had  gone 
through  in  1857  was  apparent  everywhere,  the  inhabitants  seemed 
now  to  have  forgotten  all  about  it.  The  city  was  as  densely  populated 
as  it  had  ever  been ; the  Chandni  Chauk  was  gay  as  formerly  with 
draperies  of  bright- coloured  stuffs ; jewellers  and  shawl-merchants 
carried  on  their  trades  as  briskly  as  ever,  and  were  just  as  eager  in 
their  endeavours  to  tempt  the  Sahib  log  to  spend  their  money  as  if 
trade  had  never  been  interrupted ; so  quickly  do  Orientals  recover 
from  the  effects  of  a devastating  war. 

We  left  Delhi  on  the  3rd  January,  1860,  maiching  via  Ivarnal. 
When  at  this  place  my  wife  went  to  see  Lady  Canning,  as  she  often 
did  if  we  remained  at  all  late  in  camp.  On  this  particular  occasion 
she  found  her  busy  with  the  English  mail,  which  had  just  arrived,  so 
she  said  she  would  not  stay  then,  but  would  come  next  day  instead. 
Lady  Canning,  however,  would  not  let  my  wife  go  until  she  had  read 
her  part  of  a letter  from  Lady  Waterford,  which  she  thought  would 
amuse  her.  It  was  in  answer  to  one  from  Lady  Canning,  in  which 
she  had  described  the  camp,  and  given  her  sister  a fist  of  all  the  people 
in  it.  Lady  Waterford  wrote  : ‘ Your  Quartermaster- General  must  be 
the  son  of  General  Boberts,  who  lives  near  Waterford ; he  came  home 
on  leave  last  year.  I must  tell  you  an  amusing  little  anecdote  about 
his  father.  One  night,  when  the  General  was  dining  at  Curraghmore, 
he  found  himself  sitting  next  the  Primate  of  Ireland,  with  whom  he 
entered  into  conversation.  After  some  time  they  discovered  they  had 
known  each  other  in  the  days  of  their  youth,  but  had  never  met  since 
a certain  morning  on  which  they  went  out  to  fight  a duel  on  account 
of  some  squabble  at  a mess ; happily  the  quarrel  was  stopped  without 
any  harm  being  done,  each  feeling  equally  relieved  at  being  prevented 
from  trying  to  murder  the  other,  as  they  had  been  persuaded  they 
were  in  honour  bound  to  do.  The  two  old  gentlemen  made  very 
merry  over  their  reminiscences.’ 

For  some  time  I had  been  indulging  a hope  that  I might  be  sent 
to  China  with  my  old  General,  Hope  Grant,  who  had  been  nominated 
to  the  command  of  the  expedition  which,  in  co-operation  with  the 
French,  was  being  prepared  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace  of  the  repulse 
experienced  early  in  the  year,  by  the  combined  French  and  English 
naval  squadrons  in  their  attack  on  the  Taku  forts.  My  hope,  however, 
was  doomed  to  disappointment.  Lord  Clyde  decided  to  send  Lumsden 
and  Allgood  as  A.Q.M.G.’s  with  the  force,  and  I was  feeling  very  low 
in  consequence.  A day  or  two  afterwards  we  dined  with  the  Cannings, 
and  Lord  Clyde  took  my  wife  in  to  dinner.  His  first  remark  to  her 
was : ‘ I think  I have  earned  your  gratitude,  if  I have  not  managed  to 
satisfy  everyone  by  these  China  appointments.’  On  my  wife  asking 
for  what  she  was  expected  to  be  grateful,  he  said : ‘ Why,  for  not 
sending  your  husband  with  the  expedition,  of  course.  I suppose  you 


i86o] 


LORD  CLYDE 


265 


would  rather  not  be  left  in  a foreign  country  alone  a few  months  after 
your  marriage  ? If  Roberts  had  not  been  a newly-married  man,  I 
would  have  sent  him.'  This  was  too  much  for  my  wife,  who  sympa- 
thized greatly  with  my  disappointment,  and  she  could  not  help 
retorting : ‘ I am  afraid  I cannot  be  very  grateful  to  you  for  making 
my  husband  feel  I am  ruining  his  career  by  standing  in  the  way  of  his 
being  sent  on  service.  You  have  done  your  best  to  make  him  regret 
his  marriage.'  The  poor  old  Chief  was  greatly  astonished,  and  burst 
out  in  his  not  too  refined  way  : ‘ Well,  I’ll  be  hanged  if  I can  under- 
stand you  women  1 I have  done  the  very  thing  I thought  you  would 
like,  and  have  only  succeeded  in  making  you  angry.  I will  never  try 
to  help  a woman  again.’  My  wife  saw  that  he  had  meant  to  be  kind, 
and  that  it  was,  as  he  said,  only  because  he  did  not  ‘ understand 
women  ’ that  he  had  made  the  mistake.  She  was  soon  appeased,  and 
in  the  end  she  and  Lord  Clyde  became  great  friends. 

The  middle  of  January  found  us  at  Umballa,  where  Lord  Canning 
met  in  state  all  the  Cis-Sutlej  Sikh  Chiefs.  Fine,  handsome  men 
they  most  of  them  were,  and  magnificently  attired.  The  beautifully 
delicate  tints  which  the  Sikhs  are  so  fond  of,  the  warlike  costumes  of 
some  of  the  Sirdars,  the  quiet  dignity  of  these  high-born  men  who 
had  rendered  us  such  signal  service  in  our  hour  of  need,  made  the 
scene  most  picturesque  and  impressive.  The  place  of  honour  was 
given  to  the  Maharaja  of  Patiala  (the  grandfather  of  the  present 
Maharaja),  as  the  most  powerful  of  the  Phulkian  Princes ; and  he  was 
followed  by  his  neighbours  of  Nabha  and  Jhind,  all  three  splendid 
specimens  of  well-bred  Sikhs,  of  stately  presence  and  courtly  manners. 
They  were  much  gratified  at  having  the  right  of  adoption  granted  to 
their  families,  and  at  being  given  substantial  rewards  in  the  shape  of 
extension  of  territory. 

The  Sikh  Chiefs  were  followed  by  Rajas  of  minor  importance,  chiefly 
from  the  neighbouring  hills,  whom  the  Viceroy  had  summoned  in  order 
to  thank  them  for  assistance  rendered  during  the  Mutiny.  Many  of 
them  had  grievances  to  be  redressed ; others  had  favours  to  ask ; and 
the  Viceroy  was  able  to  more  or  less  satisfy  them  by  judiciously  yield- 
ing to  reasonable  demands,  and  by  bestowing  minor  powers  on  those 
who  were  likely  to  use  them  well.  The  wisdom  of  this  policy  of 
concession  on  Lord  Canning’s  part  was  proved  in  after  years  by  its 
successful  results. 

On  the  29th  January  the  Raja  of  Kapurthala  came  out  to  meet 
the  Viceroy  one  march  from  Jullundur.  He  had  supplemented  the 
valuable  assistance  rendered  to  Colonel  Lake  in  the  early  days  of  the 
Mutiny  by  equipping  and  taking  into  Oudh  a force  of  2,000  men, 
which  he  personally  commanded  in  six  different  actions.  The  Viceroy 
cordially  thanked  him  for  this  timely  service,  and  in  recognition  of  it, 
and  his  continued  and  conspicuous  loyalty,  bestowed  upon  him  large 


266 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[i860 


estates  in  Oudh,  where  he  eventually  became  one  of  the  chief  Talukdars. 
This  Raja  was  the  grandfather  of  the  enlightened  nobleman  who  came 
to  England  three  years  ago. 

After  visiting  Umritsar,  gay  with  brilliant  illuminations  in  honour 
of  the  Viceroy,  and  crowded  with  Sikhs  come  to  welcome  the  Queen’s 
representative  to  their  sacred  city,  we  arrived  at  Lahore  on  the 
10th  February. 

Early  the  following  morning  Lord  Canning  made  his  state  entry. 
As  we  approached  the  citadel  the  long  line  of  mounted  Chiefs  drawn 
up  to  receive  the  Viceroy  came  into  view.  A brilliant  assemblage  they 
formed,  Sikh  Sirdars,  stately  Hill  Rajputs,  wildly  picturesque  Multanis 
and  Baluchis  with  their  flowing  locks  floating  behind  them,  sturdy 
Tawanas  from  the  Salt  range,  all  gorgeously  arrayed  in  every  colour 
of  the  rainbow,  their  jewels  glittering  in  the  morning  sun,  while  their 
horses,  magnificently  caparisoned  in  cloth-of-gold  saddle  cloths,  and 
gold  and  silver  trappings,  pranced  and  curvetted  under  pressure  of 
their  severe  bits.  As  the  procession  appeared  in  sight  they  moved 
forward  in  one  long  dazzling  cavalcade,  each  party  of  Chiefs  being 
headed  by  the  Commissioner  of  the  district  from  which  they  came  ; 
they  saluted  as  they  approached  the  Viceroy,  and  then  passing  him  fell 
in  behind,  between  the  Body  Guard  and  the  Artillery  of  the  escort. 
A royal  salute  was  fired  from  the  fort  as  we  passed  under  the  city 
walls  ; we  then  wound  through  the  civil  station  of  Anarkali,  and  on 
to  camp  where  the  garrison  of  Mian  Mir,  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  Sir  Charles  Windham,  was  drawn  up  to  receive  the 
Viceroy. 

At  nightfall  there  were  illuminations  and  a procession  of  elephants ; 
the  Viceroy,  seated  in  a superb  howdah,  led  the  way  through  the 
brilliantly  lighted  city.  Suddenly  a shower  of  rockets  was  discharged 
which  resulted  in  a stampede  of  the  elephants,  who  rushed  through 
the  narrow  streets,  and  fled  in  every  direction,  to  the  imminent  peril 
and  great  discomfort  of  the  riders.  In  time  they  were  quieted  and 
brought  back,  only  to  become  again  unmanageable  at  a fresh  volley 
of  fireworks ; a second  time  they  were  pacified,  and  as  they  seemed 
to  be  getting  accustomed  to  the  noise  and  lights,  the  procession  pro- 
ceeded to  the  garden  of  the  old  palace.  Here  the  elephants  were 
drawn  up,  when  all  at  once  a fresh  discharge  of  rockets  from  every 
side  drove  them  mad  with  fright,  and  off  they  bolted  under  the  trees, 
through  gates,  and  some  of  them  could  not  be  pulled  up  until  they  had 
gone  far  into  the  country.  Howdahs  were  cnished,  hats  torn  off,  but, 
strange  to  say,  there  was  only  one  serious  casualty ; an  officer  was 
swept  out  of  his  howdah  by  the  branch  of  a tree,  and  falling  to  the 
ground,  had  his  thigh  broken.  Lord  Clyde  declared  that  a general 
action  was  not  half  so  dangerous,  and  he  would  much  sooner  have 
been  in  one  I 


86o] 


THE  LAHORE  DURBAR 


267 


The  Lahore  durbar,  at  which  the  Punjab  Chiefs  were  received,  sur- 
passed any  former  ceremonials  in  point  of  numbers  and  splendour  of 
effect.  Many  of  Runjit  Singh’s  Sirdars  were  present,  and  many  who 
had  fought  against  us  in  the  Sutlej  and  Punjab  campaigns,  but  had  now 
become  our  fast  friends.  The  Chiefs  quite  spontaneously  prepared  and 
presented  Lord  Canning  with  an  address,  and,  in  reply,  his  Excellency 
made  an  eloquent  and  telling  speech,  commenting  in  terms  of  the 
highest  appreciation  on  the  courage  and  loyalty  displayed  by  the  Nobles 
and  people  of  the  Punjab  during  the  Mutiny. 

While  the  camp  was  marching  to  Sialkot,  where  the  Maharaja  of 
Kashmir  and  some  of  the  leading  men  of  the  Punjab  were  to  be 
received,  the  Viceroy,  accompanied  by  Lady  Canning,  Lord  Clyde,  and 
a small  staff,  went  on  a Hying  visit  to  Peshawar,  with  the  object  of 
satisfying  himself,  by  personal  examination  of  our  position  there,  as  to 
the  advisability  or  otherwise  of  a retirement  cis-Indus — a retrograde 
movement  which  John  Lawrence  was  still  in  favour  of.  The  visit,  how- 
ever, only  served  to  strengthen  Lord  Canning  in  his  preconceived 
opinion  that  Peshawar  must  be  held  on  to  as  our  frontier  station. 

My  wife  remained  at  Mian  Mir  with  our  good  friends  Doctor  and 
Mrs.  Tyrrell  Ross  until  it  was  time  for  her  to  go  to  Simla,  and  the  kind 
thoughtfulness  of  Lord  Canning,  who  told  me  the  camp  now  worked  so 
well  that  my  presence  was  not  always  necessary,  enabled  me  to  be  with 
her  from  time  to  time. 

Lord  Canning’s  tour  was  now  nearly  over,  and  we  marched  without 
any  halt  of  importance  from  Sialkot  to  Kalka  at  the  foot  of  the  hills, 
where,  on  the  9th  April,  the  camp  was  broken  up.  It  was  high  time  to 
get  into  cooler  regions,  for  the  heat  of  the  tents  in  the  day  had  become 
very  oppressive. 

Thus  ended  a six  months’  march  of  over  a thousand  miles — a march 
never  likely  to  be  undertaken  again  by  any  other  Viceroy  of  India,  now 
that  railway  trains  run  from  Calcutta  to  Peshawar,  and  saloon  carriages 
have  taken  the  place  of  big  tents. 

This  progress  through  India  had  excellent  results.  The  advantages 
of  the  representative  of  the  Sovereign  meeting  face  to  face  the  principal 
feudatories  and  Chiefs  of  our  great  dependency  were  very  considerable, 
and  the  opportunity  afforded  to  the  Viceroy  of  personally  acknowledg- 
ing and  rewarding  the  services  of  those  who  had  helped  us,  and  of 
showing  that  he  was  not  afraid  to  be  lenient  to  those  who  had  failed  to 
do  so,  provided  they  should  remain  loyal  in  the  future,  had  a very  good 
effect  over  the  whole  of  India.  The  wise  concessions  also  announced 
at  the  different  durbars  as  regards  the  adoption  by  Native  Rulers  of 
successors  to  their  estates,  and  the  grant  to  Native  gentlemen  of  such  a 
share  as  they  were  fitted  for  in  the  government  of  the  country,  were 
undoubtedly  more  appreciated  than  any  other  description  of  reward 
given  for  assistance  in  the  Mutiny. 


268 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[i860 


My  duty  with  the  Viceroy  being  ended,  I returned  to  Mian  Mir  to 
fetch  my  wife  and  the  little  daughter,  who  had  made  her  appearance  on 
the  10th  March,  and  escort  them  both  to  Simla.  The  journey  up  the 
hill  was  a tedious  one.  Carriages  were  not  then  used  as  they  are  now, 
and  my  wife  travelled  in  a jampan,  a kind  of  open,  half-reclining  sedan 
chair,  carried  by  relays  of  four  men,  while  I rode  or  walked  by  her  side. 
She  had  been  greatly  exhausted  by  the  heat  of  the  journey  from  Mian 
Mir,  but  as  we  ascended  higher  and  higher  up  the  mountain  side,  and 
the  atmosphere  became  clearer  and  fresher,  she  began  to  revive.  Four 
hours,  however,  of  this  unaccustomed  mode  of  travelling  in  her  weak 
state  had  completely  tired  her  out,  so  on  finding  a fairly  comfortable 
bungalow  at  the  end  of  the  first  stage,  I decided  to  remain  there  the 
next  day.  After  that  we  went  on,  stage  by  stage,  until  we  reached 
Simla.  Our  house,  ‘ Mount  Pleasant,’  was  on  the  very  top  of  a hill ; 
up  and  up  we  climbed  through  the  rhododendron  forest,  along  a path 
crimson  with  the  fallen  blossom,  till  we  got  to  the  top,  when  a glorious 
view  opened  out  before  our  delighted  eyes.  The  wooded  hills  of  Jakho 
and  Elysium  in  the  foreground,  Mahasu  and  the  beautiful  Shalli  peaks 
in  the  middle  distance,  and  beyond,  towering  above  all,  the  everlasting 
snows  glistening  in  the  morning  sun,  formed  a picture  the  beauty  of 
which  quite  entranced  us  both.  I could  hardly  persuade  my  wife  to 
leave  it  and  come  into  the  house.  Hunger  and  fatigue,  however,  at 
length  triumphed.  Our  servants  had  arranged  everything  in  our  little 
abode  most  comfortably  ; bright  fires  were  burning  in  the  grates,  a cosy 
breakfast  was  awaiting  us,  and  the  feeling  that  at  last  we  had  a home 
of  our  own  was  very  pleasant. 

Lord  Canning  did  not  remain  long  at  Simla.  His  Council  in  Calcutta 
was  about  to  lose  its  President,  Sir  James  Outram,  who  was  leaving 
India  on  account  of  failing  health  ; and  as  the  suggestion  to  impose  an 
income-tax  was  creating  a good  deal  of  agitation,  the  Viceroy  hurried 
back  to  Calcutta,  deeming  it  expedient  to  be  on  the  spot. 

The  measures  necessary  for  the  suppression  of  the  Mutiny  had 
emptied  the  Government  coffers ; and  although  a large  loan  had  been 
raised,  the  local  authorities  found  it  impossible  to  cope  with  the  in- 
creased expenditure.  Lord  Canning  had,  therefore,  applied  to  the 
Government  in  England  for  the  services  of  a trained  financier ; and 
Mr.  Wilson,  who  had  a great  reputation  in  this  respect,  was  sent  out. 
He  declared  the  only  remedy  to  be  an  income-tax,  and  he  was  supported 
in  this  view  by  the  merchants  of  Calcutta.  Other  Europeans,  however, 
who  were  intimately  acquainted  with  India,  pointed  out  that  it  was  not 
advisable  to  ignore  the  dislike  of  Natives  to  such  direct  taxation  ; and 
Sir  Charles  Trevelyan,  Governor  of  Madras,  argued  well  and  wisely 
against  the  scheme.  Instead,  however,  of  confining  his  action  in  the 
matter  to  warning  and  advising  the  supreme  Government,  he  publicly 
proclaimed  his  opposition,  thus  giving  the  signal  for  agitation  to  all  the 


i860] 


LIFE  AT  SIMLA 


269 


malcontents  in  India.  Lord  Elphinstone,  the  Governor  of  Bombay, 
followed  Trevelyan’s  example,  but  in  a less  pronounced  manner,  and 
these  attacks  from  the  minor  Presidencies  proved  a serious  embarrass- 
ment to  the  action  of  the  Government.  In  spite  of  all  this  antagonism, 
the  income-tax  was  passed,  and  Sir  Charles  Trevelyan’s  unusual  pro- 
cedure led  to  his  recall. 

Lord  Canning  left  Simla  for  his  long  and  trying  journey  in  May, 
about  the  hottest  time  of  the  year.  On  my  taking  leave  of  him,  he  told 
me  that  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  then  commanding  the  Bombay  army,  had  been 
appointed  to  succeed  Lord  Clyde,  who  had  long  been  anxious  to  return 
to  England,  and  that  Sir  Hugh,  though  he  intended  to  go  to  Calcutta 
himself,  wished  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Army  to  remain  at  Simla  ; a 
question  about  which  we  had  been  rather  anxious,  as  it  would  have 
been  an  unpleasant  breaking  up  of  all  our  plans,  had  I been  ordered  to 
Calcutta. 

Life  at  Simla  was  somewhat  monotonous.  The  society  was  not  very 
large  in  those  days ; but  there  were  a certain  number  of  people  on  leave 
from  the  plains,  who  then,  as  at  present,  had  nothing  to  do  but  amuse 
themselves,  consequently  there  was  a good  deal  of  gaiety  in  a small 
way ; but  we  entered  into  it  very  little.  My  wife  did  not  care  much 
about  it,  and  had  been  very  ill  for  the  greater  part  of  the  summer.  She 
had  made  two  or  three  kind  friends,  and  was  very  happy  in  her 
mountain  home,  though  at  times,  perhaps,  a little  lonely,  as  I had  to 
be  in  office  the  greater  part  of  each  day. 

In  the  autumn  we  made  a trip  into  the  interior  of  the  hills,  beyond 
Simla,  which  was  a new  and  delightful  experience  for  my  wife.  We 
usually  started  in  the  morning,  sending  our  servants  on  about  half  way, 
when  they  prepared  breakfast  for  us  in  some  pretty,  shady  spot ; there 
we  remained,  reading,  writing,  or  resting,  until  after  lunch,  and  it  was 
time  to  move  on,  that  we  might  get  to  our  halting  place  for  the  night 
before  dinner. 

It  was  a lovely  time  of  the  year,  when  the  autumn  tints  made  the 
forest  gorgeous,  and  the  scarlet  festoons  of  the  Himalayan  vine  stood 
out  in  brilliant  contrast  to  the  dark  green  of  the  solemn  deodar,  amongst 
the  branches  of  which  it  loves  to  twine  itself. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

In  1860  an  important  alteration  was  made  in  the  organization  of  the 
army  in  India,  by  the  passing  of  a Bill  for  the  amalgamation  of  the  local 
European  Forces  with  the  Royal  Army. 

On  the  transfer  of  the  administration  of  India  from  the  Honourable 
East  India  Company  to  the  Crown,  a question  arose  as  to  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  European  soldiers  had  enlisted.  The  Government 


270 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[i860 


contended  that  the  conditions  were  in  no  way  affected  by  the  abolition 
of  the  Company.  The  soldiers,  on  the  other  hand,  claimed  to  be 
re-enlisted,  and  on  this  being  refused  they  asked  for  their  discharge. 
This  was  granted,  and  10,000  out  of  the  16,000  men  serving  in  the  local 
army  had  to  be  sent  to  England.  These  men  were  replaced  and  the 
local  Forces  were  kept  up  to  strength  by  fresh  drafts  from  England  ; 
but,  from  the  date  of  the  amalgamation,  enlistment  to  serve  solely  in 
India  was  to  cease. 

There  was  great  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  advisability  of  this 
measure  ; officers  of  the  Queen’s  service  for  the  most  part,  and  notably 
Sir  Hugh  Rose,  were  in  favour  of  it,  but  it  was  not  generally  popular  in 
India.  It  was  feared  that  the  change  would  result  in  a great  increase 
to  the  military  charges  which  the  Indian  Government  would  be  called 
upon  to  pay ; that,  notwithstanding  such  increase,  there  would  be  a 
serious  diminution  in  the  control  exercised  by  that  Government  over 
the  administration  and  organization  of  the  British  Army  in  India  ; and 
that,  under  the  pressure  of  political  emergency  in  Europe,  troops  might 
be  withdrawn  and  Indian  requirements  disregarded.  On  the  other 
hand,  those  in  favour  of  the  Bill  thought  that,  after  the  transfer  of 
India  to  the  Crown,  the  maintenance  of  a separate  Force  uncontrolled 
by  the  Horse  Guards  would  be  an  anomaly.  There  was,  no  doubt, 
much  to  be  said  on  both  sides  of  the  question,  but,  although  it  has  been 
proved  that  the  fears  of  those  opposed  to  the  change  were  not  altogether 
without  foundation,  in  my  opinion  it  was  unavoidable,  and  has  greatly 
benefited  both  services. 

The  amalgamation  considerably  accelerated  my  promotion,  for,  in 
order  to  place  the  Indian  Ordnance  Corps  on  the  same  footing  as  those 
of  the  Royal  service,  the  rank  of  Second  Captain  had  to  be  introduced 
into  the  former,  a rank  to  which  I attained  in  October,  1860,  only,  how- 
ever, to  hold  it  for  one  day,  as  the  next  my  name  appeared  in  the 
Gazette  as  a Brevet  Major. 

The  same  year  saw  the  introduction  of  the  Staff  Corps.  This  was 
the  outcome  of  the  disappearance  during  the  Mutiny  of  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  Regular  regiments  of  the  Bengal  Army,  and  their  replace- 
ment by  Irregular  regiments.  But,  as  under  the  Irregular  system  the 
number  of  British  officers  with  each  corps  was  too  limited  to  admit  of 
their  promotion  being  carried  on  regimentally,  as  had  been  done  under 
the  Regular  system,*  some  organization  had  to  be  devised  by  which 

* Under  the  Regular  system,  which  was  modelled  on  the  Royal  Army 
organization,  each  regiment  of  Native  Cavalry  had  22,  and  each  regiment  of 
Native  Infantry  25  British  officers,  who  rose  to  the  higher  grades  by  seniority. 
From  this  establishment  officers  were  taken,  without  being  seconded,  for  the 
multifarious  extra-regimental  duties  on  which  the  Indian  Army  was,  and  is 
still,  employed,  viz.,  Stair,  Civil,  Political,  Commissariat,  Pay,  Public  Works, 
Stud,  and  Survey.  With  the  Irregular  system  this  was  no  longer  possible, 


iS6o] 


THE  STAFF  CORPS 


271 


the  pay  and  promotion  of  all  officers  joining  the  Indian  Army  in  future 
could  be  arranged.  Many  schemes  were  put  forward ; eventually  one 
formulated  by  Colonel  Norman  was,  with  certain  modifications,  accepted 
by  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  result  being  that  all  officers  about  to  enter 
the  Indian  Army  were  to  be  placed  on  one  list,  in  which  they  would  be 
promoted  after  fixed  periods  of  service  ;*  and  all  those  officers  who  had 
been  thrown  out  of  employment  by  the  disbandment  of  their  regi- 
ments, or  by  the  substitution  of  the  Irregular  for  the  Regular  system, 
were  to  have  the  option  of  joining  it.  The  term  Staff  Corps,  however, 
was  a misnomer,  for  the  constitution  of  the  Corps  and  the  training  of 
its  officers  had  no  special  connection  with  staff  requirements. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  summer  the  Viceroy  announced  his  intention 
of  making  a march  through  Central  India,  and  I was  again  ordered  to 
take  charge  of  his  camp,  which  was  to  be  formed  at  Benares.  My  wife 
and  her  baby  remained  at  Simla  with  our  friends  the  Donald  Stewarts, 
and  I left  her  feeling  sure  that  with  them  she  would  be  happy  and  well 
taken  care  of. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  at  Allahabad,  and  as  I passed  through  that  place 
I availed  myself  of  the  opportunity  to  pay  my  respects  to  the  new 
Chief,  being  anxious  to  meet  an  officer  whom  I had  held  in  great 
admiration  from  the  time  when,  as  Charge  d'affaires  at  Constanti- 
nople, his  pluck  and  foresight  practically  saved  Turkey  in  her  time  of 
peril  from  Russia’s  threatened  attack — admiration  increased  by  the 
masterly  manner  in  which  he  had  conducted  the  Central  India  cam- 
paign, in  spite  of  almost  overwhelming  difficulties  from  want  of 
transport  and  other  causes,  and  a severe  attack  of  sunstroke,  which 
would  have  incapacitated  many  men.  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  when  I first  met 
him  at  Allahabad,  was  fifty-nine  years  of  age,  tall,  slight,  with  refined 
features,  rather  delicate-looking,  and  possessing  a distinctly  distin- 
guished appearance.  He  received  me  most  kindly,  and  told  me  that  he 
wished  me  to  return  to  Head-Quarters  when  the  Viceroy  could  dispense 
with  my  services. 

The  camp  this  year  was  by  no  means  on  so  grand  a scale  as  the  pre- 
ceding one.  The  escort  was  much  smaller,  and  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  with  Army  Head-Quarters  did  not  march  with  us  as  on  the 
previous  occasion. 

Lord  and  Lady  Canning  arrived  by  steamer  at  Benares  on  the 
Gth  November,  and  I went  on  board  to  meet  them.  Lord  Canning  was 


although  the  number  of  British  officers  with  each  corps  was  (after  the  Mutiny) 
increased  from  3 to  9 with  a Cavalry,  and  3 to  8 with  an  Infantry  regiment. 

* Captain  after  twelve  years,1  Major  after  twenty  years,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  after  twenty-six  years. 


Since  reduced  to  eleven  years. 


IS 


272 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1861 


cordial  and  pleasant  as  usual,  but  I did  not  think  he  looked  well.  Lady 
Canning  was  charming  as  ever;  she  reproached  me  for  not  having 
brought  my  wife,  but  when  I told  her  how  ill  she  had  been,  she  agreed 
that  camp  was  not  quite  the  place  for  her. 

Benares,  to  my  mind,  is  a most  disappointing  city ; the  streets  are 
narrow  and  dirty,  there  are  no  fine  buildings,  and  it  is  only  interesting 
from  its  being  held  so  sacred  by  the  Hindus.  The  view  of  the  city  and 
burning  ghats  from  the  river  is  picturesque  and  pretty,  but  there  is 
nothing  else  worth  seeing. 

Two  days  were  occupied  in  getting  the  camp  to  Mirzarpur,  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  Ganges.  There  was  no  bridge,  and  everything  had 
to  be  taken  over  in  boats ; 10,000  men,  1,000  horses,  2,000  camels, 
2,000  bullocks,  besides  all  the  tents,  carts,  and  baggage,  had  to  be 
ferried  across  the  great  river.  The  180  elephants  swam  over  with  their 
mahouts  on  their  backs  to  keep  their  heads  straight  and  urge  them  on ; 
the  stream  was  rapid,  and  it  was  a difficult  business  to  land  them  safely 
at  the  other  side,  but  at  last  it  was  accomplished,  and  our  only  casualty 
was  one  camel,  which  fell  overboard. 

The  march  to  Jubbulpur  lay  through  very  pretty  scenery,  low  hills 
and  beautiful  jungle,  ablaze  with  the  flame-coloured  blossom  of  the 
dhak-tree.  Game  abounded,  and  an  occasional  tiger  was  killed.  Lord 
Canning  sometimes  accompanied  the  shooting  expeditions,  but  not 
often,  for  he  was  greatly  engrossed  in,  and  oppressed  by,  his  work, 
which  he  appeared  unable  to  throw  off.  Even  during  the  morning’s 
drive  he  was  occupied  with  papers,  and  on  reaching  camp  he  went 
straight  to  his  office  tent,  where  he  remained  the  whole  day  till  dinner- 
time, returning  to  it  directly  the  meal  was  over,  unless  there  were 
strangers  present  with  whom  he  wished  to  converse. 

At  Jubbulpur  the  Viceroy  held  a durbar  for  the  Maharaja  Tukaji 
Holkar  of  Indore,  and  some  minor  Chiefs  of  that  part  of  the  country. 
Holkar’s  conduct  during  the  Mutiny  was  not  altogether  above  suspicion, 
but,  considering  that  the  only  troops  at  his  disposal  belonged  to  the 
mutinous  Indore  Contingent,  which  consisted  mainly  of  Hindustanis 
enlisted  by  English  officers,  over  whom  he  could  not  be  expected  to 
exercise  much  control,  Lord  Canning  gave  him  the  benefit  of  the  doubt, 
and  was  willing  to  attribute  his  equivocal  behaviour  to  want  of  ability 
and  timidity,  rather  than  to  disloyalty,  and  therefore  allowed  him  to 
come  to  the  durbar. 

Another  potentate  received  at  this  time  by  the  Viceroy  was  the  Begum 
of  Bhopal,  who,  being  a powerful  and  skilful  Ruler,  and  absolutely 
loyal  to  the  British  Government,  had  afforded  us  most  valuable  assist- 
ance during  the  rebellion.  She  was  one  of  those  women  whom  the 
East  has  occasionally  produced,  endowed  with  conspicuous  talent  and 
great  strength  of  character,  a quality  which,  from  its  rarity  amongst 
Indian  women,  gives  immense  influence  to  those  who  possess  it.  Lord 


THE  MARBLE  ROCKS 


273 


1861] 

Canning  congratulated  the  Begum  on  the  success  with  which  she  had 
governed  her  country,  thanked  her  for  her  timely  help,  and  bestowed 
upon  her  a large  tract  of  country  as  a reward.  She  was  a determined- 
looking  little  woman,  and  spoke  fluently  in  her  own  language ; she 
personally  managed  the  affairs  of  her  State,  and  wrote  a remarkably 
interesting  account  of  her  travelling  experiences  during  a pilgrimage  to 
Mecca. 

Just  as  the  Begum  took  her  departure,  news  was  brought  in  of  the 
presence  of  a tiger  two  or  three  miles  from  the  cantonment,  and  as 
many  of  us  as  could  get  away  started  off  in  pursuit.  Not  considering 
myself  a first-rate  shot,  I thought  I should  be  best  employed  with  the 
beaters,  but,  as  good  luck  would  have  it,  the  tiger  broke  from  the  jungle 
within  a few  yards  of  my  elephant : I could  not  resist  having  a shot, 
and  was  fortunate  enough  to  knock  him  over. 

While  at  Jubbulpur,  I visited  the  famous  marble  rocks  on  the 
Nerbudda.  We  rowed  up  the  river  for  about  a mile,  when  the  stream 
began  to  narrow,  and  splendid  masses  of  marble  came  into  view.  The 
cliffs  rise  to  about  a hundred  feet  in  height,  pure  white  below,  gradually 
shading  off  to  gray  at  the  top.  The  water  at  their  base  is  of  a deep 
brown  colour,  perfectly  transparent  and  smooth,  in  which  the  white 
rocks  are  reflected  with  the  utmost  distinctness.  In  the  crevices  hang 
numerous  beehives,  whose  inmates  one  has  to  be  careful  not  to  disturb, 
for  on  the  bank  are  the  graves  of  two  Englishmen  who,  having 
incautiously  aroused  the  vicious  little  creatines,  were  attacked  and 
drowned  in  diving  under  the  water  to  escape  from  their  stings. 

A few  days  later  the  Viceroy  left  camp,  and  proceeded  to  Lucknow, 
where  he  held  another  durbar  for  the  Talukdars  of  Oudh.  Lady 
Canning  continued  to  march  with  us  to  Mirzapur,  where  I took  her  on 
board  her  barge,  and  bade  her  farewell — a last  farewell,  for  I never  saw 
this  good,  beautiful,  and  gifted  woman  again. 

The  camp  being  broken  up,  I returned  towards  the  end  of  February 
to  my  work  in  the  Quartermaster-General’s  Office  at  Simla.  I found 
the  place  deep  in  snow ; it  looked  very  beautiful,  but  the  change  of 
temperature,  from  the  great  heat  of  Central  India  to  several  degrees  of 
frost,  was  somewhat  trying.  My  wife  had  benefited  greatly  from  the 
fine  bracing  air,  and  both  she  and  our  baby  appeared  pictures  of 
health ; but  a day  or  two  after  my  arrival  the  little  one  was  taken  ill, 
and  died  within  one  week  of  her  birthday — our  first  great  sorrow. 

We  passed  a very  quiet,  uneventful  summer,  and  in  the  beginning  of 
October  we  left  Simla  for  Allahabad,  where  I had  received  instructions 
to  prepare  a camp  for  the  Viceroy,  who  had  arranged  to  hold  an 
investiture  of  the  Star  of  India,  the  new  Order  which  was  originally 
designed  to  honour  the  principal  Chiefs  of  India  who  had  done  us 
good  service,  by  associating  them  with  some  of  the  highest  and  most 
distinguished  personages  in  England,  and  a few  carefully  selected 

18—2 


274  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1861 

Europeans  in  India.  Lord  Canning  was  the  first  Grand  Master,  and 
Sir  Hugh  Rose  the  first  Knight. 

The  durbar  at  which  the  Maharajas  Sindhia  and  Patiala,  the  Begum 
of  Bhopal,  and  the  Nawab  of  Ramfur  were  invested,  was  a most 
imposing  ceremony.  The  Begum  was  the  cynosure  of  all  eyes— a 
female  Knight  was  a novelty  to  Europeans  as  well  as  to  Natives — and 
there  was  much  curiosity  as  to  how  she  would  conduct  herself ; but  no 
one  could  have  behaved  with  greater  dignity  or  more  perfect  decorum, 
and  she  made  a pretty  little  speech  in  Urdu  in  reply  to  Lord  Canning’s 
complimentary  address.  She  was  dressed  in  cloth-of-gold,  and  wore 
magnificent  jewels  ; but  the  effect  of  her  rich  costume  was  somewhat 
marred  by  a funny  little  wreath  of  artificial  flowers,  woollen  mittens, 
and  black  worsted  stockings  with  white  tips.  When  my  wife  visited 
the  Begum  after  the  durbar,  she  showed  her  these  curious  appendages 
with  great  pride,  saying  she  wore  them  because  they  were  ‘ English 
fashion.’  This  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  ladies  were  admitted  to 
a durbar,  out  of  compliment  to  the  Begum. 

That  evening  my  wife  was  taken  in  to  dinner  by  a man  whose  manner 
and  appearance  greatly  impressed  her,  but  she  did  not  catch  his  name 
when  he  was  introduced;  she  much  enjoyed  his  conversation  during 
dinner,  which  was  not  to  be  wondered  at,  for,  before  she  left  the  table, 
he  told  her  his  name  was  Bartle  Frere.*  She  never  saw  him  again, 
but  she  always  says  he  interested  her  more  than  almost  any  of  the 
many  distinguished  men  she  has  since  met. 

From  Allahabad  the  Viceroy  again  visited  Lucknow,  this  time  with 
the  object  of  urging  upon  the  Talukdars  the  suppression  of  the  horrible 
custom  of  female  infanticide,  which  had  its  origin  in  the  combined 
pride  and  poverty  of  the  Kajputs.  In  various  parts  of  India  attempts 
had  been  made,  with  more  or  less  success,  to  put  a stop  to  this  inhuman 
practice.  But  not  much  impression  had  been  made  in  Oudh,  in 
consequence  of  the  inordinately  large  dowries  demanded  from  the 
Rajput  fathers  of  marriageable  daughters.  Two  hundred  Talukdars 
attended  Lord  Canning’s  last  durbar,  and,  in  reply  to  his  feeling  and 
telling  speech,  declared  their  firm  determination  to  do  their  best  to 
discourage  the  evil. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  had  decided  to  pass  the  winter  in  marching 
through  the  Punjab,  and  inspecting  the  different  stations  for  troops  in 
the  north  of  India.  The  Head-Quarters  camp  had,  therefore,  been 
formed  at  Jullundur,  and  thither  we  proceeded  when  the  gathering  at 
Allahabad  had  dispersed.  We  had  but  just  arrived,  when  we  were 
shocked  and  grieved  beyond  measure  to  hear  of  Lady  Canning’s  death. 
Instead  of  accompanying  the  Viceroy  to  Allahabad  she  had  gone  to 
Darjeeling,  and  on  her  return,  anxious  to  make  sketches  of  the  beautiful 


The  late  Sir  Bartle  Frere,  Bart,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I. 


LADY  CANNING'S  DEATH 


275 


1862] 

jungle  scenery,  she  arranged,  alas!  contrary  to  the  advice  of  those  with 
her,  to  spend  one  night  in  the  terai,*  where  she  contracted  jungle- 
fever,  to  which  she  succumbed  ten  days  after  her  return  to  Calcutta. 
Her  death  was  a real  personal  sorrow  to  all  who  had  the  privilege  of 
knowing  her ; what  must  it  have  been  to  her  husband,  returning  to 
England  without  the  helpmate  who  had  shared  and  lightened  the 
burden  of  his  anxieties,  and  gloried  in  the  success  which  crowned  his 
eventful  career  in  India. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  arrived  in  the  middle  of  November,  and 
all  the  officers  of  the  Head-Quarters  camp  went  out  to  meet  him.  I 
was  mounted  on  a spirited  nutmeg-gray  Arab,  a present  from  Allgood. 
Sir  Hugh  greatly  fancied  Arabian  horses,  and  immediately  noticed 
mine.  He  called  me  up  to  him,  and  asked  me  where  I got  him,  and 
of  what  caste  he  was.  From  that  moment  he  never  varied  in  the 
kindness  and  consideration  with  which  he  treated  me,  and  I always 
fancied  I owed  his  being  well  disposed  towards  me  from  the  very  first 
to  the  fact  that  I was  riding  my  handsome  little  Arab  that  day ; he 
loved  a good  horse,  and  liked  his  staff  to  be  well  mounted.  A few  days 
afterwards  he  told  me  he  wished  me  to  accompany  him  on  the  flying 
tours  he  proposed  to  make  from  time  to  time,  in  order  to  see  more  of 
the  country  and  troops  than  would  be  possible  if  he  marched  altogether 
with  the  big  camp. 

We  went  to  Umritsar,  Mian  Mir,  and  Sialkot ; at  each  place  there 
were  the  usual  inspections,  mess  dinners,  and  entertainments.  The 
Chief’s  visit  made  a break  in  the  ordinary  life  of  a cantonment,  and 
the  residents  were  glad  to  take  advantage  of  it  to  get  up  various 
festivities ; Sir  Hugh,  too,  was  most  hospitably  inclined,  so  that  there 
was  always  a great  deal  to  do  besides  actual  duty  when  wo  arrived  at 
a station. 

Jamu,  where  the  Ruler  of  Kashmir  resides  during  the  winter,  is  not 
far  from  Sialkot,  so  Sir  Hugh  was  tempted  to  accept  an  invitation  from 
the  Maharaja  to  pay  him  a visit  and  enjoy  some  good  pig-sticking,  to 
my  mind  the  finest  sport  in  the  world.  His  Highness  entertained  us 
right  royally,  and  gave  us  excellent  sport,  but  our  pleasure  was  marred 
by  the  Chief  having  a bad  fall : he  had  got  the  first  spear  off  a fine 
boar,  who,  feeling  himself  wounded,  turned  and  charged,  knocking 
over  Sir  Hugh’s  horse.  All  three  lay  in  a heap  together ; the  pig  was 
dead,  the  horse  was  badly  ripped  up,  and  the  Chief  showed  no  signs  of 
life.  We  carried  him  back  to  Jamu  on  a charpoy,  f and  when  he 
regained  consciousness  we  found  that  no  great  harm  was  done  beyond 
a severely  bruised  face  and  a badly  sprained  leg,  which,  though  still 
very  painful  two  or  three  days  later,  did  not  prevent  the  plucky  old 
fellow  from  riding  over  the  battle-field  of  Chilianwalla. 

* The  fever-giving  tract  of  country  at  the  foot  of  the  Himalayas. 

f Native  string  bed. 


276 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1862 

Very  soon  after  this  Norman,  who  was  then  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Army,  left  Head-Quarters  to  take  up  the  appointment  of  Secretary  to 
the  Government  of  India  in  the  Military  Department.  Before  we 
parted  he  expressed  a hope  that  I would  soon  follow  him,  as  a vacancy 
in  the  Department  was  about  to  take  place,  which  he  said  he  was  sure 
Lord  Canning  would  allow  him  to  offer  to  me.  Norman  was  succeeded 
as  Adjutant-General  of  the  Indian  Army  by  Edwin  Johnson,  the  last 
officer  who  filled  that  post,  as  it  was  done  away  with  when  the  amal- 
gamation of  the  services  was  carried  into  effect. 

Two  marches  from  Jhelum  my  wife  was  suddenly  taken  alarmingly 
ill,  and  had  to  remain  behind  when  the  camp  moved  on.  Sir  Hugh 
Bose  most  kindly  insisted  on  leaving  his  doctor  (Longhurst)  in  charge 
of  her,  and  told  me  I must  stay  with  her  as  long  as  was  necessary. 
For  three  whole  weeks  we  remained  on  the  encamping  ground  of 
Sahawar ; at  the  end  of  that  time,  thanks  (humanly  speaking)  to  the 
skill  and  care  of  our  Doctor,  she  was  sufficiently  recovered  to  be  put 
into  a doolie  and  carried  to  Lahore,  I riding  a camel  by  her  side,  for 
my  horses  had  gone  on  with  the  camp. 

While  at  Lahore  I received  a most  kind  letter  from  Norman,  offering 
me  the  post  in  the  Secretariat  which  he  had  already  told  me  was  about 
to  become  vacant.  After  some  hesitation—  for  the  Secretariat  had  its 
attractions,  particularly  as  regarded  pay — I decided  to  decline  the 
proffered  appointment,  as  my  acceptance  of  it  would  have  taken  me 
away  from  purely  military  work  and  the  chance  of  service  in  the  field. 
I left  my  wife  on  the  high-road  to  recovery,  and  hurried  after  the  camp, 
overtaking  it  at  Peshawar  just  in  time  to  accompany  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  on  his  ride  along  the  Derajat  frontier,  a trip  I should  have 
been  very  sorry  to  have  missed.  We  visited  every  station  from  Kohat 
to  Bajanpur,  a ride  of  about  440  miles.  Brigadier- General  Neville 
Chamberlain,  who  was  still  commanding  the  Punjab  Frontier  Force, 
met  us  at  Kohat,  and  remained  with  us  to  the  end.  We  did  from 
twenty-five  to  forty  miles  a day,  and  our  baggage  and  servants,  carried 
on  riding-camels,  kept  up  with  us. 

This  was  my  first  experience  of  a part  of  India  with  which  I had 
later  so  much  to  do,  and  which  always  interested  me  greatly.  At  the 
time  of  which  I am  writing  it  was  a -wild  and  lawless  tract  of  country. 
As  we  left  Kohat  we  met  the  bodies  of  four  murdered  men  being 
carried  in,  but  were  told  there  was  nothing  unusual  in  such  a sight. 
On  one  occasion  General  Chamberlain  introduced  to  Sir  Hugh  Bose 
two  young  Khans,  fine,  handsome  fellows,  who  were  apparently  on 
excellent  terms.  A few  days  later  we  were  told  that  one  of  them  had 
been  murdered  by  his  companion,  there  having  been  a blood-feud  between 
their  families  for  generations;  although  these  two  had  been  brought 
up  together,  fmd  liked  each  other,  the  one  whose  clan  had  last  lost  a 
member  by  the  feud  felt  himself  in  honour  bound  to  sacrifice  his  friend. 


LORD  CANNING 


277 


1862] 

When  I rejoined  my  wife  at  the  end  of  the  tour,  I found  her  a great 
deal  worse  than  her  letters  had  led  me  to  expect,  but  she  had  been  much 
cheered  by  the  arrival  of  a sister  who  had  come  out  to  pay  us  a visit, 
and  who  lived  with  us  until  she  married  an  old  friend  and  brother 
officer  of  mine  named  Sladen.  We  remained  at  Umballa  till  the  end 
of  March  ; the  only  noteworthy  circumstance  that  occurred  there  was 
a parade  for  announcing  to  the  troops  that  Earl  Canning  had  departed, 
and  that  the  Earl  of  Elgin  and  Kincardine  was  now  Viceroy  of  India. 

There  are  few  men  whose  conduct  of  affairs  has  been  so  severely- 
criticized  as  Lord  Canning’s,  but  there  are  still  fewer  who,  as  Governors 
or  Viceroys,  have  had  to  deal  with  such  an  overwhelming  crisis  as  the 
Mutiny.  While  the  want  of  appreciation  Lord  Canning  at  first  dis- 
played of  the  magnitude  of  that  crisis  may,  with  perfect  justice,  be 
attributed  to  the  fact  that  most  of  his  advisers  had  gained  their  ex- 
perience only  in  Lower  Bengal,  and  had  therefore  a very  imperfect 
knowledge  of  popular  feeling  throughout  India,  the  very  large  measure 
of  success  which  attended  his  subsequent  action  was  undoubtedly  due 
to  his  own  ability  and  sound  judgment. 

That  by  none  of  Lord  Canning's  responsible  councillors  could  the 
extent  of  the  Mutiny,  or  the  position  in  Upper  India,  have  been  grasped, 
was  evident  from  the  telegram*  sent  from  Calcutta  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  on  the  31st  May,  three  weeks  after  the  revolt  at  Meerut  had 
occurred;  but  from  the  time  Lord  Canning  left  Calcutta  in  January. 
1858,  and  had  the  opportunity  of  seeing  and  judging  for  himself,  all  that 
he  did  was  wise  and  vigorous. 

Outwardly  Lord  Canning  was  cold  and  reserved,  the  result,  I think, 
of  extreme  sensitiveness  ; for  he  was  without  doubt  very  warm-hearted, 
and  was  greatly  liked  and  respected  by  those  about  him,  and  there  was 
universal  regret  throughout  India  when,  three  months  after  his 
departure,  the  news  of  his  death  was  received. 

We  returned  to  Simla  early  in  April.  The  season  passed  much  as 
other  seasons  had  passed,  except  that  there  was  rather  more  gaiety. 
The  new  Viceroy  remained  in  Calcutta  ; but  Sir  Hugh  Rose  had  had 
quite  enough  of  it  the  year  before,  so  he  came  up  to  the  Hills,  and 
established  himself  at  ‘ Barnes  Court.’  He  was  very  hospitable,  and 
having  my  sister-in-law  to  chaperon,  my  wife  went  out  rather  more  than 
she  had  cared  to  do  in  previous  years.  We  spent  a good  deal  of  our 
time  also  at  Mashobra,  a lovely  place  in  the  heart  of  the  Hills,  about 
six  miles  from  Simla,  where  the  Chief  had  a house,  which  he  was  good 
enough  to  frequently  place  at  our  disposal,  when  not  making  use  of  it 

* ‘ Your  force  of  Artillery  will  enable  us  to  dispose  of  Delhi  with  certainty. 
I therefore  beg  that  you  will  detach  one  European  Infantry  regiment  and  a 
small  force  of  European  Cavalry  to  the  south  of  Delhi,  without  keeping  them 
for  operations  there,  so  that  Aligarh  may  be  recovered  and  Cawnpore  relieved 

immediately.  ’ 


278 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1862 

himself.  It  was  an  agreeable  change,  and  one  which  we  all  greatly 
enjoyed.  But  at  the  best  one  gets  very  tired  of  the  Hills  by  the  close 
of  the  summer,  and  I was  glad  to  start  off  towards  the  end  of  October 
with  my  wife  and  her  sister  for  Agra,  where  this  year  the  Head- 
Quarters  camp  was  to  be  formed,  as  the  Chief  had  settled  the  cold- 
weather  tour  was  to  begin  with  a march  through  Bundelkand  and 
Central  India,  the  theatre  of  his  successful  campaign. 

The  second  march  out  we  were  startled  by  being  told,  when  we  awoke 
in  the  morning,  that  Colonel  Gawler,  the  Deputy-Adjutant-General  of 
Queen’s  troops,  had  been  badly  wounded  in  the  night  by  a thief,  who 
got  into  his  tent  with  the  object  of  stealing  a large  sum  of  money  Gawler 
had  received  from  the  bank  the  previous  day,  and  for  greater  safety  had 
placed  under  his  pillow  when  he  went  to  bed.  In  the  middle  of  the 
night  his  wife  awoke  him,  saying  there  was  someone  in  the  tent,  and 
by  the  dim  light  of  a small  oil-lamp  he  could  just  see  a dark  figure 
creeping  along  the  floor.  He  sprang  out  of  bed  and  seized  the  robber ; 
but  the  latter,  being  perfectly  naked  and  oiled  all  over,  slipped  through 
liis  hands  and  wriggled  under  the  wall  of  the  tent.  Gawler  caught  him 
by  the  leg  just  as  he  was  disappearing,  and  they  straggled  outside  to- 
gether. When  despairing  of  being  able  to  make  his  escape,  the  thief 
stabbed  Gawler  several  times  with  a knife,  which  was  tied  by  a string 
to  his  wrist.  By  this  time  Mrs.  Gawler  had  been  able  to  arouse  two 
Kaffir  servants,  one  of  whom  tried  to  seize  the  miscreant,  but  in  his  turn 
was  stabbed.  The  second  servant,  however,  was  more  wary,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  capturing  the  thief ; Kaffir  fashion,  he  knocked  all  the  breath 
out  of  his  body  by  running  at  him  head  down  and  butting  him  in  the 
stomach,  wrhen  it  became  easy  to  bind  the  miscreant  hand  and  foot.  It 
was  a bad  part  of  the  country  for  thieves  ; and  when  some  four  weeks 
later  I went  off  on  a flying  tour  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  I did 
not  leave  my  wife  quite  as  happily  as  usual.  But  neither  she  nor  her 
sister  was  afraid.  Each  night  they  sent  everything  at  all  valuable  to  be 
placed  under  the  care  of  the  guard,  and  having  taken  this  precaution, 
were  quite  easy  in  their  minds. 

When  the  camp  reached  Gwalior,  the  Maharaja  Sindhia  seemed  to 
think  he  could  not  do  enough  to  show  his  gratitude  to  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
for  his  opportune  help  in  June,  1858,*  when  the  Gwalior  troops 
mutinied,  and  joined  the  rebel  army  under  the  Rani  of  Jhansi  and 

* After  the  capture  of  Kalpi  in  May,  1858,  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  worn  out  with 
fatigue  and  successive  sunstrokes,  was  advised  by  his  medical  officer  to  return 
at  once  to  Bombay  ; his  leave  had  been  granted,  and  his  successor  (Brigadier- 
General  Napier)  had  been  appointed,  when  intelligence  reached  him  to  the 
effect  that  the  rebel  army,  under  Tantia  Topi  and  the  Rani  of  Jhansi,  had  been 
joined  by  the  whole  of  Sindhia’s  troops  and  were  in  possession  of  the  fort  of 
Gwalior  with  its  well-supplied  arsenal.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  at  once  cancelled  his 
leave,  pushed  on  to  Gwalior,  and  by  the  30th  of  June  had  re-captured  all 
Sindhia’s  guns  and  placed  him  again  in  possession  of  his  capital. 


THE  EARL  CANNING.  K.G..  G.C.B.,  G.M.S.I., 
Viceroy  and  Governor-General  of  India. 

From 

a photograph  hy  Messrs.  Mayall. 


GWALIOR  AND  JHANSI 


279 


1862] 

Tantia  Topi.  The  day  after  our  arrival  Sindhia  held  a grand  review  of 
his  new  army  in  honour  of  our  Chief.  The  next  day  there  was  an  open- 
air  entertainment  in  the  Phulbagh  (garden  of  flowers) ; the  third  a 
picnic  and  elephant  fight,  which,  by  the  way,  was  a very  tame  affair. 
We  had  nerved  ourselves  to  see  something  rather  terrific,  instead  of 
which  the  great  creatures  twisted  their  trunks  about  each  other  in  (|uite 
a playful  manner,  and  directly  the  play  seemed  to  be  turning  into 
earnest  they  were  separated  by  their  mahouts,  being  much  too  valuable 
to  be  allowed  to  injure  themselves.  Each  day  there  was  some  kind  of 
entertainment : pig-sticking  or  shooting  expeditions  in  the  morning,  and 
banquets,  fireworks,  and  illuminations  in  the  evening. 

Gwalior  is  an  interesting  place.  The  fort  is  picturesquely  situated 
above  a perpendicular  cliff ; the  road  up  to  it  is  very  steep,  and  it  must 
have  been  almost  impregnable  in  former  days.  It  was  made  doubly 
interesting  to  us  by  Sir  Hugh  Rose  explaining  how  he  attacked  it,  and 
pointing  out  the  spot  where  the  Rani  of  Jhansi  was  killed  in  a charge 
of  the  8th  Hussars. 

Our  next  halt  was  Jhansi.  Here  also  Sir  Hugh  had  a thrilling  tale 
to  tell  of  its  capture,  and  of  his  having  to  fight  the  battle  of  the  Betwa 
against  a large  force  brought  to  the  assistance  of  the  rebels  by  Tantia 
Topi,  while  the  siege  was  actually  being  carried  on. 

From  Jhansi  the  big  camp  marched  to  Lucknow,  v id  Cawnpore ; 
while  the  Chief  with  a small  staff  (of  which  I was  one)  and  light  tents, 
made  a detour  by  Saugor,  Jubbulpur,  and  Allahabad.  We  travelled 
through  pretty  jungle  for  the  most  part,  interspersed  with  low  hills,  and 
we  had  altogether  a very  enjoyable  trip.  Sir  Hugh  was  justly  proud  of 
the  splendid  service  the  Central  India  Field  Force  had  performed  under 
his  command ; and,  as  we  rode  along,  it  delighted  him  to  point  out  the 
various  places  where  he  had  come  in  contact  with  the  rebels. 

While  at  Allahabad,  on  the  13th  January — quite  the  coolest  time  of 
the  year — I had  a slight  sunstroke,  which  it  took  me  a very  long  time 
to  get  over  completely.  The  sensible  custom  introduced  by  Lord  Clyde, 
of  wearing  helmets,  was  not  always  adhered  to,  and  Sir  Hugh  Rose  was 
rather  fond  of  cocked  hats.  On  this  occasion  I was  wearing  this — for 
India — most  unsuitable  head-dress,  and,  as  ill-luck  would  have  it,  the 
Chief  kept  me  out  rather  late,  going  over  the  ground  where  the  present 
cantonment  stands.  I did  not  feel  anything  at  the  time,  but  an  hour 
later  I was  suddenly  seized  with  giddiness  and  sickness,  and  for  a short 
time  I could  neither  see  nor  hear.  Plentiful  douches  of  cold  water 
brought  me  round,  and  I was  well  enough  in  the  afternoon  to  go  with 
the  Chief  to  inspect  the  fort ; but  for  months  afterwards  I never  lost 
the  pain  in  my  head,  and  for  many  years  I was  very  susceptible  to  the 
evil  influence  of  the  sun’s  rays. 

We  reached  Lucknow  towards  the  middle  of  January.  Here,  as 
elsewhere,  we  had  constant  parades  and  inspections,  for  Sir  Hugh 


280 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1863 

carried  out  his  duties  in  the  most  thorough  manner,  and  spared  himself 
no  trouble  to  secure  the  efficiency  and  the  well-being  of  the  soldier.  At 
the  same  time,  he  was  careful  not  to  neglect  his  social  duties ; he  took 
a prominent  part  in  all  amusements,  and  it  was  mainly  due  to  his  liberal 
support  that  we  were  able  to  keep  up  a small  pack  of  hounds  with 
Head-Quarters,  which  afforded  us  much  enjoyment  during  the  winter 
months. 

From  Lucknow  we  marched  through  Bareilly,  Meerut,  and  Umballa, 
and  the  30th  March  saw  us  all  settled  at  Simla  for  the  season. 

Early  in  April  Lord  Elgin  arrived  in  Simla  for  the  hot  weather,  and 
from  that  time  to  the  present,  Simla  has  continued  to  be  the  Head- 
Quarters  of  the  Government  during  the  summer  months. 

About  this  time  the  changes  necessitated  by  the  amalgamation  of  the 
services  took  place  in  the  army  staff.  Edwin  Johnson  lost  his  appoint- 
ment in  consequence,  and  Colonel  Haythorne,*  Adjutant-General  of 
Queen’s  troops,  became  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  in  India,  with 
Donald  Stewart  as  his  deputy.  The  order  limiting  the  tenure  of 
employment  on  the  staff  in  the  same  grade  to  five  years  was  also  now 
introduced,  which  entailed  my  good  friend  Arthur  Becher  vacating  the 
Quartermaster-Generalship,  after  having  held  it  for  eleven  years.  He 
was  succeeded  by  Colonel  Paton,  with  Lumsden  as  his  deputy,  and 
Charles  Johnson  (brother  of  Edwin  Johnson)  and  myself  as  assistants 
in  the  Department. 


CHAPTER  XXXY. 

In  the  autumn  of  1863,  while  we  were  preparing  for  the  usual  winter 
tour,  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  who  had  accompanied  Lord  Elgin  on  a trip 
through  the  hills,  telegraphed  to  the  Head-Quarters  staff  to  join  him 
at  Mian  Mir  without  delay. 

The  news  which  greeted  us  on  our  arrival  was  indeed  disturbing. 
Lord  Elgin  was  at  Dharmsala  in  a dying  condition,  and  the  Chief  had 
been  obliged  to  leave  him  and  push  on  to  Lahore,  in  consequence  of 
unsatisfactory  reports  from  Brigadier-General  Chamberlain,  who  was 
just  then  commanding  an  expedition  which  had  been  sent  into  the 
mountains  near  Peshawar,  and  had  met  with  unexpected  opposition. 
The  civil  authorities  on  the  spot  reported  that  there  existed  a great 
deal  of  excitement  all  along  the  border,  that  the  tribes  were  collecting 
in  large  numbers,  that  emissaries  from  Kabul  had  appeared  amongst 
them,  and  that,  unless  reinforcements  could  be  sent  up  at  once,  the 
Government  would  be  involved  in  a war  which  must  inevitably  lead  to 
the  most  serious  complications,  not  only  on  the  frontier,  but  with 

* The  late  General  Sir  Edmund  Haythorne,  K.C.  B. 


1 86.,] 


THE  UMBEYLA  EXPEDITION 


281 


Afghanistan.  In  so  grave  a light  did  the  Lieutenant-Governor,  Sir 
Robert  Montgomery,  view  the  position,  that  ho  contemplated  the  force 
being  withdrawn  and  the  undertaking  abandoned. 

Sir  Hugh  had  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  despatch  of  this  expedition ; 
it  had  been  decided  on  by  the  Government  of  India  in  consultation 
with  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  Punjab.  "When  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  was  communicated  with,  he  expressed  himself  adverse  to  the 
proposal,  and  placed  his  views  at  length  before  the  Government, 
pointing  out  the  inexpediency  of  entering  a difficult  and  unknown 
country,  unless  the  troops  were  properly  equipped  with  transport, 
supplies,  and  reserve  ammunition ; that  time  did  not  permit  of  their 
being  so  equipped  before  the  winter  set  in ; and  that,  to  provide  a force 
of  5,000  men  (the  strength  considered  necessary  by  the  Government), 
the  frontier  would  have  to  be  dangerously  weakened.  Moreover,  he 
gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  it  would  bo  better  to  postpone  operations 
until  the  spring,  when  everything  could  be  perfectly  arranged.  Sub- 
sequent events  proved  how  sound  was  this  advice.  But  before  pro- 
ceeding with  my  narrative  it  will  be  as  well  to  explain  the  circumstances 
with  led  the  authorities  to  undertake  this  expedition. 

In  1857,  when  all  our  resources  were  required  to  quell  internal 
tumult,  the  Hindustani  fanatics*  took  the  opportunity  to  stir  up  dis- 
turbances all  along  the  Yusafzai  frontier  of  the  Peshawar  district,  and, 
aided  by  the  rebel  sepoys  who  had  fled  to  them  for  protection,  they 
made  raids  upon  our  border,  and  committed  all  kinds  of  atrocities. 
We  were  obliged,  therefore,  to  send  an  expedition  against  them  in  1858, 
which  resulted  in  their  being  driven  from  their  stronghold,  Sitana, 
and  in  the  neighbouring  tribes  being  bound  down  to  prevent  them  re- 
occupying that  place.  Three  years  later  the  fanatics  returned  to  their 
former  haunts  and  built  up  a new  settlement  at  Malka ; the  old 
troubles  recommenced,  and  for  two  years  they  had  been  allowed  to  go 
on  raiding,  murdering,  and  attacking  our  outposts  with  impunity.  It 
was,  thei'efore,  quite  time  that  measures  should  be  taken  to  effectually 
rid  the  frontier  of  these  disturbers  of  the  peace,  provided  such  measures 
could  have  been  decided  upon  early  enough  in  the  year  to  ensure  success. 

* In  1825  a religious  adventurer  from  Bareilly  made  his  appearance  on  the 
Yusafzai  frontier  with  about  forty  Hindustani  followers,  and  gave  out  that 
he  was  a man  of  superior  sanctity,  and  had  a divine  command  to  wage  a war 
of  extermination,  with  the  aid  of  all  true  believers,  against  the  infidel.  After 
studying  Arabic  at  Delhi,  he  proceeded  to  Mecca  by  way  of  Calcutta,  and 
during  this  journey  his  doctrines  had  obtained  so  great  an  ascendency  over 
the  minds  of  the  Maliomedans  of  Bengal  that  they  have  ever  since  supplied 
the  colony  which  Syad  Ahmed  Shah  founded  in  Y usafzai  with  money  and 
recruits.  The  Syad  was  eventually  slain  fighting  against  the  Sikhs,  but  his 
followers  established  themselves  at  Sitana,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  that 
place  they  continue  to  flourish,  notwithstanding  that  we  have  destroyed  their 
settlements  more  than  once  during  the  last  forty  years. 


282 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


t 1 863 


The  Punjab  Government  advocated  the  despatch  of  a very  strong 
force.  Accordingly,  two  columns  were  employed,  the  base  of  one 
being  in  the  Peshawar  valley,  and  that  of  the  other  in  Hazara.  The 
Peshawar  column  was  to  move  by  the  Umbeyla  Pass,  the  Buner 
frontier,  and  the  Chamla  valley,  thus  operating  on  the  enemy’s  line  of 
retreat.  This  route  would  not  have  been  chosen,  had  not  Chamberlain 
been  assured  by  the  civil  authorities  that  no  hostility  need  be  feared 
from  the  Bunerwals,  even  if  their  country  had  to  be  entered,  as  they 
had  given  no  trouble  for  fifteen  years,  and  their  spiritual  head,  the 
Akhund  of  Swat,*  had  no  sympathy  with  the  fanatics.  It  was  not, 
therefore,  considered  necessary  to  warn  the  Buner  people  of  our 
approach  until  preparations  were  completed;  indeed,  it  was  thought 
unadvisable  to  do  so,  as  it  was  important  to  keep  the  proposed  line  of 
advance  secret.  The  strength  of  the  force  was  6,000  men,  with  19  guns, 
but  to  make  up  these  numbers  the  stations  in  Upper  India  had  to  be 
considerably  weakened,  and  there  was  no  reserve  nearer  than  Lahore. 

The  Peshawar  columnf  being  all  ready  for  a start,  a Proclamation 
was  forwarded  to  the  Buner  and  other  neighbouring  tribes,  informing 
them  of  the  object  of  the  expedition,  and  stating  that  there  was  no 
intention  of  interfering  with  them  or  their  possessions. 

On  the  following  morning,  the  20th  October,  the  Umbeyla  Pass  was 
entered,  and  by  noon  the  kotalj  was  reached  without  any  resistance  to 
speak  of ; but,  from  information  brought  in,  it  was  evident  that  any 
further  advance  would  be  stoutly  opposed.  The  road  turned  out  to  be 
much  more  difficult  than  had  been  anticipated,  and  the  hurriedly 
collected  transport  proved  unequal  to  the  strain.  Not  a single  baggage 
animal,  except  the  ammunition  mules,  got  up  that  night ; indeed,  it 
was  not  until  the  morning  of  the  22nd — more  than  forty-eight  hours 
after  they  started — that  the  rear  guard  reached  the  kotal,  a distance  of 
only  six  miles.  As  soon  as  it  arrived  Colonel  Alex.  Taylor,  R.E.,  was 
sent  off  with  a body  of  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Probyn,  to' 
reconnoitre  the  road  in  front.  The  delay  in  reaching  the  top  of  the 

* The  Akhund  of  Swat  was  a man  of  seventy  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  the 
Umbeyla  expedition  ; ho  had  led  a holy  life,  ami  had  gained  inch  an  influence 
over  the  minds  of  Mahomedans  in  general,  that  they  believed  he  was  supplied 
by  supernatural  means  with  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  that  every  morning,  on 
rising  from  his  prayers,  a sum  of  money  sufficient  for  the  day’s  expenditure 
was  found  under  his  praying  carpet. 

f The  Peshawar  column  consisted  of  half  of  19th  Company  Royal  Artillery, 
No.  3 Punjab  Light  Field  Battery,  the  Peshawar  and  Hazara  Mountain 
Batteries,  the  71st  and  101st  Foot,  the  Guides,  one  troop  11th  Bengal  Lancers, 
one  company  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners,  14th  Sikhs,  20th  Punjab  Infantry, 
32nd  Pioneers,  1st,  3rd,  5th  and  6th  Punjab  Infantry,  and  4th  and  5th 
Gurkhas.  The  Hazara  column  consisted  of  a wing  of  the  51st  Foot,  300 
Native  Cavalry,  a regiment  of  Native  Infantry  and  eight  guns,  holding 
Darband,  Torbela,  and  Topi  on  the  Indus. 

if  The  highest  point  of  a pass  crossing  a mountain  range. 


THE  AKHUND  OF  SWAT 


283 


18631 

pass  had  given  the  tribes  time  to  collect,  and  when  the  reconnoitring 
party  entered  the  Chamla  valley  the  Bunerwals  could  be  seen  about 
two  miles  and  a half  off,  occupying  in  force  the  range  which  separates 
Buner  and  Chamla.  Whatever  may  have  been  their  first  intention, 
they  apparently  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  try  and  cut  off  this 
small  body  of  Cavalry,  for  our  horsemen  on  their  return  journey  found 
a large  number  of  the  trusted  Buner  tribe  attempting  to  block  the 
mouth  of  the  pass.  A charge  was  made,  but  mounted  men  could  not 
do  much  in  such  a hilly  country ; the  proceedings  of  the  Bunerwals, 
however,  had  been  observed  from  the  kotal,  and  Major  Brownlow,* 
with  some  of  his  own  regiment  (the  20th  Punjab  Infantry),  was  sent 
to  the  assistance  of  the  party.  A hand-to-hand  fight  ensued,  and  the 
enemy  pressed  our  troops  closely  on  their  way  back,  coming  right  in 
amongst  them  with  the  utmost  daring. 

There  was  now  brought  in  to  the  Commissioner  by  a spy  the  copy  of 
a letter  from  the  Hindustani  fanatics,  addressed  to  the  Bunerwals, 
telling  them  not  to  bo  taken  in  by  our  assurances  that  our  only  object 
was  to  punish  the  fanatics,  for  our  real  intentions  were  to  annex  Chamla, 
Buner,  and  Swat.  This  letter  no  doubt  aroused  the  suspicions  of  the 
tribes,  and,  encouraged  by  the  slowness  of  our  movements,  they  all 
joined  against  us  from  Buner,  Mahaban,  and  the  Black  Mountain. 

On  the  23rd  large  bodies  of  men  with  numerous  standards  were  to 
be  seen  approaching  the  mouth  of  the  pass,  and  a day  or  two  later  a 
report  was  received  that  our  foes  were  to  have  the  support  of  the 
Akhund  of  Swat,  which  meant  a most  formidable  accession  of  moral 
as  well  as  material  strength,  and  put  a stop,  for  the  time  being,  to  any 
possibility  of  a successful  advance  being  made  with  the  force  at 
Chamberlain’s  disposal. 

The  position  occupied  by  our  troops  was  enclosed  on  the  left  (west) 
by  the  Guru  Mountain,  which  separates  Umbeyla  from  Buner,  and  on 
the  right  (east)  by  a range  of  hills,  not  quite  so  high.  The  main 
piquet  on  the  Guru  occupied  a position  upon  some  precipitous  cliffs 
known  as  the  Eagle’s  Nest,  while  that  on  the  right  was  designated  the 
‘ Crag  piquet.’  The  Eagle’s  Nest  was  only  large  enough  to  accom- 
modate 110  men,  so  120  more  were  placed  under  the  shelter  of  some 
rocks  at  its  base,  and  the  remainder  of  the  troops  told  off  for  the 
defence  of  the  left  piquet  were  drawn  up  on  and  about  a rocky  knoll, 
400  feet  west  of  the  Eagle’s  Nest. 

Some  2,000  of  the  enemy  occupied  a breastwork  on  the  crest  of  a 
spur  of  the  Guru  Mountain ; and  about  noon  on  the  26th  they  moved 
down,  and  with  loud  shouts  attacked  the  Eagle’s  Nest.  Their  match- 
lock men  posted  themselves  to  the  greatest  advantage  in  a wood,  aDd 
opened  a galling  fire  upon  our  defences,  while  their  swordsmen  made 


Now  General  Sir  Charles  Brownlow,  G.C.B. 


284 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1863 


a determined  advance.  The  nature  of  the  ground  prevented  our  guns 
from  being  brought  to  bear  upon  the  assailants,  and  they  were  thus 
able  to  get  across  the  open  space  in  front  of  the  piquet,  and  plant  their 
standards  close  under  its  parapet.  For  some  considerable  time  they 
remained  in  this  position,  all  our  efforts  to  dislodge  them  proving  of  no 
avail.  Eventually,  however,  they  were  forced  to  give  way,  and  were 
driven  up  the  hill,  leaving  the  ground  covered  with  their  dead,  and  a 
great  many  wounded,  who  were  taken  into  our  hospitals  and  carefully 
treated,  while  a still  greater  number  were  carried  off  by  their  friends. 
Our  losses  were,  2 British  officers,  1 Native  officer,  and  26  men  killed ; 
and  2 British  officers,  7 Native  officers,  and  86  men  wounded. 

The  day  following  the  fight  the  Bunerwals  were  told  they  might 
carry  away  their  dead,  and  we  took  advantage  of  their  acceptance  of 
this  permission  to  reason  with  them  as  to  the  uselessness  of  an  unneces- 
sary sacrifice  of  their  tribesmen,  which  would  be  the  certain  result  of 
further  opposition  to  us.  Their  demeanour  was  courteous,  and  they 
conversed  freely  with  General  Chamberlain  and  Colonel  Reynell 
Taylor,  the  Commissioner,  but  they  made  it  evident  that  they  were 
determined  not  to  give  in. 

Our  position  had  now  become  rather  awkward  ; there  was  a combina- 
tion against  us  of  all  the  tribes  between  the  Indus  and  the  Kabul  rivers, 
and  their  numbers  could  not  be  less  than  15,000  armed  men.  Mutual 
animosities  were  for  the  time  allowed  to  remain  in  abeyance,  and  the 
tribes  all  flocked  to  fight  under  the  Akhund’s  standard  in  the  interests 
of  their  common  faith.  Moreover,  there  was  trouble  in  the  rear  from 
the  people  along  the  Yusafzai  border,  who  assisted  the  enemy  by 
worrying  our  lines  of  communication.  Under  these  changed  condi- 
tions, and  with  such  an  inadequate  force,  Chamberlain  came  to  the 
conclusion  that,  for  the  moment,  he  could  only  remain  on  the  defensive, 
and  trust  to  time,  to  the  discouragement  which  repeated  unsuccessful 
attacks  were  sure  to  produce  on  the  enemy,  and  to  the  gradual  decrease 
of  their  numbers,  to  break  up  the  combination  against  us ; for,  as  these 
tribesmen  only  bring  with  them  the  quantity  of  food  they  are  able  to 
carry,  as  soon  as  it  is  finished  they  are  bound  to  suspend  operations 
till  more  can  be  procured. 

For  three  weeks  almost  daily  attacks  were  made  on  our  position ; the 
enemy  fought  magnificently,  some  of  them  being  killed  inside  our 
batteries,  and  twice  they  gained  possession  of  the  ‘ Crag  piquet,’  the 
key  of  the  position,  which  it  was  essential  should  be  retaken  at  all 
hazards.  On  the  second  occasion  General  Chamberlain  himself  led  the 
attacking  party,  and  was  so  severely  wounded  that  he  was  obliged  to 
relinquish  the  command  of  the  force. 

The  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  Punjab,  being  convinced  that  rein- 
forcements were  necessary,  in  consultation  with  Colonels  Durand*  and 

* The  late  Sir  Henry  Marion  Durand,  K.C.S.I.,  C.B.,  afterwards  Lieutenant- 
Governor  of  the  Punjab. 


i863] 


THE  DEATH  OF  LORD  ELGIN 


285 


Norman  (the  Foreign  and  Military  Secretaries,  who  had  come  to 
Lahore  to  meet  the  Viceroy),  and  without  waiting  for  the  sanction  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  ordered  to  the  frontier  the  three  regiments 
which  had  been  detailed  for  the  Viceroy’s  camp,*  as  well  as  the  93rd 
Highlanders,  then  at  Sialkot ; and  when  Sir  Hugh  Rose  on  his  arrival 
at  Lahore  heard  of  the  heavy  losses  the  expeditionary  force  had  sus- 
tained, and  of  General  Chamberlain  being  hors  de  combat  from  his 
wound,  further  reinforcements  from  every  direction  were  hurried  to  the 
front.  Subsequently,  however,  it  became  a question  whether  the  troops 
should  not  be  withdrawn  altogether,  and  the  punishment  of  the  fanatics 
given  up,  the  Government  of  India  and  the  Punjab  Government  being 
completely  in  accord  in  favouring  this  view,  while  the  Commissioner  of 
Peshawar,  Major  James  (who  had  succeeded  Reynell  Taylor), f and 
Sir  Hugh  Rose  were  as  strongly  opposed  to  a retrograde  movement. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  pointed  out  to  the  Government  that  the  loss 
of  prestige  and  power  we  must  sustain  by  retiring  from  the  Umbeyla 
Pass  would  be  more  disastrous,  both  from  a military  and  political  point 
of  view,  than  anything  that  could  happen  save  the  destruction  of  the 
force  itself,  and  that  General  Chamberlain,  on  whose  sound  judgment 
he  could  rely,  was  quite  sure  that  a retirement  was  unnecessary. 

Unfortunately  at  this  time  the  Viceroy  died  at  Dharmsala,  and  the 
question  remained  in  abeyance  pending  the  arrival  of  Sir  William 
Denison,  Governor  of  Madras,  who  was  coming  round  to  take  over  the 
reins  of  Government  until  a successor  to  Lord  Elgin  should  be  sent 
from  England. 

In  the  meantime  Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  most  anxious  to  obtain  exact 
information  respecting  our  position  at  Umbeyla,  the  means  of  operating 
from  it,  the  nature  of  the  ground — in  fact,  all  details  which  could  only 
be  satisfactorily  obtained  by  sending  someone  to  report  on  the  situation, 
with  whom  he  had  had  personal  communication  regarding  the  points 
about  which  he  required  to  be  enlightened.  He  therefore  determined 
to  despatch  two  officers  on  special  service,  whose  duty  it  would  be  to 
put  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  possession  of  all  the  facts  of  the  case  ; 
accordingly,  Colonel  AdyeJ  (Deputy- Adjutant -General  of  Royal 
Artillery)  and  I were  ordered  to  proceed  to  Umbeyla  without  delay. 

Adye  proved  a most  charming  travelling  companion,  clever  and 
entertaining,  and  I think  we  both  enjoyed  our  journey.  We  reached 
the  pass  on  the  25th  November. 

There  had  been  no  fighting  for  some  days,  and  most  of  the  wounded 
had  been  removed.  Sir  Neville  Chamberlain  was  still  in  camp,  and  I 
was  sorry  to  find  him  suffering  greatly  from  his  wound.  We  were 

* 7th  Royal  Fusiliers,  23rd  Pioneers,  and  24th  Punjab  Native  Infantry. 

t Reynell  Taylor  remained  with  the  force  as  political  officer. 

t General  Sir  John  Adye,  G.C.B. 


286 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1863 


much  interested  in  going  over  the  piquets  and  listening  to  the  story  of 
the  different  attacks  made  upon  them,  which  had  evidently  been  con- 
ducted by  the  enemy  with  as  much  skill  as  courage* * * §  The  loyalty  of 
our  Native  soldiers  struck  me  as  having  been  most  remarkable.  Not 
a single  desertion  had  occurred,  although  all  the  Native  regiments 
engaged,  with  the  exception  of  the  Gurkhas  and  Punjab  Pioneers,  had 
amongst  them  members  of  the  several  tribes  we  were  fighting,  and 
many  of  our  soldiers  were  even  closely  related  to  some  of  the  hostile 
tribesmen ; on  one  occasion  a young  Buner  sepoy  actually  recognized 
his  own  father  amongst  the  enemy’s  dead  when  the  fight  was  over.+ 
We  listened  to  many  tales  of  the  gallantry  of  the  British  officers. 
The  names  of  Brownlow,  Keyes, £ and  Hughes  § were  on  everyone’s 
lips,  and  Brownlow’s  defence  of  the  Eagle’s  Nest  on  the  26th  October, 
and  of  the  ‘ Crag  piquet  ’ on  the  12th  November,  spoke  volumes  for  his 
coolness  and  pluck,  and  for  the  implicit  faith  reposed  in  him  by  the 
men  of  the  20th  Punjab  Infantry,  the  regiment  he  had  raised  in  1857 
when  but  a subaltern.  In  his  official  report  the  General  remarked 
that  ‘ to  Major  Brownlow’s  determination  and  personal  example  he 
attributed  the  preservation  of  the  “ Crag  piquet.”  ’ And  Keyes’s 
recapture  of  the  same  piquet  was  described  by  Sir  Neville  as  ‘ a most 
brilliant  exploit,  stamping  Major  Keyes  as  an  officer  possessing  some 
of  the  highest  military  qualifications.’  Brownlow  and  Keyes  were  both 
recommended  for  the  Victoria  Cross. 


* The  expedition  was  an  admirable  school  lor  training  men  in  outpost  duty. 
The  Pathans  and  Gurkhas  were  quite  at  home  at  such  work,  and  not  only  able 
to  take  care  of  themselves,  but  when  stalked  by  the  enemy  were  equal  to  a 
counter-stalk,  often  most  successful.  The  enemy  used  to  joke  with  Brownlow’s 
and  Keyes’s  men  on  these  occasions,  and  say,  ‘ We  don’t  want  you.  Where 
are  the  led  pagriwalas  ? [as  the  14th  Sikhs  were  called  from  their  lal  pagris 
(red  turbans)]  or  the  goralog  [the  Europeans]  ? They  are  better  shikar  [sport]  !’ 
The  tribesmen  soon  discovered  that  the  Sikhs  and  Europeans,  though  full  of 
fight,  were  very  helpless  on  the  hill-side,  and  could  not  keep  their  heads 
under  cover. 

f Colonel  Reynell  Taylor,  whilst  bearing  like  testimony  to  the  good  conduct 
of  the  Pathan  soldiery,  said  the  personal  influence  of  officers  will  always  be 
found  to  be  the  only  stand-by  for  the  Government  interests  when  the  religious 
cry  is  raised,  and  the  fidelity  of  our  troops  is  being  tampered  with.  Pay, 
pensions,  and  orders  of  merit  may,  and  would,  be  cast  to  tne  winds  when  the 
honour  of  the  faith  was  in  the  scale  ; but  to  snap  the  associations  of  years, 
and  to  turn  in  his  hour  of  need  against  the  man  whom  he  has  proved  to  be 
just  and  worthy,  whom  he  has  noted  in  the  hour  of  danger,  and  praised  as  a 
hero  to  his  family,  is  just  what  a Pathan  will  not  do — to  his  honour  be  it 
said.  The  fact  was  that  the  officers  in  camp  had  been  so  long  and  kindly 
associated  with  their  soldiers  that  the  latter  were  willing  to  set  them  before 
their  great  religious  teacher,  the  Aklmnd  of  Swat  (‘Records  of  Expeditions 
against  the  North-West  Frontier  Tribes’). 

X The  late  General  Sir  Charles  Keyes,  G.C.B. 

§ The  late  Major-General  T.  E.  Hughes,  C.B.,  Ro}*al  Artillery. 


1863] 


THE  ENEMY  DISHEARTENED 


287 


We  (Adye  and  I)  had  no  difficulty  in  making  up  our  minds  as  to 
the  course  which  ought  to  be  taken.  The  column  was  daily  being 
strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  and  although  the 
combination  of  the  tribesmen  was  still  formidable,  the  enemy  were 
showing  signs  of  being  disheartened  by  their  many  losses,  and  of  a 
wish  to  come  to  terms. 

Having  consulted  the  civil  and  military  authorities  on  the  spot,  we 
informed  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  they  were  of  opinion  a with- 
drawal would  be  most  unwise,  and  that  it  was  hoped  that  on  the 
arrival  of  General  Garvock*  (Chamberlain’s  successor)  an  advance 
would  be  made  into  the  Chamla  valley,  for  there  would  then  be  a 
sufficient  number  of  troops  to  undertake  an  onward  move,  as  well  as 
to  hold  the  present  position,  which,  as  we  told  the  Chief,  was  one  of 
the  strongest  we  had  ever  seen. 

Sir  William  Denison  reached  Calcutta  on  the  2nd  December.  A 
careful  study  of  the  correspondence  in  connexion  with  the  Umbeyla 
expedition  satisfied  him  that  the  Commander-in-Chief’s  views  were 
correct,  and  that  a retirement  would  be  unwise. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  had  previously  requested  to  be  allowed  to  personally 
conduct  the  operations,  and  in  anticipation  of  the  Government  acceding 
to  his  request,  he  had  sent  a light  camp  to  Hasan  Abdal,  from  which 
place  he  intended  to  push  on  to  Umbeyla ; and  with  the  object  of 
collecting  troops  near  the  frontier,  where  they  would  be  available  as 
a reserve  should  the  expedition  not  be  soon  and  satisfactorily  settled, 
he  desired  me  to  select  an  encamping-ground  between  Rawal  Pindi  and 
Attock  suitable  for  10,000  men. 

Leaving  Adye  in  the  pass,  I started  for  Attock,  where  I spent  three 
days  riding  about  in  search  of  a promising  site  for  the  camp.  I 
settled  upon  a place  near  Hasan  Abdal,  which,  however,  was  not  in  the 
end  made  use  of.  The  people  of  the  country  were  very  helpful  to  me ; 
indeed,  when  they  heard  I had  been  a friend  of  John  Nicholson,  they 
seemed  to  think  they  could  not  do  enough  for  me,  and  delighted  in 
talking  of  their  old  leader,  whom  they  declared  to  be  the  greatest  man 
they  had  ever  known. 

On  my  return  I marched  up  the  pass  with  the  Rev.  W.  G.  Cowiet 
and  Probyn,  who,  with  400  Cavalry,  had  been  ordered  to  the  front  to 
be  in  readiness  for  a move  into  the  Chamla  valley.  James,  the  Com- 
missioner, had  been  working  to  detach  the  Bunerwals  from  the  com- 
bination against  us,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  our  arrival  a deputation 
of  their  headmen  arrived  in  camp,  and  before  their  departure  the  next 
morning  they  promised  to  accompany  a force  proceeding  to  destroy 
Malka,  and  to  expel  the  Hindustani  fanatics  from  the  Buner  country. 

* The  late  General  Sir  John  Garvock,  G.C.B. 
t Now  Bishop  of  Auckland  and  Primate  of  New  Zealand. 

19 


288 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[ 1 863 


Later,  however,  a messenger  came  in  to  say  they  could  not  fulfil  their 
promise,  being  unable  to  resist  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  them 
by  their  co-religionists.  The  man  further  reported  that  large  numbers 
of  fresh  tribesmen  had  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  that  it  was  intended 
to  attack  us  on  the  16th.  He  advised  the  Commissioner  to  take  the 
initiative,  and  gave  him  to  understand  that  if  we  advanced  the  Buner- 
wals  would  stand  aloof. 

Sir  Hugh  Bose  had  been  accorded  permission  to  take  command  of 
the  troops  in  the  field,  and  had  sent  word  to  General  Garvock  not  ‘ to 
attempt  any  operations  until  further  orders.’  James,  however,  think- 
ing that  the  situation  demanded  immediate  action,  as  disturbances  had 
broken  out  in  other  parts  of  the  Peshawar  valley,  deprecated  delay, 
and  pressed  Garvock  to  advance,  telling  him  that  a successful  fight 
would  put  matters  straight.  Garvock  consented  to  follow  the  Commis- 
sioner’s advice,  arid  arranged  to  move  on  the  following  day. 

The  force  was  divided  into  three  columns.  The  first  and  second — 
consisting  of  about  4,800  men,  and  commanded  respectively  by  Colonel 
W.  Turner,  C.B.,*  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wilde,  C.B. — were  to  form 
the  attacking  party,  while  the  third,  about  3,000  strong,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Vaughan, f was  to  be  left  for  the 
protection  of  the  camp. 

At  daybreak,  on  the  15th,  the  troops  for  the  advance,  unencum- 
bered by  tents  or  baggage,  and  each  man  carrying  two  days’  rations, 
assembled  at  the  base  of  the  ‘ Crag  piquet.’  Turner,  an  excellent 
officer,  who  during  the  short  time  he  had  been  at  Umbeyla  had 
inspired  great  confidence  by  his  soldierly  qualities,  had  on  the  previous 
afternoon  reconnoitred  to  the  right  of  the  camp,  and  had  discovered 
that  about  4,000  men  were  holding  the  village  of  Lalu,  from  which  it 
was  necessary  to  dislodge  them  before  Umbeyla  could  be  attacked. 
On  being  told  to  advance,  therefore,  Turner  moved  off  in  the  direction 
of  Lalu,  and,  driving  the  enemy’s  piquets  before  him,  occupied  the 
heights  overlooking  the  valley,  out  of  which  rose,  immediately  in  front 
about  200  yards  off,  a conical  hill  which  hid  Lalu  from  view.  This 
hill,  which  was  crowded  with  Hindustani  fanatics  and  their  Pathan 
allies,  was  a most  formidable  position ; the  sides  were  precipitous,  and 
the  summit  was  strengthened  by  sangars.%  No  further  move  could 
be  made  until  the  enemy  were  dislodged,  so  Turner  lined  the  heights 
all  round  with  his  Infantry,  and  opened  fire  with  his  Mountain  guns. 
Meanwhile,  Wilde’s  column  had  cleared  off  the  enemy  from  the  front 
of  the  camp,  and  formed  up  on  Turner’s  left.  On  the  advance  being 
sounded,  Turner’s  Infantry  rushed  down  the  slopes,  and  in  ten  minutes 
could  be  seen  driving  the  enemy  from  the  heights  on  his  right ; at  the 

* The  late  Brigadier-General  Sir  W.  W.  Turner,  K.C.B. 

f General  Sir  T.  L.  Vaughan,  K.C.B. 

X Stone  breastworks. 


19—2 


THE  STORMING  OF  THE  CONICAL  HILL  AT  UMBEYLA  BY  THE  IOIkt  FOOT  (BENGAL  I USILIERS). 

From  a sketch  by  General  Sir  John  Adye,  G.C.B.,  It. A. 


1863] 


THE  CONICAL  HILL 


289 


same  time  the  101st  Fusiliers,  the  leading  regiment  of  Wilde’s  column, 
made  straight  for  the  top  of  the  conical  hill,  and,  under  cover  of  the 
fire  from  the  Mountain  guns  of  both  columns,  and  supported  by  the 
Guides,  4th  Gurkhas,  and  23rd  Pioneers,  they  climbed  the  almost  perpen- 
dicular sides.  Wien  near  the  top  a short  halt  was  made  to  give  the  men 
time  to  get  their  breath ; the  signal  being  then  given,  amidst  a shower  of 
bullets  and  huge  stones,  the  position  was  stormed,  and  carried  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet.  It  was  a grand  sight  as  Adye  and  I watched  it 
from  Hughes’s  battery  ; but  we  were  considerably  relieved  when  we  per- 
ceived the  enemy  flying  down  the  sides  of  the  hill,  and  heard  the  cheers 
of  the  gallant  Fusiliers  as  they  stood  victorious  on  the  highest  peak. 

Now  that  the  enemy  were  on  the  rim  it  was  the  time  to  press  them, 
and  this  Turner  did  so  effectually  that  the  leading  men  of  his  column 
entered  Lalu  simultaneously  with  the  last  of  the  fugitives.  The 
rapidity  of  this  movement  was  so  unexpected  that  it  threw  the  enemy 
inside  the  walls  into  confusion ; they  made  no  stand,  and  were  soon  in 
full  retreat  towards  Umbeyla  and  the  passes  leading  into  Buner. 

While  affairs  were  thus  prospering  on  our  right,  the  enemy, 
apparently  imagining  we  were  too  busy  to  think  of  our  left,  came  in 
large  numbers  from  the  village  of  Umbeyla,  threatening  the  camp  and 
the  communications  of  the  second  column.  Wilde,  however,  was  pre- 
pared for  them,  and  held  his  ground  until  reinforced  by  Turner,  when 
he  made  a forward  movement.  The  Guides,  and  detachments  of  the 
5th  Gurkhas  and  3rd  Sikhs,  charged  down  one  spur,  and  the  101st 
down  another ; the  enemy  were  driven  off  with  great  slaughter,  leaving 
a standard  in  the  hands  of  the  Gurkhas,  and  exposing  themselves  in 
their  flight  to  Turner’s  guns.  During  the  day  they  returned,  and, 
gathering  on  the  heights,  made  several  unsuccessful  attacks  upon  our 
camp.  At  last,  about  2 p.m.,  Brownlow,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
right  defences,  assumed  the  offensive,  and,  aided  by  Keyes,  moved  out 
of  the  breastworks  and,  by  a succession  of  well-executed  charges,  com- 
pletely cleared  the  whole  front  of  the  position,  and  drove  the  tribesmen 
with  great  loss  into  the  plain  below. 

All  opposition  having  now  ceased,  and  the  foe  being  in  full  retreat, 
the  force  bivouacked  for  the  night.  We  had  16  killed  and  67  wounded ; 
while  our  opponents  admitted  to  400  killed  and  wounded. 

The  next  morning  we  were  joined  by  Probyn  with  200  sabres  of  the 
11th  Bengal  Lancers  and  the  same  number  of  the  Guides ; and  after  a 
hasty  breakfast  the  order  was  given  to  march  into  the  Chamla  valley. 
My  duty  was  to  accompany  the  Mountain  batteries  and  show  them  the 
way.  As  we  debouched  into  comparatively  open  country,  the  enemy 
appeared  on  a ridge  which  completely  covered  our  approach  to  Umbeyla, 
and  we  could  descry  many  standards  flying  on  the  most  prominent 
points.  The  road  was  so  extremely  difficult  that  it  was  half-past  two 
o’clock  before  the  whole  force  was  clear  of  the  hills. 


290 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1863 


General  Garvock,  having  made  a careful  reconnaissance  of  the 
enemy’s  position,  which  was  of  great  strength  and  peculiarly  capable 
of  defence,  had  decided  to  turn  their  right,  a movement  which  was  to 
be  entrusted  to  the  second  column,  and  I was  told  to  inform  Turner 
that  he  must  try  and  cut  them  off  from  the  Buner  Pass  as  they 
retreated.  I found  Turner  close  to  Umbeyla  and  delivered  my  message. 
He  moved  forward  at  once  with  the  23rd  Pioneers  and  a wing  of  the 
32nd  Pioneers  in  line,  supported  by  the  second  wing,  having  in  reserve 
a wing  of  the  7tlrRoyal  Fusiliers. 

When  we  had  passed  the  village  of  Umbeyla,  which  was  in  flames, 
having  been  set  fire  to  by  our  Cavalry,  the  wing  of  the  32nd  was 
brought  up  in  prolongation  of  our  line  to  the  right.  The  advance  was 
continued  to  within  about  800  yards  of  the  Buner  Pass,  when  Turner, 
observing  a large  body  of  the  enemy  threatening  his  left  flank,  imme- 
diately sent  two  companies  of  the  Royal  Fusiliers  in  that  direction. 
Just  at  that  moment  a band  of  Ghazis  furiously  attacked  the  left 
flank,  which  was  at  a disadvantage,  having  got  into  broken  ground 
covered  with  low  jungle.  In  a few  seconds  five  of  the  Pioneer  British 
officers  were  on  the  ground,  one  killed  and  four  wounded ; numbers  of 
the  men  were  knocked  over,  and  the  rest,  staggered  by  the  suddenness 
of  the  onslaught,  fell  back  on  their  reserve,  where  they  found  the 
needed  support,  for  the  Fusiliers  stood  as  firm  as  a rock.  At  the 
critical  moment  when  the  Ghazis  made  their  charge,  Wright,  the 
Assistant  Adjutant-General,  and  I,  being  close  by,  rushed  in  amongst 
the  Pioneers  and  called  on  them  to  follow  us ; as  we  were  personally 
known  to  the  men  of  both  regiments,  they  quickly  pulled  themselves 
together  and  responded  to  our  efforts  to  rally  them.  It  was  lucky  they 
did  so,  for  had  there  been  any  delay  or  hesitation,  the  enemy,  who 
thronged  the  slopes  above  us,  would  certainly  have  come  down  in 
great  numbers,  and  we  should  have  had  a most  difficult  task.  As  it 
was,  we  were  entirely  successful  in  repulsing  the  Ghazis,  not  a man  of 
whom  escaped.  We  counted  200  of  the  enemy  killed ; our  losses  were 
comparatively  slight — 8 killed  and  80  wounded. 

We  bivouacked  for  the  night  near  the  village  of  Umbeyla,  and  the 
next  morning  the  Bunerwals,  who,  true  to  their  word,  had  taken  no 
part  in  the  fighting  on  the  15th  or  16th,  came  in  and  made  their  sub- 
mission. 

The  question  which  now  had  to  be  decided  was,  whether  a force  fully 
equipped  and  strong  enough  to  overcomo  all  opposition  should  be  sent 
to  destroy  the  fanatic  settlement  of  Malka,  or  whether  the  work  of 
annihilation  should  be  entrusted  to  the  Bunerwals,  witnessed  by 
British  officers.  Tho  latter  course  was  eventually  adopted,  chiefly  on 
account  of  the  delay  which  provisioning  a brigade  would  entail — a 
delay  which  the  Commissioner  was  anxious  to  avoid— for  although 
for  the  present  the  combination  had  broken  up,  and  most  of  the 


BUNERWALS  AGREE  TO  00 R TERMS 


29 1 


1863] 

tribesmen  were  dispersing  to  their  homes,  the  Akluind  of  Swat  and 
his  followers  were  still  hovering  about  in  tho  neighbourhood,  and 
inaction  on  our  part  would  in  all  probability  have  led  to  a fresh 
gathering  and  renewed  hostilities. 

Tho  terms  which  were  drawn  up,  and  to  which  the  Bunerwals 
agreed,  were : 

The  breaking-up  of  the  tribal  gathering  in  the  Buner  Pass. 

The  destruction  of  Malka  ; those  carrying  out  the  work  to  bo  accom- 
panied by  British  officers  and  such  escort  as  might  be  considered  neces- 
sary by  us. 

The  expulsion  of  the  Hindustanis  from  the  Buner,  Chamla,  and 
Amazai  countries. 

And,  finally,  it  was  stipulated  that  the  headmen  of  their  tribe  should 
be  left  as  hostages  until  such  time  as  the  requirements  should  have 
been  fulfilled. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Saturday,  the  19th  December,  tho  little  party  of 
British  officers  who  were  to  witness  the  destruction  of  Malka  assembled 
at  Umbeyla.  Its  members  were  Reynell  Taylor  (who  was  in  charge), 
Alex.  Taylor  (Commanding  Engineer),  two  Survey  officers,  Wright, 
Adye,  and  myself.  Twenty-five  Cavalry  and  4 companies  of  the  Guides 
Infantry,  under  four  officers,  formed  our  escort,  and  it  had  been 
arranged  that  we  were  to  be  accompanied  by  four  leading  Buner 
Khans,  with  2,000  followers,  who  would  be  responsible  for  our  safety, 
and  destroy  the  fanatics’  stronghold  in  our  presence.  Bain  was  falling 
heavily,  but  as  all  our  arrangements  had  been  made,  and  delay  was 
considered  undesirable,  it  was  settled  that  we  should  make  a start.  It 
was  rough  travelling,  and  it  was  almost  dark  when  we  reached  Kuria, 
only  eight  miles  on  our  way,  where  we  halted  for  the  night,  and  where 
we  had  to  remain  the  next  day,  as  the  Bunerwals  declared  they  could 
not  continue  the  journey  until  they  had  come  to  an  understanding  with 
the  Amazais,  in  whose  territory  Malka  was  situated. 

We  had  noticed  on  leaving  Umbeyla  that,  instead  of  2,000  Bunerwals, 
there  were  only  about  sixty  or  seventy  at  the  most,  and  in  reply  to  our 
repeated  questions  as  to  what  had  become  of  the  remainder,  we  were 
told  they  would  join  us  later  on.  It  soon  became  evident,  however, 
that  no  more  were  coming,  and  that  the  Khans  thought  it  wiser  to 
trust  to  their  own  influence  with  the  Amazais  rather  than  to  intimi- 
dation. 

We  made  a fresh  start  on  the  morning  of  the  21st.  Malka  was 
only  twelve  miles  off,  but  the  way  was  so  difficult,  and  our  guides 
stopped  so  often  to  consult  with  the  numerous  bands  of  armed  men  we 
came  across,  that  it  was  sunset  before  we  arrived  at  our  destination. 

Malka  was  perched  on  a spur  of  the  Mahabun  mountain,  somo 
distance  below  its  highest  peak.  It  was  a strong,  well-built  place, 
with  accommodation  for  about  1,500  people.  The  Amazais  did  not 


292 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1863 


attempt  to  disguise  their  disgust  at  our  presence  in  their  country,  and 
they  gathered  in  knots,  scowling  and  pointing  at  us,  evidently  dis- 
cussing whether  we  should  or  should  not  be  allowed  to  return. 

The  next  morning  Malka  was  set  on  fire,  and  the  huge  column  of 
smoke  which  ascended  from  the  burning  village,  and  was  visible  for 
miles  round,  did  not  tend  to  allay  the  ill-feeling  so  plainly  displayed. 
The  Native  officers  of  the  Guides  warned  us  that  delay  was  dangerous, 
as  the  people  were  becoming  momentarily  more  excited,  and  were 
vowing  we  should  never  return.  It  was  no  use,  however,  to  attempt 
to  make  a move  without  the  consent  of  the  tribesmen,  for  we  were  a 
mere  handful  compared  to  the  thousands  who  had  assembled  around 
Malka,  and  we  were  separated  from  our  camp  by  twenty  miles  of 
most  difficult  country.  Our  position  was  no  doubt  extremelj’  critical, 
and  it  was  well  for  us  that  we  had  at  our  head  such  a cool,  determined 
leader  as  Beynell  Taylor.  I greatly  admired  the  calm,  quiet  manner 
in  which  he  went  up  and  spoke  to  the  headmen,  telling  them  that,  the 
object  of  our  visit  having  been  accomplished,  we  were  ready  to  retrace 
our  steps.  At  this  the  Amazais  became  still  further  excited.  They 
talked  in  loud  tones,  and  gesticulated  in  true  Pathan  fashion,  thronging 
round  Taylor,  who  stood  quite  alone  and  perfectly  self-possessed  in 
the  midst  of  the  angry  and  dangerous-looking  multitude.  At  this 
crisis  the  Bunerwals  came  to  our  rescue.  The  most  influential  of  the 
tribe,  a grey- bearded  warrior,  who  had  lost  an  eye  and  an  arm  in  some 
tribal  contest,  forced  his  way  through  the  rapidly  increasing  crowd  to 
Taylor’s  side,  and,  raising  his  one  arm  to  enjoin  silence,  delivered 
himself  as  follows  : ‘ You  are  hesitating  whether  you  will  allow  these 
English  to  return  unmolested.  You  can,  of  course,  murder  them  and 
their  escort ; but  if  you  do,  you  must  kill  us  Bunerwals  first,  for  we 
have  sworn  to  protect  them,  and  we  will  do  so  with  our  lives.’  This 
plucky  speech  produced  a quieting  effect,  and  taking  advantage  of  the 
lull  in  the  storm,  we  set  out  on  our  return  journey  ; but  evidently  the 
tribesmen  did  not  consider  the  question  finally  or  satisfactorily  settled, 
for  they  followed  us  the  whole  way  to  Kuria.  The  slopes  of  the  hills 
on  both  sides  were  covered  with  men.  Several  times  we  were  stopped 
while  stormy  discussions  took  place,  and  once,  as  we  were  passing 
through  a narrow  defile,  an  armed  Amazai,  waving  a standard  abovo 
his  head,  rushed  down  towards  us.  Fortunately  for  us,  he  was  stopped 
by  some  of  those  less  inimically  disposed  ; for  if  he  had  succeeded  in 
inciting  anyone  to  fire  a single  shot,  the  desire  for  blood  would  quickly 
have  spread,  and  in  all  probability  not  one  of  our  party  would  have 
escaped. 

On  the  23rd  December  we  reached  our  camp  in  the  Uinbeyla  Tass. 
when  the  force,  which  had  only  been  kept  there  till  our  return,  retired 
to  the  plains  and  was  broken  up. 

During  my  absence  at  U rnbeyla  my  wife  remained  with  friends  at 


MALKA  DESTROYED 


293 


1864] 

Mian  Mir  for  some  time,  and  then  made  her  way  to  Peshawar,  where 
I joined  her  on  Christmas  Day.  She  spent  one  night  en  route  in  Sir 
Hugh  Bose’s  camp  at  Hasan  Abdal,  and  found  the  Chief  in  great 
excitement  and  very  angry  at  such  a small  party  having  been  sent  to 
Malka,  and  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the  tribes.  He  did  not  know  that 
my  wife  had  arrived,  and  in  passing  her  tent  she  heard  him  say  : ‘ It 
was  madness,  and  not  one  of  them  will  ever  come  back  alive.’  She 
was  of  course  dreadfully  frightened.  As  soon  as  Sir  Hugh  heard  she 
was  in  camp,  he  went  to  see  her,  and  tried  to  soften  down  what  ho 
knew  she  must  have  heard ; but  he  could  not  conceal  his  apprehension ; 
and  my  poor  wife’s  anxiety  was  terrible,  for  she  did  not  hear  another 
word  till  the  morning  of  the  day  I returned  to  her. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

Early  in  the  New  Year  (1864)  Sir  Hugh  Bose,  with  the  Head-Quarters 
camp,  marched  into  Peshawar,  where  we  remained  until  the  middle  of 
February.  The  time  was  chiefly  spent  in  inspections,  parades,  and 
field-days,  varied  by  an  occasional  run  with  the  hounds.  The  hunting 
about  Peshawar  was  very  fair,  and  we  all,  the  Chief  included,  got  a 
great  deal  of  fun  out  of  our  small  pack. 

On  the  25th  January  a full-dress  parade  was  held  to  announce  to 
the  garrison  that  Sir  John  Lawrence  had  been  appointed  Viceroy  of 
India,  and  soon  afterwards  we  left  Peshawar  and  began  our  return 
march  to  Simla. 

We  changed  our  house  this  year  and  took  one  close  to  the  Stewarts, 
an  arrangement  for  which  I was  very  thankful  later,  when  my  wife 
had  a great  sorrow  in  the  death  of  her  sister,  Mrs.  Sladen,  at  Peshawar. 
It  was  everything  for  her  at  such  a time  to  have  a kind  and  sympa- 
thizing friend  close  at  hand,  when  I was  engaged  with  my  work  and 
could  be  very  little  with  her  during  the  day.  At  this  time,  as  at  all 
others,  Sir  Hugh  Bose  was  a most  considerate  friend  to  us  ; he  placed 
his  house  at  Mashobra  at  my  wife’s  disposal,  thus  providing  her  with  a 
quiet  resort  which  she  frequently  made  use  of  and  which  she  learned 
to  love  so  much  that,  when  I returned  to  Simla  as  Commander-in- 
Chief,  her  first  thought  was  to  secure  this  lovely  ‘ Retreat  ’ as  a refuge 
from  the  (sometimes)  slightly  trying  gaiety  of  Simla. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  was  good  enough  to  send  hr  my  name  for 
a brevet  for  the  Umbeyla  expedition,  but  the  Viceroy  refused  to  forward 
the  recommendation,  for  the  reason  that  I was  ‘too  junior  to  be  made 
a Lieutenant-Colonel.’  I was  then  thirty- two ! 

Throughout  the  whole  of  1864  I was  more  or  less  ill ; the  office 


294 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1864 

work  (which  never  suited  me  quite  as  well  as  more  active  employ- 
ment) was  excessive,  for,  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  routine,  I had 
undertaken  to  revise  the  ‘ Bengal  Route-Book,’  which  had  become 
quite  obsolete,  having  been  compiled  in  1837,  when  Kurnal  was  our 
frontier  station.  A voyage  round  the  Cape  was  still  considered  the 
panacea  for  all  Indian  ailments,  and  the  doctors  strongly  advised  my 
taking  leave  to  England,  and  travelling  by  that  route. 

"We  left  Simla  towards  the  end  of  October,  and,  after  spending  the 
next  three  months  in  Calcutta,  where  I was  chiefly  employed  in  taking 
up  transports  and  superintending  the  embarkation  of  troops  returning 
to  England,  I was  given  the  command  of  a batch  of  300  time-expired 
men  on  board  the  Renown,  one  of  Green’s  frigate-built  ships  which 
was  chartered  for  their  conveyance.  Two  hundred  of  the  men 
belonged  to  the  2nd  and  3rd  Battalions  of  the  Rifle  Brigade,  the 
remainder  to  the  Artillery  and  various  other  corps ; they  had  all  been 
twelve  years  in  the  army,  and  most  of  them  were  decorated  for  service 
in  the  Crimea  and  Indian  Mutiny. 

At  the  inspection  parade  before  we  embarked,  a certain  number  of 
men  were  brought  up  for  punishment  for  various  offences  committed 
on  the  way  down  country ; none  of  the  misdemeanours  appeared  to  me 
very  serious,  so  I determined  to  let  the  culprits  off.  I told  the  men 
that  we  had  now  met  for  the  first  time  and  I was  unwilling  to 
commence  our  acquaintance  by  awarding  punishments ; we  had  to 
spend  three  or  four  months  together,  and  I hoped  they  would  show, 
by  their  good  behaviour  while  under  my  command,  that  I had  not 
made  a mistake  in  condoning  their  transgressions.  The  officers  seemed 
somewhat  surprised  at  my  action  in  this  matter,  but  I think  it  was 
proved  by  the  men’s  subsequent  conduct  that  I had  not  judged  them 
incorrectly,  for  they  all  behaved  in  quite  an  exemplary  manner 
throughout  the  voyage. 

"We  had  been  on  board  more  than  six  weeks,  when  one  of  the  crew 
was  attacked  by  small  pox — an  untoward  circumstance  in  a crowded 
ship.  The  sailor  was  placed  in  a boat  which  was  hung  over  the  ship’s 
side,  and  a cabin-boy,  the  marks  on  whose  face  plainly  showed  that  he 
had  already  suffered  badly  from  the  disease,  was  told  off  to  look  after 
him.  The  man  recovered,  and  there  was  no  other  case.  Shortly 
before  we  reached  St.  Helena,  scurvy  appeared  amongst  the  troops, 
necessitating  lime-juice  being  given  in  larger  quantities,  but  what 
proved  a more  effectual  remedy  was  water-cress,  many  sacks  of  which 
were  laid  in  before  we  left  the  island. 

On  the  29th  May,  1865,  we  sighted  the  ‘ Lizard,’  and  took  a pilot  on 
board,  who  brought  with  him  a few  newspapers,  which  confirmed  the 
tidings  signalled  to  us  by  an  American  ship  that  the  war  between  the 
Federals  and  Confederates  was  at  an  end.  How  eagerly  we  scanned 
the  journals,  after  having  heard  nothing  from  home  for  four  months, 


CHOLERA  CAMPS 


1866] 


295 


but  the  only  piece  of  news  we  found  of  personal  interest  to  ourselves 
was  that  my  father  had  been  made  a K.C.B. 

On  the  30th  May  we  reached  Portsmouth,  and  landed  between  two 
showers  of  snow  ! I had  a final  parade  of  the  men  before  leaving  the 
ship,  and  I w’as  quite  sorry  to  say  good-bye  to  them ; some  of  the  poor 
fellow's  w’ere  already  beginning  to  be  anxious  about  their  future,  and  to 
regret  that  their  time  with  the  colours  was  over. 

My  father,  mother,  and  sister  came  up  to  London  to  meet  us,  very 
little  changed  since  I had  left  them  six  years  before.  I remained  in 
England  till  March,  1866,  when  I returned  to  India,  leaving  my  wife 
behind  to  follow  in  the  autumn. 

While  I was  at  home,  Sir  Hugh  Rose’s  term  of  the  chief  command 
in  India  came  to  an  end,  and  his  place  had  been  taken  by  Sir  William 
Mansfield.  On  my  arrival  in  Calcutta,  I received  orders  to  join  the 
Allahabad  division,  and  thither  I proceeded.  In  October  I went  to 
Calcutta  to  meet  my  wife  and  take  her  to  Allahabad,  where  we 
remained  for  nearly  a year,  her  first  experience  of  a hot  season  in 
the  plains,  and  a very  bad  one  it  was.  Cholera  was  rife ; the  troops 
had  to  be  sent  away  into  camps,  more  or  less  distant  from  the  station, 
all  of  which  had  to  be  visited  once,  if  not  twice,  daily ; this  kept  me 
pretty  well  on  the  move  from  morning  till  night.  It  was  a sad  time 
for  everyone.  People  we  had  seen  alive  and  w'ell  one  day  were  dead 
and  buried  the  next ; and  in  the  midst  of  all  this  sorrow  and  tragedy, 
the  most  irksome — because  such  an  incongruous — part  of  our  experi- 
ence was  that  we  had  constantly  to  get  up  entertainments,  penny 
readings,  and  the  like,  to  amuse  the  men  and  keep  their  minds 
occupied,  for  if  once  soldiers  begin  to  think  of  the  terrors  of  cholera, 
they  are  seized  with  panic,  and  many  get  the  disease  from  pure  fright. 

My  wife  usually  accompanied  me  to  the  cholera  camps,  preferring 
to  do  this  rather  than  be  left  alone  at  home.  On  one  occasion,  I had 
just  got  into  our  carriage  after  going  round  the  hospital,  when  a young 
officer  ran  after  us  to  tell  me  a corporal  in  whom  I had  been  much 
interested  was  dead.  The  poor  fellow’s  face  was  blue ; the  cholera 
panic  had  evidently  seized  him,  and  I said  to  my  wife,  ‘ He  will  be  the 
next.’  I had  no  sooner  reached  home  than  I received  a report  of  his 
having  been  seized. 

We  were  fortunate  in  having  at  Allahabad  as  Chaplain  the  present 
Bishop  of  Lahore,  who,  with  his  wife,  had  only  lately  come  to  India  ; 
they  never  wearied  in  doing  all  that  was  possible  for  the  soldiers. 
Bishop  Matthew  is  still  one  of  our  closest  friends  ; his  good,  charming, 
and  accomplished  wife,  alas  ! died  some  years  ago. 

We  remained  at  Allahabad  until  August,  1867,  when  we  heard  that 
a brigade  from  Bengal  was  likely  to  be  required  to  take  part  in  an 
expedition  which  would  probably  be  sent  from  Bombay  to  Abyssinia 
for  the  relief  of  some  Europeans  whom  the  King,  Theodore,  had 


296 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1867 


imprisoned,  and  that  the  Mountain  battery,  on  the  strength  of  which 
my  name  was  still  borne,  would  in  such  case  be  employed.  I therefore 
thought  I had  better  go  to  Simla,  see  the  authorities,  and  arrange  for 
rejoining  my  battery,  if  the  rumour  turned  out  to  be  true.  The 
cholera  had  now  disappeared,  so  I was  at  liberty  to  take  leave,  and  we 
both  looked  forward  to  a cooler  climate  and  a change  to  brighter 
scenes  after  the  wretched  experience  we  had  been  through.  On  my 
arrival  at  Simla  I called  upon  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  told  him 
that,  if  my  battery  was  sent  on  service,  I wished  to  join  it  and  was 
quite  ready  to  resign  my  staff  appointment. 

Sir  William  Mansfield  was  particularly  kind  hi  his  reception  of  me, 
from  which  I augured  well ; but  I could  learn  nothing  definite,  and 
it  was  not  until  quite  the  end  of  September  that  it  was  announced  that 
Colonel  Donald  Stewart  was  to  have  command  of  the  Bengal  Brigade 
with  the  Abyssinian  Force,  and  that  I was  to  be  his  Assistant-Quarter- 
master-General. We  at  once  hastened  back  to  Allahabad,  where  we 
only  remained  long  enough  to  pack  up  what  we  wanted  to  take  with 
us,  and  arrange  for  the  disposal  of  our  property ; thence  we  proceeded 
to  Calcutta,  where,  for  the  next  two  months,  I had  a busy  time  taking 
up  transports  and  superintending  the  equipment  of  the  force. 

I had  often  read  and  heard  of  the  difficulties  and  delays  experienced 
by  troops  landing  in  a foreign  country,  in  consequence  of  their  require- 
ments not  being  all  shipped  in  the  same  vessels  with  themselves — men 
in  one  ship,  camp  equipage  in  another,  transport  and  field  hospital  in 
a third,  or  perhaps  the  mules  in  one  and  their  pack-saddles  in  another; 
and  I determined  to  try  and  prevent  these  mistakes  upon  this  occasion. 
With  Stewart’s  approval,  I arranged  that  each  detachment  should 
embark  complete  in  every  detail,  which  resulted  in  the  troops  being 
landed  and  marched  off  without  the  least  delay  as  each  vessel  reached 
its  destination.* 

* The  average  strength  of  the  regiments  was  as  follows : 10th  and  12th 
Bengal  Cavalry,  each  9 British  officers,  13  Native  officers,  450  non-com- 
missioned officers  and  men,  3 Native  doctors,  489  horses,  322  mules,  590 
followers.  21st  and  23rd  Punjab  Infantry,  each  9 British  officers,  16  Native 
officers,  736  non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  3 Native  doctors,  10  horses, 
350  mules,  400  followers.  I found  that  six  ships  were  required  for  the  con- 
veyance of  a Cavalry  and  four  for  that  of  an  Infantry  regiment ; for  the 
Mountain  battery  three  ships  were  necessary,  and  for  the  coolie  corps  (1,550 
strong)  four  ; in  all  twenty-seven  ships,  besides  nine  tugs.  In  selecting  ships, 
care  was  taken  to  secure  those  intended  for  Artillery  or  Cavalry  as  high  ’tween- 
decks  as  possible  ; a sufficient  number  of  these  were  procurable  at  Calcutta, 
either  iron  clippers  from  Liverpool  or  large  North  American  built  traders 
with  decks  varying  from  7 feet  6 inches  to  8 feet  2 inches  high.  I gave  the 
preference  to  wooden  ships,  as  being  cooler  and  more  easily  ventilated.  The 
vessels  taken  up  were  each  from  1,000  to  1,400  tons,  averaging  in  length  from 
150  to  200  feet,  with  a beam  varying  from  30  to  35  feet,  and  usually  they  had 
a clear  upper  deck,  where  from  forty  to  fifty  animals  were  accommodated. 


THE  ABYSSINIAN  EXPEDITION 


297 


1867] 

We  were  living  with  the  Stewarts  in  the  Commander-in-Chief’s 
quarters  in  Fort  William,  which  His  Excellency  had  placed  at  our 
disposal  for  the  time  being.  On  the  1st  November  Calcutta  was  visited 
by  the  second  cyclone  within  my  experience.  We  had  arranged  to  go 
to  the  opera  that  evening,  but  when  it  was  time  to  start  the  wind  was 
so  high  that  there  seemed  every  chance  of  the  carriage  being  blown 
over  before  we  could  get  there,  so  we  decided  not  to  attempt  it.  It 
was  well  we  did,  for  the  few  adventurous  spirits  who  struggled  through 
the  storm  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  getting  back  to  their  homes. 
The  opera-house  was  unroofed  before  the  performance  was  half  over, 
and  very  little  of  the  building  remained  standing  the  next  day.  At 
bedtime  we  still  thought  it  was  only  a bad  storm,  but  towards  mid- 
night the  wind  increased  to  an  alarming  extent,  and  my  wife  awoke 
me,  and  begged  mo  to  get  up,  as  the  windows  were  being  burst  open 
and  deluges  of  rain  coming  in.  Stewart  and  I tried  to  reclose  the 
windows,  but  the  thick  non  bars  had  been  bent  in  two  and  forced  out 
of  their  sockets ; a heavy  oak  plate-chest  and  boxes,  which  we  with 
much  difficulty  dragged  across  the  windows,  were  blown  into  the 
middle  of  the  dining-room,  like  so  much  cardboard,  and  the  wholo 
place  was  gradually  flooded.  We  were  driven  out  of  each  room  in 
turn,  till  at  length  we  all  took  refuge  in  a small  box  room,  about  ten 
feet  wide,  right  in  tho  middle  of  the  house,  where  we  remained  the 
rest  of  the  night  and  ‘ hoped  for  the  day.’ 

Towards  morning  the  wind  abated,  but  what  a scene  of  desolation 
was  that  upon  which  we  emerged  ! The  rooms  looked  as  if  they  could 
never  be  made  habitable  again,  and  much  of  our  property  was  floating 
about  in  a foot  of  water. 

My  first  thought  was  for  the  shipping,  and  I hurried  down  to  the 
river  to  see  how  my  transports  had  fared.  Things  were  much  better 
than  I expected  to  find  them — only  two  had  been  damaged.  Most 
fortunately  the  cyclone,  having  come  from  a different  direction,  was 
not  accompanied  by  a storm-wave  such  as  that  which  worked  so  much 
mischief  amongst  the  shipping  on  a former  occasion,  but  the  destruction 
on  land  was  even  greater : all  the  finest  trees  were  torn  up  by  the 
roots,  a great  part  of  the  Native  bazaar  was  levelled,  and  lay  from  two 
to  three  feet  deep  in  water,  while  many  houses  were  wholly  or  partly 
demolished.  We  came  across  most  curious  sights  when  driving  round 
Calcutta  in  the  evening ; some  of  the  houses  were  divided  clean  down 
the  centre,  one  half  crumbled  into  a heap  of  ruins,  the  other  half  still 
standing  and  displaying,  as  in  a doll’s  house,  the  furniture  in  the 
different  stories. 

The  work  of  filling  up  and  loading  the  vessels  was  greatly  retarded, 
owing  to  a large  number  of  cargo  boats  having  been  sunk,  conse- 
quently it  was  the  5th  December  before  the  first  transport  got  off ; 
from  that  date  the  others  started  in  quick  succession,  and  on  the  9th 


298 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1868 

January,  1868,  Stewart  and  his  staff  left  Calcutta  in  the  P.  and  0. 
steamer  Golconda.  The  officers  and  men  of  the  Mountain  battery 
were  also  on  board,  Captain  Bogle  in  command,  my  friend  Jemmy 
Hills  in  my  place  as  second  Captain,  and  Colie n*  and  Disney  as 
subalterns.  Mrs.  Stewart  and  my  wife  accompanied  us  as  far  as  Aden, 
where  they  were  left  to  the  kind  care  of  Major-General  Bussell, f com- 
manding there  at  the  time,  until  the  arrival  of  the  mail-steamer  in 
which  they  were  to  proceed  to  England. 

On  the  3rd  February  we  anchored  in  Annesley  Bay  and  landed  at 
Zula. 


CHAPTEB  XXXVII. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  as  well  to  recall  to  the  reader’s  mind  that  the 
object  of  the  expedition  in  which  we  were  taking  part  was  to  rescue 
some  sixty  Europeans,  who,  from  one  cause  or  another,  had  found 
their  way  to  Abyssinia,  and  been  made  prisoners  by  the  King  of  that 
country.  Amongst  these  were  four  English  officials,  Mr.  Bassam,  and 
Captain  Cameron,  who  had  at  different  times  been  the  bearers  of 
letters  from  Queen  Victoria  to  King  Theodore,  and  Lieutenant  Prideaux 
and  Dr.  Blanc  of  the  Bombay  Army ; the  rest  were  chiefly  French 
and  German  missionaries,  and  artisans,  with  their  wives  and  children. 
The  prisoners  were  confined  in  a fort  built  on  the  Magdala  plateau, 
9,150  feet  above  sea-level,  and  379  miles  inland  from  Annesley  Bay. 

The  repeated  demands  of  the  British  Government  for  the  restoration 
of  the  prisoners  having  been  treated  with  contemptuous  silence  by  the 
King,  Colonel  Merewether,  the  Political  Agent  at  Aden,  who  in  July, 
1867,  had  been  directed  to  proceed  to  Massowa  and  endeavour  to 
obtain  the  release  of  the  captives,  and  to  make  inquiries  and  collect 
information  in  case  of  an  expedition  having  to  be  sent,  reported  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  that  he  had  failed  to  communicate  with  the  King, 
and  urged  the  advisability  of  immediate  measures  being  taken  to 
prepare  a force  in  India  for  the  punishment  of  Theodore  and  the 
rescue  of  the  prisoners.  Colonel  Merewether  added  that  in  Abyssinia 
the  opinion  had  become  very  general  that  England  knew  herself  to  be 
too  weak  to  resent  insult,  and  that  amongst  the  peoples  of  the  neigh- 
bouring countries,  even  so  far  as  Aden,  there  was  a feeling  of  con- 
temptuous surprise  at  the  continued  long-suffering  endurance  of  the 
British  Government. 

On  receipt  of  this  communication,  Her  Majesty’s  Government, 

# Now  Major-General  Sir  Edwin  Collen,  K.C.I.E.,  Military  Member  of  the 
Governor-General’s  Council. 

t Now  General  Sir  Edward  Lechmere  Bussell,  K.C.S.I. 


iS6S] 


SIR  ROBERT  NAPIER  TO  COMMAND 


299 


having  exhausted  all  their  resources  for  the  preservation  of  peace, 
decided  to  send  an  expedition  from  India  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Robert  Napier,  the  Commandcr-in-Chief  of 
the  Bombay  Army.  After  carefully  considering  the  distance  along 
which  operations  would  have  to  be  prosecuted,  and  the  necessity  for 
holding  a number  of  detached  posts,  Napier  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that 
the  force  should  consist  of  not  less  than  12,000  men.* 

Profiting  by  the  experience  of  the  Crimean  War,  the  Government 
was  determined  that  the  mobility  of  the  force  should  not  be  hampered 
by  want  of  food  and  clothing.  Stores  of  all  descriptions  were  despatched 
in  unstinted  quantities  from  England,  and  three  of  the  steamers  in 
which  they  were  conveyed  were  fitted  up  as  hospital  ships.  But  food, 
clothing,  and  stores,  however  liberally  supplied,  would  not  take  the 
army  to  Magdala  without  transport. 

The  question  as  to  the  most  suitable  organization  for  the  Land 
Transport  Corps  occupied  a good  deal  of  Sir  Robert  Napier’s  attention 
while  the  expedition  was  being  fitted  out,  and  caused  a considerable 
amount  of  correspondence  between  him  and  the  Bombay  Government. 
The  Commissary-General  wished  to  keep  the  corps  under  his  own 
orders,  and  objected  to  its  being  given  an  entirely  military  organization. 
Sir  Robert  Napier  preferred  to  establish  the  corps  on  an  independent 
basis,  but  was  at  first  overruled  by  the  Bombay  Government.  While 
acting  in  accordance  with  their  orders,  the  Commander-in-Cliief 
wrote : ‘ I believe  that  the  success  of  systems  depends  more  on  the 
men  who  work  them  than  on  the  systems  themselves ; but  I cannot 
accept  without  protest  a decision  to  throw  such  a body  of  men  as  the 
drivers  of  our  transport  animals  will  be  (if  we  get  them)  on  an  expe- 
dition in  a foreign  country  without  a very  complete  organization  to 
secure  order  and  discipline.’  Eventually  Sir  Robert  got  his  own  way, 
but  much  valuable  time  had  been  lost,  and  the  corps  was  organized  on 
too  small  a scale  ;t  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  were 
not  sent  to  Zula  in  sufficient  time  or  in  sufficient  numbers  to  take 
charge  of  the  transport  animals  as  they  arrived. 

A compact,  properly-supervised  train  of  2,000  mules,  with  service- 
able, well-fitting  pack-saddles,  was  sent  from  the  Punjab ; and  from 
Bombay  came  1,400  mules  and  ponies  and  5,600  bullocks,  but  these 
numbers  proving  altogether  inadequate  to  the  needs  of  the  expedition, 
they  were  supplemented  by  animals  purchased  in  Persia,  Egypt,  and 

* The  numbers  actually  despatched  from  India  were  13,548,  of  whom  3,786 
were  Europeans.  In  addition,  a company  of  Royal  Engineers  was  sent  from 
England. 

t At  first  it  was  thought  that  10,000  mules,  with  a coolie  corps  3,000 
strong,  would  suffice,  but  before  the  expedition  was  over,  it  was  found 
necessary  to  purchase  18,000  mules,  1,500  ponies,  1,800  donkeys,  12,000 
camels,  and  8,400  bullocks. 


300 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1868 

on  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  men  to  look  after  them  were 
supplied  from  the  same  sources,  but  their  number,  even  if  they  had 
been  efficient,  was  insufficient,  and  they  were  a most  unruly  and 
unmanageable  lot.  They  demanded  double  the  pay  for  which  they 
had  enlisted,  and  struck  work  in  a body  because  their  demand  was  not 
at  once  complied  with.  They  refused  to  take  charge  of  the  five  mules 
each  man  was  hired  to  look  after,  and  when  that  number  was  reduced 
to  three,  they  insisted  that  one  should  be  used  as  a mount  for  the 
driver.  But  the  worst  part  of  the  whole  organization,  or,  rather,  want 
of  organization,  was  that  there  had  been  no  attempt  to  fit  the  animals 
with  pack-saddles,  some  of  which  were  sent  from  England,  some  from 
India,  and  had  to  be  adjusted  to  the  mules  after  they  had  been  landed 
in  Abyssinia,  where  there  was  not  an  establishment  to  make  the 
necessary  alterations.  The  consequence  was  that  the  wretched  animals 
became  cruelly  galled,  and  in  a few  weeks  a large  percentage  were 
unfit  for  work,  and  had  to  be  sent  to  the  sick  depot. 

Other  results  of  having  no  properly  arranged  transport  train,  and  no 
supervision  or  discipline,  were  that  mules  were  lost  or  stolen,  starved 
for  want  of  food,  or  famished  from  want  of  water.  The  condition  of 
the  unfortunate  animals  was  such  that,  though  they  had  been  but  a 
few  weeks  in  the  country,  when  they  were  required  to  proceed  to 
Senafe,  only  sixty-seven  miles  distant,  a very  small  proportion  were 
able  to  accomplish  the  march ; hundreds  died  on  the  way,  and  their 
carcases,  quickly  decomposing  in  the  hot  sun,  became  a fruitful  source 
of  dangerous  disease  to  the  force. 

On  arrival  at  Zula,  we  were  told  that  Sir  Robert  Napier  was  at 
Senafe,  the  first  station  in  the  Hills,  and  the  advanced  depot  for 
supplies.  We  of  the  Bengal  brigade  were  somewhat  disconcerted  at 
the  orders  which  awaited  us,  from  which  we  learned  that  our  brigade 
was  to  be  broken  up ; the  troops  were  to  proceed  to  the  front ; while 
Stewart  was  to  take  command  at  Senafe,  and  I myself  was  to  remain 
at  Zula,  as  senior  staff  officer.  The  disappointment  was  great,  but, 
being  the  last-comer,  I had  no  unfairness  to  complain  of,  and  I had 
plenty  to  do.  I spent  the  greater  part  of  each  day  amongst  the  shipping, 
superintending  the  embarkation  and  disembarkation  of  men,  animals, 
and  stores. 

Zula  was  not  an  attractive  place  of  residence.  The  heat  was  intense 
— 117°  in  the  daytime  in  my  tent.  The  allowance  of  fresh  water  was 
extremely  limited,*  while  the  number  of  scorpions  was  quite  the 
reverse,  and  the  food,  at  the  best,  was  not  appetizing.  Few  who 
remained  there  as  long  as  I did  escaped  scurvy  and  horrible  boils  or 
sores.  I was  fortunate,  however,  in  finding  in  charge  of  the  transport 

* Fresh  water  was  obtained  by  condensing  the  sea-water  ; there  were  few 
condensors,  and  no  means  of  aerating  the  water. 


1 868] 


KING  THEODORE  COMMITS  SUICIDE 


jo  i 

arrangements  afloat,  my  old  friend  and  Eton  schoolfellow,  George 
Tryon,*  to  whom  I owed  many  a good  dinner,  and,  what  I appreciated 
even  more,  many  a refreshing  bath  on  board  the  Euphrates,  a 
transport  belonging  to  the  British  India  Steam  Navigation  Company 
which  had  been  fitted  up  for  Captain  Tryon  and  his  stall'.  Indeed,  all 
the  officers  of  the  Royal  Navy  were  most  helpful  and  kind,  and  I have 
a very  pleasant  recollection  of  the  hospitality  I received  from  Commo- 
dore Heathf  and  those  serving  under  him. 

During  the  four  months  I remained  at  Zula,  Tryon  and  I were 
constantly  together,  and  I had  plenty  of  opportunity  for  observing  the 
masterly  manner  in  which  he  could  grasp  a situation,  his  intimate 
knowledge  of  detail,  and  the  strong  hold  he  had  over  all  those  working 
with  him,  not  only  the  officers  of  the  Royal  Navy,  but  also  the  com- 
manders of  the  merchant  vessels  taken  up  as  transports,  and  lying  in 
Annesley  Bay. 

On  the  17th  April  news  reached  us  that  four  days  before  Sir  Robert 
Napier  had  successfully  attacked  Magdala  and  released  the  prisoners, 
having  experienced  but  very  slight  opposition ; and  that  King  Theo- 
dore, deserted  by  his  army,  which  had  apparently  become  tired  of  his 
brutalities,  had  committed  suicide. | A few  days  later  Major-General 
Russell,  who  had  come  from  Aden  to  take  over  the  command  at  Zula, 
received  orders  to  prepare  for  the  embarkation  of  the  force.  Arrange- 
ments were  accordingly  made  to  enable  regiments  and  batteries  to  be 
embarked  on  board  the  transports  told  off  for  them  directly  they  arrived 
from  the  front — a matter  of  the  utmost  importance,  both  on  account  of 
the  fearful  heat  at  Zula,  and  the  absence  of  a sufficient  water-supply. 

On  the  2nd  June  the  Commander-m-Chief  returned  to  Zula,  and  on 
the  10th  he  embarked  on  board  the  old  Indian  marine  steamer  Feroze 
for  Suez.  Sir  Robert  was  good  enough  to  ask  me  to  accompany  him, 
as  he  wished  to  make  me  the  bearer  of  his  final  despatches.  My  work 
was  ended,  the  troops  had  all  left,  and  as  I was  pretty  well  knocked  up, 
I felt  extremely  grateful  for  the  offer,  and  very  proud  of  the  great 
honour  the  Chief  proposed  to  confer  upon  me. 

We  reached  Alexandria  on  the  20th  June,  and  the  next  day  I started 
in  the  mail-steamer  for  Brindisi,  arriving  in  London  on  the  evening  of 
Sunday,  the  28th.  I received  a note  at  my  club  from  Edwin  Johnson 
(w'ho  was  at  that  time  Assistant  Military  Secretary  to  H.R.H.  the 
Duke  of  Cambridge),  directing  me  to  take  the  despatches  without 
delay  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India.  I found  Sir  Stafford  and 
Lady  Northcote  at  dinner  ; Sir  Stafford  looked  through  the  despatches, 

* The  late  Admiral  Sir  George  Tryon,  K.C.B. 

t Now  Admiral  Sir  Leopold  Heath,  K.C.B. 

t He  is  said  to  have  killed  in  one  month,  or  burnt  alive,  more  than  3,000 
people.  He  pillaged  and  burnt  the  churches  at  Gondur,  and  had  many  priests 
and  young  girls  cast  alive  into  the  flames. 


20 


302 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1868 

and  when  he  had  finished  reading  them,  he  asked  me  to  take  them 
without  delay  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  as  he  knew  the  Duke  was 
most  anxious  to  see  them.  There  was  a dinner-party,  however,  that 
night  at  Gloucester  House,  and  the  servant  told  me  it  was  quite  im- 
possible to  disturb  His  Royal  Highness ; so,  placing  my  card  on  the 
top  of  the  despatches,  I told  the  man  to  deliver  them  at  once,  and  went 
back  to  my  club.  I had  scarcely  reached  it  when  the  Duke’s  Aide-de- 
camp  made  his  appearance  and  told  me  that  he  had  been  ordered  to 
find  me  and  take  me  back  with  him.  The  Commander-in-Chief 
received  me  very  kindly,  expressing  regret  that  I had  been  sent  away 
in  the  first  instance;  and  Their  Royal  Highnesses  the  Prince  and 
Princess  of  Wales,  who  were  present,  were  most  gracious,  and  asked 
many  questions  about  the  Abyssinian  Expedition. 

The  next  day  I joined  my  wife,  who  was  staying  with  my  people  at 
Clifton,  and  on  the  14th  August,  when  the  rewards  for  the  Abyssinian 
Expedition  were  published,  my  name  appeared  for  a brevet  Lieutenant- 
Colonelcy. 

I was  now  anxious  to  ascertain  in  what  manner  I was  to  be  employed. 
My  five  years  as  A.Q.M.G.  were  about  to  expire,  and  I thought  I 
should  like  to  go  back  to  my  regiment  for  a time.  I therefore  applied 
for  the  command  of  a battery  of  Horse  Artillery.  I was  told,  in 
answer  to  my  application,  that  it  was  not  the  custom  to  appoint  an 
officer  who  had  been  in  staff  employment  for  some  time  to  the  mounted 
branch,  but  that,  in  consideration  of  my  services,  the  Duke  of  Cam- 
bridge was  pleased  to  make  an  exception  in  my  favour.  I was  posted 
to  a battery  at  Meerut,  and  warned  to  be  ready  to  start  in  an  early 
troopship.  Before  the  time  for  our  departure  arrived,  however,  I 
received  a letter  from  Lumsden,  who  had  now  become  Quartermaster- 
General,  informing  me  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  recommended, 
and  the  Government  had  approved  of,  the  formation  of  a fresh  grade 
— that  of  First  A.Q.M.G. — and  that  he  was  directed  by  Sir  William 
Mansfield  to  offer  the  new  appointment  to  me — an  offer  which  I 
gratefully  accepted ; for  though  the  command  of  a Horse  Artillery 
battery  would  have  been  most  congenial,  this  unexpected  chance  of 
five  years’  further  staff  employ  was  too  good  to  be  refused. 

On  the  4th  January,  1869,  having  said  good-bye  to  those  dear  to  us, 
two  of  whom  I was  never  to  see  again,  my  wife  and  I,  with  a baby 
girl  who  was  born  the  previous  July,  embarked  at  Portsmouth  on 
board  the  s.s.  Helvetia , which  had  been  taken  up  for  the  conveyance 
of  troops  to  Bombay,  the  vessel  of  the  Royal  Navy  in  which  we  were 
to  have  sailed  having  suddenly  broken  down.  The  Helvetia  proved 
most  unsuitable  as  a transport,  and  uncomfortable  to  the  last  degree 
for  passengers,  besides  which  it  blew  a gale  the  whole  way  to  Alex- 
andria. We  were  all  horribly  ill,  and  our  child  caught  a fatal  cold. 
Wo  thoroughly  appreciated  a change  at  Suez  to  the  Indian  trooper,  the 


1869] 


LORD  MAYO  BECOMES  VICEROY 


303 


Malabar,  where  everything  possible  was  done  for  our  comfort  by  our 
kind  captain  (Rich,  R.N.),  and,  indeed,  by  everyone  on  board;  but, 
alas ! our  beautiful  little  girl  never  recovered  the  cruel  experience  of 
the  Helvetia,  and  we  had  the  terrible  grief  of  losing  her  soon  after  we 
passed  Aden.  She  was  buried  at  sea. 

It  was  a very  sad  journey  after  that.  There  were  several  nice,  kind 
people  amongst  our  fellow-passengers  ; but  life  on  board  ship  at  such  a 
time,  surrounded  by  absolute  strangers,  was  a terrible  trial  to  us  both, 
and,  what  with  the  effects  of  the  voyage  and  the  anxiety  and  sorrow 
she  had  gone  through,  my  wife  was  thoroughly  ill  when  we  arrived  at 
Simla  towards  the  end  of  February. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 


In  January,  1869,  Sir  John  Lawrence,  after  a career  which  was 
altogether  unique,  he  having  risen  from  the  junior  grades  of  the 
Bengal  Civil  Service  to  the  almost  regal  position  of  Governor-General,* 
left  India  for  good.  He  W'as  succeeded  as  Viceroy  by  Lord  Mayo,  one 
of  whose  first  official  acts  was  to  hold  a durbar  at  Umballa  for  the 
reception  of  the  Amir  Sher  Ali,  who,  after  five  years  of  civil  war,  had 
succeeded  in  establishing  himself  on  the  throne  of  Afghanistan,  to 
which  he  had  been  nominated  by  his  father,  Dost  Mahomed  Khan.f 
Sher  Ali  had  passed  through  a stormy  time  between  the  death  of 
the  Dost,  in  June,  1863,  and  September,  1868.  He  had  been  acknow- 
ledged as  the  rightful  heir  by  the  Government  of  India,  and  for  the 
first  three  years  he  held  the  Amirship  in  a precarious  sort  of  way. 
Has  two  elder  brothers,  Afzal  and  Azim,  and  his  nephew,  Abdur 
Rahman  (the  present  Ruler  of  Afghanistan),  were  in  rebellion  against 
him.  The  death  of  his  favourite  son  and  heir-apparent,  Ali  Khan,  in 


* I should  have  mentioned  that  Sir  John  Lawrence  was  not  the  only 
instance  of  a Bengal  civilian  rising  to  the  position  of  Governor-General,  as  a 
predecessor  of  his,  Sir  John  Shore,  afterwards  Lord  Teignmouth,  was  appointed 
Governor-General  in  1792,  and  held  that  office  until  1798. 

f Dost  Mahomed  had  several  sons.  Mahomed  Akbar  and  Ghulam  Haidar, 
the  two  heirs-desiguate  in  succession,  died  before  their  father.  Sixteen  other 
sons  were  alive  in  1863,  of  whom  the  following  were  the  eldest : 


1.  Mahomed  Afzal  Khan,  aged  52  years 


2.  Mahomed  Azim  Khan  ,,  45 

3.  Sher  Ali  Khan  ,,  40 

4.  Mahomed  Amir  Khan  ,,  34 

5.  Mahomed  Sharif  Khan  ,,  30 

6.  ‘SVali  Mahomed  Khan  ,,  33 

7.  Faiz  Mahomed  Khan  ,,  25 


1 


By  a wife  not  of 
Royal  blood. 

By  a favourite 
Popalzai  wife. 


} By 


a third  wife. 


Afzal  Khan  had  a son  Abdur  Rahman  Khan,  the  present  Amir  of  Afghanistan, 
and  Sher  Ali  had  five  sons — Ali  Khan,  Yakub  Khan,  Ibrahim  Khan,  Ayub 
Khan,  and  Abdulla  Jan. 


20-2 


304 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1869 

action  near  Kkelat-i-Gkilzai,  in  1865,  grieved  kim  so  sorely  tkat  for 
a time  kis  reason  was  affected.  In  May,  1866,  ke  was  defeated  near 
Gkazni  (mainly  owing  to  tke  treackery  of  kis  own  troops)  by  Abdur 
Rahman,  who,  releasing  kis  father,  Afzal,  from  the  prison  into  which 
he  had  been  cast  by  Sher  Ah,  led  him  in  triumph  to  Kabul,  and  pro- 
claimed him  Amir  of  Afghanistan. 

The  new  Amir,  Afzal,  at  once  wrote  to  the  Government  of  India 
detailing  what  had  occurred,  and  expressing  a hope  that  the  friendship 
of  the  British,  which  he  so  greatly  valued,  would  be  extended  to  him. 
He  was  told,  in  reply,  that  the  Government  recognized  him  as  Ruler 
of  Kabul,  but  that,  as  Sher  Ali  still  held  Kandahar  and  Herat,  existing 
engagements  with  the  latter  could  not  be  broken  off.  The  evident 
preference  thus  displayed  for  Sher  Ali  caused  the  greatest  vexation  to 
the  brothers  Afzal  and  Azim,  who  showed  their  resentment  by  direct- 
ing an  Envoy  who  had  come  from  Swat  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  new 
Amir  to  return  to  his  own  country  and  set  on  foot  a holy  war  against 
the  English  ; the  Waziri  vialiks*  in  attendance  at  the  court  were  dis- 
missed with  presents  and  directions  to  harass  the  British  frontier,  while 
an  emissary  was  despatched  on  a secret  mission  to  the  Russians. 

After  his  defeat  near  Ghazni,  Sher  Ali  fled  to  Kandahar,  and  in  the 
January  of  the  following  year  (again  owing  to  treachery  in  his  army) 
he  met  with  a second  defeat  near  Kkelat-i-Ghilzai,  and  lost  Kandahar. 

On  this  fact  being  communicated  to  the  Government  of  India,  Afzal 
Khan  was  in  his  turn  recognized  as  Amir  of  Kabul  and  Kandahar. 
But  he  was  at  the  same  time  informed  that  the  British  Government 
intended  to  maintain  a strict  neutrality  between  the  contending  parties 
in  Afghanistan.  John  Lawrence,  in  his  letter  of  the  20th  of  February, 
said  that  ‘ neither  men,  nor  arms,  nor  money,  nor  assistance  of  any 
kind,  have  ever  been  supplied  by  my  Government  to  Amir  Sher  Ali. 
Your  Highness  and  he,  both  equally  unaided  by  me,  have  fought  out 
the  battle,  each  upon  your  own  resources.  I purpose  to  continue  the 
same  policy  for  the  future.  If,  unhappily,  the  struggle  for  supremacy 
in  Afghanistan  has  not  yet  been  brought  to  a close,  and  hostilities  are 
again  renewed,  I shall  still  side  with  neither  party.’ 

This  reply  altogether  failed  to  satisfy  Afzal  and  Azim.  They 
answered  it  civilly,  but  at  the  same  time  they  sent  a copy  of  it  to 
General  Romanofski,  the  Russian  Governor  of  Tashkent,  who  was 
informed  by  the  new  Amir  that  he  had  no  confidence  in  the  ‘ Lord 
sahib's  fine  professions  of  friendship,  and  that  he  was  disgusted  with 
the  British  Government  for  the  ingratitude  and  ill-treatment  shown 
towards  his  brother  Azim.f  He  looked  upon  the  Russians  as  his  real 

* The  headmen  of  villages  in  Afghanistan  are  styled  vialiks. 
t Azim  Khan  behaved  well  towards  the  Lunisden  Mission,  and  it  was 
reported  that  lie  encouraged  his  father,  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  not  to  disturb 
the  Peshawar  frontier  during  the  Mutiny. 


SHER  ALI  REGAINS  THE  AMIRSHIP 


305 


1869] 

and  only  friends,  hoped  soon  to  send  a regular  Ambassador  to  the 
Russian  camp,  and  would  at  all  times  do  his  utmost  to  protect  and 
encourage  Russian  trade.’ 

In  October  of  this  year  (1867)  Afzal  Khan  died,  and  his  brother 
Azim,  hastening  to  Kabul,  took  upon  himself  the  Amirship.  Abdur 
Rahman  had  hoped  to  have  succeeded  his  father,  but  his  uncle  having 
forestalled  him,  he  thought  it  politic  to  give  in  his  allegiance  to  him, 
which  he  did  by  presenting  his  dead  father’s  sword,  in  durbar,  to  the 
new  Amir,  who,  like  his  predecessor,  was  now  acknowledged  by  the 
Government  of  India  as  Ruler  of  Kabul  and  Kandahar. 

The  tide,  however,  was  beginning  to  turn  in  favour  of  Slier  Ali. 
Azim  and  Abdur  Rahman  quarrelled,  and  the  former,  by  his  extortions 
and  cruelties,  made  himself  detested  by  the  people  generally. 

In  March,  1868,  Sher  Ali’s  eldest  son,  Yakub  Khan,  regained  posses- 
sion of  Kandahar  for  his  father.  In  July  father  and  son  found 
themselves  strong  enough  to  move  towards  Ghazni,  where  Azim 
Khan’s  army  was  assembled.  The  latter,  gradually  deserted  by  his 
soldiers,  took  to  flight,  upon  which  Sher  Ali,  after  an  absence  of  forty 
months,  entered  Kabul  on  the  8th  of  September,  and  re-posscssed 
himself  of  all  his  dominions,  with  the  exception  of  Balkh,  where  Azim 
and  Abdur  Rahman  (now  reconciled  to  each  other)  still  flew  the  flag 
of  rebellion. 

One  of  the  newly-installed  Amir’s  first  acts  was  to  inform  the 
Viceroy  of  his  return  to  Kabul,  and  of  the  recovery  of  his  kingdom. 
He  announced  his  desire  to  send  some  trusted  representatives,  or  else 
proceed  himself  in  person,  to  Calcutta,  ‘for  the  purpose  of  showing  his 
sincerity  and  firm  attachment  to  the  British  Government,  and  making 
known  his  real  wants.’ 

Sir  John  Lawrence,  in  his  congratulatory  reply,  showed  that  a 
change  had  come  over  his  policy  of  non-interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  Afghanistan,  for  he  stated  that  he  was  ‘ prepared,  not  only 
to  maintain  the  bonds  of  amity  and  goodwill  which  were  established 
between  Dost  Mahomed  and  the  British  Government,  but,  so  far  as 
may  be  practicable,  to  strengthen  those  bonds  and,  as  a substantial 
proof  of  his  goodwill,  the  Viceroy  sent  Sher  Ali  £'60,000,  aid  which 
arrived  at  a most  opportune  moment,  and  gave  the  Amir  that  advantage 
over  his  opponents  which  is  of  incalculable  value  in  Afghan  civil  war, 
namely,  funds  wherewith  to  pay  the  army  and  bribe  the  opposite  side. 

The  energetic  and  capable  Abdur  Rahman  Khan  had  in  the  mean- 
time collected  a sufficient  number  of  troops  in  Turkestan  to  enable  him 
to  move  towards  Kabul  with  his  uncle  Azim.  On  nearing  Ghazni,  he 
found  himself  confronted  by  Sher  Ali ; the  opposing  forces  were  about 
equal  in  strength,  and  on  both  sides  there  was  the  same  scarcity  of 
ready  money.  Suddenly  the  report  was  received  that  money  was 
being  sent  from  India  to  Sher  Ali,  and  this  turned  the  scale  in  his 


3' °6 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


Li  869 

favour.  Abdur  Bahman’s  men  deserted  in  considerable  numbers,  and 
a battle  fought  on  the  3rd  January,  1869,  resulted  in  the  total  defeat 
of  uncle  and  nephew,  and  in  the  firmer  consolidation  of  Sher  Ali’s 
supremacy. 

The  change  in  policy  which  induced  the  Government  of  India  to 
assist  a struggling  Amir  with  money,  after  its  repeated  and  emphatic 
declarations  that  interference  was  impossible,  was  undoubtedly  brought 
about  by  an  able  and  elaborate  memorandum  written  by  the  late  Sir 
Henry  Eawlinson  on  the  28th  July,  1868.  In  this  paper  Rawlinson 
pointed  out  that,  notwithstanding  promises  to  the  contrary,  Russia  was 
steadily  advancing  towards  Afghanistan.  He  referred  to  the  increased 
facilities  of  communication  which  would  be  the  result  of  the  recent 
proposal  to  bring  Turkestan  into  direct  communication,  via  the  Caspian, 
with  the  Caucasus  and  St.  Petersburg.  He  dwelt  at  length  upon  the 
effect  which  the  advanced  position  of  Russia  in  Central  Asia  would 
have  upon  Afghanistan  and  India.  He  explained  that  by  the  occupa- 
tion of  Bokhara  Russia  would  gain  a pretext  for  interfering  in  Afghan 
politics,  and  ‘ that  if  Russia  once  assumes  a position  which,  in  virtue 
either  of  an  imposing  military  force  on  the  Oxus,  or  of  a dominant 
political  influence  in  Afghanistan,  entitles  her,  in  Native  estimation, 
to  challenge  our  Asiatic  supremacy,  the  disquieting  effect  will  be 
prodigious.’ 

‘ With  this  prospect  before  us,’  Sir  Henry  asked,  ‘ are  we  justified  in 
maintaining  what  has  been  sarcastically,  though  perhaps  unfairly, 
called  Sir  John  Lawrence’s  policy  of  “ masterly  inaction  ”?  Are  we 
justified  in  allowing  Russia  to  work  her  way  to  Kabul  unopposed,  and 
there  to  establish  herself  as  a friendly  power  prepared  to  protect  the 
Afghans  against  the  English  ?’  He  argued  that  it  was  contrary  to  our 
interests  to  permit  anarchy  to  reign  in  Afghanistan  ; that  Lord  Auck- 
land’s famous  doctrine  of  ‘ establishing  a strong  and  friendly  Power  on 
our  North-West  Frontier  ’ was  the  right  policy  for  India,  ‘ that  Dost 
Mahomed’s  successful  management  of  his  country  was  in  a great 
measure  due  to  our  aid,  and  that,  if  we  had  helped  the  son  as  we  had 
helped  the  father,  Sher  Ali  would  have  summarily  suppressed  the 
opposition  of  his  brothers  and  nephews.’  Rawlinson  then  added : 
‘ Another  opportunity  now  presents  itself.  The  fortunes  of  Sher  Ali 
are  again  in  the  ascendant ; he  should  be  secured  in  our  interests 
without  delay.’ 

Rawlinson’s  suggestions  were  not  at  the  time  supposed  to  commend 
themselves  to  the  Government  of  India.  In  the  despatch  in  which  they 
were  answered,*  the  Viceroy  and  his  Councillors  stated  that  they  still 
objected  to  any  active  interference  in  the  affairs  of  Afghanistan  ; they 
foresaw  no  limits  to  the  expenditure  which  such  a move  would  entail, 


Dated  4th  January,  1869. 


THE  UMBALLA  DURBAR 


307 


1869] 

and  they  believed  that  the  objects  that  they  had  at  heart  might  be 
attained  by  an  attitude  of  readiness  and  firmness  on  the  frontier.  It 
is  worthy  of  note,  however,  that,  after  Sir  Henry  Rawlinsoti’s  memor- 
andum had  been  received  by  the  Indian  Government,  and  notwith- 
standing these  protests,  the  sum  of  £60,000  was  sent  to  Sher  Ali,  that 
Sir  John  Lawrence  invited  him  ‘ to  come  to  some  place  in  British 
territory  for  a personal  meeting  in  order  to  discuss  the  best  manner 
in  which  a limited  support  might  be  accorded,’  and  that  five  days  from 
the  time  of  writing  the  above-mentioned  despatch,  John  Lawrence 
sent  a farewell  letter  to  Sher  Ali,  expressing  the  earnest  hope  of  the 
British  Government  that  His  Highness’s  authority  would  be  established 
on  a solid  and  permanent  basis,  and  informing  him  that  a further  sum 
of  £60,000  would  be  supplied  to  him  during  the  next  few  months,  and 
that  future  Viceroys  would  consider,  from  time  to  time,  what  amount 
of  practical  assistance  in  the  shape  of  money  or  war  materials  should 
periodically  be  made  over  to  him  as  a testimony  of  their  friendly  feeling, 
and  to  the  furtherance  of  his  legitimate  authority  and  influence. 

Sher  Ali  expressed  himself  as  most  grateful,  and  came  to  Umballa 
full  of  hope  and  apparently  thoroughly  well  disposed  towards  the 
British  Government.  He  was  received  with  great  state  and  ceremony, 
and  Lord  Mayo  was  most  careful  to  demonstrate  that  he  was  treating 
with  an  independent,  and  not  a feudatory,  Prince. 

At  this  conference  Sher  Ali  began  by  unburdening  himself  of  his 
grievances,  complaining  to  Lord  Mayo  of  the  manner  in  which  his  two 
elder  brothers  had  each  in  his  turn  been  recognized  as  Amir,  and 
dwelling  on  the  one  sided  nature  of  the  treaty  made  with  his  father, 
by  which  the  British  Government  only  bound  itself  to  abstain  from 
interfering  with  Afghanistan,  while  the  Amir  was  to  be  ‘ the  friend  of 
the  friends  and  the  enemy  of  the  enemies  of  the  Honourable  East 
India  Company.’  His  Highness  then  proceeded  to  make  known  his 
wants,  which  were  that  he  and  his  lineal  descendants  on  the  throne 
that  he  had  won  ‘ by  his  own  good  sword  ’ should  be  acknowledged  as 
the  de  jure  sovereigns  of  Afghanistan ; that  a treaty  offensive  and 
defensive  should  be  made  with  him ; and  that  he  should  be  given  a 
fixed  subsidy  in  the  form  of  an  annual  payment. 

It  was  in  regard  to  the  first  of  these  three  demands  that  Sher  Ali 
was  most  persistent.  He  explained  repeatedly  and  at  some  length  that 
to  acknowledge  the  Buler  pro  tempore  and  de  facto  was  to  invite 
competition  for  a throne,  and  excite  the  hopes  of  all  sorts  of  candi- 
dates ; but  that  if  the  British  Government  would  recognize  him  and 
his  dynasty,  there  was  nothing  he  would  not  do  in  order  to  evince  his 
gratitude. 

These  requests,  the  Amir  was  informed,  were  inadmissible.  There 
could  be  no  treaty,  no  fixed  subsidy,  no  dynastic  pledges.  He  was 
further  told  that  we  were  prepared  to  discourage  his  rivals,  to  give  him 


3°8 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1869 

warm  countenance  and  support,  and  such  material  assistance  as  we 
considered  absolutely  necessary  for  his  immediate  wants,  if  he,  on  his 
part,  would  undertake  to  do  all  he  could  to  maintain  peace  on  our 
frontier  and  to  comply  with  our  wishes  in  matters  connected  -with 
trade. 

As  an  earnest  of  our  goodwill,  the  Amir  was  given  the  second 
£'60,000  promised  him  by  Sir  John  Lawrence,  besides  a considerable 
supply  of  arms  and  ammunition,*  and  was  made  happy  by  a promise 
that  European  officers  should  not  be  required  to  reside  in  any  of  his 
cities.  Before  the  conference  took  place,  Lord  Mayo  had  contemplated 
British  agents  being  sent  to  Kabul  in  order  to  obtain  accurate  in- 
formation regarding  events  in  Central  Asia,  but  on  discovering  how 
vehemently  opposed  Sher  Ah  was  to  such  an  arrangement,  he  gave 
him  this  promise.  Saiyad  Nur  Mahomed,  the  Minister  who  accom- 
panied the  Amir,  though  equally  averse  to  European  agents,  admitted 
that  ‘ the  day  might  come  when  the  Bussians  would  arrive,  and  the 
Amir  would  be  glad,  not  only  of  British  officers  as  agents,  but  of  arms 
and  troops  to  back  them.’ 

One  request  which  the  Amir  made  towards  the  close  of  the  meeting 
the  Viceroy  agreed  to,  which  was  that  we  should  call  Persia  to  account 
for  her  alleged  encroachments  on  the  debatable  ground  of  Sistan. 
This,  which  seemed  but  an  unimportant  matter  at  the  time,  was  one 
of  the  chief  causes  of  Sher  Ali’s  subsequent  estrangement ; for  the 
committee  of  arbitration  which  inquired  into  it  decided  against  the 
Amir,  who  never  forgave  what  he  considered  our  unfriendly  action  in 
discountenancing  his  claims. 

The  Umballa  conference  was,  on  the  whole,  successful,  in  that  Sher 
Ali  returned  to  his  own  country  much  gratified  at  the  splendour  of 
his  reception,  and  a firm  personal  friend  of  Lord  Mayo,  whose 
fine  presence  and  genial  manner  had  quite  won  the  Amir’s  heart, 
although  he  had  not  succeeded  in  getting  from  him  everything  he 
had  demanded. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

We  spent  a very  quiet  year  at  Simla.  My  wife  was  far  from  strong, 
and  we  had  another  great  sorrow  in  the  death  of  a baby  boy  three 
weeks  after  his  birth. 

That  winter  I was  left  in  charge  of  the  Quartermaster-General’s 

* Besides  the  remainder  of  the  aggregate  sum  of  twelve  lakhs,  6,600  more 
rifles  were  forwarded  to  the  frontier  for  transmission  to  the  Amir,  and  in 
addition  four  18-pounder  smooth-bore  guns,  two  8-inch  howitzers,  and  a 
Mountain  battery  of  six  3-pounders  complete,  with  due  proportion  of 
ammunition  and  stores,  together  with  draught  bullocks  and  nine  elephants. 


WINTER  AT  SIMLA 


309 


1S70] 

office,  and  we  moved  into  ‘ Ellerslie,’  a larger  and  warmer  house  than 
that  in  which  we  had  lived  during  the  summer. 

Simla  in  the  winter,  after  a fresh  fall  of  snow,  is  particularly 
beautiful.  Bange  after  range  of  hills  clothed  in  their  spotless 
garments  stretch  away  as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach,  relieved  in  the 
foreground  by  masses  of  reddish-brown  perpendicular  cliffs  and  dark- 
green  ilex  and  deodar  trees,  each  bearing  its  pure  white  burden,  and 
decked  with  glistening  fringes  of  icicles.  Towards  evening  the  scene 
changes,  and  the  snow  takes  the  most  gorgeous  colouring  from  the 
descending  rays  of  the  brilliant  eastern  sun — brilliant  even  in  mid- 
winter— turning  opal,  pink,  scarlet,  and  crimson ; gradually,  as  the 
light  wanes,  fading  into  delicate  lilacs  and  grays,  which  slowly  mount 
upwards,  till  at  last  even  the  highest  pinnacle  loses  the  life-giving 
tints,  and  the  whole  snowy  range  itself  turns  cold  and  white  and  dead 
against  a background  of  deepest  sapphire  blue.  The  spectator  shivers, 
folds  himself  more  closely  in  his  wraps,  and  retreats  indoors,  glad  to 
be  greeted  by  a blazing  log-fire  and  a hot  cup  of  tea. 

In  the  spring  of  the  next  year  (1870)  Sir  William  Mansfield’s  term 
of  command  came  to  an  end,  and  he  was  succeeded  by  Lord  Napier  of 
Magdiila.  The  selection  of  this  distinguished  officer  for  the  highest 
military  position  in  India  was  greatly  appreciated  by  the  Indian  army, 
as  no  officer  of  that  army  had  held  it  since  the  days  of  Lord  Clive. 

I11  September  a daughter  was  born,  and  that  winter  we  again 
remained  at  Simla.  I amused  myself  by  going  through  a course  of 
electric  telegraphy,  which  may  seem  rather  like  a work  of  supereroga- 
tion; but  during  the  Umbeyla  campaign,  when  the  telegraph  office 
had  to  be  closed  in  consequence  of  all  the  clerks  being  laid  up  with 
fever,  and  we  could  neither  read  nor  send  messages,  I determined  that 
I would  on  the  first  opportunity  learn  electric  signalling,  in  order  that 
I might  be  able  to  decipher  and  send  telegrams  should  I ever  again 
find  myself  in  a similar  position. 

In  May  my  wife  and  I went  for  a march  across  the  hills  to  Chakrata, 
and  thence  to  Mussoorie  and  back  by  way  of  Dehra  Dun  and  the 
plains.  The  object  of  this  trip  was  to  settle  the  boundary  of  Chakrata, 
and  my  wife  took  the  opportunity  of  my  being  ordered  on  this  duty  to 
get  away  from  Simla,  as  we  had  now  been  there  for  more  than  two 
years,  and  were  consequently  rather  longing  for  a change.  Our  route 
lay  through  most  beautiful  scenery,  and  notwithstanding  that  the  trip 
was  a little  hurried,  and  that  some  of  the  marches  were  therefore 
rather  long,  we  enjoyed  it  immensely.  When  passing  along  the  ridge 
of  a very  high  hill  one  afternoon,  we  witnessed  rather  a curious  sight 
— a violent  thunderstorm  was  going  on  in  the  valley  below  us,  while 
we  ourselves  remained  in  the  mildest,  most  serene  atmosphere,  enjoy- 
ing bright  sunshine  and  a blue  sky.  Dense  black  clouds  filled  up  the 
valley  a thousand  feet  beneath  us,  the  thunder  roared,  the  lightning 


3io 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1871 


flashed,  and  soon  we  could  hear  the  rush  of  waters  in  the  streams 
below  from  the  torrents  of  rain  which  the  clouds  were  discharging; 
but  it  was  not  until  we  had  crossed  over  the  mountain,  and  descended 
to  a low  level  on  the  other  side,  that  we  fully  realized  the  effects  of 
the  heavy  storm. 

On  our  return  to  Simla  we  had  the  pleasure  of  a visit  from  Major- 
General  Donald  Stewart,  who  had  come  up  to  receive  Lord  Mayo’s 
instructions  before  taking  over  his  appointment  as  Superintendent  of 
the  Andaman  Islands.  In  September  he  and  I travelled  together  to 
Calcutta,  to  which  place  I was  directed  to  proceed  in  order  to  make 
arrangements  for  a military  expedition  into  the  country  of  the  Lushais, 
having  been  appointed  senior  staff  officer  to  the  force. 

Lushai,  situated  between  south-eastern  Bengal  and  Burma,  was  a terra 
incognita  to  me,  and  I had  only  heard  of  it  in  connexion  with  the  raids 
made  by  its  inhabitants  upon  the  tea-gardens  in  its  vicinity,  which  had  now 
spread  too  far  away  from  Cachar  for  the  garrison  of  that  small  military 
station  to  afford  them  protection.  From  time  to  time  the  Lushais  had 
done  the  planters  much  damage,  and  carried  off  several  prisoners, 
and  various  attempts  had  been  made  in  the  shape  of  small  military 
expeditions  to  punish  the  tribesmen  and  rescue  the  captives  ; but  from 
want  of  proper  organization,  and  from  not  choosing  the  right  time  of 
the  year,  these  attempts  had  hitherto  been  unsuccessful,  and  our 
failures  had  the  inevitable  result  of  making  the  Lushais  bolder.  Raids 
became  more  frequent  and  more  destructive ; until  at  last  a little 
European  girl,  named  Mary  Winchester,  was  carried  off,  and  kept 
by  them  as  a prisoner ; on  this  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Bengal 
declared  that  a punitive  expedition  was  ‘ absolutely  necessary  for  the 
future  security  of  the  British  subjects  residing  on  the  Cachar  and 
Chittagong  frontiers.’ 

The  despatch  of  a force  was  therefore  decided  upon ; it  was  to 
consist  of  two  small  columns* — one  having  its  base  at  Cachar,  the 
other  at  Chittagong — commanded  respectively  by  Brigadier-Generals 
Bourchier,  C.B.,  and  C.  Brownlow,  C.B.,  supreme  political  power 
being  also  vested  in  these  two  officers.  Long  experience  had  taught 
Lord  Napier  the  wisdom  of  having  only  one  head  in  time  of  war,  and 
he  impressed  upon  the  Government  his  opinion  that  the  civil  officers, 
while  acting  as  advisers  and  as  the  channels  of  communication  with 
the  tribes,  should  be  subordinate  to  the  control  of  the  two  Commanders, 
who,  after  having  been  put  in  possession  of  the  views  and  wishes  of 

* The  Cachar  column  consisted  of  half  of  the  Peshawar  Mountain  battery, 
one  company  of  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners,  the  22nd  Punjab  Infantry,  42nd 
and  44th  Assam  Light  Infantry.  The  Chittagong  column  consisted  of  the 
othor  half  of  the  Mountain  battery,  the  27th  Punjab  Infantry,  and  the  2nd 
and  4th  Gurkhas.  Each  regiment  was  500  strong,  and  each  column  was 
accompanied  by  100  armed  police. 


THE  LUSH  A l EXPEDITION 


1871] 


3ii 


the  Government,  should  be  held  responsible  for  carrying  them  out  loyally 
so  far  as  circumstances  and  the  safety  of  the  force  would  permit. 

As  the  existence  of  the  tea  industry  was  at  stake,  the  Lushais  having 
established  a perfect  terror  on  all  the  estates  within  their  reach,  it  was 
essential  that  they  should  be  given  a severe  lesson,  and  this  could  only 
be  done  by  their  principal  villages,  which  lay  at  somo  considerable 
distance  from  the  base  of  operations,  being  visited  in  force.  The 
difficult  country  and  the  paucity  of  transport  necessitated  the  columns 
being  lightly  equipped  ; no  tents  were  to  be  allowed,  and  baggage  and 
followers  were  to  be  reduced  to  a minimum.  My  instructions  were  to 
fit  out  and  despatch  the  two  columns,  and  then  join  Brigadier- General 
Bourcliier  at  Cachar. 

I was  kept  in  Calcutta  all  October — not  a pleasant  month,  the 
climate  then  being  very  muggy  and  unhealthy.  Everyone  who  could 
get  away  had  gone  to  the  Hills  or  out  to  sea ; and  the  offices  being 
closed  for  the  Hindu  holidays  of  the  Durgn  Pujn,  it  was  extremely 
difficult  to  get  work  done.  Everything  for  the  Chittagong  column  had 
to  be  sent  by  sea.  The  shipping  of  the  elephants  was  rather  interest- 
ing : they  clung  desperately  to  the  ground,  trying  hard  to  prevent 
themselves  being  lifted  from  it ; and  when  at  last,  in  spite  of  all  their 
struggles,  they  were  hoisted  into  the  air,  the  helpless  appearance  of 
the  huge  animals  and  their  despairing  little  cries  and  whines  were 
quite  pathetic.  I found  it  trying  work  being  on  the  river  all  day  ; my 
eyes  suffered  from  the  glare,  and  I became  so  reduced  that  before  I 
left  Calcutta  I weighed  scarcely  over  eight  stone — rather  too  fine  a 
condition  in  which  to  enter  on  a campaign  in  a mountainous  country, 
so  thickly  covered  with  jungle  as  to  make  riding  out  of  the  question. 

By  the  3rd  November  the  equipment  and  stores  for  both  columns 
had  been  despatched,  and  on  the  16th  I joined  General  Bourchier 
at  the  house  of  that  most  hospitable  of  hosts,  Mr.  Edgar,*  Deputy- 
Commissioner  of  Cachar,  who  accompanied  the  left  column  as  civil 
officer. 

We  left  Cachar  on  the  23rd,  and  from  the  outset  we  had  to  make 
our  own  roads,  a labour  which  never  ceased  until  the  end  of  January, 
by  which  date  110  miles  had  been  completed.  There  was  not  the 
vestige  of  a track  to  direct  us ; but  I got  hold  of  some  people  of  the 
country,  with  whom  I made  friends,  and  induced  them  to  act  as  guides. 
Many  a long  and  weary  reconnaissance  had  to  be  executed,  however, 
before  the  line  of  advance  could  be  decided  upon.  The  troops  worked 
with  a will,  and,  notwithstanding  the  vapour-bath-like  atmosphere  of 
the  valleys  and  the  difficult  nature  of  the  country,  which  was  a 
succession  of  hill-ranges  covered  with  jungle  forests,  made  almost 
impenetrable  from  the  huge  creepers,  and  intersected  by  rivers  and 


Now  Sir  John  Edgar,  K.C.S.I. 


312 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1871 


watercourses,  a good  road,  from  six  to  eight  feet  wide,  was  constructed, 
with  a sufficiently  easy  gradient  for  laden  elephants  to  travel  over. 
Cutting  one’s  way  day  after  day  through  these  dense,  gloomy  forests, 
through  which  hardly  a ray  of  light  penetrates,  was  most  stifling  and 
depressing.  One  could  hardly  breathe,  and  was  quite  unable  to  enjoy 
the  beauty  of  the  magnificent  trees,  the  graceful  bamboos  and  canes, 
and  the  wonderful  creepers,  which  abounded,  and  under  other  circum- 
stances would  have  been  a source  of  pleasure ; the  difficulties  we 
encountered,  and  the  consequent  delay  in  our  progress,  quite  pre- 
vented me  from  being  in  a frame  of  mind  to  appreciate  my  picturesque 
surroundings. 

It  became  evident  from  the  first  that  our  onward  movements 
would  be  greatly  impeded  by  want  of  transport.  Notwithstanding  the 
experience  which  ought  to  have  been  gained  in  many  small  mountain 
wars,  the  Government  had  not  been  taught  that  a properly  organized 
transport  corps  was  an  absolute  necessity,  and  that  it  was  a mere 
waste  of  money  to  collect  a number  of  men  and  animals  without 
providing  trained  supervision.  Fourteen  hundred  of  our  coolies  were 
attached  to  the  Commissariat  Department  without  anyone  to  look 
after  them,  consequently  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  who 
could  ill  be  spared  from  their  regimental  duties,  had  to  be  told  off  to 
organize  and  work  them. 

To  add  to  our  troubles,  cholera  broke  out  amongst  some  Nepalese 
coolies  on  their  way  to  join  us  ; out  of  840,  251  died  in  a few  days,  and 
a number  deserted  panic-stricken,  while  the  rest  were  so  weakened  and 
shaken  that,  notwithstanding  the  care  bestowed  upon  them  by  their 
able  and  energetic  Commandant,  Major  H.  Moore,  only  387  joined  the 
column.  We  were  not  much  better  off  in  the  matter  of  elephants,  which 
had  been  so  carelessly  selected  that  only  33  out  of  the  157  sent  with 
our  column  were  of  any  use.  All  this  resulted  in  our  being  obliged  to 
still  further  reduce  our  already  small  kits.  Officers  were  allowed  only 
forty  pounds  of  baggage,  and  soldiers  twenty-four  pounds,  limits  within 
which  it  was  rather  difficult  to  keep.  A couple  of  blankets  were 
essential,  as  we  should  have  to  operate  over  mountains  five  and  six 
thousand  feet  high  ; so  was  a waterproof  sheet,  for  even  if  we  should 
be  lucky  enough  to  escape  rain,  the  dew  is  so  heavy  in  those  parts  that 
it  wets  one  just  as  thoroughly  as  a shower  of  rain.  These  three  items 
with  my  cloak  and  cork  mattress — which  is  also  a very  necessary  adjunct 
in  such  a damp  climate— amounted  to  thirty-one  pounds,  leaving  only 
nine  pounds  for  a change  of  clothes,  plate,  knife,  fork,  etc. — not  too 
much  for  a four  months’  campaign.  However,  * needs  must,’  and  it  is 
surprising  how  many  things  one  considers  absolute  necessities  under 
ordinary  circumstancos  turn  out  to  have  been  luxuries  when  we  are 
obliged  to  dispense  with  them. 

The  advance  portion  of  the  column  did  not  arrive  at  Tipai  Mukh, 


PRACTICE  VERSUS  THEORY 


3*3 


1871] 

only  eighty-four  miles  from  Cachar,  until  the  9tli  December,  which  will 
give  an  idea  of  the  enforced  slowness  of  our  progress.  Tipai  Mukh 
proved  a very  suitable  place  for  our  depot : it  was  situated  at  the 
junction  of  two  rivers,  the  Tipai  and  the  Barak  ; thickly-wooded  hills 
rose  precipitously  on  all  sides,  but  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Barak  there 
was  sufficient  level  space  for  all  our  requirements.  With  the  help  of 
local  coolies,  the  little  Gurkhas  were  not  long  in  running  up  hospitals 
and  storesheds  ; bamboo,  the  one  material  used  in  Lushailand  for  every 
conceivable  purpose,  whether  it  be  a house,  a drinking  vessel,  a bridge, 
a woman’s  ear-ring,  or  a musical  instrument,  grew  in  profusion  on  the 
hillside.  A trestle  bridge  was  thrown  across  the  Tipai  in  a few  hours, 
and  about  that  bridge  I have  rather  an  amusing  story  to  relate.  On 
my  telling  the  young  Engineer  officer  in  charge  of  the  Sapper  company 
that  a bridge  was  required  to  be  constructed  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  he  replied  that  it  should  be  done,  but  that  it  was  necessary  to 
calculate  the  force  of  the  current,  the  weight  to  be  borne,  and  the  con- 
sequent strength  of  the  timber  required.  Off  he  went,  urged  by  me  to 
be  as  quick  as  he  could.  Some  hours  elapsed,  and  nothing  was  seen  of 
the  Engineer,  so  I sent  for  him  and  asked  him  when  the  bridge  was  to 
be  begun.  He  answered  that  his  plans  were  nearly  completed,  and 
that  he  would  soon  be  able  to  commence  work.  In  the  meantime, 
however,  and  while  these  scientific  calculations  were  being  made,  the 
headman  of  the  local  coolies  had  come  to  me  and  said,  if  the  order  were 
given,  he  would  throw  a good  bridge  over  the  river  in  no  time.  I 
agreed,  knowing  how  clever  Natives  often  are  at  this  kind  of  work,  and 
thinking  I might  just  as  well  have  two  strings  to  this  particular  bow. 
Immediately,  numbers  of  men  were  to  be  seen  felling  the  bamboos  on 
the  hillside  a short  distance  above  the  stream : these  were  thrown  into 
the  river,  and  as  they  came  floating  down  they  were  caught  by  men 
standing  up  to  their  necks  in  water,  who  cut  them  to  the  required 
length,  stuck  the  uprights  into  the  river-bed,  and  attached  them  to  each 
other  by  pieces  laid  laterally  and  longitudinally  ; the  flooring  was  then 
formed  also  of  bamboo,  the  whole  structure  was  firmly  bound  together 
by  strips  of  cane,  and  the  bridge  was  pronounced  ready.  Haring  tested 
its  strength  by  marching  a large  number  of  men  across  it,  I sent  for 
my  Engineer  friend.  His  astonishment  on  seeing  a bridge  finished 
ready  for  use  was  great,  and  became  still  greater  when  he  found  how 
admirably  the  practical  woodmen  had  done  their  work ; from  that  time, 
being  assured  of  their  ability  to  assist  him,  he  wisely  availed  himself 
when  difficulties  arose  of  their  useful,  if  unscientific,  method  of 
engineering. 

By  the  14th  December  matters  had  so  far  progressed  as  to  warrant 
an  advance.  As  our  route  now  lay  away  from  the  river,  scarcity  of 
water  entailed  greater  care  being  taken  in  the  selection  of  encamping 
grounds,  so  on  arriving  at  our  halting-place  each  day  I had  to  recon- 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


3U 


[1871 


noitre  ahead  for  a suitable  site  for  our  next  resting-ground,  a consider- 
able addition  to  the  day’s  work.  Road-making  for  the  passage  of  the 
elephants  became  more  difficult,  and  transport  was  so  deficient  that  the 
troops  could  only  be  brought  up  very  gradually.  Thus,  it  was  the  22nd 
of  the  month  before  we  reached  the  Tuibum  river,  only  twenty  miles 
from  Tipai  Mukh.  On  our  way  we  were  met  by  some  scouts  from  the 
villages  ahead  of  us,  who  implored  of  us  to  advance  no  further,  saying, 
if  we  would  only  halt,  their  headmen  would  come  in  and  submit  to 
whatever  terms  we  chose  to  make.  The  villagers  were  informed  in 
reply  that  our  quarrel  was  not  with  them,  and  so  long  as  we  remained 
unmolested,  not  the  slightest  injury  should  be  done  to  them,  their 
villages,  or  their  crops ; but  that  we  were  determined  to  reach  the 
country  of  Lalbura,  the  Chief  who  had  been  the  ringleader  in  the  raids 
upon  the  tea-gardens. 

We  pushed  on  as  fast  as  the  dense  undergrowth  would  permit  until 
within  about  a mile  of  the  river,  where  we  found  the  road  blocked  by  a 
curious  erection  in  the  form  of  a gallows,  from  which  hung  two  grotesque 
figures,  made  of  bamboo.  A little  further  on  it  was  a felled  tree  which 
stopped  us ; this  tree  was  studded  all  over  with  knife-like  pieces  of 
bamboo,  and  from  the  incisions  into  which  these  were  stuck  exuded  a 
red  juice,  exactly  the  colour  of  blood.  This  was  the  Lushai  mode  of 
warning  us  what  would  be  our  fate  if  we  ventured  further.  We,  how- 
ever, proceeded  on  our  way,  bivouacked  for  the  night,  and  early  the 
next  morning  started  off  in  the  direction  of  some  villages  whic^  we 
understood  lay  in  the  road  to  our  destination. 

For  the  first  thousand  feet  the  ascent  was  very  steep,  and  the  path  so 
narrow  that  we  could  only  march  in  single  file.  Suddenly  we  entered 
upon  a piece  of  ground  cleared  for  cultivation,  and  as  we  emerged  from 
the  forest  we  were  received  by'  a volley  from  a position  about  sixty 
yards  off.  A young  police  orderly,  who  was  acting  as  our  guide,  was 
knocked  over  by  my  side,  and  a second  volley  wounded  one  of  the 
sepoys,  on  which  we  charged  and  the  enemy  retired  up  the  hill.  We 
came  across  a large  number  of  these  jooms  (clearings),  and  at  each 
there  was  a like  effort  to  oppose  us,  always  with  the  same  result.  After 
advancing  in  this  way  for  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  alternately 
through  dense  jungle  and  open  spaces,  and  occasionally  passing  by 
scattered  cottages,  we  sighted  a good-sized  village,  where  it  was  decided 
we  should  remain  for  the  night.  The  day’s  march  had  been  very 
severe,  the  village  being  4,000  feet  above  the  river  ; and  the  troops  were 
so  worn  out  with  their  exertions  that  it  was  with  difficulty  the  piquets 
could  be  got  to  construct  proper  shelter  for  themselves  out  of  the 
plentiful  supply  of  trees  and  underwood  ready  at  hand.  Throughout 
the  night  the  enemy’s  sharpshooters  kept  up  an  annoying  fire  under 
cover  of  the  forest  which  surrounded  the  village,  and  so  as  soon  as  day 
dawned  a party  moved  out  to  clear  the  ground  all  round. 


1872] 


LUSH  A IS  FOILED  BY  GURKHAS 


315 


It  was  most  aggravating  to  find  from  the  view  we  got  of  the  country 
from  this  elevated  position  that  the  previous  day’s  harassing  march 
had  been  an  absolutely  useless  performance  and  an  unnecessary  waste 
of  time  and  strength.  We  could  now  distinctly  see  that  this  village  did 
not  lead  to  Lalbura’s  country,  as  we  had  been  led  to  believe  it  would, 
and  that  there  was  no  alternative  but  to  retrace  our  steps  as  far  as  the 
river.  The  men  and  animals  were  too  tired  to  march  that  day,  and  the 
next  being  Christmas,  we  made  another  halt,  and  commenced  our  re- 
tirement on  the  26th.  This  was  an  extremely  nasty  business,  and  had 
to  be  carried  out  with  very  great  caution.  The  ground,  as  I said  before, 
necessitated  our  proceeding  in  single  file,  and  with  only  250  fighting 
men  (all  that  our  deficient  transport  admitted  of  being  brought  on  to 
this  point)  it  was  difficult  to  guard  the  long  line  of  sick,  wounded,  and 
coolies.  As  soon  as  we  began  to  draw  in  our  piquets,  the  Lushais,  who 
had  never  ceased  their  fire,  perceiving  we  were  about  to  retire,  came 
down  in  force,  and  entered  one  end  of  the  village,  yelling  and  scream- 
ing like  demons,  before  we  had  got  out  at  the  other.  The  whole  way 
down  the  hill  they  pressed  us  hard,  endeavouring  to  get  amongst  the 
baggage,  but  were  invariably  baffled  by  the  Gurkhas,  who,  extending 
rapidly  whenever  the  ground  was  favourable,  retired  through  their 
supports  in  admirable  order,  and  did  not  once  give  the  enemy  the  chance 
of  passing  them.  We  had  3 men  killed  and  8 wounded  during  the 
march,  but  the  Lushais  confessed  afterwards  to  a loss  of  between  50 
and  60. 

As  we  were  given  to  understand  that  our  short  retrograde  movement 
had  been  interpreted  into  a defeat  by  the  Lushais,  the  General  wisely 
determined  to  pay  the  village  of  Kholel  another  visit.  Our  doing  so  had 
the  best  possible  effect.  A slight  resistance  was  offered  at  the  first 
clearance,  but  by  the  time  the  ridge  was  reached  the  Chief,  having 
become  convinced  of  the  uselessness  of  further  opposition,  submitted, 
and  engaged  to  give  hostages  and  keep  open  communication  with  our 
depot  at  Tipai  Mukh,  a promise  which  he  most  faithfully  performed. 

1872  opened  auspiciously  for  me.  On  New  Year’s  Day  I was  agree- 
ably surprised  by  a communication  from  the  Quartermaster-General 
informing  me  that,  a vacancy  having  unexpectedly  occurred,  Lord 
Napier  had  appointed  me  Deputy-Quartermaster-General.  This  was 
an  important  step  in  my  department,  and  I was  proportionately 
elated. 

A few  days  later  I received  the  good  news  of  the  birth  of  a son  at 
Umballa  on  the  8th. 

Paucity  of  transport  and  difficulty  about  supplies  kept  us  stationary 
on  the  Tuibum  for  some  time,  after  which  we  moved  on  as  before,  the 
Lushais  retiring  in  front  of  us  until  the  25th,  when  they  attacked  us 
while  we  were  moving  along  a narrow  ravine,  with  a stream  at  the 
bottom  and  steep  hills  on  either  side.  The  first  volley  wounded  the 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1872 


3^ 

General  in  the  arm  and  hand,  and  killed  his  orderly.  The  enemy’s 
intention  was  evidently  to  push  past  the  weak  column  along  the  hill- 
side and  get  amongst  the  coolies ; but  this  attempt  was  again  foiled  by 
the  Gurkhas,  who,  flinging  off  their  great-coats,  rushed  into  the  stream 
and  engaged  the  Lushais  before  they  could  get  at  the  baggage,  pressing 
them  up  the  mountain,  rising  2,500  feet  above  us,  as  fast  as  the  preci- 
pitous nature  of  the  ascent  would  allow.  On  the  crest  we  found  the 
enemy  occupying  a good-sized  village,  out  of  which  we  cleared  them 
and  took  possession  of  it  ourselves.  On  this  occasion  we  had  only 
4 killed  and  8 wounded,  including  the  General,  while  the  enemy  lost 
about  60.  In  one  place  we  found  a heap  of  headless  bodies.  The 
Lushais,  if  unable  to  remove  their  dead,  invariably  decapitate  them  to 
prevent  their  adversaries  from  carrying  off  the  heads,  their  own  mode 
of  dealing  with  a slain  enemy,  as  they  believe  that  whoever  is  in 
possession  of  the  head  will  have  the  man  to  whom  it  belonged  as  a 
slave  in  the  next  world. 

To  complete  the  success  we  had  gained,  the  General  sent  me  the 
next  day  with  a small  party  to  burn  the  village  of  Taikum,  belonging 
to  the  people  who  had  attacked  us.  It  was  past  noon  before  we  could 
make  a start,  owing  to  the  non-arrival  of  the  elephants  with  the  guns. 
When  they  did  come  in,  the  poor  huge  creatures  were  so  fatigued  by 
their  climb  that  it  was  considered  advisable  to  transfer  their  '<  ads  to 
coolies,  particularly  as  the  route  we  had  to  traverse  was  reported  to  be 
even  more  difficult  than  anything  we  had  yet  encountered.  When  we 
had  proceeded  a short  distance,  we  perceived  that  our  way  was  blocked 
a mile  ahead  by  a most  formidable-looking  stockade,  on  one  side  of 
which  rose  perpendicular  cliffs,  while  on  the  other  was  a rocky  ravine. 
As  the  nature  of  the  ground  did  not  admit  of  my  approaching  near 
enough  to  discover  whether  the  Artillery  could  be  placed  so  as  to  cover 
the  Infantry  advance,  and  being  anxious  to  avoid  losing  many  of  my 
small  party,  I settled  to  turn  the  stockade  by  a detour  up  the  hillside. 
This  manoeuvre  took  some  time,  owing  to  the  uncompromising  nature 
of  the  country ; but  it  was  successful,  for  when  we  struck  the  track, 
we  found  ourselves  about  a mile  on  the  other  side  of  the  stockade. 
The  Lushais,  on  realizing  what  we  were  about,  retired  to  Taikum, 
which  place  came  into  view  at  5 p.m.  It  was  situated  on  the  summit 
of  a hill  1,200  yards  in  front,  and  was  crowded  with  men.  The  guns 
were  brought  at  once  into  action,  and  while  Captain  Blackwood*  was 
preparing  his  fuses,  I advanced  towards  the  village  with  the  Infantry. 
The  first  shell  burst  a little  beyond  the  village,  the  second  was  lodged 
in  its  very  centre,  for  a time  completely  paralyzing  the  Lushais.  On 
recovering  from  the  shock,  they  took  to  their  heels  and  scampered  off 

* Major  Blackwood,  who  was  killed  at  Maiwaud,  iu  command  of  E Battery, 
R.H.A. 


1872] 


LA  LB U HA'S  VILLAGE 


317 


in  every  direction,  the  last  man  leaving  the  village  just  as  we  entered 
it.  The  houses,  as  usual,  were  made  of  bamboo,  and  after  it  had  been 
ascertained  that  there  was  no  living  creature  inside  any  of  them,  the 
place  was  set  on  fire,  and  we  began  our  return  journey.  There  was  a 
bright  moon,  but  even  aided  by  its  light  we  did  not  reach  our  bivouac 
until  midnight.  This  ended  the  campaign  so  far  as  opposition  was 
concerned,  for  not  another  shot  was  fired  either  by  us  or  against  us 
during  the  remaining  six  weeks  we  continued  in  the  country. 

Soon  after  this  we  heard  that  some  of  the  captives  we  had  come  to 
relieve  had  been  given  up  to  the  Chittagong  column,  and  that  Mary 
Winchester  was  safe  in  General  Brownlow’s  hands — very  satisfactory 
intelligence,  showing  as  it  did  that  the  Lushais  were  beginning  to 
understand  the  advisability  of  acceding  to  our  demands.  The  work  of 
our  column,  however,  was  not  over,  for  although,  from  the  information 
we  received  of  his  whereabouts,  we  had  given  up  hope  of  joining 
hands  with  Brownlow,  Bourchier  determined  that  Lalbura’s  country 
must  be  reached ; he  (Lalbura)  being  the  chief  offender,  it  would  never 
have  done  to  let  him  think  his  stronghold  lay  beyond  our  power. 

In  order  that  we  might  be  well  out  of  Lusliailand  before  the  rains, 
which  usually  begin  in  that  part  of  the  world  about  the  middle  of 
March,  and  are  extremely  heavy,  it  was  decided  not  to  wait  until  a 
road  could  be  made  for  elephants,  but  to  trust  to  coolie-carriage  alone,  and 
to  push  on  rapidly  as  soon  as  supplies  sufficient  for  twelve  days  could 
be  collected.  Kits  were  still  further  reduced,  officers  and  soldiers  alike 
being  only  allowed  a couple  of  blankets  and  one  or  two  cooking  utensils. 

We  resumed  our  march  on  the  12th  February ; the  route  in  many 
places  was  strongly  and  skilfully  stockaded,  but  the  tidings  of  our 
successes  had  preceded  us,  and  our  advance  was  unopposed.  In  five 
days  we  reached  the  Chamfai  valley,  at  the  end  of  which,  on  a high 
hill,  Lalbura’s  village  was  situated.*  Although  Lalbura’s  father, 
Vonolel,  had  been  dead  some  years,  the  people  still  called  the  place 
Vonolel’s  country.  Vonolel  had  been  a famous  warrior,  and  they  were 
evidently  very  proud  of  his  reputation.  We  were  shown  his  tomb, 
which,  like  that  of  all  great  Lushai  braves,  was  decorated  with  the 
heads  of  human  beings  (his  slaves  in  paradise)  and  those  of  animals, 
besides  drinking-vessels  and  various  kinds  of  utensils  for  his  use  in 
another  life. 

Lalbura  had  taken  himself  off;  but  his  headmen  submitted  to  us 
and  accepted  our  terms.  We  remained  at  this  place  till  the  21st,  in 
accordance  with  an  agreement  we  had  made  with  Brownlow  to  send 
up  signals  on  the  night  of  the  20th  in  case  his  column  should  be  any- 
where in  the  neighbourhood.  During  the  three  days  we  stayed  amongst 

# Latitude  23°  26'  32",  longitude  (approximately)  93°  25'  ; within  a short 
distance  of  Fort  White,  lately  built  in  the  Chin  Hills. 


21 


3<8 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1872 


them  we  mixed  freely  with  the  Lushais,  who  were  greatly  delighted 
and  astonished  with  all  we  had  to  show  them.  The  telescope  and  the 
burning-glass  amused  them  greatly;  our  revolvers  excited  their  envy ; 
and  for  the  little  Mountain  guns  they  displayed  the  highest  veneration. 
But  what  seemed  to  astonish  them  more  than  anything  was  the  white- 
ness of  our  skins,  particularly  when  on  closer  inspection  they  discovered 
that  our  arms  and  bodies  were  even  fairer  than  our  faces  and  hands, 
which  to  our  eyes  had  become  from  long  exposure  so  bronzed  as  to 
make  us  almost  unrecognizable  as  Europeans. 

We  were  all  glad  that  the  duty  entrusted  to  us  had  been  satisfactorily 
ended,  and  We  were  hoping  that  the  Viceroy,  who  had  taken  a keen 
personal  interest  in  our  proceedings,  would  be  satisfied  with  the  result, 
when  we  were  shocked  and  startled  beyond  measure  by  hearing  that 
Lord  Mayo  had  been  murdered  by  a convict  while  visiting  the  Andaman 
Islands.  The  disastrous  news  arrived  as  we  were  in  the  midst  of  firing 
signal-rockets,  burning  blue-lights,  and  lighting  bonfires  to  attract  the 
attention  of  the  Chittagong  column.  I could  not  help  thinking  of  the 
heavy  loss  India  had  sustained,  for  the  manly,  open-hearted  Governor- 
General  had  impressed  the  Native  Chiefs  in  quite  an  exceptional 
manner,  and  he  was  liked  as  well  as  respected  by  all  classes  of 
Europeans  and  Natives.  I felt  also  much  for  Donald  Stewart,  to 
whom,  I knew,  such  a terrible  tragedy,  happening  while  he  was  Super- 
intendent at  Port  Blair,  would  be  a heavy  blow. 

On  the  6th  March  we  reached  Tipai  Mukh,  where  we  bade  farewell 
to  our  Lushai  friends,  numbers  of  whom  accompanied  us  to  get  posses- 
sion of  the  empty  tins,  bags,  and  casks  which  were  got  rid  of  at  every 
stage.  The  hostages  and  those  who  had  assisted  us  were  liberally 
rewarded,  and  we  parted  on  the  best  of  terms,  with  promises  on  their 
part  of  future  good  behaviour — promises  which  were  kept  for  nearly 
twenty  years. 

No  one  was  sorry  that  the  marching  was  at  an  end,  and  that  the 
rest  of  the  journey  back  was  to  be  performed  in  boats.  Constant  hard 
work  and  exposure  in  a peculiarly  malarious  and  relaxing  climate  had 
told  upon  the  whole  force  ; while  our  having  to  depend  for  so  long  on 
tinned  meats,  which  were  not  always  good,  and  consisted  chiefly  of 
pork,  with  an  occasional  ration  of  mutton  and  salt  beef,  had  been  very 
trying  to  the  officers.  One  and  all  were  ‘ completely  worn  out,’  as  the 
principal  medical  officer  reported  ; two  out  of  our  small  number  died, 
and  the  General’s  condition  gave  cause  for  grave  anxiety.  For  myself, 
having  a perfect  horror  of  pork,  I think  I should  have  starved  outright 
but  for  the  extraordinary  culinary  talent  of  Mr.  Edgar,  who  disguised 
the  presence  of  the  unclean  animal  in  such  a wonderful  way  in  soups, 
stews,  etc.,  that  I frequently  partook  of  it  without  knowing  what  I 
was  eating.  My  wife  and  some  anonymous  kind  friend  sent  by  post 
small  tins  of  Liebig’s  extract,  which  were  highly  appreciated. 


1872] 


MURDER  OF  LORD  MAYO  319 

Cholera  pursued  us  up  to  and  beyond  Cachar ; the  wretched  coolies 
suffered  most,  and  it  is  a disease  to  which  Gurkhas  are  peculiarly 
susceptible,  while  a feast  on  a village  pig  from  time  to  tune  probably 
helped  to  make  matters  worse  for  them.  Many  of  these  grand  little 
soldiers  and  some  of  the  Sikhs  also  fell  victims  to  the  scourge.  My 
orderly,  a very  smart  young  Gurkha,  to  my  great  regret,  was  seized 
with  it  the  day  after  I reached  Cachar,  and  died  next  morning. 

On  my  way  to  Simla,  I spent  a few  days  with  Norman  at  Calcutta. 
The  whole  place  was  in  mourning  on  account  of  the  terrible  catastrophe 
which  had  happened  at  Port  Blair. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

Lord  Napier  of  Murchiston,  the  Governor  of  Madras,  had  been 
summoned  to  Calcutta  to  act  as  Viceroy  until  Lord  Northbrook,  Lord 
Mayo’s  successor,  should  arrive.  He  seemed  interested  in  what  I 
had  to  tell  him  about  Lushai,  and  Lord  Napier  of  Magdala  spoke  in 
laudatory  terms  of  the  manner  in  which  the  expedition  had  been 
carried  out. 

I reached  Simla  on  the  1st  of  April,  the  twentieth  anniversary  of  my 
arrival  in  India.  I found  my  wife,  with  the  two  children,  settled  in 
Snowdon,*  a house  I had  recently  purchased.  She  had  had  much 
trouble  in  my  absence,  having  been  at  death’s  door  herself,  and  having 
very  nearly  lost  our  little  son  at  Umballa  three  weeks  after  his  birth 
from  a Native  wet-nurse  having  tried  to  kill  him.  The  English  nurse’s 
suspicions  had  been  aroused  by  one  day  finding  a five  coal  in  the 
cradle,  but  she  did  not  mention  this  discovery  at  the  time  for  fear  of 
frightening  my  wife  ; but  she  determined  to  watch.  A few  days  later, 
while  with  our  little  girl  in  the  next  room,  she  heard  the  baby  boy 
choking,  and  rushed  in  to  find,  to  her  horror,  blood  on  his  lips,  and 
that  he  was  struggling  violently,  as  if  to  get  rid  of  something  in  his 
throat ! She  pushed  down  her  finger  and  pulled  out  a sharp  piece  of 
cane  about  two  inches  long ; but  other  pieces  had  evidently  gone  down, 
for  the  poor  little  fellow  was  hr  terrible  agony  for  many  days.  It 
turned  out  that  the  wretched  woman  hated  the  unwonted  confinement 
of  her  new  life,  and  was  determined  to  get  away,  but  was  too  much 
afraid  of  her  husband  to  say  so.  He  wanted  her  to  remain  for  the 
sake  of  the  high  pay  this  class  of  servant  receives,  so  it  appeared  to 
the  woman  that  her  only  chance  of  freedom  was  to  get  rid  of  the 
child,  and  to  carry  out  her  purpose  she  first  attempted  to  set  fire  to  the 

* We  lived  in  this  house  whenever  we  were  in  Simla,  till  we  left  it  in  1892. 
It  has  since  been  bought  by  Government  for  the  Commander-m-Chief’s 
residence. 


21—2 


320 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1872 

cradle,  and  finding  this  did  not  succeed,  she  pulled  some  pieces  of 
cane  off  the  chair  upon  which  she  was  sitting,  and  shoved  them  down 
the  child’s  throat.  She  was,  as  my  wife  described  her,  a pretty, 
innocent,  timid-looking  creature,  to  whom  no  one  would  ever  have 
dreamt  of  attributing  such  an  atrocity.  The  boy  was  made  extremely 
delicate  for  several  months  by  this  misadventure,  as  his  digestion  had 
been  ruined  for  the  time  being,  but  eventually  he  completely  recovered 
from  its  effects. 

In  September  the  C.B.  was  conferred  upon  me  for  the  Lushai 
Expedition.  Lord  Napier  informed  me  of  the  fact  in  a particularly 
kind  little  note.  I was  very  proud  of  being  a member  of  the  Bath, 
although  at  the  time  a brevet  would  have  been  a more  useful  reward, 
as  want  of  rank  was  the  reason  Lord  Napier  had  given  for  not  allowing 
me  to  act  as  Quartermaster- General,  on  Lumsden  being  temporarily 
appointed  Resident  at  Hyderabad. 

We  began  our  usual  winter  tour  in  the  middle  of  October.  At  Mian 
Mir  I made  the  acquaintance  of  the  Adjutant  of  the  37th  Foot,  the  late 
Sir  Herbert  Stewart,  who  was  then  a smart,  good-looking  subaltern, 
and  I recollect  his  bemoaning  bitterly  his  bad  luck  in  never  having  had 
a chance  of  seeing  service.  How  little  at  that  time  could  it  have  been 
anticipated  that  within  twelve  years  he  would  see  hard  fighting  in 
Africa,  and  be  killed  as  a Major-General  in  command  of  a column ! 

We  visited  several  of  the  stations  in  the  Punjab,  and  spent  a few  days 
at  Jamu  as  guest  of  the  Maharaja  of  Kashmir,  who  treated  us  royally, 
and  gave  us  some  excellent  pig-sticking ; and  on  the  21st  December  we 
joined  Head-Quarters  at  Lawrencepur  for  a large  Camp  of  Exercise,  to 
be  held  on  the  identical  ground  which  I had  selected  for  the  camp 
which  Sir  Hugh  Rose  proposed  to  have  eleven  years  before. 

Lord  Napier  of  Magdala  did  much  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the 
army  by  means  of  Camps  of  Exercise.  He  held  one  at  Delhi  in  the 
winter  of  1871-72,  and  the  Camp  of  which  I am  writing  was  most 
successful  and  instructive.  No  Commander-in  Chief  ever  carried  out 
inspections  with  more  thoroughness  than  did  Lord  Napier  of  Magdala. 
He  spared  himself  no  trouble.  On  the  hottest  day  he  would  toil 
through  barrack  after  barrack  to  satisfy  himself  that  the  soldiers  were 
properly  cared  for;  Europeans  and  Natives  were  equally  attended  to, 
and  many  measures  conducive  to  the  men’s  comfort  date  from  the  time 
he  was  in  command  in  India. 

At  the  close  of  this  camp  Lumsden,  who  had  returned  to  his  appoint- 
ment from  Hyderabad,  gave  up  the  Quartermaster  - Generalship  for 
good.  We  had  been  greatly  thrown  together  during  the  twenty-one 
years  I had  been  in  India,  and  my  wife  and  I were  very  sorry  to  bid 
farewell  to  him  and  Mrs.  Lumsden.  He  was  succeeded  by  Edwin 
Johnson,  pending  whose  arrival  I was  now  allowed  to  officiate. 

From  Lawrencepur  I went  with  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  Cal- 


1873]  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  SHER  A LI  RENEWED 


321 


cutta.  Soon  after  we  arrived  there  I was  asked  by  Sir  Douglas  Forsyth 
to  accompany  him  on  his  Mission  to  Yarkand  and  Kashgar.  I should 
have  much  liked  to  have  done  so,  for  the  idea  of  a trip  to  these,  at  that 
time  unknown,  regions  possessed  great  fascinations  for  me.  I was 
therefore  well  pleased  when  Lord  Napier  told  me  he  would  not  stand 
in  the  way  of  my  going,  and  proportionately  disappointed  when,  the 
next  day,  His  Excellency  said  that  on  consideration  he  did  not  think 
I could  be  spared  just  then,  for  the  Quartermaster-General  would  be 
new  to  the  work  at  first,  and  he  thought  he  would  need  my  assistance. 

The  end  of  April  saw  us  back  in  Simla,  and  in  July  Edwin  Johnson 
arrived. 

During  the  summer  of  1873  important  events  occurred  which  had 
much  to  do  with  our  subsequent  relations  with  Afghanistan.  The 
inquiries  which  Sher  Ali  had  begged  Lord  Mayo  to  make  about  Persian 
encroachments  in  Sistan,  had  resulted  in  General  Goldsmid*  and 
Colonel  Pollockf  being  deputed  in  1871  to  proceed  to  Sistan  to  decide 
the  question.  The  settlement  arrived  at  bj?  these  officers,  which 
assigned  to  Afghanistan  the  country  up  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Hel- 
mand,  but  nothing  beyond,  satisfied  neither  the  Shah  nor  the  Amir, 
and  the  latter  sent  his  confidential  Minister,  Saiyad  Nur  Mahomed,  the 
Afghan  Commissioner  in  the  Sistan  arbitration,  to  meet  Lord  North- 
brook on  his  arrival  in  Bombay  for  the  purpose  of  appealing  to  him 
against  the  decision.  It  could  not,  however,  be  reversed  ; but  in  a sub- 
sequent interview  which  the  new  Viceroy  accorded  the  Envoy,  the 
latter  was  told  that  as  soon  as  Persia  and  Afghanistan  had  signified 
their  acceptance  of  the  settlement,  the  Government  of  India  would 
present  the  Amir  with  five  lakhs  of  rupees  as  compensation  for  the 
ceded  territory  which  had  for  a time  belonged  to  Afghanistan. 

The  action  of  Her  Majesty’s  Ministers  in  communication  with  Russia 
regarding  the  northern  boundary  of  Afghanistan  was  another  matter 
about  which  the  Amir  was  greatly  exercised ; and  Lord  Northbrook, 
thinking  that  all  such  vexed  questions  could  be  more  satisfactorily 
explained  by  personal  communication  than  by  letter,  proposed  to  the 
Amir  that  His  Highness  should  consent  to  receive  at  Kabul  a British 
officer  ‘ of  high  rank  and  dignity,  in  whom  I have  full  confidence  ’ 
(Mr.  Macnabb),f  ‘ "'ho  will  also  explain  to  Your  Highness,’  wrote  the 
Viceroy,  ‘ the  negotiations  which  have  now  been  satisfactorily  con- 
cluded with  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 
whereby  the  Russian  Government  have  agreed  to  recognize  and  re- 
spect the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  territories  now  in  Your 
Highness’s  possession.’ 

To  this  request  Sher  Ali  replied  that  he  considered  it  advisable  that 

* General  Sir  Frederick  Goldsmid,  K.C.M.G. 

t Major-General  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  K.C.S.I. 

+ Sir  Donald  Macnabb,  K.C.S.I.,  then  Commissioner  of  Peshawar. 


322 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1873 

one  of  his  agents  should  first  wait  on  the  Viceroy  to  ascertain  the  real 
views  of  the  British  Government  on  these  important  matters.  This 
was  agreed  to,  and  Saiyad  Nur  Mahomed  was  again  selected  to  repre- 
sent the  Amir.  He  reached  Simla  towards  the  end  of  June.  On 
being  informed  that  Persia  had  unreservedly  accepted  the  decision  as 
to  the  Sistan  question,  the  Envoy  declared  that,  whatever  opinion  the 
Amir  might  hold  as  to  his  rights,  His  Highness  would  also  scrupu- 
lously respect  that  decision.  With  regard  to  the  northern  frontier,  the 
Envoy  begged  it  to  be  clearly  understood  that  the  Afghan  Government 
wished  to  be  allowed  to  make  their  own  laws  and  follow  their  own 
customs  within  their  territories ; that  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country 
should  be  free  from  interference ; and  that  the  acknowledgment  by 
Russia  of  the  Amir’s  claim  to  land  south  of  the  Oxus  should  be  con- 
firmed by  Bokhara.  He  further  requested  ‘ that  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  distinctly  promise  that,  in  the  event  of  any  aggression  on 
the  Amir’s  territories,  they  would  consider  the  perpetrator  of  such 
aggression  as  their  own  enemy.’  It  was  explained  to  the  Saiyad  that 
the  British  Government  did  not  share  the  Amir’s  apprehension  of 
Russia ; that  under  such  circumstances  as  he  contemplated,  it  would 
be  the  duty  of  the  Amir  to  refer  to  the  British  Government,  who  would 
decide  whether  it  was  an  occasion  for  assistance  to  be  rendered  by 
them,  and  what  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  assistance  should  be ; 
moreover,  that  their  help  must  be  conditional  upon  the  Amir  himself 
abstaining  from  aggression,  and  on  his  unreserved  acceptance  of  the 
advice  of  the  British  Government  in  regard  to  his  external  relations. 

Two  other  questions  were  discussed  : 

(1)  The  location  in  certain  towns  in  Afghanistan  of  British  officers  as 
representatives  of  the  British  Government. 

(2)  The  present  assistance  to  be  rendered  to  the  Amir  for  the 
purpose  of  strengthening  his  country  against  foreign  aggression. 

On  the  first  point  the  Envoy  said  he  had  no  instructions,  but  that, 
in  his  opinion,  to  ask  Sher  Ali  to  allow  British  officers  to  be  located 
in  Afghanistan  would  give  rise  to  mistrust  and  apprehension.  He 
recommended  that  a letter  should  be  addressed  to  the  Amir,  pointing 
out  the  desirability  of  a British  officer  being  sent  to  inspect  the  western 
and  northern  boundaries  of  Afghanistan,  proceeding  via  Kandahar  and 
returning  via  Kabul,  where  he  might  confer  personally  with  His  High- 
ness. This  suggestion  was  carried  out. 

With  regard  to  the  second  point  under  discussion,  the  Envoy  stated 
that  20,000  stand-of-arms  were  desired,  laying  very  particular  stress 
on  5,000  Sniders  being  included  in  this  number,  and  that  hopes  were 
entortained  by  the  Amir  that  lie  would  be  largely  assisted  with  money. 
In  answer  to  ihis,  the  Saiyad  was  told  that  there  was  not  then  a 
sufficient  reserve  supply  of  Sniders  for  the  English  troops  in  India, 
and  that  it  was  impossible  to  spare  more  than  5,000  Enfields ; that 


i«73] 


SHER  A LI'S  DEM  AM  US 


323 


this  number  should  at  once  be  placed  at  the  Amir’s  disposal,  and  that 
the  remainder  should  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  they  were  received  from 
England.  Ho  was  further  informed  that  live  lakhs  of  rupees  (exclusive 
of  the  five  lakhs  promised  the  year  before,  as  indemnification  for  the 
loss  of  territory)  would  be  given  to  Slier  Ali. 

A final  letter  from  the  Viceroy  was  sent  to  the  Amir  through  Saiyad 
Nur  Mahomed,  dated  6th  September,  1873,  summing  up  the  result  of 
the  conference.  His  Highness  was  told,  with  reference  to  a fear 
expressed  by  the  Envoy  lest  Russia  should  press  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a Russian  Mission  and  agents  in  Afghanistan,  that  Prince 
Gortschakoff  had  officially  intimated  that,  while  he  saw  no  objection 
to  British  officers  going  to  Kabul,  he  engaged  that  Russian  agents 
should  abstain  from  doing  so,  and  that,  far  from  apprehending  a 
Russian  invasion  of  Afghanistan,  the  British  Government  believed 
that  the  effect  of  the  recent  arrangements  had  been  to  render  the 
occurrence  of  such  a contingency  more  remote  than  ever.  At  the 
same  time,  being  desirous  of  seeing  the  Amir  strong  and  his  rule 
firmly  established,  the  Government  were  prepared  to  give  him  any 
reasonable  assistance. 

Sher  Ali  was  greatly  annoyed  and  disappointed  at  the  result  of  his 
Envoy’s  visit  to  Simla.  He  was  of  a very  impulsive,  passionate  dis- 
position ; his  reply  to  the  Viceroy’s  letter  was  discourteous  and 
sarcastic;  he  declined  to  receive  a British  officer  at"  Kabul,  and 
although  he  condescended  to  accept  the  arms  presented  to  him,  he 
left  the  ten  lakhs  of  rupees  untouched  in  the  Peshawar  treasury. 
Colonel  Valentine  Baker,  who  was  at  that  time  travelling  through 
Central  Asia,  was  forbidden  by  the  Amir  to  pass  through  Afghanistan 
on  his  way  to  India ; and  a few  months  later  he  refused  to  allow  Sir 
Douglas  Forsyth’s  Mission  to  return  to  India  by  way  of  Afghanistan. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

In  the  beginning  of  October  my  wife  and  I started  for  a fortnight’s  trip 
to  the  top  of  the  Chor,  a fine  mountain  sixty-two  miles  from  Simla, 
and  close  on  12,000  feet  high.  We  were  accompanied  by  a very  dear 
friend  of  ours — now  no  more — Colonel  Baigrie,  who  was  soon  after- 
wards made  Quartermaster-General  in  Bombay.  He  was  a talented 
artist  and  delightful  companion,  and  notwithstanding  the  old  adage 
that  two  are  company  and  three  none,  we  three  enjoyed  our  holiday 
immensely. 

After  crossing  a stream  called  the  Ghiri,  below  Fagu,  the  road 
passes  through  beautiful  forest  and  cliff  scenery,  and  for  the  most  part 
was  fairly  easy,  until  the  foot  of  the  mountain  was  reached  about  six 


324 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1873 


miles  from  the  top,  when  it  became  very  precipitous  and  difficult. 
We  were  the  whole  day  doing  this  inarch,  breakfasting  in  one  place 
and  lunching  in  another  higher  up.  There  was  a good  deal  of  snow  in 
the  shady  spots.  A few  days  before  we  had  noticed  that  the  top  of 
the  mountain  was  white,  but  the  sun  was  still  too  strong  in  the  day- 
time for  the  snow  to  lie  long  in  exposed  parts.  The  way  being  too 
steep  for  my  wife  to  ride  or  go  in  a dandy,  we  all  three  v'alked,  or 
rather  climbed,  up  to  the  shoulder  where  our  tents  were  pitched,  about 
a mile  from  the  summit. 

The  forest  through  which  we  passed  was  very  beautiful,  com- 
mencing with  dark-green  ilex,  glistening  holly,  and  sombre  brown 
oak,  interspersed  with  groups  of  the  dainty,  graceful,  w'hite-stemmed 
birch,  and  wreathed  with  festoons  of  the  scarlet  Himalayan  vine.  As 
we  mounted  higher,  trees  became  fewer  and  the  foliage  less  luxuriant, 
till  at  length  only  oaks  were  to  be  seen,  their  branches  twisted  into 
all  sorts  of  weird,  fantastic  shapes  from  the  strength  of  the  south-west 
monsoon.  Huge  rocks  became  more  frequent,  covered  with  lichens 
and  mosses  of  every  shade,  from  dark-green  to  brilliant  crimson.  At 
length  trees  and  shrubs  were  left  behind,  except  the  red-berried  juniper, 
which  grows  at  a higher  elevation  here  than  any  other  bush,  and 
flourishes  in  the  clefts  of  the  rocks,  where  nothing  else  will  exist.  We 
got  up  in  time  to  see  the  most  glorious  sunset ; the  colours  were  more 
wonderful  than  anything  I had  ever  seen  before,  even  in  India.  My 
wife  urged  Baigrie  to  make  a rough  sketch,  and  note  the  tints,  that  he 
might  paint  a picture  of  it  later.  He  made  the  sketch,  saying : ‘ If  I 
attempted  to  represent  truly  what  we  see  before  us,  the  painting  would 
be  rejected  by  the  good  people  at  home  as  absurdly  unreal,  or  as  the 
work  of  a hopeless  lunatic.’  There  was  such  a high  wind  that  our 
small  tents  had  a narrow  escape  of  being  blown  away.  That  night 
the  water  was  frozen  in  our  jugs,  and  it  was  quite  impossible  to  keep 
warm. 

We  were  up  betimes  the  next  morning,  and  climbed  to  the  highest 
peak,  where  we  found  breakfast  awaiting  us  and  a magnificent  view  of 
the  Himalayan  ranges,  right  down  to  the  plains  on  one  side  and  up  to 
the  perpetual  snows  on  the  other.  We  descended  to  the  foot  of  the 
mountain  in  the  afternoon,  and  then  returned,  march  by  march,  to 
Simla. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  month  Lord  Napier  began  his  winter  tour, 
visiting  the  hill  stations  first.  At  Chakrata  I made  the  acquaintance 
of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  that  distinguished  corps  which  stood  me  in 
such  good  stead  a few  years  later  in  Afghanistan.  At  the  end  of 
November  we  found  ourselves  at  Lucknow,  in  time  to  take  part  in 
Lord  Northbrook’s  state  entry,  and  be  present  at  a fete  given  to  the 
Viceroy  in  the  Wingfield  Park  by  Sir  George  Cooper,  the  Chief  Com- 
missioner. 


A TRIP  IN  THE  HIMALAYAS 


325 


1874] 

From  Lucknow  we  went  for  a brief  visit  to  a small  Camp  of  Exercise 
near  Rurki,  where  Lord  Napier  left  the  Adjutant-General,  Thesiger,* 
in  command,  while  he  himself  proceeded  to  visit  some  of  the  stations 
in  the  Madras  Presidency,  and  I returned  for  a short  tune  to  Simla. 

While  riding  up  the  hill  from  Kalka,  I had  a novel  experience.  One 
of  those  tremendous  thunder-storms  which  are  not  uncommon  in  the 
Himalayas  came  on ; the  rain  was  blinding  and  incessant,  and  the  peals 
of  thunder  were  simultaneous  with  the  lightning.  At  last  there  was  a 
tremendous  crash ; a flash,  more  vivid  than  the  rest,  passed  right  in 
front  of  my  horse’s  head,  accompanied  by  a whizzing  noise  and  a sul- 
phurous smell,  completely  blinding  me  for  a second.  Two  Natives 
travelling  a few  yards  ahead  of  me  fell  flat  on  their  faces,  and  I thought 
they  were  killed,  but  it  turned  out  they  were  only  knocked  over  and 
very  much  frightened. 

Early  in  January,  1874,  we  received  by  telegram  the  infinitely  sad 
news  of  my  father’s  death.  We  ought,  I suppose,  to  have  been  pre- 
pared for  such  an  event,  seeing  that  he  was  within  a few  months  of 
his  ninetieth  birthday ; but  he  was  so  well  and  active,  and  took  such  a 
keen  interest  in  all  that  was  going  on,  especially  anything  connected 
with  India,  that  we  hardly  realized  his  great  age,  and  always  hoped  we 
might  see  him  once  more.  He  had  received  the  G.C.B.  from  Her 
Majesty’s  hands  at  Windsor  on  the  8th  December,  and  two  days  after- 
wards he  wrote  me  an  account  of  the  ceremony,  and  expressed  himself 
much  pleased  and  gratified  at  the  Queen’s  gracious  manner  to  him. 
He  said  nothing  about  his  health,  but  we  heard  later  that  he  had  taken 
cold  in  the  train  on  his  way  home,  and  never  recovered  from  the 
effects ; he  died  on  the  30th  of  December.  His  love  for  India  had  not 
been  weakened  by  his  twenty  years’  absence  from  the  country,  and  he 
never  wearied  of  being  told  of  the  wonderful  changes  which  had  taken 
place  since  his  day — changes  which,  for  the  most  part,  dated  from  the 
Mutiny,  for  up  till  1857  life  in  India  was  much  the  same  as  when  my 
father  first  landed  in  the  beginning  of  the  century. 

A continued  drought  in  Behar  was  at  this  time  causing  grave  fears 
of  a famine,  such  as  from  time  to  time  had  desolated  various  parts  of 
India.  Nine  years  before  such  a drought,  and  the  absence  of  means  of 
communication,  which  prevented  grain  being  thrown  into  the  famine- 
stricken  districts  in  sufficient  quantities,  resulted  in  one-fourth  of  the 
population  of  Orissa  being  carried  off  by  starvation,  or  disease  conse- 
quent on  starvation.  So  on  this  occasion  Lord  Northbrook  was 
determined,  at  all  costs,  to  ward  off  such  a calamity.  He  sent  Sir 
Richard  Temple  to  Behar  in  the  confident  hope  that  his  unbounded 
resource  and  energy  would  enable  him  to  cope  with  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation,  a hope  that  was  fully  realized.  Relief  works  were  at 

* Now  General  Lord  Chelmsford,  G.C.R. 


326 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1874 


once  commenced ; a transport  train  was  quickly  improvised,  worked 
chiefly  by  military  and  police  officers ; and  one  million  tons  of  rice  were 
distributed  amongst  the  people.  Not  a life  was  lost,  but  the  cost  to  the 
State  was  enormous — six  millions  and  a half  sterling. 

In  the  beginning  of  February  I was  ordered  by  Government  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  famine  districts  to  help  Temple.  I started  at  once  ; but  I 
had  not  been  long  in  Behar  before  I was  required  to  join  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  in  Calcutta,  His  Excellency  having  determined  to 
nominate  me  Quartermaster-General,  in  succession  to  Johnson,  who 
was  about  to  become  Adjutant-General.  Being  only  a Lieutenant- 
Colonel  in  the  army,  I could  not,  according  to  the  rules,  be  put  at  once 
permanently  into  the  appointment,  which  carried  with  it  the  rank  of 
Major-General.  The  difficulty  was  overcome,  however,  by  my  being 
allowed  to  officiate  till  the  following  January,  when,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  promotion,  I should  become  a Colonel. 

Lord  Northbrook  spent  the  summer  of  1874  in  Calcutta,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  famine  necessities  having  to  be  met ; and  as  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  determined  to  follow  his  example,  I took  a house  in 
Calcutta,  and  my  wife  joined  me  in  the  middle  of  March — rather  a bad 
time  of  year  to  come  down  to  the  plains  after  spending  the  winter 
amongst  the  snows  of  Simla.  But  she  did  not  fancy  Simla  in  the 
season  as  a grass-widow,  and  had  had  quite  enough  of  being  alone. 

We  continued  in  Calcutta  until  August,  when  the  Head-Quarters 
returned  to  Simla,  where  we  remained  till  November. 

We  had  a standing  camp  at  Umballa  during  the  winter  of  1874-75, 
doing  our  inspections  from  there,  and  returning  to  the  camp  at 
intervals.  There  was  the  usual  visit  to  Calcutta  in  March,  towards  the 
end  of  which  month  another  daughter  was  born. 

In  October,  1875,  I spent  some  time  at  Delhi,  arranging  for  the 
Camp  of  Exercise  to  be  held  there  in  January  for  His  Royal  Highness 
the  Prince  of  Wales.  The  camp  was  formed  in  the  beginning  of 
December,  and  consisted  of  17,000  men,  in  four  divisions,  commanded 
by  Major-Generals  Sir  Charles  Reid,  Macdonnell,  the  Hon.  Arthur 
Hardinge,  and  Donald  Stewart. 

The  country  round  Delhi  is  particularly  well  suited  for  extended 
manoeuvres,  and  full  advantage  was  taken  of  the  facilities  it  afforded 
during  the  two  months  the  Camp  of  Exercise  lasted.  The  Prince  of 
Wales  landed  at  Calcutta  on  the  23rd  December ; and  Lord  Napier  with 
his  staff  went  down  to  meet  His  Royal  Highness,  whose  reception  was 
loyal  and  hearty  to  a degree.  As  the  Serapis,  with  the  Prince  on 
board,  steamed  slowly  up  the  Hughli,  salutes  were  fired  from  Fort 
William  and  three  ships  of  the  Royal  Navy.  All  the  vessels  in  the 
river  were  gay  with  flags,  their  yards  were  manned,  and  good  hearty 
English  cheers  resounded  from  stem  to  stern  of  each  ship  as  the  Indian 
troopship,  carrying  the  heir  to  England’s  throne,  came  in  sight.  As 


1876] 


THE  PRINCE  OF  I VALES  IN  INDIA 


327 


soon  as  the  Scrapis  was  moored,  the  Viceroy  went  on  board  to  greet 
the  Prince  and  conduct  His  Royal  Highness  to  the  gaily-decorated 
landing-stage,  where  the  principal  officials,  Native  Princes,  and  chief 
inhabitants  of  Calcutta  were  assembled.  Troops  lined  the  road  from 
the  river  to  Government  House,  and  the  maidan  (the  great  open 
space  in  front)  was  thronged  with  a dense  crowd  of  Natives  in  their 
most  brilliant  gala  attire,  eager  to  catch  a glimpse  of  the  son  of  the 
great  Queen  of  England. 

That  evening  Lord  Northbrook  gave  a State  banquet.  The  next  day 
there  was  a reception  of  the  Princes  and  Chiefs,  followed  by  a lev^e, 
and  after  dark  the  whole  place  was  most  beautifully  illuminated.  The 
week  that  followed  was  taken  up  with  entertainments  of  various  kinds 
— balls,  races,  and  garden-parties,  interspersed  with  official  visits — 
which  I am  afraid  the  Prince  could  not  have  found  amusing — and  on 
New  Year’s  Day,  1876,  His  Royal  Highness  held  a Chapter  of  the 
Order  of  the  Star  of  India,  after  which  the  Commander-in-Chief 
returned  to  Delhi  to  arrange  to  receive  the  Prince  in  that  historical 
city  on  the  11th  January. 

His  Royal  Highness’s  camp,  and  that  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
were  pitched  on  the  ground  occupied  by  the  British  army  during  the 
siege.  The  road,  five  miles  in  length,  from  the  station  to  the  camp 
was  lined  with  troops,  and  on  the  Ridge  itself  were  placed  six  Rifle 
corps,  three  of  which  had  taken  part  in  the  siege.*  The  2nd  Gurkhas 
were  very  appropriately  drawn  up  immediately  under  Hindu  Rao’s 
house,  and  when  this  point  was  reached,  the  Prince  stopped  and 
warmly  complimented  the  men  on  the  distinguished  service  the 
regiment  had  performed. 

The  next  day  there  was  a parade  of  all  the  troops  in  review  order 
for  the  inspection  of  the  Prince,  who  was  pleased  to  express  his  com- 
plete satisfaction  and  approval  of  ‘ the  steadiness  under  arms,  soldier- 
like bearing,  and  precision  of  movement,  which  distinguish  the  corps 
of  the  three  armies  assembled  at  the  camp  at  Delhi.’ 

That  evening  the  Prince  was  present  at  a ball  in  the  diwan-i-lihas 
(private  audience  hall)  in  the  palace,  given  in  His  Royal  Highness’s 
honour  by  the  officers  of  the  army. 

The  next  few  days  were  taken  up  with  manoeuvres,  which  the  Prince 
attended,  accompanied  by  Lumsdent  and  myself.  The  defence  was 
commanded  by  Reid,  the  attack  by  Hardinge,  the  latter’s  object  being 
to  gain  possession  of  the  Ridge,  with  a view  to  future  operations 
against  the  city  on  the  arrival  of  the  main  army  from  the  Punjab. 
But  the  attack  did  not  meet  with  the  success  which  attended  Barnard 
in  1857,  while  the  Commander  of  the  defence  proved  himself  as  skilful 

* 60th  Rifles,  2nd  Gurkhas,  and  1st  Punjab  Infantry. 

+ Lumsden  returned  to  Head-Quarters  as  Adjutant-General  on  Edwin 
Johnson  being  appointed  a member  of  the  Indian  Council  in  London. 


328 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1876 


in  protecting  the  Ridge  against  an  enemy  advancing  from  the  north  as 
he  had  been,  twenty  years  before,  in  repulsing  one  coming  from  the 
opposite  direction. 

The  Prince  of  Wales  held  another  investiture  of  the  Star  of  India 
on  the  7th  of  March  at  Allahabad,  which  Lord  Napier  and  the  staff 
attended.  At  its  close  we  took  our  leave  of  His  Royal  Highness,  who 
started  that  night  for  England. 

In  less  than  a fortnight  our  dear  old  Chief  followed,  and  I saw  him 
off  from  Bombay  on  the  10th  April.  I was  very  low  at  parting  with 
him,  for  though  in  the  earlier  days  of  our  acquaintance  I used  to  think 
he  was  not  very  favourably  disposed  towards  me,  when  I became  more 
intimately  associated  with  him  nothing  could  exceed  his  kindness.  He 
was  universally  regretted  by  Europeans  and  Natives  alike.  The 
soldiers  recognized  that  he  had  carefully  guarded  their  interests  and 
worked  for  their  welfare,  and  the  Native  Princes  and  people  felt  that 
he  was  in  sympathy  with  them,  and  to  this  day  they  speak  of  Lat 
Napier  Sahib  with  the  deepest  respect  and  affection. 

Lord  Napier  was  succeeded  in  the  command  by  Sir  Frederick 
Haines. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

With  a new  Commander-in-Chief  came  a new  Viceroy,  and  it  was 
while  we  were  in  Bombay  seeing  the  last  of  Lord  Napier  that  the 
Orontes  steamed  into  the  harbour  with  Lord  Lytton  on  board.  Little 
did  I imagine  when  making  Lord  Lytton’s  acquaintance  how  much  he 
would  have  to  say  to  my  future  career. 

His  Excellency  received  me  very  kindly,  telling  me  he  felt  that  I 
was  not  altogether  a stranger,  as  he  had  been  reading  during  the 
voyage  a paper  I had  written  for  Lord  Napier,  a year  or  two  before, 
on  our  military  position  in  India,  and  the  arrangements  that  would  be 
necessary  in  the  event  of  Russia  attempting  to  continue  her  advance 
south  of  the  Oxus.  Lord  Napier  had  sent  a copy  of  this  memor- 
andum to  Lord  Bcaconsfield,  by  whom  it  had  been  given  to  Lord 
Lytton. 

During  the  summer  of  1876  our  frontier  policy  was  frequently  under 
discussion.  Sir  Bartle  Frere  wrote  two  very  strong  letters  after  the 
Conservative  Government  came  into  power  in  1874,  drawing  attention 
to  the  danger  of  our  being  satisfied  with  a policy  of  aloofness,  and 
pointing  out  the  necessity  for  coming  into  closer  relations  with  the 
Amir  of  Afghanistan  and  the  Khan  of  Khelat.  Soon  afterwards 
the  Secretary  of  State  communicated  with  the  Government  of  India 


FIELD-MARSHAL  LORD  NAPIER  OF  MAGDALA,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I. 

From 

a photograph  by  Messrs.  Maull  and  Fox. 


LORD  LYTTON  BECOMES  VICEROY 


329 


1876] 

as  to  the  advisability  of  establishing  British  agents  in  Afghanistan, 
and  of  persuading  the  Amir  to  receive  a temporary  Embassy  at  Kabul, 
as  had  originally  been  proposed  by  Lord  Northbrook. 

The  members  of  Lord  Northbrook’s  Council  were  unanimously 
opposed  to  both  these  proposals,  but  they  did  not  succeed  in  convincing 
Lord  Salisbury  that  the  measures  were  undesirable ; and  on  the 
resignation  of  Lord  Northbrook,  the  new  Viceroy  was  furnished  with 
special  instructions  as  to  the  action  which  Her  Majesty’s  Government 
considered  necessary  in  consequence  of  the  activity  of  Russia  in 
Central  Asia,  and  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  accurate  information 
of  what  was  going  on  in  and  beyond  Afghanistan. 

The  question  of  the  Embassy  was  dealt  with  at  once  ; Lord  Lytton 
directed  a letter  to  be  sent  to  the  Amir  announcing  his  assumption  of 
the  Viceroyalty,  and  his  intention  to  depute  Sir  Lewis  Pelly  to  proceed 
to  Kabul  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  certain  matters  with  His 
Highness. 

To  this  communication  a most  unsatisfactory  reply  was  received, 
and  a second  letter  was  addressed  to  the  Amir,  in  which  he  was 
informed  that,  should  he  still  decline  to  receive  the  Viceroy’s  Envoy 
after  deliberately  weighing  all  the  considerations  commended  to  his 
serious  attention,  the  responsibility  of  the  result  would  rest  entirely 
on  the  Government  of  Afghanistan,  which  would  thus  alienate  itself 
from  the  alliance  of  that  Power  which  was  most  disposed  and  best  able 
to  befriend  it. 

This  letter  was  the  cause  of  considerable  excitement  in  Kabul, 
excitement  which  ran  so  high  that  the  necessity  for  proclaiming  a 
religious  war  was  mooted ; and,  to  complicate  matters,  the  Amir  at 
this  time  received  overtures  from  General  Kauffmann,  the  Russian 
Governor-General  in  Turkestan. 

A delay  of  six  weeks  occurred  before  Sher  Ali  replied  to  Lord 
Lytton’s  letter,  and  then  he  altogether  ignored  the  Viceroy’s  proposal 
to  send  a Mission  to  Kabul,  merely  suggesting  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment should  receive  an  Envoy  from  him,  or  that  representatives  from 
both  countries  should  meet  and  hold  a conference  on  the  border,  or,  as 
another  alternative,  that  the  British  Native  Agent  at  Kabul  should 
return  and  discuss  affairs  with  the  Viceroy. 

The  last  suggestion  was  accepted  by  the  Government  of  India,  and 
the  agent  (Nawab  Ata  Mahomed  Khan)  arrived  in  Simla  early  in 
October.  The  Nawab  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  Amir’s  attitude 
of  estrangement  was  due  to  an  accumulation  of  grievances,  the  chief 
of  which  were — the  unfavourable  arbitration  in  the  Sistan  dispute ; 
the  want  of  success  of  Saiyad  Nur  Mahomed’s  mission  to  India  in 
1873,  when  it  was  the  desire  of  the  Amir’s  heart  to  enter  into  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  British  Government ; the 
interposition  of  Lord  Northbrook’s  Government  on  behalf  of  Yakub 


33° 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1876 


Khan  ;*  the  recent  proceedings  in  Khelat,f  which  the  Amir  thought 
were  bringing  us  objectionably  near  Kandahar;  the  transmission  of 
presents  through  Afghanistan,  to  his  vassal,  the  Mir  of  Wakhan, 
without  the  Amir’s  permission  and,  above  all,  the  conviction  that 
our  policy  was  exclusively  directed  to  the  furtherance  of  British 
interests  without  any  thought  for  those  of  Afghanistan. 

As  regarded  the  proposed  Mission  to  Kabul,  the  Envoy  said  that  His 
Highness  objected  to  it  for  many  reasons.  Owing  to  local  fanaticism, 
he  could  not  insure  its  safety,  and  it  seemed  probable  that,  though  of  a 
temporary  nature  to  begin  with,  it  might  only  be  the  thin  end  of  the 
wedge,  ending  in  the  establishment  of  a permanent  Resident,  as  at  the 
courts  of  the  Native  Rulers  in  India.  Furthermore,  the  Amir  conceived 
that,  if  he  consented  to  this  Mission,  the  Russians  would  insist  upon 
their  right  to  send  a similar  one,  and  finally,  he  feared  a British  Envoy 
might  bring  his  influence  to  bear  in  favour  of  the  release  of  his  son, 
Yakub  Khan,  with  whom  his  relations  were  as  strained  as  ever. 

In  answer,  the  Viceroy  enumerated  the  concessions  he  was  prepared 
to  make,  and  the  conditions  upon  which  alone  he  would  consent  to 
them ; and  this  answer  the  agent  was  directed  to  communicate  to  the 
Amir. 

The  concessions  were  as  follows : 

(1)  That  the  friends  and  enemies  of  either  State  should  be  those  of 
the  other. 

(2)  That,  in  the  event  of  unprovoked  aggression  upon  Afghanistan 
from  without,  assistance  should  be  afforded  in  men,  money,  and  arms ; 
and  also  that  to  strengthen  the  Amir  against  such  aggression,  the 
British  Government  was  willing  to  fortify  Herat  and  other  points  on 
the  frontier,  and,  if  desired,  to  lend  officers  to  discipline  the  army. 

(3)  That  Abdulla  Jan  should  be  recognized  as  the  Amir’s  successor 
to  the  exclusion  of  any  other  aspirant ; and  that  the  question  of 
material  aid  in  support  of  such  recognition  should  be  discussed  by  the 
Plenipotentiaries. 

(4)  That  a yearly  subsidy  should  be  paid  to  the  Amir  on  the 
following  conditions : 

That  he  should  refrain  from  external  aggression  or  provocation  of 
his  neighbours,  and  from  entering  into  external  relations  without  our 
knowledge. 

* The  Amir’s  eldest  son,  who  had  rebelled  011  his  younger  brother,  Abdulla 
Jan,  being  nominated  heir  to  the  throne. 

f Before  Lord  Northbrook  left  India  ho  sent  Major  Sandeman  on  a Mission 
to  Khelat  to  re-open  the  Bolan  Pass,  and  endeavour  to  settle  the  differences 
between  the  Khan  and  the  Baluchistan  tribes,  and  between  the  tribes  them- 
selves, who  wore  all  at  loggerheads. 

I Presents  given  by  the  British  Government  to  the  Mir  of  Wakhan  in 
recognition  of  his  hospitable  reception  of  the  members  of  the  Forsyth  Mission 
on  their  return  from  Yarkund. 


1876] 


IMPERIAL  ASSEMBLAGE  AT  DELHI 


331 


That  he  should  decline  all  communication  with  Russia,  and  refer 
her  agents  to  us. 

That  British  agents  should  reside  at  Herat  and  elsewhere  on  the 
frontier. 

That  a mixed  commission  of  British  and  Afghan  ofliccrs  should 
determine  and  demarcate  the  Amir’s  frontier. 

That  arrangements  should  bo  made,  by  allowances  or  otherwise,  for 
free  circulation  of  trade  on  the  principal  trade  routes. 

That  similar  arrangements  should  be  made  for  a line  of  telegraph, 
the  direction  of  which  was  to  be  subsequently  determined. 

That  Afghanistan  should  be  freely  opened  to  Englishmen,  official 
and  non-official,  and  arrangements  made  by  the  Amir,  as  far  as 
practicable,  for  their  safety,  though  His  Highness  would  not  be 
absolutely  held  responsible  for  isolated  accidents. 

The  Viceroy  concluded  by  suggesting  that,  if  the  Amir  agreed  to 
these  proposals,  a treaty  might  be  arranged  between  the  agents  of  the 
respective  Governments,  and  ratified  either  at  Peshawar,  by  the  Amir 
meeting  Lord  Lytton  there,  or  at  Delhi  if  the  Amir  accepted  His 
Excellency’s  invitation  to  be  present  at  the  Imperial  Assemblage. 

The  Amir  at  the  time  vouchsafed  no  reply  whatever  to  these  pro- 
posals or  to  the  invitation  to  come  to  Delhi. 

In  the  autumn  of  1876  preparations  were  commenced  for  the 
‘ Imperial  Assemblage,’  which  it  was  announced  by  the  Viceroy  would 
be  held  at  Delhi  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1877,  for  the  purpose 
of  proclaiming  to  the  Queen’s  subjects  throughout  India  the  assump- 
tion by  Her  Majesty  of  the  title  of  ‘ Empress  of  India.’  To  this 
Assemblage  Lord  Lytton  further  announced  that  lie  proposed  ‘ to 
invite  the  Governors,  Lieutenant-Governors,  and  Heads  of  Administra- 
tion from  all  parts  of  the  Queen’s  Indian  dominions,  as  well  as  the 
Princes,  Chiefs,  and  Nobles  in  whose  persons  the  antiquity  of  the  past 
is  associated  with  the  prosperity  of  the  present,  and  who  so  worthily 
contribute  to  the  splendour  and  stability  of  this  great  Empire.’ 

Delhi  was  selected  as  the  place  where  the  meeting  between  the 
Queen’s  representative  and  the  great  nobles  of  India  could  most 
appropriately  be  held,  and  a committee  was  appointed  to  make  the 
necessary  arrangements.  As  a member  of  the  committee  I was 
deputed  to  proceed  to  Delhi,  settle  about  the  sites  for  the  camps,  and 
carry  out  all  details  in  communication  with  the  local  authorities.  The 
Viceroy  impressed  upon  me  that  the  Assemblage  was  intended  to 
emphasize  the  Proclamation  Lord  Canning  issued  eighteen  years  before, 
by  which  the  Queen  assumed  the  direct  sovereignty  of  her  eastern 
possessions,  and  that  he  wished  no  trouble  or  expense  to  be  spared 
in  making  the  ceremony  altogether  worthy  of  such  a great  historical 
event. 

I returned  to  Simla  in  October,  when  my  wife  and  I accompanied 


332 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1876 


the  Commander  in-Chief  on  a very  delightful  march  over  the  Jalauri 
Pass  through  the  Kulu  valley,  then  over  the  Bubbu  Pass  and  through 
the  Kangra  valley  to  Chamba  and  Dalhousie.  Our  party  consisted  of 
the  Chief,  his  Doctor  (Bradshaw),  Persian  interpreter  (Moore),  General 
and  Mrs.  Lumsden,  and  ourselves.  The  first  slight  shower  of  snow 
had  just  fallen  on  the  Jalauri  Pass,  and  as  we  crossed  over  we  dis- 
turbed a number  of  beautiful  snow-pheasants  and  minals  busily  engaged 
in  scratching  it  away  to  get  at  their  food.  The  scenery  on  this  march 
is  very  fine  and  varied ; for  the  most  part  the  timber  and  foliage  are 
superb,  and  the  valleys  are  very  fertile  and  pretty,  lying  close  under 
the  snow-capped  mountains. 

Having  inspected  the  ‘ Hill  stations,’  we  proceeded  to  Peshawar, 
where  the  Viceroy  had  arranged  to  hold  a conference  with  the 
Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  Punjab  and  the  Commissioner  of  Peshawar 
about  frontier  affairs. 

Early  in  December  I was  back  again  at  Delhi,  where  I found  the 
arrangements  for  the  several  camps  progressing  most  satisfactorily, 
and  canvas  cities  rising  up  in  every  direction,  I had  previously  chosen 
the  site  of  the  old  cantonment  for  the  camps  of  the  Viceroy,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  and  the  principal  officials,  while  for  the  Assemblage 
itself  I had  selected  ground  about  three  miles  off. 

The  Chiefs  and  Princes  were  all  settled  in  their  several  camps  ready 
to  meet  the  Viceroy,  who,  on  his  arrival,  in  a few  graceful  words 
welcomed  them  to  Delhi,  and  thanked  them  for  responding  to  his 
invitation.  He  then  mounted,  with  Lady  Lytton,  on  a state  elephant, 
and  a procession  was  formed,  which,  I fancy,  was  about  the  most 
gorgeous  and  picturesque  which  has  ever  been  seen  even  in  the 
East.  The  magnificence  of  the  Native  Princes’  retinues  can  hardly 
be  described  ; their  elephant-housings  were  of  cloth  of  gold,  or  scarlet- 
and-blue  cloths  embroidered  in  gold  and  silver.  The  howdahs  were 
veritable  thrones  of  the  precious  metals,  shaded  by  the  most  brilliant 
canopies,  and  the  war-elephants  belonging  to  some  of  the  Central  India 
and  Bajputana  Chiefs  formed  a very  curious  and  interesting  feature. 
Their  tusks  were  tipped  with  steel ; they  wore  shields  on  their  fore- 
heads, and  breastplates  of  flashing  steel ; chain-mail  armour  hung 
down  over  their  trunks  and  covered  their  backs  and  sides ; and  they 
were  mounted  by  warriors  clad  in  chain-mail,  and  armed  to  the  teeth. 
Delhi  must  have  witnessed  many  splendid  pageants,  when  the  Bajput, 
the  Moghul,  and  the  Mahratta  dynasties,  each  in  its  turn,  was  at  the 
height  of  its  glory ; but  never  before  had  Princes  and  Chiefs  of  every 
race  and  creed  come  from  all  parts  of  Hindustan,  vying  with  each 
other  as  to  the  magnificence  of  their  entourage,  and  met  together  with 
the  same  object — that  of  acknowledging  and  doing  homage  to  one 
supreme  Buler. 

The  next  few  days  were  spent  by  Lord  Lytton  in  receiving  the  sixty- 


1877] 


QUEEN  PROCLAIMED  EMPRESS  OF  INDIA 


333 


three*  Ruling  Princes  of  India  according  to  the  strictest  etiquette. 
Each  Prince,  with  his  suite,  was  met  at  the  entrance  to  the  camp,  and 
conducted  up  the  street  to  the  durbar  tent  by  mounted  officers,  the 
salute  to  which  he  was  entitled  being  fired  while  the  procession  moved 
on.  He  was  then  presented  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  the  Viceroy, 
who  placed  him  on  a chair  on  his  right,  immediately  below  a full- 
length  portrait  of  Her  Majesty.  A satin  banner,  richly  embroidered 
with  the  Chief’s  armorial  bearings,  surmounted  by  the  Imperial  crown, 
was  next  brought  in  by  Highland  soldiers  and  planted  in  front  of  the 
throne,  when  the  Viceroy,  leading  the  particular  Chief  towards  it,  thus 
addressed  him : ‘ I present  Your  Highness  with  this  banner  as  a 
personal  gift  from  Her  Majesty  the  Queen,  in  commemoration  of  her 
assumption  of  the  title  of  Empress  of  India.  Her  Majesty  trusts  that 
it  may  never  be  unfurled  without  reminding  you  not  only  of  the  close 
union  between  the  throne  of  England  and  your  loyal  and  princely 
house,  but  also  of  the  earnest  desire  of  the  paramount  power  to  see 
your  dynasty  strong,  prosperous,  and  permanent.’ 

His  Excellency  then  placed  round  the  Chief’s  neck  a crimson  l-ibbon, 
to  which  was  attached  a very  handsome  gold  medal  f with  the  Queen's 
head  engraved  on  it,  adding : * I further  decorate  you,  by  command  of 
Her  Majesty.  May  this  medal  be  long  worn  by  yourself,  and  long 
kept  as  an  heirloom  in  your  family  in  remembrance  of  the  auspicious 
date  it  bears.’ 

The  1st  January,  1877,  saw  the  Queen  proclaimed  Empress  of  India, 
The  ceremony  was  most  imposing,  and  in  every  way  successful.  Three 
tented  pavilions  had  been  constructed  on  an  open  plain.  The  throne- 
pavilion  in  the  centre  was  a very  graceful  erection,  brilliant  in  hangings 
and  banners  of  red,  blue,  and  white  satin  magnificently  embroidered 
in  gold,  with  appropriate  emblems.  It  was  hexagonal  in  shape,  and 
rather  more  than  200  feet  in  circumference.  In  front  of  this  was  the 
pavilion  for  the  Ruling  Chiefs  and  high  European  officials,  in  the  form 
of  a semicircle  800  feet  long.  The  canopy  was  of  Star  of  India  blue- 
and-white  satin  embroidered  in  gold,  each  pillar  being  surmounted  by 
an  Imperial  crown.  Behind  the  throne  was  the  stand  for  the  spec- 
tators, also  in  the  form  of  a semicircle  divided  in  the  middle,  and 
likewise  canopied  in  brilliant  colours.  Between  these  two  blocks  was 
the  entrance  to  the  area. 

Each  Chief  and  high  official  sat  beneath  his  own  banner,  which  was 
planted  immediately  behind  his  chair,  and  they  were  all  mixed  up  as 

* 1 Besides  the  sixty-tliree  Ruling  Chiefs,  there  were  nearly  three  hundred 
titular  Chiefs  and  persons  of  distinction  collected  at  the  Imperial  Assemblage, 
besides  those  included  in  the  suites  of  Ruling  Chiefs.—  J.  Talboys  Wheeler, 

1 History  of  the  Delhi  Assemblage.’ 

t These  gold  medals  were  also  presented  to  the  Governors,  Lieutenant- 
Governors,  and  other  high  officials,  and  to  the  members  ol  the  Imperial 
Assemblage  Committee. 


22 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


334 


[iS77 


much  as  possible  to  avoid  questions  of  precedence,  the  result  being  the 
most  wonderful  mass  of  colour,  produced  from  the  intermingling  of 
British  uniforms  and  plumes  with  gorgeous  eastern  costumes,  set  off  by 
a blaze  of  diamonds  and  other  precious  stones. 

All  the  British  troops  brought  to  Delhi  for  the  occasion  were  paraded 
to  the  north,  and  the  troops  and  retainers  belonging  to  the  Native 
Chiefs  to  the  south,  of  the  pavilion.  Guards  of  Honour  were  drawn  up 
on  either  side  of  the  throne  and  at  each  opening  by  which  the  Ruling 
Chiefs  were  to  enter  the  pavilion. 

The  guests  being  all  seated,  a flourish  of  trumpets  by  the  heralds 
exactly  at  noon  announced  the  arrival  of  the  Viceroy.  The  military 
bands  played  a march,  and  Lord  Lytton,  accompanied  by  Lady  Lytton, 
their  daughters,  and  his  staff,  proceeded  to  the  pavilion.  His  Excel- 
lency took  his  seat  upon  the  throne,  arrayed  in  his  robes  as  Grand 
Master  of  the  Star  of  India,  the  National  Anthem  was  played,  the 
Guards  of  Honour  presented  arms,  while  the  whole  of  the  vast 
assemblage  rose  as  one  man.  The  Chief  Herald  was  then  commanded 
to  read  the  Proclamation.  A flourish  of  trumpets  was  again  sounded, 
and  Her  Majesty  was  proclaimed  Empress  of  India. 

When  the  Chief  Herald  had  ceased  reading,  the  Royal  Standard 
was  hoisted,  and  a salute  of  101  salvoes  of  artillery  was  fired,  with  a 
feu  de  joie  from  the  long  line  of  troops.  This  was  too  much  for  the 
elephants.  As  the  feu  de  joie  approached  nearer  and  nearer  to  them  they 
became  more  and  more  alarmed,  and  at  last  scampered  off,  dispersing 
the  crowd  in  every  direction.  When  it  ceased  they  were  quieted  and 
brought  back  by  their  mahouts,  only  to  start  off  again  when  the  firing 
recommenced  ; but,  as  it  was  a perfectly  bare  plain,  without  anything 
for  the  great  creatures  to  come  in  contact  with,  there  was  no  harm 
done  beyond  a severe  shaking  to  their  riders.  As  the  sound  of  the  last 
salvo  died  away  the  Viceroy  addressed  the  assemblage.  When  he 
had  ceased  speaking,  the  assembly  again  rose  en  masse  and  joined  the 
troops  in  giving  several  ringing  cheers. 

His  Highness  the  Maharaja  Sindhia  then  spoke  as  follows : ‘ Shah  in 
Shah  Padishah.  May  God  bless  you.  The  Princes  of  India  bless  you, 
and  pray  that  your  sovereignty  and  power  may  remain  steadfast 
for  ever.’ 

Sir  Salar  Jung  rose  on  behalf  of  the  boy  Nizam,  and  said : ‘ I am 
desired  by  His  Highness  the  Nizam  to  request  your  Excellency  to  con- 
vey to  Her  Majesty,  on  the  part  of  himself  and  the  Chiefs  of  India,  the 
expression  of  their  hearty  congratulations  on  the  assumption  of  the 
title  of  Empress  of  India,  and  to  assure  the  Queen  that  they  pray  for 
her,  and  for  the  enduring  prosperity  of  her  Empire,  both  in  India  and 
England.’ 

The  Maharajas  of  Udaipur  and  Jaipur,  in  the  name  of  the  united 
Chiefs  of  Rajputana,  begged  that  a telegram  might  be  sent  to  the 


THE  EARL  OF  LITTON,  G.C.B..  G.M.S.I..  G.M.I.E., 
Viceroy  of  India. 

From 

a photograph  by  Messrs.  Maull  and  Fox. 


1877]  POLITICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  ASSEMBLAGE  335 

Queen,  conveying  their  dutiful  and  loyal  congratulations  ; and  the 
Maharaja  of  Kashmir  expressed  his  gratification  at  the  tenor  of  the  Vice- 
roy’s speech,  and  declared  that  he  should  henceforth  consider  himself 
secure  under  the  shadow  of  Her  Majesty’s  protecting  care.* 

It  is  difficult  to  overrate  the  political  importance  of  this  great 
gathering.  It  was  looked  upon  by  most  of  the  Ruling  Chiefs  as  the 
result  of  the  Prince  of  Wales’s  visit,  and  rejoiced  in  as  an  evidence  of 
Her  Majesty's  increased  interest  in,  and  appreciation  of,  the  vast 
Empire  of  India  with  its  many  different  races  and  peoples. 

I visited  all  the  camps,  and  conversed  with  every  one  of  the  Princes 
and  Nobles,  and  each  in  turn  expressed  the  same  intense  gratification 
at  the  Viceroy’s  reception  of  him,  the  same  fervent  loyalty  to  the 
Empress,  and  the  same  satisfaction  that  the  new  title  should  have  been 
announced  with  such  appropriate  splendour  and  publicity. 

General  rejoicings  in  honour  of  the  occasion  took  place  all  over 
India,  in  Native  States  as  well  as  British  cantonments.  School-houses, 
town  halls,  hospitals,  and  dispensaries  were  founded,  large  numbers  of 
prisoners  were  released,  substantial  additions  were  made  to  the  pay  of 
all  ranks  in  the  Native  Army,  as  well  as  a considerable  increase  in 
numbers  to  the  Order  of  British  India ; and  the  amnesty  granted  in 
1859  was  extended  to  all  but  murderers  and  leaders  in  the  Mutiny. 

When  the  Assemblage  broke  up,  I started  with  Sir  Frederick  Haines 
for  a tour  along  the  Derajat  frontier.  We  visited  Kohat,  Bannu,  Dera 
Ismail  Khan,  and  Multan ; proceeded  by  steamer  down  the  Indus  to 
Sukkur,  and  thence  rode  to  Jacobabad.  Then  on  to  Kotri,  from  which 
place  we  went  to  see  the  battle-field  of  Miani,  where  Sir  Charles  Napier 
defeated  the  Amirs  of  Sind  in  1843.  From  Kotri  we  travelled  to 
Simla  via  Karachi  and  Bombay,  where  we  were  most  hospitably  enter- 
tained by  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Bombay  (Sir  Charles  Stavely)  and 
his  wife. 

Afghan  affairs  were  this  year  again  giving  the  Viceroy  a great  deal  of 
anxiety.  The  Amir  had  eventually  agreed  to  a discussion  of  Lord 
Lytton's  proposals  being  held,  and  for  this  purpose  Saivad  Nur 
Mahomed  and  Sir  Lewis  Pelly  had  met  at  Peshawar  in  January,  1877. 
The  meeting,  unfortunately,  ended  in  a rupture,  owing  to  Sher  Ah’s 
agent  pronouncing  the  location  of  European  officers  in  any  part  of 
Afghanistan  an  impossibility ; and  what  at  this  crisis  complicated 
matters  to  a most  regrettable  extent  was  the  death  of  Saivad  Nur 
Mahomed,  who  had  been  in  failing  health  for  some  time. 

On  learning  the  death  of  his  most  trusted  Minister,  and  the  failure  of 
the  negotiations,  Sher  Ah  broke  into  a violent  fit  of  passion,  giving  vent 
to  his  fury  in  threatenings  and  invectives  against  the  British  Govern- 

* In  endeavouring  to  describe  this  historical  event,  I have  freely  refreshed 
my  memory  from  Talboys  Wheeler’s  ‘ History  of  the  Imperial  Assemblage,’  in 
which  is  given  a detailed  account  of  the  proceedings. 


22—2 


336 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1877 

ment.  He  declared  it  was  not  possible  to  come  to  terms,  and  that  there 
was  nothing  left  for  him  but  to  fight ; that  he  had  seven  crores  of 
rupees,  every  one  of  which  he  would  hurl  at  the  heads  of  the  English, 
and  he  ended  by  giving  orders  for  ajahad  (a  religious  war)  to  be  pro- 
claimed. 

For  the  time  being  nothing  more  could  be  done  with  Afghanistan, 
and  the  Viceroy  was  able  to  turn  his  attention  to  the  following  im- 
portant questions : the  transfer  of  Sind  from  Bombay  to  the  Punjab, 
a measure  which  had  been  unanimously  agreed  to  by  Lord  North- 
brook’s Government;  the  removal  from  the  Punjab  government  of 
the  trans -Indus  tract  of  country,  and  the  formation  of  the  latter  into  a 
separate  district  under  the  control  of  a Chief  Commissioner,  who  would 
be  responsible  to  the  Government  of  India  alone  for  frontier  adminis- 
tration and  trans-frontier  relations.  This  post  Lord  Lytton  told  me, 
as  much  to  my  surprise  as  to  my  gratification,  that  he  meant  to  offer 
to  me,  if  his  views  were  accepted  by  the  Secretary  of  State.  It  was 
above  all  others  the  appointment  I should  have  liked.  I delighted  in 
frontier  life  and  frontier  men,  who,  with  all  their  faults,  are  men,  and 
grand  men,  too.  I had  felt  for  years  what  an  important  factor  the 
trans-Indus  tribes  are  in  the  defence  of  India,  and  how  desirable  it  was 
that  we  should  be  on  better  terms  with  them  than  was  possible  so  long 
as  our  policy  consisted  in  keeping  them  at  arm’s  length,  and  our  only 
intercourse  with  them  was  confined  to  punitive  expeditions  or  the  visits 
of  their  head-men  to  our  hard-worked  officials,  whose  whole  time  was 
occupied  in  writing  long  reports,  or  in  settling  troublesome  disputes 
to  the  satisfaction  of  no  one. 

I now  hoped  to  be  able  to  put  a stop  to  the  futile  blockades  and 
inconclusive  reprisals  which  had  been  carried  on  for  nearly  thirty  years 
with  such  unsatisfactory  results,  and  I looked  forward  to  turning  the 
wild  tribesmen  from  enemies  into  friends,  a strength  instead  of  a 
weakness,  to  our  Government,  and  to  bringing  them  by  degrees  within 
the  pale  of  civilization.  My  wife  quite  shared  my  feelings,  and  wc 
were  both  eager  to  begin  our  frontier  life. 

As  a preliminary  to  my  engaging  in  this  congenial  employment, 
Lord  Lytton  proposed  that  I should  take  up  the  command  of  the 
Punjab  Frontier  Force.  I gladly  acquiesced ; for  I had  been  a long 
time  on  the  staff,  and  had  had  three  years  of  the  Quartermaster- General- 
ship.  My  friends  expressed  surprise  at  my  accepting  the  position  of 
Brigadier-General,  after  having  filled  an  appointment  carrying  with  it 
the  rank  of  Major-General ; but  this  was  not  my  view.  I longed  for 
a command,  and  the  Frontier  Force  offered  opportunities  for  active 
service  afforded  by  no  other  post. 

We  were  in  Calcutta  when  the  question  was  decided,  and  started 
very  soon  afterwards  to  make  our  arrangements  for  the  breaking  up  of 
our  home  at  Simla.  I took  over  the  command  of  the  Force  on  the 


1878] 


A JOURNEY  UNDER  DIFFICULTIES 


337 


15th  March,  1878.  My  wife  accompanied  me  to  Abbottabad — the 
pretty,  quiet  little  place  in  Hazara,  about  4,000  feet  above  the  sea, 
which  was  to  be  henceforth  our  winter  head-quarters.  For  the  summer 
months  we  were  to  be  located  in  the  higher  hills,  and  my  wife  was 
anxious  to  see  the  house  which  I had  purchased  from  my  predecessor, 
General  Keyes,  at  Natiagali.  So  off  we  set,  nothing  daunted  by  being 
told  that  we  were  likely  to  find  snow  still  deep  in  places. 

For  the  first  part  of  the  way  we  got  on  well  enough,  my  wife  in  a 
dandy,  I riding,  and  thirteen  miles  were  accomplished  without  much 
difficulty.  Suddenly  the  road  took  a bend,  and  we  found  ourselves  in 
deep  snow.  Riding  soon  proved  to  be  impossible,  and  the  dandy- 
bearers  could  not  carry  my  wife  further ; so  there  was  nothing  for  it 
but  to  walk.  We  were  seven  miles  from  our  destination,  and  at  each 
step  we  sank  into  the  snow,  which  became  deeper  and  deeper  the  higher 
we  ascended.  On  we  trudged,  till  my  wife  declared  she  could  go  no 
further,  and  sat  down  to  rest,  feeling  so  drowsy  that  she  entreated  me 
to  let  her  stay  where  she  was.  Fortunately  I had  a small  flask  with 
me  filled  with  brandy.  I poured  a little  into  the  cup,  mixed  it  with 
snow,  and  administered  it  as  a stimulant.  This  restored  her  some- 
what, and  roused  her  from  the  state  of  lethargy  into  which  she  had 
fallen.  Again  we  struggled  on.  Soon  it  became  dark,  except  for  such 
light  as  the  stars,  aided  by  the  snow,  afforded.  More  than  once  I 
despaired  of  reaching  the  end  of  our  journey ; but,  just  as  I had 
become  quite  hopeless,  we  saw  lights  on  the  hill  above  us,  and  heard 
our  servants,  who  had  preceded  us,  shouting  to  attract  our  attention. 
I answered,  and  presently  they  came  to  our  assistance.  Half  carrying, 
half  dragging  her,  we  got  my  wife  up  the  steep  mountain-side ; and 
at  length,  about  9 p.m.,  we  arrived  at  the  little  house  buried  in  snow, 
into  which  we  crept  through  a hole  dug  in  the  snow  wall  which 
encircled  it.  We  were  welcomed  by  a blazing  wood-fire  and  a most 
cheering  odour  of  dinner,  to  which  we  did  full  justice,  after  having 
got  rid  of  our  saturated  garments.  Next  morning  we  started  on  our 
return  journey  at  daybreak,  for  it  was  necessary  to  get  over  the  worst 
part  of  the  road  before  the  sun  had  had  time  to  soften  the  snow,  which 
the  night’s  frost  had  so  thoroughly  hardened  that  we  slipped  over  it 
without  the  least  difficulty. 

This  was  our  only  visit  to  our  new  possession,  for  very  soon  after- 
wards I was  informed  that  Lord  Lytton  wished  me  to  spend  the 
summer  at  Simla,  as  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  Punjab  would  be 
there,  and  His  Excellency  was  anxious  to  discuss  the  details  of  the 
proposed  Chief  Commissionership.  My  wife,  therefore,  returned  to 
Simla  at  once,  and  I joined  her  at  the  end  of  May,  having  in  the  mean- 
while inspected  every  regiment  and  visited  every  post  held  by  the 
Frontier  Force  between  Sind  and  Hazara — a most  interesting  ex- 
perience, which  I thoroughly  enjoyed. 


338 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

Before  continuing  my  story,  it  will,  I think,  be  as  well  to  recall  to  the 
minds  of  my  readers  the  train  of  events  which  led  to  England  and 
Russia  becoming  at  the  same  moment  solicitous  for  the  Amir’s  friend- 
ship, for  it  was  this  rivalry  which  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
second  Afghan  war. 

Less  than  two  hundred  years  ago  the  British  Empire  in  the  East  and 
Russia  were  separated  from  each  other  by  a distance  of  4,000  miles. 
Russia’s  most  advanced  posts  were  at  Orenburg  and  Petropaulovsk, 
while  England  had  obtained  but  an  uncertain  footing  on  the  seaboard 
of  southern  India.  The  French  were  our  only  European  rivals  in  India, 
and  the  advance  of  Russia  towards  the  Oxus  was  as  little  anticipated  as 
was  England’s  advance  towards  the  Indus. 

Thirty  years  later  Russia  began  to  absorb  the  hordes  of  the  Kirghiz 
steppes,  which  gave  her  occupation  for  more  than  a hundred  years, 
during  which  time  England  was  far  from  idle.  Bengal  was  conquered, 
or  ceded  to  us,  the  Madras  Presidency  established,  and  Bombay  had 
become  an  important  settlement,  with  the  result  that,  in  the  earl}’  part 
of  this  century,  the  distance  between  the  Russian  and  English  posses- 
sions had  been  diminished  to  less  than  2,000  miles. 

Our  progress  wa  now  more  rapid.  "While  Russia  was  laboriously 
crossing  a barren  desert,  the  North-West  Provinces,  the  Carnatic,  the 
territories  of  the  Peshwa,  Sind,  and  the  Punjab,  successively  came  under 
our  rule,  and  by  1850  we  had  extended  our  dominions  to  the  foot  of  the 
mountains  beyond  the  Indus. 

Russia  by  this  time,  having  overcome  the  difficulties  of  the  desert, 
had  established  herself  at  Aralsk,  near  the  junction  of  the  Syr  Daria 
with  the  waters  of  Lake  Aral ; so  that  in  fifty  years  the  distance  between 
the  outposts  of  the  two  advancing  Powers  in  Asia  had  been  reduced  to 
about  1,000  miles. 

Repeated  successful  wars  with  Persia,  and  our  desertion  of  that 
Power  owing  to  the  conviction  that  we  could  no  longer  defend  her 
against  the  Russians,  had  practically  placed  her  at  their  mercy,  and 
they  had  induced  Persia,  in  1837,  to  undertake  the  siege  of  Herat.  At 
the  same  time,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Teheran  had  despatched 
Captain  Vitkievitch  to  Kabul  with  letters  from  himself  and  from  the 
Czar  to  the  Amir,  in  the  hope  of  getting  Dost  Mahomed  Khan  to  join 
the  Russians  and  Persians  in  their  alliance  against  the  English. 

Yitkievitch’s  arrival  at  Kabul  towards  the  end  of  1837  had  been  anti- 
cipated by  Captain  (afterwards  Sir  Alexander)  Burnes,  who  had  been 
sent  three  months  before  by  Lord  Auckland  on  a Mission  to  the  Amir, 
ostensibly  to  improve  our  commercial  relations  with  the  Afghans,  but 
in  reality  to  prevent  them  from  joining  the  Russo-Persian  alliance. 


878] 


OBJECT  OF  THE  FIRST  AFGHAN  WAR 


339 


Bumes  had  been  most  cordially  received  by  Dost  Mahomed,  who 
hoped,  with  the  help  of  the  Indian  Government,  to  recover  the  district 
of  Peshawar,  which  had  been  wrested  from  him  by  the  Sikhs.  Vit- 
kievitch’s  reception  was  proportionately  discouraging,  and  for  some 
weeks  he  could  not  obtain  an  interview  with  the  Amir. 

The  Dost’s  hopes,  however,  were  not  fulfilled.  We  declined  to  give 
him  any  assistance  towards  regaining  possession  of  Peshawar  or 
defending  his  dominions,  should  his  refusal  to  join  with  Persia  and 
Russia  draw  down  upon  him  the  enmity  of  those  Powers. 

Vitkievitch,  who  had  been  patiently  biding  his  time,  was  now  taken 
into  favour  by  the  Amir,  who  accorded  him  a reception  which  fully 
compensated  for  the  neglect  with  which  he  had  previously  been 
treated. 

Burnes  remained  at  Kabul  until  the  spring  of  1838,  and  then  returned 
to  India  to  report  that  Dost  Mahomed  had  thrown  himself  heart  and 
soul  into  the  Russo-Persian  alliance. 

Under  pressure  from  the  English  Ministry  the  Governor-General  of 
India  determined  to  take  the  extreme  measure  of  deposing  an  Amir 
who  had  shown  himself  so  hostilely  inclined,  and  of  placing  on  the 
throne  of  Kabul  a Ruler  who,  it  was  hoped,  would  feel  that  it  was  to 
his  interest  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  us.  It  was  for  this  object  that 
the  first  Afghan  war*  was  undertaken,  which  ended  in  the  murder  of 
our  nominee,  Shah  Shuja,  and  the  triumphant  return  of  Dost  Mahomed. 
The  disastrous  failure  of  our  action  in  this  matter  taught  the  British 
Government  that  our  frontier  on  the  Sutlej  was  too  far  removed  for  us 
to  think  of  exercising  any  real  influence  in  Afghanistan,  and  that  the 
time  had  not  arrived  to  warrant  our  interfering  in  Afghan  affairs. 

After  this  came  our  war  with  the  Sikhs,  resulting  in  our  conquest  of 
the  Punjab,  and  our  frontier  becoming  conterminous  with  that  of 
Afghanistan  on  the  banks  of  the  Indus. 

There  was  a lull  in  the  movements  of  Russia  in  Central  Asia  until 
after  the  Crimean  "War  of  1854-56,  which,  while  temporarily  checking 
the  designs  of  Russia  in  Europe,  seems  to  have  stimulated  her  progress 
in  the  East.  After  the  passage  of  the  great  desert,  Russia  found  her- 
self in  the  midst  of  fertile  and  settled  countries,  whose  provinces  fell 
under  her  control  as  rapidly  as  those  of  India  had  fallen  under  ours, 
until  in  1864  Chimkent  was  occupied,  the  point  beyond  which  Prince 
Gortchakoff  stated  that  there  was  no  intention  on  the  part  of  Russia  to 
make  further  advances. 

Notwithstanding  these  assuxances,  Tashkent  was  captured  on  the 
29th  June  of  the  following  year.  In  1866  Khojent  was  successfully 

* It  is  instructive  to  note  how  remarkably  similar  were  the  circumstances 
which  brought  about  the  first  and  second  Afghan  wars,  viz.,  the  presence  of 
Russian  officers  at  Kabul. 


34° 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


assaulted.  Tisakh  fell  on  the  30th  October ; and  in  the  spring  of  1867  the 
fort  of  Yani-Kargan  in  the  Nurata  mountains  was  seized  and  occupied. 

Bokhara  alone  remained  unconquered,  but  the  Ruler  of  that  State, 
after  vainly  endeavouring  to  gain  assistance  from  Afghanistan  and  to 
enlist  the  sympathies  of  the  Indian  Government,  was  compelled  to  sue 
for  peace. 

Important  as  these  acquisitions  were,  they  attracted  but  little  atten- 
tion in  England,  owing  partly  to  the  policy  of  non-interference  which 
had  been  adopted  as  regards  Central  Asian  affairs,  and  partly  to  the 
British  public  being  absorbed  in  European  politics,  until  1868,  when 
the  occupation  of  Samarkand  by  Russia  caused  considerable  excitement, 
not  to  say  consternation,  amongst  the  authorities  in  England. 

Conferences  took  place  in  the  spring  of  1870  between  Lord  Claren- 
don, the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Baron  Brunow, 
the  Russian  Ambassador,  with  the  object  of  determining  a neutral 
zone,  which  should  be  the  limit  of  the  possessions  of  England  and 
Russia  in  Central  Asia.  For  nearly  three  years,  Russia  was  persistent 
in  her  endeavours  to  have  Afghanistan  placed  outside  the  pale  of 
British  influence  ; but  the  Indian  Government  were  equally  persistent 
in  pointing  out  the  danger  of  agreeing  to  such  an  arrangement,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  31st  January,  1873,  that  the  boundary,  which  neither 
England  nor  Russia  might  cross,  was  finally  agreed  upon. 

Six  months  later  the  conquest  of  Khiva  by  Russia  was  effected.  It 
was  at  first  given  out  that  the  expedition  was  to  punish  acts  of 
brigandage,  and  to  rescue  fifty  Russian  prisoners,  but  was  on  no 
account  to  lead  to  a prolonged  occupancy  of  the  Khanate.  Count 
Schouvaloff,  the  Russian  Statesman  who  was  deputed  to  communicate 
the  object  of  the  expedition  to  the  British  Government,  declared  that 
a positive  promise  to  this  effect  might  be  given  to  the  British  public, 
as  a proof  of  the  friendly  and  pacific  intentions  of  his  master  the  Czar ; 
but,  notwithstanding  these  assurances,  the  Russians  never  left  Khiva, 
and  it  has  been  a Russian  possession  from  that  time. 

Thus,  in  a little  more  than  twenty  years,  Russia  had  made  a stride 
of  600  miles  towards  India,  leaving  but  400  miles  between  her  outposts 
and  those  of  Great  Britain.  Russia’s  southern  boundary  was  now,  in 
fact,  almost  conterminous  with  the  northern  boundary  of  Afghanistan, 
near  enough  to  cause  the  Ruler  of  that  country  considerable  anxiety, 
and  make  him  feel  that  Russia  had  become  a dreaded  neighbour,  and 
that  the  integrity  of  his  kingdom  could  not  be  maintained  save  by  the 
aid  of  one  of  the  two  great  Powers  between  whose  fire  he  now  found 
himself. 

I have  endeavoured  to  show  how  it  was  that  Slier  Ali,  notwith- 
standing his  soreness  and  disappointment  at  the  many  rebuffs  he  had 
received  from  us  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  career,  gratefully  remem- 
bered the  timely  aid  afforded  him  by  Sir  John  Lawrence,  and  the 


i87«] 


GENERAL  STOLIETOFF'S  MISSION 


341 


princely  reception  accorded  to  him  by  Lord  Mayo,  and  was  still  quite 
prepared  in  1873  to  enter  into  friendly  relations  with  us,  provided  we 
would  recognize  his  favourite  son  as  his  heir,  and  give  a direct  promise 
of  aid  in  the  event  of  Russian  aggression.  Our  refusal  to  accede  to 
these  terms,  added  to  our  adverse  decision  in  regard  to  the  Sistan 
boundary,  turned  Slier  Ali  from  a friend  into  an  enemy,  and  he  de- 
cided, as  his  father  had  done  forty  years  before,  to  throw  in  his  lot 
with  Russia. 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

In  1877  Russia  declared  war  with  Turkey;  for  more  than  a year 
fighting  had  been  going  on  between  the  two  countries,  and  as  it 
seemed  possible  to  the  British  Government  that  England  might  in  the 
end  be  drawn  into  the  contest,  it  was  deemed  expedient  to  obtain  help 
from  India,  and  a force  of  about  5,000  Native  soldiers  was  despatched 
from  Bombay  to  Malta  in  response  to  the  demand  from  home. 

Russia  answered  this  move  on  our  part  by  increased  activity  in 
Central  Asia ; and  in  June,  1878,  it  was  reported  by  Major  Cavagnari, 
Deputy-Commissioner  of  Peshawar,  that  a Russian  Envoy  of  the  same 
rank  as  the  Governor-General  of  Tashkent  was  about  to  visit  Kabul, 
and  that  General  Kauffmann  had  written  to  the  Amir  that  the  Envoy 
must  be  received  as  an  Ambassador  deputed  by  the  Czar  himself.  A 
few  days  later  further  reports  were  received  of  Russian  troops  being 
mobilized,  and  of  the  intention  of  Russia  to  establish  cantonments  on 
the  ferries  of  Kilif  and  Kerki  on  the  Oxus. 

The  Amir,  it  was  said,  summoned  a council  of  the  leading  Chiefs, 
to  discuss  the  question  whether  it  would  be  most  advantageous  for 
Afghanistan  at  this  juncture  to  side  with  Russia  or  with  England ; it 
was  decided  apparently  in  favour  of  the  former,  for  from  the  moment 
General  Stolietoffs  Mission  set  foot  on  Afghan  territory  it  met  with 
an  enthusiastic  reception.  Five  miles  from  the  capital  Stolietoff  and 
his  companions  were  welcomed  by  the  Foreign  Secretary.  They  were 
then  mounted  on  richly-caparisoned  elephants,  and  escorted  by  a large 
body  of  troops  to  the  Bala  Hissar,  where  the  following  morning  they 
were  received  in  state  by  Slier  Ali,  and  the  nobles  of  highest  degree  in 
his  kingdom.* 

* On  the  13th  June,  the  day  on  which  the  Berlin  Congress  held  its  first 
sitting,  the  news  of  the  approach  of  General  Stolietoffs  Mission  reached 
Kabul.  The  Russians  hoped  that  the  Mission  might  influence  the  decision  of 
the  Berlin  Congress,  and  although  its  despatch  was  repudiated  by  the  Imperial 
Government  at  St.  Petersburg,  it  was  subsequently  ascertained  on  excellent 
authority  that  the  project  of  sending  a Mission  to  Kabul  was  discussed  three 
times  at  the  Council  of  Ministers,  and,  according  to  a statement  in  the 


342 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


On  the  eve  of  the  day  that  the  Mission  entered  Kabul,  Stolietoff 
received  a despatch  from  General  Kauffmann  giving  him  the  heads  of 
the  Berlin  Treaty,  with  the  following  commentary  in  the  handwriting 
of  the  Governor- General  himself : ‘ If  the  news  be  true,  it  is  indeed 
melancholy  adding,  however,  that  the  Congress  had  finished  its 
sittings,  and  that,  therefore,  the  Envoy  in  his  negotiations  with  the 
Amir  had  better  refrain  from  arranging  any  distinct  measures,  or 
making  any  positive  promises,  and  ‘ not  go  generally  as  far  as  ivould 
have  been  advisable  if  war  with  England  had  been  threatened.' 
Evidently  these  instructions  greatly  modified  the  basis  of  Stolietoffs 
negotiations  with  Sher  Ah  ; for,  although  the  Russians  deny  that  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Afghan  Ruler  was  contem- 
plated, it  seems  probable,  from  the  tone  of  Kauffmann’s  despatch,  that 
the  Envoy’s  instructions  were  elastic  enough  to  admit  of  such  an 
arrangement  had  the  circumstances  of  the  case  made  it  desirable — 
e.g.,  had  the  Berlin  Congress  failed  to  establish  peace  in  Europe. 

In  telegraphing  to  the  Secretary  of  State  an  account  of  these  pro- 
ceedings at  Kabul,  the  Viceroy  requested  explicit  instructions  from  Her 
Majesty’s  Government  as  to  whether  this  conduct  on  the  part  of  Russia 
and  Afghanistan  was  to  be  left  to  the  Government  of  India  to  deal  with 
as  a matter  between  it  and  the  Amir,  or  whether,  having  regard  to 
Russia’s  formal  promises,  it  would  be  treated  as  an  Imperial  question 
‘ In  the  former  case,’  he  concluded,  ‘ I shall  propose,  with  your  approval, 
to  insist  on  an  immediate  suitable  reception  of  a British  Mission.’ 

Lord  Lytton's  proposition  was  approved  of  by  Her  Majesty’s 
Ministers,  and  a letter* *  was  at  once  written  by  the  Viceroy  to  the 


Journal  de  St.  Petersbourg,  orders  were  sent  in  April,  1878,  to  General 
Kauffmann  regarding  its  despatch.  About  the  same  time,  the  Russian 
Minister  of  War  proposed  that  the  Army  of  the  Caucasus  should  be  transferred 
bodily  across  the  Caspian  to  Astrabad,  whence  the  troops  would  march  in  two 
columns  on  Herat ; while  three  columns,  amounting  in  the  aggregate  to 
14,000  men,  were  to  move  direct  upon  the  Oxus  from  Turkestan.  The  main 
part  of  this  scheme  was  never  carried  into  effect,  probably  from  its  being 
found  too  great  an  undertaking  at  a time  when  Russia  had  scarcely  obtained 
a footing  beyond  the  Caspian,  but  the  minor  movement  was  partially  carried 
out.  The  largest  of  the  three  columns,  under  Kauffmann’s  own  command, 
moved  from  Tashkent,  through  Samarkand,  to  Jam,  the  most  southern  point 
of  the  Russian  possessions  at  that  time,  and  within  ten  marches  of  Kilif,  the 
main  ferry  over  the  Oxus.  There  it  remained  for  some  weeks,  when  it  returned 
to  Tashkent,  the  Afghan  expedition  being  abandoned  in  consequence  of  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  having  been  signed. 

* ‘Simla, 

‘14 th  August,  1878. 

‘ The  authentic  intelligence  which  I have  lately  received  of  the  course  of 
* recent  events  at  Kabul  and  in  the  countries  bordering  on  Afghanistan  has 
rendered  it  necessary  that  I should  communicate  fully  and  without  reserve 
with  your  Highness  upon  matters  of  importance  which  concern  the  interests 


187S 


SHER  A LI  DECIDES  AGAINST  ENGLAND 


343 


Amir,  announcing  that  a Mission  would  shortly  be  despatched  to 
Kabul  with  General  Sir  Neville  Chamberlain,  at  that  time  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  in  Madras,  as  its  responsible  head. 

Major  Cavagnari  was  at  the  samo  time  directed  to  inform  the 
authorities  at  Kabul  that  the  object  of  the  Mission  was  altogether 
friendly,  and  that  a refusal  to  grant  it  a free  passage  and  safe  conduct, 
such  as  had  been  accorded  to  the  Russian  Envoy,  would  be  considered 
as  an  act  of  open  hostility. 

Intimation  of  the  Viceroy’s  intentions  reached  Kabul  on  the  17th 
August,  the  day  on  which  the  Amir’s  favourite  son,  Abdulla  Jan,  died. 
This  untoward  event  was  taken  advantage  of  to  delay  answering  the 
Viceroy’s  letter,  but  it  was  not  allowed  in  any  way  to  interfere  with  the 
progress  of  the  negotiations  with  Russia.  When  these  were  completed, 
Stolietoff  inquired  from  Sher  Ali  whether  he  meant  to  receive  the 
English  Mission,  whereupon  the  Amir  asked  for  the  General’s  advice 
in  the  matter.  Stolietoff,  while  replying  somewhat  evasively,  gave 
Sher  Ali  to  understand  that  the  simultaneous  presence  of  Embassies 
from  two  countries  in  almost  hostile  relations  with  each  other  would 
not  be  quite  convenient,  upon  which  His  Highness  decided  not  to  allow 
the  British  Mission  to  enter  Afghanistan.  This  decision,  however,  was 
not  communicated  to  the  Viceroy,  and  on  the  21st  September  the 
Mission*  marched  out  of  Peshawar  and  encamped  at  Jamrud,  three 
miles  short  of  the  Kyber  Pass. 


of  India  and  of  Afghanistan.  For  this  reason,  I have  considered  it  expedient 
to  depute  a special  and  confidential  British  Envoy  of  high  rank,  who  is  known 
to  your  Highness — his  Excelleney  General  Sir  Neville  Bowles  Chamberlain, 
Knight  Grand  Cross  of  the  Most  Honourable  Order  of  the  Bath,  Knight 
Grand  Commander  of  the  Most  Exalted  Order  of  the  Star  of  India,  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Madras  Army — to  visit  your  Highness  immediately  at  Kabul, 
in  order  that  he  may  converse  personally  with  your  Highness  regarding  these 
urgent  affairs.  It  appears  certain  that  they  can  best  be  arranged  for  the 
welfare  and  tranquillity  of  both  States,  and  for  the  preservation  of  friendship 
between  the  two  Governments,  by  a full  and  frank  statement  of  the  present 
position.  This  letter  is  therefore  sent  in  advance  to  your  Highness  by  the 
hand  of  Nawab  Gholarn  Hussein  Khan,  C.S.  I.,  a faithful  and  honoured  Sirdar 
of  my  Government,  who  will  explain  all  necessary  details  as  to  the  time  and 
manner  of  the  Envoy’s  visit.  It  is  asked  that  your  Highness  may  be  pleased 
to  issue  commands  to  your  Sirdars,  and  to  all  other  authorities  in  Afghanistan, 
upon  the  route  between  Peshawar  and  Kabul,  that  they  shall  make,  without 
any  delay,  whatever  arrangements  are  necessary  and  proper  for  effectively 
securing  to  my  Envoy,  the  representative  of  a friendly  Power,  due  safe 
conduct  and  suitable  accommodation  according  to  his  dignity,  while  passing 
with  his  retinue  through  the  dominions  of  your  Highness. 

‘ I beg  to  express  the  high  consideration  I entertain  for  your  Highness,  and 
to  subscribe  myself.’ 

* The  Mission  was  composed  of  General  Sir  Neville  Chamberlain,  G.C.B., 
G.C.S.I.  ; Major  Cavagnari,  C.S.I.  ; Surgeon-Major  Bellew,  C.S.I.  ; Major 
O.  St.  John,  R.E.  ; Captain  St.  V.  Hammick,  43rd  Foot ; Captain  F.  Onslow, 


344 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


In  consequence  of  the  extremely  hostile  attitude  of  the  Amir,  and  the 
very  unsatisfactory  reply  received  from  General  Faiz  Mahomed  Khan, 
commanding  the  Afghan  troops  in  the  Kyber  Pass,  to  a letter* *  he  had 
written  a few  days  before,  Sir  Neville  Chamberlain  suspected  that  the 
advance  of  the  Mission  would  be  opposed,  and,  in  order  ‘ to  reduce  to  a 
minimum  any  indignity  that  might  be  offered  to  our  Government,’  he 
deputed  Major  Cavagnari  to  ride  on  with  a few  sowars  to  Ali  Masjid,  a 
fort  ten  miles  beyond  the  mouth  of  the  Pass,  and  demand  leave  for  the 
Mission  to  proceed. 

Madras  Cavalry ; Lieutenant  Neville  Chamberlain,  Central  India  Horse  ; 
Maharaj  Pertap  Sing  of  Jodhpur  ; and  Sirdar  Ohed  Ulla  Khan,  of  Tonk. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  Jenkins  and  Captain  W.  Battye  were  with  the  escort. 

* ‘ Peshawar, 

‘ lath  Septcviber,  1878. 

(After  compliments.)  ‘I  write  to  inform  you  that,  by  command  of  His 
Excellency  the  Viceroy  and  Governor-General  of  India,  a friendly  Mission  of 
British  officers,  with  a suitable  escort,  is  about  to  proceed  to  Kabul  through 
the  Khyber  Pass,  and  intimation  of  the  despatch  of  this  Mission  has  been 
duly  communicated  to  His  Highness  the  Amir  by  the  hand  of  the  Nawab 
Ghulam  Hussein  Khan. 

1 1 hear  that  an  official  from  Kabul  has  recently  visited  you  at  Ali  Masjid, 
and  he  has  doubtless  instructed  you  in  accordance  with  His  Highness  the 
Amir’s  commands.  As,  however,  information  has  now  been  received  that 
you  have  summoned  from  Peshawar  the  Khyber  headmen  with  whom  we  were 
making  arrangements  for  the  safe  conduct  of  the  British  Mission  through  the 
Khyber  Pass,  I therefore  write  to  inquire  from  you  whether,  in  accordance 
with  the  instructions  you  have  received,  you  are  prepared  to  guarantee  the 
safety  of  the  British  Mission  to  Daka  or  not ; and  I request  that  a clear  reply 
to  this  inquiry  may  be  speedily  communicated  by  the  hand  of  the  bearer  of 
this  letter,  as  I cannot  delay  my  departure  from  Peshawar.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  Khyber  tribes  are  in  receipt  of  allowances  from  the  Kabul  Govern- 
ment, and  also,  like  other  independent  tribes  on  this  frontier,  have  relations 
with  the  British  Government.  It  may  be  well  to  let  you  know  that  when  the 
present  negotiations  were  opened  with  the  Khyber  tribes,  it  was  solely  with 
the  object  of  arranging  with  them  for  the  safe  conduct  of  the  British  Mission 
through  the  Khyber  Pass,  in  the  same  manner  as  was  done  in  regard  to  the 
despatch  of  our  Agent,  the  Nawab  Ghulam  Hussein  Khan  ; and  the  tribes 
were  given  clearly  to  understand  that  these  negotiations  were  in  no  way 
intended  to  prejudice  their  relations  with  His  Highness  the  Amir,  as  it  was 
well  known  that  the  object  of  the  British  Mission  was  altogether  of  a friendly 
character  to  His  Highness  the  Amir  and  the  people  of  Afghanistan. 

‘ I trust  that,  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  you  have  received  from 
His  Highness  the  Amir,  your  reply  to  this  letter  will  be  satisfactory,  and  that 
it  will  contain  the  required  assurances  that  the  Mission  will  be  safely  con- 
ducted to  Daka.  I shall  expect  to  receive  your  reply  to  this  letter  not  later 
than  the  18th  instant,  so  please  understand  that  the  matter  is  most  urgent. 

‘ But  at  the  same  time,  it  is  my  duty  to  inform  you,  in  a frank  and  friendly 
manner,  that  if  vour  answer  is  not  what  I trust  it  will  bo,  or  if  you  delay  to 
send  an  early  reply,  I shall  have  no  alternative  but  to  make  whatever  arrange- 
ments may  seem  to  me  best  for  carrying  out  the  instructions  I have  received 
from  my  own  Government 


iS7S] 


A MEETING  OF  PORTENTOUS  MOMENT 


345 


When  within  n mile  of  the  fort,  Cavagnari  was  met  by  a body  of 
Afridis,  who  warned  him  that  the  road  ahead  was  blocked  by  Afghans, 
and  that  if  he  ventured  further  he  would  be  fired  upon.  On  this 
Cavagnari  halted,  and  while  in  the  act  of  writing  a letter  to  Faiz 
Mahomed,  complaining  of  the  treatment  he  had  met  with,  and  in- 
forming him  that  he  and  his  companions  intended  to  proceed  until  fired 
upon,  an  act  the  responsibility  for  which  would  rest  with  the  Amir’s 
representatives,  a message  was  brought  him  from  Faiz  Mahomed  to  the 
effect  that  he  was  coming  to  meet  him,  and  would  hear  anything  he 
had  to  communicate. 

The  interview  took  place  near  a water-mill  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
stream  which  flows  under  Ali  Masjid.  I have  several  times  since 
ridden  past  the  spot  and  pictured  to  myself  the  meeting  between  the 
British  political  officer  and  the  Afghan  General.  It  was  a meeting  of 
most  portentous  moment,  for  its  result  would  mean  peace  or  war. 

Faiz  Mahomed’s  bearing  was  perfectly  courteous,  but  he  made  it 
clear  that  he  did  not  intend  to  permit  the  Mission  to  pass,  explaining 
that  he  was  only  acting  as  a sentry  under  instructions  from  Kabul,  and 
that  he  was  bound  to  resist  the  entrance  of  the  Mission  into  Afghan 
territory  with  all  the  force  at  his  disposal.  He  spoke  with  considerable 
warmth,  and  told  Cavagnari  that  but  for  their  personal  friendship  he 
would,  in  obedience  to  the  Amir’s  orders,  have  shot  down  him  and  his 
escort. 

Faiz  Mahomed’s  followers  were  not  so  respectful  in  then  bearing  as 
their  Chief,  and  their  manner  warned  Cavagnari  that  it  was  unad- 
visable  to  prolong  the  conversation ; he,  therefore,  took  leave  of  the 
Afghan  General,  and  returned  to  Jamrud.  The  Mission  was  dissolved,* 
our  Agent  at  Kabul  was  ordered  to  return  to  India,  and  Cavagnari  was 
instructed  to  remain  at  Peshawar  and  arrange  for  alienating  the  Afridis 
in  the  Khyber  from  the  Amir’s  interests. 

In  reporting  these  circumstances  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  the 
Government  of  India  expressed  their  regret  that  this  final  endeavour 
on  their  part  to  arrive  at  some  definite  understanding  with  the  Amir 
of  Kabul  should  have  been  thus  met  with  repudiation  and  affront,  and 
concluded  their  despatch  in  the  following  words  : ‘ The  repulse  of  Sir 
Neville  Chamberlain  by  Sher  Ali  at  his  frontier  while  the  Kussian 

* Iu  a letter  to  Lord  Lytton  reporting  the  rebuff  the  Mission  had  en- 
countered, General  Chamberlain  wrote  : ‘ No  man  was  ever  more  anxious  than 
1 to  preserve  peace  and  secure  friendly  solution,  and  it  was  only  when  I 
plainly  saw  the  Amir’s  fixed  intention  to  drive  us  into  a corner  that  I told 
you  we  must  either  sink  into  a position  of  merely  obeying  his  behests  on  all 
points  or  stand  on  our  rights  and  risk  rupture.  Nothing  could  have  been 
more  distinct,  nothing  more  humiliating  to  the  dignity  of  the  British  Crown 
and  nation  ; and  I believe  that  but  for  the  decision  and  tact  of  Cavagnari  at 
one  period  of  the  interview,  the  lives  of  the  British  officers  and  the  Native 
following  were  in  considerable  danger.  ’ 


346 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


emissaries  are  still  at  his  capital  has  proved  the  inutility  of  diplomatic 
expedients,  and  has  deprived  the  Amir  of  all  claim  upon  our  further 
forbearance.’ 

It  had  been  arranged  that,  if  it  were  unfortunately  found  to  be 
necessary  to  support  political  efforts  by  military  measures,  two  columns 
should  be  mobilized,  one  at  Sukkur  on  the  Indus,  for  an  advance  in 
the  direction  of  Kandahar,  the  other  at  Kohat  for  operations  in  the 
Kuram  valley,  and  that  I was  to  have  command  of  the  latter.  As 
soon,  therefore,  as  the  tidings  of  Sir  Neville’s  repulse  was  received,  I 
started  from  Simla  to  be  on  the  spot  in  case  the  proposal  to  employ 
force  should  be  sanctioned  by  the  authorities  in  England. 

Between  the  tune  of  my  leaving  Simla  and  my  arrival  at  Kohat  on 
the  9th  October,  it  was  decided  to  employ  a third  column  to  make  a 
demonstration  in  the  direction  of  the  Khyber  for  the  purpose  of  clear- 
ing the  Amir’s  troops  out  of  the  pass.* 

The  formation  of  this  column  was  no  doubt  a wise  move,  as  the 
Afghans  were  holding  Ali  Masjid,  the  spot  on  which  the  insult  had 
been  offered  to  our  Envoy,  and  the  presence  of  a force  on  this  line 
would  tend  to  relieve  the  pressure  against  my  column ; but  looked  at 
from  my  point  of  view,  this  third  column  was  not  quite  so  desirable, 
as  it  involved  the  withdrawal  of  three  of  my  most  efficient  regiments, 
and  the  transfer  of  a large  number  of  my  transport  animals  to  the 
Khyber  for  its  use.  There  was  some  consolation,  however,  in  the  fact 
that  my  old  friend  Major-General  Sir  Samuel  Browne,  who  had  been 
named  for  the  command  in  the  Khyber,  was  to  be  the  gainer  by  my 
loss. 

Major-General  Donald  Stewart,  who  was  in  England,  was  tele- 
graphed for  to  command  the  Kandahar  column,  the  advanced  portion 
of  which,  it  was  intended,  should  push  on  under  Major-General 
Biddulph  to  strengthen  Quetta. 

The  long-expected  replyf  from  the  Amir  to  the  Viceroy’s  letter  of 

* The  approximate  strength  of  the  three  columns  was  as  follows  : 


I.  The  Kandahar  Field  Force 

Officers. 
...  265 

Men. 

12,599 

Guns. 

78 

II.  The  Kuram  Field  Force  ... 

...  116 

6,549 

IS 

III.  The  Peshawar  Valley  Field  Force 

...  325 

15,854 

48 

706 

35,002 

144 

t ‘ Kabul, 

‘ 6th  October,  1878. 

(After  compliments.)  ‘ Your  Excellency’s  despatch  regarding  the  sending 
of  a friendly  Mission  has  been  received  through  N awab  Gholam  Hussein 
Khan  ; I understand  its  purport,  but  the  Nawab  had  not  yet  an  audience, 
nor  had  your  Excellency’s  letters  been  seen  by  me  when  a communication  was 
received  to  the  address  of  my  servant,  Mirza  Habibulla  Khan,  from  the 
Commissioner  of  Peshawar,  and  was  read.  I am  astonished  and  dismayed  by 


•878] 


LETTER  FROM  SHER  A LI 


347 


the  14th  August  was  received  at  Simla  on  the  19tli  October.  Its  tone 
was  considered  extremely  discourteous ; it  contained  no  apology  for 
the  public  affront  offered  to  the  British  Government,  and  indicated  no 
desire  for  unproved  relations. 

The  reply  was  at  once  communicated  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  who 
was  further  informed  that  the  Government  of  India  proposed  the 
following  measures : — 

The  immediate  issue  of  a manifesto  which  should  define  the  cause 
of  offence,  declare  a friendly  disposition  towards  the  Afghan  people 
and  reluctance  to  interfere  in  their  internal  affairs,  and  should  fix  the 
whole  responsibility  of  what  might  happen  upon  the  Amir. 

An  advance  into  the  Kuram  valley  as  soon  as  the  force  at  Kohat  was 
ready  to  move. 

The  expulsion  of  the  Afghan  troops  holding  the  Khyber  Pass. 

An  advance  from  Quetta  into  Pishin,  or,  if  necessary,  to  Kandahar. 

Lord  Cranbrook  (who  had  succeeded  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  as 
Secretary  of  State  for  India)  replied*  that  he  did  not  consider  matters 
to  be  at  present  ripe  for  taking  the  extreme  measures  recommended 
by  the  Government  of  India,  and  that,  before  crossing  the  frontiers  of 
Afghanistan,  a letter  should  be  addressed  to  the  Amir  demanding,  in 
temperate  language,  an  apology,  and  the  acceptance  of  a permanent 
Mission  within  Afghan  limits ; that  sufficient  time  should  be  given  for 


this  letter,  written  threateningly  to  a well-intentioned  friend,  replete  with 
contentions,  and  yet  nominally  regarding  a friendly  Mission.  Coining  thus 
by  force,  what  result,  or  profit,  or  fruit,  could  come  of  it  ? Following  this, 
three  other  letters  from  above-mentioned  source,  in  the  very  same  strain, 
addressed  to  my  officials,  have  been  perused  by  me.  Thus,  during  a period 
of  a few  days  several  letters  from  that  quarter  have  all  been  before  me,  and 
none  of  them  have  been  free  from  harsh  expressions  and  hard  words,  repugnant 
to  courtesy  and  politeness,  and  in  tone  contrary  to  the  ways  of  friendship  and 
intercourse.  Looking  to  the  fact  that  I am  at  this  time  assaulted  by  affliction 
and  grief  at  the  hand  of  fate,  and  that  great  trouble  has  possessed  my  soul,  in 
the  officials  of  the  British  Government  patience  and  silence  would  have  been 
specially  becoming.  Let  your  Excellency  take  into  consideration  this  harsh 
and  breathless  haste  with  which  the  desired  object  and  place  of  conference 
have  been  seized  upon,  and  how  the  officials  of  the  Government  have  been  led 
into  discussion  and  subjection  to  reproach.  There  is  some  difference  between 
this  and  the  pure  road  of  friendship  and  goodwill.  In  alluding  to  those 
writings  of  the  officials  of  the  opposite  Government  which  have  emanated 
from  them,  and  are  at  this  time  in  the  possession  of  my  own  officials,  the 
latter  have  in  no  respect  desired  to  show  enmity  or  opposition  towards  the 
British  Government,  nor,  indeed,  do  they  with  any  other  Power  desire  enmity 
or  strife  ; but  when  any  other  Power,  without  cause  or  reason,  shows  animosity 
towards  this  Government,  the  matter  is  left  in  the  hands  of  God,  and  to  His 
will.  The  esteemed  Nawab  Gholam  Hussein  Khan,  the  bearer  of  this  despatch, 
has,  in  accordance  with  written  instructions  received  from  the  British  Govern- 
ment, asked  for  permission  to  retire,  and  it  has  been  granted.  ’ 

* 25th  October. 


348 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 

the  receipt  of  a reply  to  this  letter  (the  text  of  which  was  to  be  tele- 
graphed to  Lord  Cranbrook  for  approval  before  despatch),  and  that 
meanwhile  the  massing  of  troops  should  be  continued,  and  adequate 
forces  assembled  at  the  various  points  where  the  frontier  would  be 
crossed  if  war  were  declared.  The  Secretary  of  State  went  on  to  say : 
‘ There  must  be  no  mistake  at  to  our  show  of  power  to  enforce  what 
we  require ; this  locus  penitentice  should  be  allowed  before  hostile  acts 
are  committed  against  the  Amir.’ 

These  instructions  were  carried  out,  and  on  the  30th  October  the 
ultimatum  was  despatched  to  Sher  Ah,  informing  him  that,  unless  his 
acceptance  of  the  conditions  were  received  by  the  Viceroy  not  later 
than  the  20th  November,  he  would  be  treated  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment as  a declared  enemy. 


CHAPTER  XLV. 

It  was  a proud,  albeit  a most  anxious,  moment  for  me  when  I assumed 
command  of  the  Kuram  Field  Force ; though  a local  Major-General, 
I was  only  a Major  in  my  regiment,  and  save  for  a short  experience 
on  one  occasion  in  Lushai,  I had  never  had  an  opportunity  of  com- 
manding troops  in  the  field.  Earnestly  longing  for  success,  I was 
intensely  interested  in  ascertaining  the  qualities  of  those  who  were  to 
aid  me  in  achieving  it.  To  this  end  I lost  no  tune  in  taking  stock  of 
the  several  officers  and  corps  who  were  to  be  associated  with  me,  some 
of  whom  were  personally  known  to  me,  while  others  I had  never  met 
before ; and  in  endeavouring  to  satisfy  myself  as  to  their  qualifications 
and  fitness  for  their  several  posts,  I could  not  help  feeling  that  they 
must  be  equally  anxious  as  to  my  capability  for  command,  and  that 
the  inspection  must  be  of  nearly  as  great  moment  to  them  as  to  me. 

The  results  of  a very  close  investigation  were  tolerably  satisfactory, 
but  there  were  weak  points  in  my  armour  which  gave  me  grave  cause 
for  anxiety. 

I came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  force  was  not  numerically  strong 
enough  for  the  very  difficult  task  before  it — in  the  first  instance,  the 
occupation  of  the  Kuram  valley  and  the  expulsion  of  all  Afghan 
garrisons  south  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass,  and  in  the  second,  as  oppor- 
tunity might  offer,  the  pushing  my  reconnaissances  into  the  Ivhost 
valley,  and,  if  military  considerations  would  admit,  the  dislodging  the 
Amir’s  administration  from  that  tract  of  country,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
Kabul  Government  drawing  supplies  from  it.  Finally,  I was  directed 
to  explore  the  roads  leading  to  the  unknown  region  beyond  Khost. 

The  Shutargardan  was  not  less  than  180  miles  from  lvohat,  the 
garrison  of  which  station  would,  on  my  departure,  be  reduced  to  a 


1878] 


SHORTCOMINGS  OF  MY  COLUMN 


349 


minimum,  and  Rawal  Pindi,  the  nearest  place  from  which  aid  could 
bo  procured,  was  130  miles  still  further  off,  separated  from  Kohat  by 
an  execrable  road  and  the  swiftly-flowing  river  Indus,  crossed  by  a 
precarious  bridge  of  boats.  It  had  to  be  taken  into  account  also  that 
the  various  Afridi  tribes  were  watching  their  opportunity,  and  at  the 
first  favourable  moment,  in  common  with  the  tribesmen  nearer  Kuram, 
they  might  be  expected  to  take  advantage  of  our  weakness  and  attack 
our  convoys  and  the  small  posts  which  had  necessarily  to  bo  estab- 
lished along  our  line  of  communication. 

The  attitude  of  the  Mahomedan  sepoys,  of  whom  there  were  large 
numbers  in  four  out  of  my  six  Native  Infantry  regiments,  was  also  a 
cause  of  considerable  anxiety ; for  I was  aware  that  they  were  not 
altogether  happy  at  the  prospect  of  taking  part  in  a war  against  their 
co-religionist,  the  Ruler  of  Afghanistan,  and  that  the  mullas  were 
already  urging  them  to  desert  our  cause. 

Furthermore,  I discovered  that  my  only  British  Infantry  Regiment, 
the  2nd  Battalion  of  the  8th  Foot,  was  sickly  to  a degree,  and  there- 
fore in  an  unserviceable  condition.  It  was  largely  composed  of  quite 
young,  unacclimatized  soldiers,  peculiarly  susceptible  to  fever — that 
terrible  scourge  which  fills  the  hospitals  of  our  Punjab  stations  in  the 
autumn  of  each  year.  I rode  out  to  meet  the  battalion  on  its  way  into 
Kohat,  and  was  horrified  to  see  the  long  line  of  doolies  and  ambulance- 
carts  by  which  it  was  accompanied. 

The  inefficient  state  of  the  transport  added  to  my  anxieties.  Not- 
withstanding the  difficulties  experienced  in  former  campaigns  from  the 
same  cause,  the  Government  had  neglected  to  take  any  steps  for  the 
organization  of  a proper  transport  service  while  we  were  at  peace ; 
consequently,  when  everything  should  have  been  ready  for  a start, 
confusion  reigned  supreme  in  this  all-important  department.  Large 
numbers  of  camels,  mules,  and  bullocks  arrived  daily,  picked  up  at 
exorbitant  prices  from  anyone  who  would  supply  them ; but  most  of 
these  animals  were  quite  unfit  to  enter  upon  the  hard  work  of  a cam- 
paign, and  with  a totally  inexperienced  and  quite  insufficient  staff  of 
officers  to  supervise  them,  it  was  evident  that  the  majority  must 
succumb  at  an  early  date. 

Hardly  had  I realized  these  shortcomings  in  the  constitution  and 
equipment  of  my  column  than  I received  intelligence  which  led  me  to 
believe  that  the  Afghans  would  hold  the  Pei  war  Kotal  (the  pass  leading 
into  Afghanistan  over  the  range  of  mountains  bounding  the  Kuram 
valley)  in  great  strength,  and  were  determined  to  oppose  our  advance 
at  this  point.  Under  these  circumstances  I felt  myself  justified  in 
representing  to  the  powers  at  Simla  that  I considered  the  number  of 
troops  at  my  disposal  inadequate  for  the  task  they  were  expected  to 
perform,  which  representation  resulted  in  the  23rd  Pioneers,  whose 
transfer  to  the  Khyber  column  had  been  under  consideration,  being 

23 


3So 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


left  with  me,  and  the  72nd  Highlanders,  a battery  of  Field  Artillery, 
and  the  28th  Punjab  Infantry,  being  sent  to  Kohat.  Of  these,  how- 
ever, I was  allowed  to  take  on  with  me  only  one  wing  of  the  72nd, 
half  the  battery,  and  the  28th  Punjab  Infantry;  and  the  last-named 
regiment  I could  hardly  consider  as  part  of  my  force,  for  when  we 
should  arrive  at  Thai,  our  furthest  frontier  post,  it  would  have  to  be 
dropped,  with  a wing  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry  and  No.  2 Mountain 
Battery,  to  garrison  that  place. 

This  small  reinforcement  was  not  given  to  me  without  considerable 
demur  on  the  part  of  the  military  authorities,  who  had  made  up  their 
minds  that  the  Kuram  column  would  meet  with  slight,  if  any, 
opposition,  and  that  the  chief  stand  would  be  made  in  the  Khyber. 
Lord  Lytton,  however,  supported  my  appeal,  as  did  Sir  Neville 
Chamberlain,  who  was  then  acting  as  Military  Member  of  Council, 
and  who  had  personal  knowledge  of  the  great  natural  strength  of  the 
Peiwar  Kotal  position. 

I next  turned  my  attention  to  the  transport,  and  endeavoured  by  all 
the  means  I could  think  of  to  render  it  more  efficient.  A certain 
portion  of  it  I placed  in  regimental  charge ; I had  the  men  instructed 
in  loading  and  unloading,  and  I took  great  care  that  the  animals  were 
not  overladen. 

Happily,  I had  a very  able  staff.  Major  Galbraith,  the  Assistant- 
Adjutant-General,  though  new  to  the  work,  proved  exceptionally  good, 
and  Captain  Badcock,  the  chief  Commissariat  officer,  and  Major 
Collett  and  Captain  ‘ Dick  ’ Kennedy,  officers  of  the  Quartermaster- 
General’s  department,  whom  I had  myself  selected,  I could  thoroughly 
depend  upon. 

As  regards  my  own  personal  staff  I was  equally  lucky,  Captain 
Pretyman  of  the  It. A.  being  my  A.D.C.,  and  Lieutenant  Neville 
Chamberlain,  of  the  Central  India  Horse,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
George  Villiers,  of  the  Grenadier  Guards,  my  Orderly  officers. 

As  political  adviser  I had  with  me  an  old  friend  and  schoolfellow, 
Colonel  Garrow  Waterfield,  Commissioner  of  Peshawar,  who  brought 
with  him  a large  following  of  Native  gentlemen  connected  with  the 
frontier,  by  whom  he  thought  our  intercourse  with  the  tribesmen 
would  be  assisted.  With  scarcely  an  exception  they  proved  loyal,  and 
throughout  the  campaign  helped  me  materially. 

Knowing  how  important  it  was  to  secure  the  interest  of  the  Chiefs 
and  Khans  of  the  border  on  our  side,  especially  those  who  had 
influence  in  the  Kuram  valley,  we  lost  no  opportunity  of  becoming 
acquainted  with  them  while  we  were  at  Kohat.  They  were  friendly 
and  full  of  promises,  but  it  was  clear  that  the  amount  of  assistance  to 
be  given  by  them  depended  on  whether  or  not  our  occupation  of 
Kuram  was  to  be  permanent,  and  on  this  important  point  I solicited 
definite  instructions.  I reported  to  the  Commandcr-in-Chief  that, 


1878] 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  BORDER  TRIBES 


35* 


from  all  I had  learnt,  the  advent  of  a British  force  would  be  welcomed 
by  the  people,  provided  they  understood  that  it  was  the  forerunner  of 
annexation ; that  in  this  case  we  should  be  regarded  as  deliverers,  and 
all  the  resources  of  the  country  would  be  placed  at  our  disposal ; but 
if  the  people  were  led  to  believe  that  the  force  would  be  withdrawn 
when  our  work  was  finished,  and  that  they  would  be  again  handed 
over  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  Kabul  Government,  we  must  expect 
no  aid  from  them,  as  they  would  naturally  dread  the  resentment  of 
their  Afghan  rulers. 

In  reply,  I was  informed  that  I could  assure  the  people  of  Kuram 
that  our  occupation  would  be  permanent;  and  my  being  enabled  to 
make  this  promise  was  undoubtedly  the  explanation  of  the  friendly 
reception  we  met  with  on  entering  the  valley,  and  the  cause  of  my 
receiving  at  the  same  time  a letter  from  the  Chief  of  the  Turis  (the 
inhabitants  of  the  Kuram  valley),  inquiring  when  we  might  be 
expected,  as  they  were  suffering  greatly  from  the  tyranny  of  the 
Afghan  Government,  and  were  anxiously  waiting  the  arrival  of  the 
British. 


CHAPTER  XLVI. 

By  the  15th  November  my  column*  (consisting  of  1,345  British  and 
3,990  Native  soldiers,  with  13  guns)  was  concentrated  at  Thai,  and  on 
the  20th — the  limit  of  time  given  to  the  Amir — no  reply  having  been 
vouchsafed  to  the  Viceroy’s  ultimatum,  orders  were  issued  to  the  three 
columns  to  advance  the  next  dav.f 

* The  details  of  the  column  are  given  in  the  Appendix. 

+ On  the  30th  November  a subordinate  officer  of  the  Kabul  Government 
reached  Sir  Samuel  Browne’s  camp  at  Daka,  and  delivered  the  following  letter 
from  the  Amir  to  the  address  of  the  Viceroy  : 

‘From  his  Highness  the  Amir  of  Kabul  to  the  Viceroy  of  India. 

4 Kabul,  1 9th  November,  1878. 

4 Be  it  known  to  your  Excellency  that  I have  received,  and  read  from 
beginning  to  end,  the  friendly  letter  which  your  Excellency  has  sent,  in  reply 
to  the  letter  I despatched  by  Nawab  Ghulam  Hussein  Khan.  With  regard  to 
the  expressions  used  by  yotu  Excellency  in  the  beginning  of  your  letter, 
referring  to  the  friendly  character  of  the  Mission  and  the  goodwill  of  the 
British  Government,  I leave  it  to  your  Excellency,  whose  wisdom  and  justice 
are  universally  admitted,  to  decide  whether  any  reliance  can  be  placed  upon 
goodwill,  if  it  be  evidenced  by  words  only.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  good- 
will really  consists  of  deeds  and  actions,  then  it  has  not  been  manifested  by 
the  various  wishes  that  have  been  expressed,  and  the  proposals  that  have 
been  made  by  British  officials  during  the  last  few  years  to  officials  of  this  God- 
granted  Government— proposals  which,  from  their  nature,  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  comply  with. 

4 One  of  these  proposals  referred  to  my  dutiful  son,  the  ill-starred  wretch, 

23—2 


352 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


The  Kuram  valley,  from  which  my  force  received  its  designation,  is 
about  60  miles  long,  and  from  3 to  10  miles  wide.  On  every  side  rise 
high  and  magnificently-wooded  mountains,  those  on  the  north  and  east 
being  the  most  lofty  and  precipitous,  while  on  the  north-west  projects 
the  spur  which  runs  down  from  Sika  Earn,  the  highest  peak  of  the 


Mahomed  Yakub  Khan,  and  was  contained  in  a letter  addressed  by  the 
officials  of  the  British  Government  to  the  British  Agent  then  residing  in 
Kabul.  It  was  written  in  that  letter  that,  “if  the  said  Yakub  Khan  be 
released  and  set  at  liberty,  our  friendship  with  the  Afghan  Government  will 
be  firmly  cemented,  but  that  otherwise  it  will  not.” 

‘ There  are  several  other  grounds  of  complaint  of  similar  nature,  which 
contain  no  evidence  of  goodwill,  but  which,  on  the  contrary,  were  effective  in 
increasing  the  aversion  and  apprehension  already  entertained  by  the  subjects 
of  this  God-granted  Government. 

‘ With  regard  to  my  refusal  to  receive  the  British  Mission,  your  Excellency 
has  stated  that  it  would  appear  from  my  conduct  that  I was  actuated  by 
feelings  of  direct  hostility  towards  the  British  Government. 

‘ I assure  your  Excellency  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  officials  of  this  God- 
granted  Government,  in  repulsing  the  Mission,  w'ere  not  influenced  by  any 
hostile  or  inimical  feelings  towards  the  British  Government,  nor  did  they 
intend  that  any  insult  or  affront  should  be  offered.  But  they  were  afraid 
that  the  independence  of  this  Government  might  be  affected  by  the  arrival 
of  the  Mission,  and  that  the  friendship  which  has  now  existed  between  the 
two  Governments  for  several  years  might  be  annihilated. 

‘ A paragraph  in  your  Excellency’s  letter  corroborates  the  statement  which 
they  have  made  to  this  Government.  The  feelings  of  apprehension  which 
were  aroused  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  Afghanistan  by  the  mere  announce- 
ment of  the  intention  of  the  British  Government  to  send  a Mission  to  Kabul, 
before  the  Mission  itself  had  actually  started  or  arrived  at  Peshawar,  have 
subsequently  been  fully  justified  by  the  statement  in  your  Excellency’s  letter, 
that  I should  be  held  responsible  for  any  injury  that  might  befall  the  tribes 
who  acted  as  guides  to  the  Mission,  and  that  I should  be  called  upon  to  pay 
compensation  to  them  for  any  loss  they  might  have  suffered  ; and  that  if,  at 
any  time,  these  tribes  should  meet  with  ill-treatment  at  my  hands,  the  British 
Government  would  at  once  take  steps  to  protect  them. 

‘ Had  these  apprehensions  proved  groundless,  and  had  the  object  of  the 
Mission  been  really  friendly,  and  no  force  or  threats  of  violence  used,  the 
Mission  would,  as  a matter  of  course,  have  been  allowed  a free  passage,  as 
such  Missions  are  customary  and  of  frequent  occurrence  between  allied  States. 
I am  now  sincerely  stating  my  own  feelings  when  I say  that  this  Govern- 
ment has  maintained,  and  always  will  maintain,  the  former  friendship  which 
existed  between  the  two  Governments,  and  cherishes  no  feelings  of  hostility 
and  opposition  towards  the  British  Government. 

‘ It  is  also  incumbent  upon  the  officials  of  the  British  Government  that, 
out  of  respect  and  consideration  for  the  greatness  and  eminence  of  their  own 
Government,  they  should  not  consent  to  inflict  any  injury  upon  their  well- 
disposed  neighbours,  and  to  impose  the  burden  of  grievous  troubles  upon  the 
shoulders  of  their  sincere  friends.  But,  on  the  contrary,  they  should  exert 
themselves  to  maintain  the  friendly  feelings  which  have  hitherto  existed 
towards  this  God-granted  Government,  in  order  that  the  relations  between 
tho  two  Governments  may  remain  on  the  same  footing  as  before  ; and  if,  in 
accordance  with  the  custom  of  allied  States,  the  British  Government  should 


i878] 


THE  KURAM  VALLEY 


353 

Sufed  Koh  range,  upwards  of  14,000  feet  high.  This  spur  forms  the 
boundary  between  Kuram  and  Afghanistan,  and  is  crossed  by  the 
Peiwar  Kotal.  A river,  which  varies  from  100  to  500  yards  in  width, 
flows  through  the  valley,  and  the  road,  or,  rather,  track,  which  existed 
in  1878,  ran  for  the  most  part  along  its  rocky  bed.  In  the  winter 
months  the  depth  of  the  water  nowhere  exceeded  three  feet,  except 
after  heavy  rain,  and  although  the  stream  was  rather  swift,  it  could 
usually  be  forded  with  very  little  risk.  The  valley  itself  had  a bleak 
and  deserted  appearance,  save  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  few  and 
widely-scattered  villages,  around  which  were  clustered  fruit  trees  and 
patches  of  cultivation. 

For  six  weeks  the  thoughts  of  every  one  in  the  force  had  been  turned 
towards  Kuram,  consequently  there  was  considerable  excitement  when 
at  3 a.m.  on  the  21st  November  the  leading  troops  crossed  the  river 
into  Afghan  territory  and  encamped  eight  miles  from  Thai.  The  next 
morning  we  marched  fifteen  miles  farther  up  the  valley  to  Hazir  Pir, 
where  we  halted  for  one  day  to  improve  the  road  (in  some  places  im- 
practicable for  guns  and  transport)  and  to  allow  of  the  rear  part  of  the 
column  closing  up.  As  we  proceeded  on  our  way,  the  headmen  from 
the  different  villa'ges  came  out  to  welcome  us,  and  on  arriving  at  Hazir 
Pir  we  found  a plentiful  repast  awaiting  us  spread  under  the  shade  of 
some  trees.  Knives  and  forks  were  evidently  considered  unnecessary 
adjuncts  by  our  entertainers,  so  I unhesitatingly  took  my  first  lesson 
in  eating  roast  kid  and  pillaued  chicken  without  their  aid. 

On  the  24th  we  marched  to  the  Darwazai  defile,  and  the  next  day 
proceeded  through  it  to  Kuram,  forty-eight  miles  from  Thai.  We 
found  the  fort  evacuated  by  the  Afghans,  who  had  left  behind  one 
6-pounder  gun. 

Notwithstanding  the  proffers  of  assistance  I had  received,  I could  get 
no  reliable  information  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy ; from  one 
account  I was  led  to  believe  that  they  were  in  full  retreat,  from  another 
that  they  were  being  strongly  reinforced.  So,  to  find  out  the  truth,  I 
reconnoitred  as  far  as  the  cantonment  of  Habib  Kila,  fifteen  miles 


desire  to  send  a purely  friendly  and  temporary  Mission  to  this  country,  with 
a small  escort,  not  exceeding  twenty  or  thirty  men,  similar  to  that  which 
attended  the  Russian  Mission,  this  servant  of  God  will  not  oppose  its 
progress.’ 

It  was  ascertained  that  this  messenger  had  come  to  Basawal  on  the 
22nd  November,  when,  hearing  of  the  capture  of  Ali  Masjid  by  British 
troops,  he  immediately  returned  to  Kabul.  The  Amir’s  letter,  though  dated 
the  19th  November,  was  believed  to  have  been  re-written  at  Kabul  after  the 
news  of  the  fall  of  Ali  Masjid.  The  text  of  this  letter  was  telegraphed  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  on  the  7th  December  ; in  reply  Lord  Cranbrook  pointed 
out  that  the  letter  evaded  all  the  requirements  specified  in  the  Viceroy’s 
ultimatum,  and  could  not  have  been  accepted  even  if  it  had  reached  him 
before  the  20th  November. 


354 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


ahead,  and  there  ascertained  that  the  Afghan  army,  consisting  (it  was 
said)  of  18,000  men  and  eleven  guns,  had  left  the  place  only  a short 
time  before,  and  was  then  moving  into  position  on  the  Peiwar  Kotal. 

Depot  hospitals  were  formed  at  Kuram,  and  all  our  surplus  stores  and 
baggage  were  left  there  with  the  following  garrison : Two  guns  of  F/A, 
Royal  Horse  Artillery,  half  of  G/3,  R.A.,  the  squadron  10th  Hussars, 
one  squadron  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  and  the  company  of  Bengal  Sappers 
and  Miners,  besides  all  the  sick  and  weakly  men  of  the  column. 

At  5 a.m.  on  the  28th  the  remainder  of  the  force,  with  the  exception 
of  the  troops  who  had  been  dropped  at  the  several  halting- places  to  keep 
open  our  line  of  communication,  marched  towards  the  Peiwar. 

The  stars  were  still  shining  when  we  started,  but  it  was  very  dark, 
and  we  were  chilled  to  the  bone  by  a breeze  blowing  straight  off  the 
snows  of  the  Sufed  Koh ; towards  sunrise  it  died  away,  and  was 
followed  by  oppressive  heat  and  clouds  of  dust.  Our  progress  was  slow, 
for  the  banks  of  the  numerous  nullas  which  intersect  the  valleys  had  to 
be  ramped  before  the  guns  and  baggage  could  pass  over  them. 

On  reaching  Habib  Kila,  intelligence  was  again  brought  that  the 
Amir’s  troops  were  in  disorderly  retreat,  and  had  abandoned  their  guns 
at  the  foot  of  the  pass.  I at  once  pushed  a reconnaissance  in  force  up 
the  south-eastern  slopes  of  the  mountain  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Gordon,*  of  the  29th  Punjab  Infantry,  who  discovered  that,  so  far  from 
the  enemy  having  abandoned  their  guns,  they  had  taken  up  an 
extremely  strong  position  on  the  pass,  from  which  they  fired  on  the 
reconnaissance  party  as  it  advanced,  wounding  one  British,  one  Native 
officerf  and  nine  men. 

As  the  Afghans  seemed  inclined  to  press  Gordon,  two  guns  were 
brought  into  action,  and,  to  cover  his  retirement,  I sent  out  the  5th 
Gurkhas,  under  Lieutenant- Colonel  Fitz-Hugh,  who  skilfully  effected 
this  object  with  the  loss  of  only  one  Gurkha  wounded. 

Gordon  brought  me  back  the  valuable  piece  of  information  that  no 
further  advance  in  that  direction  was  possible,  save  in  single  file — 
valuable  because,  had  I attempted  a front  attack,  the  sacrifice  of  life 

* Now  General  J.  Gordon,  C.B.,  Assistant  Military  Secretary,  Horse 
Guards. 

f The  Native  officer  was  Subadar-Major  Aziz  Khan,  a fine  old  soldier  who 
had  seen  hard  work  with  his  regiment  during  the  Mutiny,  and  in  many  a 
frontier  expedition.  He  twice  obtained  the  Order  of  Merit  for  bravery  in  the 
field,  and  for  his  marked  gallantry  on  one  occasion  he  had  received  a sword 
of  honour  and  a khilat  (a  dress  of  honour  or  other  present  bestowed  as  a 
mark  of  distinction).  Aziz  Khan  was  shot  through  the  knee,  and  after  a few 
days  the  wound  became  so  bad  the  Doctors  told  him  that,  unless  he  submitted 
to  amputation,  or  consented  to  take  some  stimulants  in  the  shape  of  wine,  he 
would  die  of  mortification.  Aziz  Khan,  who  was  a strict  and  orthodox 
Mahomedan,  replied  that,  as  both  remedies  were  contrary  to  the  precepts  of 
the  religion  by  which  he  had  guided  his  life,  he  would  accept  death  rather 
than  disobey  them.  He  died  accordingly. 


1878]  AN  APPARENTLY  IMPREGNABLE  POSITION  355 

must  have  been  enormous,  even  if  the  attack  had  proved  successful,  the 
possibility  of  which  I still  greatly  doubt. 

Our  tents  not  having  arrived,  the  force  prepared  to  bivouac  ; but  our 
position  proving  untenable,  from  being  within  range  of  the  Afghan 
shells,  we  moved  a mile  to  the  rear.  Strong  piquets  were  posted  on  the 
neighbouring  heights,  and  the  night  passed  without  further  inter- 
ruption. 

We  halted  the  two  following  days.  Men  and  cattle  were  exhausted 
from  their  fatiguing  marches,  and  supplies  had  to  be  brought  up  before 
we  could  advance  further ; besides,  I required  time  to  look  about 
me  before  making  up  my  mind  how  the  Peiwar  Kotal  could  most 
advantageously  be  attacked. 

It  was,  indeed,  a foi'midable  position — a great  deal  more  formidable 
than  I had  expected— on  the  summit  of  a mountain  rising  abruptly 
2,000  feet  above  us,  and  only  approachable  by  a narrow,  steep,  and 
rugged  path,  flanked  on  either  side  by  precipitous  spurs  jutting  out  like 
huge  bastions,  from  which  an  overwhelming  fire  could  be  brought  to 
bear  on  the  assailants.  The  mountain  on  the  enemy’s  right  did  not 
look  much  more  promising  for  moving  troops,  and  I could  only  hope 
that  a way  might  be  found  on  their  left  by  which  their  flank  could  be 
turned.  The  country,  however,  in  that  direction  was  screened  from 
view  by  spurs  covered  with  dense  forests  of  deodar. 

I confess  to  a feeling  very  nearly  akin  to  despair  when  I gazed  at 
the  apparently  impregnable  position  towering  above  us,  occupied,  as 
I could  discern  through  my  telescope,  by  crowds  of  soldiers  and  a 
large  number  of  guns. 

My  Chief  Engineer,  Colonel  Perkins,*  made  a reconnaissance,  which 
only  too  surely  confirmed  Gordon’s  opinion ; and  he  further  ascertained 
that  a deep  ravine  lay  between  the  ground  occupied  by  our  piquets  on 
the  north  and  the  kotal,  so  that  an  attack  on  the  enemy’s  immediate 
left  seemed  as  hopeless  as  on  his  right,  or  to  his  front. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  I sent  my  Quartermaster-General, 
Major  Collett,  with  his  assistant,  Captain  Carr,  and  a small  escort,  to 
the  top  of  a hill,  which  lay  to  the  right  rear  of  our  camp,  from  which 
they  were  able  to  get  a fairly  good  view  of  the  surrounding  country. 
Collett  reported  that,  so  far  as  he  could  judge,  it  seemed  likely  that,  as 
I had  hoped,  the  enemy’s  left  might  be  turned  by  a route  over  what 
was  known  as  the  Spingawi  Kotal,  where  it  had  been  ascertained  that 
some  Afghan  troops  were  posted.  This  was  encouraging,  but  before  I 
could  finally  decide  on  adopting  this  line  of  attack,  it  w7as  expedient 
to  find  out  whether  it  was  practicable  for  troops,  and  whether  the 
kotal  itself  was  held  in  great  strength.  Accordingly,  early  next 
morning,  Collett  wTas  again  despatched  to  make  a closer  reconnaissance 
of  the  Spingawi  approaches. 

* Now  General  Sir  iEneas  Perkins,  K.C.B. 


356 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


While  all  this  was  going  on,  I did  everything  I could  think  of  to 
prevent  what  was  in  my  mind  being  suspected  by  the  enemy  or,  indeed, 
by  my  own  troops.  Each  day  more  than  once,  accompanied  by  an 
imposing  number  of  officers  and  a considerable  escort,  I climbed  the 
lofty  spur- by  which  a direct  attack  would  have  to  be  covered,  and 
everyone  in  camp  was  made  to  believe  that  an  attack  in  this  direction 
was  being  prepared  for.  I was  particularly  careful  to  have  this  idea 
impressed  on  the  Turis  and  the  Afghan  camel-drivers,  by  whom  the 
enemy  were  pretty  sure  to  be  informed  of  what  was  going  on ; and 
also  on  the  Mahomedan  sepoys,  whom  I suspected  of  being  half- 
hearted. I confided  my  real  plan  to  only  three  people,  my  two  senior 
staff-officers,  Galbraith  and  Collett,  and  my  A.D.C.,  Pretyman,  for  I 
knew,  from  the  nature  of  the  country,  that,  under  the  most  favourable 
circumstances,  the  way  must  be  difficult  and  circuitous,  and  its  passage 
must  occupy  several  hours ; and  that  if  the  Afghans  got  wind  of  the 
contemplated  movement,  and  should  attack  my  small  force  while  on 
the  march  and  divided,  defeat  if  not  annihilation  would  be  inevitable, 
for  the  surrounding  tribes  would  be  certain  to  join  against  us  if  once 
they  believed  us  to  be  in  difficulties. 

I had  heard  that  the  smallness  of  the  column  was  being  freely 
commented  on  and  discussed ; indeed,  people  in  Kuram  did  not  care 
to  disguise  their  belief  that  we  were  hastening  to  our  destruction. 
Even  the  women  taunted  us.  When  they  saw  the  little  Gurkhas  for 
the  first  time,  they  exclaimed  : ‘ Is  it  possible  that  these  beardless  boys 
think  they  can  fight  Afghan  warriors  ?’  They  little  suspected  that  the 
brave  spirits  which  animated  those  small  forms  made  them  more  than 
a match  for  the  most  stalwart  Afghan.  There  was  no  hiding  from 
ourselves,  however,  that  the  force  was  terribly  inadequate  for  the 
work  to  be  done.  But  done  it  must  be.  A retirement  was  not  to  be 
thought  of,  and  delay  would  only  add  to  our  difficulties,  as  the  Afghans 
were  daily  being  reinforced  from  Kabul,  and  we  heard  of  still  further 
additions  of  both  Artillery  and  Infantry  being  on  their  way. 

Collett  returned  soon  after  noon  on  the  30th;  he  had  done  admirably 
and  brought  me  most  useful  information,  the  result  of  which  was  that 
I determined  tc  adopt  the  Spingawi  route.  The  nights  were  long,  and 
I calculated  that  by  starting  at  10  p.m.,  and  allowing  for  unforeseen 
delays,  we  should  reach  the  foot  of  the  pass  while  it  was  still  dark. 

Fresh  efforts  were  now  made  to  distract  the  enemy’s  attention  from 
the  real  point  of  attack.  In  addition  to  the  reconnoitring  parties  which 
were  ostentatiously  moved  towards  the  Peiwar,  batteries  were  marked 
out  at  points  commanding  the  kotal,  and  a great  display  was  made  of 
tho  arrival  of  the  two  Horse  and  three  Field  Artillery  guns,  which  I 
had  left  at  Kuram  till  the  last  moment  on  account  of  scarcity  of  forage 
at  the  front,  and  of  the  two  squadrons  of  Bengal  Cavalry,  which  for 
the  same  reason  I had  sent  back  to  Habib  Kila.  Even  with  these 


THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  PEIWAR  KOTAL 

From 

a pointing  by  Vereker  Hamilton. 


>878] 


DISPOSITION  OF  THE  FORCE 


357 


additions  the  total  strength  of  the  force  in  camp,  including  British 
officers,  amounted  to  only  889  Europeans  and  2,415  Natives,  with 
13  guns. 

These  attempts  to  mislead  the  enemy  were  entirely  successful,  for 
the  Afghans  shelled  the  working  parties  in  the  batteries,  and  placed 
additional  guns  in  position  on  the  south  side  of  the  pass,  showing 
distinctly  that  they  were  preparing  for  a front  attack,  while  in  our 
camp  also  it  was  generally  believed  that  this  was  the  movement  which 
would  be  carried  out  the  next  morning. 

When  it  became  sufficiently  dark  to  conceal  our  proceedings,  all  the 
commanding  and  staff  officers  assembled  in  my  tent,  and  I disclosed 
to  them  my  scheme  for  the  attack,  impressing  upon  them  that  success 
depended  upon  our  being  able  to  surprise  the  enemy,  and  begging  of 
them  not  even  to  whisper  the  word  ‘ Spingawi  ’ to  each  other. 

I  had  had  sufficient  time  since  I took  over  the  command  to  test  the 
capabilities  of  the  officers  and  regiments  upon  wrhom  I had  to  depend, 
so  that  I had  now  no  difficulty  in  disposing  the  troops  in  the  manner 
most  likely  to  ensure  success. 

For  the  turning  movement  I selected  : 

4 guns  F/A,  R.H.A., 

The  wing  72nd  Highlanders, 

No  1 Mountain  Battery  (4  guns), 

2nd  and  29th  Punjab  Infantry, 

5th  Gurkhas, 

23rd  Pioneers — 

Total  strength  2,263  men  with  8 guns  ; 
and  I determined  to  command  the  attack  myself,  with  Brigadier- 
General  Thelwall  as  second  in  command. 

For  the  feint  and  for  the  defence  of  our  camp  I left  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-General  Cobbe  : 

2 guns  F/A,  R.H.A., 

3 guns  G/3,  R.A., 

2nd  Battalion  8th  Foot,*' 

12th  Bengal  Cavalry, 

5th  Punjab  Infantry. 

In  all,  a little  more  than  1,000  men  with  5 guns. 

At  10  p.m.  on  Sunday,  the  1st  December,  the  little  column  fell  in, 
in  absolute  silence,  and  began  its  hazardous  march.  Tents  were  left 
standing  and  camp-fires  burning ; and  so  noiselessly  were  orders  carried 
out  that  our  departure  remained  unsuspected  even  by  those  of  our  own 
people  who  were  left  in  camp. 

The  track  (for  there  was  no  road)  led  for  two  miles  due  east,  and 
then,  turning  sharp  to  the  north,  entered  a wide  gorge  and  ran  along 

* The  strength  of  this  battalion  had  now  dwindled  down  to  348  men. 


358 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


the  bed  of  a mountain  stream.  The  moonlight  lit  up  the  cliffs  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  ravine,  but  made  the  darkness  only  the  more  dense 
in  the  shadow  of  the  steep  hills  on  the  west,  underneath  which  our  path 
lay,  over  piles  of  stones  and  heaps  of  glacier  debris.  A bitterly  cold 
wind  rushed  down  the  gorge,  extremely  trying  to  all,  lightly  clad  as 
we  were  in  anticipation  of  the  climb  before  us.  Onward  and  upwards 
we  slowly  toiled,  stumbling  over  great  boulders  of  rock,  dropping  into 
old  water-channels,  splashing  through  icy  streams,  and  halting  fre- 
quently to  allow  the  troops  in  the  rear  to  close  up. 

In  spite  of  the  danger  incurred,  I was  obliged  every  now  and  then  to 
strike  a match  and  look  at  my  watch  to  see  how  the  time  was  going.  I 
had  calculated  that,  by  starting  as  early  as  ten  o’clock,  there  would  be 
an  hour  or  two  to  spare  for  rest.  The  distance,  however,  proved  rather 
greater  than  was  expected  and  the  road  much  rougher,  but  these  facts 
were,  to  my  mind,  not  sufficient  to  account  for  the  slowness  of  our 
progress,  and  I proceeded  to  the  head  of  the  column,  anxious  to  discover 
the  true  cause  of  the  delay. 

I had  chosen  the  29th  Punjab  Infantry  to  lead  the  way,  on  account 
of  the  high  reputation  of  Colonel  John  Gordon,  who  commanded  it, 
and  because  of  the  excellent  character  the  regiment  had  always  borne ; 
but  on  overtaking  it  my  suspicions  were  excited  by  the  unnecessarily 
straggling  manner  in  which  the  men  were  marching,  and  to  which  I 
called  Gordon’s  attention.  No  sooner  had  I done  so  than  a shot  was 
fired  from  one  of  the  Pathan  companies,  followed  in  a few  seconds  by 
another.  The  Sikh  companies  of  the  regiment  immediately  closed  up, 
and  Gordon’s  Sikh  orderly  whispered  in  his  ear  that  there  was  treachery 
amongst  the  Pathans. 

It  was  a moment  of  intense  anxiety,  for  it  was  impossible  to  tell  how 
far  we  were  from  the  Spingawi  Kotal,  or  whether  the  shots  could  be 
heard  by  the  enemy ; it  was  equally  impossible  to  discover  by  whom 
the  shots  had  been  fired  without  delaying  the  advance,  and  this  I was 
loath  to  risk.  So,  grieved  though  I was  to  take  any  steps  likely  to 
discredit  a regiment  with  such  admirable  traditions,  I decided  to 
change  the  order  of  the  inarch  by  bringing  one  company  of  the  72nd 
Highlanders  and  the  5th  Gurkhas  to  the  front,  and  I warned  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Brownlow,  in  command  of  the  72nd,  to  keep  a watch 
over  the  Pathans  with  his  three  remaining  companies,  for  I felt  that 
our  enterprise  had  already  been  sufficiently  imperilled  by  the  Pathans, 
and  that  hesitation  would  be  culpable ; for,  unless  we  could  reach  the 
kotal  while  our  approach  was  still  concealed  by  the  darkness,  the 
turning  movement  would  in  all  probability  end  in  disaster. 

On  the  Gurkhas  coming  up,  I told  Major  Fitz-Hugh,  who  com- 
manded them,  that  the  moment  he  reached  the  foot  of  the  kotal,  he 
must  front  form  company,  fix  bayonets,  and  charge  up  the  slope  with- 
out waiting  for  further  orders. 


i»78] 


A NIGHT  ATTACK 


359 


Soon  afterwards,  and  just  as  the  first  streak  of  dawn  proclaimed  the 
approach  of  day,  the  enemy  became  aware  of  our  presence,  and  fired 
into  us,  when  instantly  I heard  Fitz-Hugh  give  the  word  to  charge. 
Brownlow,  at  the  head  of  his  Highlanders,  dashed  forward  in  support, 
and  two  guns  of  the  Mountain  battery  coming  up  at  the  moment,  I 
ordered  its  Commandant,  Captain  Kelso,  to  come  into  action  as  soon 
as  he  could  find  a position. 

I was  struck  by  the  smile  of  satisfied  pride  and  pleasure  with  which 
he  received  the  order.  He  was  delighted,  no  doubt,  that  the  oppor- 
tunity had  arrived  to  prove  what  the  battery — to  perfect  which  he  had 
spared  neither  time  nor  labour — could  do ; but  it  was  the  last  time  that 
gallant  soldier  smiled,  for  a few  seconds  later  he  was  shot  dead. 

The  Gurkhas,  forgetting  their  fatigue,  rapidly  climbed  the  steep  side 
of  the  mountain,  and,  swarming  into  the  first  entrenchment,  quickly 
cleared  it  of  the  enemy ; then,  guided  by  the  flashes  of  the  Afghan 
rifles,  they  pressed  on,  and,  being  joined  by  the  leading  company  of  the 
72nd,  took  possession  of  a second  and  larger  entrenchment  200  yards 
higher  up.  Without  a perceptible  pause,  the  Highlanders  and  Gurkhas 
together  rushed  a third  position,  the  most  important  of  all,  as  it  com- 
manded the  head  of  the  pass. 

The  Spingawi  Kotal  was  won ; but  we  were  surrounded  by  woods, 
which  were  crowded  with  Afghans,  some  400  of  whom  made  a dashing 
but  ineffectual  attempt  to  carry  off  them  guns,  left  behind  in  the  first 
scare  of  our  sudden  attack.  These  men  were  dressed  so  exactly  like 
some  of  our  own  Native  soldiers  that  thej*  were  not  recognized  until 
they  got  within  100  yards  of  the  entrenchment,  and  they  would  doubt- 
less have  succeeded  in  accomplishing  their  purpose — as  the  Highlanders 
and  Gurkhas  were  busy  pursuing  the  fugitives — had  not  Galbraith, 
whom  I had  sent  with  an  order  to  the  front,  hurriedly  collected  a 
certain  number  of  stragglers  and  met  the  Afghans  with  such  a 
murderous  fire  that  they  broke  and  fled,  leaving  seventy  dead  in  a 
space  of  about  fifty  yards  square. 

As  the  rising  sun  lighted  up  the  scene  of  the  conflict,  the  advantages 
of  a night  attack  became  more  apparent.  The  pass  lay  across  the 
shoulder  of  a mountain  (9,400  feet  above  the  sea),  and  through  a mag- 
nificent pine  forest.  Its  approaches  were  commanded  by  precipitous 
heights,  defended  by  breastworks  of  felled  trees,  which  completely 
screened  the  defenders,  who  were  quite  comfortably  placed  in  wide 
ditches,  from  which  they  could  fire  deadly  volleys  without  being  in  the 
least  exposed  themselves.  Had  we  not  been  able  to  surprise  the  enemy 
before  the  day  dawned,  I doubt  whether  any  of  us  could  have  reached 
the  first  entrenchment.  As  it  was,  the  regiment  holding  it  fled  in  such 
a hurry  that  a sheepskin  coat  and  from  sixty  to  a hundred  rounds  of 
ammunition  were  left  behind  on  the  spot  where  each  man  had  lain. 


360  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1878 

We  had  gained  our  object  so  far,  but  we  were  still  a considerable  dis- 
tance from  the  body  of  the  Afghan  army  on  the  Peiwar  Kotal. 

Immediately  in  rear  of  the  last  of  the  three  positions  on  the  Spingawi 
Kotal  was  a murg,  or  open  grassy  plateau,  upon  which  I re-formed  the 
troops  who  had  carried  the  assault.  The  2nd  Punjab  Infantry,  the 
23rd  Pioneers,  and  the  battery  of  Royal  Horse  Artillery  were  still  be- 
hind ; but  as  the  guns  were  being  transported  on  elephants,  I knew  the 
progress  of  this  part  of  the  force  must  be  slow,  and  thinking  it  unwise 
to  allow  the  Afghans  time  to  recover  from  their  defeat,  I determined  to 
push  on  with  the  troops  at  hand. 

A field  hospital  was  formed  on  the  murg,  and  placed  under  a guard, 
ammunition-pouches  were  re-filled,  and  off  we  started  again,  choosing 
as  our  route  the  left  of  two  hog-backed,  thickly-wooded  heights  run- 
ning almost  longitudinally  in  the  direction  of  the  Peiwar  Kotal,  in  the 
hope  that  from  this  route  communication  might  be  established  with  our 
camp  below.  I was  not  disappointed,  for  very  soon  Captain  Wynne, 
in  charge  of  the  signalling,  was  able  to  inform  Brigadier-General  Cobbe 
of  our  progress,  and  convey  to  him  the  order  to  co-operate  with  me  so 
far  as  his  very  limited  numbers  would  permit. 

Our  advance  was  at  first  unopposed,  but  very  slow,  owing  to  the 
density  of  the  forest,  which  prevented  our  seeing  any  distance,  and 
made  it  difficult  to  keep  the  troops  together. 

At  the  end  of  two  hours  we  arrived  at  the  edge  of  a deep  hollow,  on 
the  further  side  of  which,  150  yards  off,  the  enemy  were  strongly 
posted,  and  they  at  once  opened  fire  upon  us. 

Fancy  my  dismay  at  this  critical  moment  on  discovering  that  the 
Highlanders,  Gurkhas,  and  the  Mountain  battery,  had  not  come  up  ! 
They  had  evidently  taken  a wrong  turn  in  the  almost  impenetrable 
forest,  and  I found  myself  alone  with  the  29th  Punjab  Infantry. 
Knowing  that  the  missing  troops  could  not  be  far  off,  I hoped  that 
they  would  hear  the  firing,  which  was  each  moment  becoming  heavier  ; 
but  some  time  passed,  and  there  were  no  signs  of  their  approach.  I sent 
staff  officer  after  staff  officer  to  search  for  them,  until  one  only  re- 
mained, the  Rev.  J.  W.  Adams,  who  had  begged  to  be  allowed  to 
accompany  me  as  Aide-de-camp  for  this  occasion,  and  him  I also 
despatched  in  quest  of  the  missing  troops.  After  some  time,  which 
seemed  to  me  an  age,  he  returned  to  report  that  no  trace  could  he  find 
of  them ; so  again  I started  him  off  in  another  direction.  Feeling  the 
situation  was  becoming  serious,  and  expecting  that  the  Afghans, 
encouraged  by  our  inaction,  would  certainly  attack  us,  I thought  it 
advisable  to  make  a forward  movement ; but  the  attitude  of  the  29th 
was  not  encouraging.  I addressed  them,  and  expressed  a hope  that 
they  would  now  by  their  behaviour  wipe  out  the  slur  of  disloyalty 
which  the  firing  of  the  signal  shots  had  cast  upon  the  regiment,  upon 


MY  GURKHA  ORDERLIES. 

From 

a water -colour  sketch  by  the  late  General  Woodthoiye , C.B.,  It.  E. 


1878) 


DEVOTION  OF  MY  ORDERLIES 


36i 

which  Captain  Channer,*  who  was  just  then  in  command,  stepped 
forward,  and  said  he  would  answer  for  the  Sikhs;  but  amongst  the 
Pathans  there  was  an  ominous  silence,  and  Channer  agreed  with  me 
that  they  did  not  intend  to  fight.  I therefore  ordered  Channer  and  his 
subaltern,  Picot,  to  advance  cautiously  down  the  slope  with  the  Sikhs 
of  the  regiment,  following  myself  near  enough  to  keep  the  party  in 
sight.  I had  not  gone  far,  however,  before  I found  that  the  enemy 
were  much  too  strongly  placed  to  be  attacked  successfully  by  so  few 
men ; accordingly  I recalled  Channer,  and  we  returned  to  the  position 
at  the  top  of  the  hill. 

My  orderliest  during  this  little  episode  displayed  such  touching 
devotion  that  it  is  with  feelings  of  the  most  profound  admiration  and 
gratitude  I call  to  mind  their  self-sacrificing  courage.  On  this  (as  on 
many  other  occasions)  they  kept  close  round  me,  determined  that  no 
shot  should  reach  me  if  they  could  prevent  it ; and  on  my  being  hit  in 
the  hand  by  a spent  bullet,  and  turning  to  look  round  in  the  direction 
it  came  from,  I beheld  one  of  the  Sikhs  standing  with  his  arms 
stretched  out  trying  to  screen  me  from  the  enemy,  which  he  could 
easily  do,  for  he  was  a grand  specimen  of  a man,  a head  and  shoulders 
taller  than  myself. 

To  my  great  relief,  on  my  return  to  the  edge  of  the  hollow,  Adams 
met  me  with  the  good  tidings  that  he  had  found  not  only  the  lost  troops, 
but  the  Native  Infantry  of  the  rear  portion  of  the  column,  and  had 
ascertained  that  the  elephants  writh  the  guns  were  close  at  hand. 

Their  arrival  was  most  opportune,  for  the  enemy  had  been  rein- 
forced, and,  having  discovered  our  numerical  weakness,  were  becoming 
bolder ; they  charged  down  the  hill,  and  were  now  trying  to  force  their 
way  up  to  our  position,  but  our  Mountain  guns  were  quickly  brought 
into  action,  and  under  their  cover  another  attempt  was  made  to  drive 
the  Afghans  from  their  position.  The  23rd  Pioneers,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Colonel  Currie,  the  two  front  companies  led  by  Captain  Ander- 
son, moved  dotvn  the  slope,  and  were  soon  lost  to  view  in  the  thick 
wood  at  the  bottom  of  the  dell ; when  they  reappeared  it  was,  to  my 
great  disappointment,  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  hollow : they  had 

* Now  Major-General  Channer,  Y.C.,  C.B. 

t I had  six  orderlies  attached  to  me— -two  Sikhs,  two  Gurkhas,  and  two 
Pathans.  The  Sikhs  and  Gurkhas  never  left  me  for  a day  during  the  two 
years  I was  in  Afghanistan.  The  Pathans  behaved  equally  well,  but  they 
fell  sick,  and  had  to  be  changed  more  than  once.  'Whenever  I emerged  from 
my  tent,  two  or  more  of  the  orderlies  appeared  and  kept  close  by  me.  They 
had  always  good  information  as  to  what  was  going  on,  and  I could  generally 
tell  whether  there  was  likely  to  be  trouble  or  not  by  the  number  in  attendance ; 
they  put  themselves  on  duty,  and  decided  how  many  were  required.  One  of 
the  Gurkhas  is  since  dead,  but  the  other  and  the  two  Sikhs  served  with  me 
afterwards  in  Burma,  and  all  three  now  hold  the  high  position  of  Subadar  in 
their  respective  regiments. 


362 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


failed  in  the  attack,  and  Anderson  and  some  men  had  been  killed.  The 
enemy’s  position,  it  was  found,  could  only  be  reached  by  a narrow 
causeway,  which  was  swept  by  direct  and  cross  fires,  and  obstructed  by 
trunks  of  trees  and  a series  of  barricades. 

It  was  evident  to  me  that  under  these  circumstances  the  enemy  could 
not  be  cleared  out  of  their  entrenchment  by  direct  attack  without 
entailing  heavy  loss,  which  I could  ill  afford  and  was  most  anxious  to 
avoid.  I therefore  reconnoitred  both  flanks  to  find,  if  possible,  a way 
round  the  hill.  On  our  left  front  was  a sheer  precipice ; on  the  right, 
however,  I discovered,  to  my  infinite  satisfaction,  that  we  could  not 
only  avoid  the  hill  which  had  defeated  us,  but  could  get  almost  in  rear 
of  the  Peiwar  Kotal  itself,  and  threaten  the  enemy’s  retreat  from  that 
position. 

At  this  juncture  I was  further  cheered  by  the  arrival  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Perkins  and  Major  McQueen,  who,  with  the  5th  Punjab 
Infantry,  had  worked  their  way  up  the  steep  mountain-side,  in  the 
hope  of  getting  near  to  the  Peiwar  Kotal  and  co-operating  with  me. 
They  were,  however,  checked  by  the  deep  ravine  I have  before 
described,  and,  guided  by  the  sound  of  firing,  pushed  higher  up  the  hill. 
They  brought  me  word  that  the  Artillery  left  in  camp  had  opened  fire 
on  the  kotal  soon  after  daybreak,  and  had  succeeded  in  silencing  two  of 
the  enemy ’8  guns;  that  our  Infantry  had  crept  up  within  1,400  yards 
of  the  kotal,  but  were  met  by  such  a destructive  fire  that  they  could  not 
advance  further ; that  Brigadier- General  Cobbe  had  been  severely 
wounded,  and  that  Colonel  Barry  Drew  had  assumed  the  command. 
Perkins  also  gave  me  the  useful  information  that  he  had  observed  on 
his  way  up  a spur  from  which  the  kotal  position  could  be  fired  upon  at 
a distance  of  1,100  yards.  To  this  spot  I ordered  Lieutenant  Shirres, 
who  had  succeeded  poor  Kelso  in  command  of  the  Mountain  battery, 
to  take  his  guns,  and  I asked  Perkins  to  return  and  tell  Drew  to  press 
on  to  the  kotal,  in  the  hope  that  Sherries’s  fire  and  the  turning  move- 
ment I was  about  to  make  would  cause  the  enemy  to  retreat. 

I sent  the  29th  Punjab  Infantry  back  to  the  Spingawi  to  protect  the 
wounded.  I left  the  2nd  Punjab  Infantry  in  the  position  we  had  up 
till  now  been  occupying,  and  I took  McQueen’s  regiment  with  me. 

A few  rounds  from  the  Mountain  battery,  and  the  fact  that  their  rear 
was  threatened  and  their  retreat  about  to  be  cut  off,  soon  produced 
signs  of  wavering  amongst  the  Afghans.  Their  Artillery  fire  slackened, 
their  Infantry  broke,  and  about  2 p.m.  Drew  and  Hugh  Gough  found 
it  possible  to  make  a move  towards  the  Peiwar  Kotal.  Gough  was  the 
first  to  reach  the  crest,  closely  followed  by  Lieutenant  Brabazon,  his 
orderly  officer,  and  a fine  plucky  Dogra  named  Birbul.  They  were 
soon  joined  by  somo  hundreds  of  Turi  levies  collected  by  Waterfield 
and  by  the  8th  Foot.  Another  body  of  levies  under  Major  Palmer,* 
* Now  Major-General  Sir  Arthur  Palmer,  K.C.  13. 


MY  SIKH  ^ORDERLIES. 

From 

a water-colour  sketch  by  the  late  General  Woodthorpe,  C.B.,  li.E. 

24 


1 878] 


THE  PF.1WAR  KOTA  L 


363 


who  had  done  good  service  by  making  a feint  on  the  right  of  the 
Afghan  position,  arrived  about  the  same  time.  Plunder  was  of  course 
the  sole  object  of  the  Turis,  but  their  co-operation  at  the  moment  was 
useful,  and  helped  to  swell  our  small  numbers.  The  enemy  having 
evacuated  their  stronghold  and  retreated  by  the  Alikhel  road,  abandon- 
ing in  their  headlong  flight  guns,  waggons,  and  baggage,  were  pursued 
by  Hugh  Gough,  whose  Cavalry  had  by  this  time  come  up. 

The  Peiwar  Kotal  was  not  visible  from  the  route  we  had  taken,  but 
just  before  daylight  had  quite  gone  I could  make  out  with  the  aid  of 
my  telescope  a large  body  of  Afghans  moving  towards  the  Shutargar- 
dan,  which  made  me  feel  quite  satisfied  that  the  enemy’s  position 
was  in  our  possession. 

Night  overtook  us  before  w’e  could  reach  the  kotal,  and  as  everyone 
was  thoroughly  tired  out,  having  been  hard  at  work  since  10  p m.  the 
night  before,  with  but  little  food,  I thought  it  better  to  bivouac  where 
we  were,  on  the  southern  slope  of  the  Sika  Ram  mountain.  It  was 
hardly  a pleasant  experience  lying  on  the  ground  without  even  cloaks 
at  an  elevation  of  9,000  feet,  and  with  the  thermometer  marking 
twenty  degrees  of  frost ; but  spite  of  cold  and  hunger,  thoroughly 
content  with  the  day’s  work,  and  with  my  mind  at  rest,  I slept  as 
soundly  as  I had  ever  done  in  the  most  luxurious  quarters,  and  I think 
others  did  the  same.  At  any  rate,  no  one  that  I could  hear  of  suffered 
from  that  night’s  exposure. 

We  continued  our  march  at  daybreak,  and  reached  the  kotal  in  an 
horn-. 

The  examination  of  the  enemy’s  position  was  very  interesting.  It 
was  of  enormous  natural  strength,  the  dispositions  made  for  its  defence 
were  most  complete  and  judicious,  and  the  impossibility  of  taking  it  by 
other  than  a turning  movement  was  proved  beyond  a doubt ; it  extended 
from  the  Spingawi  to  some  commanding  heights  nearly  a mile  south  of 
the  Peiwar  Kotal ; thus  having  a front  of  about  four  miles  facing  due 
east.  From  right  to  left  the  position  ran  along  a lofty  and  rugged 
range  of  mountains,  clothed  with  dense  pine-forests.  Towards  the 
eastern  side  the  range  was  precipitous,  but  descended  on  ihe  west  by  a 
succession  of  upland  meadows  to  the  valley  of  the  Hariab ; it  was 
crossed  by  only  two  roads,  viz.,  the  Peiwar  and  Spingawi  Kotals;  at  a 
few  other  points  there  were  paths,  but  too  narrow  and  precipitous  for 
the  passage  of  troops. 

The  Peiwar  Kotal  is  a narrow  depression  in  the  ridge,  commanded 
on  each  side  by  high  pine- clad  mountains.  The  approach  to  it  from 
the  Kuram  valley  was  up  a steep,  narrow,  zigzag  path,  commanded 
throughout  its  entire  length  from  the  adjacent  heights,  and  difficult  to 
ascend  on  account  of  the  extreme  roughness  of  the  road,  which  was 
covered  with  large  fragments  of  rocks  and  boulders.  Every  point  of 
the  ascent  was  exposed  to  fire  from  both  guns  and  rifles,  securely  placed 

24—2 


364 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


behind  breastworks  constructed  of  pine-logs  and  stones.  At  the  top  of 
the  path  was  a narrow  plateau,  which  was  again  commanded  from 
the  thickly-wooded  heights  on  each  side,  rising  to  an  elevation  of  500 
feet. 

The  Afghan  Commander  had  been  quite  confident  of  success,  and 
was  only  waiting  for  reinforcements  to  attack  our  camp ; but  these 
reinforcements  did  not  arrive  until  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  December, 
just  too  late  for  him  to  carry  out  his  intention.  He  had  under  his 
command  eight  Regular  regiments  of  the  Afghan  army,  and  eighteen 
guns ; while  these  numbers  were  augmented  by  hordes  of  neighbouring 
tribesmen,  who  were  only  too  glad  to  respond  to  the  cry  of  a jahad 
against  the  infidel,  firmly  believing  that  as  true  believers  their  cause 
would  be  victorious. 

Our  loss  at  the  Peiwar  was  not  great — 2 officers  and  18  men  killed, 
and  3 officers  and  75  men  wounded.  The  Afghans  suffered  much  more 
severely,  besides  leaving  in  our  possession  all  their  guns,  with  quantities 
of  ammunition  and  other  warlike  stores. 


CHAPTER  XLVII. 

Perceiving  that  further  pursuit  of  the  enemy  would  be  useless,  I 
decided  to  halt  a few  days  to  admit  of  our  overtaxed  transport  bringing 
up  supplies  and  tents,  and  to  arrange  for  the  occupation  of  the  Peiwar 
position  during  the  winter  months.  But  I considered  that  my  work 
would  be  incomplete  if  we  stopped  short  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass. 
Moreover,  it  was  very  desirable  that  we  should  investigate  this  route, 
and,  if  possible,  get  into  friendly  communication  with  some  of  the 
sections  of  the  Ghilzai  tribe.  The  Jajis,  through  whose  territory  the 
first  part  of  the  road  ran,  now  showed  themselves  to  be  as  well  disposed 
as  the  Turis ; they  readily  brought  in  supplies,  and  volunteered  to 
labour  for  us,  and  from  the  information  obtained  by  the  political  officers, 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Hariab  valley  seemed  equally  anxious  to  be 
friendly.  The  dislodgment  of  the  Afghan  army  by  a much  smaller 
force,  from  a position  they  had  themselves  chosen,  had  evidently  had 
a salutary  effect. 

As  soon  as  I had  leisure,  I inquired  from  Colonel  Gordon  whether 
he  had  been  able  to  discover  the  men  who  had  fired  the  signal  shots  on 
the  night  of  the  2nd,  and  whether  he  did  not  think  that  the  Pathan 
Native  officers  ought  to  be  able  to  point  out  the  offenders.  Gordon 
replied  that  he  suspected  the  Jemadar  of  the  Pathan  company  knew 
who  the  culprits  were,  and  that  one  soldier  had  confessed  to  firing  the 
second  shot ; moreover,  he  told  me  that  eighteen  Pathans  had  left  the 
regiment  during  the  fight.  On  receiving  this  unpleasant  information, 


ONE  OF  MY  PATH  AN  ORDERLIES. 

From 

a water-colour  sketch,  by  the  late  General  Woodthorpe,  C.B.,  R.E. 


•878] 


ALIKHEL 


36s 

I assembled  a Court  of  Inquiry,  with  orders  to  have  the  proceedings 
ready  for  my  consideration  by  the  time  I returned  from  the  Shutar- 

gardan. 

Having  despatched  the  sick  and  wounded  to  Kuram  and  made  all 
necessary  arrangements,  I marched  on  the  6th  December  to  Alikhel, 
twelve  miles  on  the  road  to  the  Shutargardan.  Before  starting,  I 
issued  an  order  thanking  the  troops  for  the  efforts  they  had  made  to 
ensure  success,  and  I had  the  honour  of  communicating  to  them  at  the 
same  time  a congratulatory  message  from  the  Queen.*' 

We  reached  the  foot  of  the  Shutargardan  on  the  8th,  and  recon- 
noitred to  the  top  of  the  pass  the  next  morning.  This  point  was  11,000 
feet  above  the  sea,  commanded  a fine  view  of  the  Logar  valley,  and  I 
discovered  from  it  that  there  was  nothing  between  us  and  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Kabul  to  prevent  a force  moving  rapidly  on  that  place. 

We  returned  to  Alikhel  on  the  10th,  and,  as  it  was  important  to 
retain  control  of  this  advanced  post,  I decided  to  leave  Captain  Rennick 
in  political  charge,  a duty  for  which  his  nerve  and  determination  of 
character  eminently  fitted  him.  Colonel  Waterfield,  as  a temporary 
arrangement,  remained  there  also  with  a battery  of  Artillery  and  two 
regiments  of  Punjab  Infantry,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  friendly 
relations  with  the  neighbouring  tribesmen. 

From  Alikhel  there  were  said  to  be  two  roads  leading  to  Kuram, 
besides  the  difficult  path  over  the  Peiwar  Kotal ; and  as  it  was  of  great 
importance  to  gain  a knowledge  of  an  alternative  fine  of  communica- 
tion, in  view  of  further  trouble,  I determined  to  explore  one  of  them, 
choosing  that  which  appeared  to  be  the  shortest,  and  which  I heard 
had  been  used  some  time  before  by  an  Afghan  Mountain  battery. 
This  route  was  described  as  practicable  for  camels,  and  ran  through 
lands  belonging  to  tribes  whose  headmen  were  with  me,  a fact  which 
should,  I thought,  ensure  our  being  free  from  attack. 

I left  Alikhel  on  the  12th  December,  taking  with  me  No.  1 Mountain 
Battery,  a wing  72nd  Highlanders,  the  5th  Gurkhas,  and  the  23rd 
Pioneers.  The  route  lay  for  four  miles  along  the  banks  of  the  Hariab 
stream,  a tributary  of  the  Kuram  river,  through  a valley  which 
gradually  narrowed  into  a thickly-wooded  ravine,  three  miles  long : 

* ‘From  the  Viceroy,  Lahore,  to  General  Roberts. 

‘ 6th  December,  1878. 

‘ I have  much  pleasure  in  communicating  to  you  and  the  force  under  your 
command  the  following  telegram  just  received  from  Her  Majesty,  and  desire 
at  the  same  time  to  add  my  warm  congratulations  on  the  success  achieved. 
Message  begins  : “I  have  received  the  news  of  the  decisive  victory  of  General 
Roberts,  and  the  splendid  behaviour  of  my  brave  soldiers,  with  pride  and 
satisfaction,  though  I must  ever  deplore  the  unavoidable  loss  of  life.  Pray 
inquire  after  the  wounded  in  my  name.  May  we  continue  to  receive  good 
news.” 


^66 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


at  the  end  of  this  ravine  the  road,  turning  sharply  to  the  left,  ascended 
till  it  reached  an  open  grassy  plateau,  on  which  stood  the  hamlet  of 
Sapari.  The  inhabitants  turned  out  to  welcome  us,  bringing  supplies, 
and  appearing  so  friendly  that  I settled  to  halt  there  for  the  night.  I 
had  been  warned,  however,  by  the  maliks  of  some  of  the  villages  we 
had  passed  through  in  the  morning,  that  we  should  probably  be 
attacked  on  the  march  the  next  day,  and  that  a defile  which  lay  at  the 
other  side  of  a mountain  over  which  we  had  to  cross  would  be  par- 
ticularly dangerous  to  us.  I determined,  therefore,  to  send  on  troops 
that  evening  to  occupy  the  pass  over  this  mountain,  and  to  start  the 
baggage  off  long  before  daybreak,  so  that  it  should  be  out  of  the  way 
of  the  main  body,  which  would  also  have  to  march  at  an  early  hour  in 
order  to  reach  the  kotal  before  the  tribesmen  had  time  to  collect. 

This  could  have  been  accomplished  without  difficulty,  but  for  the 
machinations  of  our  false  friends  in  the  village,  who  directed  on  to  the 
precipitous  path  we  had  to  ascend  a stream  of  water  which  soon 
turned  into  a sheet  of  ice,  and  when  I arrived  on  the  spot  I found  the 
road  blocked  by  fallen  animals  vainly  struggling  to  regain  their  footing. 
This  caused  so  much  delay  that  it  was  nearly  noon  before  the  last 
camel  had  got  over  the  pass. 

The  descent  on  the  other  side  was  scarcely  less  difficult,  though  free 
from  ice.  We  dropped  3,000  feet  in  the  first  two  miles,  down  a way 
which  can  only  be  described  as  a ruined  staircase,  with  the  steps  miss- 
ing at  intervals,  ending  in  the  defile  against  the  dangers  of  which  we 
had  been  warned.  This  defile  was  certainly  a nasty  place  to  be  caught 
in,  being  five  miles  long,  and  so  narrow  that  the  camels’  loads  struck 
against  the  rocks  on  either  side  ; and  it  was  impossible  to  move  flank- 
ing parties  along  the  cliffs  above,  as  they  were  intersected  by  wide 
chasms  running  back  for  long  distances. 

It  was  important  to  secure  the  exit  from  this  gorge  without  delay, 
and  for  this  purpose  I pushed  on  four  companies  of  the  23rd  Pioneers, 
and  in  support,  when  the  ravine  began  to  widen  out  a little,  I hurried 
on  the  Highlanders  and  the  Mountain  battery,  leaving  the  Gurkhas  to 
protect  the  baggage  and  bring  up  the  rear. 

We  only  got  possession  of  the  exit  just  in  time.  The  Pioneers, 
by  occupying  commanding  positions  on  either  side  of  the  opening, 
effectually  checkmated  several  large  bodies  of  armed  men  who  were 
approaching  from  different  directions,  and  whose  leaders  now  declared 
they  had  only  come  to  help  us ! Later  on  we  discovered  still  more 
formidable  gatherings,  which  doubtless  would  have  all  combined  to 
attack  us,  had  they  been  in  time  to  catch  us  in  the  ravine. 

The  tail  of  the  column  was  followed  and  much  harassed  by  the 
enemy;  but  they  were  kept  at  bay  by  the  steadiness  of  the  gallant 
Gurkhas,  and  so  successful  were  they  in  safe-guarding  the  baggage, 
that,  although  many  of  the  drivers  ran  away  at  the  first  shot,  leaving 


ONE  OF  MY  PATHAN  ORDERLIES. 

From 

a water-colour  sketch  by  the  late  General  IVooclthorpe,  C.B..  R.E. 


i«78] 


GALLANTRY  OF  SERGEANT  GREER 


367 


the  soldiers  to  lead  the  animals  as  well  as  defend  them,  not  a single 
article  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  tribesmen.  The  regiment  lost  three 
men  killed,  and  Captain  Powell  and  eleven  men  wounded.  Captain 
Goad,  of  the  Transport  Department,  was  also  badly  hurt.* 

On  Goad  being  knocked  over,  Sergeant  Greer,  of  the  72nd  High- 
landers, assisted  by  three  privates,  picked  him  up,  and  having  placed 
him  under  cover  of  a rock,  they  turned  their  attention  to  the  enemy. 
They  were  only  four  against  large  numbers,  but  by  then-  cool  and 
steady  use  of  the  Martini-Henry  rifle,  which  had  shortly  before  been 
issued  to  the  British  soldiers  in  India,  they  were  enabled  to  hold 
their  ground  until  help  arrived,  when  the}’  succeeded  in  carrying  the 
wounded  officer  away. 

I had  observed  in  the  advance  on  the  Peiwar  Kotal  the  skill  and 
gallantry  displayed  by  Sergeant  Greer,  and  noted  him  as  a man  fitted 
for  promotion.  His  distinguished  conduct  in  rescuing  and  defending 
Goad  confirmed  me  in  my  opinion,  and  I accordingly  recommended 
him  for  a commission,  which,  to  my  great  gratification,  Her  Majesty 
was  graciously  pleased  to  bestow  upon  him. 

That  night  we  halted  at  the  village  of  Keria  ; thence  the  route  was 
easy  enough,  so,  leaving  the  troops  to  rest  and  recover  from  the  last 
hard  march,  I rode  on  to  Kuram,  where  there  was  much  to  be  done. 

The  ejectment  of  the  Afghan  ruler  of  Kliost  and  the  exploration  of 
that  valley  formed,  it  will  be  remembered,  part  of  the  programme 
given  to  me  to  carry  through,  and  it  was  very  desirable  that  this  service 
should  be  completed  before  the  winter  rains  set  in.  Peace  and  order 
now  reigned  in  Upper  Kuram  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Peiwar ; 
but  there  was  a good  deal  of  excitement  in  the  lower  part  of  the  valley 
and  in  Khost,  our  line  of  communication  was  constantly  harassed  by 
raiders,  convoys  were  continually  threatened,  outposts  fired  into,  and 
telegraph-wires  cut.  The  smallness  of  my  force  made  it  difficult  for 
me  to  deal  with  these  troubles,  so  I applied  to  the  Commander-in-Chief 
for  the  wing  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  left  at  Kohat,  and  the  5th 
Punjab  Cavalry  at  Thai  to  be  ordered  to  join  me  at  Kuram.  At  the 
same  time  I moved  up  No.  2 Mountain  Battery  and  the  28th  Punjab 
Infantry,  sending  the  29th  Punjab  Infantry  to  take  the  place  of  the 
28th  at  Thai. 

I was  greatly  hampered  by  want  of  transport.  Arrangements  had 
to  be  made  for  sending  the  sick  and  wounded,  as  well  as  the  captured 
guns,  to  Kohat  (the  sight  of  the  latter,  I fancied,  would  have  a good 
effect  on  the  tribes  in  our  rear) ; but  hard  work,  scarcity  of  forage, 
and  absence  of  supervision,  had  told,  as  was  to  be  expected,  on  animals 
in  bad  condition  at  the  outset.  Mules  and  camels  died  daily,  reducing 
our  all  too  small  numbers  to  such  an  extent  that  it  was  with  consider- 
able difficulty  the  convoy  was  at  last  despatched. 

* Both  officers  died  of  their  wounds  soon  afterwards. 


368 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1878 


From  the  first  I foresaw  that  want  of  transport  would  be  our  greatest 
difficulty,  and  so  it  proved  ; very  few  supplies  could  be  obtained  in  the 
vicinity  of  Kuram ; the  troops  at  Kohat  had  been  drawing  on  the 
adjacent  districts  ever  since  October,  so  that  the  purchasing  agents  had 
every  day  to  go  further  away  to  procure  necessaries,  and  consequently 
an  increased  number  of  animals  were  required  for  their  conveyance. 
My  Commissary-General  reported  to  me  that  only  a few  days’  pro- 
visions for  the  troops  remained  in  hand,  and  that  it  was  impossible  to 
lay  in  any  reserve  unless  more  transport  could  be  provided.  About 
this  reserve  I was  very  anxious,  for  the  roads  might  soon  become 
temporarily  impassable  from  the  rising  of  the  rivers  after  the  heavy 
rain  to  be  expected  about  Christmas.  Contractors  were  despatched  to 
all  parts  of  the  country  to  procure  camels,  and  I suggested  to  Govern- 
ment that  pack-bullocks  should  be  bought  at  Mirzapur,  and  railed  up 
country,  which  suggestion  being  acted  upon,  the  danger  of  the  troops 
having  to  go  hungry  was  warded  off. 

The  treacherous  soldiers  of  the  29th  Punjab  Infantry  had  now  to  be 
dealt  with — a necessary,  but  most  unpleasant,  duty.  A perusal  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  satisfied  me  that  the  two  men  who 
discharged  their  rifles  during  the  night-march,  the  Jemadar  of  their 
company  who  failed  to  report  their  criminal  action,  and  the  eighteen 
who  deserted  their  colours  during  the  engagement,  should  all  be  tried 
by  Court-Martial. 

The  prisoners  were  found  guilty.  The  sepoy  who  fired  the  first  shot 
was  sentenced  to  death,  and  the  one  who  discharged  the  second  to  two 
years’  imprisonment  with  hard  labour ; the  court,  recognizing  a possi- 
bility that  the  latter,  being  a young  soldier,  might  have  loaded  and 
fired  without  intending  treachery,  gave  him  the  benefit  of  the  doubt. 
The  Jemadar  was  awarded  seven  years’  transportation,  and  the  eighteen 
deserters  terms  varying  from  ten  years  to  one  year. 

It  was  with  deep  regret  that  I confirmed  these  several  sentences,  but 
it  was  necessary  that  a deterrent  example  should  be  made.  Treachery 
was  altogether  too  grave  a crime  to  be  lightly  dealt  with,  and  desertions 
amongst  the  Pathans  were  becoming  of  much  too  frequent  occurrence, 
particularly  as  the  deserters  invariably  carried  away  with  them  their 
rifles  and  ammunition. 

The  effect  of  these  sentences  was  most  salutary;  there  was  not  a 
single  desertion  subsequent  to  the  Court-Martial  for  more  than  a year, 
although  during  that  time  the  Mahomedan  portion  of  my  force  were 
severely  tried  by  appeals  from  their  co-religionists. 

On  Christmas  Eve  authentic  intelligence  was  brought  to  me  that, 
on  hearing  of  the  defeat  of  the  Afghan  army,  Slier  Ali,  with  the 
members  of  the  Russian  Mission  then  at  Kabul,  had  fled  to  Turkestan, 
and  that  his  son,  Yakub  Khan,  had  been  released  from  prison,  and  had 
assumed  the  reins  of  Government. 


878] 


SHF.R  A LI  LOOKS  TO  RUSSIA  FOR  AID 


369 


About  this  time,  also,  Sir  Samuel  Browne,  who  was  at  Jalalabad, 
received  a letter*  from  the  Amir,  in  which  he  announced  his  intention 
of  proceeding  to  St.  Petersburg  to  lay  his  case  before  the  Czar  and 
obtain  the  aid  of  Russia. 

Sher  Ali’s  disappearance  and  Yakub  Khan’s  assumption  of  authority 
suggested  new  possibilities  to  the  Viceroy,  who  at  once  instructed 
Major  Cavagnari,  the  political  officer  with  the  Kliyber  column,  to 
communicate,  if  possible,  with  Yakub  Khan,  and  explain  to  him  that 
our  quarrel  was  with  Sher  Ali  alone,  that  he  might  rest  assured  of 
the  friendly  disposition  of  the  British  Government  towards  him 
personally,  and  that,  unless  he  took  the  initiative,  hostilities  would 
not  be  resumed. 

Before  proceeding  to  Ivuram,  I invited  all  the  Turis  and  Jajis  who 
had  afforded  us  assistance  to  meet  me  in  durbar  that  they  might  be 
suitably  rewarded.  A goodly  number  responded  to  tho  invitation,  and 
were  told,  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  I had  received  from  the 
Government  of  India,  that  they  would  henceforth  be  under  British  pro- 
tection ; that  no  Amir  of  Afghanistan  should  ever  again  be  permitted 
to  tyrannize  over  them ; that  while  they  would  be  expected  to  live 
peaceably,  neither  their  religion  nor  their  customs  would  be  interfered 
with ; that  roads  would  be  made  and  markets  established,  and  that 
whatever  supplies  they  could  provide  for  the  use  of  the  troops  would  be 
liberally  paid  for. 

* ‘ From  Amir  Sher  Ali  Khan*  to  the  Officers  of  the  British 
Government. 

‘ Be  it  known  to  the  officers  of  the  British  Government  that  this  suppliant 
before  God  never  supposed,  nor  wished,  that  the  matters  [in  dispute]  between 
you  and  myself  should  come  to  this  issue  [literally,  “should  come  out  from 
the  curtain  ”],  or  that  the  veil  of  friendship  and  amity,  which  has  for  many 
years  been  upheld  between  two  neighbours  and  adjoining  States,  should, 
without  any  cause,  be  thus  drawn  aside. 

‘ And  since  you  have  begun  the  quarrel  and  hostilities,  and  have  advanced 
on  Afghan  territory,  this  suppliant  before  God,  with  the  unanimous  consent 
and  advice  of  all  tire  nobles,  grandees,  and  of  the  arruy  in  Afghanistan, 
having  abandoned  his  troops,  his  realm,  and  all  the  possessions  of  liis  crown, 
has  departed  with  expedition,  accompanied  by  a few  attendants,  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, the  capital  of  the  Czar  of  Russia,  where,  before  a congress,  the  whole 
history  of  the  transactions  between  myself  and  yourselves  will  be  submitted  to 
all  the  Powers  [of  Europe].  If  you  have  anything  in  dispute  with  me  regarding 
State  affairs  in  Afghanistan,  you  should  institute  and  establish  your  case  at 
St.  Petersburg,  and  state  and  explain  what  you  desire,  so  that  the  questions 
in  dispute  between  us  may  be  made  known  and  clear  to  all  the  Powers. 
And  surely  the  side  of  right  will  not  be  overlooked.  If  your  intentions  are 
otherwise,  and  you  entertain  hostile  and  vindictive  feelings  towards  the  people 
of  Afghanistan,  God  alone  is  their  Protector  and  real  Preserver.  Upon  the 
course  of  action  here  above  stated  this  suppliant  before  God  has  resolved 
and  decided.’ 


370  FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1879 

After  this  I started  for  Khost,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Waterfield, 
the  political  officer. 

The  column  I took  with  me  consisted  of  the  squadron  of  the  10th 
Hussars,  200  of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  a wing  of  the  5th  Punjab 
Cavalry,  the  21st  and  28th  Punjab  Infantry,  and  Nos.  1 and  2 
Mountain  Batteries.  The  corps  were  so  weak  that  their  total  strength 
only  amounted  to  2,000  men. 

We  reached  Matun,  the  name  given  to  some  three  villages  grouped 
round  a small  fort  in  the  centre  of  the  valley,  on  the  6th  January,  1879. 
The  Afghan  Governor,  with  whom  I had  been  in  communication,  met 
me  and  arranged  to  surrender  the  fort,  on  condition  that  his  personal 
safety  should  be  guaranteed,  and  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  go  either 
to  Kabul  or  India,  as  he  might  desire. 

About  half  a mile  from  the  fort  I halted  the  column,  and  taking  a 
small  escort  of  the  10th  Hussars,  I rode  on  with  the  Governor,  who 
invited  me  with  my  staff  into  his  house.  While  tea  was  being  handed 
round,  the  Governor  (Akram  Khan  by  name)  warned  me  that  we 
should  be  attacked,  and  that  he  could  do  nothing  to  prevent  it,  having 
only  some  200  local  militia  and  no  regular  troops.  He  further  said 
that  the  inhabitants  of  the  valley  were  not  directly  opposed  to  the 
British  Government,  and,  if  left  to  themselves,  would  give  no  trouble  ; 
but  he  doubted  their  being  able  to  resist  the  pressure  put  upon  them  by 
a large  number  of  tribesmen  who  had  collected  from  the  adjacent 
districts,  attracted  by  the  smallness  of  the  force,  which  they  believed 
‘ had  been  delivered  into  their  hands.’ 

This  intelligence  showed  me  I must  be  prepared  for  a scrimmage,  so 
I ordered  the  camp  to  be  pitched  in  the  form  of  a square  as  compactly 
as  possible,  with  the  transport  animals  and  impedimenta  in  the  centre, 
and  strong  piquets  at  the  four  angles.  Cavalry  patrols  were  sent  out 
as  far  as  the  broken  and  hilly  nature  of  the  ground  would  permit,  and 
every  endeavour  was  made  to  ascertain  the  strength  and  whereabouts 
of  the  enemy,  but  to  no  purpose : the  enemy  were  invisible,  and  the 
patrols  reported  that  they  had  come  across  numbers  of  peaceable- 
looking  husbandmen,  but  no  one  else. 

The  night  passed  off  quietly,  but  when  advancing  day  made  them 
visible,  multitudes  of  tribesmen  were  descried  collecting  on  the  slopes 
of  the  neighbouring  hills.  Some  friendly  Natives  were  sent  to  ascertain 
their  intentions,  followed  by  a Cavalry  reconnoitring  party,  when 
suddenly  a number  of  camel-drivers  and  mule-men,  who  had  gone  to 
the  nearest  village  to  procure  fodder  for  their  animals,  came  rushing 
back  to  camp  in  the  wildest  terror  and  excitement,  declaring  that  the 
enemy  seemed  to  rise  as  if  by  magic  out  of  the  ground,  and  that  several 
thousands  were  already  in  the  village.  No  doubt  some  of  these  were 
1 the  peaceable-looking  husbandmen  ’ the  patrols  had  encountered  the 
previous  day.  I now  became  somewhat  anxious,  not  only  for  the 


KHOST 


37i 


18791 

safety  of  the  reconnoitring  party,  whicn  appeared  to  be  in  danger  of 
being  cut  off,  but  for  that  of  the  whole  force  ; such  a mere  handful  as 
we  were  compared  to  the  numbers  airayed  against  us. 

Vigorous  action  was  evidently  necessary.  Accordingly,  I ordered  all 
the  available  Cavalry  (only  70  men  of  the  10th  Hussars,  and  155  of  the 
5th  Punjab  Cavalry),  under  Colonel  Hugh  Gough,  to  follow  the  recon- 
noitring party  in  case  of  their  being  so  hard  pressed  as  to  have  to  retire, 
and  Captain  Swinley’s  Mountain  battery,  with  six  companies  of  the 
28th  Punjab  Infantry,  under  Colonel  Hudson,*  to  move  out  in  support. 
Colonel  Drew  I left  in  charge  of  the  camp,  with  200  Highlanders,  the 
21st  Punjab  Infantry,  and  a Mountain  battery.  I myself  joined  Gough, 
who,  by  dismounted  fire  and  several  bold  charges,  notwithstanding  the 
difficult  nature  of  the  ground,  succeeded  in  driving  the  enemy  to  the 
highest  ridges,  over  which  Swinley’s  well-directed  fire  eventually  forced 
them  to  retreat. 

Heavy  firing  was  now  heard  in  the  direction  of  our  camp,  and  I 
hurried  back,  taking  with  me  a troop  of  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry.  I 
found  that  during  my  absence  Drew  had  been  attacked  on  two  sides ; 
he  had  been  able  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  coming  to  close  quarters, 
but  they  were  still  hovering  about  at  no  great  distance,  and  I thought 
it  advisable  to  clear  them  away  by  moving  out  against  them  with  all 
the  troops  at  my  disposal.  As  we  approached,  they  disappeared  with 
their  usual  rapidity;  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  however,  got  in  amongst 
some  of  them,  and  we  returned  to  camp  with  100  prisoners,  500  head  of 
cattle,  some  sheep,  and  a large  quantity  of  grain. 

The  tribesmen,  however,  had  not  been  sufficiently  punished  to 
prevent  a repetition  of  the  attack,  probably  with  largely  increased 
numbers ; so  I ordered  the  destruction  of  the  hamlets  nearest  us,  in 
which  they  had  been  sheltered  and  some  of  our  camp  followers  had 
been  murdered. 

The  next  night  a most  unfortunate  occurrence  took  place,  resulting 
in  the  death  of  six  of  our  prisoners ; but  it  was  just  one  of  those 
things  which  could  hardly  have  been  foreseen  or  guarded  against,  and 
for  which,  however  lamentable,  no  one  was  to  blame.  The  headmen 
of  the  particular  Waziri  tribe  to  which  the  captives  belonged  had  been 
summoned  during  the  day,  and  told  that  the  men  would  be  released 
on  payment  of  a sum  of  fifty  rupees  each.  The  money  was  paid 
down  at  once  for  a certain  number,  who  were  immediately  set  free ; 
but  there  was  not  quite  enough  for  all,  and  the  headmen  went  off  to 
procure  what  was  required  for  the  ransom  of  the  remainder.  Soon 
after  dark,  however,  some  of  the  enemyf  were  discovered  creeping  up 
the  banks  of  a nulla  at  the  back  of  the  camp,  where  the  unransomed 

* The  late  Lieutenant-General  Sir  John  Hudson,  K.C.B.,  who  died  as 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Bombay  Army. 

t No  doubt  friends  of  the  prisoners,  who  had  come  to  help  them  to  escape. 


372 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

men  were  detained  under  a guard  ; the  nearest  sentry  instantly  fired, 
and  the  piquets  all  round  took  up  the  firing,  thinking  that  another 
attack  on  the  camp  had  commenced.  At  the  sound  of  the  first  shot 
the  prisoners  all  jumped  to  their  feet,  and  calling  to  each  other  to 
escape,  attempted  to  seize  the  rifles  belonging  to  the  guard,  upon 
which  the  Native  officer  in  command  (a  Pathan  like  themselves)  told 
them  that  if  they  persisted  in  trying  to  escape,  they  would  be  shot. 
His  words  had  no  effect,  and  to  prevent  his  men  being  overpowered, 
he  gave  the  order  to  fire.  Six  of  the  prisoners  were  killed  and  thirteen 
wounded.  It  was  a most  regrettable  affair,  but  a Court  of  Inquiry 
decided  that  the  Native  officer  had  no  option,  and  completely 
exonerated  the  guard  from  acting  with  undue  severity.  The  wounded 
were,  of  course,  taken  to  our  hospital,  and  well  cared  for  by  our 
Doctors.* 

The  remainder  of  our  sojourn  in  Khost  was  not  marked  by  any 
incident  of  particular  interest.  We  marched  to  the  end  of  the  valley, 
and  made  a careful  survey  of  it  and  of  the  surrounding  hills. 

The  instructions  I received  with  regard  to  Khost  were,  to  occupy 
the  valley  and  dislodge  the  Afghan  administration  therefrom.  To  my 
great  chagrin,  the  smallness  of  my  force  made  it  impossible  for  me  to 
give  effect  to  these  instructions  as  I could  have  wished.  To  have 
remained  in  Khost  under  the  circumstances  would  have  been  to  court 
disaster;  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  were  daily  increasing,  and  it 
would  have  been  impossible  to  hold  our  own.  It  was,  however,  of 
great  importance,  if  practicable,  to  retain  some  control  over  the 
valley,  a peculiarly  productive  district,  which,  if  left  alone  by  us,  I 
feared  would  become  a centre  of  dangerous  intrigue  against  any 
settled  government  in  Kuram.  Accordingly  I determined  to  try  how 
placing  Khost  in  charge  of  one  of  our  own  Native  officials  would 
answer,  and  I selected  for  the  position  Shahzada  Sultan  Jan,  a Saddozai 
gentleman  of  good  birth,  and  a Sunni  Mahomedan  in  religion,  who,  I 
thought,  would  be  a 2)ersona  grata  to  the  Khostwals,  and,  if  supported 
by  some  Native  levies,  and  associated  in  his  administrative  duties  with 
the  chief  maliks  of  Khost,  would  be  more  likely  to  hold  his  own  than 
anyone  else  I could  place  there.  This  was,  however,  a mere  experi- 
ment, and  I did  not  disguise  from  myself  that  its  success  was  very 
doubtful ; but  it  was  the  only  way  in  which  I could  attempt  to  carry 
out  the  orders  of  Government,  my  hands  being  so  completely  tied  by 

* This  occurrence  was  made  great  capital  of  by  the  anti-war  party  at  home. 
A member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  in  commenting  upon  it.  said  that  ‘ some 
ninety  prisoners,  who  had  been  taken,  had  been  tied  together  with  ropes  ’ ; 
that  1 on  their  making  some  attempt  to  escape  they  were  set  upon,  and  many 
of  them  slaughtered  in  their  bonds  ’ ; and  that  ‘ the  dead,  the  living,  the 
dying,  and  the  wounded  were  left  tied  together,  and  lying  in  one  confused 
mass  of  bodies.  ’ 


>879] 


AN  UNSUCCESSFUL  EXPERIMENT 


37 3 


paucity  of  troops.  I had  no  fear  for  the  Shahzada’s  personal  safety, 
and  I felt  that,  if  in  the  end  I should  be  obliged  to  abandon  Khost 
altogether  for  the  present,  it  could  later,  if  necessary,  be  easily 
re-occupied  with  a somewhat  larger  force. 

Having  decided  on  the  course  to  be  adopted,  I held  a durbar,  which 
was  numerously  attended,  and  addressed  the  people  of  Khost  in  much 
the  same  way  I had  spoken  to  the  Turis  in  Kuram,  expressing  a hope 
that  they  would  support  the  Shahzada’s  authority  until  a more 
permanent  form  of  government  could  be  established. 

On  the  27th  January  we  left  Khost  and  made  one  march  ; the  next 
day  I halted,  so  as  to  be  near  the  Shahzada  in  case  of  need.  The 
intelligence  brought  to  me  that  evening  satisfied  me  that  my  experi- 
ment would  not  answer,  and  that  without  troops  (which  I could  not 
spare)  to  support  the  newly-established  authority  at  first  starting  oft', 
we  could  not  hope  to  maintain  any  hold  over  the  country  ; for  though 
the  Khostwals  themselves  were  perfectly  content  with  the  arrange- 
ments I had  made,  they  could  not  resist  the  tribesmen,  who  directly 
our  backs  were  turned  began  to  show  their  teeth.  Accordingly,  I 
decided  to  bring  the  Shahzada  away  while  I could  do  so  without 
trouble.  I marched  back  to  Matun  the  next  morning  with  1,000  men 
(Cavalry  and  Infantry)  and  four  Mountain  guns.  We  found  Sultan 
Jan  in  anything  but  a happy  frame  of  mind,  and  quite  ready  to  come 
away.  So  having  formally  made  the  place  over  to  the  maliks,  we 
started  on  our  return  journey.  As  we  departed,  a collection  of  our 
tribal  enemies  (about  3,000)  who  had  been  watching  the  proceedings 
took  the  opportunity  to  attack  us  ; but  two  weak  squadrons  of  Cavalry, 
skilfully  handled  by  Hugh  Gough,  kept  them  in  check,  and  we  reached 
camp  without  further  molestation. 

The  next  day,  the  last  of  January,  we  returned  to  Hazir  Fir  in 
Kuram.  There  I received  a visit  from  Sirdar  Wali  Mahomed  Khan, 
brother  of  Sher  Ali,  who  was  accompanied  by  several  leading  men  of 
the  Logar  valley,  some  of  whom  were  of  great  assistance  to  me  a few 
months  later.  Wali  Mahomed  was  a man  of  about  fifty  years  of  age ; 
he  had  a pleasing  countenance,  of  the  same  Jewish  type  as  the 
majority  of  the  Afghan  nation,  but  he  had  a weak  face  and  was 
evidently  wanting  in  character.  He  told  me  that  he  had  fled  from 
Kabul  to  escape  the  vengeance  of  his  nephew,  Yakub  Khan,  who 
attributed  his  long  imprisonment  by  his  father  to  the  Sirdar’s 
influence.  Sir  Samuel  Browne  and  Major  Cavagnari,  on  the  Khyber 
line,  were  conducting  all  political  negotiations  with  the  Afghans,  so  I 
passed  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  on  to  them. 

During  the  month  of  February  my  time  was  chiefly  employed  in 
inspecting  the  roads  and  the  defensive  posts  which  my  talented  and  in- 
defatigable Chief  Engineer  was  constructing,  examining  the  arrange- 
ments for  housing  the  troops,  and  looking  after  the  transport  animals 

25 


374 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

and  Commissariat  depots.  No  more  military  demonstrations  were 
necessary,  for  the  people  were  quietly  settling  down  under  British  rule. 
Convoys  were  no  longer  molested  nor  telegraph  wires  cut ; but  I had 
one  rather  unpleasant  incident  with  regard  to  a war  Correspondent, 
which,  until  the  true  facts  of  the  case  were  understood,  brought  me 
into  disrepute  with  one  of  the  leading  London  newspapers,  the  repre- 
sentative of  which  I felt  myself  compelled  to  dismiss  from  the  Kuram 
Field  Force. 

Judging  from  his  telegrams,  which  he  brought  to  me  to  sign,  the 
nerves  of  the  Correspondent  in  question  must  have  been  somewhat 
shaken  by  the  few  and  very  distant  shots  fired  at  us  on  the  28th  No- 
vember. These  telegrams  being  in  many  instances  absolutely  incorrect 
and  of  the  most  alarming  nature,  were  of  course  not  allowed  to  be 
despatched  until  they  had  been  revised  in  accordance  with  truth ; but 
one,  evidently  altered  and  added  to  after  I had  countersigned  it,  was 
brought  to  me  by  the  telegraph  master.  I sent  for  the  Correspondent, 
who  confessed  to  having  made  the  alterations,  not  apparently  realizing 
that  he  had  done  anything  at  all  reprehensible,  but  he  promised  that  he 
would  never  do  such  a thing  again.  This  promise  was  not  kept ; tele- 
grams appeared  in  his  paper  which  I had  not  seen  before  despatch,  and 
which  were  most  misleading  to  the  British  public.  Moreover,  his  letters, 
over  which  I could  have  no  control,  and  which  I heard  of  for  the  first 
time  when  the  copies  of  his  paper  arrived  in  Kuram,  were  most  subver- 
sive of  the  truth.  It  was  on  the  receipt  of  these  letters  that  I felt  it  to 
be  my  duty  to  send  the  too  imaginative  author  to  the  rear. 

No  one  could  be  more  anxious  than  I was  to  have  all  details  of  the 
campaign  made  public.  I considered  it  due  to  the  people  of  Great 
Britain  that  the  press  Correspondents  should  have  every  opportunity 
for  giving  the  fullest  and  most  faithful  accounts  of  what  might  happen 
while  the  army  was  in  the  field,  and  I took  special  pains  from  the  first 
to  treat  the  Correspondents  with  confidence,  and  give  them  such  infor- 
mation as  it  was  in  my  power  to  afford.  All  I required  from  them  in 
return  was  that  the  operations  should  be  truthfully  reported,  and  that 
any  Correspondent  who  did  not  confine  himself  to  the  recording  of  facts, 
and  felt  himself  competent  to  criticize  the  conduct  of  the  campaign, 
should  be  careful  to  acquaint  himself  with  the  many  and  varied  reasons 
which  a Commander  must  always  have  to  consider  before  deciding  on 
any  line  of  action. 

What  to  my  mind  was  so  reprehensible  in  this  Correspondent’s  con- 
duct was  the  publication,  in  tune  of  war,  and  consequent  excitement 
and  anxiety  at  home,  of  incorrect  and  sensational  statements,  founded 
on  information  derived  from  irresponsible  and  uninformed  sources,  and 
the  alteration  of  telegrams  after  they  had  been  countersigned  by  the 
recognized  authority,  the  result  of  which  could  only  be  to  keep  the 
public  in  a state  of  apprehension  regarding  the  force  in  the  field,  and, 


PUNJAB  CHIEFS'  CONTINGENT 


375 


1879] 

what  is  even  more  to  be  deprecated,  to  weaken  the  confidence  of  the 
troops  in  their  Commander.  It  was  satisfactory  to  me  that  my  action 
in  the  matter  met  with  the  fullest  approval  of  the  Viceroy. 

About  this  time  my  column  was  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  the 
Contingent  provided  by  the  Punjab  Chiefs,  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier  General  John  Watson,  my  comrade  of  the  Mutiny  days.  The 
Contingent  consisted  of  868  Cavalry,  and  2,685  Infantry  with  13  guns, 
which  were  placed  in  position  along  the  line  of  communication,  and 
proved  of  great  use  in  relieving  the  Regular  army  of  escort  duty.  The 
senior  Native  officer  with  the  Punjabis  was  Bakshi  Ganda  Sing, 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Patiala  army,  a particularly  handsome, 
gentlemanly  Sikh,  with  whom  I have  ever  since  been  on  terms  of 
friendly  intercourse. 

Towards  the  end  of  February  I paid  a visit  to  Kohat,  where  my  wife 
met  me ; we  spent  a week  together,  and  I had  the  pleasure  of 
welcoming  to  the  frontier  that  grand  regiment,  the  92nd  Highlanders, 
which  had  been  sent  up  to  be  in  readiness  to  join  my  column  in  the 
event  of  an  advance  on  Kabul  becoming  necessary. 


CHAPTER  XLVIII. 

I was  informed  by  the  Viceroy’s  Private  Secretary  in  the  beginning  of 
March  that,  unless  satisfactory  arrangements  could  soon  be  come  to 
with  Yakub  Khan,  an  onward  move  would  have  to  be  made.  Accord- 
ingly I now  set  about  preparing  for  such  a contingency. 

Sher  Ali  had  died  in  Afghan  Turkestan  on  the  21st  February,  and,  in 
communicating  the  event  to  the  Viceroy,  Yakub  Khan  wrote  that  he 
was  anxious  matters  might  be  so  arranged  that  ‘ the  friendship  of  this 
God-granted  State  with  the  illustrious  British  Government  may  remain 
constant  and  firm.’ 

The  new  Amir  was  told  in  reply  that  Lord  Lytton  was  prepared  to 
enter  into  negotiations  for  the  conclusion  of  peace,  and  for  the  restora- 
tion of  a friendly  alliance  between  the  two  Governments,  provided  that 
His  Highness  renounced  all  claim  to  authority  over  the  Khyber  and 
Michni  Passes,  and  the  independent  tribes  inhabiting  the  territory 
directly  connected  with  the  main  routes  leading  to  India  ; that  the  dis- 
trict of  Kuram  from  Thai  to  the  crest  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass,  and  the 
districts  of  Pishin  and  Sibi,  should  remain  under  the  control  of  the 
British  Government ; that  the  foreign  relations  of  Afghanistan  should 
be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  advice  and  wishes  of  the  British 
Government ; and  that  British  officers  should  be  accredited  to  the 
Kabul  Government,  and  permitted  to  reside  at  such  places  as  might 
hereafter  be  decided  upon. 


25—2 


376 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

Yakub  Khan’s  reply  was  not  altogether  satisfactory.  He  agreed  to 
British  officers  being  deputed  to  Afghanistan  on  the  understanding 
that  they  should  reside  in  Kabul,  and  abstain  from  interference  in 
State  affairs;  but  he  declined  to  renounce  his  authority  over  the 
Khyber  and  Michni  Passes  and  the  tribes  in  their  vicinity,  and 
refused  to  consent  to  Kuram,  Pishin,  and  Sibi  being  placed  under 
British  protection. 

The  Viceroy  now  determined  to  try  what  a personal  conference 
between  the  Amir  and  Cavagnari  could  effect  towards  a settlement  of 
these  vexed  questions,  60  in  answering  the  Amir  Cavagnari  was 
directed  to  convey  a hint  that  an  invitation  to  him  to  visit  Kabul 
might  be  productive  of  good  results,  and  to  point  out  that  the  places 
we  desired  to  occupy  were  looked  upon  as  essential  to  the  permanent 
security  of  the  Indian  frontier.  The  Amir  replied,  expressing  his 
readiness  to  receive  Cavagnari  in  his  capital,  and  laying  stress  on  his 
determination  to  regulate  his  future  conduct  in  strict  conformity  with 
his  professions  of  loyalty,  but  begged  that  he  might  not  be  called  upon 
to  cede  any  portion  of  his  territory. 

Hardly  had  this  letter,  dated  the  29th  March,  been  received,  than  a 
proclamation  addressed  by  Yakub  to  the  Khagianis,  a tribe  which  had 
been  giving  much  trouble,  was  intercepted  and  brought  to  Cavagnari ; 
in  it  the  Amir  praised  and  complimented  the  Khagianis  for  their 
religious  zeal  and  fidelity  to  himself.  He  exhorted  them  to  have  no 
fear  of  the  infidels,  against  whom  he  was  about  to  launch  an  irresistible 
force  of  troops  and  Gliazis,  and  wound  up  as  follows  : ‘ By  the  favour 
of  God,  and  in  accordance  with  the  verse  “ Verily  God  has  destroyed 
the  powerful  ones,”  the  whole  of  them  will  go  to  the  fire  of  hell  for 
evermore.  Therefore  kill  them  to  the  extent  of  your  ability.’  A 
curious  commentary  this  on  the  Amir’s  protestation  of  loyalty. 

Notwithstanding  this  piece  of  treachery,  it  was  decided  not  to  break 
off  negotiations,  and  Yakub  Khan  was  informed  by  Cavagnari  that  a 
Mission  would  proceed  to  Kabul  so  soon  as  the  necessary  arrangements 
could  be  made  for  its  reception.  At  the  same  time  Lord  Lytton  him- 
self wrote  to  the  Amir,  telling  him  that,  as  he  was  willing  to  receive 
an  Envoy,  Cavagnari  would  be  deputed  to  visit  Kabul,  and  com- 
municate unreservedly  with  him  upon  the  questions  at  issue  between 
the  two  States. 

I,  personally,  was  not  at  all  satisfied  that  the  time  had  come  for 
negotiation,  for  I felt  that  the  Afghans  had  not  had  the  sense  of  defeat 
sufficiently  driven  into  them  to  convince  them  of  our  strength  and 
ability  to  punish  breach  of  treaty,  and,  therefore,  that  a peace  made 
now,  before  they  had  been  thoroughly  beaten,  would  not  be  a lasting 
one,  and  would  only  end  in  worso  trouble  in  the  near  future.  The 
Afghans  are  an  essentially  arrogant  and  conceited  people;  they  had 
not  forgotten  our  disastrous  retreat  from  Kabul,  nor  the  annihilation 


PREMATURE  NEGOTIATIONS 


377 


18791 

of  our  army  in  the  Khurd  Kabul  and  Jagdalak  Passes  in  1842,  and 
believed  themselves  to  be  quite  capable  of  resisting  our  advance  on 
Kabul.  No  great  battle  had  as  yet  been  fought ; though  Ali  Masjid 
and  the  Peiwar  Kotal  had  been  taken,  a small  force  of  the  enemy 
had  been  beaten  by  Charles  Gough’s  brigade,  near  Jalalabad,  and  a 
successful  Cavalry  skirmish  had  occurred  near  Kandahar,  the  Afghans 
had  nowhere  suffered  serious  loss,  and  it  was  not  to  be  wondered  at  if 
the  fighting  men  in  distant  villages,  and  in  and  around  Kabul,  Ghazni, 
Herat,  Balkh,  and  other  places,  still  considered  themselves  undefeated 
and  capable  of  defying  us.  They  and  their  leaders  had  to  depend  for 
information  as  to  recent  events  upon  the  garbled  accounts  of  those  who 
had  fought  against  us,  and  it  was  unlikely  they  would  be  shaken  in 
their  belief  in  their  superiority  by  such  one-sided  versions  of  what  had 
occurred.  On  many  occasions  I had  been  amused,  in  listening  to 
Afghan  conversation,  to  find  that,  while  they  appeared  thoroughly 
conversant  with  and  frequently  alluded  to  their  triumphs  over  us,  they 
seemed  to  know  nothing,  or  had  no  recollection,  of  Sale’s  successful 
defence  of  Jalalabad,  or  of  Pollock's  victorious  march  through  tho 
Khyber  Pass  and  the  destruction  by  him  of  the  chief  bazaar  in  Kabul. 

My  ideas  about  the  negotiations  being  premature  were  freely 
expressed  to  Colonel  Colley,*  Lord  Lytton’s  Private  Secretary,  who 
paid  me  a visit  in  Kuram  at  this  time,  and  had  been  a constant 
correspondent  of  mine  from  the  commencement  of  the  war.  Colley, 
however,  explained  to  me  that,  right  or  wrong,  the  Viceroy  had  no 
option  in  the  matter  ; that  there  was  the  strongest  feeling  in  England 
against  the  continuance  of  the  war ; and  that,  unless  the  new  Amir 
proved  actively  hostile,  peace  must  be  signed.  He  expressed  himself 
sanguine  that  the  terms  of  the  treaty  which  Cavagnari  hoped  to 
conclude  with  Yakub  Khan  would  give  us  an  improved  frontier,  and 
a permanent  paramount  influence  at  Kabul,  the  two  points  about  which 
he  said  the  Viceroy  was  most  anxious,  and  to  which  he  assigned  the 
first  place  in  his  political  programme.  Lord  Lytton  foresaw  that, 
whatever  might  be  the  future  policy  of  the  two  European  Powers 
concerned,  the  contact  of  the  frontiers  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  in 
Asia  was  only  a matter  of  time,  and  his  aim  was  to  make  sure  that  the 
conterminous  line,  whenever  it  might  be  reached,  should  be  of  our 
choosing,  and  not  one  depending  on  the  exigencies  of  the  moment,  or 
on  the  demands  of  Russia. 

The  Native  agent  (Bukhtiar  Khan),  who  was  the  bearer  of  the 
Viceroy’s  and  Cavagnari’s  letters  to  the  Amir,  reached  Kabul  at  the 
moment  when  the  Afghan  officials  who  had  accompanied  Sher  Ali  in 
his  flight  returned  to  that  place  from  Turkestan.  Counsel  was  held 
with  these  men  as  to  the  manner  of  receiving  the  British  Mission  ; but 

* The  late  Major-General  Sir  George  Colley,  K.C.B. 


37» 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

there  was  an  influential  military  party  averse  to  peace,  and  the  Amir 
was  strongly  advised  to  abandon  the  English  alliance  and  trust  to 
Russia.  Upon  hearing  this,  our  agent  became  alarmed  for  the  safety 
of  the  Mission,  and  being  apprehensive  that  Yakub  Khan  would  not 
have  the  power  to  protect  its  members  from  insult,  he  suggested  to  the 
Amir  that  he  should  visit  our  camp  instead  of  the  British  Mission 
coming  to  Kabul,  a suggestion  which  was  ultimately  adopted,  the 
Viceroy  considering  that  it  was  infinitely  the  best  arrangement  that 
could  be  made. 

On  the  8th  May  the  Amir  arrived  in  Sir  Samuel  Browne’s  camp  at 
Gandamak,  thirty  miles  on  the  Kabul  side  of  Jalalabad,  and  on  the 
26th,  owing  to  the  tact  and  diplomatic  skill  of  Louis  Cavagnari,  the 
Treaty  of  Gandamak  was  signed,  and  so  ended  the  first  phase  of  the 
second  Afghan  war. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  Yakub  Khan  agreed  to  the  cession 
of  territory  considered  necessary  by  us,  and  bound  himself  to  conduct 
his  foreign  policy  in  accordance  with  the  advice  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment ; while,  on  our  side,  we  promised  to  support  him  against  external 
aggression.  It  was  further  arranged  that  a British  representative, 
with  a suitable  escort,  should  reside  at  Kabul  ;*  that  the  Amir  should 
in  like  manner  (if  he  desired  it)  depute  an  agent  to  the  Viceregal 
Court ; that  British  agents  with  sufficient  escorts  should  be  at  liberty 
to  visit  the  Afghan  frontiers  whenever,  in  the  interests  of  both  countries, 
it  was  considered  necessary  by  the  British  Government ; that  there 
should  be  no  hindrance  to  British  subjects  trading  peaceably  within 
the  Amir’s  dominions  ; that  traders  should  be  protected,  the  transit  of 
merchandise  facilitated,  and  roads  kept  in  good  order ; that  a line  of 
telegraph  should  be  constructed  from  India  to  Kabul,  at  the  expense  of 
the  British,  but  under  the  protection  of  the  Afghan  Government ; and 
that  an  annual  subsidy  of  six  lakhs  of  rupees  should  be  paid  to  the  Amir 
and  his  successors. 

The  Khyber  column  was  now  withdrawn,  with  the  exception  of  two 
brigades,  and  orders  were  sent  to  the  Kandahar  column  to  prepare  to 
withdraw  on  the  1st  September,  the  earliest  date  at  which  the  troops 
could  safely  march  through  the  Bolan  Pass.  I was  told  to  stay  where 
I was,  as  Kuram,  by  the  treaty  conditions,  was  to  remain  under  our 
control  and  be  administered  by  the  British  Government. 

On  the  24th  May  I held  a parade  in  honour  of  the  Queen’s  birthday, 
at  which  6,450  officers  and  men  were  present.f  They  were  thoroughly 

* Kabul  was  expressly  selected  by  Yakub  Khan  as  the  place  where  he 
wished  the  Embassy  to  reside. 

t At  this  parade  I had  the  great  pleasure  of  decorating  Captain  Cook  with 
the  Victoria  Cross,  and  Subadar  Ragobir  Nagarkoti,  Jemadar  Pursoo  Kliatri, 
Native  Doctor  Sankar  Dass,  and  five  riflemen  of  the  5th  Gurkhas,  with  the 
Order  of  Merit,  for  their  gallant  conduct  in  the  attack  on  the  Spingawi  Kotal, 


MAKING  FRIENDS  WITH  THE  TRIBESMEN 


379 


1879] 

fit  and  workmanlike,  and  being  anxious  that  the  tribesmen  should  see 
what  grand  soldiers  I had  at  hand  should  an  advance  be  necessary,  I 
invited  all  the  neighbouring  clans  to  witness  the  display.  The  Afghans 
were  seated  in  picturesque  groups  round  the  Hag-staff,  when  suddenly, 
as  the  first  round  of  the  feu-de-joic  was  fired,  they  started  to  their  feet, 
thinking  that  treachery  was  intended,  and  that  they  were  caught  in  a 
trap : they  took  to  their  heels,  and  we  had  considerable  difficulty  in 
bringing  them  back,  and  in  making  them  understand  that  the  firing 
which  had  so  upset  their  equanimity  was  only  a sign  of  rejoicing  on 
that  auspicious  anniversary.  By  degrees  they  became  assured  that 
there  was  no  thought  of  taking  an  unfair  advantage  of  them,  and  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  ceremony  they  were  made  happy  by  a present  of 
sheep.  In  the  afternoon  an  impromptu  rifle  meeting  was  got  up.  The 
matchlock  men  could  not  hold  their  own  against  our  good  shots  armed 
with  Martini-Henry  rifles,  a fact  which  evidently  greatly  impressed  the 
tribesmen,  some  of  whom  then  and  there  came  forward  and  promised 
that  if  I should  be  required  to  advance  on  Kabul  they  would  not  oppose 
me. 

I took  advantage  of  our  improved  relations  with  the  Afghans,  conse- 
quent on  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  to  enlarge  our  geographical 
knowledge  of  the  passes  which  lead  from  Kuram  towards  Kabul,  and 
the  independent  territories  in  the  neighbourhood.  The  presence  of  the 
troops,  no  doubt,  had  something  to  say  to  the  cheerful  acquiescence  of 
the  tribesmen  in  these  explorations,  which  they  appeared  to  look  upon 
as  the  result  of  a wish  to  make  ourselves  acquainted  with  the  country 
assigned  to  us  by  the  treaty,  and  having,  to  use  their  own  expression, 
lifted  for  us  the  purdah  (curtain)  of  their  country,  they  became  most 
friendly,  and  took  a curious  pleasure  in  pointing  out  to  us  the  points  of 
defence  at  which  they  would  have  opposed  us,  had  we  been  advancing 
as  enemies. 

Towards  the  end  of  June  I heard  from  Lord  Lytton  that  he  wished 
me  to  be  one  of  the  military  members  of  a Commission  of  Inquiry  into 
army  expenditure  and  organization  which  was  about  to  be  convened  at 
Simla,  if  I thought  I could  be  spared  from  my  post  at  Kuram.  The 
people  of  the  valley  had  by  this  time  settled  down  so  contentedly,  and 
the  tribesmen  showed  themselves  so  peacefully  disposed,  that  I thought 
I could  safely  leave  my  post  for  a time,  before  returning  to  take  up  my 
abode  in  the  neighbourhood  for  some  years,  as  I hoped  to  do,  when 
my  appointment  as  Frontier  Commissioner  should  have  received  the 
sanction  of  the  authorities  in  England. 


and  during  the  passage  of  the  Mangior  defile.  It  was  a happy  circumstance 
that  Major  Galbraith,  who  owed  his  life  to  Captain  Cook’s  intrepidity,  and 
Major  Fitz-Hugh,  whose  life  was  saved  by  Jemadar  (then  Havildar)  Pursoo 
Khatri,  should  both  have  been  present  on  the  parade. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


380 


[1879 


Meanwhile,  however,  some  temporary  arrangement  was  necessary 
for  the  administration  of  Kuram,  and  I wrote  to  the  Foreign  Secretary 
(Alfred  Lyall),  pointing  out  my  views  upon  the  subject. 

Seeing  how  much  could  be  done  with  these  wild  people  by  personal 
influence,  and  how  ready  they  were  to  submit  to  my  decisions  when 
disputes  arose  amongst  them — decisions  at  times  literally  given  from 
the  saddle — I was  very  adverse  to  their  being  handed  over  to  some 
official  who,  from  his  training,  would  not  be  able  to  understand  dealing 
out  the  rough-and-ready  justice  which  alone  was  suited  to  these  lawless 
beings,  and  who  could  not  imagine  any  question  being  properly  settled 
without  its  having  undergone  the  tedious  process  of  passing  through  the 
law  courts.  Such  a rule  would,  I knew,  disgust  a people  accustomed  to 
decide  their  quarrels  at  the  point  of  the  sword — a people  to  whom  law 
and  order  had  been  hitherto  unknown,  and  mus«,  be  distasteful,  until 
they  had  had  time  to  realize  their  beneficial  effects.  Profitable  employ- 
ment and  judicious  management  would  in  time,  no  doubt,  turn  them 
into  peaceful  subjects.  Friendly  intercourse  had  alread}’  done  much 
towards  this  end,  and  tribes  who  for  generations  had  been  at  feud  with 
each  other  now  met,  when  visiting  our  camp,  on  common  ground, 
without  (much  I think  to  their  own  astonishment)  wanting  to  cut  each 
other’s  throats.  "What  was  further  required,  I conceived,  was  the 
opening  up  of  the  country  by  means  of  roads,  which  would  facilitate 
intercommunication  and  give  remunerative  employment  to  thousands 
who  had  hitherto  lived  by  plunder  and  bloodshed. 

In  answering  my  letter,  the  Foreign  Secretary  informed  me  that  the 
future  of  Kuram  would  be  settled  when  I reached  Simla,  whither  I was 
to  proceed  so  soon  as  I had  seen  the  British  Mission  across  the  frontier. 

On  the  15th  July  Major  Cavagnari,  who  had  been  selected  as  ‘ the 
Envoy  and  Plenipotentiary  to  His  Highness  the  Amir  of  Kabul,’ 
arrived  in  Kuram,  accompanied  by  Mr.  "William  Jenkins,  C.I.E.,  of 
the  Civil  Service,  and  Lieutenant  Hamilton,  Y.C.,  Surgeon-Major 
Kelly,  25  Cavalry  and  50  Infantry  of  the  Guides  Corps.  I,  with  some 
fifty  officers  who  were  anxious  to  do  honour  to  the  Envoy  and  see  the 
country  beyond  Kuram,  marched  with  Cavagnari  to  within  five  miles 
of  the  crest  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass,  where  we  encamped,  and  my 
staff  and  I dined  that  evening  with  the  Mission.  After  dinner  I was 
asked  to  propose  the  health  of  Cavagnari  and  those  with  him,  but 
somehow  I did  not  feel  equal  to  the  task ; I was  so  thoroughly  de- 
pressed, and  my  mind  was  filled  with  such  gloomy  forebodings  as  to 
the  fate  of  these  fine  fellows,  that  I could  not  utter  a word.  Like 
many  others,  I thought  that  peace  had  been  signed  too  quickly,  before, 
in  fact,  we  had  instilled  that  awe  of  us  into  the  Afghan  nation  which 
would  have  been  the  only  reliable  guarantee  for  the  safety  of  the 
Mission.  Had  we  shown  our  strength  by  marching  to  Kabul  in  the 
first  instance,  whether  opposed  or  not,  and  there  dictated  the  terms  of 


GLOOMY  FOREBODINGS 


38i 


1879] 

the  treaty,  there  would  have  been  some  assurance  for  its  being  adhered 
to ; as  it  was,  I could  not  help  feeling  there  was  none,  and  that  the 
chances  were  against  the  Mission  ever  coming  back. 

Cavagnari,  however,  showed  no  sign  of  sharing  my  forebodings  ; he 
and  his  companions  were  in  the  best  of  spirits ; he  spoke  most  hopefully 
of  the  future,  and  talked  of  a tour  he  hoped  to  make  with  me  in  the 
cold  weather  along  the  northern  and  western  frontiers  of  Afghanistan. 
Other  matters  of  intense  interest  to  us  both  were  discussed,  and  before 
separating  for  the  night  it  was  arranged  that  Mrs.  Cavagnari  should 
either  join  him  in  Kabul  the  following  spring,  or  come  and  stay  with 
my  wife  and  me  in  Kurarn,  where  I had  already  laid  the  foundations 
of  a house  near  the  beautifully  situated  village  of  Shalufzan. 

Early  next  morning  the  Sirdar,  who  had  been  deputed  by  the  Amir 
to  receive  the  Mission,  came  into  camp,  and  soon  we  all  started  for  the 
top  of  the  pass.  We  had  gone  about  a mile,  when  we  were  joined  by 
an  escort  of  Afghan  Cavalry,  dressed  something  like  British  Dragoons, 
with  the  exception  of  their  head-gear,  which  consisted  of  the  discarded 
helmets  of  the  old  Bengal  Horse  Artillery.  ' They  were  mounted  on 
small,  useful-looking  horses,  and  were  armed  with  smooth-bore  car- 
bines and  tulwars  (Native  swords). 

As  we  ascended,  curiously  enough,  we  came  across  a solitary  magpie, 
which  I should  not  have  noticed  had  not  Cavagnari  pointed  it  out  and 
begged  me  not  to  mention  the  fact  of  his  having  seen  it  to  his  wife,  as 
she  would  be  sure  to  consider  it  an  unlucky  omen. 

On  reaching  the  Afghan  camp,  we  were  received  in  a large,  tastefully 
decorated  tent,  where  tea  was  served,  and  we  were  afterwards  con- 
ducted to  the  top  of  the  mountain,  where  carpets  were  spread  and 
more  tea  passed  round,  while  we  gazed  on  the  fine  view  of  the  Logar 
valley  which  stretched  out  beneath  us. 

On  descending  to  the  camp,  we  were  invited  to  partake  of  dinner, 
served  in  Oriental  fashion  on  a carpet  spread  on  the  ground.  Every- 
thing was  done  most  lavishly  and  gracefully,  and  nothing  was  omitted 
that  was  calculated  to  do  us  honour.  Nevertheless,  I could  not  feel 
happy  as  to  the  prospects  of  the  Mission,  and  my  heart  sank  as  I 
wished  Cavagnari  good-bye.  "When  we  had  proceeded  a few  yards 
in  our  different  directions,  we  both  turned  round,  retraced  our  steps, 
shook  hands  once  more,  and  parted  for  ever. 

I did  not  delay  at  Kuram  ; there  was  nothing  to  keep  me  there,  and 
the  prospect  of  getting  back  to  my  belongings  and  to  civilization,  now 
that  all  active  work  was  at  an  end,  was  too  alluring  to  be  withstood. 
My  wife  met  me  at  the  foot  of  the  Hills,  and  we  drove  up  to  Simla 
together.  I was  greeted  by  Lord  Lytton  and  many  kind  friends  most 
warmly,  and  had  the  gratification  of  hearing  that  I had  been  made  a 
K.C.B.,  and  that  I had  been  accorded  the  thanks  of  both  Houses  of 
Parliament. 


382 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

I was  soon  deep  in  the  work  of  the  Army  Commission,  which  met 
for  the  first  time  under  the  presidency  of  the  Hon.  Sir  Ashley  Eden,* 
K.C.S.I.,  on  the  1st  August.  The  heavy  loss  to  the  revenues  of  India, 
consequent  on  the  unfavourable  rate  of  exchange,  rendered  extensive 
reductions  in  public  expenditure  imperative,  and  the  object  of  this 
Commission  was  to  find  out  how  the  cost  of  the  army  could  be  reduced 
without  impairing  its  efficiency. 

Very  little  was  done  at  the  first  meeting,  and  at  its  close  Eden 
confessed  to  me  that  he  did  not  at  all  see  his  way,  and  that  he  was 
somewhat  aghast  at  the  difficulties  of  the  task  before  the  Commission. 
To  me  it  seemed  clear  that  the  maintenance  of  a separate  army  for 
each  presidency,  Bengal,  Bombay,  and  Madras,  was  at  the  root  of  the 
evils  it  was  our  duty  to  consider  and  try  to  reform ; and  I promised 
the  President  that,  before  the  Commission  again  assembled,  I would 
prepare  a scheme  which  might  form  a basis  for  them  to  work  upon. 

I considered  it  an  anachronism,  since  railways  and  telegraphs  had 
annihilated  distance,  to  keep  up  three  Commander s-in- Chief,  and 
separate  departments,  each  having  an  independent  head,  in  the  three 
different  presidencies.  I put  my  ideas  on  paper,  and  Eden  announced 
himself  in  favour  of  my  scheme,  which  substituted  for  the  three 
presidential  armies  four  army  corps,  all  subordinate  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  in  India.  Portions  of  my  recommendation  began  to 
be  carried  into  effect  directly  they  had  received  the  sanction  of  the 
authorities  in  England — such  as  the  amalgamation  of  the  Commis- 
sariat, Pay,  Ordnance,  and  Stud  departments— but  it  was  not  until 
April,  1895,  sixteen  years  after  the  proposal  had  been  recommended 
by  the  Government  of  India,  and  although,  during  that  period,  four 
successive  Viceroys,  each  backed  up  by  a unanimous  Council,  had 
declared  themselves  strongly  in  favour  of  the  change,  that  the  finishing 
touch  was  given  to  the  new  organization,  by  the  abolition  of  the  offices 
of  Commanders-in-Chief  of  Madras  and  Bombay,  and  the  creation  of 
four  Army  Corps,  namely,  the  Punjab,  the  Bengal,  the  Madras,  and 
the  Bombay,  each  commanded  by  a Lieutenant-General. 


CHAPTER  XLIX. 

My  wife  and  I thought  and  talked  much  over  our  new  life  on  the 
frontier,  to  which  we  both  looked  forward  with  great  interest  and 
pleasure,  but,  before  entering  upon  it,  we  settled  to  go  home  for  a time 
to  place  our  boy  at  school  and  see  our  friends,  and  we  were  arranging 
our  plans  accordingly,  when  suddenly  our  * castles  in  the  air  ’ were 

* Lieutenant-Governor  of  Bengal. 


MASSACRE  OF  THE  EMBASSY 


383 


1879] 

dashed  to  the  ground  by  a ruthless  blow  from  the  hand  of  Fate,  and 
the  whole  of  India,  the  whole  of  the  civilized  world,  was  struck  with 
grief,  horror,  and  indignation  at  the  awful  news  of  the  massacre  at 
Kabul  of  Cavagnari  and  his  gallant  companions. 

Throughout  the  month  of  August  telegrams  and  letters  constantly 
came  from  Cavagnari  (now  a Lieutenant-Colonel  and  a K.C.B.)  to  the 
Viceroy,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  and  myself,  in  which  he  always 
expressed  himself  in  such  a manner  as  to  lead  to  the  belief  that  he 
was  perfectly  content  with  his  position,  and  felt  himself  quite  secure  ; 
and  in  his  very  last  letter,  dated  the  30th  August,  received  after  his 
death,  he  wrote  : ‘ I personally  believe  that  Yakub  Khan  will  turn  out 
to  be  a very  good  ally,  and  that  we  shall  be  able  to  keep  him  to  his 
engagements.’  His  last  telegram  to  the  Viceroy,  dated  the  2nd 
September,  concluded  with  the  words,  ‘ All  well.’  Cavagnari  mentioned 
in  one  of  his  letters  that  the  Afghan  soldiers  were  inclined  to  be 
mutinous,  and  in  another  that  a dispute  had  arisen  in  the  bazaar 
between  them  and  the  men  of  the  British  escort,  but  at  the  same  time 
he  expressed  his  confidence  in  the  Amir’s  ability  and  determination  to 
maintain  order ; I could  not,  however,  help  being  anxious  about 
Cavagnari,  or  divest  myself  of  the  feeling  that  he  might  be  over- 
estimating Yakub  Khan’s  power,  even  if  His  Highness  had  the  will,  to 
protect  the  Mission. 

Between  one  and  two  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  September, 
I was  awakened  by  my  wife  telling  me  that  a telegraph  man  had  been 
wandering  round  the  house  and  calling  for  some  time,  but  that  no  one 
had  answered  him.*  I got  up,  went  downstairs,  and,  taking  the 
telegram  from  the  man,  brought  it  up  to  my  dressing-room,  and 
opened  it ; it  proved  to  be  from  Captain  Conolly,  Political  Officer  at 
Alikhel,  dated  the  4th  September.  The  contents  told  me  that  my 
worst  fears — fears  I had  hardly  acknowledged  to  myself— had  been 
only  too  fully  realized.  The  telegram  ran : 

‘ One  Jelaladin  Ghilzai,  who  says  he  is  in  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari’s  secret 
service,  has  arrived  in  hot  haste  from  Kabul,  and  solemnly  states  that  yester- 
day morning  the  Residency  was  attacked  by  three  regiments  who  had  mutinied 
for  their  pay,  they  having  guns,  and  being  joined  by  a portion  of  six  other 
regiments.  The  Embassy  and  escort  were  defending  themselves  when  he  left 
about  noon  yesterday.  I hope  to  receive  further  news.  ’ 

I was  paralyzed  for  the  moment,  but  was  roused  by  my  wife  calling 
out,  ‘ What  is  it  ? Is  it  bad  news  from  Kabul  ?’  She  had  divined  my 
fears  about  Cavagnari,  and  had  been  as  anxious  about  him  as  I had 
been  myself.  I replied,  ‘ Yes,  very  bad,  if  true.  I hope  it  is  not.’ 
But  I felt  it  was.  I woke  my  A.D.C.,  and  sent  him  off  at  once  to  the 
Viceroy  with  the  telegram.  The  evil  tidings  spread  rapidly.  I was 

* There  are  no  such  things  as  bells  or  knockers  in  India. 


384 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

no  sooner  dressed  than  Mr.  Alfred  Lyall  arrived.  We  talked  matters 
over,  I despatched  a telegram*  to  Captain  Conolly,  and  we  then  went 
off  to  Lord  Lytton. 

Early  as  it  was,  I found  the  Council  assembled.  The  gravity  of  the 
situation  was  thoroughly  appreciated,  and  it  was  unanimously  decided 
that,  should  the  disastrous  report  prove  to  be  true,  troops  must 
proceed  to  Kabul  with  the  least  possible  delay  to  avenge  or,  if  happily 
incorrect  or  exaggerated,  to  support  the  Mission. 

Sir  Samuel  Browne’s  force  had  been  broken  up,  Sir  Donald  Stewart 
was  in  far  off  Kandahar,  and  his  .troops  had,  all  but  a small  number, 
left  on  their  return  march  to  India ; the  Kuram  force  was,  therefore, 
the  only  one  in  a position  to  reach  Kabul  quickly,  and  I was  ordered 
to  proceed  at  once  to  Kuram  and  resume  my  command. 

As  a preliminary  measure,  Brigadier- General  Massy,  who  had  been 
placed  in  temporary  command  during  my  absence,  was  directed  to 
move  troops  to  the  Shutargardan,  where  they  were  to  entrench  them- 
selves and  await  orders,  while  Stewart  was  directed  to  stop  all 
regiments  on  their  way  back  to  India,  and  himself  hold  fast  at 
Kandahar. 

During  the  day  further  telegrams  were  received  confirming  the 
truth  of  the  first  report,  and  telling  of  the  Mission  having  been  over- 
whelmed and  every  member  of  it  cruelly  massacred ; and  later 
Captain  Conolly  telegraphed  that  messengers  had  arrived  from  the 
Amir  bringing  two  letters  addressed  to  me  giving  his  version  of  what 
had  occurred. 

During  the  few  hours  I remained  at  Simla  I was  busily  engaged  in 
discussing  with  Sir  Frederick  Haines  the  formation  of  the  Kabul 
Field  Force, f as  my  new  command  was  designated,  and  the  many 

* ‘ Lose  no  time  and  spare  no  money  to  obtain  reliable  information  of  what 
is  going  on  in  Kabul,  and  keep  me  constantly  informed  by  urgent  telegrams. 
I am  in  hopes  that  Jelaladin’s  report  wall  turn  out  to  be  greatly  exaggerated, 
if  not  untrue.  As,  however,  his  intelligence  is  sure  to  spread  and  oause  a 
certain  amount  of  excitement,  warn  General  Massy  and  Mr.  Christie  (tho 
Political  Officer  in  Kuram)  to  be  on  the  alert.  ’ 

t The  Kabul  Field  Force  was  composed  as  follows : 

Artillery. 

Lieutenant- Colonel  B.  L.  Gordon,  commanding. 

Captain  J.  W.  Inge,  Adjutant. 

F/A,  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  Major  J.  C.  Smyth- Windham. 

G/3,  Royal  Artillery,  Major  Sydney  Parry. 

No.  1 (Kohat)  Mountain  Battery  (four  guns),  Captain  Morgan. 

No.  2 (Derajat)  Mountain  Battery  (four  guns),  Captain  Swinley. 

Two  Gatling  guns,  Captain  Broaafoot. 

Engineers. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  M.  Perkins,  C.B. , commanding. 

Lieutenant  F.  Spratt,  Adjutant. 


THE  KABUL  FIELD  FORCE 


385 


1879] 

important  matters  which  had  to  be  considered.  More  troops  had  to 
be  hurried  up,  for  it  would  be  necessary  to  hold  Kuram  in  strength 
while  I moved  on  to  Kabul,  and,  as  communication  by  the  Shutargardan 
could  not  be  depended  upon  after  December,  on  account  of  snow,  the 
Khyber  route  would  have  to  be  opened  out. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  last  year’s  campaign  my  anxiety  had 
been  so  largely  increased  by  having  been  given  officers  totally  inex- 
perienced in  war  to  fill  the  higher  posts  in  the  Kuram  column,  that  I 
did  not  hesitate  to  press  upon  the  Commander  - in  - Chief,  now  that 
I had  a far  more  difficult  operation  to  carry  through,  the  importance  of 
my  senior  officers  being  tried  men  on  whom  I could  implicitly  rely ; 
and  I succeeded  in  getting  for  the  command  of  my  two  Infantry 
brigades  Herbert  Macpherson*  and  T.  D.  Baker, f the  Viceroy’s  Mili- 
tary Secretary,  both  of  whom  had  seen  a good  deal  of  service,  while  the 
former  had  already  commanded  a brigade  in  the  field. 

To  the  command  of  the  Artillery  and  Cavalry,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
B.  Gordon  and  Brigadier-General  Massy  were  appointed,  neither  of 
whom  had  much  experience  of  war.  Gordon  had  served  in  Central  India 
during  the  Mutiny,  and  Massy  by  his  pluck  as  a subaltern  of  Infantry 

Captain  Woodthorpe,  R.E.,  in  charge  of  surveying. 

Captain  Stratton,  22nd  Regiment,  in  charge  of  signalling. 

Lieutenant  F.  Buru-Murdoch,  R.E.,  Royal  Engineer  Park. 

Cavalry. 

Brigadier-General  W.  D.  Massy,  commanding. 

Lieutenant  J.  P.  Brabazon,  10th  Hussars,  Brigade-Major. 

9th  Lancers,  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  S.  Cleland. 

5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  Major  B.  ‘Williams. 

12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  Major  Green. 

14th  Bengal  Lancers,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ross. 

1st  Infantry  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  H.  Macpherson,  C.B.,  V.C.,  commanding. 

Captain  G.  de  C.  Morton,  6th  Foot,  Brigade-Major. 

67th  Foot.  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  B.  Knowles. 

92nd  Highlanders,  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  H.  Parker. 

28th  Punjab  Infantry,  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  Hudson. 

2nd  Infantry  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  T.  D.  Baker,  C.B.,  18th  Foot,  commanding. 

Captain  W.  C.  Farwell,  26th  Punjab  Infantry,  Brigade-Major. 

72nd  Highlanders,  Lieutenant- Colonel  Brownlow. 

5th  Gurkhas,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fitz-Hugli. 

5th  Punjab  Infantry,  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  Macqueen. 

3rd  Sikhs,  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  N.  Money. 

23rd  Pioneers,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Currie. 

* The  late  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Herbert  Macpherson,  V.C.,  K.C.B.,  who 
died  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  Madras. 

+ The  late  Sir  Thomas  Baker,  K.C.B.,  who  died  as  Quartermaster-General 
at  the  Horse  Guards. 


386 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

in  the  Crimea  had  gained  for  himself  the  sobriquet  of  ‘ Redan  ’ Massy. 
But  he  had  not  served  with  Cavalry  in  the  field,  and  from  my  slight 
acquaintance  with  him  I could  not  say  whether  he  possessed  the  very 
exceptional  qualities  required  in  a Cavalry  Commander. 

My  staff  had  proved  themselves  so  capable  and  reliable  that  I had  no 
wish  to  make  any  change  ; it  was,  however,  materially  strengthened 
by  the  addition  of  Colonel  MacGregor,* * * §  as  ‘ Chief  of  the  Staff,’  with 
Captain  Combe, f 10th  Hussars,  and  Lieutenant  Manners  Smith}  as 
Deputy- Assistant  Quartermaster-Generals. 

Mr.  H.  M.  Durand  § was  attached  to  me  as  Political  Secretary,  and 
Major  Hastings  as  Political  Officer,  in  place  of  Colonel  Waterfield,  who 
was  liors  de  combat  from  a broken  leg.  Hugh  Gough,  with  the  rank 
of  Brigadier-General,  and  Major  Mark  Heathcote  as  his  assistant,  were 
placed  in  charge  of  the  lines  of  communication. 

Before  leaving  Simla  I paid  a farewell  visit  to  Lord  Lytton.  I found 
him  in  a state  of  deep  distress  and  depression.  To  a man  of  his 
affectionate  disposition,  the  fate  of  Cavagnari,  for  whom  he  had  a great 
personal  regard,  was  a real  grief.  But  on  public  grounds  he  felt  still 
more  strongly  the  collapse  of  the  Mission  and  the  consequent  heavy 
blow  to  the  policy  he  had  so  much  at  heart,  viz.,  the  rectification  of 
our  defective  frontier,  and  the  rendering  India  secure  against  foreign 
aggression — a policy  which,  though  scouted  at  the  time  by  a party 
which  later  became  all-powerful,  has  since  been  justified  by  the  action 
of  successive  Governments,  Liberal  and  Conservative  alike,  until  at  the 
present  moment  our  frontier  is  gradually  becoming  what  Lord  Lytton, 
with  his  clear  foresightedness  and  intelligent  appreciation  of  our  respon- 
sibilities and  India’s  requirements,  would  then  have  made  it. 

In  answer  to  my  request  for  instructions  as  to  the  line  I should  take 
about  our  future  relations  with  the  Afghans,  Lord  Lytton  said  : ‘ You 
can  tell  them  we  shall  never  again  altogether  withdraw  from  Afghanistan, 
and  that  those  who  help  you  will  be  befriended  and  protected  by  the 
British  Government.’ 

While  I was  with  Lord  Lytton,  a telegram||  was  brought  in  from 

* The  late  Sir  Charles  MacGregor,  K.C.B. 

t Now  Major-General  Combe,  C.B. 

% This  promising  young  officer  greatly  distinguished  himself  at  Kabul,  and 
died  a few  years  afterwards  of  cholera. 

§ Now  Sir  Mortimer  Durand,  K.C.S.I.,  K.C.I.E.,  British  Minister  at 
Teheran. 

||  Telegram  dated  6th  September,  1879. 

From  To 

Captain  Conolly,  Foreign  Secretary, 

Alikhel.  Simla. 

‘ Clear  the  Line. — Sirkai  Khan,  bearer  of  the  Amir’s  first  letter,  confirms 
previous  reports  of  disaster,  and  describes  how  Badshah  Khan  visited  the 


START  FOR  KABUL 


387 


1879] 

Captain  Conolly,  reporting  the  details  of  the  attack  upon  the  Em- 
bassy, as  given  to  him  by  the  messenger  who  had  been  entrusted  by 
the  Amir  to  deliver  the  two  letters  addressed  to  me.  In  this  telegram 
Conolly  solicited  instructions  as  to  what  he  was  to  communicate  to  the 
Amir  in  reply  to  His  Highness’s  request  for  aid,  and  inquired  whether 
he  was  at  liberty  to  make  terms  with  one  Badshah  Khan,  an  influential 
Ghilzai  Chief,  who  had  come  to  Alikhel  to  offer  his  services. 

The  following  telegram  was  sent  in  reply  by  the  Foreign  Secretary : 

‘ Your  telegram  6th.  Reply  to  the  Amir  at  once  from  the  Viceroy  that  a 
strong  British  force  under  General  Roberts  will  march  speedily  on  Kabul 
to  his  relief,  from  the  Shutargardan,  and  that  he  should  use  all  his  resources 
to  co-operate  with,  and  facilitate,  the  advance  of  the  troops  through  his 
country.  Your  proposal  to  subsidize  Badshah  Khan  and  accept  his  services 
is  approved.  Roberts  will  send  detailed  instructions.’ 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  (September  6th)  I left  Simla, 
accompanied  by  my  wife  as  far  as  Umbafla,  where  I found  my  staff 
waiting  for  me.  She  saw  us  off  in  the  train,  bidding  us  a cheery  good- 
bye and  good  luck,  but  I am  afraid  the  return  journey  must  have  been 
a sad  one  for  her. 

Thought  for  the  immediate  future  filled  my  mind  as  we  sped  on  our 
way  to  the  front,  and  not  a few  difficulties  connected  with  the  pro- 
posed advance  on  Kabul  presented  themselves  to  me.  My  chief  causes 
for  anxiety  were  the  insufficiency  of  transport,  and  the  great  extent  of 
the  lines  of  communication  which  would  have  to  be  guarded.  It 
would  be  necessary  to  hold  the  country  in  strength  from  Thai  to  the 
Shutargardan,  a distance  of  115  miles,  until  such  time  as  the  Khyber 
route  could  be  opened,  and  I felt  that  the  force  at  my  disposal  (7,500 
men  and  22  guns)  was  none  too  large  for  the  work  before  it,  considering 


spot,  and  saw  the  dead  bodies  of  the  Envoy,  staff,  and  escort.  Of  the  latter, 
some  nine  sowars  are  said  to  have  been  out  getting  glass  that  day,  and  were 
not  killed  with  the  rest ; defence  was  very  stubborn,  and  the  loss  of  the 
Kabulis  heavy,  put  down  at  one  hundred,  or  more.  Finding  they  could  not 
storm  the  place,  the  mutineers  set  fire  to  the  doorway  below,  and,  when  that 
gave  way,  swarmed  in  and  up  to  the  upper  story,  overwhelmed  the  defenders, 
and  sacked  the  place. 

‘ The  second  letter  was  brought  by  another  messenger,  servant  of  the 
Embassy  Mehmandar,  whose  story  in  all  but  a few  unimportant  details  is  the 
same  as  that  first  received. 

1 If  an  advance  on  Kabul  is  decided  on  to  revenge  massacre  of  Embassy, 
and  also  to  quiet  surrounding  tribes,  whom  any  (?)  action  would  tempt  to 
break  out,  it  appears  to  me  all-important  to  secure  safe  passage  of  the  Shutar- 
gardan, and  with  this  object  to  subsidize  Badshah  Khan  handsomely. 

‘ I have  detained  the  Kabul  messengers  pending  receipt  of  instructions  as 
to  the  line  of  policy  to  follow,  and  what  to  communicate  to  the  Amir  or 
Badshah  Khan.  The  former  invokes  our  aid  ; the  latter  expresses  himself, 
through  his  messenger,  anxious  to  serve  us.  Once  in  Logar  valley,  where 
they  have  had  a bumper  harvest,  we  could  live  on  the  country.’ 


388  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1879 

that  I should  have  to  provide  a garrison  for  the  Shutargardan,  if  not 
for  other  posts  between  that  place  and  Kabul. 

My  Commissariat  arrangements,  too,  caused  me  many  misgivings, 
increased  by  the  fact  that  Major  Badcock,  my  chief  Commissariat 
Officer,  and  Major  Collett,  my  Assistant  Quartermaster-General,  who 
had  afforded  such  valuable  aid  in  Kuram,  thinking  the  war  was  at  an 
end,  had  taken  leave  to  England.  My  doubts  vanished,  however,  and 
my  spirits  rose  at  the  sight  of  my  brave  troops,  and  the  enthusiastic 
welcome  they  gave  me  as  I rode  through  Kuram  on  the  12th  Sep- 
tember on  my  way  to  Alikhel.  A splendid  spirit  pervaded  the  whole 
force ; the  men’s  hearts  were  on  fire  with  eager  desire  to  press  on  to 
Kabul,  and  be  led  against  the  miscreants  who  had  foully  massacred  our 
countrymen,  and  I felt  assured  that  whatever  it  was  possible  for  daunt- 
less courage,  unselfish  devotion,  and  firm  determination  to  achieve, 
would  be  achieved  by  my  gallant  soldiers. 

On  reaching  Alikhel,  Captain  Conolly  handed  to  me  the  Amir’s 
letters,*  to  which  I replied  at  once,  and  the  next  day,  under  instructions 

* Translation  of  a Letter  from  the  Amir  of  Kabul  to  General 
Roberts,  dated  Kabul,  8 a.m.,  the  3rd  September,  1879. 

(After  compliments.)  The  troops  who  had  assembled  for  pay  at  the  Bala 
Hissar  suddenly  broke  out  and  stoned  their  officers,  and  then  all  rushed  to 
the  Residency  and  stoned  it,  receiving  in  return  a hail  of  bullets.  Con- 
fusion and  disturbance  reached  such  a height  that  it  was  impossible  to  quiet 
it.  People  from  Sherpur  and  country  around  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  city 
people  of  all  classes,  poured  into  the  Bala  Hissar  and  began  destroying  work- 
shops, Artillery  park,  and  magazine  ; and  all  the  troops  and  people  attacked 
the  Residency.  Meanwhile,  I sent  Daud  Shah1  to  help  the  Envoy.  On 
reaching  the  Residency,  he  was  unhorsed  by  stones  and  spears,  and  is  now 
dying.  I then  sent  Sirdar  Yahia  Khan  and  my  own  son,  the  heir-apparent, 
with  the  Koran  to  the  troops  ; but  no  use.  I then  sent  well-known  Syads 
and  Mullahs  of  each  class,  but  of  no  avail ; up  till  now,  evening,  the  distur- 
bance continues.  It  will  be  seen  how  it  ends.  I am  grieved  with  this  con- 
fusing state  of  things.  It  is  almost  beyond  conception.  (Here  follow  the 
date  and  the  Amir’s  seal. ) 

Second  Letter  from  the  Amir,  dated  Kabul,  the  4th 
September,  1879. 

Yesterday,  from  8 a.m.  till  evening,  thousands  assembled  to  destroy  the 
Embassy.  There  has  been  much  loss  of  life  on  both  sides.  At  evening  they 
set  fire  to  the  Residency.  All  yesterday  and  up  till  now,  I with  five 
attendants  have  been  besieged.  I have  no  certain  news  of  the  Envoy,  whether 
he  and  his  people  have  been  killed  in  their  quarters,  or  been  seized  and 
brought  out.  Afghanistan  is  ruined  ; the  troops,  city,  and  surrounding 
country  have  thrown  off  their  yoke  of  allegiance.  Daud  Shah  is  not  expected 
to  recover  ; all  his  attendants  were  killed.  The  workshops  and  magazine  are 
totally  gutted — in  fact,  my  kingdom  is  ruined.  After  God,  I look  to  the 
Government  for  aid  and  advice.  My  true  friendship  and  honesty  of  purpose 
will  be  proved  as  clear  as  daylight.  By  this  misfortune  I have  lost  my  friend, 

1 The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Afghan  army. 


LETTER  TO  THE  AMIR 


389 


1879] 

from  the  Government  of  India,  I wrote  to  His  Highness  that,  in  con- 
formity with  his  own  special  request  that  an  English  officer  should  be 
deputed  as  Envoy  to  his  Court,  and  on  condition  that  he  would  him- 
self be  responsible  for  the  protection  and  honourable  treatment  of  such 
an  Envoy,  Major  Cavagnari  and  three  British  officers  had  been  allowed 
to  go  to  Kabul,  all  of  whom  within  six  weeks  had  been  ruthlessly 
murdered  by  his  troops  and  subjects  ; that  his  inability  to  carry  out  the 
treaty  engagements,  and  his  powerlessness  to  establish  his  authority, 
even  in  his  own  capital,  having  thus  become  apparent,  an  English 
army  would  now  advance  on  Kabul  with  the  double  object  of  con- 
solidating his  Government,  should  he  himself  loyally  do  his  best  to  fullil 
the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  of  exacting  retribution  from  the  murderers 
of  the  British  Mission.  But  that,  although  His  Highness  laid  great 
stress  in  his  letter  of  the  4th  September  on  the  sincerity  of  his  friend- 
ship, my  Government  had  been  informed  that  emissaries  had  been 
despatched  from  Kabul  to  rouse  the  country  people  and  tribes  against 
us,  and  as  this  action  appeared  inconsistent  with  friendly  intentions,  I 
considered  it  necessary  for  His  Highness  to  send  a confidential  repre- 
sentative to  confer  with  me  and  explain  his  object. 

I had  little  doubt  as  to  the  truth  of  the  report  that  the  Amir  was 
using  every  efi’ort  to  incite  the  Ghilzais  and  other  tribes  to  oppose  us, 
and  I was  confirmed  in  my  conviction  by  a Native  gentleman,  Nawab 
Ghularn  Hussein  Khan,* *  at  one  time  our  agent  at  Kabul,  who  told 
me  that,  although  he  did  not  believe  that  Yakub  Khan  had  actually 
planned  the  massacre  of  the  Embassy,  he  had  certainly  taken  no  steps 
to  prevent  it,  and  that  he,  Ghularn  Hussein  Khan,  was  convinced  that 
the  Amir  was  now  playing  us  false.  It  was,  therefore,  a relief  to  find 
awaiting  me  at  Alikhel  several  of  the  leading  men  from  the  neighbour- 
ing districts,  to  whom  I had  telegraphed,  before  leaving  Simla,  asking 
them  to  meet  me. 

These  men  were  profuse  in  their  proffers  01  assistance,  and,  although 
I did  not  place  a great  deal  of  faith  in  their  promises,  I came  to  the 
conclusion  that,  notwithstanding  Yakub  Khan’s  treacherous  efforts  to 
stir  up  the  tribes,  if  I could  only  push  on  rapidly  with  a fairly  strong 
force,  I need  not  anticipate  any  opposition  that  I could  not  overcome. 
Everything  depended  on  speed,  but  rapidity  of  movement  depended  on 
the  condition  of  the  transport  service,  and  my  inspection  of  the  animals, 
as  I passed  through  Kuram,  was  not  calculated  to  raise  hrpes  of  being 
able  to  make  a very  quick  advance ; for,  owing  to  continuous  hard 
work  and  the  want  of  a staff  of  trained  transport  attendants,  the 


the  Envoy,  and  also  my  kingdom.  I am  terribly  grieved  and  perplexed. 
(Here  follow  the  date  and  the  Amir's  seal.) 

* The  Nawab  was  on  his  way  from  Kandahar  to  Kabul,  but  on  hearing  of 
the  massacre  he  came  to  Alikhel. 


26 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


390 


[1879 


numbers  of  animals  had  steadily  diminished,  and  those  that  remained 
were  for  the  most  paid  sickly  and  out  of  condition. 

On  the  16th  of  September  I issued  a Proclamation,*  copies  of  which 
I caused  to  be  sent  to  the  people  of  Kabul,  Ghazni,  and  all  the  neigh- 
bouring tribes ; this,  I hoped,  would  facilitate  our  advance,  and  reassure 
those  who  had  taken  no  part  in  the  attack  on  the  Residency.  I also 
wrote  a letter-)-  to  the  maliks  of  the  Logar  valley,  whose  territory  we 

* Translation  of  a Proclamation  issued  by  Major-General  Sir 
Frederick  Roberts. 

Alikhel , 16th  September,  1879. 

Be  it  known  to  all  the  Chiefs  and  the  people  of  the  country  of  Kabul  and  its 
dependencies  that,  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty  concluded  in  May,  1879, 
corresponding  to  Jamdi-ul-Akhir  1296  Hijri,  between  the  two  great  Govern- 
ments, and  to  the  terms  of  which  His  Highness  the  Amir  expressed  his  assent, 
and  agreed  to  the  location  of  an  Envoy  of  Her  Imperial  Majesty  the  Empress, 
a British  Envoy  was,  at  the  special  request  of  His  Highness  the  Amir,  located 
at  the  Kabul  Court,  and  the  Amir  guaranteed  that  he  should  be  treated 
honourably  and  protected. 

Within  six  weeks  after  the  said  Envoy  was  received  at  and  entered  Kabul 
the  whole  Embassy  was  besieged  and  massacred  in  the  very  citadel  of  His 
Highness  the  Amir,  who  could  not  save  or  protect  them  from  the  hands  of  the 
soldiers  and  the  people.  From  this,  the  lack  of  power  of  the  Amir  and  the 
weakness  of  his  authority  in  his  capital  itself  are  quite  apparent  and  manifest. 
For  this  reason  the  British  troops  are  advancing  for  the  purpose  of  taking  a 
public  vengeance  on  behalf  of  the  deceased  as  well  as  of  obtaining  satisfaction 
(lit. , consolidation)  of  the  terms  entered  into  in  the  Treaty  concluded.  The 
British  troops  are  entering  Afghanistan  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the 
royal  authority  of  His  Highness  the  Amir  on  condition  that  His  Highness 
loyally  uses  those  powers  for  the  maintenance  of  friendship  and  of  amicable 
relations  with  the  British  Government.  This  is  the  only  course  by  which  the 
Amir’s  kingdom  can  remain  intact,  and  (by  which)  also  the  friendly  senti- 
ments and  sincerity  expressed  in  his  letter  of  the  4th  September,  1879,  after 
the  occurrence  of  the  (said)  event  can  be  proved. 

For  the  purpose  of  removing  any  doubt  about  the  concord  of  the  two 
Governments,  the  Amir  has  been  addressed  to  depute  a confidential  agent  to 
my  camj).  The  British  force  will  not  punish  or  injure  anyone  except  the 
persons  who  have  taken  part  or  joined  in  the  massacre  of  the  Embassy  unless 
1 hey  offer  opposition.  All  the  rest,  the  small  and  great,  who  are  uncon- 
cerned (therein)  may  rest  assured  of  this.  Carriage  and  supplies  of  every 
description  should  be  brought  into  the  British  camp.  Full  price  and  hire 
shall  be  paid  for  everything  that  may  be  taken.  Whereas  mercy  and  humanity 
are  the  characteristics  of  this  great  Government,  this  proclamation  is  issued 
beforehand  for  the  information  of  the  people  at  large. 

t Translation  of  a Letter  from  Major-General  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts  to  certain  maliks  of  the  Logar  Valley. 

From  the  Proclamation  already  issued  by  me,  you  will  have  learnt  the 
reasons  for  the  march  of  the  British  troops  to  Kabul.  Her  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment, by  the  movement  of  troops,  intends  to  exact  retribution  for  the  massacre 
of  the  Embassy  and  to  aid  His  Highness  the  Amir  in  restoring  order. 

Let  all  those  not  concerned  in  the  massacre  rest  assured,  provided  no  oppo- 
sition is  shown. 


18793  PROCLAMATION  TO  THE  PEOPLE  OF  KABUL 


391 


must  enter  directly  we  had  crossed  the  Shutargardan,  and  whose  co- 
operation I was  most  anxious  to  obtain.  On  the  18th  I again  wrote*  to 
the  Amir,  enclosing  copies  of  these  two  documents,  and  informing  him 
that  I was  still  awaiting  a reply  to  my  first  letter  and  the  arrival  of 
His  Highness’s  confidential  representative  ; that  I hoped  he  would 
soon  issue  the  necessary  orders  for  the  furtherance  of  our  plans,  and 
that  he  might  rest  assured  of  the  support  of  the  British  Government. 

On  the  19tli  September  matters  had  so  far  progressed  that  I was  able 
to  tell  the  Viceroy  that  Brigadier-General  Baker  was  entrenched  with 
his  brigade  on  the  Shutargardan,  and  engaged  in  improving  the  road 
to  Kushi,  the  first  halting-place  in  the  Logar  valley ; that  supplies 
were  being  collected  by  means  of  local  transport ; that  I was  bringing 
up  reserve  ammunition  and  treasure  from  the  rear  on  Artillery 
waggons ; and  that  every  possible  effort  was  being  made  to  render  the 
force  mobile. 

On  the  20th  I received  the  Amir’s  reply.  He  expressed  regret  that 
he  was  unable  to  come  to  Alikliel  himself,  but  intimated  that  he  was 
sending  two  confidential  agents,  his  Mustauri  (Finance  Minister), 
Habibulla  Khan,  and  his  Wazir  (Prime  Minister),  Shah  Mahomed 
Khan,  who  accordingly  arrived  the  next  day. 

At  each  interview  I had  with  these  gentlemen  during  the  three  days 
they  remained  in  my  camp,  they  impressed  upon  me  that  the  Amir 
was  inclined  to  be  most  friendly,  and  that  his  only  wish  was  to  be 
guided  by  the  advice  of  the  British  Government.  But,  notwithstanding 
these  plausible  assurances,  I soon  discovered  that  Yakub  Khan’s  real 
object  in  sending  these  two  high  officials  was  to  stop  the  advance  of 
the  force,  and  induce  me  to  leave  the  punishment  of  the  troops  who 
had  committed  the  massacre  in  the  hands  of  the  Afghan  authorities,  or 
else  to  delay  us  long  enough  to  give  time  for  the  whole  country  to  rise 
against  us. 

As  the  conversations  which  were  carried  on  at  the  meetings  with  the 
Afghan  agents  are  interesting,  and  have  an  important  bearing  on  the 
subsequent  proceedings,  I give  in  the  Appendix  the  notes  taken  at  the 
time  by  my  Political  Secretary. 

I was  anxious  to  keep  one  of  the  Amir’s  representatives  with  me, 


His  Highness  the  Amir,  in  communications  received  by  me,  expresses  his 
friendship,  and  wishes  to  continue  amicable  relations.  As  the  British  troops 
under  my  command  will  shortly  enter  the  Logar  valley,  I write  to  reassure 
you,  and  expect  that  you  will  inform  all  the  residents  of  the  valley  not  con- 
cerned in  the  late  hateful  massacre  the  purport  of  the  Proclamation,  and  give 
every  assistance  in  providing  carriage  and  supplies  required  for  the  troops,  for 
which  adequate  hire  and  payment  will  be  made.  I hope  that  after  the  above 
assurance  all  the  headmen  will  come  to  meet  me  in  my  camp,  where  I shall  be 
glad  to  see  them. 

* This  letter  is  given  in  full  in  the  Appendix. 


26-2 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


392 


[1879 


but  neither  of  them  was  willing  to  remain,  so  I felt  bound  to  let  them 
both  depart,  taking  with  them  the  following  letter  to  the  Amir  : 

To  His  Highness  the  Amir  of  Kabul. 

Camp,  Alikhcl,  25th  September,  1879. 

(After  compliments.)  I have  received  Your  Highness’s  two  letters  of  the 
19th  and  20th  September  (1st  and  2nd  Shawal),  delivered  to  me  by  the  hands 
of  Your  Highness’s  two  confidential  representatives,  Mustaufi  Habibulla  Khan 
and  Wazir  Shah  Mahomed. 

I am  much  obliged  to  Your  Highness  for  sending  me  two  such  well-known 
men,  and  of  such  character  as  the  Mustaufi  and  the  Wazir.  They  have 
informed  me  of  Your  Highness’s  wishes,  and  I quite  understand  all  they 
have  told  me.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  season  is  so  late,  and  that  ■winter 
will  soon  be  here  ; but  there  is  yet  time  for  a British  army  to  reach  Kabul 
before  the  great  cold  sets  in. 

The  Viceroy  of  India  is  much  concerned  that  there  should  have  been  any 
delay  in  promptly  acceding  to  Your  Highness’s  request  for  advice  and  assist- 
ance, as  conveyed  in  Your  Highness’s  letters  of  the  3rd  and  4th  instant.  It 
was  His  Excellency’s  earnest  wish  that  troops  should  march  on  Kabul  at  once, 
so  as  to  ensure  Your  Highness’s  personal  safety  and  aid  Your  Highness  in 
restoring  peace  and  order  at  your  capital. 

Unfortunately,  the  want  of  transport,  and  the  necessity  for  collecting  a 
certain  amount  of  supplies,  have  caused  a few  weeks’  delay  ; it  is,  however,  a 
source  of  gratification  and  happiness  to  the  Viceroy  to  learn  that  Your  High- 
ness’s safety  is  not  at  present  endangered,  and  His  Excellency  trusts  Your 
Highness  will  be  able  to  keep  everything  quiet  in  your  kingdom,  until  such 
time  as  British  troops  may  reach  Kabul. 

I am  glad  to  be  able  to  inform  Your  Highness  that  news  reached  me 
yesterday  of  the  departure  of  a considerable  force  from  Kandahar  under  the 
command  of  a brave  and  distinguished  officer,  and  that  a large  body  of  troops, 
under  command  of  General  Bright,  were  advancing  rapidly  from  Peshawar  to 
Jalalabad  and  onwards  vid  Gandamak  to  Kabul.  My  own  force  will,  I hope, 
be  in  a state  to  march  before  long.  As  Your  Highness  is  aware,  the  Shutar- 
gardan  has  been  occupied  for  some  days.  Meanwhile  regiments  of  Cavalry  and 
Infantry  and  batteries  of  Artillery  have  reached  Kuram  to  replace  those  I am 
taking  on  with  me,  and  to  reinforce  my  own  column  should  a necessity  for 
more  troops  arise — a contingency  I do  not  in  the  least  expect. 

The  Viceroy  of  India,  in  His  Excellency’s  anxiety  for  Your  Highness's 
welfare  and  safety,  issued  orders  that  each  of  the  three  armies,  now  advancing 
from  Kandahar,  Kuram,  and  the  Khyber,  should  be  strong  enough  to  overcome 
any  opposition  Your  Highness’s  enemies  could  possibly  offer.  That  each  is 
strong  enough  there  can  be  no  doubt. 

I understand  that  there  is  no  one  at  Kelat-i-Ghilzai  or  Ghazni  to  stop  the 
progress  of  the  troops  en  route  from  Kandahar.  There  is  no  reason,  therefore, 
why  they  should  not  reach  Kabul  in  a very  short  time. 

The  Khyber  tribes,  having  understood  and  appreciated  the  Treaty  of  peace 
made  by  Your  Highness  with  the  British  Government  in  Slay  last,  have 
unanimously  agreed  to  assist  the  troops  from  Peshawar  in  every  way,  and  arc 
now  eager  to  keep  the  road  through  the  Khyber  safe,  and  to  place  all  their 
transport  animals  at  the  disposal  of  the  British  Commander,  who  will  thus  be 
enabled  to  concentrate  his  force  rapidly  at  Kabul.  Through  the  kindness  of 
Your  Highness  I have  experienced  much  less  difficulty  than  I could  have 
expected,  and  I may  now  reasonably  hope  to  be  with  Your  Highness  at  least 
as  soon  as  either  the  Kandahar  or  Khyber  column. 


REASONS  FOR  REMAINING  AT  ALIKHEL 


393 


1879] 

I look  forward  with  great  pleasure  to  the  meeting  with  Your  Highness, 
and  trust  that  you  will  continue  your  kind  assistance  to  obtain  for  me  supplies 
and  transport. 

I have  carefully  considered  Your  Highness's  proposal  that  you  yourself 
should  be  permitted  to  administer  just  punishment  to  the  mutinous  troops 
and  others  who  shared  in  the  treacherous  and  cruel  attack  on  the  British 
Envoy  and  his  small  escort,  and  thus  save  Her  Majesty’s  troops  the  trouble, 
hardship,  and  privation  which  must  necessarily  be  encountered  by  an  advance 
on  Kabul  at  this  season  of  the  year.  I thank  Your  Highness  most  cordially, 
on  the  part  of  the  Viceroy  and  Government  of  India,  for  this  further  proof 
of  Your  Highness’s  friendly  feelings.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  such  an 
offer  would  be  gratefully  and  willingly  accepted,  but  after  what  has  recently 
occurred,  I feel  sure  that  the  great  British  nation  would  not  rest  satisfied 
unless  a British  army  marched  to  Kabul  and  there  assisted  Your  Highness  to 
inflict  such  punishments  as  so  terrible  and  dastardly  an  act  deserves. 

I have  forwarded  Your  Highness’s  letters  in  original  to  the  Viceroy  ; a copy 
of  this,  my  reply,  will  be  submitted  by  to-day’s  post  for  His  Excellency’s 
consideration.  Meanwhile  I have  permitted  Mustaufi  Habibulla  Khan  and 
Wazir  Shah  Mahomed  to  take  their  leave  and  rejoin  Your  Highness. 

I delayed  my  own  departure  from  Alikhel  until  a sufficiency  of 
supplies  had  been  collected  at  Kushi,  and  everything  was  ready  for  as 
rapid  an  advance  on  Kabul  as  my  limited  transport  would  admit  of ; 
for,  so  long  as  I remained  behind,  the  people  of  Afghanistan  could  not 
be  sure  of  my  intentions,  and  no  doubt  hoped  that  the  Amir’s  remon- 
strances would  have  the  desired  effect,  and  prevent  our  doing  more  than 
occupying  the  Shutargardan,  or  making  a demonstration  toward 
Kushi.  My  crossing  the  pass  would,  I knew,  be  the  signal  for  all  those 
determined  on  opposition  to  assemble ; it  was  politic,  therefore,  to 
remain  behind  until  the  last  moment. 

When  all  arrangements  were  complete,  so  far  as  was  possible  with 
the  means  at  my  disposal,  I issued  the  following  Field  Force  Order : 

‘ The  Government  of  India  having  decided  that  a force  shall  proceed  with 
all  possible  despatch  to  Kabul,  in  response  to  His  Highness  the  Amir’s  appeal 
for  aid,  and  with  the  object  of  avenging  the  dastardly  murder  of  the  British 
representative  and  his  escort,  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  feels  sure  that  the  troops 
under  his  command  will  respond  to  the  call  with  a determination  to  prove 
themselves  worthy  of  the  high  reputation  they  have  maintained  during  the 
recent  campaign. 

‘ The  Major-General  need  address  no  words  of  exhortation  to  soldiers  whose 
courage  and  fortitude  have  been  so  well  proved.  The  Afghan  tribes  are 
numerous,  but  without  organization  ; the  regular  army  is  undisciplined,  and 
whatever  may  be  the  disparity  in  numbers  such  foes  can  never  be  formidable 
to  British  troops.  The  dictates  of  humanity  require  that  a distinction  should 
be  made  between  the  peaceable  inhabitants  of  Afghanistan  and  the  treacherous 
murderers  for  whom  a just  retribution  is  in  store,  and  Sir  Frederick  Roberts 
desires  to  impress  upon  all  ranks  the  necessity  for  treating  the  unoffending 
population  with  justice,  forbearance,  and  clemency. 

‘The  future  comfort  and  wellbeing  of  the  force  depend  largely  on  the 
friendliness  of  our  relations  with  the  districts  from  which  supplies  must  be 
drawn  ; prompt  payment  is  enjoined  for  all  articles  purchased  by  departments 
and  individuals,  and  all  disputes  must  be  at  once  referred  to  a political  officer 
for  decision. 


394 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

‘ The  Major-General  confidently  looks  forward  to  the  successful  accom- 
plishment of  the  object  of  the  expedition,  and  the  establishment  of  order  and 
a settled  Government  in  Afghanistan.’ 


CHAPTER  L. 

On  the  27th  September  I made  over  the  Kuram  command  to  Brigadier- 
General  T.  Gordon,  and  set  out  for  Kushi,  where  Baker  was  now 
encamped. 

Just  before  I started  I had  the  pleasure  of  welcoming  my  old  friend 
and  brother  officer,  Major-General  J.  Hills,  V.C.,  C.B.,  who  had  been 
with  Sir  Donald  Stewart  as  Assistant  Adjutant-General  from  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign,  and  who  had,  the  moment  he  heard  there 
was  to  be  an  advance  on  Kabul,  come  with  all  speed  to  place  his 
services  at  my  disposal.  Although  I had  no  employment  for  Hills  at 
the  time,  there  would  be  plenty  for  all  to  do  at  Kabul,  and  I was 
delighted  to  have  so  good  a soldier  with  me. 

My  escort  consisted  of  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Cavalry  brigade,  one 
squadron  9th  Lancers,  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  and  detachments  of  the 
5th  and  28th  Punjab  Infantry.  We  had  only  gone  about  halfway 
through  the  pass  when  I pushed  on  with  the  Cavalry,  in  the  hope  of 
reaching  the  camp  on  the  top  before  dark,  and  was  very  soon  met  by 
twenty-five  men  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  who  brought  me  a note  from 
Colonel  Perkins,  R.E.,  in  command  on  the  Shutargardan,  warning  me 
that  we  were  sure  to  be  attacked.  We  had  not  proceeded  far,  when  at 
the  narrowest  part  of  the  defile  we  found  the  passage  blocked  by  some 
2,000  Afghans,  and  as  we  approached  a volley  was  fired  from  a party 
concealed  by  some  rocks  on  our  left.  I was  told  afterwards  that  it 
was  intended  for  me,  but  I remained  unscathed,  and  the  principal 
medical  officer,  Dr.  Townsend,  who  was  riding  on  my  right,  and  to 
whom  I was  talking  at  the  moment,  was  severely  wounded.  The 
Highlanders,  supported  by  some  dismounted  Cavalry,  cleared  away  the 
enemy  to  the  north,  but  as  they  clung  to  the  precipitous  hills  on  the 
south,  we  had  to  wait  till  the  main  body  of  the  escort  came  up,  when 
they  were  speedily  dispersed. 

Meanwhile,  a sharp  little  engagement  had  taken  place  further  up  the 
gorge,  and  as  we  advanced  we  could  see  the  enemy  retiring  before  a 
detachment  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  under  Colour- Sergeant  Hector 
Macdonald,  and  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  under  Jemadar  Sher  Mahomed,  a 
Native  of  Kabul.  The  manner  in  which  the  Colour- Sergeant  and 
the  Native  officer  handled  their  men  gave  me  a high  opinion  of  them 
both.* 

* Macdonald,  having  subsequently  further  distinguished  himself,  was  given 
a commission,  and  is  now  commanding  a regiment  in  the  Egyptian  Army. 
Sher  Mahomed  was  rewarded  with  the  Order  of  Merit. 


1 879]  HECTOR  MACDONALD  AND  SHER  MAHOMED 


395 


On  the  top  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass  that  evening  I received  the 
Amir’s  reply*  to  my  last  letter,  in  which  he  expressed  his  gratitude  for 
the  sympathy  and  support  afforded  him  by  the  British  Government, 
and  informed  me  that  he  had  given  orders  to  the  Governor  of  Jalalabad 
that  the  Khyber  column  should  not  meet  with  any  opposition.  I was 
also  given  a letter  from  Sirdar  \Yali  Mahomed  Khan,  and  several  other 
Sirdars,  professing  loyalty  to  the  British  Government,  and  expressing 
pleasure  at  my  approach.  And  at  the  same  time  the  rather  embarrass- 
ing information  reached  me  that  the  Amir,  desiring  personal  com- 
munication with  me,  had  already  arrived  in  Baker’s  camp  at  Kushi, 
attended  by  his  son  Musa  Khan,  a lad  about  seven  years  old,  his  father- 
in-law,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Afghan  army  (Baud  Shah), 
with  a suite  of  45  members  and  an  escort  of  200  men. 

Although  I had  met  with  but  slight  opposition  hitherto,  it  was  evident 
from  the  secret  information  I received  that  the  Ghilzais  were  inclined 
to  be  hostile,  and  intended  to  oppose  us,  and  as  it  was  important  to 
keep  open  communication  with  Alikhel  through  their  country,  I 
arranged  for  the  Shutargardan  to  be  held  by  a Mountain  battery,  the 
3rd  Sikhs,  and  the  21st  Punjab  Infantry,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  N.  Money,  an  officer  on  whose  judgment  and 
coolness  I knew  I could  rely. 

The  next  morning  I rode  to  Kushi,  where  my  first  interview  with  the 
Amir  of  Afghanistan  took  place. 

I cannot  say  that  I was  favourably  impressed  by  his  appearance. 
He  was  an  insignificant-looking  man,  about  thirty-two  years  of  age, 
with  a receding  forehead,  a conical-shaped  head,  and  no  chin  to  speak 


* From  the  Amir  of  Kabul,  dated  Kushi,  27th  September,  1879. 

(After  compliments.)  Your  friendly  letter  has  reached  me  just  at  this 
moment,  8 p.m.,  the  10th  Shawal  (27th  September),  and  opened  the  doors  of 
joy  and  happiness  on  the  face  of  my  heart  marked  with  affection.  I feel 
perfectly  certain  and  confident  that  the  movements  of  Her  Imperial  Majesty’s 
victorious  troops  are  merely  for  the  purpose  of  consolidating  the  foundation 
of  my  kingdom  and  strengthening  the  basis  of  my  government. 

In  truth,  the  sympathy  of  friends  with  friends  is  fitting  and  proper,  and 
the  indulgence  and  kindness  of  a great  Government  to  a sincere  and  faithful 
friend  are  agreeable  and  pleasing.  I am  exceedingly  gratified  with,  and 
thankful  to,  the  representatives  of  the  illustrious  British  Government  for 
their  expression  of  sympathy  and  their  support  of  my  cause.  Your  friendly 
and  wise  suggestion  that  none  of  the  ignorant  tribes  of  Afghanistan  should 
oppose  the  British  troops,  so  that  the  officers  of  the  British  Government 
should  be  the  better  able  to  support  and  protect  me,  is  very  acceptable  and 
reasonable.  Before  I received  your  letter,  I had  sent  orders  repeatedly  to  the 
Governors  of  Jalalabad  and  Lalpura  not  to  let  anyone  oppose  or  resist  the 
British  troops,  and  stringent  orders  have  again  been  issued  to  the  Governor  of 
Jalalabad  to  use  his  utmost  endeavours  and  efforts  in  this  respect.  The  order- 
in  question  to  the  address  of  the  Governor  of  Jalalabad  will  be  shown  you 
to-morrow,  and  sent  by  an  express  courier. 


396 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


of,  and  he  gave  me  the  idea  of  being  entirely  wanting  in  that  force  of 
character  without  which  no  one  could  hope  to  govern  or  hold  in  check 
the  warlike  and  turbulent  people  of  Afghanistan.  He  was  possessed, 
moreover,  of  a very  shifty-  eye,  he  could  not  look  one  straight  in  the 
face,  and  from  the  first  I felt  that  his  appearance  tallied  exactly  with 
the  double-dealing  that  had  been  imputed  to  him.  His  presence  in  my 
camp  was  a source  of  the  gravest  anxiety  to  me.  He  was  constantly 
receiving  and  sending  messages,  and  was  no  doubt  giving  his  friends  at 
Kabul  all  the  information  he  could  collect  as  to  our  resources  and 
intentions.  He  had,  however,  come  ostensibly  as  our  ally,  seeking 
refuge  from  his  mutinous  soldiers,  and  whatever  suspicions  I might 
secretly  entertain,  I could  only  treat  him  as  an  honoured  guest,  so  long 
as  there  was  nothing  proved  against  him. 

My  first  visit  to  Yakub  Khan  was  of  a formal  character.  Neverthe- 
less, he  seized  the  opportunity  to  urge  strongly  upon  me  the  advisa- 
bility of  delaying  my  advance,  that  he  might  have  time,  he  said,  to 
restore  order  amongst  his  troops,  and  to  punish  those  who  had  pai-tici- 
pated  in  the  attack  on  the  Embassy.  I replied  that  my  orders  were 
peremptory,  and  that  it  was  my  duty,  as  it  was  my  determination,  to 
press  on  to  Kabul  with  all  possible  speed.  Finding  that  his  arguments 
had  no  effect,  he  changed  his  tactics,  and  declared  that  he  was  much 
alarmed  for  the  safety  of  his  family,  whom  he  had  left  in  the  Bala 
Hissar ; that  he  had  only  one  regiment  on  which  he  could  depend ; 
that  he  feared  when  the  others  should  hear  of  our  approach  they  would 
break  out  and  attack  the  citadel ; and  that  the  innocent  people  in 
Kabul,  not  considering  it  possible  that  a British  force  could  get  there 
so  quickly,  had  made  no  arrangements  to  convey  their  families  away. 

Feeling  that  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  the  families  was  not  the  true 
cause  for  the  Amir’s  efforts  to  delay  us,  and  that  his  sole  object  was 
to  gain  time  for  the  development  of  plans  for  opposing  our  advance — 
which  subsequent  events  proved  had  been  made  with  great  care — I 
told  him  it  was  impossible  to  accede  to  his  wishes,  but  that  time  would 
be  given  for  all  women  and  children  to  clear  out  of  the  city  if  it  should 
prove  necessary  to  attack  it.  This  necessity,  however,  I was  most 
anxious  to  avoid,  and  earnestly  hoped  that  our  fighting  would  be  over 
before  we  entered  Kabul,  for  I had  not  forgotten  Delhi,  and  I dreaded 
the  idea  of  the  troops  having  to  force  their  way  through  narrow  streets 
and  crowded  bazaars. 

Yakub  Khan  was  evidently  much  chagrined  at  my  decision.  He  had 
left  Kabul  hurriedly,  his  movements  probably  being  hastened  by  hear- 
ing that  his  uncle,  Wali  Mahomed  Khan,  and  several  other  Sirdars 
with  whom  he  was  at  enmity,  were  on  their  way  to  join  me.  He  had 
not  even  brought  a tent  with  him,  and,  had  he  succeeded  in  inducing 
me  to  delay  our  advance,  he  would  without  doubt  have  returned  to 
Kabul  at  once.  As  it  was,  he  was  accommodated  with  a tent  in  the 


»79] 


A PROCLAMATION  AND  AN  ORDER 


397 


centre  of  tho  camp,  anil  the  best  arrangements  possible,  under  the 
circumstances,  made  for  his  entertainment. 

When  his  own  tents  arrived,  he  asked  leave  to  have  them  pitched 
outside  camp  limits.  To  this  I consented,  at  the  same  time  ordering 
that  a guard  of  tho  same  strength  as  my  own  should  be  detailed  as  his 
escort,  ostensibly  to  do  him  honour,  but  in  reality  that  I might  be 
kept  informed  as  to  his  movements.  Unwelcome  guest  as  he  was,  I 
thought  the  least  of  two  evils  was  to  keep  him  now  that  we  had  got 
him,  as  his  presence  in  Kabul  would  be  sure  to  increase  the  opposition 
I felt  certain  we  should  encounter. 

In  response  to  the  fears  expressed  by  the  Amir  as  to  the  safety  of 
the  non-combatants,  I issued  the  following  Proclamation  to  the  people 
of  Kabul : 

‘ Be  it  known  to  all  that  the  British  Army  is  advancing  on  Kabul  to  take 
possession  of  the  city.  If  it  be  allowed  to  do  so  peacefully,  well  and  good  ; 
if  not,  the  city  will  be  seized  by  force.  Therefore,  all  well-disposed  persons, 
who  have  taken  no  part  in  the  dastardly  murder  of  the  British  Envoy,  or  in 
the  plunder  of  the  Residency,  are  warned  that,  if  they  are  unable  to  prevent 
resistance  being  offered  to  the  entrance  of  the  British  army,  and  the  authority 
of  His  Highness  the  Amir,  they  should  make  immediate  arrangements  for 
their  own  safety,  either  by  coming  to  the  British  camp,  or  by  such  other 
measures  as  may  seem  fit  to  them.  And  as  the  British  Government  does  not 
make  war  on  women  and  children,  warning  is  given  that  all  women  and 
children  should  be  removed  from  the  city  beyond  the  reach  of  harm.  The 
British  Government  desires  to  treat  all  classes  with  justice,  and  to  respect 
their  religion,  feelings,  and  customs,  while  exacting  full  retribution  from 
offenders.  Every  effort  will,  therefore,  be  made  to  prevent  the  innocent 
suffering  with  the  guilty,  but  it  is  necessary  that  the  utmost  precaution  should 
be  taken  against  useless  opposition. 

‘ After  receipt  of  this  Proclamation,  therefore,  all  persons  found  armed  in 
or  about  Kabul  will  be  treated  as  enemies  of  the  British  Government ; and, 
further,  it  must  be  distinctly  understood  that,  if  the  entry  of  the  British 
force  is  resisted,  I cannot  hold  myself  responsible  for  any  accidental  injury 
which  may  be  done  to  the  persons  or  property  of  even  well-disposed  people, 
who  may  have  neglected  this  warning.’ 

At  the  same  time,  the  matter  having  been  brought  to  my  notice  by 
Lord  Lytton,  and  bearing  in  my  mind  that  my  father  had  told  me  one 
of  the  chief  causes  of  the  outbreak  in  Kabul  in  1841  was  the  Afghans’ 
jealousy  of  their  women,  and  resentment  at  the  European  soldiers’ 
intimacy  with  them,  I thought  it  well  to  impress  upon  all  the  necessity 
for  caution  in  this  respect  by  publishing  the  following  Order : 

‘ Sir  Frederick  Roberts  desires  General  officers,  and  officers  commanding 
corps,  to  impress  upon  all  officers  under  their  command  the  necessity  for 
constant  vigilance  in  preventing  irregularities  likely  to  arouse  the  personal 
jealousies  of  the  people  of  Kabul,  who  are,  of  all  races,  most  susceptible  as 
regards  their  women. 

‘ The  deep-seated  animosity  of  the  Afghans  towards  the  English  has  been 
mainly  ascribed  to  indiscretions  committed  during  the  first  occupation  of 
Kabul,  and  the  Major-General  trusts  that  the  same  excellent  discipline  so 


39§ 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


long  exhibited  by  the  troops  under  his  command  will  remove  the  prejudices 
of  past  years,  and  cause  the  British  name  to  he  as  highly  respected  in 
Afghanistan  as  it  is  throughout  the  civilized  world.* 

On  the  30th  September  (my  forty-seventh  birthday),  all  arrange- 
ments which  it  was  possible  for  me  to  make  having  been  completed, 
the  Cavalry  brigade  marched  eight  miles  to  Zargunshahr,  the  first 
halting-place  on  the  way  to  Kabul.  I accompanied  it,  for  I was  in- 
formed that  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  and  the  Sirdars  had  arrived  so  far, 
and  I could  not  let  them  come  on  to  my  camp  so  long  as  the  Amir 
was  still  in  it.  I wished,  also,  to  interview  the  Logar  maliks  and 
ascertain  whether  I could  procure  supplies  from  their  valley.  There 
was  bread-stuff  with  the  force  sufficient  for  fourteen  days,  but  for  the 
transport  of  so  much  grain  a large  number  of  animals  was  required, 
which  could  ill  be  spared,  for  carriage  was  so  short  that  I could  only 
move  a little  more  than  half  the  troops  at  one  tune,  and  instead  of 
being  able  to  march  direct  on  Kabul  with  6,000  men,  a halt  would 
have  to  be  made  every  other  day  to  admit  of  the  animals  going  back 
to  bring  up  the  rear  brigade,  which  practically  meant  my  only  having 
at  my  disposal  rather  more  than  half  that  number  at  any  one  time. 
How  fervently  I wished  that  those  in  authority,  who  never  can  see 
the  necessity  for  maintaining  transport  in  time  of  peace,  could  be 
made  to  realize  the  result  of  their  short-sightedness — the  danger  of 
having  to  divide  a none  too  large  force  in  an  enemy’s  country,  the 
consequent  risk  of  failure,  the  enormous  increase  of  anxiety  to  the 
Commander,  the  delay  in  achieving  the  object  of  the  campaign,  and 
the  additional  labour  to  all  concerned  in  an  undertaking,  arduous 
enough  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances,  in  a difficult  country, 
and  under  a burning  eastern  sun,  even  if  possessed  of  good  and 
sufficient  transport. 

Stores  had  been  collected  at  Kushi  partly  by  means  of  local  carriage, 
and  partly  by  our  own  animals  doing  the  journey  twice  over  from 
Alikhel,  a distance  of  thirty-six  miles.  So  hard  pressed  was  I for 
transport  that  I had  to  make  the  Cavalry  soldiers  march  on  foot  and 
lead  their  horses  laden  with  grain — an  unusual  piece  of  duty,  which 
was,  however,  performed  with  the  cheerful  alacrity  which  the  troops  of 
the  Kabul  Field  Force  always  displayed. 

But  all  this  is  a digression.  To  return  to  my  story.  The  maliks 
of  Logar,  greatly  to  my  relief,  agreed  to  bring  a certain  amount  of 
supplies;  while  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  and  the  other  Sirdars  were  full 
of  protestations  of  loyalty  and  devotion.  Most  of  them  remained  with 
me  all  the  time  I was  in  Kabul,  and  some  of  them  afforded  me  con- 
siderable assistance.  The  Sirdars  warned  mo  to  place  no  trust  in  the 

* It  was  a matter  of  intense  gratification  to  me  that  the  whole  time  we 
remained  in  Afghanistan,  nearly  two  years,  not  a single  complaint  was  made 
by  an  Afghan  of  any  soldier  in  my  force  having  interfered  with  the  women 
of  the  country. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  SHUTARGARDAN 


399 


1879] 

Amir,  and  enlarged  on  the  treachery  of  his  conduct,  but  as  I knew 
they  looked  upon  Yakub  Khan  as  their  own  deadly  enemy,  I accepted 
their  counsel  with  some  reservation.  I was  not,  however,  able  to  feel 
quite  at  ease  about  the  proceedings  of  my  Royal  guest,  so  I returned 
to  Ivushi  that  same  evening. 

On  the  1st  October  the  whole  of  the  Kabul  Field  Force  was 
assembled  in  the  Logar  valley.* 

I waited  at  Kushi  with  the  last  of  the  Infantry  until  the  morning  of 
the  2nd.  Just  as  I was  leaving  camp,  I became  aware  that  firing  was 
going  on  in  the  direction  of  the  Shutargardan,  and  later  in  the  day  I 
received  a report  from  Colonel  Money  as  to  what  had  happened  there. 

The  enemy,  emboldened  by  the  diminished  numbers  of  the  garrison, 
and  undervaluing  what  might  be  accomplished  by  a small  number  of 
good  soldiers,  had  assembled  in  force,  and  occupied  the  crest  of  the 
mountain,  the  only  place  from  which  heliographic  communication  with 
me  could  be  kept  up.  Money  very  properly  decided  that  this  could 
not  be  permitted,  and  considered  it  best  to  take  the  initiative  before 
the  enemy  should  become  still  stronger,  so  ordered  an  advance.  Under 
cover  of  the  Mountain  battery's  fire,  Major  Griffiths,  of  the  3rd  Sikhs, 
with  200  of  his  own  men  and  50  of  the  21st  Punjab  Infantry,  supported 
by  150  rifles  of  the  latter  corps,  stormed  the  Afghans’  position.  The 
assault,  delivered  in  a most  spirited  manner,  was  perfectly  successful. 

* The  force  was  made  up  as  follows  : 


British 

Other  Ranks. 

Officers. 

British. 

Native. 

Divisional,  Brigade,  and  Departmental  Staff 
F/A,  R.H.A. 

60 

7 

118 

G/3,  R.A. 

7 

137 

No.  2 Mountain  Battery 

3 

223 

Two  Gatling  guns 

1 

34 

9th  Lancers  (one  squadron)  - 

4 

118 

5th  Punjab  Cavalry  .... 

7 

325 

12th  Bengal  Cavalry  - 

6 

328 

14th  Bengal  Lancers  - 

7 

407 

67th  Foot  ... 

18 

686 

72nd  Highlanders 

23 

746 

92nd  Highlanders  .... 

17 

717 

5th  Punjab  Infantry  - 

8 

610 

5th  Gurkhas  ..... 

7 

574 

23rd  Pioneers  .... 

6 

671 

28th  Punjab  Infantry 

8 

636 

7th  Company  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners 

3 

2 

93 

192 

2,558 

3,867 

40o 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

Major  Griffiths,  however,  was  wounded,  also  a signalling  sergeant  of 
the  67th  Foot  and  five  men  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  while  the  enemy  left 
thirty  dead  on  the  ground,  and  were  pursued  down  the  slope  of  the  hill 
without  making  any  attempt  to  rally. 

On  the  3rd  we  marched  fifteen  miles  to  Zahidabad,  where  we  first 
came  in  sight  of  the  fortified  hill  above  Kabul.  The  rear  guard  was 
fired  into  on  the  way,  and  we  had  considerable  difficulty  in  crossing  the 
Logar  river,  as  the  water  from  a large  irrigation  cut  had  been  directed 
back  into  the  stream  just  above  the  ford.  Our  only  casualty  on  this 
day  was  Captain  1 Dick  ’ Kennedy,  who  was  wounded  in  the  hand. 

It  was  plain  from  these  occurrences,  and  from  the  attack  on  the 
Shutargardan,  that  the  people  generally  were  not  disposed  to  be 
friendly.  From  the  Amir  I could  extract  no  information  on  this  head, 
although  he  must  have  been  fully  aware  of  the  feelings  and  intentions 
of  his  subjects.  He  was  in  constant  communication  with  Kabul,  and 
was  frequently  being  met  by  mounted  messengers,  who,  from  the  haste 
with  which  they  travelled,  as  evidenced  by  the  exhausted  state  of  their 
horses  and  the  eagerness  with  which  the  Amir  read  the  letters  they 
brought,  appeared  to  be  the  bearers  of  important  tidings. 

It  may  be  imagined  how  irritating  and  embarrassing  was  Yakub 
Khan’s  presence,  since  his  position  in  my  camp  enabled  him  to  give 
the  leaders  at  Kabul  accurate  information  as  to  our  numbers  and 
movements.  That  he  felt  pretty  sure  of  crur  discomfiture  was  apparent 
from  his  change  of  manner,  which,  from  being  at  first  a mixture  of 
extreme  cordiality  and  cringing  servility,  became  as  we  neared  Kabul 
distant,  and  even  haughty. 

On  the  5th  October,  one  month  from  the  receipt  at  Simla  of  the  evil 
tidings  of  the  fate  of  the  British  Embassy,  we  reached  the  pretty  little 
village  of  Charasia,  nestling  in  orchards  and  gardens,  with  a rugged 
range  of  hills  towering  above  it  about  a mile  away.  This  range  de- 
scended abruptly  on  the  right  to  permit  the  exit  of  the  Logar  river,  and 
rose  again  on  its  other  side  in  precipitous  cliffs,  forming  a fine  gorge* 
about  halfway  between  our  camp  and  Kabul  city,  now  only  from  ten  to 
twelve  miles  distant. 

An  uncle  of  the  Amir  (Sirdar  Nek  Mahomed  Khan),  and  a General 
in  the  Afghan  army,  came  out  to  meet  Yakub  Khan  at  this  place  ; he 
remained  some  time  in  earnest  conversation  with  his  nephew,  and,  as 
he  was  about  to  remount  his  horse,  called  out  in  so  loud  a tone  that  it 
was  evidently  meant  for  us  all  to  hear,  that  he  was  ‘ now  going  to 
disperse  the  troops. ’f  Very  different,  however,  was  the  story  brought 

* Known  as  the  saruj-i-nawishta  (inscribed  stone). 

f Shortly  after  I was  settled  at  Kabul,  the  following  letter,  written  by 
Nek  Mahomed  on  the  evening  of  the  day  lie  had  been  with  the  Amir,  to 
some  person  whom  he  wished  to  acquaint  with  the  state  of  affairs,  was 
brought  to  me  : 


1879]  RECONNOITRING  ROADS  LEADING  TO  KABUL 


401 


to  me  by  an  escaped  Native  servant  of  Cavagnari’s,  who  came  into 
our  camp  later  in  the  day.  This  man  declared  that  preparations  for 
fighting  were  steadily  being  carried  on ; that  the  soldiers  and  towns- 
people were  streaming  into  the  arsenal  and  supplying  themselves  with 
cartridges ; that  large  bodies  of  troops  were  moving  out  in  our  direction ; 
and  that,  when  we  advanced  next  day,  we  should  certainly  be  opposed 
by  a formidable  force.  The  Amir,  on  having  this  intelligence  com- 
municated to  him,  pretended  to  disbelieve  it  utterly,  and  assured  me 
that  all  was  at  peace  in  the  city,  that  Nek  Mahomed  would  keep  the 
troops  quiet,  and  that  I should  have  no  trouble ; but  I was  not  taken 
in  by  his  specious  assurances. 

Now  more  than  ever  I felt  the  want  of  sufficient  transport  1 Had 
it  been  possible  to  have  the  whole  of  my  force  with  me,  I should  have 
advanced  at  once,  and  have  occupied  that  evening  the  range  of  hills 
I have  described ; but  Macpherson’s  brigade  was  still  a march  behind, 
and  all  I could  do  was,  immediately  on  arrival,  to  send  back  every 
available  transport  animal  to  bring  it  up.  I pushed  forward  Cavalry 
patrols  along  the  three  roads  leading  to  Kabul,  and  rode  out  myself  to 
reconnoitre  the  position  in  front.  It  was  sufficiently  strong  to  make 
me  wish  I had  a larger  force.  Towards  evening  groups  of  men 
appeared  on  the  skyline  all  round,  giving  unmistakable  warning  that 
the  tribes  were  gathering  in  large  numbers. 

From  the  information  brought  me  by  the  Cavalry,  and  from  my 
own  examination  of  the  ground,  I decided  to  advance  along  the  left 
bank  of  the  river:  and  to  facilitate  this  movement  I determined  to 
seize  the  heights  on  either  side  of  the  gorge  at  daybreak,  whether 
Macpherson’s  brigade  had  arrived  or  not.  That  night  strong  piquets 
were  thrown  out  round  the  camp,  and  Cavalry  patrols  were  ordered  to 
proceed  at  dawn  to  feel  for  the  enemy.  L'liomme  propose,  mais  Dieu 
dispose. 


‘ My  kind  Friend, — The  truth  is  that  to-day,  at  sunrise,  I went  to  the 
camp,  the  Amir  having  summoned  me.  When  I arrived,  Mulla  Shah 
Mahomed  [the  Wazir]  first  said  to  me,  “ Go  back  and  tell  the  people  to  raise 
a holy  war.”  I did  not  feel  certain  about  what  lie  said  [or  was  not  satisfied 
with  this],  [but]  the  Amir  afterwards  told  me  to  go  back  that  very  hour  and 
rouse  the  people  to  a ghaza.  I got  back  to  Kabul  about  7 o’clock,  and  am 
collecting  the  people.  Salaam.  ’ 

The  letter  was  not  addressed,  but  it  was  sealed  with  Nek  Mahomed’s  seal, 
and  there  was  no  reason  to  doubt  its  authenticity. 


402 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


CHAPTER  LI. 

The  Cavalry  having  reported  that  the  road  through  the  sang-i-nawishta 
gorge  was  impassable,  I started  off  a party*  before  it  was  fully  light 
on  the  6th,  to  work  at  it  and  make  it  practicable  for  guns.  I was 
preparing  to  follow  with  an  escort  of  Cavalry  to  examine  the  pass  and 
the  ground  beyond,  when  the  growing  daylight  discovered  large 
numbers  of  Afghan  troops  in  regular  formation  crowning  the  hills  that 
I ought  to  have  been  in  a position  to  occupy  the  preceding  evening. 
No  hurry,  no  confusion  was  apparent  in  their  movements ; positions 
were  taken  up  and  guns  placed  with  such  coolness  and  deliberation 
that  it  was  evident  regularly  trained  troops  were  employed.  Very 
soon  I received  reports  of  our  Cavalry  patrols  having  been  fired  upon, 
and  of  their  having  been  obliged  to  retire. 

Immediate  action  was  imperatively  necessary ; the  Afghans  had  to 
be  dislodged  from  their  strong  position  at  any  cost,  or  we  should  have 
been  surrounded  by  overwhelming  numbers.  Their  occupation  of  the 
heights  was,  I felt,  a warning  that  must  not  be  disregarded,  and  a 
menace  that  could  not  be  brooked. 

Behind  this  range  of  hills  lay  the  densely-crowded  city  of  Kabul, 
with  the  scarcely  less  crowded  suburbs  of  Chardeh,  Deh-i-Afghan,  and 
numberless  villages  thickly  studded  over  the  Kabul  valley,  all  of  which 
were  contributing  their  quota  of  warriors  to  assist  the  Regular  troops 
in  disputing  the  advance  of  the  British.  It  did  not  require  much 
experience  of  Asiatics  to  understand  that,  if  the  enemy  were  allowed 
to  remain  undisturbed  for  a single  night  in  the  position  they  had  taken 
up,  their  numbers  would  increase  to  an  extraordinary  extent. 

I now  received  a report  from  the  rear  that  the  road  was  blocked, 
and  that  the  progress  of  Macpherson’s  brigade  would  certainly  be 
opposed ; while,  on  the  crests  of  the  hills  to  the  right  and  left  of  my 
camp,  bodies  of  men  began  to  assemble,  who,  I surmised  (which 
surmise  I afterwards  learnt  was  correct),  were  only  waiting  for  the 
sun  to  go  down  to  make  a general  attack  upon  the  camp  under  cover 
of  dusk. 

The  situation  was  one  of  great  anxiety.  The  whole  force  with  me 
was  not  more  than  4,000  men  and  eighteen  guns.  The  treacherous 
Amir  and  his  equally  treacherous  Ministers  had,  of  course,  kept  the 
Afghan  Commander  fully  informed  as  to  the  manner  in  which  my 
troops  were  perforce  divided ; the  position  of  every  man  and  every  gun 
with  me  was  known ; and  I feared  that,  as  soon  as  we  were  engaged 

* Twenty  sabres,  9th  Lancers,  one  squadron  6th  Punjab  Cavalry,  two 
guns,  No.  2 Mountain  battery,  284  rifles,  92nd  Highlanders,  and  460  rifles, 
23rd  Pioneers. 


THE  AFGHAN  POSITION 


403 


1879] 

with  the  enemy,  the  opportunity  would  be  taken  to  attack  my  weakly- 
defended  camp  and  to  engage  Macpherson’s  small  brigade,  encumbered 
as  it  was  with  its  large  convoy  of  stores  and  ammunition. 

The  numbers  of  the  enemy  were  momentarily  increasing,  so  delay 
would  assuredly  make  matters  worse ; the  only  chance  of  success, 
therefore,  was  to  take  the  initiative,  and  attack  the  Afghan  main 
position  at  once.  Accordingly,  I sent  an  officer  with  orders  to  the 
troops  who  were  moving  towards  the  gorge  not  to  commence  work, 
but  to  take  up  a defensive  position  until  my  plans  were  further 
developed.  I sent  another  messenger  to  Macpherson,  informing  him 
of  my  intention  to  take  immediate  action,  and  telling  him  to  keep  a 
good  look-out,  and  push  on  to  Charasia  with  all  possible  speed,  and  at 
the  same  time  I reinforced  him  by  a squadron  of  Cavalry. 

The  Afghan  position  formed  the  arc  of  a circle,  extending  from  the 
sang-i-nawishta  gorge  to  the  heights  above  Chardeh.  Both  sides  of  the 
gorge  were  occupied  by  the  enemy,  as  was  a semi-detached  hill  to  the 
south  of  it,  and  sixteen  guns  were  observed  in  position.  The  line  they 
had  taken  up  occupied  nearly  three  miles  of  country ; and  their  main 
position  was  the  ridge,  which,  close  to  the  gorge,  rose  1,000  feet  above 
the  plain,  running  up  at  its  western  extremity  to  a peak  2,200  feet 
high.  Thence  the  line  stretched  along  the  edge  of  some  lower  heights 
to  a rugged  hill,  the  summit  of  which  was  about  1,800  feet  above 
Charasia.  In  front  of  this  formidable  position  were  a succession  of 
sandy  hills,  forming  a series  of  easily  defensible  posts,  and  at  the  foot 
of  these  hills  ran  a bare  stony  belt,  sloping  down  to  the  cultivated  land 
surrounding  Charasia  and  the  hamlet  of  Khairabad. 

My  movements  and  reconnaissances  up  till  now  having  led  the 
enemy  to  believe  that  I intended  to  deliver  my  attack  on  their  left  at 
the  sang-i-nawishta,  they  were  seen  to  be  concentrating  their  forces  in 
that  direction.  But  this  position  could  only  have  been  carried  with 
such  damaging  loss  to  us  that  I determined  to  make  the  real  attack  by 
an  outflanking  movement  to  then-  right. 

The  men  having  made  a hasty  breakfast,  I despatched  General 
Baker  in  this  direction,  and  placing  at  his  disposal  the  troops  noted 
below,*  I entrusted  to  him  the  difficult  task  of  dislodging  the  enemy, 
while  I continued  to  distract  their  attention  towards  the  gorge  by 
making  a feint  to  their  left. 

Baker’s  little  column  assembled  in  a wooded  enclosure  close  to 
Charasia,  where  he  left  his  field  hospital  and  reserve  ammunition,  for 
the  safe  guarding  of  which  I sent  him  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  while 
he  was  further  reinforced  by  450  men  of  the  23rd  Pioneers  and  three 
Field  Artillery  guns.  I was  thus  left  with  only  six  Horse  Artillery 

* Two  guns,  No.  2 Mountain  battery,  two  Gatling  guns,  detachment  12th 
Bengal  Cavalry,  72nd  Highlanders,  5th  Gurkhas  (300  rifles),  5th  Punjab 
Infantry  (200  rifles),  No.  7 Compauy  Sappers  and  Miners. 


404 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

guns,  450  Cavalry,  and  between  600  and  700  Infantry  for  the 
protection  of  the  camp,  where  I was  still  handicapped  by  the  presence 
of  the  Amir  and  his  untrustworthy  following. 

While  Baker  advanced  to  the  left,  the  party  near  the  sang-i-nawishta 
gorge,  commanded  by  Major  White,  of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  was 
ordered  to  threaten  the  pass  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  occupying  any 
portion  of  the  Charasia  village,  to  advance  within  Artillery  range  of 
the  enemy’s  main  position  above  the  gorge,  and  when  the  outflanking 
movement  had  been  thoroughly  developed  and  the  enemy  were  in  full 
retreat,  but  not  before,  to  push  the  Cavalry  through  the  gorge  and 
pursue. 

At  about  11.30  a.m.  Baker’s  leading  troops  emerged  into  the  open, 
and  were  immediately  engaged  with  a crowd  of  armed  Afghans, 
supported  by  a considerable  body  of  Regular  troops.  The  General 
now  sent  one  company  of  the  72nd,  under  Captain  Hunt,  to  turn  the 
Afghans  off  a succession  of  peaks  situated  at  right  angles  to  the  ridge 
they  were  occupying  on  then  extreme  right.  Running  along  this  ridge, 
and  stretching  across  the  Indiki  road  to  the  sandhills,  the  Afghan  right 
wing  held  a line  considerably  in  advance  of  then*  left  on  the  hill  above 
the  sang-i-nawishta  gorge,  and  one  which  could  not  easily  be  turned, 
for  the  peaks  the  72nd  were  sent  to  occupy  were  almost  inaccessible, 
and  the  fire  from  them  swept  the  slopes  up  which  our  troops  must 
advance.  These  peaks,  therefore,  formed  the  key  of  the  position,  and 
their  defenders  had  to  be  dislodged  from  them  at  all  hazards  before 
anything  else  could  be  attempted.  The  company  of  the  72nd  with 
much  difficulty  fought  their  way  up,  and  gained  a footing  on  the  first 
peak,  where  they  were  obliged  to  pause,  until  reinforced  by  two 
companies  of  the  5th  Gurkhas  under  Captain  Cook,  V.C.,  when  they 
advanced  all  together,  clearing  the  enemy  from  each  successive  point, 
while  the  remainder  of  the  72nd  breasted  the  hill,  and,  under  cover  of 
the  Mountain  guns,  attacked  the  position  in  front.  But  the  enemy 
were  obstinate,  and  the  extremely  difficult  nature  of  the  ground 
somewhat  checked  the  gallant  Highlanders.  Seeing  their  dilemma, 
Baker  despatched  two  companies  of  the  5tli  Gurkhas,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Fitz-Hugh,  and  200  men  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  under 
Captain  Hall,  to  then-  assistance ; while  the  23rd  Pioneers  were 
brought  up  on  the  right,  in  support,  and  a detachment  of  the  5th 
Punjab  Infantry  echeloned  in  rear,  on  the  left  of  the  line. 

The  engagement  now  became  hot,  and  the  firing  fast  and  furious. 
My  readers  will,  I am  sure,  be  able  to  realize  with  what  intense 
excitement  and  anxiety  I watched  the  proceedings.  It  was  evident  to 
me  that  little  progress  could  be  made  so  long  as  the  enemy  retained 
possession  of  the  ridge,  which  the  Afghan  Commander  apparently  had 
just  begun  to  appreciate  was  the  real  point  of  attack,  for  his  troops 
could  now  be  seen  hurrying  to  this  point,  and  it  became  more  urgently 


1879]  HIGHLANDERS,  GURKHAS,  AND  PUNJABIS 


405 


necessary  than  ever  to  carry  the  position  before  it  could  be  reinforced. 
At  2 p.m.  it  was  seized ; the  Highlanders  and  Gurkhas  could  no 
longer  be  resisted;  the  Afghans  wavered,  and  then  began  to  retreat, 
exposed  to  a cross  fire  that  effectually  prevented  their  rallying. 

The  brunt  of  this  affair  was  borne  by  the  72nd,  admirably  led  by 
their  company  officers,  under  the  skilful  direction  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Clarke  and  his  Adjutant,  Lieutenant  Murray.  I closely 
watched  their  movements,  and  particularly  observed  one  man  pushing 
up  the  precipitous  hillside  considerably  in  advance  of  everyone  else, 
and  apparently  utterly  regardless  of  the  shower  of  bullets  falling 
round  him.  I inquired  about  him  later  on,  and  found  that  he  was  a 
young  Irish  private  of  the  72nd,  named  MacMahon,  to  whose  coohiess 
and  daring  was  in  a great  measure  due  the  capture  of  this  very  strong 
post.  Her  Majesty,  I am  glad  to  be  able  to  relate,  subsequently 
rewarded  this  intrepid  soldier  by  bestowing  on  him  the  Victoria 
Cross. 

The  general  advance  was  now  sounded,  and  gallantly  was  it  responded 
to.  The  main  position  was  stormed  by  the  Highlanders,  Gurkhas,  and 
Punjab  Infantry,  each  trying  hard  to  be  the  first  to  close  with  its 
defenders.  The  enemy  fought  desperately,  charging  down  on  the 
Gurkhas,  by  whom,  under  the  leadership  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fitz- 
Hugh  and  his  Adjutant,  Lieutenant  Martin,  they  were  repulsed  and 
driven  over  the  crest  with  heavy  loss. 

The  Afghans  now  took  up  a position  some  600  yards  in  the  rear  of 
that  from  which  they  had  just  been  dislodged,  where  they  made  an 
obstinate  stand  for  half  an  hom,  but  they  wTere  again  forced  back  on 
the  attacking  party  being  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  two  companies 
of  the  92nd  Highlanders,  sent  to  their  assistance  by  Major  "White,  who 
had  already  successfully  engaged  the  Afghan  left  above  the  sang-i- 
nawislita  gorge.  As  the  enemy’s  advanced  posts  on  the  hill  to  the 
south,  and  directly  in  front  of  the  gorge,  prevented  our  guns  from 
coming  within  range  of  their  position  on  the  heights  above,  these  posts 
had  to  be  disposed  of  as  a preliminary  to  effective  co-operation  with 
Baker;  accordingly,  about  noon  the  hill  was  captured  by  two  com- 
panies of  the  92nd,  under  Captain  Cotton,  and  half  a battery  of  Field 
Artillery  was  advanced  to  a point  whence  Major  Parry  was  able  to 
engage  the  Afghan  guns  posted  above  the  gorge. 

It  was  at  this  juncture,  when  Baker’s  troops,  having  carried  the 
main  position,  were  proceeding  to  attack  that  to  which  the  enemy  had 
retreated,  that  White  despatched  two  companies  of  the  92nd,  under 
Captain  Oxley,  by  whose  timely  aid  the  determined  foe  were  at  length 
driven  from  this  point  of  vantage  also.  The  troops  followed  up  their 
success  and  advanced  at  the  double,  while  our  guns  shelled  the  shaken 
masses. 

The  Afghan  right  and  centre  now  gave  way  completely  ; the  enemy 


406  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1879 

broke,  and  fled  down  the  slopes  on  the  further  side  in  a north-westerly 
direction,  eventually  taking  refuge  in  the  Chardeh  villages. 

By  3.45  we  were  in  possession  of  the  whole  of  the  main  ridge.  The 
first  objective  having  been  thus  gained,  the  troops,  pivoting  on  their 
right,  brought  round  their  left  and  advanced  against  the  now  exposed 
flanks  of  the  enemy’s  left  wing,  and  simultaneously  with  this  move- 
ment White  advanced  from  his  position  by  the  hill  in  front  of  the 
gorge,  and  a little  after  four  o’clock  had  gained  possession  of  the  pass 
and  twelve  Afghan  guns. 

Completely  outflanked  and  enfiladed  by  Baker’s  fire,  the  left  wing  of 
the  Afghan  force  made  but  little  resistance  ; they  rapidly  abandoned 
the  height,  and  retired  across  the  river  toward  the  north-east,  pursued 
by  the  small  body  of  Cavalry  attached  to  White’s  force,  under  Major 
Hammond,  and  a party  of  the  92nd,  under  Major  Hay. 

Baker  now  paused  to  allow  of  the  Infantry’s  ammunition  being 
replenished,  and  then  advanced  along  the  ridge  towards  the  pass,  which 
he  reached  in  time  to  help  the  Cavalry  who  were  engaged  with  the 
enemy’s  rear  guard  at  the  river  ; the  latter  were  driven  off  and  forced 
to  retreat ; but  by  this  time  the  growing  darkness  made  further  pursuit 
impossible.  We  were  therefore  compelled  to  rest  satisfied  with  holding 
the  ground  in  advance  by  piquets  and  occupying  both  ends  of  the  sang- 
i-nawisliia  defile,  where  the  troops  bivouacked  for  the  night.  I was 
able  to  supply  them  with  food  from  Charasia,  and  they  were  made  as 
comfortable  as  they  could  be  under  the  circumstances. 

While  the  fighting  was  taking  place  on  the  heights  in  front  of 
Charasia,  the  hills  on  both  flanks  of  my  camp  were  crowded  with 
the  enemy,  anxiously  watching  the  result ; they  did  not  approach  within 
the  Cavalry  patrols,  but  one  party  caused  so  much  annoyance  to  a 
picquet  by  firing  into  it  that  it  became  necessary  to  dislodge  it,  a service 
which  was  performed  in  a very  daring  manner  by  a few  of  the  92nd, 
under  Lieutenant  Grant  and  Colour- Sergeant  Hector  Macdonald,  the 
same  non-commissioned  officer  who  had  a few  days  before  so  distin- 
guished himself  in  the  Hazardarakht  defile. 

Our  casualties  were  wonderfully  few,  only  18  killed  and  70  wounded,* 
while  the  enemy  left  300  dead  behind  them,  and  as  they  succeeded  in 
carrying  numbers  of  their  killed  and  wounded  off  the  field,  their  loss 
must  have  been  heavy.  I subsequently  ascertained  that  we  had 

* During  the  fight  the  Infantry  expended  41,090  rounds,  of  which  over 
20,000  were  fired  by  the  72nd  Highlanders.  The  half-battery  G/3  R.A.  fired 
6 common  shell  (percussion  fuses)  and  71  shrapnel  (time  fuses)  ; total, 
77  rounds.  No.  2 Mountain  Battery  fired  10  common  shell  and  94  shrapnel, 
total,  104  rounds.  Tho  two  Gatlings  fired  150  rounds. 

At  the  tenth  round  one  of  the  Gatlings  jammed,  and  had  to  be  taken  to 
pieces.  This  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  Gatling  guns  were  used  in  action. 
They  were  not  of  the  present  improved  make,  and,  being  found  unsatisfactory, 
were  made  but  little  use  of. 


1879] 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  AFGHANS 


407 


opposed  to  us,  besides  thirteen  Regular  regiments,  between  eight  and 
ten  thousand  Afghans.  Ghilzais  from  Tezin  and  Hisarak  had  hurried 
up  in  large  numbers  to  join  the  enemy,  but,  luckily  for  us,  arrived  too 
late.  Of  these  some  returned  to  their  homes  when  they  found  the 
Afghan  army  had  been  beaten,  but  the  greater  number  waited  about 
Kabul  to  assist  in  any  further  stand  that  might  be  made  by  the  Regular 
troops. 

The  heliograph,  worked  by  Captain  Stratton,  of  the  22nd  Foot,  had 
been  of  the  greatest  use  during  the  day,  and  kept  me  fully  informed  of 
all  details.  The  last  message  as  the  sun  was  sinking  behind  the  hills, 
confirming  my  own  observations,  was  a most  satisfactory  one,  to  the 
effect  that  the  whole  of  the  enemy’s  position  was  in  our  possession,  and 
that  our  victor}7  was  complete. 

Throughout  the  day  my  friend  (1)  the  Amir,  surrounded  by  his 
Sirdars,  remained  seated  on  a knoll  in  the  centre  of  the  camp  watching 
the  progress  of  the  fight  with  intense  eagerness,  and  questioning  every- 
one who  appeared  as  to  his  interpretation  of  what  he  had  observed. 
So  soon  as  I felt  absolutely  assured  of  our  victory,  I sent  an  Aide-de- 
camp  to  His  Highness  to  convey  the  joyful  intelligence  of  our  success. 
It  was,  without  doubt,  a trying  moment  for  him,  and  a terrible  dis- 
appointment after  the  plans  which  I subsequently  ascertained  he  and 
his  adherents  at  Kabul  had  carefully  laid  for  our  annihilation.  But  he 
received  the  news  with  Asiatic  calmness,  and  without  the  smallest  sign 
of  mortification,  merely  requesting  my  Aide-de-camp  to  assure  me  that, 
as  my  enemies  were  his  enemies,  he  rejoiced  at  my  victory. 

Macpherson’s  brigade,  with  its  impedimenta,  arrived  before  it  was 
quite  dark,  so  altogether  I had  reason  to  feel  satisfied  with  the  day’s 
results.  But  the  fact  still  remained  that  not  more  than  twelve  miles 
beyond  stood  the  city  of  Kabul,  with  its  armed  thousands  ready  to 
oppose  us  should  an  assault  prove  necessary.  I had  besides  received 
information  of  a further  gathering  of  Ghilzais  bent  upon  another 
attack  on  the  Shutargardan,  and  that  reinforcements  of  Regular  troops 
and  guns  were  hastening  to  Kabul  from  Ghazni.  Prompt  action  was 
the  one  and  only  means  of  meeting  these  threatened  difficulties.  My 
trocos  had  had  more  than  enough  for  one  day,  and  required  rest,  but 
needs  must  when  the  devil  (in  the  shape  of  Afghan  hordes)  drives.  I 
resolved  to  push  on,  and  issued  orders  for  tents  to  be  struck  at  once  and 
an  advance  to  be  made  at  break  of  day. 

At  the  first  streak  of  dawn  on  the  7th  I started,  leaving  Macpherson 
to  come  on  with  the  heavy  baggage  as  quickly  as  he  could.  I marched 
by  the  sang-i-naivishta  defile,  where  Major  White  met  me  and  ex- 
plained to  me  his  part  in  the  victory  of  the  previous  day.  From  my 
inspection  of  the  ground,  I had  no  difficulty  in  coming  to  the  conclusion 
that  much  of  the  success  which  attended  the  operations  on  this  side  was 
due  to  White’s  military  instincts  and,  at  one  supreme  moment,  his 

27—2 


408 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

extreme  personal  gallantry.  It  afforded  me,  therefore,  very  great 
pleasure  to  recommend  this  officer  for  the  Victoria  Cross,  an  honour  of 
which  more  than  one  incident  hi  his  subsequent  career  proved  him  to 
be  well  worthy. 

Our  rapid  advance,  following  on  the  defeat  of  the  previous  day,  had 
the  effect  I hoped  it  would  have.  On  arriving  at  Beni  Hissar,  a con- 
siderable village,  surrounded  by  orchards  and  gardens,  only  two  miles 
south  of  the  far-famed  citadel  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  I sent  out  Cavalry 
patrols  to  reconnoitre,  who  brought  me  the  pleasing  news  that  the  Bala 
Hissar  had  been  evacuated,  and  the  only  part  of  the  city  visible  seemed 
to  be  deserted. 

During  the  day  I received  visits  from  some  of  the  chief  merchants 
of  Kabul,  who  each  told  a different  tale  regarding  the  movements  of 
the  defeated  Afghan  army  and  the  intentions  of  the  Afghan  Commander. 
From  their  conflicting  accounts,  however,  I gathered  that,  fresh  troops 
having  arrived  from  Kohistan,  the  remnants  of  the  Charasia  army  had 
joined  them,  and  that  the  combined  forces  were  then  occupying  the 
range  of  hills  immediately  above  Kabul,  to  the  west,  and  had  deter- 
mined to  make  another  stand. 

Having  received  intelligence  that  the  enemy,  if  again  defeated, 
intended  to  retire  towards  Turkestan,  I directed  Brigadier-General 
Massy,  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  October,  to  move  out  with  the 
Cavalry  brigade  and  place  himself  across  their  line  of  retreat.*  The 
brigade  started  at  11  a.m.,  and,  in  order  to  avoid  the  city  and  adjacent 
heights,  made  a considerable  detour  by  Siah  Sang  and  Sherpur,  the  new 
Afghan  cantonment.  On  reaching  the  latter  place,  Massy  lieliograplied 
to  me  that  he  had  found  it  deserted,  the  magazine  blown  up,  aud 
seventy-five  gunsf  abandoned  inside  the  enclosure,  and  that  the  enemy 
were  now  occupying  a ridge  J which  seemed  to  him  to  be  a prolongation 
of  the  Shahr-i-Darwaza  range  above  Kabul ; then,  continuing  his 
march,  he  crossed  a depression  in  this  ridge  called  the  Nanachi  Kotal, 
and  wheeling  to  his  left,  and  skirting  the  Asmai  heights  on  the  western 
side,  he  soon  came  in  sight  of  the  Afghan  camp,  pitched  on  the  slope 
of  the  hills  about  a mile  from  Deh-i-Mazang. 

Brigadier- General  Massy  was  informed,  in  reply  to  his  heliogram, 
that  Baker  would  be  despatched  at  once  to  drive  the  enemy  from  their 
position  and  force  them  to  fall  back  upon  the  Cavalry,  upon  which 
Massy  immediately  made  the  arrangements  which  appeared  to  him 

* The  troops  available  for  this  purpose  were  : One  squadron  9th  Lancers, 
5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  and  14th  Bengal  Lancers  ; total, 
720  of  all  ranks. 

t The  guns  included  four  English  18-pounders,  one  English  8-inch  howitzer 
and  two  Afghan  imitations  of  this  weapon,  and  forty-two  bronze  Mountain 
guns. 

t The  Asmai  heights. 


1879] 


DEH-IMAZANG  GORGE 


409 


most  advisable  for  blocking,  with  the  limited  number  of  sabres  at  his 
disposal,  the  several  roads  by  which  the  enemy  might  attempt  to 
escape. 

I could  only  spare  to  Baker  a very  small  force  (1,044  rifles,  two 
Mountain  guns  and  one  Gatling),  for  Macpherson’s  and  White’s  troops 
had  not  yet  come  up.  He  started  off  without  a moment’s  delay,  and, 
driving  the  enemy’s  scouts  before  him,  worked  his  way  along  the 
Shahr-i-Danvaza  heights  to  the  west ; but  his  progress  was  very  slow, 
owing  to  the  extreme  difficulty  of  the  ground,  and  the  day  was  far 
spent  before  ho  found  himself  near  enough  to  the  enemy  to  use  his 
Artillery.  To  his  delight,  Baker  perceived  that  he  commanded  the 
Afghan  camp  and  the  rear  of  their  main  position  ; but  his  satisfaction 
was  considerably  alla3'ed  when  he  discovered  that  between  him  and 
them  lay  a deep  gorge*  with  precipitous  sides,  through  which  ran  the 
Kabul  river,  and  that  before  he  could  attack  he  would  have  to  descend 
1,600  feet,  and  then  climb  up  the  opposite  side,  which  was  nearly  as 
high  and  quite  as  steep. 

Anxious  as  Baker  was  that  there  should  be  no  delay  in  delivering  the 
assault,  by  the  time  his  dispositions  were  made  it  had  become  too  dark 
to  attempt  it,  and  most  reluctantly  he  had  to  postpone  the  movement 
till  daybreak  the  next  day.  He  had  ascertained  that  the  Kabul  river 
was  not  fordable  for  Infantry  except  at  a point  which  was  commanded 
by  the  enemy’s  camp,  and  was  too  far  from  support  to  warrant  piquets 
being  pushed  across  at  night.  Nothing  whatever  could  be  seen,  but  a 
very  slight  noise  as  of  stealthy  movement  in  the  Afghan  camp  was 
heard,  and  the  fear  seized  Baker  that  the  enemy  might  escape  him. 
Soon  after  11  p.m.,  therefore,  when  the  rising  moon  began  in  a 
measure  to  dispel  the  darkness,  Baker  sent  a strong  patrol  under  a 
British  officer  to  feel  for  the  enemy.  The  patrol  came  into  contact 
with  the  Afghan  scouts  on  the  river-bank,  from  some  of  whom,  taken 
prisoners  in  the  struggle,  they  learned  that  the  enemy  had  crept  away 
under  cover  of  the  night,  and  the  greater  number  had  dispersed  to  their 
own  homes  ; but  about  800,  mounted  on  Artillery  horses,  were  reported 
to  have  accompanied  their  Commander,  Mahomed  Jan,  and  to  have 
escaped  in  the  direction  of  Bamian. 

Meanwhile,  Brigadier-General  Massy,  from  his  point  of  observation 
beneath  the  Asmai  heights,  had  perceived  that  it  was  impossible  for 
Baker  to  carry  the  enemy’s  main  position  by  daylight ; he  tried  to 
communicate  with  Baker  and  ascertain  his  plans,  but  the  party 
despatched  on  this  service  were  unable  to  get  through  the  villages  and 
woods,  which  were  all  held  by  the  enemy,  and  returned  unsuccessful. 
Massy  then  collected  his  scattered  squadrons  and  bivouacked  for  the 
night,  being  anxious  that  his  men  and  horses  should  have  food  and  rest, 


The  Deh-i-Mazang  gorge. 


4io  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1879 

and  it  not  having  struck  him  that  the  enemy  might  attempt  to  escape 
during  the  hours  of  darkness. 

The  information  that  in  very  truth  they  had  escaped  was  brought  to 
Baker  at  4.30  a.m.  He  at  once  communicated  it  to  Massy,  telling  him 
at  the  same  time  that  any  movement  the  Cavalry  might  make  in  pur- 
suit would  be  supported  by  the  troops  under  his  immediate  command, 
and  also  by  a brigade  under  Brigadier-General  Macplierson,  which  I 
had  despatched  to  reinforce  Baker  ; Macpherson  and  White,  with 
their  respective  troops,  having  arrived  at  Beni  Hissar  shortly  after 
Baker  had  started. 

I joined  Baker  at  this  time,  and  great  was  my  disappointment  at 
being  told  that  the  Afghans  had  given  us  the  slip.  I went  carefully 
over  the  ground,  however,  and  satisfied  myself  that  Baker  had  done  all 
that  was  possible  under  the  circumstances,  and  that  the  enemy  having 
eluded  us  could  not  in  any  way  be  attributed  to  want  of  care  or  skill  on 
his  part. 

Massy  scoured  the  country  until  nightfall  on  the  9th,  but  with  very 
little  success,  only  one  small  party  of  fugitives  being  overtaken  about 
four-and-twenty  miles  on  the  road  to  Ghazni.  Numbers,  doubtless, 
found  shelter  in  the  city  of  Kabul,  others  in  the  numerous  villages  with 
which  the  richly-cultivated  Chardeh  valley  was  thickly  studded,  and 
whose  inhabitants  were  hostile  to  a man  ; others  escaped  to  the  hills  ; 
and  the  remainder,  having  had  ten  hours’  start,  could  not  be  over- 
taken. 

The  enemy’s  camp  was  left  standing,  and  twelve  guns,  some 
elephants,  camels,  mules,  and  ponies,  fell  into  our  possession. 

During  that  day  our  camp  was  moved  nearer  the  city  to  Siah  Sang, 
a commanding  plateau  between  the  Kabul  and  Logar  rivers,  close  to 
their  confluence,  and  less  than  a mile  east  of  the  Bala  Hissar.  The 
5th  Gurkhas  and  two  Mountain  guns  were  left  to  hold  the  heights  on 
which  Brigadier-General  Baker  had  been  operating,  and  the  x-est  of  the 
force  was  concentrated  on  Siah  Sang. 


CHAPTER  LII. 

At  last  I was  at  Kabul,  the  place  I had  heard  so  much  of  from  my  boy- 
hood, and  had  so  often  wished  to  see  I The  city  lay  beneath  me,  with 
its  mud-coloured  buildings  and  its  50,000  inhabitants,  covering  a con- 
siderable extent  of  ground.  To  the  south-east  corner  of  the  city 
appeared  the  Bala  Hissar,  picturesquely  perched  on  a saddle  just 
beneath  the  Shahr-i-Darwaza  heights,  along  the  top  of  which  ran  a 
fortified  wall,  enclosing  the  upper  portion  of  the  citadel  and  extending 
to  the  Deh-i-Mazang  gorge. 


1879] 


GUIDING  INSTRUCTIONS 


411 


Kabul  was  reported  to  be  perfectly  quiet,  and  numbers  of  traders 
came  into  our  camp  to  dispose  of  their  wares  ; but  I forbade  anyone  to 
enter  the  city  until  I had  been  able  to  decide  upon  the  best  means  of 
maintaining  order  amongst  a population  for  tho  most  part  extremely 
fanatical,  treacherous,  and  vindictive. 

So  far  our  success  had  been  complete  : all  opposition  had  been  over- 
come, Kabul  was  at  our  mercy,  the  Amir  was  in  my  camp  ready  to  agree 
to  whatever  I might  propose,  and  it  had  been  all  done  with  extraordi- 
narily little  loss  to  ourselves.  Nevertheless,  I felt  my  difficulties  were 
very  far  from  being  at  an  end — indeed,  the  part  of  my  duty  still  re- 
maining to  be  accomplished  was  surrounded  with  far  greater  difficulty, 
and  was  a source  of  much  more  anxiety  to  me  than  the  military  task  I 
had  undertaken  ; for,  with  regard  to  the  latter,  I possessed  confidence 
in  myself  and  my  ability  to  perforin  it,  whereas,  with  respect  to  the 
political  and  diplomatic  side  of  the  question,  actual  personal  experience 
I had  none,  and  I could  only  hope  that  common-sense  and  a sense  of 
justice  would  carry  me  through. 

The  instructions  I had  received  from  the  Government  of  India  were 
very  general  in  their  character,  for  the  Viceroy  felt  that  any  proceedings 
must  necessarily  depend  on  the  state  of  affairs  obtaining  at  Kabul,  the 
acts  and  attitude  of  the  Amir  and  his  people,  and  the  various  conditions 
impossible  to  foresee  when  the  Foreign  Office  letter  was  written  to  me 
on  the  29th  September.  But,  though  general,  they  were  very  compre- 
hensive. 

The  troops  were  to  be  placed  in  strong  and  secure  positions,  such  as 
would  give  me  complete  control  over  the  Amir’s  capital ; any  Afghan 
soldiers  remaining  at  Kabul,  and  the  whole  of  the  city  population,  were 
to  be  disarmed  ; supplies  were  to  be  collected  in  sufficient  quantities  to 
render  my  force  independent  in  case  of  intenuption  along  the  line  of 
communication  ; Yakub  Khan's  personal  safety  was  to  be  secured,  and 
adequate  supervision  maintained  over  his  movements  and  actions ; a 
close  investigation  was  to  be  instituted  into  all  the  causes  and  circum- 
stances connected  with  the  1 totally  unprovoked  and  most  barbarous 
attack  by  the  Amir’s  soldiery  and  the  people  of  his  capital  upon  the 
representative  of  an  allied  State,  who  was  residing  under  the  Amir’s 
protection  in  the  Amir’s  fortress,  in  very  close  proximity  to  the  Amir 
himself,  and  whose  personal  safety  and  honourable  treatment  had  been 
solemnly  guaranteed  by  the  Euler  of  Afghanistan.’ 

The  retribution  to  be  exacted  was  to  be  adapted  to  the  twofold 
character  of  the  offence,  and  was  to  be  imposed  upon  the  Afghan 
nation  in  proportion  as  the  offence  was  proved  to  be  national,  and  as 
the  responsibility  should  be  brought  home  to  any  particular  com- 
munity. Further,  the  imposition  of  a fine,  it  was  suggested  upon  the 
city  of  Kabul  ‘ would  be  in  accordance  with  justice  and  precedent, 
and  the  demolition  of  fortifications  and  removal  of  buildings  within 


412  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  JN  INDIA  [1879 

range  of  my  defences,  or  which  might  interfere  with  my  control  over 
the  city,  might  be  ‘ necessary  as  a military  precaution.’ 

In  forming  my  plans  for  the  removal  of  obstructive  buildings,  I was 
to  consider  ‘ whether  they  can  be  combined  with  any  measures  com- 
patible with  justice  and  humanity  for  leaving  a memorial  of  the  retri- 
bution exacted  from  the  city  in  some  manner  and  by  some  mark  that 
will  not  be  easily  obliterated.’ 

I was  told  that  ‘ in  regard  to  the  punishment  of  individuals,  it  should 
be  swift,  stern,  and  impressive,  without  being  indiscriminate  or  im- 
moderate ; its  infliction  must  not  be  delegated  to  subordinate  officers 
of  minor  responsibility  acting  independently  of  your  instructions  or 
supervision ; and  you  cannot  too  vigilantly  maintain  the  discipline  of 
the  troops  under  your  orders,  or  superintend  their  treatment  of  the 
unarmed  population,  so  long  as  your  orders  are  obeyed  and  your 
authority  is  unresisted.  You  will  deal  summarily  in  the  majority  of 
cases  with  persons  whose  share  in  the  murder  of  anyone  belonging  to 
the  British  Embassy  shall  have  been  proved  by  your  investigations, 
but  while  the  execution  of  justice  should  be  as  public  and  striking  as 
possible,  it  should  be  completed  with  all  possible  expedition,  since 
the  indefinite  prolongation  of  your  proceedings  might  spread  abroad 
unfounded  alarm.’ 

The  despatch  concluded  with  the  words  : ‘ It  will  probably  be  essen- 
tial, not  only  for  the  protection  of  your  own  camp  from  annoyance, 
but  also  for  the  security  of  the  well-affected  population  and  for  the 
general  maintenance  of  order,  that  you  should  assume  and  exercise 
supreme  authority  in  Kabul,  since  events  have  unfortunately  proved 
that  the  Amir  has  lost  that  authority,  or  that  he  has  conspicuously 
failed  to  make  use  of  it.’ 

On  the  10th  I visited  Sherpur,  and  the  next  day  I went  to  the  Bala 
Hissar,  and  wandered  over  the  scene  of  the  Embassy’s  brave  defence 
and  cruel  end.  The  walls  of  the  Residency,  closely  pitted  with  bullet- 
holes,  gave  proof  of  the  determined  nature  of  the  attack  and  the  length 
of  the  resistance.  The  floors  were  covered  with  blood-stains,  and 
amidst  the  embers  of  a fire  were  found  a heap  of  human  bones.  It 
may  be  imagined  how  British  soldiers’  hearts  burned  within  them  at 
such  a sight,  and  how  difficult  it  was  to  suppress  feelings  of  hatred 
and  animosity  towards  the  perpetrators  of  such  a dastardly  crime.  I 
had  a careful  but  unsuccessful  search  made  for  the  bodies  of  our  ill- 
fated  friends. 

The  Bala  Hissar,  at  one  time  of  great  strength,  was  now  in  a some- 
what dilapidated  condition.  It  contained  eighty-five  guns,  mortars 
and  howitzers,  some  of  them  of  English  manufacture,  upwards  of  250 
tons  of  gunpowder,  stowed  away  in  earthen  vessels,  many  millions  of 
Enfield  and  Snider  cartridges,  and  a large  number  of  arms,  besides 
quantities  of  saddlery,  clothing  for  troops,  musical  instruments,  shot. 


Hi 


ENTRANCE  TO  THE  BALA  HISSAR.  KABUL. 


VISIT  TO  THE  BALA  HISSAR 


4«3 


1879] 

shell,  caps,  and  accoutrements,  and  a vast  amount  of  lead,  copper  and 
tin.  It  would  not  have  given  us  much  trouble  to  storm  the  Bala 
Hissar,  had  we  been  obliged  to  do  so,  for  Artillery  could  have  opened 
on  it  within  easy  range,  and  there  was  cover  for  Infantry  close  up  to 
the  walls. 

The  reading  of  the  Proclamation  announcing  the  intentions  of  the 
British  Government  with  regard  to  the  punishment  of  the  city  was  to 
take  place  in  the  Bala  Hissar  next  day.  The  Amir  had  agreed  to 
accompany  me.  The  leading  people  were  invited  to  attend,  and  I had 
given  orders  that  all  the  troops  were  to  take  part  in  the  procession,  so 
as  to  render  as  impressive  as  possible  the  ceremony,  at  which  were  to 
be  made  known  to  the  inhabitants  of  Kabul  the  terms  imposed  upon 
them  by  the  British  Government.  The  object  of  my  visit  was  to 
decide  how  the  troops  might  best  be  disposed  so  as  to  make  the  most 
imposing  display  on  the  occasion. 

I decided  to  detain  in  custody  two  Sirdars,  Yahia  Khan*  and  his 
brother  Zakariah  Khan,  the  Mustaufi,  and  the  Wazir,  as  these  four 
were  Yakub  Khan's  principal  advisers,  and  I was  satisfied  that  their 
influence  was  being  used  against  us,  and  that  so  long  as  they  were  at 
large  a mine  might  be  sprung  upon  me  at  any  moment. 

The  Commander-in-Chief,  Baud  Shah,  was  also  in  the  Amir’s  confi- 
dence ; but  I determined  to  leave  him  at  liberty,  for,  from  what  I could 
learn,  he  had  made  an  effort  (not  a very  strong  one,  perhaps)  to  help 
our  unfortunate  countrymen,  and  he  had  on  several  occasions  since  he 
had  been  in  my  camp  given  me  useful  information ; moreover,  I hoped 
to  obtain  further  help  from  him,  in  which  hope  I was  not  altogether 
disappointed. 

As  to  what  I ought  to  do  with  the  Amir  I was  considerably  puzzled. 
Lord  Lytton  had  urged  upon  me  the  necessity  for  weighing  well  the 
advisability  of  prematurely  breaking  with  him,  as  it  was  very  possible 
he  might  become  a useful  instrument  in  our  hands,  an  eventuality 
which  I thoroughly  understood ; but  I was  not  at  all  sure  that  Yakub 
Khan  would  not  break  with  me  when  he  learnt  my  decision  with  regard 
to  his  Ministers,  and  I had  received  more  than  one  warning  that,  if  he 
failed  to  keep  me  from  entering  Kabul,  he  contemplated  flight  and  a 
supreme  effort  to  raise  the  country  against  me. 

Y’akub  Khan  certainly  did  not  deserve  much  consideration  from  us ; 
for,  though  no  absolute  proof  was  forthcoming  of  his  having  instigated 
the  attack  upon  the  Embassy,  he  most  certainly  made  not  the  slightest 
effort  to  stop  it  or  to  save  the  lives  of  those  entrusted  to  his  care,  and 
throughout  that  terrible  day  showed  himself  to  be,  if  not  a deliberate 
traitor,  a despicable  coward.  Again,  his  endeavours  to  delay  the  march 
of  my  force  for  the  sole  purpose  of  gaining  sufficient  time  to  organize 

* Yahia  Khan  was  Yakub  Khan’s  father-in-law. 


414 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


1879 


the  destruction  of  the  army  to  whose  protection  he  had  appealed 
deprived  him,  to  my  mind,  of  the  smallest  claim  to  be  treated  as  an 
honourable  ally. 

My  doubts  as  to  what  policy  I ought  to  pursue  with  regard  to  Yakub 
Khan  were  all  solved  by  his  own  action  on  the  morning  of  the  12th 
October.  He  came  to  my  tent  before  I was  dressed,  and  asked  for  an 
interview,  which  was,  of  course,  accorded.  The  only  chair  I possessed 
I offered  to  my  Royal  visitor,  who  seated  himself,  and  then  and  there 
announced  that  he  had  come  to  resign  the  Amirsliip,  and  that  he  was 
only  carrying  out  a determination  made  before  he  came  to  Kushi ; he 
had  then  allowed  himself  to  be  over-persuaded,  but  now  his  resolution 
was  fixed.  His  life,  he  said,  had  been  most  miserable,  and  he  would 
rather  be  a grass-cutter  in  the  English  camp  than  Ruler  of  Afghanistan; 
he  concluded  by  entreating  me  to  allow  his  tent  to  be  pitched  close  to 
mine  until  he  could  go  to  India,  to  London,  or  wherever  the  Viceroy 
might  desire  to  send  him.  I placed  a tent  at  his  disposal,  ordered 
breakfast  to  be  prepared  for  him,  and  begged  him  not  to  decide  at  once, 
but  think  the  matter  over  for  some  hours,  adding  that  I would  see  him 
again  at  ten  o’clock,  the  hour  appointed  for  him  to  accompany  me  to 
the  Bala  Hissar  in  order  that  he  might  be  present  at  the  reading  of  the 
Proclamation.  At  this  time,  it  must  be  remembered,  the  Amir  did  not 
know  what  the  terms  of  the  Proclamation  were,  and  was  entirely 
ignorant  of  my  intentions  regarding  his  Ministers. 

As  arranged,  I had  another  interview  with  Yakub  Khan  at  ten 
o’clock,  when  I found  him  unshaken  in  his  resolve  to  abdicate,  and 
unwilling,  under  the  circumstances,  to  be  present  at  the  ceremony 
which  was  about  to  take  place.  He  said,  however,  that  he  would  send 
his  eldest  son,  and  that  all  his  Ministers  should  attend  me.  I begged 
him  again  to  reconsider  the  decision  he  had  come  to,  and  to  think  well 
over  the  results  to  himself ; but  finding  that  he  had  finally*  made  up 
his  mind,  I told  His  Highness  I would  telegraph  his  determination  to 

* At  an  interview  which  Major  Hastings,  the  Political  Officer,  and  Mr. 
Durand,  my  Political  Secretary,  had  with  His  Highness  at  my  request  on  the 
23rd  October,  he  said,  referring  to  the  subject  of  the  Amirsliip  : ‘ I call  God 
and  the  Koran  to  witness,  and  everything  a Mussulman  holds  sacred,  that  my 
only  desire  is  to  be  set  free,  and  end  my  days  in  liberty.  I have  conceived  an 
utter  aversion  for  these  people.  I always  treated  them  well,  and  you  see  how 
they  have  rewarded  me.  So  long  as  I was  fighting  in  one  place  or  another, 
they  liked  me  well  enough.  Directly  I became  Amir,  and  consulted  their 
own  good  by  making  peace  with  you,  they  turned  on  me.  Now  1 detest  them 
all,  and  long  to  be  out  of  Afghanistan  for  ever.  It  is  not  that  I am  unable  to 
hold  the  country  ; 1 have  held  it  before  and  could  hold  it  again,  but  I have 
no  further  wish  to  rule  such  a people,  and  I beg  of  you  to  let  me  go.  If  the 
British  Government  wish  me  to  stay,  I will  stay,  as  their  servant  or  as  the 
Amir,  if  you  like  to  call  me  so,  until  my  son  is  of  an  age  to  succeed  me,  or 
even  without  that  condition  ; but  it  will  be  wholly  against  my  own  inclina- 
tion, and  I earnestly  beg  to  be  set  free.’ 


THE  PROCLAMATION 


4*5 


1879] 

the  Viceroy  and  ask  for  instructions  ; that  he  would  not,  of  course,  be 
forced  to  continue  to  reign  at  Kabul  against  his  will,  but  that  I would 
ask  him  to  retain  his  title  until  I could  receive  a reply  from  Simla. 

At  noon  I proceeded  to  the  llala  Hissar,  accompanied  by  my  staff, 
the  Heir-Apparent,  the  Ministers,  and  a large  gathering  of  the  chief 
Sirdars  of  Kabul.  Both  sides  of  the  road  were  lined  with  troops,  of 
whom  I felt  not  a little  proud  that  day.  Notwithstanding  that  the 
duty  required  of  them  had  been  severe  and  continuous,  now  that  they 
were  required  to  take  part  in  a ceremonial  parade,  they  turned  out  as 
clean  and  smart  as  one  could  wish  to  see  them. 

As  the  head  of  the  procession  entered  the  main  gateway,  the  British 
flag  was  run  up,  the  bands  played  the  National  Anthem,  and  a salute 
of  thirty-one  guns  was  fired. 

On  arriving  at  the  public  Hall  of  Audience,  I dismounted,  and 
ascending  the  steps  leading  to  it,  I addressed  the  assembled  multitude, 
and  read  to  them  the  following  Proclamation,  containing  the  orders  of 
the  British  Government : 

‘ In  my  Proclamation  dated  the  3rd  October,  I informed  the  people  of  Kabul 
that  a British  army  was  advancing  to  take  possession  of  the  city,  and  I 
warned  them  against  offering  any  resistance  to  the  entry  of  the  troops  and  the 
authority  of  His  Highness  the  Amir.  That  warning  has  been  disregarded. 
The  force  under  my  command  has  now  reached  Kabul  and  occupied  the  Bala 
Hissar,  but  its  advance  has  been  pertinaciously  opposed,  and  the  inhabitants 
of  the  city  have  taken  a conspicuous  part  in  the  opposition  offered.  They 
have  therefore  become  rebels  against  His  Highness  the  Amir,  and  have  added 
to  the  guilt  already  incurred  by  them  in  abetting  the  murder  of  the  British 
Envoy  and  his  companions — a treacherous  and  cowardly  crime  which  has 
brought  indelible  disgrace  upon  the  Afghan  people.  It  would  be  but  a just 
and  fitting  reward  for  such  misdeeds  if  the  city  of  Kabul  were  now  totally 
destroyed  and  its  very  name  blotted  out ; but  the  great  British  Government 
ever  desires  to  temper  justice  with  mercy,  and  I now  announce  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Kabul  that  the  full  retribution  for  their  offence  will  not  be  exacted, 
and  that  the  city  will  be  spared. 

‘ Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary  that  they  should  not  escape  all  penalty,  and, 
further,  that  the  punishment  inflicted  should  be  such  as  will  be  felt  and 
remembered.  Therefore,  such  portions  of  the  city  buildings  as  now  interfere 
with  the  proper  military  occupation  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  and  the  safety  and 
comfort  of  the  British  troops  to  be  quartered  in  it,  will  be  at  once  levelled 
with  the  ground  ; and,  further,  a heavy  fine,  the  amount  of  which  will  be 
notified  hereafter,  will  be  imposed  upon  the  inhabitants  of  Kabul,  to  be  paid 
according  to  their  several  capacities.  I further  give  notice  to  all,  that,  in 
order  to  provide  for  the  restoration  and  maintenance  of  order,  the  city  of 
Kabul  and  the  surrounding  country,  to  a distance  of  ten  miles,  are  placed 
under  martial  law.  With  the  consent  of  His  Highness  the  Amir,  a military 
Governor  of  Kabul  will  be  appointed,  to  administer  justice  and  punish  with  a 
strong  hand  all  evil-doers.  The  inhabitants  of  Kabul  and  of  the  neighbouring 
villages  are  hereby  warned  to  submit  to  his  authority. 

‘ This  punishment,  inflicted  upon  the  whole  city,  will  not,  of  course,  absolve 
from  further  penalties  those  whose  individual  guilt  may  be  hereafter  proved. 
A full  and  searching  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of  the  late  outbreak  will 


4i6  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1879 

be  held,  and  all  persons  convicted  of  having  taken  part  in  it  will  be  dealt 
with  according  to  their  deserts. 

‘ With  the  view  of  providing  effectually  for  the  prevention  of  crime  and 
disorder,  and  the  safety  of  all  well-disposed  persons  in  Kabul,  it  is  hereby 
notified  that  for  the  future  the  carrying  of  dangerous  weapons,  whether  swords, 
knives,  or  firearms,  within  the  streets  of  the  city  or  within  a distance  of  live 
miles  from  the  city  gates,  is  forbidden.  After  a week  from  the  date  of  this 
Proclamation,  any  person  found  armed  within  those  limits  will  be  liable  to 
the  penalty  of  death.  Persons  having  in  their  possession  any  articles  whatso- 
ever which  formerly  belonged  to  members  of  the  British  Embassy  are  required 
to  bring  them  forthwith  to  the  British  camp.  Anyone  neglecting  this  warning 
will,  if  found  hereafter  in  possession  of  any  such  articles,  be  subject  to  the 
severest  penalties. 

‘Further,  all  persons  who  may  have  in  their  possession  any  firearms  or 
ammunition  formerly  issued  to  or  seized  by  the  Afghan  troops,  are  required 
to  produce  them.  For  every  country-made  rifle,  whether  breech  or  muzzle 
loading,  the  sum  of  Rs.  3 will  be  given  on  delivery,  and  for  every  rifle  of 
European  manufacture  Rs.  5.  Anyone  found  hereafter  in  possession  of  such 
weapons  will  be  severely  punished.  Finally,  I notify  that  I will  give  a 
reward  of  Rs.  50  for  the  surrender  of  any  person,  whether  soldier  or  civilian, 
concerned  in  the  attack  on  the  British  Embassy,  or  for  such  information  as 
may  lead  directly  to  his  capture.  A similar  sum  will  be  given  in  the  case  of 
any  person  who  may  have  fought  against  the  British  troops  since  the  3rd 
September  (Shawal)  last,  and  therefore  become  a rebel  against  His  Highness 
the  Amir.  If  any  such  person  so  surrendered  or  captured  be  a captain  or 
subaltern  officer  of  the  Afghan  army,  the  reward  will  be  increased  to  Rs.  75, 
and  if  a field  officer  to  Rs.  120.’ 

The  Afghans  were  evidently  much  relieved  at  the  leniency  of  the 
Proclamation,  to  which  they  listened  with  the  greatest  attention. 
When  I had  finished  reading  it,  I dismissed  the  assembly,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Ministers  whom  I had  decided  to  make  prisoners. 
To  them  I explained  that  I felt  it  to  be  my  duty  to  place  them  under 
restraint,  pending  investigation  into  the  part  they  had  taken  in  the 
massacre  of  the  Embassy. 

The  following  day  I made  a formal  entry  into  the  city,  traversing 
all  its  main  streets,  that  the  people  might  understand  that  it  and  they 
were  at  our  mercy.  The  Cavalry  brigade  headed  the  procession ; I 
followed  with  my  staff  and  escort,  and  five  battalions  of  Infantry 
brought  up  the  rear ; there  were  no  Artillery,  for  in  some  places  the 
streets  were  so  narrow  and  tortuous  that  two  men  could  hardly  ride 
abreast. 

It  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  the  citizens  would  give  us  a warm 
welcome  ; but  they  were  perfectly  respectful,  and  I hoped  the  martial 
and  workmanlike  appearance  of  the  troops  would  have  a salutary 
effect. 

I now  appointed  Major-General  James  Hills,  V.C.,  to  be  Governor 
of  Kabul  for  the  time  being,  associating  with  him  the  able  and 
respected  Mahomedan  gentleman,  Nawab  Ghulam  Hussein  Khan,  as 
the  most  likely  means  of  securing  for  the  prosent  order  and  good 


ADMINISTRATIVE  MEASURES 


417 


1879] 

government  in  the  city.  I further  instituted  two  Courts — one  political, 
consisting  of  Colonel  Macgregor,  Surgeon-Major  Bellew,*  and  Mahomed 
Hyat  Khan,  a Mahomedan  member  of  the  Punjab  Commission,  and 
an  excellent  Persian  and  Pushtu  scholar,  to  inquire  into  the  com- 
plicated circumstances  which  led  to  the  attack  on  the  Residency,  and 
to  ascertain,  if  possible,  how  far  the  Amir  and  his  Ministers  were 
implicated.  The  other,  a military  Court,  with  Brigadier -General 
Massy  as  president,  for  the  trial  of  those  Chiefs  and  soldiers  accused 
of  having  taken  part  in  the  actual  massacre. f 

Up  to  this  time  (the  middle  of  October)  communication  with  India 
had  been  kept  up  by  way  of  the  Shutargardan,  and  I had  heard 
nothing  of  the  approach  of  the  Kliyber  column.  It  was  so  very 
necessary  to  open  up  the  Ivhyber  route,  in  view  of  early  snow  on 
the  Shutargardan,  that  I arranged  to  send  a small  force  towards 
Jalalabad,  and  to  move  the  Shutargardan  garrison  to  Kabul,  thus 
breaking  off  communication  with  Kuram. 

Colonel  Money  had  beaten  off  another  attack  made  by  the  tribes- 
men on  his  position,  but  as  they  still  threatened  him  in  considerable 
numbers,  I despatched  Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough  with  some 
troops  to  enable  him  to  withdraw.  This  reinforcement  arrived  at  a 
most  opportune  moment,  when  the  augmented  tribal  combination, 
imagining  that  the  garrison  was  completely  at  its  mercy,  had  sent  a 
message  to  Money  offering  to  spare  their  lives  if  they  laid  down  their 
arms ! So  sure  were  the  Afghans  of  their  triumph  that  they  had 
brought  200  of  their  women  to  witness  it.  On  Gough’s  arrival,  Money 
dispersed  the  gathering,  and  his  force  left  the  Shutargardan,  together 
with  the  Head-Quarters  and  two  squadrons  of  the  9th  Lancers,  wThich 
had  been  ordered  to  join  me  from  Sialkot,  and  afterwards  proved  a 
most  valuable  addition  to  the  Kabul  Field  Force. 

I was  sitting  in  my  tent  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  October,  when 
I was  startled  by  a most  terrific  explosion  in  the  upper  part  of  the 
Bala  Hissar,  which  was  occupied  by  the  5th  Gurkhas,  while  the  67th 
Foot  were  pitched  in  the  garden  below.  The  gunpowder,  stored  in  a 
detached  building,  had  somehow — we  never  could  discover  how — 
become  ignited,  and  I trembled  at  the  thought  of  what  would  be  the 

* Dr.  Bellew  was  with  the  brothers  Lumsden  at  Kandahar  in  1857. 

t My  action  in  endorsing  the  proceedings  of  this  court,  and  my  treatment 
of  Afghans  generally,  were  so  adversely  and  severely  criticized  by  party 
newspapers  and  periodicals,  and  by  members  of  the  Opposition  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  that  I was  called  upon  for  an  explanation  of  my  conduct,  which 
was  submitted  and  read  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  India,  Viscount  Cranbrook,  and  the  Under- Secretary  of  State  for  India, 
the  Hon.  E.  Stanhope.  In  the  Parliamentary  records  of  February,  1880,  can 
be  seen  my  reply  to  the  accusations,  as  well  as  an  abstract  statement  of  the 
executions  carried  out  at  Kabul  in  accordance  with  the  findings  of  the  military 
Court. 


4 1 8 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


consequences  if  the  main  magazine  caught  fire,  which,  with  its  250 
tons  of  gunpowder,  was  dangerously  near  to  the  scene  of  the  explosion. 
I at  once  sent  orders  to  the  Gurkhas  and  the  67th  to  clear  out,  and  not 
to  wait  even  to  bring  away  their  tents,  or  anything  but  their  ammuni- 
tion, and  I did  not  breathe  freely  till  they  were  all  safe  on  Siah  Sang. 
The  results  of  this  disaster,  as  it  was,  were  bad  enough,  for  Captain 
Shafto,  R.A.  (a  very  promising  officer),  a private  of  the  67th,  the 
Subadar-Major  of  the  5th  Gurkhas,  and  nineteen  Natives,  most  of 
them  soldiers,  lost  their  lives. 

A second  and  more  violent  explosion  took  place  two  horns  and  a half 
after  the  first,  but  there  was  no  loss  of  life  amongst  the  troops,  though 
several  Afghans  were  killed  at  a distance  of  400  yards  from  the  fort. 

There  was  given  on  this  occasion  a very  practical  exemplification  of 
the  good  feeling  existing  between  the  European  soldiers  and  the 
Gurkhas.  The  72nd  and  the  5th  Gurkhas  had  been  much  associated 
from  the  commencement  of  the  campaign,  and  a spirit  of  camaraderie 
had  sprung  up  between  them,  resulting  in  the  Highlanders  now  coming 
forward  and  insisting  on  making  over  their  greatcoats  to  the  little 
Gurkhas  for  the  night — a very  strong  proof  of  their  friendship,  for  at 
Kabul  in  October  the  nights  are  bitterly  cold. 

Two  telegrams  received  about  this  time  caused  the  greatest  gratifica- 
tion throughout  the  force.  One  was  from  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
conveying  Her  Majesty’s  expression  of  ‘ warm  satisfaction  ’ at  the 
conduct  of  the  troops ; the  other  was  from  the  Viceroy,  expressing 
his  ‘ cordial  congratulations  ’ and  His  Excellency’s  ‘ high  appreciation 
of  the  ability  with  wnich  the  action  was  directed,  and  the  courage 
with  which  it  was  so  successfully  carried  out.’  I was  informed  at  the 
same  time  by  Lord  Lytton  that,  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, I was  given  the  local  rank  of  Lieutenant-General, 
to  enable  me  to  be  placed  in  command  of  all  the  troops  in  eastern 
Afghanistan,  a force  of  20,000  men  and  46  guns,  in  two  divisions. 
The  first  division  remained  under  my  own  immediate  command,  and 
Major-General  R.  O.  Bright,  C.B.,*  was  appointed  to  the  command  of 
the  other.  I was,  of  course  very  much  pleased  at  this  proof  of  the 
confidence  reposed  in  me. 


CHAPTER  LIII. 

I had  given  much  thought  to  the  question  of  housing  the  troops  during 
the  winter,  which  was  now  fast  approaching.  Some  of  the  senior 
officers  were  in  favour  of  quartering  them  in  the  Bala  Hissar,  as  being 
the  place  with  most  prestige  attached  to  it ; but  the  fact  that  there  was 
* Afterwards  General  Sir  Robert  Bright,  G.C.B. 


1879] 


AFGHANS  AFRAID  TO  BEFRIEND  US 


419 


not  accommodation  in  it  for  the  whole  force,  and  that,  therefore,  the 
troops  would  have  to  be  separated,  as  well  as  the  dangerous  proximity 
of  the  huge  store  of  gunpowder,  which  could  only  be  got  rid  of  by 
degrees,  decided  me  to  occupy  in  preference  the  partly -fortified  canton- 
ment of  Sherpur,  about  a mile  north-east  of  the  city,  and  close  to  the 
mins  of  the  old  British  entrenchment.  It  was  enclosed  on  three  sides 
by  a high  and  massive  loop-holed  wall,  and  on  the  fourth  by  the  Bimaru 
heights,  while  it  possessed  the  advantage  of  having  within  its  walls 
sufficient  shelter  in  long  ranges  of  brick  buildings  for  the  British  troops, 
and  good  hospital  accommodation,  and  there  was  ample  space  for  the 
erection  of  huts  for  the  Native  soldiers. 

The  drawback  was  that  the  great  extent  of  its  perimeter,  more  than 
four  and  a half  miles,  made  it  a very  difficult  place  to  defend ; but, 
remembering  the  grievous  results  of  General  Elphinstone’s  force  being 
scattered  in  1841,  I thought  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  keep  my 
troops  together  outweighed  the  disadvantage  of  having  to  defend  so 
long  a line. 

Materials  for  the  Native  soldiers’  huts  were  brought  from  the  Bala 
Hissar,  the  demolition  of  which,  as  an  act  of  retributive  justice,  I had 
recommended  to  the  Government  of  India,  as  it  appeared  to  me  that 
the  destruction  of  the  fortified  palace  in  which  the  massacre  had  taken 
place,  and  which  was  the  symbol  of  the  power  of  the  Afghans  and  their 
boasted  military  strength,  would  be  a more  fitting  punishment  for 
treachery  and  insult  than  any  other  we  could  inflict,  and  a more  lasting 
memorial  of  our  ability  to  avenge  our  countrymen  than  any  we  could 
raise.  The  tidings  that  their  ancient  citadel  had  been  levelled  to  the 
ground  would,  I felt  sure,  spread  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of 
Afghanistan,  bearing  with  them  a political  significance  that  could 
hardly  be  over-estimated. 

I now  set  to  work  to  collect  supplies  for  the  winter.  A1  khalsa,  or 
State  grain,  we  took  as  our  right,  the  justice  of  this  being  recognized 
both  by  the  Amir  and  the  people,  but  what  was  the  property  of  private 
individuals  was  purchased  at  a price  the  avaricious  Afghan  could  not 
resist.  There  had  been  a good  harvest,  and  supplies  were  abundant ; 
but  the  people  from  the  outlying  districts  were  chary  of  assisting  us, 
for  they  knew  from  experience  that  all  who  befriended  the  British 
would  be  sure  to  suffer  when  we  took  our  departure. 

I had  repeated  complaints  brought  to  me  of  the  harshness  and  in- 
justice with  which  those  who  had  shown  themselves  well  disposed 
towards  us  were  treated  by  the  Amir  on  his  return  from  signing  the 
Treaty  at  Gandamak,  and  most  of  the  Afghans  were  so  afraid  of  the 
Amir’s  vengeance  when  they  should  again  be  left  to  his  tender  mercies, 
that  they  held  aloof,  except  those  who,  like  Wali  Mahomed  Khan  and 
his  following,  were  in  open  opposition  to  Yakub  Khan,  and  some  few 
who  were  still  smarting  from  recent  injury  and  oppression. 


28 


420 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

I was  frequently  asked  by  the  Afghans,  when  requiring  some  service 
to  be  rendered,  ‘ Are  you  going  to  remain  ?’  Could  I have  replied  in 
the  affirmative,  or  could  I have  said  that  we  should  continue  to  exercise 
sufficient  control  over  the  Government  of  the  country  to  prevent  their 
being  punished  for  helping  us,  they  would  have  served  us  willingly. 
Not  that  I could  flatter  myself  they  altogether  liked  us,  but  they  would 
have  felt  it  wise  in  their  own  interests  to  meet  our  requirements ; and, 
besides,  the  great  mass  of  the  people  were  heartily  sick  and  tired  of  a 
long  continuance  of  oppression  and  misrule,  and  were  ready  to  submit 
(for  a time,  at  least)  to  any  strong  and  just  Government. 

Lord  Lytton,  in  the  hope  of  saving  from  the  resentment  of  the  Amir 
those  who  had  been  of  use  to  us  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  had 
expressly  stipulated  in  Article  II.  of  the  Gandamak  Treaty  that  ‘ a full 
and  complete  amnesty  should  be  published,  absolving  all  Afghans  from 
any  responsibility  on  account  of  intercourse  with  the  British  Forces 
during  the  campaign,  and  that  the  Amir  should  guarantee  to  protect  all 
persons,  of  whatever  degree,  from  punishment  or  molestation  on  that 
account.’ 

But  this  stipulation  was  not  adhered  to.  Yakub  Khan  more  than 
once  spoke  to  me  about  it,  and  declared  that  it  was  impossible  to 
control  the  turbulent  spirits  in  Afghanistan  without  being  supreme,  and 
that  this  amnesty,  had  it  been  published,  would  have  tied  his  hands 
with  regard  to  those  who  had  proved  themselves  his  enemies. 

His  neglect  to  carry  out  this  Article  of  the  treaty  added  considerably 
to  my  difficulty,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following  letter  from  Asmatula 
Khan,  a Ghilzai  Chief,  to  whom  I wrote,  asking  him  to  meet  me  at 
Kabul. 

‘ 1 received  your  kind  letter  on  the  8th  of  Sliawal  [‘28th  September],  and 
understood  its  contents,  and  also  those  of  the  enclosed  Proclamation  to  the 
people  of  Kabul.  I informed  all  whom  I thought  tit  of  the  contents  of  the 
Proclamation. 

‘ Some  time  ago  I went  to  Gandamak  to  Major  Cavagnari.  He  instructed 
me  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  Amir,  and  made  me  over  to  His  Highness. 
When  Major  Cavagnari  returned  to  India,  the  Amir's  officials  confiscated 
my  property,  and  gave  the  Chiefship  to  my  cousin*  [or  enemy],  Bahrain 
Khan. 

‘ The  oppression  I suffered  on  your  account  is  beyond  description.  They 
ruined  and  disgraced  every  friend  and  adherent  of  mine.  On  the  return  of 
Major  Cavagnari  to  Kabul,  I sent  my  Naib  [deputy]  to  him,  who  informed 
him  of  my  state.  Major  Cavagnari  sent  a message  to  me  to  the  effect  that  I 
should  recover  my  property  by  force  if  I could,  otherwise  I should  go  to  the 
hills,  and  not  come  to  Kabul  until  I heard  from  him.  In  the  meantime  I 
received  news  of  the  murder  of  the  Envoy,  and  I am  still  in  the  hills.’ 


* In  Pushtu  the  word  tarbur  signifies  a cousin  to  any  degree,  and  is  not 
unfrequently  used  as  ‘ enemy  ’ the  inference  being  that  in  Afghanistan  a 
cousin  is  necessarily  an  enemy. 


1879] 


KABUL  RUSSIANIZED 


421 


The  thought  of  what  might  be  in  store  for  those  who  were  now 
aiding  me  troubled  me  a good  deal.  No  doubt  their  help  was  not  dis- 
interested, but  they  were  ‘ friends  in  need,’  and  I could  not  be  quite 
indifferent  to  their  future. 

I had  several  interesting  conversations  with  Yakub  Khan,  and  in  dis- 
cussing with  him  Sher  Ah’s  reasons  for  breaking  with  us,  he  dwelt  on 
the  fact  that  his  father,  although  he  did  not  get  all  he  wished  out  of 
Lord  Mayo,  was  fairly  satisfied  and  content  with  what  had  been  done 
for  him,  but  when  Saiyad  Nur  Mahomed  returned  from  Simla  in  1873, 
he  became  thoroughly  disgusted,  and  at  once  made  overtures  to  the 
Russians,  with  whom  constant  intercourse  had  since  been  kept  up. 

Yakub  Khan’s  statements  were  verified  by  the  fact  that  we  found 
Kabul  much  more  Russian  than  English.  The  Afghan  Sirdars  and 
officers  were  arrayed  in  Russian  pattern  uniforms,  Russian  money  was 
found  in  the  treasury,  Russian  wares  were  sold  in  the  bazaars,  and 
although  the  roads  leading  to  Central  Asia  were  certainly  no  better 
than  those  leading  to  India,  Russia  had  taken  more  advantage  of  them 
than  we  had  to  carry  on  commercial  dealings  with  Afghanistan.* 

When  I inquired  of  Yakub  Khan  what  had  become  of  the  corre- 
spondence which  must  have  been  carried  on  between  his  father  and  the 
Russians,  he  declared  that  he  had  destroyed  it  all  when  on  his  way  to 
Gandamak  ; nevertheless,  a certain  number  of  lettersf  from  Generals 
Kauffmann  and  Stoliatoff  came  into  my  possession,  and  a draft  of  the 
treaty  the  latter  officer  brought  from  Tashkent  was  made  for  me  from 
memory  by  the  man  who  had  copied  it  for  Sher  Ah,  aided  by  the 

* As  I reported  at  the  time,  the  magnitude  of  Sher  Ah’s  military  prepara- 
tions was,  in  my  opinion,  a fact  of  peculiar  significance.  He  had  raised  and 
equipped  with  arms  of  precision  sixteen  regiments  of  Cavalry  and  sixty-eight 
of  Infantry,  while  his  Artillery  amounted  to  nearly  300  guns.  Numbers  of 
skilled  artisans  were  constantly  employed  in  the  manufacture  of  rifled  cannon 
and  breech-loading  small  arms.  Swords,  helmets,  uniforms,  and  other  articles 
of  military  equipment,  were  stored  in  proportionate  quantities.  Upon  the 
construction  of  the  Sherpur  cantonment  Sher  Ali  had  expended  an  astonishing 
amount  of  labour  and  money.  The  size  and  cost  of  this  work  may  be  judged 
from  the  fact  that  the  main  line  of  rampart,  with  barrack  accommodation, 
extended  to  a length  of  nearly  two  miles  under  the  western  and  southern 
slopes  of  the  Bimaru  hills,  while  the  original  design  was  to  cany  the  wall 
entirely  round  the  hills,  a distance  of  four  and  a half  miles,  and  the  founda- 
tions were  laid  for  a considerable  portion  of  this  length.  All  these  military 
preparations  must  have  been  going  on  for  some  years,  and  were  quite  un- 
necessary, except  as  a provision  for  contemplated  hostilities  with  ourselves. 
Sher  Ali  had  refused  during  this  time  to  accept  the  subsidy  we  had  agreed  to 
pay  him,  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  their  entire  cost  could  have 
been  met  from  the  Afghan  treasury,  the  annual  gross  revenue  of  the  country 
at  that  time  amounting  only  to  about  80  lakhs  of  rupees. 

T These  letters,  as  well  as  my  report  to  the  Secretary  to  the  Government  of 
India  in  the  Foreign  Department,  with  an  account  of  my  conversation  with 
Yakub  Khan,  are  given  in  the  Appendix. 

28 — 2 


422  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1879 

Afghan  official  who  was  told  off  to  be  in  attendance  on  Stoliatcff,  and 
who  had  frequently  read  the  treaty. 

In  one  of  my  last  conversations  with  Yakub  Khan,  he  advised  me 
‘not  to  lose  sight  of  Herat  and  Turkestan.’  On  my  asking  him 
whether  he  had  any  reason  to  suppose  that  his  representatives  in  those 
places  meant  to  give  trouble,  he  replied : ‘ I cannot  say  what  they  may 
do ; but,  remember,  I have  warned  you.’  He,  no  doubt,  knew  more 
than  he  told  me,  and  I think  it  quite  possible  that  he  had  some  inkling 
of  his  brother’s*  (Ayub  Khan’s)  intentions,  in  regard  to  Kandahar,  and 
he  probably  foresaw  that  Abdur  Rahman  Khan  would  appear  on  the 
scene  from  the  direction  of  Turkestan. 

I duly  received  an  answer  to  my  telegram  regarding  the  abdication 
of  Yakub  Khan,  in  which  I was  informed  that  His  Highness’s  resigna- 
tion was  accepted  by  Her  Majesty’s  Government,  and  I was  directed  to 
announce  the  fact  to  the  people  of  Afghanistan  in  the  following  terms  : 

‘ I,  General  Roberts,  011  behalf  of  the  British  Government,  hereby  proclaim 
that  the  Amir,  having  by  his  own  free  will  abdicated,  lias  left  Afghanistan 
without  a Government.  I11  consequence  of  the  shameful  outrage  upon  its 
Envoy  and  suite,  the  British  Government  has  been  compelled  to  occupy  by 
force  of  arms  Kabul,  the  capital,  and  to  take  military  possession  of  other 
parts  of  Afghanistan. 

‘ The  British  Government  now  commands  that  all  Afghan  authorities, 
Chiefs,  and  Sirdars  do  continue  their  functions  in  maintaining  order,  referring 
to  me  whenever  necessary. 

‘The  British  Government  desire  that  the  people  shall  be  treated  with 
justice  and  benevolence,  and  that  their  religious  feelings  and  customs  be 
respected. 

‘ The  services  of  such  Sirdars  and  Chiefs  as  assist  in  preserving  order  will 
be  duly  recognized,  but  all  disturbers  of  the  peace  and  persons  concerned  in 
attacks  upon  the  British  authority  will  meet  with  condign  punishment. 

‘The  British  Government,  after  consultation  with  the  principal  Sirdars, 
tribal  Chiefs,  and  others  representing  the  interests  and  wishes  of  the  various 
provinces  and  cities,  will  declare  its  will  as  to  the  future  permanent  arrange- 
ments to  be  made  for  the  good  government  of  the  people.' 

This  manifesto  was  issued  on  the  28th  October,  and  the  same  day  I 
informed  Yakub  Khan  that  his  abdication  had  been  accepted,  and 
acquainted  him  with  the  orders  passed  by  the  British  Government  in 
connexion  with  this  fact.f 

Yakub  Khan  showed  no  interest  either  in  the  Proclamation,  a 
Persian  translation  of  which  was  read  to  him,  or  the  Government’s 
decision  as  to  himself,  and  made  no  comment  beyond  a formal  ‘ bisyar 
khub  ’ (‘  very  good  ’)  and  an  inclination  of  the  head. 

I then  told  Yakub  Khan  that,  as  I was  now  charged  with  the  govern- 

* Sirdar  Ayub  Khan  was  Governor  of  Herat  in  1879. 

t There  were  present  at  the  interview,  besides  myself,  Colonel  Macgregor, 
Major  Hastings,  Surgeon-Major  Bellew,  Nawab  Sir  Ghulam  Hussein  Khan, 
and  Mr.  H.  M.  Durand. 


STATE  TREASURY  TAKEN  OVER 


423 


1S79] 

ment  of  the  country,  it  was  necessary  that  I should  take  possession  of 
the  treasury  and  all  moneys  therein.  He  signified  his  assent,  but 
demurred  to  certain  sums  being  considered  as  public  property,  contend- 
ing that  they  formed  part  of  his  father’s  wealth,  and  that  the  British 
Government  might  as  well  take  from  him  his  clioga,*  this  also  having 
come  from  the  pockets  of  the  people.  1 My  father  was  Padishah,'  he 
said ; * there  was  no  distinction  between  public  and  private  money. 
However,’  he  went  on,  1 1 have  given  up  the  crown,  and  I am  not 
going  to  dispute  about  rupees.  You  may  take  all  I have,  down  to  my 
clothes ; but  the  money  was  my  father’s,  and  is  mine  by  right.’ 

I replied  that  it  was  necessary  that  all  money  in  his  possession 
should  be  given  up,  but  that  his  private  effects  should  not  be  touched ; 
that  he  would  be  given  a receipt  for  the  money,  and  that,  if  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  decided  it  to  be  his  personal  property,  it  should  be 
returned  to  him. 

This  Yakub  Khan  at  first  declined  to  accept,  with  some  show  of 
temper.  Eventually  he  came  round,  and  said,  ‘ Yes,  give  me  a receipt, 
so  that  no  one  may  say  hereafter  that  I carried  off  State  money  to 
which  I had  no  right.  It  can  be  easily  made  sure  that  I have  no 
money  when  I go.’  f 

Spite  of  all  his  shortcomings,  I could  not  help  feeling  sorry  for  the 
self-deposed  Euler,  and  before  leaving  him  I explained  that  he  would 
be  treated  with  the  same  consideration  that  had  always  been  accorded 
to  him,  that  Nawab  Sir  Ghulam  Hussein  Khan}  should  have  a tent 
next  to  his,  and  that  it  should  be  the  Nawab’s  care  to  look  after  his 
comfort  in  every  way,  and  that  I should  be  glad  to  see  him  whenever 
he  wished  for  an  interview.  That  same  day,  under  instructions,  I 
issued  the  following  further  manifesto  : 

‘ In  my  Proclamation  of  yesterday  I announced  that  His  Highness  the 
Amir  had  of  his  own  free  will  abdicated,  and  that  for  the  present  the  govern- 
ment of  Afghanistan  would  be  carried  on  under  my  supervision.  I now 
proclaim  that,  in  order  to  provide  for  the  cost  of  administration,  I have  taken 
possession  of  the  State  treasury,  and  that,  until  the  British  Government 
shall  declare  its  will  as  to  the  permanent  arrangements  to  be  made  for  the 
future  good  government  of  the  country,  the  collection  of  revenue  and  the 
expenditure  of  public  money  will  be  regulated  by  me.  All  persons  concerned 


* A kind  of  mantle  worn  by  Afghans. 

t As  Yakub  Khan  refused  under  one  pretext  or  another  to  deliver  up  any 
money,  Major  Moriarty,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  Kabul  Field  Force 
treasure-chest,  and  Lieutenant  Neville  Chamberlain,  accompanied  by  an 
escort,  searched  a house  in  the  city  in  which  a portion  of  Yakub  Khan’s 
money  was  said  to  be  concealed.  Upwards  of  eight  and  a half  lakhs  of 
rupees,  and  a certain  amount  of  jewellery  and  gold  coins,  tillas  and  Russian 
five-rouble  pieces,  in  all  amounting  to  nine  and  a half  lakhs,  were  found. 
This  sum  was  subsequently  refunded  to  the  Afghan  Government, 
t The  Nawab  had  been  made  a K.C.S.I. 


424 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


are  hereby  informed  that  they  must  obey  without  dispute  or  delay  such 
orders  as  may  be  issued  by  me  in  regard  to  the  payment  of  taxes  ana  other 
connected  matters  ; and  I give  plain  warning  that  anyone  resisting  or  ob- 
structing the  execution  of  such  orders  will  be  treated  with  the  utmost  severity 
as  an  enemy  to  the  British  Government.’ 


CHAPTER  LIY. 

On  the  1st  November  my  Head-Quarters  and  the  1st  division  moved 
into  Sherpur,  which  the  Engineers  had  prepared  for  winter  quarters, 
and  where  stores  of  provisions  and  forage  were  assuming  satisfactory 
proportions.  The  same  day  Brigadier-General  Macpherson  left  Kabul 
with  a brigade  of  about  1,800  men  and  four  guns  to  join  hands  with 
the  troops  which  I had  lately  heard  were  advancing  from  the  Khyber, 
and  had  reached  Gandamak.  I joined  Macpherson  the  following 
morning  at  Butkhak,  about  eleven  miles  from  Kabul,  where  our  first 
post  towards  the  Khyber  had  already  been  established.  It  was  very 
important  that  our  communication  with  India  should  be  by  a route 
good  enough  for  wheeled  carriages ; I was  therefore  anxious  to  see  for 
myself  if  it  were  not  possible  to  avoid  the  Khurd- Kabul  Pass,  which 
was  said  to  be  very  difficult.  I had,  besides,  a strong  wish  to  visit  this 
pass,  as  being  the  scene  of  Sir  Robert  Sale’s  fight  with  the  tribesmen 
in  1841,  and  of  the  beginning  of  the  massacre  of  General  Elphin- 
stone’s  unfortunate  troops  in  1842.*  The  Afghan  Commander-in-Chief, 
Daud  Shah,  and  several  Ghilzai  Chiefs,  accompanied  me ; from  them 
I learned  that  an  easier  road  did  exist,  running  more  to  the  east,  and 
crossing  over  the  Lataband  mountain.  Personal  inspection  of  the  two 
lines  proved  that  Daud  Shah’s  estimate  of  their  respective  difficulties 
was  correct ; the  Lataband  route  was  comparatively  easy,  there  was  no 
defile  as  on  the  Khurd-Kabul  side,  and  the  kotal,  8,000  feet  above  the 
sea,  was  reached  by  a gradual  ascent  from  Butkhak.  However,  I 
found  the  Khurd-Kabul  much  less  difficult  than  I had  imagined  it  to 
be ; it  might  have  been  made  passable  for  carts,  but  there  was  no 
object  in  using  it,  as  the  Lataband  route  possessed  the  additional 
advantage  of  being  some  miles  shorter ; accordingly  I decided  upon 
adopting  the  latter  as  the  line  of  communication  with  India. 

Macpherson  reported  that  the  country  beyond  Khurd-Kabul  was 
fairly  settled,  and  that,  on  the  7tli,  he  had  been  able  to  open  com- 
munication with  Brigadier  - General  Charles  Gough,  commanding 
Bright’s  leading  brigade.  I was  thus  again  brought  into  communica- 
tion with  India,  and  in  a position  to  clear  my  hospitals  of  those 

* A most  thrilling  account  of  Elphinstone’s  retreat  through  this  pass  is 
given  in  Kaye’s  ‘ History  of  the  War  in  Afghanistan,’  vol.  ii.,  p.  229. 


THE  LATABAND  PASS. 


THE  AMNESTY  PROCLAMATION 


1S79J 


425 


amongst  the  sick  and  wounded  who  were  not  progressing  favourably, 
and  could  not  soon  be  fit  for  duty. 

By  this  time  the  Inquiry  Commission  had  completed  its  difficult 
task  of  trying  to  sift  the  truth  concerning  the  fate  of  Cavagnari  and 
his  companions  from  the  mass  of  falsehood  with  which  it  was 
enveloped.  The  progress  had  been  slow,  particularly  when  examina- 
tion touched  on  the  part  Yakub  Khan  had  played  in  the  tragedy ; 
witnesses  were  afraid  to  give  evidence  openly  until  they  were  con- 
vinced that  he  would  not  be  re-established  in  a position  to  avenge 
himself.  The  whole  matter  had  been  gone  into  most  fully,  and  a 
careful  perusal  of  the  proceedings  satisfied  me  that  the  Amir  could  not 
have  been  ignorant  that  an  attack  on  the  Residency  was  contemplated. 
He  may  not  have  foreseen  or  desired  the  massacre  of  the  Embassy, 
but  there  was  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  his  having  connived  at  a 
demonstration  against  it,  which,  had  it  not  ended  so  fatally,  might 
have  served  him  in  good  stead  as  a proof  of  his  inability  to  guarantee 
the  safety  of  foreigners,  and  thus  obtain  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Mission. 

It  was  impossible,  under  these  circumstances,  that  Yakub  Khan 
could  ever  be  reinstated  as  Ruler  of  Kabul,  and  his  remaining  in  his 
present  equivocal  position  was  irksome  to  himself  and  most  em- 
barrassing to  me.  I therefore  recommended  that  he  should  be 
deported  to  India,  to  be  dealt  with  as  the  Government  might  decide 
after  reviewing  the  information  elicited  by  the  political  Court  of 
Inquiry,  which  to  me  appeared  to  tell  so  weightily  against  the  ex-Amir, 
that,  in  my  opinion,  I was  no  longer  justified  in  treating  as  rebels  to 
his  authority  Afghans  who,  it  was  now  evident,  had  only  carried  out 
his  secret,  if  not  his  expressed,  wishes  when  opposing  our  advance  on 
Kabul.  I decided,  therefore,  to  proclaim  a free  and  complete  amnesty* 

* The  amnesty  Proclamation  ran  as  follows  : 

‘ Kabul, 

‘ Vlth  November,  1879. 

‘ To  all  whom  it  may  concern.  On  the  12th  October  a Proclamation  was 
issued  in  which  I offered  a reward  for  the  surrender  of  any  person  who  had 
fought  against  the  British  troops  since  the  3rd  September,  and  had  thereby 
become  a rebel  against  the  Amir  Yakub  Khan.  I have  now  received  in- 
formation which  tends  to  show  that  some,  at  least,  of  those  who  shared  in  the 
opposition  encountered  by  the  British  troops  during  their  advance  on  Kabul, 
were  led  to  do  so  by  the  belief  that  the  Amir  was  a prisoner  in  my  camp, 
and  had  called  upon  the  soldiery  and  people  of  Kabul  to  rise  on  his  behalf. 
Such  persons,  although  enemies  to  the  British  Government,  were  not  rebels 
against  their  own  Sovereign,  and  the  great  British  Government  does  not  seek 
for  vengeance  against  enemies  who  no  longer  resist.  It  may  be  that  few  only 
of  those  who  took  up  arms  were  thus  led  away  by  the  statements  of  evil- 
minded  men,  but  rather  than  punish  the  innocent  with  the  guilty,  I am 
willing  to  believe  that  all  were  alike  deceived.  On  behalf  of  the  British 
Government,  therefore,  I proclaim  a free  and  complete  amnesty  to  all  persons 


426 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

to  all  persons  not  concerned,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  the  attack  on 
the  Residency,  or  who  were  not  found  hereafter  in  possession  of 
property  belonging  to  our  countrymen  or  their  escort,  on  the  condition 
that  they  surrendered  their  arms  and  returned  to  their  homes. 

At  Daud  Shah’s  suggestion,  I sent  three  influential  Sirdars  to  the 
Logar,  Kohistan,  and  Maidan  valleys,  to  superintend  the  collection  of 
the  amount  of  forage  which  was  to  be  levied  from  those  districts ; and 
in  order  to  lessen  the  consumption  at  Kabul,  I sent  away  all 
elephants,* *  spare  bullocks,  and  sick  transport  animals.  In  furtherance 
of  the  same  object,  as  soon  as  Macpherson  returned,  I sent  Baker 
with  a brigade  into  the  Maidan  district,  about  twenty  miles  from 
Kabul,  on  the  Ghazni  road,  where  the  troops  could  more  easily  be  fed, 
as  it  was  the  district  from  which  a large  proportion  of  our  supplies 
was  expected,  and  I also  despatched  to  India  all  time-expired  men  and 
invalids  who  were  no  longer  fit  for  service,  t 

Towards  the  end  of  November,  Mr.  Luke,  the  officer  in  charge  of 
the  telegraph  department,  who  had  done  admirable  work  throughout 
the  campaign,  reported  that  communication  was  established  with 
India.  As,  however,  cutting  the  telegraph-vires  was  a favourite 
amusement  of  the  tribesmen,  a heliograph  was  arranged  at  suitable 
stations  between  Landi  Kotal  and  Kabul,  which  was  worked  with  fair 
success  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Had  we  then  possessed  the  more 
perfect  heliographic  apparatus  which  is  now  available,  it  would  have 


who  have  fought  against  the  British  troops  since  the  3rd  September,  pro- 
vided that  they  now  give  up  any  arms  in  their  possession  and  return  to  their 
homes.  The  offer  of  a reward  for  the  surrender  of  such  persons  is  now  with- 
drawn, and  they  will  not  for  the  future  be  molested  in  any  way  on  account  of 
their  opposition  to  the  British  advance  ; but  it  must  be  clearly  understood 
that  the  benefits  of  this  amnesty  do  not  extend  to  anyone,  whether  soldier  or 
civilian,  who  was  concerned  directly  or  indirectly  in  the  attack  upon  the 
Residency,  or  who  may  hereafter  be  found  in  possession  of  any  property 
belonging  to  members  of  the  Embassy,  To  such  persons  no  mercy  will  be 
shown.  Further,  I hold  out  no  promise  of  pardon  to  those  who,  well  knowing 
the  Amir’s  position  in  the  British  camp,  instigated  the  troops  and  people  of 
Kabul  to  take  up  arms  against  the  British  troops.  They  have  been  guilty  of 
wilful  rebellion  against  the  Amir’s  authority,  and  they  will  be  considered  and 
treated  as  rebels  wherever  found.  ’ 

* There  was  a slight  fall  of  snow  on  the  11th  November,  followed  by  severe 
frost,  and  the  elephants  were  beginning  to  suffer  from  the  cold.  Three  of 
them  succumbed  on  the  Lataband  Kotal,  much  to  the  annoyance  of  the 
olfactory  nerves  of  all  passers-by.  It  was  impossible  to  bury  the  huge 
carcasses,  as  the  ground  was  all  rock,  and  there  was  not  wood  enough  to  burn 
them.  So  intense  was  the  cold  that  the  ink  froze  in  my  pen,  and  I was 
obliged  to  keep  my  inkstand  under  my  pillow  at  night. 

t This  party  marched  towards  India  on  the  14th  November,  followed  by  a 
second  convoy  of  sickly  men  on  the  27th  idem.  On  this  latter  date  the 
strength  of  the  1st  and  2nd  Divisions,  Kabul  Field  Force,  and  the  Reserve 
at  Peshawar  was  as  follows : 


1879]  STRENGTH  OF  THE  KABUL  FIELD  FORCE  427 

made  us,  in  that  land  of  bright  sun,  almost  independent  of  the  tele- 
graph, so  far  as  connexion  with  Landi  Ivotal  was  concerned. 

Hearing  that  Baker  was  experiencing  difficulty  in  collecting  his 
supplies,  I joined  him  at  Maidan  to  satisfy  myself  how  matters  stood. 
The  headmen  in  the  neighbourhood  refused  to  deliver  the  kh aha  grain 
they  had  been  ordered  to  furnish,  and,  assisted  by  a body  of  Ghilzais 
from  Ghazni  and  Wardak,  they  attacked  our  Cavalry  charged  with 
collecting  it,  and  murdered  our  agent,  Sirdar  Mahomed  Hussein  Khan. 
For  these  offences  I destroyed  the  chief  malik's  fort  and  confiscated 
his  store  of  grain,  after  which  there  was  no  more  trouble,  and  supplies 
cams  in  freely.  I returned  to  Kabul,  and  Baker,  with  his  brigade, 
followed  me  on  the  1st  December. 

That  same  day  Yakub  Khan  was  despatched  by  double  marches  to 
India,  careful  precautions  having  been  taken  to  prevent  his  being 
rescued  on  the  way.  'When  saying  good-bye  to  him,  he  thanked  me 
warmly  for  the  kindness  and  consideration  he  had  received,  and 
assured  me  that  he  left  his  wives  and  children  in  my  hands  in  the 
fullest  confidence  that  they  would  be  well  treated  and  cared  for. 

A week  later  I sent  off  the  two  Sirdars,  Yahia  Khan  and  Zakariah 
Khan,  as  well  as  the  Wazir,  whose  guilt  had  been  clearly  proved,  and 
whose  powerful  influence,  I had  every  reason  to  believe,  was  being 
used  to  stir  up  the  country  against  us.  The  Mustaufi  I allowed  to 
remain ; he  had  been  less  prominent  than  the  others  in  opposing  us, 
and,  besides,  I had  an  idea  that  he  might  prove  useful  to  me  in  the 
administration  of  the  country. 


British  Force. 

Native  Force. 

Officers. 

Rank  & 
File. 

British 

Officers. 

Troops. 

Total. 

1st  Division,  at  and  around 
Kabul  .... 

100 

2,783 

71 

5,060 

8,014 

2nd  Division,  on  the  Kliyber 
line 

90 

2,385 

118 

8,590 

11,183 

190 

5,168 

189 

13,650 

19,197 

Reserve  at  Peshawar  - 

55 

1,952 

49 

4,654 

6,710 

245 

7,120 

238 

18,304 

25,907 

Total : — 483  British  officers. 

7,120  British  troops. 
18,304  Native  troops. 


Grand  total: — 25,907  with  60  guns,  24  with  1st  Division,  and  36  with 
2nd  Division  and  the  Reserve. 


428 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


CHAPTER  LV. 

The  general  political  situation,  as  it  developed  itself  in  the  early  part 
. of  December,  and  the  causes  which  appeared  to  me  to  have  contributed 
to  produce  it,  may  be  briefly  summarized  as  follows.  After  the  out- 
break in  the  previous  September  and  the  massacre  of  our  Envoy,  the 
advance  of  the  British  force  was  too  rapid  to  give  the  Afghans,  as  a 
nation,  time  to  oppose  us.  At  Charasia,  the  troops,  aided  by  large 
numbers  of  the  disaffected  townspeople,  were  conspicuously  beaten  in 
the  open  field  ; their  organization  as  an  armed  body  was  at  an  end,  and 
their  leaders  all  sought  personal  safety  in  flight. 

It  appears  probable  that  at  this  period  the  general  expectation 
amongst  the  Afghans  was  that  the  British  Government  would  exact  a 
heavy  retribution  from  the  nation  and  city,  and  that,  after  vengeance 
had  been  satisfied,  the  army  would  be  withdrawn. 

Thirty-seven  years  before,  a British  massacre  had  been  followed  by 
a temporary  occupation  of  the  city  of  Kabul,  and  just  as  the  troops  of 
Pollock  and  Nott,  on  that  occasion,  had  sacked  and  destroyed  the  great 
bazaar  and  then  retired,  so  in  1879  the  people  believed  that  some  signal 
punishment  would  again  be  succeeded  by  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops. 
Thus  a period  of  doubt  and  expectation  ensued  after  the  battle  of 
Charasia ; the  Afghans  were  waiting  on  events,  and  the  time  had  not 
arrived  for  a general  movement. 

This  pause,  however,  was  marked  by  certain  occurrences  which 
doubtless  touched  the  national  pride  to  the  quick,  and  which  were  also 
susceptible  of  being  used  by  the  enemies  of  the  British  Government  to 
excite  into  vivid  fanaticism  the  religious  sentiment,  which  has  ever 
formed  a prominent  trait  in  the  Afghan  character. 

The  prolonged  occupation  by  foreign  troops  of  the  fortified  canton- 
ment which  had  been  prepared  by  the  late  Amir  Slier  AH  for  his  own 
army ; the  capture  of  the  large  park  of  Artillery,  and  of  the  vast  muni- 
tions of  war,  which  had  raised  the  military  strength  of  the  Afghans  to 
a standard  unequalled  among  Asiatic  nations  ; the  destruction  of  their 
historic  fortress,  the  residence  of  their  Kings ; and,  lastly,  the  deporta- 
tion to  India  of  their  Amir  and  his  principal  Ministers,  were  all  circum- 
stances which  united  to  increase  to  a high  pitch  the  antipathy  naturally 
felt  towards  a foreign  invader. 

The  temper  of  the  people  being  in  this  inflammable  condition,  it  was 
clear  that  only  disunion  and  jealousy  amongst  their  Chiefs  prevented 
their  combining  against  us,  and  that  if  any  impetus  could  be  given  to 
their  religious  sentiment  strong  enough  to  unite  the  discordant 
elements  in  a common  cause,  a powerful  movement  would  be  initiated, 
having  for  its  object  our  annihilation  or  expulsion  from  their  country. 


'379] 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  AT  KABUL 


429 


Such  an  impetus  was  supplied  by  the  fervent  preaching  of  the  aged 
mulla  Mushk-i-Alam,*  who  denounced  the  English  in  every  mosque 
throughout  the  country.  The  people  were  further  incited  to  rise  by  the 
appeals  of  the  ladies  of  Yakub  Khan’s  family  to  popular  sympathy,  and 
bribed  to  do  so  by  the  distribution  of  the  concealed  treasure  at  their 
command. 

The  mullas,  in  short,  became  masters  of  the  situation,  and,  having 
once  succeeded  in  subordinating  private  quarrels  to  hatred  of  the 
common  foe,  the  movement  rapidly  assumed  the  aspect  of  a religious 
war.  The  Afghan  successes  of  1841-42  were  cited  as  examples  of  what 
might  happen  again,  and  the  people  were  assured  that,  if  they  would 
only  act  simultaneously,  the  small  British  army  in  Sherpur  would 
be  overwhelmed,  and  the  plunder  of  our  camp  would  be  part  of  their 
reward. 

From  time  to  time  reports  reached  me  of  what  was  going  on,  and, 
from  the  information  supplied  to  me,  I gathered  that  the  Afghans 
intended  to  gain  possession  of  the  city,  and,  after  occupying  the 
numerous  forts  and  villages  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Sherpur,  to 
surround  the  cantonment. 

It  was  under  the  stimulating  influences  of  religious  enthusiasm, 
patriotic  and  military  ardour,  the  prestige  of  former  success,  and  the 
hope  of  remuneration  and  plunder,  that  the  Afghans  took  the  field 
against  us  early  in  December. 

It  was  arranged  that  the  forces  from  the  south  f should  seize  the 
range  of  hills  extending  from  Charasia  to  the  Shahr-i-Darwaza  heights, 
including  the  fortifications  of  the  upper  Bala  Hissar  and  the  high 
conical  peak  called  the  Takht-i-Shah ; that  those  from  the  north;}; 
should  occupy  the  Asmai  heights  and  hills  to  the  north  of  Kabul ; and 
those  from  the  west§  should  make  direct  for  the  city. 

As  it  was  evident  to  me  that  these  several  bodies,  when  once  con- 
centrated at  Kabul,  would  be  joined  by  the  thousands  in  the  city,  and 
the  inhabitants  of  the  adjoining  villages,  I determined  to  try  and  deal 
with  the  advancing  forces  in  detail,  and  disperse  them,  if  possible, 
before  the  concentration  could  be  effected.  I had,  however,  but  a very 
imperfect  idea  of  the  extent  of  the  combination,  or  of  the  enormous 
numbers  arrayed  against  us.  My  intelligence  was  most  defective  ; 
neither  the  nature  of  the  country  nor  the  attitude  of  the  people 
admitted  of  extended  reconnaissances,  and  I was  almost  entirely  de- 
pendent for  information  on  Afghan  sources.  Some  of  the  Afghan 
soldiers  in  our  ranks  aided  me  to  the  best  of  their  ability,  but  by  the 
Sirdars,  notably  “Wali  Mahomed  Khan,  I was,  either  wilfully  or  from 

* Fragrance  of  the  universe. 

f Viz.,  Logar,  Zurmat,  the  Mangal  and  Jadran  districts,  and  the  intervening 
Ghilzai  country. 

£ Kohistan.  § Maidan  and  Ghazni. 


43° 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


ignorance,  grossly  misinformed  as  to  the  formidable  character  of  the 
rising.  But  that  there  was  serious  trouble  ahead  was  plain  enough 
when  the  conflicting  reports  had  been  carefully  sifted,  and  I therefore 
thought  it  only  prudent  to  telegraph  to  General  Bright  at  Jalalabad 
to  push  on  the  Guide  Corps,  although  I was  very  much  averse  to 
augmenting  the  Sherpur  garrison,  and  thereby  increasing  the  drain  on 
our  supplies. 

In  the  meantime  immediate  action  was  necessary  to  carry  out  my 
idea  of  preventing  the  different  sections  of  the  enemy  concentrating  at 
Kabul.  I accordingly  prepared  two  columns  : one  under  Macpherson, 
whose  orders  were  to  attack  the  tribesmen  coming  from  the  north 
before  they  could  join  those  advancing  from  the  west;  the  other  under 
Baker,  who  was  instructed  to  place  himself  across  the  line  by  which 
the  enemy  would  have  to  retreat  when  beaten,  as  I hoped  they  would 
be,  by  Macpherson. 

Macpherson*  started  on  the  8th  towards  Kila  Aushar,  about  three 
miles  from  Sherpur,  en  route  to  Arghandeh.  And  on  the  following 
morning  Baker,  with  a small  force, f proceeded  to  Chihal  Dukhteran, 
giving  out  that  his  destination  was  the  Logar  valley,  and  that  he  would 
march  by  Charasia,  as  I had  directed  him  to  make  a feint  in  that 
direction,  and  then  to  turn  to  the  west,  and  place  himself  between 
Arghandeh  and  Maidan,  on  the  Ghazni  road. 

To  give  Baker  time  to  carry  out  this  movement,  I halted  Macpherson 
at  Kila  Aushar  on  the  9th,  whence  he  sent  out  two  reconnoitring  parties 
— one  in  the  direction  of  Kohistan,  the  other,  in  charge  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Lockhart,}  A.Q.M.G.,  towards  Arghandeh. 

The  intelligence  brought  in  induced  me  to  change  my  orders  to 
Macpherson.  The  first  party  reported  that  a very  considerable  force 
of  Kohistanis  had  collected  at  Karez-i-Mir,  about  ten  miles  north  of 
Kila  Aushar,  while  Lockhart  had  discovered  large  numbers  of  the 
enemy  moving  from  Arghandeh  and  Paghmau  towards  Kohistan. 
Accordingly,  I directed  Macpherson  to  attack  the  Kohistanis,  in  the 
hope  of  being  able  to  disperse  them  before  the  people  from  Ghazni 
could  join  them ; and,  as  the  part  of  the  country  through  which  he 
had  to  move  was  unsuited  to  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry,  I ordered 
him  to  leave  the  mounted  portion  of  his  column,  except  one  squadron 
of  Cavalry,  at  Kila  Aushar. 

Macpherson  made  a rapid  advance  on  the  morning  of  the  10th 

* Macpherson  had  with  him  the  following  troops  : 4 guns  R.  H.  A. ; 4 guns 
Mountain  battery ; 1 squadron  9th  Lancers ; 2 squadrons  14th  Bengal  Lancers ; 
401  rifles  G7th  Foot ; 509  rifles  3rd  Sikhs  ; 393  rifles  5th  Ghurkas. 

f Baker’s  column  consisted  of : 4 guns  Mountain  battery  ; 3 troops  5th 
Punjab  Cavalry  ; 25  Sappers  and  Miners  ; 450  rifles  92nd  Highlanders  ; 450 
rifles  5th  Punjab  Infantry. 

t Now  Lieutenant-General  Sir  William  Lockhart,  K.C.B.,  K.C.S.I. 


1879] 


MACPHERSON  ATTACKS  THE  KO  HI  ST  AN  IS 


431 


December,  skirting  the  fringe  of  low  hills  which  intervenes  between 
Kohistan  and  the  Chardeh  valley.  He  reached  the  Surkh  Kotal— 
which  divides  western  Kohistan  from  the  Arghandeh  valley — without 
opposition.  From  this  point,  however,  the  Kohistanis  were  sighted, 
occupying  a position  about  two  miles  to  his  right  front,  their  centre  on 
a steep,  conical,  isolated  hill,  at  the  base  of  which  lay  the  village  of 
Karez-i-Mir. 

Macpherson  was  now  able  to  obtain  a good  view  of  the  Paghman  and 
Chardeh  valleys  on  his  left  and  left  rear,  and  the  numerous  standards 
planted  on  the  different  knolls  near  the  villages  of  Paghman  gave  ample 
evidence  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  discovered  by  Lockhart  the 
previous  da}',  and  showed  him  that,  unless  he  could  quickly  succeed  in 
scattering  the  Kohistanis,  he  would  find  himself  attacked  by  an  enemy 
in  his  rear,  in  fact,  between  two  fires. 

Macpherson  made  his  disposition  for  an  attack  with  skill  and 
rapidity.  Leaving  Lieutenant-Colonel  Money  with  one  company  of 
the  67th,  five  companies  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  and  two  guns,  to  hold  the 
ridge,  he  sent  the  remainder  of  the  Sikhs  to  harass  the  enemy’s  left 
flank  and  support  the  Cavalry,  who  were  ordered  to  hover  about  and 
threaten  the  line  of  retreat,  while  Macpherson  himself  went  forward 
with  the  rest  of  the  force. 

The  Kohistanis  retreated  rapidly  before  our  skirmishers,  and  the 
attacking  party,  protected  by  a well-directed  fire  from  Morgan’s  guns, 
advanced  with  such  promptitude  that  the  enemy  made  no  attempt  to 
rally  until  they  reached  the  conical  hill,  where  they  made  a stubborn 
resistance.  The  liill  was  carried  by  assault,  its  defenders  were  driven 
off,  leaving  seven  standards  on  the  field,  and  Morgan,  bringing  up  his 
Artillery,  inflicted  severe  loss  on  the  flying  Kohistanis.  On  this 
occasion  Major  Cook,  Y.C.,  of  the  5th  Gurkhas,  was  again  noticed  for 
his  conspicuous  gallantry,  and  Major  Griffiths,  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  greatly 
distinguished  himself.  Our  casualties  were  one  officer  (Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Fitz-Hugh)  and  six  men  wounded. 

It  was  evident  that  the  tribesmen  from  the  directions  of  Arghandeh 
and  Paghman  intended  to  ascend  the  Surkh  Kotal,  but  suddenly  they 
appeared  to  change  their  minds,  on  discovering,  probably,  that  our 
troops  held  all  the  commanding  positions  and  that  their  allies  were  in 
full  flight. 

Soon  after  noon  on  the  10th  I received  the  report  of  Macpherson’s 
success  and  the  enemy’s  retirement  towards  Arghandeh.  I at  once  sent 
off  Lieutenant-Colonel  B.  Gordon,  B.H.A.,  with  orders  to  intercept 
them  with  the  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry  at  Aushar ; but  when  I 
rode  over  myself  later  in  the  day  to  that  place,  I was  much  disappointed 
to  find  that  Gordon  had  not  been  able  to  give  effect  to  my  instructions, 
as  the  enemy,  on  perceiving  his  troops,  dispersed  and  took  shelter  in 
the  surrounding  villages  and  on  the  slopes  of  the  hills. 


432 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

Macpherson  encamped  for  the  night  between  the  Surkh  Kotal  and 
Ivarez-i-Mir,  and  Baker,  who  had  steadily  pursued  his  march  along  a 
very  difficult  road,  halted  a short  distance  west  of  Maidan  and  eight 
miles  only  from  Arghandeh. 

To  Macpherson  I sent  orders  to  march  very  early  the  next  morning 
— the  11th — through  Paghman  towards  Arghandeh  and  in  Baker’s 
direction ; at  the  same  time  I informed  him  that  Massy,  whom  I had 
placed  in  command  of  the  troops  at  Aushar,  would,  according  to 
directions  from  me,  leave  that  place  at  nine  o’clock  to  co-operate  with 
him,  via  the  Arghandeh  and  Ghazni  road.  That  evening  Massy  came 
to  my  room,  and  I carefully  explained  to  him  his  part  in  the  next 
day’s  proceedings ; I told  him  that  he  was  to  advance  cautiously  and 
quietly  by  the  road  leading  directly  from  the  city  of  Kabul  towards 
Arghandeh,  feeling  for  the  enemy ; that  he  was  to  communicate  with 
Macpherson  and  act  in  conformity  with  that  officer’s  movements  ; and 
I impressed  upon  him  that  he  was  on  no  account  to  commit  himself  to 
an  action  until  Macpherson  had  engaged  the  enemy. 

Up  to  this  time  the  combination  of  tribesmen,  which  later  proved  so 
formidable,  had  not  been  effected ; Macpherson  for  the  time  being  had 
dispersed  the  Kohistanis  and  checked  the  force  advancing  from  Gbazni 
under  the  leadership  of  Mahomed  Jan  ; the  Logaris  and  Ghilzais  were 
merely  watching  events,  and  waiting  to  see  how  it  fared  with  the 
Kohistani  and  Ghazni  factions,  before  committing  themselves  to  hos- 
tilities ; they  had  but  recently  witnessed  our  successful  advance  through 
their  country ; they  knew  that  their  homes  and  property  would  be  at 
our  mercy  should  we  be  victorious,  and  they  were  uncertain  as  to 
Baker’s  movements. 

On  the  morning  of  the  11th  December,*  therefore,  only  one  section 
was  actually  in  opposition  to  us,  that  led  by  Mahomed  Jan,  who  during 
the  night  of  the  10th  had  taken  up  a position  near  the  group  of  villages 
known  as  Kila  Kazi. 

Further,  I felt  that  Mahomed  Jan  must  be  disheartened  at  our  recent 

* On  the  11th  December,  the  troops  at  and  around  Kabul  amounted  to 
6,352  men  and  20  guns,  which  were  thus  disposed  : 


Baker’s  column 

Men. 

1.325 

Guns. 

4 

Macpherson’s  column  - 

1,492 

4 

Massy’s  column 

351 

4 

At  Sherpur  ..... 

3,184 

8 

There  were  besides  at  Butkhak  and  Lataband 

6,352 

1,343 

- 20 
2 

And  the  Guides  Corps,  which  reached  Slier- \ 
pur  on  the  evening  of  the  11th  December  ) 

Total  - 

679 

8,374 

- 22 

THE  UNCERTAINTY  OF  WAR 


433 


18791 

success,  and  at  his  failure  to  induce  the  Logaris  to  join  him,  and  doubt- 
less felt  that  a movement  towards  Kabul  would  expose  his  left  flank  to 
Macpherson,  while  his  rear  would  be  threatened  by  Baker. 

The  strength  of  Baker’s  and  Macpherson’s  columns  had  been  care- 
fully considered,  as  well  as  the  routes  they  were  to  take.  I was 
thoroughly  well  acquainted  with  the  ground  comprised  in  the  theatre 
of  the  proposed  operations,  having  frequently  ridden  over  it  during  the 
preceding  two  months  ; I was  thus  able  to  calculate  to  a nicety  the  diffi- 
culties each  column  would  have  to  encounter  and  the  distances  they 
would  have  to  cover,  and  arrange  with  the  utmost  precision  the  horn:  at 
which  each  Commander  should  move  off  to  insure  a timely  junction. 
So  that  when  I left  Sherpur  at  ten  o'clock  on  the  11th  December  to 
take  command  of  Macpherson's  and  Massy's  columns  as  soon  as  they 
should  unite,  I had  no  misgivings,  and  was  sanguine  that  my  carefully 
arranged  programme  would  result  in  the  discomfiture  of  Mahomed  Jan ; 
but  the  events  which  followed  on  that  day  afforded  a striking  exempli- 
fication of  the  uncertainly  of  war,  and  of  how  even  a very  slight 
divergence  from  a General’s  orders  may  upset  plans  made  with  the 
greatest  care  and  thought,  and  lead  to  disastrous  results. 

Massy  could  not  have  clearly  understood  the  part  he  was  meant  to 
take  in  co-operation  with  Macpherson,  for  instead  of  following  the 
route  I had  directed  him  to  take,  he  marched  straight  across  country 
to  the  Ghazni  road,  which  brought  him  face  to  face  with  the  enemy 
before  he  could  be  joined  by  Macpherson.  In  his  explanatory  report 
Massy  stated  that  he  had  been  misled  by  a memorandum*  which  he 
received  from  the  Assistant -Adjutant-General  after  his  interview  with 
me  (although  this  memorandum  contained  nothing  contradictory  of  the 
orders  I had  given  him) ; that  he  understood  from  it  that  his  business 
was  to  reach  the  Ghazni  road  at  its  nearest  point  in  the  direction  of 
Arghandeh,  and  that  he  thought  it  better,  with  a thirty  miles’  march 
in  prospect,  to  take  the  most  direct  line  in  order  to  save  his  horses,  to 
economize  time  in  a short  December  day,  and  to  keep  as  near  as  he 
could  to  the  column  with  which  he  was  to  co-operate ; further,  he 
stated  that  he  was  under  the  impression  there  wTas  little  likelihood  of 
his  meeting  with  any  of  the  enemy  nearer  than  Arghandeh. 

On  starting  from  Aushar  Massy  detached  a troop  of  the  9th  Lancers 
to  communicate  with  Macpherson.  This  reduced  his  column  to  247 
British  and  44  Native  Cavalry,  with  4 Horse  Artillery  guns. 

As  the  party  moved  along  the  Chardeh  valley,  a loud  beating  of 

* The  memorandum  was  as  follows  : 

‘Brigadier-General  Massy  will  start  at  eight  a. m.  to-morrow  with  a squadron 
of  Cavalry,  join  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery  now  out  under  Colonel 
Gordon,  taking  command  thereof,  and  operating  towards  Arghandeh  in  on- 
junction  with  Brigadier-General  Macpherson.  The  troops  to  return  in  the 
evening.  ’ 


434 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

drums  was  heard,  and  Captain  Bloomfield  Gough,  9th  Lancers,  com- 
manding the  advance  guard,  perceived  when  he  had  moved  to  about 
a mile  north  of  Kila  Kazi,  that  the  enemy  were  occupying  hills  on 
both  sides  of  the  Ghazni  road,  about  two  miles  to  his  left  front,  and 
sent  back  word  to  that  effect.  Massy,  not  believing  that  the  Afghans 
had  collected  in  any  considerable  numbers,  continued  to  advance  ; but 
he  was  soon  undeceived  by  the  crowds  of  men  and  waving  standards 
which  shortly  came  into  view  moving  towards  Kila  Kazi.  He  then 
ordered  Major  Smith-Wyndham  to  open  fire,  but  the  range,  2,900 
yards,  being  considered  by  Colonel  Gordon,  the  senior  Artillery  officer, 
too  far  for  his  six -pounders,  after  a few  rounds  the  guns  were  moved 
across  the  Ghazni  road,  and  again  brought  into  action  at  2,500  yards; 
as  this  distance  was  still  found  to  be  too  great,  they  were  moved  to 
2,000  yards.  The  enemy  now  pressed  forward  on  Massy’s  left  flank, 
which  was  also  his  line  of  retreat,  and  the  guns  had  to  be  retired  about 
a mile,  covered  on  the  right  and  left  by  the  9th  Lancers  and  the  14th 
Bengal  Lancers  respectively,  and  followed  so  closely  by  the  Afghans 
that  when  fire  was  next  opened  they  were  only  1,700  yards  distant. 
Four  Horse  Artillery  guns  could  do  nothing  against  such  numbers 
attacking  without  any  regular  formation,  and  when  the  leading  men 
came  within  carbine  range,  Massy  tried  to  stop  them  by  dismounting 
thirty  of  the  9th  Lancers  ; but  their  fire  ‘ had  no  appreciable  effect.’ 

It  was  at  this  critical  moment  that  I appeared  on  the  scene. 
Warned  by  the  firing  that  an  engagement  was  taking  place,  I galloped 
across  the  Chardeh  valley  as  fast  as  my  horse  could  carry  me,  and  on 
gaining  the  open  ground  beyond  Bhagwana,  an  extraordinary  spectacle 
was  presented  to  my  view.  An  unbroken  line,  extending  for  about 
two  miles,  and  formed  of  not  less  than  between  9,000  and  10,000  men, 
was  moving  rapidly  towards  me,  all  on  foot  save  a small  body  of 
Cavalry  on  their  left  flank — in  fact,  the  greater  part  of  Mahomed  Jan’s 
army.  To  meet  this  formidable  array,  instead  of  Macpherson’s  and 
Massy’s  forces,  which  I hoped  I should  have  found  combined,  there 
were  but  4 guns,  198  of  the  9th  Lancers  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Cleland,  40  of  the  14th  Bengal  Lancers  under  Captain  Philip  Neville, 
and  at  some  little  distance  Gough’s  troop  of  the  9th  Lancers,  wrho  were 
engaged  in  watching  the  enemy’s  Cavalry. 

The  inequality  of  the  opposing  forces  was  but  too  painfully  apparent. 
The  first  glance  at  the  situation  showed  me  the  hopelessness  of  con- 
tinuing the  struggle  without  Infantry.  Up  to  that  moment  our 
casualties  had  not  been  many,  as  Afghans  seldom  play  at  long  bowls, 
it  being  necessary  for  them  to  husband  their  ammunition,  and  when, 
as  in  the  present  instance,  they  outnumber  their  adversaries  by  forty 
to  one,  they  universally  try  to  come  to  close  quarters  and  use  their 
knives. 

My  first  thought  was  how  to  secure  the  best  and  shortest  line  of 


FORCED  TO  RETIRE 


435 


1879] 

retreat ; it  lay  by  Deh-i-Mazang,  but  in  order  to  use  it,  the  gorge  close 
by  that  village  had  to  be  held  ; for  if  the  enemy  reached  it  first  they 
would  have  no  difficulty  in  gaining  the  heights  above  Kabul,  which 
would  practically  place  the  city  at  their  mercy. 

I was  very  anxious  also  to  prevent  any  panic  or  disturbance  taking 
place  in  Kabul.  I therefore  told  General  Hills,  who  just  then  oppor- 
tunely joined  me,  to  gallop  to  Sherpur,  explain  to  Brigadier-General 
Hugh  Gough,  who  had  been  placed  in  temporary  command  of  that 
place,  how  matters  stood,  and  order  200  of  the  72nd  Highlanders  to 
come  to  Deh-i-Mazang  with  the  least  possible  delay.  I directed  Hills, 
after  having  delivered  this  message,  to  make  for  the  city,  shut  the 
gates,  and  do  all  in  his  power  to  keep  the  people  quiet,  while  warning 
the  Kizilbashes*  to  be  prepared  to  defend  their  quarter.  I then 
despatched  my  nephew  and  A.D.C.,  Lieutenant  John  Sherston,  to 
Macpherson  to  inform  him  of  what  had  happened,  and  desire  him  to 
push  on  with  the  utmost  speed. 

Having  taken  these  precautionary  measures,  I sent  another  A.D.C., 
Captain  Pole  Carew,  to  Brigadier-General  Massy  to  direct  him  to  try 
and  find  a way  by  which  the  guns  could  retire  in  case  of  a necessity, 
which  appeared  to  me  to  be  only  too  probable. 

The  engagement  had  now  become  a question  of  time.  If  Mahomed 
Jan  could  close  with  and  overwhelm  our  small  force,  Kabul  would  be 
his ; but  if,  by  any  possibility,  his  advance  could  be  retarded  until 
Macpherson  should  come  up,  we  might  hope  to  retain  possession  of 
the  city.  It  was,  therefore,  to  the  Afghan  leader’s  interest  to  press 
on,  while  it  was  to  ours  to  delay  him  as  long  as  we  possibly  could. 

Pole  Carew  presently  returned  with  a message  from  Massy  that  the 
enemy  were  close  upon  him,  and  that  he  could  not  keep  them  in  check. 
I desired  Pole  Carew  to  go  back,  order  Massy  to  retire  the  guns,  and 
cover  the  movement  by  a charge  of  Cavalry. 

The  charge  was  led  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cieland  and  Captain 
Neville,  the  former  of  whom  fell  dangerously  wounded  ; but  the  ground, 
terraced  for  irrigation  purposes  and  intersected  by  nullas,  so  impeded 
our  Cavalry  that  the  charge,  heroic  as  it  was,  made  little  or  no  impres- 
sion upon  the  overwhelming  numbers  of  the  enemy,  now  flushed  with 
the  triumph  of  having  forced  our  guns  to  retire.  The  effort,  howevor, 
was  worthy  of  the  best  traditions  of  our  British  and  Indian  Cavalry, 
and  that  it  failed  in  its  object  was  no  fault  of  our  gallant  soldiers.  To 
assist  them  in  their  extremity,  I ordered  two  of  Smyth-Windham’s 
four  guns  to  halt  and  come  into  action  while  the  other  two  continued 
to  retire,  but  these  had  not  gone  far  before  they  got  into  such  difficult 

* Kizilbashes  are  Persians  by  nationality  and  Shiah  Mahomedans  by 
religion.  They  formed  the  vanguard  of  Nadir  Shah’s  invading  army,  and 
after  his  death  a number  of  them  settled  in  Kabul  where  they  exercise 
considerable  influence. 


29 


436 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

ground  that  one  had  to  be  spiked  and  abandoned  in  a water-cut,  where 
Smyth-Windham  found  it  when  he  came  up  after  having  fired  a few 
rounds  at  the  fast  advancing  foe.  I now  ordered  Smyth-Windham  to 
make  for  the  village  of  Bhagwana  with  his  three  remaining  guns,  as 
the  only  chance  left  of  saving  them.  This  he  did,  and  having  reached 
the  village,  he  again  opened  fire  from  behind  a low  wall  which  enclosed 
the  houses  ; but  the  ammunition  being  nearly  expended,  and  the 
enemy  close  at  hand,  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  limber  up  again 
and  continue  the  retirement  through  the  village.  At  the  further  side, 
however,  and  forming  part  of  its  defences,  was  a formidable  obstacle  in 
the  shape  of  a ditch  fully  twelve  feet  deep,  narrowing  towards  the 
bottom ; across  this  Smyth-Windham  tried  to  take  his  guns,  and  the 
leading  horses  had  just  begun  to  scramble  up  the  further  bank,  when 
one  of  the  wheelers  stumbled  and  fell,  with  the  result  that  the  shafts 
broke  and  the  gun  stuck  fast,  blocking  the  only  point  at  which  there 
was  any  possibility  of  getting  the  others  across. 

With  a faint  hope  of  saving  the  guns,  I directed  Captain  Stewart- 
Mackenzie,  who  had  assumed  command  of  the  9th  Lancers  on  Cleland 
being  disabled,  to  make  a second  charge,  which  he  executed  with  the 
utmost  gallantry,*  but  to  no  purpose ; and  in  the  meanwhile  Smyth- 
Windham  had  given  the  order  to  unhook  and  spike  the  guns. 

By  this  time  the  enemy  were  within  a few  hundred  yards  of  Bhag- 
wana, and  the  inhabitants  had  begun  to  fire  at  us  from  the  roofs  of 
their  houses.  I was  endeavouring  to  help  some  men  out  of  the  ditch, 
when  the  headman  of  the  village  rushed  at  me  with  his  knife,  seeing 
which,  a Mahomedanf  of  the  1st  Bengal  Cavalry,  who  was  following 
me  on  foot,  having  just  had  his  horse  shot  under  him,  sprang  at  my 
assailant,  and,  seizing  him  round  the  waist,  threw  him  to  the  bottom 
of  the  ditch,  thereby  saving  my  life.} 

* Stewart-Mackenzie’s  horse  was  shot,  and  fell  on  him,  and  he  was  ex- 
tricated with  the  greatest  difficulty. 

t Mazr  AH  was  given  the  order  of  merit  for  his  brave  action,  and  is  now  a 
Native  officer  in  the  regiment. 

+ Our  Chaplain  (Adams),  who  had  accompanied  me  throughout  the  day, 
behaved  in  this  particular  place  with  conspicuous  gallantry.  Seeing  a 
wounded  man  of  the  9th  Lancers  staggering  towards  him,  Adams  dismounted, 
and  tried  to  lift  the  man  on  to  his  own  charger.  Unfortunately,  the  mare,  a 
very  valuable  animal,  broke  loose,  and  was  never  seen  again.  Adams,  how- 
ever, managed  to  support  the  Lancer  until  he  was  able  to  make  him  over  to 
some  of  his  own  comrades. 

Adams  rejoined  me  in  time  to  assist  two  more  of  the  9th  who  were  struggling 
under  their  horses  at  the  bottom  of  the  ditch.  Without  a moment’s  hesita- 
tion, Adams  jumped  into  the  ditch.  He  was  an  unusually  powerful  man, 
and  by  sheer  strength  dragged  the  Lancers  clear  of  their  horses.  The 
Afghans  meanwhile  had  reached  Bhagwana,  and  were  so  close  to  the  ditch 
that  I thought  my  friend  the  padre  could  not  possibly  escape.  I called  out 
to  him  to  look  after  himself,  but  he  jHikl  no  attention  to  my  warnings  until 


PADRE  ADAMS  EARNS  THE  V.C. 


437 


1879] 

Suddenly  the  Afghans  stayed  their  advance  for  a few  minutes, 
thinking,  as  I afterwards  learnt,  that  our  Infantry  were  in  the  village 
— a pause  which  allowed  many  of  our  Cavalry  who  had  lost  their 
horses  to  escape.* * 

Directly  we  had  got  clear  of  the  village  the  Cavalry  reformed,  and 
retired  slowly  by  alternate  squadrons,  in  a manner  which  excited  my 
highest  admiration,  and  reflected  the  greatest  credit  on  the  soldierly 
qualities  of  Stewart- Mackenzie  and  Neville.  From  Bhagwana,  Deh-i- 
Mazang  was  three  miles  distant,  and  it  was  of  vital  importance  to  keep 
the  enemy  back  in  order  to  give  the  Highlanders  from  Sherpur  time  to 
reach  the  gorge. 

For  a time  the  Afghans  continued  to  press  on  as  before,  but  after  a 
while  their  advance  gradually  became  slower  and  their  numbers  some- 
what decreased.  This  change  in  Mahomed  Jan’s  tactics,  it  afterwards 
turned  out,  was  caused  by  Macpherson’s  advance  guard  coming  into 
collision  with  the  rear  portion  of  his  army ; it  was  of  the  greatest 
advantage  to  us,  as  it  enabled  the  72nd  to  arrive  in  time  to  bar  the 
enemy’s  passage  through  the  gorge.  My  relief  was  great  when  I 
beheld  them,  headed  by  their  eager  Commander,  Brownlow,  doubling 
through  the  gap  and  occupying  the  village  of  Deh-i-Mazang  and  the 
heights  on  either  side.  The  Cavalry  greeted  them  with  hearty  cheers, 
and  the  volleys  delivered  by  the  Highlanders  from  the  roofs  of  the 
houses  in  the  village  soon  checked  the  Afghans,  some  of  whom  turned 
back,  while  others  made  for  Indiki  and  the  slopes  of  the  Takht-i-Shah. 
For  a time,  at  any  rate,  their  hopes  of  getting  possession  of  Kabul  had 
been  frustrated. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  orders  I sent  to  Macpherson  on  the 
10th  were  that  he  was  to  march  very  early  the  next  morning,  as  Massy 
with  the  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry  would  leave  Aushar  at  9 a.m., 


he  had  pulled  the  almost  exhausted  Lancers  to  the  top  of  the  slippery  bank. 
Adams  received  the  Victoria  Cross  for  his  conduct  on  this  occasion. 

* These  men  were  much  impeded  by  their  long  boots  and  their  swords 
dangling  between  their  legs  ; the  sight,  indeed,  of  Cavalry  soldiers  trying  to 
defend  themselves  on  foot  without  a firearm  confirmed  the  opinion  I had 
formed  during  the  Mutiny,  as  to  the  desirability  for  the  carbine  being  slung 
on  the  man’s  back  when  going  into  action.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bushman 
(Colonel  Cleland’s  successor)  curiously  enough  had  brought  with  him  from 
England  a sling  which  admitted  of  this  being  done,  and  also  of  the  carbine 
being  carried  in  the  bucket  on  all  ordinary  occasions.  This  pattern  was 
adopted,  and  during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign  the  men  of  the  9th 
Lancers  placed  their  carbines  on  their  backs  whenever  the  enemy  were 
reported  to  be  in  sight.  At  the  same  time  I authorized  the  adoption  of  an 
arrangement — also  brought  to  my  notice  by  Colonel  Bushman — by  which  the 
sword  was  fastened  to  the  saddle  instead  of  round  the  man’s  body.  This 
mode  of  wearing  the  sword  was  for  some  time  strenuously  opposed  in  this 
country,  but  its  utility  could  not  fail  to  be  recognized,  and  in  1891  an  order 
was  issued  sanctioning  its  adoption  by  all  mounted  troops. 


29—2 


438 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

and  that  he  must  join  him  on  the  Arghandeh  road.  Maepherson  did 
not  make  so  early  a start  as  I had  intended ; from  one  cause  or  another, 
he  said,  he  was  not  able  to  leave  Karez-i-Mir  before  eight  o’clock.  On 
reaching  the  Surkh  Kotal  he  observed  dense  bodies  of  the  enemy  hurry- 
ing from  the  Paghman  and  Arghandeh  directions  towards  Kila  Kazi, 
and  he  pushed  on,  hoping  to  be  able  to  deal  with  them  individually 
before  they  had  time  to  concentrate.  For  the  first  three  miles  from 
the  foot  of  the  pass  the  view  was  obstructed  by  a range  of  hills,  and 
nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry ; but  soon 
after  10  a.m.  the  booming  of  guns  warned  Maepherson  that  fighting 
was  going  on,  but  he  could  not  tell  whether  it  was  Baker’s  or  Massy’s 
troops  which  were  engaged.  He  was,  however,  not  left  long  in  doubt, 
for  Lieutenant  Neville  Chamberlain,  attached  to  Maepherson  as 
political  officer,  and  who  had  gone  on  with  his  advance  guard,  sent 
back  word  that  he  could  distinguish  British  Cavalry  charging  the 
Afghans,  and  as  Baker  had  only  Native  Cavalry  with  him,  Maepherson 
knew  at  once  that  the  action  was  being  fought  by  Massy.  Suddenly 
the  firing  ceased,  and  he  was  informed  that  the  enemy  were  advancing 
on  Kabul,  and  that  their  vanguard  had  already  reached  the  belt  of 
orchards  and  enclosures,  on  the  further  fringe  of  which  the  smoke  from 
our  guns  and  the  charge  of  our  Cavalry  had  been  seen. 

Maepherson,  feeling  that  something  serious  had  occurred,  called  on 
his  men  to  make  a further  effort.  At  12.30  p.m.,  less  than  an  hour 
after  we  had  begun  to  retire,  he  reached  the  ground  where  the  fight 
had  taken  place.  The  dead  bodies  of  our  officers  and  men,  stripped 
and  horribly  mutilated,  proved  how  fierce  had  been  the  struggle,  and 
the  dropping  shots  which  came  from  the  fortified  villages  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood and  from  the  ravines,  warned  the  Brigadier-General  that 
some  of  the  enemy  were  still  in  the  neighbourhood.  But  these  men,  so 
bold  in  the  confidence  of  overwhelming  numbers  when  attacking 
Massy’s  Cavalry,  were  not  prepared  to  withstand  Macpherson’s  In- 
fantry ; after  a brief  resistance  they  broke  and  fled  in  confusion,  some 
to  Indiki,  but  the  greater  number  to  the  shelter  of  the  hills  south  of 
Kila  Kazi,  to  which  place  Maepherson  followed  them,  intending  to  halt 
there  for  the  night.  This  I did  not  allow  him  to  do,  for,  seeing  the 
heavy  odds  we  had  opposed  to  us,  and  that  the  enemy  were  already  in 
possession  of  the  Takht-i-Shah,  thus  being  in  a position  to  threaten  the 
Bala  Hissar,  I sent  orders  to  him  to  fall  back  upon  Deh-i-Mazang, 
where  he  arrived  about  7 p.m. 

Meanwhile,  Macpherson’s  baggage,  with  a guard  of  the  5th  Gurkhas, 
commanded  by  Major  Cook,  V.C.,  was  attacked  by  some  Afghans,  who 
had  remained  concealed  in  the  Paghman  villages,  and  it  would  pro- 
bably have  fallen  into  their  hands,  as  the  Gurkhas  were  enormously 
outnumbered,  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  four  companies  of  the  3rd 
Sikhs,  under  Major  Griffiths,  who  had  been  left  by  Maepherson  to  see 


THE  CAPTURED  GUNS  RECOVERED 


439 


1879] 

everything  safely  down  the  pass.  Cook  himself  was  knocked  over  and 
stunned  by  a blow,  while  his  brother  in  the  3rd  Sikhs  received  a severe 
bullet  wound  close  to  his  heart. 

During  the  retirement  from  Bhagwana,  Macgregor,  my  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  Durand,  Badcock,  and  one  or  two  other  staff  officers,  got 
separated  from  me  and  were  presently  overtaken  by  an  officer  (Captain 
Gerald  Martin),  sent  by  Macpherson  to  tell  Massy  he  was  coming  to 
his  assistance  as  fast  as  his  Infantry  could  travel ; Martin  informed 
Macgregor  that  as  he  rode  by  Bhagwana  he  had  come  across  our 
abandoned  guns,  and  that  there  was  no  enemy  anywhere  near  them. 
On  hearing  this,  Macgregor  retraced  his  steps,  and,  assisted  by  the 
staff  officers  with  him  and  a few  Horse  Artillerymen  and  Lancers,  and 
some  Gurkhas  of  Macpherson’s  baggage  guard  picked  up  on  the  way, 
he  managed  to  rescue  the  guns  and  bring  them  into  Sherpur  that  night. 
They  had  been  stripped  of  all  their  movable  parts,  and  the  ammunition- 
boxes  had  been  emptied  ; otherwise  they  were  intact,  and  were  fit  for 
use  the  next  day. 

I found  assembled  at  Deh-i-Mazang  Wali  Mahomed  and  other 
Sirdars,  who  had  been  watching  with  considerable  anxiety  the  issue  of 
the  fight,  for  they  knew  if  the  Afghans  succeeded  in  their  endeavours 
to  enter  Kabul,  all  property  belonging  to  people  supposed  to  be  friendly 
to  us  would  be  plundered  and  their  houses  destroyed.  I severely 
upbraided  these  men  for  having  misled  me  as  to  the  strength  and 
movements  of  Mahomed  Jan’s  army,  and  with  having  failed  to  fulfil 
their  engagement  to  keep  me  in  communication  with  Baker.  They 
declared  they  had  been  misinformed  themselves,  and  were  powerless  in 
the  matter.  It  was  difficult  to  believe  that  this  was  the  case,  and  I 
was  unwillingly  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  not  a single  Afghan 
could  be  trusted,  however  profuse  he  might  be  in  his  assurances  of 
fidelity,  and  that  we  must  depend  entirely  on  our  own  resources  for 
intelligence. 

I waited  at  Deh-i-Mazang  until  Macpherson  arrived,  and  thus  did 
not  get  back  to  Sherpur  till  after  dark.  I was  gratified  on  my  arrival 
there  to  find  that  Hugh  Gough  had  made  every  arrangement  that 
could  be  desired  for  the  defence  of  the  cantonment,  and  that  by  his  own 
cool  and  confident  bearing  he  had  kept  the  troops  calm  and  steady, 
notwithstanding  the  untoward  appearance  of  some  fugitives  from  the 
field  of  battle,  whose  only  too  evident  state  of  alarm  might  otherwise 
have  caused  a panic. 

For  the  safety  of  Sherpur  I never  for  one  moment  had  the  smallest 
apprehension  during  that  eventful  day.  It  was,  I believe,  thought  by 
some  that  if  Mahomed  Jan,  instead  of  trying  for  the  city,  had  made  for 
the  cantonment,  it  would  have  fallen  into  his  hands ; but  they  were 
altogether  wrong,  for  there  were  a sufficient  number  of  men  within  the 
walls  to  have  prevented  such  a catastrophe  had  Mahomed  Jan  been  in 


440 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


a position  to  make  an  attack ; but  this,  with  Macpherson’s  brigade 
immediately  in  his  rear,  he  could  never  have  dreamt  of  attempting. 

The  city  of  Kabul  remained  perfectly  quiet  while  all  the  excitement  I 
have  described  was  going  on  outside.  Hills,  with  a few  Sikhs,  patrolled 
the  principal  streets,  and  even  when  the  Afghan  standard  appeared  on 
the  Takht-i-Shah  there  was  no  sign  of  disturbance.  Nevertheless,  I 
thought  it  would  be  wise  to  withdraw  from  the  city ; I could  not  tell 
how  long  the  people  would  remain  well  disposed,  or  whether  they 
would  assist  us  to  keep  the  enemy  out.  I therefore  directed  Hills  to 
come  away  and  make  over  his  charge  to  an  influential  Kizilbash  named 
Futteh  Khan.  I also  telegraphed  to  General  Bright  at  Jalalabad  to 
reinforce  Gandamak  by  a sufficient  number  of  troops  to  hold  that  post 
in  case  it  should  be  necessary  to  order  Brigadier-General  Charles 
Gough,  who  was  then  occupying  it,  to  move  his  brigade  nearer  to  Kabul  ; 
for  I felt  sure  that,  unless  I could  succeed  in  driving  Mahomed  Jan 
out  of  the  neighbourhood  of  Kabul,  excitement  would  certainly  spread 
along  my  line  of  communication.  I concluded  my  message  to  Bright 
thus  : ‘ If  the  wire  should  be  cut,  consider  it  a bad  sign,  and  push  on  to 
Gandamak,  sending  Gough’s  Brigade  towards  Kabul.’ 

I could  not  help  feeling  somewhat  depressed  at  the  turn  things  had 
taken.  I had  no  news  from  Baker,  and  we  had  undoubtedly  suffered 
a reverse,  which  I knew  only  too  well  would  give  confidence  to  the 
Afghans,  who,  from  the  footing  they  had  now  gained  on  the  heights 
above  Kabul,  threatened  the  Bala  Hissar,  which  place,  stored  as  it 
was  with  powder  and  other  material  of  war,  I had  found  it  necessary 
to  continue  to  occupy.  Nevertheless,  reviewing  the  incidents  of  the 
11th  December,  as  I have  frequently  done  since,  with  all  the  con- 
comitant circumstances  deeply  impressed  on  my  memory,  I have 
failed  to  discover  that  any  disposition  of  my  force  different  from  that 
I made  could  have  had  better  results,  or  that  what  did  occur  could 
have  been  averted  by  greater  forethought  or  more  careful  calculation 
on  my  part.  Two  deviations  from  my  programme  (which  probably  at 
the  time  appeared  unimportant  to  the  Commanders  in  question)  were 
the  principal  factors  in  bringing  about  the  unfortunate  occurrences  of 
that  day.  Had  Macpherson  marched  at  7 a.m.  instead  of  8,  and  had 
Massy  followed  the  route  I had  arranged  for  him  to  take,  Mahomed 
Jan  must  have  fallen  into  the  trap  I had  prepared  for  him. 

Our  casualties  on  the  11th  were — killed,  4 British  officers,  16  British 
and  9 Native  rank  and  file ; wounded,  4 British  officers,  1 Native 
officer,  20  British  and  10  Native  rank  and  file. 


SKETCH 

SHOWING  THE  OPERATIONS 

IN 

THE  CHARD EH  VALLEY 

01 1 

December  10th  and  11th,  1879. 


DISTANCES : 


Sherpur  to  Aushar  ...  

. 3^  m lies 

Deh-i-Mazang  to  Sherpur  ... 

. 2h 

Deh-i-Mazang  to  A ushar 

3 

Deh-i-Mazang  to  SurTch  Kutal 
( by  Baghwana) 

13  „ 

Surkh  Kotal  to  Karez-i-Mir 

If  „ 

Karez-i- Mir  to  Aushar 

{by  Kirs  Khana  Kotal ) 

11  „ 

*»79] 


ATTACK  ON  THE  TAKHTI-SHAH 


441 


CHAPTER  LVI. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th  I was  cheered  by  hearing  that  the  Guides 
had  arrived  during  the  night  under  the  command  of  Colonel  F.  Jenkins 
— a most  welcome  reinforcement,  for  I knew  how  thoroughly  to  be 
depended  upon  was  every  man  in  that  distinguished  corps. 

The  first  thing  now  to  be  done  was  to  endeavour  to  drive  the  Afghans 
from  the  crest  of  the  Takht-i-Shah ; and  I directed  Macpherson,  as 
soon  as  his  men  had  breakfasted,  to  attack  the  position  from  Deh-i- 
Mazang.  Just  then  my  mind  was  considerably  relieved  by  a heliogram 
from  Baker  informing  me  that  he  was  on  his  way  back  to  Kabul. 
The  message  was  despatched  from  near  Ivila  Kazi,  within  four  miles  of 
which  place  Baker  had  encamped  on  the  afternoon  of  the  previous  day. 

Macpherson  deputed  the  task  of  trying  to  dislodge  the  enemy  to 
Lieutenant- Colonel  Money,  of  the  3rd  Sikhs,  with  a detachment  con- 
sisting of  2 Mountain  guns  and  560  British  and  Native  Infantry. 

It  was  a most  formidable  position  to  attack.  The  slopes  leading  up 
to  it  were  covered  with  huge  masses  of  jagged  rock,  intersected  by 
perpendicular  cliffs,  and  its  natural  great  strength  was  increased  by 
breastworks,  and  stockades  thrown  up  at  different  points. 

After  a gallant  and  persistent  attempt  had  been  made,  I ordered  the 
assault  to  be  deferred ; for  I perceived  that  the  enemy  were  being 
reinforced  from  their  rear,  and  to  ensure  success  without  great  loss,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  attack  them  in  rear  as  well  as  in  the  front.  The 
arrival  of  Baker’s  brigade  made  it  possible  to  do  this.  I therefore 
ordered  Macpherson  to  hold  the  ground  of  which  he  had  gained  posses- 
sion until  Baker  could  co-operate  with  him  next  morning  from  the  Beni 
Hissar  side. 

During  the  night  Mahomed  Jan,  who  had  been  joined  by  several 
thousands  from  Logar  and  Wardak,  occupied  the  villages  situated 
between  Beni  Hissar  and  the  Bala  Hissar  and  along  the  sang-i- 
nawishta  road.  Baker,  who  started  at  8 a.m.  on  the  13th,*  had, 
therefore,  in  the  first  place,  to  gain  the  high  ground  above  these 
villages,  and,  while  holding  the  point  over-looking  Beni  Hissar,  to 
wheel  to  his  right  and  move  towards  the  Takht-i-Shah. 

When  he  had  proceeded  some  little  distance,  his  advance  guard 
reported  that  large  bodies  of  the  enemy  were  moving  up  the  slope  of 
the  ridge  from  the  villages  near  Beni  Hissar.  To  check  this  movement, 
and  prevent  the  already  very  difficult  Afghan  position  being  still  further 
strengthened,  Major  "White,  who  was  in  command  of  the  leading 

* His  force  consisted  of  4 guns,  Field  Artillery  ; 4 Mountain  guns  ; 
1 squadron  9th  Lancers  ; 5th  Punjab  Cavalry  ; 6 companies  92nd  High- 
landers ; 7 companies  Guides  ; and  300  3rd  Sikhs  ; and  subsequently  it  was 
strengthened  by  150  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry. 


442 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


portion  of  the  attacking  party,  turned  and  made  for  the  nearest  point 
on  the  ridge.  It  was  now  a race  between  the  Highlanders  and  the 
Afghans  as  to  who  should  gain  the  crest  of  the  ridge  first.  The 
Artillery  came  into  action  at  a range  of  1,200  yards,  and  under  cover 
of  their  fire  the  92nd,  supported  by  the  Guides,  rushed  up  the  steep 
slopes.  They  were  met  by  a furious  onslaught,  and  a desperate  conflict 
took  place.  The  leading  officer,  Lieutenant  Forbes,  a lad  of  great 
promise,  was  killed,  and  Colour-Sergeant  Drummond  fell  by  his  side. 
For  a moment  even  the  brave  Highlanders  were  staggered  by  the 
numbers  and  fury  of  their  antagonists,  but  only  for  a moment.  Lieu- 
tenant Dick  Cunyngham*  sprang  forward  to  cheer  them  on,  and  confi- 
dence was  restored.  With  a wild  shout  the  Highlanders  threw  them- 
selves on  the  Afghans,  and  quickly  succeeded  in  driving  them  down 
the  further  side  of  the  ridge. 

By  this  successful  movement  the  enemy’s  line  was  cut  in  two,  and 
while  the  Cavalry  and  a party  of  the  3rd  Sikhs  prevented  their  rallying 
in  the  direction  of  Beni  Hissar,  the  92nd  and  Guides,  protected  by  the 
Mountain  guns,  which  had  been  got  on  to  the  ridge,  and  the  Field 
Artillery  from  below,  advanced  towards  the  Takht -i  - Shah.  The 
Afghans  disputed  every  inch  of  the  way,  but  by  11.30  a.m.  White’s 
men  had  reached  the  foot  of  the  craggy  eminence  which  formed  the 
enemy’s  main  position.  They  were  here  joined  by  some  of  the  72nd 
Highlanders,  3rd  Sikhs,  and  5tli  Gurkhas,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Money,  who  had  fought  their  way  from  the  uppor 
Bala  Hissar. 

A brilliant  charge  by  the  combined  troops  now  took  place,  the  two 
Highlands  corps  vying  with  each  other  for  the  honour  of  reaching  the 
summit  first.  It  fell  to  the  72nd,  Colour- Sergeant  Yulef  of  that 
regiment  being  the  foremost  man  on  the  top.  The  enemy  made  a 
most  determined  stand,  and  it  was  only  after  a severe  struggle  and 
heavy  loss  that  they  were  driven  off  the  heights. 

From  my  position  at  Sherpur  I had  the  satisfaction  of  witnessing 
this  success.  This  satisfaction,  however,  was  short-lived,  for  almost 
immediately  I received  a report  from  the  city  that  the  inhabitants  had 
joined  the  tribesmen,  and  that  the  cantonment  was  being  threatened ; 
indeed,  I could  see  large  bodies  of  armed  men  emerging  from  the  city 
and  moving  towards  Siah  Sang,  whence  the  road  between  the  Bala 
Hissar  and  Sherpur  would  be  commanded. 

Having  only  too  evidently  lost  control  over  the  city,  tho  value  of 
Deh-i-Mazang  was  gone,  so  I ordered  Macplierson  to  abandon  it  and 
move  to  the  Shahr-i-Darwaza  heights,  taking  with  him  six  companies 
of  the  67th  Foot  for  the  protection  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  to  which  it  was 

* Dick  Cunyngham  received  the  Victoria  Cross  for  conspicuous  gallantry 
and  coolness  on  this  occasion. 

t This  gallant  non-commissioned  officer  was  killed  tho  following  day. 


CAPTURE  OF  SI  AH  SANG 


443 


1879] 

desirable  to  hold  on  as  long  as  possible.  The  remainder  of  his  troops 
I ordered  to  be  sent  to  Sherpur.  To  Baker  I signalled  to  leave  a party 
on  the  Takht-i-Shah  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Money,  and  to  move 
himself  towards  the  cantonment  with  the  rest  of  his  troops,  driving 
the  enemy  off  the  Siah  Sang  on  the  way. 

But  from  his  point  of  vantago  on  the  heights  Baker  could  see,  what 
I could  not,  that  the  Afghans  had  occupied  two  strongly  fortified 
villages  between  Siah  Sang  and  the  Bala  Hissar,  from  which  it  was 
necessary  to  dislodge  them  in  the  first  instance,  and  for  this  service  he 
detached  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry  and  a battery  of  Artillery.  It  was 
carried  out  in  a masterly  manner  by  Major  Pratt,  who  soon  gained 
possession  of  one  village.  The  other,  however,  was  resolutely  held, 
and  the  Artillery  failing  to  effect  a breach,  the  gates  were  set  on  fire  ; 
but  even  then  a satisfactory  oponing  was  not  made,  and  the  place  was 
eventually  captured  by  means  of  scaling-ladders  hastily  made  of  poles 
tied  together  with  the  Native  soldiers’  turbans. 

Baker  was  now  able  to  turn  his  attention  to  Siah  Sang,  so  I de- 
spatched the  Cavalry  under  Massy,  to  act  with  him  when  a signal 
success  was  achieved.  The  enemy  fought  stubbornly,  but  were  at  last 
driven  off.  The  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  led  by  Lieutenant  - Colonel 
Williams  and  Major  Hammond,  greatly  distinguished  themselves,  and 
a grand  charge  was  made  by  the  Guides  and  9th  Lancers,  in  which 
Captain  Butson,  of  the  latter  regiment,  was  killed,  also  the  troop 
Sergeant-Major  and  3 men ; and  Captain  Chisholme,*  Lieutenant 
Trower,  and  8 men  were  wounded. 

This  ended  the  operations  on  the  13th.  Our  losses  during  the  day 
were : killed,  2 British  officers  and  12  men ; wounded,  2 British  officers 
and  43  men,  British  and  Native. 

I was  in  great  hopes  that  our  successes  and  the  heavy  losses  the 
enemy  had  sustained  would  result  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  combina- 
tion against  us;  but  in  case  these  hopes  should  not  be  realized,  I 
decided  to  do  away  with  some  of  the  smaller  posts  on  the  line  of  com- 
munication, and  order  up  more  troops.  Accordingly,  I telegraphed  to 
General  Bright  to  send  on  Charles  Gough’s  brigade,  and  I directed  the 
detachment  at  Butkhak  to  return  to  Kabul,  and  that  at  Seh  Baba  to 
fall  back  on  Lataband.  Having  great  confidence  in  its  Commander, 
Colonel  Hudson,  I determined  to  hold  on  to  Lataband  for  a time, 
though  by  so  doing  the  numbers  I might  otherwise  have  had  at 
Sherpur  were  considerably  diminished.  Lataband  was  the  most  im- 
portant link  in  the  chain  of  communication  between  Kabul  and  Jala- 
labad ; it  was  in  direct  heliographic  connexion  with  Kabul ; it  had 
sufficient  ammunition  and  supplies  to  last  over  the  date  on  which 
Gough  should  arrive  at  Sherpur,  and  its  being  held  would  be  a check 

* Notwithstanding  that  his  wound  was  most  severe,  Captain  Chisholme 
remained  in  the  saddle,  and  brought  the  regiment  out  of  action. 


444 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

on  the  Ghilzais,  and  prevent  his  encountering  any  serious  opposition. 
At  the  same  time,  I could  not  disguise  from  myself  that  there  was  a 
certain  amount  of  risk  attached  to  leaving  so  small  a garrison  in  this 
somewhat  isolated  position. 

The  night  of  the  13th  passed  quietly,  but  when  day  dawned  on  the 
14th  crowds  of  armed  men,  with  numerous  standards,  could  be  seen 
occupying  a hill  on  the  Kohistan  road;  and  as  day  advanced  they 
proceeded  in  vast  numbers  to  the  Asmai  heights,  where  they  were 
joined  by  swarms  from  the  city  and  the  Chardeh  valley.  It  thne 
became  apparent  that  the  combination  was  much  more  formidable 
than  I had  imagined,  and  that  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  now  in 
opposition  to  us  were  far  greater  than  I had  dreamt  was  possible. 
Foiled  in  their  attempt  to  close  in  upon  us  from  the  south  and  west, 
the  tribesmen  had  concentrated  to  the  north,  and  it  was  evident  they 
were  preparing  to  deliver  an  attack  in  great  strength  from  that  quarter. 
I quickly  decided  to  drive  the  enemy  off  the  Asmai  heights,  to  cut 
their  communication  with  Kohistan,  and  to  operate  towards  the  north, 
much  as  I had  operated  the  previous  day  to  the  south  of  Sherpur. 

At  9 a.m.  I despatched  Brigadier  General  Baker  to  the  eastern  slope 
of  the  Asmai  range  with  the  following  troops  : 4 guns,  Field  Artillery ; 
4 guns,  Mountain  Artillery;  14th  Bengal  Lancers;  72nd  Highlanders 
(192  rifles) ; 92nd  Highlanders  (100  rifles) ; Guides  Infantry  (460 
rifles) ; and  5th  Punjab  Infantry  (470  rifles). 

Covered  by  the  fire  of  his  Artillery,  Baker  seized  the  conical  hill 
which  formed  the  northern  boundary  of  the  Aliabad  Kotal,  thus 
placing  himself  on  the  enemj^’s  line  of  communication,  and  prevent- 
ing them  from  being  reinforced.  He  then  proceeded  to  attack  the 
Asmai  heights,  leaving  2 Mountain  guns,  64  men  of  the  72nd,  and 
60  Guides,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  H.  Clarke, 
to  hold  the  hill. 

To  aid  Baker  in  his  difficult  task,  I brought  four  guns  into  action 
near  the  north-west  corner  of  the  cantonment,  and  I signalled  to  Mac- 
pherson  to  give  him  every  possible  assistance.  Macpherson  at  once 
sent  the  67th  across  the  Kabul  river  to  threaten  the  enemy’s  left  rear ; 
while  the  marksmen  of  the  regiment  and  the  Mountain  guns  opened 
fire  from  the  northern  slope  of  the  Bala  Hissar  heights. 

The  enemy  fought  with  the  greatest  obstinacy,  but  eventually  our 
troops  reached  the  top  of  the  hill,  where,  on  the  highest  point,  a 
number  of  ghazis  had  taken  their  stand,  determined  to  sell  their  lives 
dearly. 

All  this  I eagerly  watched  from  my  place  of  observation.  There 
was  a fierce  struggle,  and  then,  to  my  intense  relief,  I saw  our  men  on 
the  topmost  pinnacle,  and  I knew  the  position  was  gained.* 

* Lance-Corporal  George  Sellar,  of  the  72nd  Highlanders,  was  given  the 
Victoria  Cross  for  gallantry  on  this  occasion. 


LOSS  OF  THE  CONICAL  HILL 


445 


1879] 

It  was  now  a little  past  noon,  and  I was  becoming  anxious  about  the 
party  left  on  the  conical  hill,  as  Macpherson  had  heliographed  that 
very  largo  bodies  of  Afghans  were  moving  northwards  from  Indiki, 
with  the  intention,  apparently,  of  effecting  a junction  with  the  tribes- 
men who  were  occupying  the  hills  in  the  Kohistan  direction.  I therefore 
signalled  to  Baker  to  leave  the  67th  in  charge  of  the  Asmai  heights, 
and  himself  return  to  the  lower  ridge,  giving  him  my  reasons. 

Baker  at  once  despatched  a detachment  of  the  5th  Punjab  Infantry, 
under  Captain  Hall,  to  reinforce  Clarke,  who  I could  see  might  soon 
be  hard  pressed,  and  I sent  200  rifles  of  the  3rd  Sikhs  (the  only  troops 
available  at  the  moment)  to  his  assistance. 

I watched  what  was  taking  place  on  the  conical  hill  through  my 
telescope,  and  was  startled  to  perceive  that  the  enemy  were,  unnoticed 
by  him,  creeping  close  up  to  Clarke’s  position.  I could  just  see  a long 
Afghan  knife  appear  above  the  ridge,  steadily  mounting  higher  and 
higher,  the  bearer  of  which  was  being  concealed  by  the  contour  of  the 
hill,  and  I knew  it  was  only  one  of  the  many  weapons  which  were 
being  carried  by  our  enemies  to  the  attack.  The  reinforcements  were 
still  some  distance  off,  and  m3’  heart  sank  within  me,  for  I felt 
convinced  that  after  our  recent  victories  the  Afghans  w’ould  never 
venture  to  cross  the  open  and  attack  British  soldiers  unless  an 
overwhelming  superiority  of  numbers  made  success  appear  to  them  a 
certainty.  Next  I heard  the  boom  of  guns  and  the  rattle  of  musket^’, 
and  a minute  or  two  later  (which,  in  my  anxiety,  seemed  an  eternity 
to  me),  I only  too  plainly  saw  our  men  retreating  down  the  hill, 
closely  followed  by  the  enem3’.  The  retirement  was  being  conducted 
steadily  and  slowdy,  but  from  that  moment  I realized,  what  is  hard  for 
a British  soldier,  how  much  harder  for  a British  commander,  to  realize, 
that  we  were  over-matched,  and  that  we  could  not  hold  our  ground. 

Clarke,*  as  well  as  every  man  writh  him,  fought  splendidly:  the 
Afghans  by  force  of  numbers  alone  made  themselves  masters  of  the 
position  and  captured  two  guns.f 

* Clarke  never  recovered  the  loss  of  this  post.  He  and  I had  been  cadets 
together  at  Sandhurst,  and  I often  visited  him  while  he  was  in  hospital  at 
Sherpur.  He  was  apparently  suffering  from  no  disease,  but  gradually  faded 
away,  and  died  not  long  after  he  reached  India. 

f General  Baker,  in  his  despatch,  stated  that  ‘No  blame  for  the  loss  of 
these  guns  is  in  any  way  to  be  attached  to  the  officers  and  men  of  No.  2 
Mountain  Batteiy.  . . . Every  credit  is  due  to  Captain  Swinley,  the  late 
Lieutenant  Montanaro,  and  Lieutenant  Liddell,  and  the  several  Native 
officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  composing  the  gun  detachments, 
for  the  gallant  manner  in  which  they  stood  to  their  guns  to  the  last,  and  it 
was  only  on  the  suddeD  rush  of  this  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy  that 
they  had  to  retire  with  the  loss  of  two  guns.’ 

Of  the  men  composing  the  gun  detachments,  one  was  killed  and  six 
w’ounded,  and  Surgeon-Major  Joshua  Duke  was  specially  mentioned  for  his 
attention  to  the  wounded  under  heavy  fire. 


446 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

While  all  that  I ha^e  described  was  going  on,  the  enemy  began  to 
collect  again  on  Siah  Sang,  and  to  make  then-  way  round  the  eastern 
flank  of  the  cantonment  towards  Kohistan. 

I had  sent  orders  in  the  morning  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Williams, 
who  was  quartered  with  his  regiment  (the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry)  in  the 
King’s  Garden,  between  Slierpur  and  the  city,  to  be  on  the  look-out, 
and  not  to  allow  any  of  the  enemy  to  pass  in  that  direction.  About 
1 p.m.  some  400  Afghans  were  observed  moving  along  the  left  bank  of 
the  river:  these  were  met  by  Captain  Vousden  of  the  same  regiment, 
who  with  one  troop  was  employed  in  reconnoitring ; he  most  gallantly 
charged  in  amongst  them  with  only  twelve  of  his  men,  the  remainder 
being  effectually  stopped  by  a heavy  fire  opened  upon  them  from 
behind  a low  wall.  Vousden  succeeded  in  dispersing  these  heavy 
odds,  and  in  inflicting  severe  loss  upon  them — a very  brilliant  service, 
for  which  he  received  the  Victoria  Cross. 

My  object  throughout  these  operations  had  been,  as  I hope  I have 
made  clear,  to  break  up  the  combination  by  dealing  with  the  enemy  in 
detail,  and  preventing  them  getting  possession  of  the  city  and  the  Bala 
Hissar. 

Up  till  noon  on  the  14th  I had  no  idea  of  the  extraordinary  numbers 
they  were  able  to  bring  together,  and  I had  no  reason  to  believe  that 
it  would  be  possible  for  them  to  cope  with  disciplined  troops  ; but  the 
manner  in  which  the  conical  hill  had  been  retaken  gave  me  a more 
correct  idea  of  their  strength  and  determination,  and  shook  my  con- 
fidence in  the  ability  of  my  comparatively  small  force  to  resist  the 
ever-increasing  hordes,  on  ground  which  gave  every  advantage  to 
numerical  superiority.  It  was  a bitter  thought  that  it  might  be  my 
duty  to  retire  for  a time  within  the  defences  of  Sherpur,  a measure 
which  would  involve  the  abandonment  of  the  city  and  the  Bala  Hissar, 
and  which  I knew,  moreover,  would  give  heart  to  the  tribesmen. 

I had  to  decide  at  once  on  the  course  I ought  to  pursue,  for,  if  I 
continued  to  act  on  the  defensive,  food  and  ammunition  must  be  sent 
before  dark  to  Macpherson’s  brigade,  occupying  the  hills  above  the  city, 
and  arrangements  must  be  made  for  Baker’s  retention  of  the  Asmai 
heights.  I heliographed  to  Macpherson  to  inquire  the  direction  in 
which  the  enemy  were  moving,  and  whether  their  numbers  were  still 
increasing.  He  replied  that  large  masses  were  steadily  advancing  from 
north,  south,  and  west,  and  that  their  numbers  were  momentarily 
becoming  greater,  to  which  the  young  officer  in  charge  of  the  signalling 
station  added,  ‘ Tho  crowds  of  Afghans  in  the  Chardeh  valley  remind 
me  of  Epsom  on  the  Derby  day.’ 

This  decided  me ; I determined  to  withdraw  from  all  isolated 
positions,  and  concentrate  my  force  at  Sherpur,  thereby  securing  the 
safety  of  the  cantonment  and  avoiding  what  had  now  become  a useless 
sacrifice  of  life.  I only  too  thoroughly  recognized  the  evils  of  the 


THE  RETIREMENT  TO  SHERPUP. 


447 


1879] 

measure,  but  I considered  that  no  other  course  would  be  justifiable, 
and  that  I must  act  for  the  present  entirely  on  the  defensive,  and 
wait  until  the  growing  confidence  of  the  enemy  should  afford  me  a 
favourable  opportunity  for  attacking  them,  or  until  reinforcements 
could  arrive. 

The  inevitable  order  reached  the  two  Generals  at  2 p.m.,  and  the 
retirement  was  begun  at  once.  The  Afghans  speedily  discovered  the 
retrograde  movement,  and  no  sooner  had  each  post  in  its  turn  been 
evacuated  than  it  was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  who  pressed  our  troops 
the  whole  way  back  to  the  cantonment.  There  was  hand-to-hand 
fighting,  and  many  splendid  acts  of  courage  were  performed,  Major 
Hammond,  of  the  Guides,  earning  the  Victoria  Cross ; but  throughout 
there  was  no  hurry  or  confusion,  all  was  conducted  with  admirable 
coolness  and  skill,  and  shortly  after  dark  the  troops  and  baggage  were 
safe  inside  Sherpur.  That  night  the  Afghans  occupied  the  city  and 
the  Bala  Hissar. 

It  is  comparatively  easy  for  a small  body  of  well-trained  soldiers, 
such  as  those  of  which  the  army  in  India  is  composed,  to  act  on  the 
offensive  against  Asiatics,  however  powerful  they  may  be  in  point  of 
numbers.  There  rs  something  in  the  determined  advance  of  a compact, 
disciplined  body  of  troops  which  they  can  seldom  resist.  But  a retire- 
ment is  a different  matter.  They  become  full  of  confidence  and  valour 
the  moment  they  see  any  signs  of  their  opponents  being  unable  to 
resist  them,  and  if  there  is  the  smallest  symptom  of  unsteadiness, 
wavering,  or  confusion,  a disaster  is  certain  to  occur.  It  may  be 
imagined,  therefore,  with  what  intense  anxiety  I watched  for  hours  the 
withdrawal.  The  ground  was  all  in  favour  of  the  Afghans,  who,  un- 
impeded by  impedimenta  of  any  kind,  swarmed  down  upon  the  mere 
handful  of  men  retreating  before  them,  shouting  cries  of  victory  and 
brandishing  their  long  knives ; but  our  brave  men,  inspired  by  the 
undaunted  bearing  of  their  officers,  were  absolutely  steady.  They 
took  up  position  after  position  with  perfect  coolness  ; every  movement 
was  carried  out  with  as  much  precision  as  if  they  were  manoeuvring  on 
an  ordinary  field-day ; and  the  killed  and  wounded  were  brought  away 
without  the  slightest  hurry  or  confusion.  In  fact,  the  whole  of  the 
hazardous  operation  was  most  successfully  and  admirably  carried  out ; 
and  as  each  regiment  and  detachment  filed  through  the  Head-Quarters 
gateway  I was  able  to  offer  my  warm  congratulations  and  heartfelt 
thanks  to  my  gallant  comrades. 

Our  losses  during  the  day  were  : 19  killed,  including  Captain  Spens 
and  Lieutenant  Gaisford,  72nd  Highlanders,  and  88  wounded,  amongst 
whom  were  Captain  Gordon,  92nd  Highlanders,  Lieutenant  Egerton, 
72nd  Highlanders,  and  Captain  Bittye,  of  the  Guides.* 

* The  same  officer  who  so  gallantly  met  his  death  during  the  recent  Chitral 
campaign,  while  commanding  the  regiment  of  which  he  was  so  justly  proud, 


448 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


CHAPTER  LVII. 

The  moment  the  gates  were  closed  I telegraphed  the  result  of  the  day’s 
operations  to  the  Viceroy  and  Commander-in-Chief,  for  I knew  that  the 
enemy’s  first  thought  would  be  to  stop  communication  with  India  by 
cutting  the  telegraph-wires.  I reported  that  I had  ordered  Brigadier- 
General  Charles  Gough’s  brigade  to  push  on  from  Gandamak  as  fast 
as  possible ; and  I recommended  that  General  Bright  should  have  more 
troops  sent  up  to  him,  to  allow  of  his  keeping  open  the  route  to  Kabul, 
and  of  his  reinforcing  me  should  I find  it  impossible  to  clear  the 
country  with  the  force  at  my  disposal.  It  was  a satisfaction  to  be  able 
to  assure  the  authorities  in  these,  to  me,  otherwise  painful  telegrams, 
that  there  was  no  cause  for  anxiety  as  to  the  safety  of  the  troops  ; that 
sufficient  supplies  for  men  were  stored  in  Sherpur  for  nearly  four 
months,  and  for  animals  for  six  weeks ; that  there  was  abundance  of 
firewood,  medicines,  and  hospital  comforts,  and  sufficient  ammunition 
both  for  guns  and  rifles  to  admit  of  an  active  resistance  being  carried 
on  for  between  three  and  four  months. 

It  was  fortunate  there  was  no  lack  of  provisions,  for  our  numbers 
were  considerably  increased  by  the  presence  of  Wali  Mahomed  Khan 
and  many  other  Sirdars,  who  begged  for  shelter  in  Sherpur,  on  the  plea 
that  their  lives  would  not  be  safe  were  they  to  return  to  the  city.  They 
were  far  from  being  welcome  guests,  for  I could  not  trust  them ; 
ostensibly,  however,  they  were  our  friends,  and  I could  not  refuse 
their  petition.  I therefore  admitted  them,  on  condition  that  each 
Sirdar  should  only  be  accompanied  by  a specified  number  of  followers. 

The  stormy  occurrences  of  the  14th  were  succeeded  by  a period  of 
comparative  calm,  during  which  the  entrenchments  were  strengthened, 
and  the  heavy  guns  found  in  the  Kabul  arsenal  were  prepared  for 
service. 

The  great  drawback  to  Sherpur,  as  I have  already  mentioned,  was 
its  extent  and  the  impossibility  of  reducing  the  line  of  defences  owing 
to  the  length  of  the  Bimaru  ridge.  The  cantonment  was  in  the  form 
of  a parallelogram,  with  the  Bimaru  heights  running  along,  and  pro- 
tecting, the  northern  side.  Between  this  range  and  the  hills,  which 
form  the  southern  boundary  of  Kohistan,  lay  a lake,  or  rather  jhil,  a 
barrier  between  which  and  the  commanding  Bimaru  ridge  no  enemy 
would  dare  to  advance. 

The  massive  wall  on  the  south  and  west  faces  was  twenty  feet  high, 
covered  at  a distance  of  thirty  feet  by  a lower  wall  fifteen  feet  high ; 
the  southern  wall  was  pierced  at  intervals  of  about  700  yards  by  gate- 

and  in  which  two  brave  brothers  had  been  killed  before  him — Quinton  at 
Delhi,  and  Wigram  during  the  first  phase  of  the  Afghan  war. 


1879] 


SHERPUR 


449 


ways,  three  in  number,  protected  by  lofty  circular  bastions,  and  be- 
tween these  and  at  the  four  corners  were  a series  of  low  bastions 
which  gave  an  admirable  flanking  fire.  The  wall  on  the  western  flank 
was  of  similar  construction,  but  had  been  considerably  damaged  at  the 
northern  end,  evidently  by  an  explosion  of  gunpowder. 

The  weak  part  of  our  defence  was  on  the  eastern  face,  where  the 
wall,  which  had  never  been  completed,  was  only  seven  feet  high,  and 
did  not  extend  for  more  than  700  yards  from  the  south-east  corner ; the 
line  then  ran  to  the  north-west,  and,  skirting  the  village  of  Bimaru, 
ended  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge. 

From  this  description  it  will  be  seen  that,  though  the  perimeter*  of 
Sherpur  was  rather  too  large  for  a force  of  7,000  effective  men  to  de- 
fend, its  powers  of  resistance,  both  natural  and  artificial,  were  consider- 
able. It  was  absolutely  necessary  to  hold  the  Bimaru  ridge  for  its 
entire  length ; to  have  given  up  any  part  of  it  would  have  been  to 
repeat  the  mistake  which  proved  so  disastrous  to  Elphinstone’s  army 
in  1841 . In  fact,  the  Bimaru  heights  were  at  once  the  strength  and 
the  weakness  of  the  position.  So  long  as  we  could  hold  the  heights  we 
were  safe  from  attack  from  the  north ; but  if  we  had  been  forced, 
either  from  the  weakness  of  our  own  garrison,  or  from  any  other  cause, 
to  relinquish  the  command  of  this  natural  barrier,  the  whole  of  the 
cantonment  must  have  lain  open  to  the  enemy,  and  must  forthwith 
have  become  untenable. 

The  question  of  how  Sherpur  could  best  be  defended  had  been  care- 
fully considered  by  a committee, f assembled  by  my  orders  soon  after 
our  arrival  in  Kabul ; and  a scheme  had  been  drawn  up  detailing  the 
measures  which  should  be  adopted  in  case  of  attack. 

On  the  recommendation  of  this  committee  six  towers  had  been  con- 
structed on  the  Bimaru  heights,  and  shelter  trenches  and  gunpits  made 
at  the  points  where  Infantry  and  Artillery  fire  could  be  used  with  the 
greatest  advantage.  These  trenches  were  now  deepened  and  pro- 
longed, so  as  to  form  one  continuous  line  of  defence,  protected  by  an 
abattis ; and  the  defences  in  the  depression  between  the  heights  were 
so  arranged  that  fire  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  an  enemy  advancing 
from  the  north.  To  strengthen  the  north-east  comer,  a battery  was 
thrown  up  on  the  slope  of  the  ridge,  which  was  connected  with  the 
tower  above  and  the  village  below.  The  village  itself  was  loop-holed, 
the  outlying  buildings  to  the  front  made  defensible,  and  the  open  space 
to  the  north-east  secured  by  abattis  and  wire  entanglements.  The 
Native  Field  Hospital  was  strengthened  in  like  manner,  and  sand-bag 
parapets  were  piled  upon  the  roof,  which  was  somewhat  exposed. 

* Four  and  a half  miles. 

+ The  committee  consisted  of  Brigadier-General  T.  D.  Baker,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  iE.  Perkins,  commanding  Royal  Engineers,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
B.  Gordon,  commanding  Royal  Artillery. 


450 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 

The  unfinished  wall  on  the  eastern  face  was  raised  by  logs  of  wood, 
and  abattis  and  wire  entanglements  were  placed  in  front.  In  the  open 
space  lying  between  the  Bimaru  ridge  and  the  north-west  circular 
bastion,  a defence  on  the  laager  system  was  constructed  out  of  gun- 
carriages  and  limbers  captured  from  the  enemy ; while  the  village  of 
Ghulam  Hasan  Khan,  which  formed  an  excellent  flanking  defence 
along  the  northern  and  western  faces,  was  held  as  an  independent 
post. 

I divided  the  whole  of  the  defences  into  five  sections,  under  the 
superintendence  of  five  different  commanders : Brigadier-General  Mac- 
pherson,  Colonel  Jenkins,  Brigadier  - General  Hugh  Gough,  Major- 
General  Hills,  and  Colonel  Brownlow.  Brigadier- General  Massy  was 
given  the  centre  of  the  cantonment,  where  were  collected  the  forage 
and  firewood ; and  Brigadier-General  Baker  commanded  the  reserve, 
which  was  formed  up  at  the  depression  in  the  Bimaru  heights  men- 
tioned above,  that  he  might  be  able  to  move  rapidly  to  either  end  of  the 
ridge,  the  weakest  points  in  our  defences. 

The  several  sections  were  connected  with  each  other  and  with  my 
Head-Quarters  by  a telegraph-wire,  and  visual  signalling  was  established 
at  all  important  points. 

In  my  arrangements  for  the  defence  of  Sherpur  I relied  to  a great 
extent  on  the  advice  of  my  accomplished  Chief  Engineer,  Colonel 
iEneas  Perkins,  and  it  was  mainly  owing  to  him,  and  to  the  exertions 
of  his  competent  staff,  that  the  work  was  carried  on  as  rapidly  and 
satisfactorily  as  it  was. 

During  these  days  of  preparation  the  enemy  remained  comparatively 
inactive,  being  chiefly  employed  in  looting  the  city  and  emptying  the 
Amir’s  arsenal.  The  gunpowder  had  been  destroyed  as  far  as  possible; 
but  a great  deal  still  remained,  and  many  tons  of  it  were  carried  off  by 
the  army  of  Mahomed  Jan,  who  had  now  become  the  practical  leader 
of  the  Afghan  combination,  and  had  lately  proclaimed  Yakub  Khan’s 
eldest  son,  Musa  Khan,  Amir. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  16th  I received  the  welcome  news  that 
Colonel  Hudson  had  successfully  resisted  an  attack  on  his  position  by 
the  Ghilzais — welcome  because  I could  now  feel  assured  that  Lataband 
could  be  depended  upon  to  hold  its  own. 

For  the  next  five  days  nothing  of  much  importance  was  done  on 
either  side.  The  enemy  took  up  positions  daily  in  the  neighbouring 
forts  and  gardens,  causing  a few  casualties,  and  some  of  our  troops 
moved  out  to  dislodge  them  from  those  places  from  which  they  could 
specially  annoy  us.  I destroyed  some  of  the  forts,  and  removed  other 
cover  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  walls  ; but  I did  not  undertake 
any  large  sorties,  for  to  have  attempted  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the 
outlying  posts,  which  I could  not  then  have  held,  would  have  been  a 
useless  waste  of  strength. 


THE  LAAGER  ANI)  ABATTIS  NORTH-WEST  CORNER,  SHERPUR,  DECEMBER  23,  187‘.i 


ARREST  OF  DAUD  SHAH 


45i 


1879] 

My  chief  trouble  at  this  time  was  the  presence  of  the  Afghan  Sirdars 
within  the  cantonment.  I had  good  reason  to  believe  that  some  of 
them,  though  full  of  protestations  of  friendship,  had  been  in  com- 
munication with  Mahomed  Jan,  the  high-priest  Mushk-i-Alam  and 
other  Afghan  leaders,  so  that  I felt  sure  that  neither  they  nor  their 
followers  were  to  be  depended  upon.  I was  also  somewhat  anxious 
about  the  Pathan  soldiers  in  our  ranks,  a feeling  which  I was  unwilling 
to  acknowledge  even  to  myself,  for  they  had  hitherto  behaved  with 
marked  loyalty,  and  done  splendid  service ; but  they  were  now  being 
exposed  to  a most  severe  trial,  in  that  they  were,  as  I knew,  being  con- 
stantly appealed  to  by  their  co- religionists  to  join  in  the  jahad  against 
us,  and  bitterly  reproached  for  serving  their  infidel  masters.  Whether 
they  would  be  strong  enough  to  resist  such  appeals,  it  was  impossible 
to  tell ; but  it  would  have  been  most  unwise,  as  well  as  most  painful  to 
me,  to  show  the  slightest  suspicion  of  these  fine  soldiers.  It  happened 
that  the  Corps  of  Guides  and  5th  Punjab  Infantry,  which  had  of  all 
regiments  the  largest  number  of  Mahomedans  amongst  them,  were 
located  at  the  two  extremities  of  the  Bimaru  range,  the  points  most 
likely  to  be  attacked ; to  have  made  any  change  in  the  disposition 
would  have  been  to  show  that  they  were  suspected,  so  I determined 
(after  taking  their  commanding  officers,  Colonels  Jenkins  and 
McQueen,  into  my  confidence)  to  leave  them  where  they  were,  and 
merely  to  strengthen  each  post  by  a couple  of  companies  of  High- 
landers. 

I was  also  considerably  exercised  about  the  safety  of  the  large  stacks 
of  firewood,  grain,  and  forage,  for  if  anything  had  happened  to  them 
we  could  not  have  continued  to  hold  Sherpur.  There  were  not  enough 
British  soldiers  to  furnish  guards  for  these  stacks,  so  I was  obliged  to 
have  them  watched  for  a time  by  officers ; an  opportune  fall  of  snow, 
however,  on  the  night  of  the  18th,  rendered  incendiarism  impossible. 

One  other  extremely  unpleasant  precaution  I felt  it  my  duty  to  take 
was  the  placing  of  Daud  Shah,  Yakub  Khan’s  Commander-in-Chief, 
under  arrest.  I liked  the  man,  and  he  had  mixed  freely  with  us  all  for 
more  than  two  months.  He  was  not,  however,  absolutely  above 
suspicion  : some  of  his  near  relatives  were  the  most  prominent  amongst 
our  enemies;  and  I had  been  struck  by  a change  in  his  manner 
towards  me  of  late.  In  trusting  him  to  the  extent  I had  done,  I acted 
against  the  opinion  of  almost  everyone  about  me,  and  now  that  I had 
a doubt  myself,  I felt  I was  not  justified  in  leaving  him  at  liberty,  for 
if  he  were  disposed  to  make  use  of  his  opportunities  to  our  disadvan- 
tage, his  unrestrained  freedom  of  movement  and  observation  would  be 
certainly  a source  of  great  danger. 

For  three  or  four  days  cloudy  weather  prevented  heliograph  com- 
munication with  Lataband.  and  messengers  sent  by  Hudson  had  failed 
to  reach  Sherpur,  so  that  we  were  without  any  news  from  the  outer 

30 


FORTY. ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


452 


[1879 


world ; but  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  I received  a letter  from 
Brigadier-General  Charles  Gough,  conveying  the  disappointing  intelli- 
gence that  he  had  only  got  as  far  as  Jagdalak,  twenty-one  miles  from 
Gandamak,  and  that  he  did  not  consider  himself  strong  enough  to 
advance  on  Kabul. 

Gough  no  doubt  felt  himself  in  an  awkward  position.  The  line  to 
his  rear  was  weakly  held,  the  telegraph-wire  on  both  sides  of  him  was 
cut,  his  rear  guard  had  been  attacked  near  Jagdalak,  there  was  a con- 
siderable collection  of  men  on  the  hills  to  his  front,  and,  as  he  reported, 

‘ the  whole  country  was  up.’  Moreover,  Major-General  Bright,  under 
whom  Gough  was  immediately  serving,  shared  his  opinion  that  it 
would  be  wiser  for  him  to  wait  until  reinforcements  came  up  from  the 
rear. 

Gough,  however,  had  with  him  4 Mountain  guns  and  125  Artillerymen, 
73  Sappers  and  Miners,  222  Native  Cavalry,  487  British  Infantry,  and 
474  Gurkhas ; in  all,  1,381  men,  besides  36  officers — not  a very  large 
force,  but  composed  of  excellent  material,  and  large  enough,  I con- 
sidered, augmented,  as  it  would  be,  by  the  Lataband  detachment,  to 
move  safely  on  Kabul.  I had  no  hesitation,  therefore,  in  sending 
Gough  peremptory  orders  to  advance  without  delay,  thus  relieving  him 
of  all  responsibility  in  the  event  of  anything  unexpected  occurring. 

Hudson,  at  Lataband,  as  has  already  been  recorded,  was  only 
victualled  until  the  23rd,  before  which  date  I had  calculated  that 
Gough  would  surely  have  relieved  the  garrison  and  brought  the  troops 
away.  But  now  all  was  uncertain,  and  it  was  incumbent  upon  me  to 
send  them  food.  The  difficulty  as  to  how  to  get  supplies  to  Lataband 
was  solved  by  some  Hazaras,  who  had  been  working  in  our  camp  for 
several  weeks,  volunteering  to  convey  what  was  necessary,  and  it  was 
arranged  that  the  provisions  should  be  sent  with  two  parties,  one  on 
the  19th,  the  other  on  the  20th.  The  first  got  through  safely,  but  the 
second  almost  entirely  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  21st  a heliogram  from  Hudson  informed  me  that  Gough’s 
brigade  was  expected  the  next  day ; but  as  it  had  been  found  necessary 
to  drop  his  Cavalry  at  the  several  posts  he  passed  on  the  way  for  their 
better  protection,  I deemed  it  expedient  to  send  him  the  12th  Bengal 
Cavalry,  for  he  had  to  pass  through  some  fairly  open  country  near 
Butkhak,  where  they  might  possibly  be  of  use  to  him.  Accordingly, 
they  started  at  3 a.m.  on  the  22nd,  with  instructions  to  halt  at 
Butkhak  should  that  post  be  unoccupied,  otherwise  to  push  on  to 
Lataband. 

Finding  the  former  place  in  possession  of  the  Afghans,  Major 
Green,  who  was  in  command  of  the  regiment,  made  for  the  further 
post,  where  he  arrived  with  the  loss  of  only  three  men  killed  and 
three  wounded. 

It  was  not  easy  to  get  reliable  information  as  to  the  movements  or 


RUMOURS  OF  AN  ASSAULT 


453 


i879l 

intentions  of  the  enemy  while  we  were  surrounded  in  Sherpur ; but 
from  spies  who  managed  to  pass  to  and  from  the  city  under  cover  of 
night,  I gathered  that  plans  were  being  made  to  attack  us. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  the  21st  that  there  were  any  very  great 
signs  of  activity.  On  that  and  the  following  day  the  several  posts  to 
the  east  of  the  cantonment  were  occupied  preparatory  to  an  attack 
from  that  quarter ; and  I was  told  that  numbers  of  scaling-ladders 
were  being  constructed.  This  looked  like  business.  Next,  information 
was  brought  in  that,  in  all  the  mosques,  mullas  were  making  frantic 
appeals  to  the  people  to  unite  in  one  final  effort  to  exterminate  the 
infidel ; and  that  the  aged  Mushk-i-Alam  was  doing  all  in  his  power  to 
fan  the  flame  of  fanaticism,  promising  to  light  with  his  own  hand  at 
dawn  on  the  23rd  (the  last  day  of  the  Moharram,  when  religious 
exaltation  amongst  Mahomedans  is  at  its  height)  the  beacon-fire  which 
was  to  be  the  signal  for  assault. 

The  night  of  the  22nd  was  undisturbed,  save  by  the  songs  and  cries 
of  the  Afghans  outside  the  walls,  but  just  before  day  the  flames  of  the 
signal-fire,  shooting  upwards  from  the  topmost  crag  of  the  Asmai 
range,  were  painly  to  be  seen,  followed  on  the  instant  by  a burst  of 
firing. 

Our  troops  were  already  under  arms  and  at  their  posts,  waiting  for 
the  assault,  which  commenced  with  heavy  firing  against  the  eastern 
and  southern  faces.  The  most  determined  attack  was  directed  against 
the  two  sections  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough  and 
Colonel  Jenkins,  who  by  their  able  dispositions  proved  themselves 
worthy  of  the  confidence  I had  reposed  in  them. 

It  was  too  dark  at  first  to  see  anything  in  front  of  the  walls,  and 
orders  wrere  given  to  reserve  fire  until  the  advancing  masses  of  the 
assailants  could  be  clearly  made  out.  Gough's  Mountain  guns,  under 
Lieutenant  Shirres,  then  fired  star-shells,  which  disclosed  the 
attacking  force  up  to  a thousand  yards  off.  The  28th  Punjab 
Infantry  were  the  first  to  open  fire ; then  the  Guides,  the  67th.  and 
92nd,  each  in  their  turn,  greeted  by  their  volleys  the  ghazis  who 
approached  close  to  the  walls.  Guns  from  every  battery  opened  on 
the  foe  moving  forward  to  the  attack,  and  from  7 to  10  a.m.  the  fight 
was  carried  on.  Repeated  attempts  were  made  to  scale  the  south- 
eastern wall,  and  many  times  the  enemy  got  up  as  far  as  the  abattis, 
but  were  repulsed,  heaps  of  dead  marking  the  spots  where  these 
attempts  had  been  most  persistent.* 

* A curious  exemplification  of  the  passive  courage  and  indifference  to 
danger  of  some  Natives  was  the  behaviour  of  an  old  Mahomedan  servant  of 
mine.  At  this  juncture,  just  at  the  time  when  the  fight  was  hottest,  and  I 
was  receiving  reports  every  few  seconds  from  the  officers  commanding  the 
several  posts,  Eli  Bux  (a  brother  of  the  man  who  had  been  with  me  throughout 
the  Mutiny)  whispered  in  my  ear  that  my  bath  was  ready.  He  was  quite 

30—2 


454 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1879 


Soon  after  10  a.m.  there  was  a slight  lull  in  the  fighting,  leading  us 
to  believe  that  the  Afghans  were  recoiling  before  the  breechloaders. 
An  hour  later,  however,  the  assault  grew  hot  as  ever,  and  finding  we 
could  not  drive  the  enemy  back  by  any  fire  which  could  be  brought 
against  them  from  the  defences,  I resolved  to  attack  them  in  flank. 
Accordingly,  I directed  Major  Craster,  with  four  Field  Artillery  guns, 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Williams,  with  the  5th  Punjab  Cavalry,  to 
move  out  over  the  hollow  in  the  Bimaru  range  and  open  fire  on  a 
body  of  the  enemy  collected  in  and  around  the  village  of  Kurja  Kila. 
This  fire  had  the  desired  effect ; the  Afghans  wavered  and  broke. 

From  that  moment  the  attacking  force  appeared  to  lose  heart,  the 
assault  was  no  longer  prosecuted  with  the  same  vigour,  and  by  1 p.m. 
it  had  ceased  altogether,  and  the  enemy  were  in  full  flight. 

This  was  the  Cavalry’s  opportunity.  I ordered  Massy  to  follow  in 
pursuit  with  every  available  man,  and  before  nightfall  all  the  open 
ground  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Sherpur  was  cleared  of  the  enemy. 
Simultaneously  with  the  movement  of  the  Cavalry,  a party  was 
despatched  to  destroy  some  villages  near  the  southern  wall  which  had 
caused  us  much  trouble,  and  whence  it  was  necessary  the  enemy 
should  be  driven,  to  facilitate  the  entrance  of  Brigadier-General 
Charles  Gough  the  next  day,  for  that  officer  had  arrived  with  his 
brigade  within  about  six  miles  of  Sherpur,  where  I could  see  his  tents, 
and  gathered  from  the  fact  of  his  pitching  them  that  he  meant  to  halt 
there  for  the  night.  The  villages  were  found  to  be  occupied  by  ghazis, 
who  refused  to  surrender,  preferring  to  remain  and  perish  in  the 
buildings,  which  were  then  blown  up.  Two  gallant  Engineer  officers 
(Captain  Dundas,  Y.C.,  and  Lieutenant  C.  Nugent)  were  most  unfor- 
tunately killed  in  carrying  out  this  duty. 

The  relief  I felt  when  I had  gathered  my  force  inside  the  walls  of 
Sherpur  on  the  evening  of  the  14th  December  was  small  compared  to 
that  which  I experienced  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  when  I realized 
that  not  only  had  the  assault  been  abandoned,  but  that  the  great 
tribal  combination  had  dissolved,  and  that  not  a man  of  the  many 
thousands  who  had  been  opposed  to  us  the  previous  day  remained  in 
any  of  the  villages,  or  on  the  surrounding  hills.  It  was  difficult  to 
form  an  accurate  estimate  of  the  numbers  opposed  to  us.  As  the 
Contingent  from  the  more  distant  districts  advanced,  they  received 
accessions  from  every  place  they  passed,  and  as  they  neared  Kabul 
they  were  joined  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  numerous  villages,  and  by 
the  disaffected  in  the  city  It  was  calculated  by  those  best  able  to 
judge  that  the  combined  forces  exceeded  100,000,  and  I myself  do  not 
think  that  an  excessive  computation. 


unmoved  by  the  din  and  shots,  and  was  carrying  on  bis  ordinary  duties  as  if 
nothing  at  all  unusual  was  occurring. 


&WVLr 


1879]  COMMUNICATION  WITH  INDIA  RE  OPENED 


455 


Our  casualties  between  the  15th  and  23rd  wore  remarkably  few : 
2 officers,  9 men,  and  7 followers  killed,  and  5 officers,  41  men,  and 
22  followers  wounded ; while  the  enemy  lost  not  less  than  3,000. 

I think  I had  great  reason  to  be  proud  of  my  force.  All  night  and 
every  night,  the  ground  covered  with  snow  and  the  thermometer 
marking  sixteen  degrees  of  frost,  officers  and  men  were  at  their  posts, 
and  each  day  every  available  man  had  to  be  hard  at  work  strengthening 
the  defences.  Native  and  European  soldiers  alike  bore  the  hardships 
and  exposure  with  the  utmost  cheerfulness,  and  in  perfect  confidence 
that,  when  the  assault  should  take  place,  victory  would  be  ours. 

Early  on  the  24th  the  fort  of  Mahomed  Sharif  was  occupied,  and  a 
force  moved  out  to  escort  Charles  Gough’s  brigade  into  Sherpur,  a 
precaution  which,  however,  was  hardly  necessary,  as  there  was  no 
enemy  to  bo  seen. 

I next  set  to  work  to  re  open  communication  with  India.  Butkhak 
was  re-occupied,  and  the  relaying  of  the  telegraph  was  taken  in  hand. 
General  Hills  resumed  his  position  as  military  Governor  of  Kabul ; the 
dispensary  and  hospital  were  re-established  in  the  city  under  the 
energetic  and  intelligent  guidance  of  Surgeon-Captain  Owen  ;*  and  in 
the  hope  of  reassuring  the  people,  I issued  the  following  Proclamation  : 

‘ At  the  instigation  of  some  seditious  men,  the  ignorant  people,  generally 
not  considering  the  result,  raised  a rebellion.  Now  many  of  the  insurgents 
have  received  their  reward,  and  as  subjects  are  a trust  from  God,  the  British 
Government,  which  is  just  and  merciful,  as  well  as  strong,  has  forgiven  their 
guilt.  It  is  now  proclaimed  that  all  who  come  in  without  delay  will  be 
pardoned,  excepting  only  Mahomed  Jan  of  Wardak,  Mir  Baclia  of  Kohistan, 
Samandar  Khan  of  Logar,  Uhulam  Hyder  of  Chardeh,  ansi  the  murderers  of 
Sirdar  Mahomed  Hassan  Khan.  Come  and  make  your  submission  without 
fear,  of  whatsoever  tribe  you  may  be.  You  can  then  remain  in  your  houses 
in  comfort  and  safety,  and  no  harm  will  befall  you.  The  British  Government 
has  no  enmity  towards  the  people.  Anyone  who  rebels  again  will,  of  course, 
be  punished.  This  condition  is  necessary.  But  all  who  come  in  without 
delay  need  have  no  fear  or  suspicion  The  British  Government  speaks  only 
that  which  is  in  its  heart.’ 

The  effect  of  this  Proclamation  was  most  satisfactory  : the  city  and 
the  surrounding  country  quieted  rapidly,  shops  were  re-opened,  and 
before  the  close  of  the  year  the  bazaars  were  as  densely  thronged  as 
ever.  Most  of  the  principal  men  of  Logar  and  Kohistan  came  to  pay 
their  respects  to  me  ; they  were  treated  with  due  consideration,  and  the 
political  officers  did  all  they  could  to  find  out  xvhat  they  really  wanted, 

* This  hospital  was  admirably  managed,  and  was  attended  by  a large 
number  of  patients,  half  of  whom  were  women.  The  disease  most  prevalent 
in  Kabul  was  ophthalmia,  caused  by  dust,  dirt,  and  exposure,  while  cataract 
and  other  affections  of  the  eye  were  very  common.  Dr.  Owen,  amongst  his 
other  many  qualifications,  excelled  as  an  oculist,  and  his  marvellous  cures 
attracted  sufferers  from  all  parts  of  Afghanistan. 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


456 


[1879 


so  that  some  basis  of  an  arrangement  for  the  peaceful  administration 
of  the  country  might  be  arrived  at. 

While  taking  these  measures,  which  I thought  would  create  confi- 
dence in  our  clemency  and  justice,  I endeavoured  in  other  ways  to 
prevent  a repetition  of  further  serious  troubles.  Snow  was  still  deep 
on  the  ground,  but  I did  not  let  it  prevent  my  sending  General  Baker 
to  destroy  a fort  about  twenty  miles  off,  where  dwelt  an  influential 
malik,  who  was  one  of  the  chief  ringleaders  in  the  revolt.  All  walled 
enclosures  within  1,000  yards  of  the  cantonment  were  razed  to  the 
ground,  roads  fit  for  guns  were  made  all  round  the  outside  walls  and 
towards  the  several  gates  of  the  city  and  Siah  Sang,  while  two  bridges, 
strong  enough  for  Artillery  to  pass  over,  were  thrown  across  the  Kabul 
River. 

The  increased  numbers  to  be  accommodated  on  the  arrival  of  Gough’s 
brigade  necessitated  the  re-occupation  of  the  Bala  Hissar,  the  defences 
of  which  were  reconstructed  so  as  to  give  a continuous  line  of  fire,  and 
admit  of  free  circulation  round  the  walls ; roads  were  made  through 
the  lower  Bala  Hissar,  and  redoubts  and  towers  were  built  on  the 
Shahr-i-Darwaza  range. 

A strong  fort — Fort  Roberts— was  constructed  on  the  south-west 
point  of  Siah  Sang,  which  commanded  the  Bala  Hissar  and  the  city ; 
a smaller  one  was  built  at  the  crossing  of  the  river ; and  as  these  two 
forts  were  not  within  sight  of  each  other,  a tower  to  connect  them  was 
constructed  at  the  north-west  extremity  of  Siah  Sang. 

Sherpur  was  thus  made  safe  ; but  for  the  absolute  protection  of  the 
city  against  an  enemy  operating  from  the  Chardeh  direction,  a third 
fort  was  erected  on  the  Asmai  heights,  which  completed  a formidable 
line  of  defences  most  skilfully  carried  out  by  Colonel  Perkins  and  his 
staff. 


CHAPTER  LVIII. 

The  outlook  in  Afghanistan  on  the  1st  January,  1880,  was  fairly  satis- 
factory ; the  tidings  of  the  defeat  and  dispersion  of  the  tribesmen  had 
spread  far  and  wide,  and  had  apparently  had  the  effect  of  tranquillizing 
the  country  even  in  remote  Kandahar,  where  the  people  had  been 
greatly  excited  by  the  news  of  our  retiring  from  Sherpur,  and  by  the 
exaggerated  reports  of  their  countrymen’s  success.  No  complications 
now  existed  anywhere,  and  preparations  were  commenced  for  Sir 
Donald  Stewart’s  force  in  southern  Afghanistan  to  move  towards 
Ghazni,  in  anticipation  of  the  carrying  out  of  a complete  and  connected 
scheme*  for  the  pacification  of  the  country,  and  an  early  withdrawal 

* In  reply  to  a reference  made  to  me  on  the  subject,  I represented  that, 
before  operations  could  be  undertaken  on  so  extensive  a scale  as  was  proposed. 


TWO  IMPORTANT  QUESTIONS 


457 


1879] 

from  northern  Afghanistan.  No  withdrawal,  however,  would  be 
possible  until  durable  foundations  had  been  laid  for  the  future  safety  of 
the  Indian  frontier,  and  reliable  guarantees  given  for  the  continued 
good  behaviour  of  India’s  Afghan  neighbours. 

The  two  questions,  therefore,  which  chiefly  exercisod  the  minds  of 
people  in  authority,  both  in  England  and  in  India,  with  regard  to 
Afghan  affairs  were,  What  was  to  be  done  with  Afghanistan  now  we 
had  got  it  ? and,  Who  could  be  set  up  as  Ruler  with  any  chance  of 
being  able  to  hold  his  own  ? 

The  second  question  depended  a good  deal  on  the  decision  which 
might  be  arrived  at  with  regard  to  the  first,  for  the  selection  of  a Ruler 
could  hardly  bo  considered  until  it  had  been  determined  whether  the 
several  provinces  of  Afghanistan  were  to  be  again  formed  into  one 
kingdom,  or  whether  the  political  scheme  for  the  future  government 
of  the  country  should  be  based  on  the  separation  of  the  several  States. 

I myself  had  come  to  the  conclusion,  after  much  deliberation  and 
anxious  thought,  that  the  latter  course  was  the  least  dangerous  for  us 
to  adopt.  Disintegration  had  been  the  normal  condition  of  Afghanistan, 
except  for  a short  period  which  ended  as  far  back  as  1818.  Dost 
Mahomed  was  the  first  since  that  time  to  attempt  its  unification,  and 
it  took  him  (the  strongest  Amir  of  the  century)  eight  years  after  his 
restoration  to  establish  his  supremacy  over  Afghan-Turkestan,  fourteen 
years  before  Kandahar  acknowledged  his  authority,  and  twenty-one 
years  ere  he  got  possession  of  Herat,  a consummation  which  was 
achieved  only  just  before  his  death.  His  successor,  Sher  Ali,  was  five 
years  making  himself  master  of  Afghanistan,  and  he  could  never  have 
attained  that  position  but  for  the  material  assistance  he  received  from 
us.  I felt  it  would  be  in  the  future  as  it  had  been  in  the  past,  and  that 
there  would  always  be  the  danger  of  a Ruler,  made  supreme  by  the  aid 
of  our  money  and  our  arms,  turning  against  us  for  some  supposed  griev- 

it  would  be  necessary  to  reinforce  the  Kabul  garrison  and  the  several  posts  on 
the  Kyber  line  by  : 

One  battery  of  Horse  or  Field  Artillery. 

One  Heavy  battery. 

One  Mountain  battery. 

A detachment  of  Garrison  Artillery. 

A brigade  of  Cavalry. 

Three  companies  of  Sappers  and  Miners. 

Two  regiments  of  British  Infantry. 

Six  regiments  of  Native  Infantry. 

Drafts  sufficient  to  raise  each  Infantry  regiment  at 
Kabul  to  800  men. 

This  was  agreed  to  ; the  reinforcements  were  sent  up  by  degrees,  and  a second 
division  was  formed  at  Kabul,  to  the  command  of  which  Major-General  J. 
Ross,1  C.B.,  was  appointed. 


1 Now  General  Sir  John  Ross,  G.C.B. 


458 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


ance,  or  at  the  instigation  of  a foreign  Power,  as  had  happened  with 
Sher  Ali.  A strong,  united  Afghanistan  was  very  desirable,  no  doubt, 
could  we  be  certain  that  its  interests  and  ours  would  always  remain 
identical ; but,  in  addition  to  the  chance  of  its  strength  and  unity 
being  used  against  us,  there  was  the  certainty  that,  even  if  the  man  we 
might  choose  as  Amir  were  to  remain  perfectly  loyal,  at  his  death 
Afghan  history  would  repeat  itself  ; the  succession  to  the  throne  would 
be  disputed,  and  the  unification  would  have  to  begin  all  over  again. 
For  these  reasons  I had  no  hesitation  in  giving  it  as  my  opinion  that 
Afghanistan  should  be  disintegrated,  and  that  we  should  not  again 
attempt  to  place  the  whole  country  under  any  one  Sovereign. 

My  views  must  have  commended  themselves  to  the  Government  of 
India,  for  in  their  despatch  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  dated  7th 
January,  1880,  they  indicated  them  as  the  line  of  policy  they  proposed 
to  adopt  in  pursuance  of  the  object  they  had  at  heart,  viz.,  the  safety 
of  the  Indian  Empire  and  the  tranquillity  of  its  northern  frontier ; 
and  in  the  communication  to  myself,  conveying  their  idea  of  the 
general  principles  upon  which  the  permanent  settlement  of  Afghanistan 
should  be  based,  the  Foreign  Secretary  wrote  that  all  arrangements  for 
the  establishment  of  a durable  Government  at  Kabul  depended  on  the 
selection  of  a suitable  Ruler  for  that  province ; and  that,  as  it  was 
essential  to  clear  away  any  apprehension  that  the  British  Government 
contemplated  territorial  annexation,  which  might  be  caused  by  a pro- 
longed interregnum,  it  would  be  very  advantageous  if  one  of  the 
principal  Sirdars,  qualified  by  his  family  connexions,  his  local  influence, 
and  his  personal  following,  could  be  selected  as  the  Ruler  of  the  Kabul 
State. 

There  was  another  very  strong  reason  why  the  Government  of  India 
should  wish  to  find  some  one  to  whom  the  administration  of  the 
country  could  safely  be  made  over.  The  first  warning  notes  of  a 
General  Election  were  heard  in  India  early  in  January.  Afghan 
affairs  were  being  made  a party  question,  and  the  policy  of  the 
Beaconsfield  Government  with  regard  to  them  was  being  severely  and 
adversely  criticized.  Lord  Lytton  was,  therefore,  most  anxious  that 
a definite  conclusion  should  be  arrived  at  as  to  the  administration  of 
Afghanistan,  and  a period  put  to  our  occupation  of  the  northern 
province  before  the  meeting  of  Parliament  should  take  place. 

The  difficulty  was  to  find  the  right  man.  Abdur  Rahman,  who  I 
had  reason  to  believe  would  be  acceptable  to  the  army,  was  far  away, 
I could  not  find  out  where,  and  I could  think  of  no  one  else  at  all 
suitable.  Under  the  circumstances,  I deemed  it  advisable  to  open 
negotiations  with  the  several  leaders  of  the  late  combination  against 
us,  who  were  congregated  at  Ghazni,  and  had  with  them  the  young 
Heir-apparent,  Musa  Khan.  In  the  middle  of  January  I had  received 
two  communications  from  these  people,  one  ostensibly  written  by 


i8So] 


NEWS  OF  ABDUR  RAHMAN  KHAN 


459 


Musa  Khan  himself,  the  other  signed  by  seventy  of  the  most  in- 
fluential chiefs ; the  tenor  of  both  was  the  same ; they  demanded 
Yakub  Khan’s  restoration,  and  asserted  his  innocence  as  to  the 
massacre  of  the  Embassy.  I replied  that  Yakub  Khan’s  return  was 
impossible,  and  that  they  must  consider  his  abdication  final,  as  he 
himself  had  declared  that  he  wished  it  to  be,*  and  a few  days  later  I 
deputed  the  Mustaufif  to  visit  Ghazni,  in  the  hope  that  he  might  be 
able  to  induce  the  leaders  to  make  some  more  feasible  suggestion  for 
the  government  of  the  country. 

The  Mustaufi  had  scarcely  started,  before  what  seemed  to  be  a 
reliable  report  reached  me  that  Abdur  Rahman  was  at  Kanduz,  on  his 
way  to  Badakhshan,  and  I immediately  communicated  this  news  to 
Lord  Lytton. 

A fortnight  later  Abdur  Rahman’s  mother,  who  resided  at  Kanda- 
har, informed  Sir  Donald  Stewart  that  Ayub  Khan  had  received  a 
letter  from  her  son,  in  answer  to  an  offer  from  Ayub  to  join  him  at 
Balkh  and  march  with  him  against  the  British.  In  this  letter  Abdur 
Rahman  had  replied  that  he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  of 
Sher  Ali’s  family,  who  had  deceived  him  and  dealt  with  him  in  the 
same  treacherous  manner  that  characterized  Sher  Ali’s  dealings  with 
the  British ; further,  that  he  had  no  intention  of  opposing  the  British, 
knowing  full  well  he  was  not  strong  enough  to  do  so ; that  he  could 
not  leave  Russian  territory  without  the  permission  of  the  Russians, 
whose  pensioner  he  was ; and  that,  even  if  he  got  that'  permission,  he 
could  not  come  either  into  Turkestan  or  Kabul  without  an  invitation 

* As  the  deportation  of  Yakub  Khan  was  believed  to  be  one  of  the  chief 
caur  ;s  of  recent  disturbances,  and  as  a powerful  party  in  the  country  still 
looked  forward  to  having  him  back  as  their  Ruler,  I was  directed  to  make  it 
clear  to  his  adherents  that  the  ex-Amir  would  never  be  allowed  to  return  to 
Afghanistan,  and  that  his  abdication  must  be,  as  he  himself  at  the  time  wished 
it  to  be,  considered  irrevocable.  In  support  of  this  decision,  I was  informed 
that  the  unanimous  verdict  of  guilty  of  murder,  recorded  against  Yakub 
Khan  by  Colonel  Macgregor’s  Commission,  was  substantially  endorsed  by  the 
Chief  Justice  of  Calcutta  and  the  Advocate-General  ; and  that,  although  other 
authorities  who  had  considered  the  evidence  did  not  quite  go  so  far  as  these 
two  high  legal  functionaries,  the  general  conclusion  come  to  was  that,  if  the 
Amir  did  not  connive  at  the  massacre  of  the  Mission,  he  made  no  attempt 
whatever  to  interpose  on  its  behalf,  and  that  his  whole  conduct  on  that 
occasion  betrayed  a culpable  indifference  to  the  fate  of  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari 
and  his  companions,  and  a total  disregard  of  the  solemn  obligation  which  he 
had  contracted  with  the  British  Government. 

t I had  released  the  Mustaufi  from  confinement  when  the  general  amnesty 
was  published  on  the  26th  December,  and  he  had  subsequently  been  usefully 
employed  assisting  the  political  officers  in  revenue  matters.  I did  not  suppose 
that  he  had  any  great  love  for  the  British,  but  he  was  anxious  to  see  us  out 
of  the  country,  and  was  wise  enough  to  know  that  no  armed  opposition  could 
effect  his  purpose,  and  that  it  could  only  be  accomplished  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a stable  government,  under  a Ruler  that  we  could  accept. 


460 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


from  us,  but  that,  if  he  received  such  an  invitation,  he  would  obey  it 
as  an  order.  He  concluded  by  advising  Ayub  Khan  to  make  his  sub- 
mission to  the  British,  as  opposition  was  useless.  Sir  Donald  Stewart 
telegraphed  the  substance  of  this  communication  to  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  adding  that  Abdur  Rahman’s  family  were  well  disposed 
towards  us,  and  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  communicating 
with  the  Sirdar  through  them. 

In  the  meantime,  I had  been  careful  to  acquaint  the  Government  of 
India  with  my  failure  to  come  to  any  conclusion  with  the  Ghazni 
faction  as  to  the  future  government  of  the  country,  and  the  hopeless- 
ness of  finding  anyone  of  sufficient  strength  of  character  to  set  up  as 
Ruler  of  Kabul ; and  I had  suggested,  failing  a really  strong  man,  the 
alternative  of  letting  the  Afghans  choose  for  themselves  some  Ruler, 
other  than  Yakub  Khan,  and  thus  leave  us  free  to  evacuate  the 
country. 

About  this  time  Mr.  Lyall,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  came  to  Kabul 
on  a visit  to  me,  and  Captain  West  Ridgeway*  took  the  place  of  my 
Political  Secretary,  Mr.  Durand,  who  left  me  to  join  the  Foreign 
Office  at  Simla,  Mr.  (now  Sir)  Lepel  Griffin,  Secretary  to  the  Punjab 
Government,  being  appointed  Chief  of  the  political  staff  at  Kabul. 

Lyall  told  me  that  the  Indian  Government  fully  appreciated  the 
difficulty  I was  in  about  finding  a Ruler  for  the  province,  and  that, 
unless  Abdur  Rahman  could  be  brought  within  negotiable  distance,  the 
alternative  I had  suggested  would  have  to  be  acted  upon. 

Lord  Lytton,  however,  was  very  sanguine  about  Abdur  Rahman, 
and  he  warned  Mr.  Griffin,  before  he  started  for  Kabul,  that  the 
Sirdar’s  letter  to  Ayub  Khan  indicated  possibilities  that  might  have 
the  most  important  bearing  on  the  solution  of  the  difficult  problem  to 
be  dealt  with  in  northern  Afghanistan.  It  was  lord  Lytton’s  wish  to 
place  Abdur  Rahman  on  the  throne  of  Kabul,  or,  at  least,  to  afford 
him  the  best  opportunity  of  winning  his  own  way  to  that  position. 
The  difficulty  was  to  get  at  him,  in  the  first  instance,  and,  in  the 
seccrnd,  to  convince  him  of  our  wish  and  power  to  help  him  ; while  a 
not  unnatural  hesitation  on  the  Sirdar’s  part  to  enter  Afghanistan 
without  Russia’s  permission  had  to  be  considered. 

Lord  Lytton  impressed  upon  Mr.  Griffin  the  necessity  for  over- 
coming these  difficulties  in  time  to  enable  us  to  withdraw  from 
northern  Afghanistan  in  tho  early  autumn  at  latest ; and  he  desired 
Sir  Oliver  St.  John  (Sir  Donald  Stewart’s  political  officer,  who  was 
at  that  time  in  Calcutta),  immediately  on  his  return  to  Kandahar,  to 
communicate  with  Abdur  Rahman,  through  his  mother,  the  Viceroy’s 
willingness  to  make  him  Ruler  of  Kabul  and  Turkestan,  if  he  would 
accept  the  terms  offered  to  him  without  delay. 

* Now  Colonel  Sir  West  Ridgeway,  K.C.B. 


1880]  ABDUR  RAHMAN  IN  AFGHAN-TURKESTAN  46i 


The  Viceroy  communicated  his  views  to  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
the  following  telegram  : 

‘ Necessary  to  find  without  delay  some  Native  authority  to  which  we  can 
restore  northern  Afghanistan  without  risk  of  immediate  anarchy  on  our 
evacuation  of  Kabul  not  later  than  next  autumn,  and  if  possible  earlier.  No 

Iirosjiect  of  finding  in  the  country  any  man  strong  enough  for  this  purpose. 

therefore  advocate  early  public  recognition  of  Abdur  Rahman  as  legitimate 
heir  of  Dost  Mahomed,  and  open  deputation  of  Sirdars  with  British  con- 
currence to  oiler  him  throne  of  Afghanistan  as  sole  means  of  saving  the  country 
from  anarchy.  Do  you  approve  V 

Lord  Cranbrook’s  reply  was  as  follows : 


‘ Assuming  that  Abdur  Rahman  is  acceptable  to  the  country,  and  that  he 
would  be  content  with  northern  Afghanistan,  it  is  desirable  to  support  him 
at  Kabul  ; the  more  spontaneous  any  advances  to  him  on  the  part  of  the 
Sirdars,  and  the  less  appearance  of  British  influence,  the  better.  But  where 
is  he?  And  how  do  you  propose  to  learn  his  wishes  and  intentions?  If 
invited  by  Chiefs,  every  inducement  to  bring  him  to  Kabul  should  be  then 
held  out.  Public  recognition  should  not  precede,  but  follow,  his  adoption  by 
Sirdars,  and  his  acceptance  of  the  position.’ 

By  the  end  of  March  authentic  intelligence  was  received  that  Abdur 
Rahman  had  made  himself  master  of  Afghan-Turkestan,  and  was 
corresponding  with  the  representative  Sirdars  at  Kabul.  It  seemed, 
therefore,  that  the  time  had  arrived  when  distinct  overtures  might  be 
made  to  Abdur  Rahman ; accordingly,  on  the  1st  April  Mr.  Griffin 
addressed  to  him  the  following  letter : 

‘ It  has  become  known  that  you  have  entered  Afghanistan,  and  consequently 
this  letter  is  sent  you  by  a confidential  messenger,  in  order  that  you  may 
submit  to  the  British  officers  at  Kabul  any  representations  that  you  may  desire 
to  make  to  the  British  Government  with  regard  to  your  object  in  entering 
Afghanistan.  ’ 

Abdur  Rahman,  in  his  friendly  but  guarded  reply,*  expressed  in 
general  terms  his  hope  of  being  recognized  as  Amir.  He  greatly 
desired,  he  wrote,  the  friendship  of  the  British,  and  their  assistance  in 
restoring  peace  and  order  to  Afghanistan ; but  at  the  same  time,  he 
hinted  that  his  obligations  to  the  Russian  Government  for  the  hos- 
pitality they  had  extended  to  him  placed  him  in  some  doubt  as  to  the 
terms  upon  which  our  friendship  might  be  accorded  to  him,  and  while 
he  expressed  a desire  for  the  permanent  establishment  of  Afghanistan, 
with  our  assistance  and  sympathy,  he  let  it  be  understood  that  he 
wished  to  consider  himself  under  the  protection  of  Russia  as  well  as  of 
Great  Britain. 

In  a verbal  message,  however,  he  added  that  he  was  ready  to  cross 
the  Hindu  Kush  to  discuss  matters  with  our  officers,  and  he  begged 
that  he  might  be  furnished  with  information  as  to  the  ‘ nature  of  our 
friendship  ’ and  ‘ its  conditions.’ 

* Abdur  Rahman’s  letter  is  given  in  the  Appendix. 


462 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


In  answer,  Mr.  Griffin  was  directed  to  inform  Abdur  Kahman  that 
the  relations  of  Afghanistan  to  the  British  and  Russian  Empires  was 
a subject  the  Government  of  India  must  decline  to  discuss  with  him, 
and  to  explain  that  their  declared  determination  had  been  the  exclusion 
of  foreign  influence  and  interference  from  Afghanistan,  a cardinal 
condition  ‘ which  had  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances  been 
deemed  essential  for  the  permanent  security  of  Her  Majesty’s  Indian 
Empire,’  a condition,  moreover,  which  had  always  been  accepted  by 
the  Government  of  the  Czar,  which  had  repeatedly  renewed  those 
assurances,  solemnly  given  to  Her  Majesty’s  Ministers,  that  ‘ Russia 
considered  Afghanistan  as  entirely  beyond  the  sphere  of  her  in- 
fluence.’* 

Early  in  April  the  Mustaufi  (whom,  it  will  be  remembered,  I had 
sent  to  Ghazni  to  communicate  with  the  Chiefs,  and  ascertain  their 
ideas  and  desires  as  to  the  future  government  of  Kabul)  returned  with- 
out having  achieved  much  success.  He  had  persuaded  some  of  the 
leading  men  to  accompany  him  as  far  as  Maidan,  whence  a few  repre- 
sentatives came  on  to  Kabul  as  bearers  of  a document  signed  by 
Mahomed  Jan,  twelve  other  Sirdars,  and  189  influential  tribesmen, 
setting  forth  their  views  and  wishes  ; but  as  these  were  all  based  upon 
the  restoration  of  Yakub  Khan,  their  proposals  could  not  be  entertained. 

On  the  13th  April  I held  a durbar,  at  which  I received  this  deputa- 
tion ; all  the  Sirdars,  Chiefs,  and  maliks  of  Kabul  and  many  Hazaras 
being  present.  Mr.  Griffin,  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  told  them 
that  Yakub  Khan  could  not  be  allowed  to  return  to  Afghanistan,  but 
that  the  names  of  any  Sirdars,  approved  of  by  a large  proportion  of  the 
people  for  the  Amirship,  would  be  laid  before  the  Viceroy ; that  there 
was  no  intention  of  annexing  Afghanistan,  and  that  there  would  be  no 
occupation  of  any  places  except  such  as  were  necessary  for  the  safety 
of  our  Indian  frontier.  They  were  further  informed  that  the  British 
army  would  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  country  had  settled  down 
peacefully  and  an  Amir,  amicably  disposed  towards  us,  had  been 
selected ; but  that  Kandahar  would  not  again  be  united  to  Kabul. 

The  effect  produced  was  good.  The  deputation  was  greatly  dis- 
appointed that  Yakub  Khan  was  not  to  be  permitted  to  return,  but  all 
present  felt  that  they  had  received  a definite  reply. 


CHAPTER  LIX. 

Sir  Donald  Stewart’s  division,  which,  I have  mentioned,  it  had  been 
decided  should  be  sent  to  Kabul  to  take  part  in  the  pacification  of 

* This  letter  from  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  Mr.  Griffin  is  given  in  full  in 
the  Appendix. 


88o] 


JENKINS  ATTACK  F.O  NEAR  CHAR  ASIA 


463 


northern  Afghanistan,  left  Kandahar*  on  the  30th  March,  and  was 
expected  to  arrive  at  Ghazni  about  the  21st  April.  On  the  16th  I 
received  a letter  from  Sir  Donald,  dated  six  days  before,  asking  me  to 
send  supplies  to  meet  him.  1,  therefore,  that  same  day  despatched  a 
small  column,  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Ross,  C.B.,  with 
the  articles  of  food  required ; and  as  I thought  it  likely  that  my  object 
in  sending  this  force  might  be  misunderstood,  the  deputation  which 
attended  the  durbar  was  told  to  explain  matters  to  the  Chiefs  at 
Maidan,  and  assure  them  that  the  advance  would  be  peaceful  unless 
hostilities  should  be  provoked  by  their  own  action.  Notwithstanding 
this  precaution,  I thought  it  quite  possible  the  column  would  be  opposed, 
for  tjhe  news  concerning  Abdur  Rahman’s  advent  was  causing  con- 
siderable excitement ; and  whilst  the  soldiers  and  a proportion  of  the 
tribesmen  were  disposed  to  welcome  him  as  a deliverer,  those  from 
Wardak  and  Logar  resented  his  appearance  on  the  scene  as  putting  an 
end  to  their  hopes  of  having  Yakub  Khan  reinstated. 

With  a view,  therefore,  to  prevent  the  Logaris  from  joining  any 
attack  which  might  be  made  on  General  Ross,  I sent  a party,  1,200 
strong,  under  Colonel  Jenkins,  in  the  direction  of  Charasia. 

On  the  22nd  April  Ross  reached  Sar-i-top,  forty-one  miles  from 
Ghazni ; Sir  Donald  Stewart  having  arrived  that  same  day  at  the  latter 
place,  heliographic  communication  was  at  once  opened  with  him,  and 
the  welcome  news  was  signalled  that  Sir  Donald  had  fought  an  engage- 
ment at  Ahmedkhel  on  the  19th,  and  had  been  entirely  successful.  On 
receipt  of  this  intelligence  I ordered  a Royal  salute  to  be  fired  in  honour 
of  the  victory,  the  announcement  of  which  I hoped  might  have  a 
quieting  effect  on  the  excitement  which  prevailed  around  Kabul. 

In  this  I was  disappointed.  On  the  evening  of  the  24th,  Jenkins, 
who  was  encamped  at  Charasia,  heard  that  he  was  about  to  be  attacked 
by  the  Logaris,  under  Mahomed  Hasan  Khan.  At  once  striking  his 
tents,  and  collecting  his  baggage  in  a sheltered  spot,  he  ordered  a party 
of  Cavalry  to  reconnoitre  up  the  Logar  valley,  strengthened  his  piquets, 
and  sent  off  an  express  messenger  to  inform  me  of  the  situation. 

I immediately  despatched  Brigadier-General  Macpherson  to  Jenkins’s 
assistance.  By  9 am.  he  had  started,  with  four  Mountain  guns  and 
962  Infantry,  followed  later  by  two  more  guns  and  a troop  of  the  3rd 
Punjab  Cavalry ; and  as  a support  to  Macpherson,  Brigadier-General 
Hugh  Gough,  with  the  Cavalry  brigade  and  four  Horse  Artillery  guns, 
was  ordered  to  take  up  a position  half-way  between  Kabul  and  Charasia. 

At  1 p.m.  on  the  25th  Macpherson  arrived  on  the  high  ground 
beyond  the  sang-i-nazvishta  gorge,  whence  he  obtained  a good  view 
of  Jenkins’s  position;  and  seeing  that  the  enemy  formed  a complete 
semicircle  round  it,  he  pushed  on.  Jenkins  had  stood  on  the  defensive 

* Sir  Donald  Stewart’s  division  was  replaced  at  Kandahar  by  troops  from 
Bombay. 


464 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


from  the  early  morning,  and  the  Afghans,  who  had  advanced  to  within 
a couple  of  hundred  yards,  were  only  kept  at  bay  by  the  steadiness  of 
his  fire. 

Macpherson  first  sent  back  the  baggage  to  Sherpur,  so  as  to  free  all 
hands  for  action,  and  then  proceeded  to  attack  the  left  horn  of  the 
semicircle.  The  enemy  broke,  fell  back,  and  were  completely  scattered 
by  a well-directed  Artillery  fire ; the  surrounding  hills  were  speedily 
cleared,  and  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery  pursued  for  four  miles. 
By  four  o’clock  not  a single  living  Afghan  was  to  be  seen  ; more  than 
200  had  been  killed,  while  our  casualties  were  only  four  killed  and 
thirty-four  wounded. 

I came  up  just  as  the  fight  was  over ; and  being  sure  from  the 
decisive  character  of  the  defeat  that  a retirement  could  not  be  mis- 
understood, I ordered  the  troops  to  return  to  Kabul. 

In  anticipation  of  Sir  Donald  Stewart’s  arrival,  and  the  consequent 
necessity  for  my  making  over  to  him,  as  my  senior,  the  supreme 
command  of  the  Kabul  Field  Force,  I prepared  a report*  for  his 
information,  which  explained  the  general  military  situation  in  northern 
Afghanistan,  and  contained  a statement  of  economic  details  which  I 
thought  would  be  of  use  to  the  Government,  and  concerning  which 
an  experience  of  eighteen  months  in  the  field  enabled  me  to  give  an 
opinion  with  some  confidence. 

The  strength  of  the  Kabul  Field  Force  at  the  end  of  April  amounted 
to  nearly  14,000  men  and  thirty-eight  guns,  with  12,500  followers  ;f 
besides  15,000  men  and  thirty  guns  on  the  Khyber  line,  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Major-General  Bright. 

Sir  Donald  reached  Kabul  on  the  5th  May.  On  the  same  day  we 
heard  that  the  Beaconsfield  Administration  had  come  to  an  end ; that 
a new  Ministry  had  been  formed  under  Mr.  Gladstone ; that  Lord 
Lytton  had  resigned,  and  was  to  be  succeeded  by  the  Marquis  of 
Kipon  ; and  that  the  Marquis  of  Hartington  had  become  Secretary  of 
State  for  India. 

Notwithstanding  the  pleasure  of  meeting  an  old  friend  in  my  new 
Commander,  that  5th  of  May  was  altogether  not  a happy  day  for  me. 
Lord  Lytton’s  approaching  departure  was  a source  of  real  sorrow. 
Personally,  I felt  that  I was  deeply  indebted  to  him  for  the  confidence 
he  had  reposed  in  me,  and  for  the  warm  support  he  had  invariably 
accorded  me.  I had  hoped  that  he  would  have  had  the  gratification 
of  seeing,  while  in  office,  the  campaign  in  which  he  was  so  much 

* The  part  of  the  report  which  deals  with  economic  details  is  given  in  the 
Appendix  ; the  military  portion  is  omitted,  as  it  was  only  intended  for  Sir 
Donald  Stewart’s  information  at  the  time. 

+ Of  these,  more  than  3,000  were  doolie-bearers,  and  nearly  8,000  were 
saices  of  Native  Cavalry  regiments,  and  men  belonging  to  the  I*rans|X)rt  and 
other  Departments. 


1880]  SIR  DONALD  STEWART  REACHES  KABUL  465 

interested  satisfactorily  concluded,  and  with  the  prospect  of  permanent 
results ; and  I dreaded  that  a change  of  Government  might  mean  a 
reversal  of  the  policy  which  I believed  to  be  the  best  for  the  security  of 
our  position  in  India.  Moreover,  it  was  not  in  human  nature  to  feel 
absolute  satisfaction  in  yielding  up  the  supreme  command  I had  so 
greatly  delighted  in,  into  the  hands  of  another,  even  though  that  other 
was  one  for  whom  I had  so  great  a personal  regard,  and  under  whom 
I had  already  served  in  the  field. 

The  amalgamated  troops  were  now  styled  the  Northern  Afghanistan 
Field  Force,  and  I retained  the  command  of  the  two  divisions  at 
Kabul,  with  Major-General  John  Ross  as  second  in  command ; while 
Major-General  Hills  was  given  the  brigades  from  Kandahar,  which 
now  became  the  third  division  of  the  Force. 

The  idea  in  bringing  Stewart  away  from  Kandahar  was  that  he 
should  occupy  Ghazni  and  Kabul ; that  my  divisions  should  operate  in 
Kohistan  and  in  the  direction  of  Bamian  ; that  General  Bright  should 
move  against  the  Ghilzais ; and  that  a column  from  Kuram  should 
march  over  the  Shutargardan  to  Kabul.  It  was  hoped  that  these 
operations  would  have  the  effect  of  quieting  the  country,  and,  by  the 
time  they  had  been  carried  out,  it  would  be  possible  to  evacuate 
northern  Afghanistan. 

With  a view  to  having  my  divisions  thoroughly  efficient  and  mobile 
for  the  service  they  were  expected  to  perform,  I had  largely  replenished 
the  numbers  of  my  transport  animals,  which  had  suffered  greatly  from 
the  strain  put  upon  them  in  supplying  the  troops  with  food  and  other 
necessaries  during  the  winter  months ; they  had  been  continuously  at 
work  in  the  most  inclement  weather,  numbers  had  died,  and  those  that 
remained  required  to  be  carefully  looked  after  and  given  complete 
rest  to  render  them  fit  for  the  contemplated  operations.  Major  Mark 
Heathcote,  who  had  taken,  at  my  particular  request,  the  arduous 
charge  of  this  department,  wished  to  revert  to  regimental  duty,  so  I 
applied  for,  and  obtained,  the  services  of  Lieutenant -Colonel  R.  Low* 
as  Director  of  Transport,  under  whose  energetic  and  intelligent  manage- 
ment the  transport  service  was  rendered  as  perfect  as  it  was  possible 
to  make  it.  In  the  end,  circumstances  prevented  the  concerted  move- 
ments for  which  these  preparations  were  made  being  carried  out,  but 
I reaped  the  benefit  of  them  when  later  in  the  year  I was  required  to 
undertake  a rapid  march  to  Kandahar,  which  could  not  possibly  have 
been  successfully  accomplished  had  my  transport  not  been  in  such 
admirable  condition. 

In  order  to  relieve  the  great  pressure  put  upon  the  Commissariat 
Department  by  having  to  provide  for  the  increased  number  of  troops 
at  Kabul,  and  with  a view  to  opening  up  the  roads  upon  which  traffic 

* Now  Major-General  Sir  Robert  Low,  G.C.B. 


466 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


had  been  more  or  less  impeded  for  some  months,  it  was  considered 
desirable  to  send  a strong  brigade  towards  Maidan,  which  I accom- 
panied, and  remained  away  from  Kabul  for  some  weeks.  On  my 
return,  I found  a considerable  change  had  taken  place  in  the  political 
situation.  The  Mustaufi  had  been  deported  to  India ; the  corre- 
spondence between  Abdur  Rahman  and  Mr.  Griffin  had  taken  rather 
an  unsatisfactory  turn,  and  the  Sirdar’s  dealings  with  the  leading 
Chiefs  and  tribesmen  had  given  cause  to  fear  that,  if  he  came  to 
Kabul  during  our  occupation,  it  might  be  as  an  enemy  rather  than  a 
friend. 

The  Mustaufi  was  a firm  adherent  of  the  Sher  Ali  faction,  and, 
finding  there  was  no  hope  of  Yakub  Khan  being  reinstated,  and  that 
we  were  negotiating  with  Abdur  Rahman,  he  had  espoused  the  cause 
of  Yakub’s  younger  brother,  Ayub  Khan,  and  had  been  proved  guilty 
of  inciting  the  Sirdars  and  Chiefs  to  oppose  us.  For  this  he  was  very 
properly  sent  out  of  Afghanistan ; nevertheless,  I looked  upon  his 
removal  as  a misfortune,  for  it  broke  up  the  only  party  that  could 
possibly  be  formed  to  counterbalance  Abdur  Rahman,  who  was  astute 
enough  to  see  that  the  weaker  our  position  became,  the  more  chance 
there  was  of  his  being  able  to  get  his  own  terms  from  us. 

From  the  letters  he  had  written  to  his  friends  and  relations  in 
northern  Afghanistan  (the  majority  of  which  had  fallen  into  cur  hands), 
it  was  evident  that  he  was  doing  all  he  could  to  strengthen  himself, 
even  at  our  expense,  and  that  he  greatly  disliked  the  idea  of  Kandahar 
being  separated  from  the  kingdom  of  Kabul.  Indeed,  in  one  of  his 
communications  to  Mr.  Griffin  he  had  made  it  clear  that  he  expected 
the  whole  inheritance  of  his  grandfather,  Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  to  be 
made  over  to  him. 

The  uncertainty  as  to  the  result  of  the  correspondence  with  Abdur 
Rahman,  the  rumours  in  circulation  regarding  his  real  disposition  and 
plans,  and  the  general  excitement  throughout  the  country,  suggested 
such  grave  doubts  of  the  Sirdar’s  good  faith  that,  in  some  quarters,  the 
question  was  seriously  discussed  whether  it  might  not  be  necessary  to 
break  off  negotiations  with  him,  and  reinstate  Yakub  Khan,  or  else  set 
up  his  brother,  Ayub  Khan,  as  Amir. 

I myself  was  altogether  opposed  to  Yakub  Khan’s  restoration,  and 
as  to  Ayub  Khan,  we  were  in  total  ignorance  of  his  character  and  pro- 
clivities, even  if  he  had  been  near  enough  to  treat  with.  It  appeared 
to  me,  moreover,  that  we  had  gone  too  far  with  Abdur  Rahman  to 
throw  him  over  because,  in  conformity  with  Afghan  character  and 
tradition,  he  was  not  running  quite  straight.  I,  therefore,  gave  it  as 
my  opinion  that  wo  should  not  change  our  tactics  unless  it  was  found 
impossible  to  come  to  terms  with  him,  or  unless  it  was  made  evident 
on  his  nearer  approach  to  Kabul  that  the  majority  of  his  countrymen 
were  averse  to  have  him  as  their  Ruler. 


i88o] 


ABDUR  RAHMAN  PROCLAIMED  AMIR 


467 


Soon  after  this  tho  situation  began  to  improve,  and  early  in  July 
Mr.  Griffin  was  able  to  inform  the  Government  of  India  that  ‘ the 
probabilities  of  a settlement  with  Abdur  Rahman  appear  far  more 
favourable  than  they  did  last  week.  . . .’  ‘ Abdur  Rahman  has  seen 

that  we  have  been  fully  informed  of  the  game  he  has  been  playing,  that 
trickery  and  treachery  would  not  be  tolerated,  and  that,  if  he  intends 
coming  to  a settlement  with  us  at  all,  he  must  be  prepared  to  accept 
our  terms  rather  than  dictate  his  own.’ 

A few  days  later  a letter  was  received  from  Abdur  Rahman, 
announcing  his  arrival  in  Ivohistan.  His  near  approach,  and  the 
report  that  he  was  willing  to  accept  our  terms,  excited  a keen  and 
hopeful  interest  throughout  tho  country,  for  the  Afghans  had  at  length 
become  convinced  that  the  only  chance  of  getting  rid  of  us  was  by 
agreeing  to  any  form  of  settled  government  we  might  establish,  and 
they  had  grown  heartily  tired  of  perpetual  fighting  and  of  having  to 
maintain  bands  of  ghazis  to  oppose  us,  who  were  eating  them  out  of 
house  and  home.  With  the  exception  of  the  Sher  Ali  faction,  there- 
fore, whose  interests  were  directly  opposed  to  his,  Abdur  Rahman’s 
advent  was  welcomed  by  the  people,  and  several  of  the  most  influential 
amongst  them  went  to  meet  him. 

Towards  the  end  of  July  Sir  Donald  Stewart  was  empowered  to  con- 
clude all  political  and  military  arrangements  preparatory  to  with- 
drawing from  northern  Afghanistan.  Abdur  Rahman  was  to  be 
recognized  as  ‘ Amir  of  Kabul  ’ ; he  was  to  be  provided  with  a sufficient 
number  of  guns  to  strengthen  effectively  his  occupation  of  the  city,  and 
he  was  to  be  given  as  much  money  (within  a maximum  of  ten  lakhs) 
as  was  thought  necessary  to  meet  his  present  wants.  It  was  to  be 
clearly  explained  to  Abdur  Rahman  that  the  Government  of  India  would 
not  engage  to  give  him  a regular  subsidy,  or  a continuous  supply  of 
arms  or  money,  and  that  after  he  had  taken  possession  of  his  capital  he 
would  have  to  rely  upon  his  own  resources  for  holding  it.  There  was 
to  be  no  treaty,  and  all  questions  of  reciprocal  engagements  between 
the  two  Governments  were  to  be  postponed  until  some  settled  and 
responsible  administration  had  been  consolidated. 

General  Stewart  was  directed  to  make  the  best  arrangements  he 
could  with  Abdur  Rahman  for  the  protection  of  the  tribes  and  indi- 
viduals who  had  assisted  us,  and  the  Sirdar  was  to  be  informed  that,  if 
he  desired  our  goodwill,  he  could  give  no  better  proof  of  his  friendly 
disposition  than  by  his  behaviour  towards  those  of  his  own  nation  in 
whom  the  British  Government  were  interested. 

Sir  Donald  Stewart  considered  that  the  best  way  of  giving  effect  to 
these  instructions  was  to  publicly  proclaim  Abdur  Rahman  as  Amir  of 
Kabul;  for  this  purpose  he  held  a durbar  on  the  22nd  July,  at  which 
the  Sirdar’s  representatives  were  received.  Sir  Donald,  in  a few 
words,  gave  his  reasons  for  summoning  them  to  meet  him,  and  Mr. 

31 


468 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


Griffin  then  explained  more  fully  the  motives  by  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  were  actuated  in  acknowledging  the  claims  of  Abdur 
Rahman.  Immediately  after  the  durbar  orders  were  issued  for  an 
early  retirement. 

I was  to  withdraw  my  column  by  the  Kuram  route ; but  being 
anxious  to  see  something  of  the  Khyber  line  while  I had  the  oppor- 
tunity, I started  off  the  following  day  to  ride  through  the  Jagdalak 
Pass  to  Gandamak,  where  I was  entertained  by  General  Bright  and 
his  staff.  The  next  day  I went  on  to  Jalalabad,  and  was  greatly 
interested  in  wandering  over  the  place  where  Sir  Robert  Sale  in  some 
measure  redeemed  the  lamentable  failures  of  the  first  Afghan  war. 

My  intention,  when  I left  Kabul,  was  to  ride  as  far  as  the  Khyber 
Pass,  but  suddenly  a presentiment,  which  I have  never  been  able  to 
explain  to  myself,  made  me  retrace  my  steps  and  hurry  back  towards 
Kabul — a presentiment  of  coming  trouble  which  I can  only  characterize 
as  instinctive. 

The  feeling  was  justified  when,  about  half-way  between  Butkhak  and 
Kabul,  I was  met  by  Sir  Donald  Stewart  and  my  Chief  of  the  Staff,* * * § 
who  brought  me  the  astounding  news  of  the  total  defeat  by  Ayub 
Khan  of  Brigadier-General  Burrows’s  brigade  at  Maiwand,  and  of 
Lieutenant-General  Primrose,!  with  the  remainder  of  his  force,  being 
besieged  at  Kandahar.  • 


CHAPTER  LX. 

For  more  than  six  months  rumours  had  been  afloat  of  Ayub  Khan’s 
determination  to  advance  on  Kandahar ; but  little  attention  was  paid 
to  them  by  the  authorities  at  that  place  until  towards  the  end  of  May, 
when  a Sirdar,  named  Sher  Ali,ij:  who  had  been  a few  days  before 
formally  installed  as  Wali,  or  Ruler,  of  Kandahar,  informed  the  poli- 
tical officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  St.  John,  that  the  British  occupation  of 
Kabul  had  had  the  effect  of  bringing  about  a reconciliation  between  the 
various  chiefs  at  Herat,  who  had  placed  themselves  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Ayub  Khan  and  induced  him  to  proclaim  a jahad.  Sher  Ali, 
who  evidently  considered  this  news  authentic,  declared  his  belief  that 
his  own  troops, § who  were  then  engaged  in  collecting  revenue  in 

* Colonel  Macgregor  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Chapman  had  changed  places, 
the  former  joining  Sir  Donald  Stewart  as  Chief  of  the  Staff,  and  the  latter 
taking  up  the  same  position  with  me. 

t Lieutenant-General  Primrose  succeeded  Sir  Donald  Stewart  in  command 
of  the  troops  at  Kandahar. 

+ Sirdar  Sher  Ali  had  been  appointed  Governor  of  Kandahar  by  the  Amir 
Yakub  Khan  after  the  treaty  of  Gandamak,  and  had  since  assisted  Sir  Donald 
Stewart  in  the  civil  administration  of  the  province. 

§ Local  Native  levies. 


1 88o] 


AFFAIRS  AT  KANDAHAR 


469 


Zaraindawar,  would  desert  to  Ayub  Khan  as  he  approached  Kandahar, 
and  he  begged  that  a brigade  of  British  soldiers  might  be  sent  to 
Girishk  to  support  him. 

On  General  Primrose  communicating  this  information  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  in  India,  he  recommended  to  the  Government  that  the 
Bombay  reserve  division,  located  at  Jacobabad,  Hyderabad,  and 
Karachi,  should  be  mobilized  so  soon  as  it  became  certain  that  Ayub 
Khan  really  contemplated  this  move,  as  in  his  opinion  the  garrison 
at  Kandahar  would  be  left  dangerously  weak  after  a brigade  had  been 
detached  for  Girishk. 

Ayub  Khan’s  movements,  however,  were  not  ascertained  until  the 
27th  June,  when  he  had  advanced  halfway  to  the  Helmand;  it  was  too 
late  then  to  mobilize  troops  so  far  off  as  Jacobabad,  Hyderabad,  and 
Karachi  with  any  chance  of  their  being  in  time  to  check  his  onward 
march.  The  news  of  his  approach  spread  rapidly,  and  had  the  most 
disturbing  effect  in  Kandahar  and  its  neighbourhood.  The  Governor’s 
authority  daily  diminished,  and  many  of  the  inhabitants  left  the  city. 

Ayub  Khan  had  with  him,  when  he  started  from  Herat  on  the 
15th  June,  7,500  men  and  ten  guns  as  the  nucleus  of  an  army,  which 
he  calculated,  as  he  moved  forward,  would  be  strongly  reinforced  by 
tribesmen,  levies,  and  gliazis. 

On  the  4th  July  a brigade,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Burrows,  started  from  Kandahar,  and  reached  the  Helmand  on  the 
11th,  encamping  on  the  near  bank  of  the  river  opposite  Girishk.  On 
the  further  bank  Sirdar  Sher  Ali’s  troops  were  located,  having  with 
them  six  guns.  Two  days  afterwards  these  troops  deserted  in  a body 
to  the  enemy,  but  did  not  succeed  in  taking  their  Artillery  with  them, 
as  Burrows,  on  perceiving  their  intention,  crossed  the  river  and  cap- 
tured the  guns. 

Brigadier  - General  Burrows’s  position  had  now  entirely  changed ; 
instead  of  there  being  a loyal  force  under  the  Wall,  with  which  to  co- 
operate and  prevent  Ayub  Khan  crossing  the  Helmand,  he  found  him- 
self with  an  inadequate  number  of  troops,  the  Wali’s  men  gone  over  to 
the  enemy,  and  the  Wali  himself  a fugitive  in  the  British  camp.  The 
Hehnand  was  fordable  everywhere  at  that  season,  making  it  easy  for 
Ayub  to  cut  off  Burrows’s  retreat ; the  first  twenty-five  of  the  eighty 
miles  by  which  he  was  separated  from  Kandahar  was  a desert,  and  no 
supplies  were  forthcoming  owing  to  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  people. 
Burrows  therefore  determined  to  retire  to  Khushk-i-Nakhud,  an  im- 
portant position  half-way  to  Kandahar,  covering  the  road  from  Girishk, 
and  where  supplies  and  water  were  plentiful. 

Burrows  reached  Khushk-i-Nakhud  on  the  16th  July.  On  the  22nd 
the  Commander  - in  - Chief  in  India,  who  had  been  inquiring  from 
General  Primrose  whether  there  were  ‘ any  routes  from  the  Helmand 
passing  by  the  north  to  Ghazni,  by  which  Ayub  Khan  might  move  with 

bl— 2 


470 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


his  guns,’  telegraphed  to  Primrose  : ‘ You  will  understand  that  you 
have  full  liberty  to  attack  Ayub,  if  you  consider  you  are  strong  enough 
to  do  so.  Government  consider  it  of  the  highest  political  importance 
that  his  force  should  be  dispersed,  and  prevented  by  all  possible  means 
from  passing  on  to  Ghazni.’ 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  information  was  received  by  Brigadier- 
General  Burrows  that  2,000  of  the  enemy’s  Cavalry  and  a large  body 
of  ghazis  had  arrived  at  Maiwand,  eleven  miles  off,  and  that  Ayub 
Khan  was  about  to  follow  with  the  main  body  of  his  army. 

To  prevent  Ayub  Khan  getting  to  Ghazni,  General  Burrows  had  to 
do  one  of  two  things,  either  await  him  at  Khuslik  l-Nakhud,  or  ir- 
tercept  him  at  Maiwand.  After  consulting  with  Colonel  St.  John,  he 
determined  to  adopt  the  latter  course,  as  he  hoped  thus  to  be  able  to 
deal  with  the  ghazis  before  they  were  joined  by  Ayub  Khan 

The  brigade  started  soon  after  6 a.m.  on  the  27th.  It  was  encumbered 
by  a large  number  of  baggage  animals,  which  Burrows  considered 
could  not  be  left  behind  because  of  the  hostile  state  of  the  country,  and 
the  impossibility  of  detaching  any  part  of  his  already  too  small  force  for 
their  protection. 

At  10  a.m.,  when  about  half  way  to  Maiwand,  a spy  brought  in 
information  that  Ayub  Khan  had  arrived  at  that  place,  and  was  occu- 
pying it  in  force;  General  Burrows,  however,  considered  it  then  too  late 
to  turn  back,  and  decided  to  advance.  At  a quarter  to  twelve  the  forces 
came  into  collision,  and  the  fight  lasted  until  past  three  o’clock.  The 
Afghans,  who,  Burrows  reported,  numbered  25,000,  soon  outflanked  the 
British.  Our  Artillery  expended  their  ammunition,  and  the  Native 
portion  of  the  brigade  got  out  of  hand,  and  pressed  back  on  the  few 
British  Infantry,  who  were  unable  to  hold  their  own  against  the  over- 
whelming numbers  of  the  enemy.  Our  troops  were  completely  routed, 
and  had  to  thank  the  apathy  of  the  Afghans  in  not  following  them  up 
for  escaping  total  annihilation. 

Of  the  2,476  men  engaged  at  Maiwand,  934  were  killed  and  175 
were  wounded  and  missing  ;*  the  remnant  struggled  on  throughout  the 

, Wounded  and 

Killed.  ...  ■ 

Missing. 

* British  officers  ...  ...  ...  20  9 

,,  troops  ...  ...  ...  290  48 

Native  ,,  ...  ...  ...  624  118 


934 


175 


Total,  1,109 

Of  the  regimental  followers  331  were  killed  and  7 were  missing  ; 455  trans- 
port followers  and  drivers  were'  reported  as  killed  or  missing,  but  a number  of 
these,  being  Afghans,  probably  joined  the  enemy. 

A large  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition  was  lost,  including  over  1,000 
rifles  and  carbines,  and  600  or  700  swords  and  bayonets. 


iSSo] 


THE  MAI  WAND  DISASTER 


47i 


night  to  Kandahar,  where  the  first  of  the  fugitives  arrived  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th.  Brigadier-General  Burrows,  who  had  two 
horses  shot  under  him  during  the  engagement,  was  amongst  the  last  to 
reaeli  Kandahar. 

This  lamentable  story  imparted  to  me  by  Stewart  almost  took  my 
breath  away,  and  we  eagerly  discussed  the  situation  as  we  rode  back 
together  to  Sherpur.  It  was  impossible  to  predict  how  the  news 
would  affect  the  recent  arrangements  entered  into  with  Abdur 
Rahman,  or  what  the  attitude  of  the  tribesmen  would  be ; but  we 
agreed  that,  whatever  might  happen  in  our  immediate  neighbourhood, 
the  only  means  of  affording  speedy  relief  to  the  Kandahar  garrison 
was  by  sending  a force  from  Kabul. 

It  soon,  however,  became  apparent,  by  telegrams  received  from 
Simla,  that  the  Government  were  in  doubt  as  to  the  best  course  to 
pursue,  and  looked  to  Quetta  rather  than  Kabul  as  the  place  from 
which  Kandahar  could  be  most  conveniently  and  rapidly  succoured. 
This  was  not  altogether  surprising,  for  the  authorities  naturally 
hesitated  to  weaken  Kabul  until  matters  had  been  finally  settled 
with  Abdur  Rahman,  and  it  was  only  to  be  expected  that,  after  what 
had  occurred  at  Maiwand,  they  should  be  alarmed  at  the  idea  of  a 
force  being  cut  off  from  all  communication  with  India  during  the  four 
weeks,  or  thereabouts,  it  would  take  to  reach  Kandahar.  But  there 
was  really  no  alternative,  for,  as  Major-General  Phayre* *  (commanding 
in  Baluchistan)  reported, f the  troops  available  for  Field  Service  were 
but  few  in  number,  it  would  require  at  least  fifteen  days  to  equip 
them,  and  there  was  no  organized  transport  at  hand,  the  animals 
having  been  sent  to  distant  grazing  grounds  on  account  of  the  scarcity 
of  water  and  forage. 

I knew  nothing  as  to  the  actual  condition  of  the  troops  in 
Baluchistan,  except  that,  as  belonging  to  the  Bombay  Presidency, 
they  could  not  be  composed  of  the  best  fighting  races,  and  I had  a 
strong  feeling  that  it  would  be  extremely  unw'ise  to  make  use  of  any 
but  the  most  proved  Native  soldiers  against  Ayub  Khan’s  superior 
numbers,  elated  as  his  men  must  be  with  their  victory  at  Maiw'and. 

The  disaster  to  our  arms  caused,  as  was  to  be  expected,  considerable 
excitement  all  along  the  border ; indeed,  throughout  India  the 
announcement  produced  a certain  feeling  of  uneasiness  — a mere 


201  horses  were  killed,  and  1,676  camels,  355  ponies,  24  mules,  291  donkeys, 
and  79  bullocks,  were  not  forthcoming. 

* Afterwards  General  Sir  Robert  Phayre.  G.C.B. 

t General  Phayre  reported  on  the  28th  July  that  there  were  only  seven 
Native  regiments  in  Baluchistan,  three  of  which  were  required  for  the  lines 
of  communication,  leaving  only  four  available  for  Field  Service  ; and  that  a 
battalion  of  British  Infantry  and  a battery  of  Field  Artillery  required  for  his 
column  were  a long  way  off,  being  still  in  Sind. 


472  FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1880 

surface  ripple — but  enough  to  make  those  who  remembered  the  days 
of  the  Mutiny  anxious  for  better  news  from  the  north. 

To  me  it  seemed  of  such  supreme  importance  that  Kandahar  should 
be  relieved  without  delay,  and  the  reverse  to  our  arms  retrieved,  that 
I made  up  my  mind  to  communicate  my  views  to  the  Viceroy  through 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  in  the  hope  that,  when  he  realized  that  a 
thoroughly  efficient  force  was  ready  and  willing  to  start  from  Kabul, 
he  would  no  longer  hesitate  as  to  what  was  best  to  do. 

On  the  30th  July,  I dined  with  Stewart,  and,  leaving  his  mess-tent 
at  an  early  hour,  I retired  to  my  own  quarters,  and  wrote  out  the 
following  telegram  in  cipher,  but,  before  despatching  it,  I showed  it  to 
Stewart,  for,  although  I knew  that  his  views  were  in  accord  with 
mine,  I could  not  with  propriety  have  sent  it  without  his  knowledge : 

‘To  Major-General  Greaves,*  Adjutant-General  in  India,  Simla. 

‘ Kabul, 

‘ 30 th  July,  1880. 

‘ Personal  and  secret.  I strongly  recommend  that  a force  be  sent  from  this 
to  Kandahar.  Stewart  has  organized  a very  complete  one  consisting  of  nine 
regiments  of  Infantry,  three  of  Cavalry,  and  three  Mountain  batteries.  This 
will  suffice  to  overcome  all  opposition  en  route  ; it  will  have  the  best  possible 
effect  on  the  country,  and  will  be  ready  to  go  anywhere  on  reaching  Kandahar, 
being  fully  equipped  in  all  respects.  He  proposes  sending  me  in  command. 

1 1 am  sure  that  but  few  Bombay  regiments  are  able  to  cope  with  Afghans, 
and  once  the  Kabul  Field  Force  leaves  this  country,  the  chance  of  sending  a 
thoroughly  reliable  and  well-equipped  column  will  be  lost.  The  movement 
of  the  remainder  of  the  Kabul  troops  towards  India  should  be  simultaneous 
with  the  advance  of  my  division  towards  Kandahar,  it  being  most  desirable 
to  limit  the  area  of  our  responsibilities  as  soon  as  possible  ; at  the  same  time, 
it  is  imperative  that  we  should  now  show  our  strength  throughout  Afghanistan. 
The  withdrawal,  under  existing  circumstances,  of  the  whole  force  from  Kabul 
to  India  would  certainly  be  misunderstood,  both  in  Afghanistan  and  else- 
where. You  need  have  no  fears  about  my  division.  It  can  take  care  of  itself, 
and  will  reach  Kandahar  under  the  month.  I will  answer  for  the  loyalty  and 
good  feeling  of  the  Native  portion,  and  would  propose  to  inform  them  that, 
as  soon  as  matters  have  been  satisfactorily  settled  at  Kandahar,  they  will  be 
sent  straight  back  to  India.  Show  this  to  Lyall.’ 

Exaggerated  reports  of  the  Maiwand  affair  being  rife  in  the  Kabul 
bazaars,  which  were  daily  becoming  crowded  with  artned  Afghans 
from  Abdur  Rahman’s  camp,  and  the  prospect  of  troops  having  to 
leave  at  once  for  Kandahar,  made  it  more  than  ever  necessary  to 
bring  the  negotiations  with  the  new  Amir  to  a speedy  conclusion.  It 
was  accordingly  arranged  that  Mr.  Griffin  should  meet  him  at  Zimina, 
about  sixteen  miles  from  Kabul.  This  interview  had  the  happiest 
results,  and  must  have  been  extremely  gratifying  to  Mr.  Griffin,  whom 
we  all  heartily  congratulated  on  the  successful  ending  to  the  very 

* Now  General  Sir  George  Greaves,  G.C.B.,  G.C.M.G. 


1880]  A FORCE  ORDERED  FROM  KABUL  473 

delicate  and  difficult  negotiations  which  he  had  carried  on  with  so 
much  skill  and  patience. 

In  taking  leave  of  His  Highness,  Mr.  Griffin  invited  him  to  come 
to  the  British  camp  the  following  day  to  be  received  by  Sir  Donald 
Stewart.  Abdur  Rahman  himself  was  quite  willing  to  come,  and 
some  of  his  supporters  were  in  favour  of  his  doing  so,  but  others 
vehemently  opposed  the  idea,  and  ‘ swore  by  their  faith  they  would 
leave  him  if  he  persisted.’  After  a stormy  meeting  with  his  Chiefs, 
the  Amir  wrote  to  Mr.  Griffin  as  follows:  ‘If  you  really  wish  me  to 
come  to  you,  irrespective  of  the  opinion  of  the  people,  I am  quite 
ready  to  do  so.  Please  write  and  let  me  know  your  wishes.  I am  in 
the  hands  of  ignorant  fools,  who  do  not  know  their  own  interests, 
good  or  bad.  What  can  I do  ? I am  most  anxious  to  meet  you.’ 

Upon  receipt  of  this  note  Stewart  decided  that  it  would  be  impolitic 
to  press  for  an  interview,  for  instead  of  strengthening  the  Amir,  as 
had  been  the  intention,  it  was  evident  it  would  have  the  opposite 
effect,  so  the  meeting  was  given  up. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3rd  August  the  telegram  arrived  from  Lord 
Ripon,  which  I had  been  so  anxiously  expecting,  authorizing  the 
despatch  of  a force  to  Kandahar,  and  directing  that  I should  be  placed 
in  command. 

I heard  afterwards  that  my  message  to  the  Adjutant-General  was 
received  at  Simla  at  a most  opportune  moment.  Lyall  took  it  without 
delay  to  Lord  Ripon,  who  from  the  first  had  been  in  favour  of  a force 
being  sent  from  Kabul,  but  had  refrained  from  ordering  the  movement 
in  deference  to  the  views  held  by  some  members  of  his  Council,  whose 
longer  experience  of  India,  His  Excellency  considered,  entitled  their 
opinions  to  be  treated  with  respect. 

I set  to  work  at  once  to  organize  the  column  which  I was  to  have 
the  great  honour  of  commanding.  In  this  most  congenial  duty  I 
received  every  possible  assistance  and  encouragement  from  Stewart ; 
he  gave  me  carte-blanche,  and  I should  only  have  had  myself  to 
blame  if  every  unit  had  not  been  as  efficiently  equipped  as  circum- 
stances would  admit. 

I wished  that  the  force  should  be  composed,  as  far  as  possible,  of 
those  who  had  served  with  me  throughout  the  campaign ; but  as  some 
of  the  regiments  (more  especially  Native  corps)  had  been  away  from 
their  homes  for  two  years,  and  had  had  more  than  their  share  of 
fighting,  besides  having  suffered  heavy  losses  in  action  and  through 
sickness,  I considered  it  right  to  consult  their  commanders  before 
detailing  the  troops.  With  the  exception  of  three,  who  thought  that 
their  regiments  had  been  long  enough  away  from  India,  all,  to  my 
great  delight,  eagerly  responded  to  my  call,  and  I took  upon  myself  to 
promise  the  men  that  they  should  not  be  left  to  garrison  Kandahar, 
but  should  be  sent  back  to  India  as  soon  as  the  fighting  ceased. 


474 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


When  the  several  regiments  were  decided  upon,  every  man  not 
likely  to  stand  the  strain  of  prolonged  forced  marches  was  weeded 
out,  and  the  scale  of  baggage,  tents,  and  impedimenta  was  reduced  to 
a minimum.* 

I had  no  fear  as  to  the  officers  and  men  ably  and  cheerfully 
performing  their  part  of  the  task ; we  had  been  long  enough  together 
to  enable  us  thoroughly  to  understand  and  trust  each  other,  and  I felt 
that  I could  depend  upon  each  and  all  to  respond  heartily  to  whatever 
call  I might  make  upon  them. 

The  question  of  supplies  was  my  greatest  anxiety,  and  I had  many 
consultations  with  my  experienced  Commissariat  officer,  Major 
Badcock,  before  I could  feel  satisfied  in  this  respect. 

The  transport,  as  I have  already  recorded,  was  in  good  order ; it 
was  fortunate  that  the  soldiers  had  been  practised  in  loading,  leading, 
and  tending  the  animals,  for  the  Afghan  drivers  deserted  to  a man  a 
march  or  two  from  Kabul,  and  the  Hazaras  followed  their  example  on 
reaching  their  own  country.  Sir  Donald  Stewart’s  account  of  the 
troubles  he  had  encountered  during  his  march  from  Kandahar  was  not 
very  encouraging,  and  I should  have  been  glad  if  I could  have  taken  a 
larger  amount  of  supplies  ;f  but  on  this  point  I had  to  be  guided  by 

* Each  British  soldier  was  allowed  for  kit  and  camp-equipage, 


including  great-coat  and  waterproof  sheet  - - - 30  lbs. 

Each  Native  soldier  - - - - - - 20  ,, 

Each  public  and  private  follower  - - - - 10  ,, 

Each  European  officer  - • - - - 1 mule. 

Every  eight  officers  for  mess  - - - - 1 ,, 

Each  staff-officer  for  office  purposes  - - - - 80  lbs. 

Each  Native  officer  - - - - - - 30  ,, 

t The  amount  of  supplies  taken  with  the  force  was  as  follows  : 

Foe  British  Tkoops. 

Bread-stuff  - - - - - - 5 days. 

Preserved  vegetables  - - - - 15  ,, 

Tea,  sugar,  salt,  and  rum  - - - - 30  ,, 

For  Native  Troops  and  Followers. 

Flour  - - - - - 5 days. 

Dal  and  salt  - - - - - 30  ,, 

Rum  for  spirit-drinking  men  - - 8 , , 


Sheep,  ten  days’  supply  for  British  troops  and  four  issues  for  Native 
troops,  with  20  per  cent,  spare.  Nearly  5,000  sheep  were  pur- 
chased on  the  march.  N.B. — There  are  no  horned  cattle  in 
Afghanistan,  except  those  used  for  the  plough  or  transport. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  a small  reserve  of  lime-juice,  pea-soup,  and  tinned 
meat  was  taken  ; these  proved  most  useful,  and  might  have  been  increased 
with  advantage  had  carriage  been  available. 

I gave  strict  orders  that  the  reserve  of  bread-stuff  flour,  and  sheep  was 
never  to  be  used  without  my  sanction,  and  that  wherever  possible  food  for 


iS8o] 


THE  KABUL  KANDAHAR  FIELD  FORCE 


475 


the  number  of  animals  that  could  be  allotted  to  the  column,  which 
was  necessarily  limited,  as  carriage  had  to  be  provided  simultaneously 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  rest  of  the  army  of  occupation. 

The  strength  of  the  force  placed  at  my  disposal  consisted  of  9,986 
men  of  all  ranks  and  eighteen  guns,  divided  into  three  brigades  of 
Infantry,  one  brigade  of  Cavalry,  and  three  batteries  of  Mountain 
Artillery.  There  were,  besides,  over  8,000  followers*  and  2,300  horses 
and  gun-mules. 

It  was  designated  the  Kabul- Kandahar  Field  Force. 

Major-General  J.  Ross,  C.B  , was  given  the  command  of  the  Infantry 
division,  his  three  Brigadier-Generals  being  Herbert  Macpherson, 
T.  D.  Baker,  and  Charles  Macgregor.  Brigadier- General  Hugh 

Gough  commanded  the  Cavalry  brigade  ; Colonel  Alured  Johnson  the 
Artillery ; while  Colonel  JE.  Perkins  held  the  position  of  Commanding 
Royal  Engineer ; Deputy  Surgeon-General  J.  Hanbury  that  of  Prin- 
cipal Medical  Officer ; and  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  F.  Chapman,  Chief 
of  the  Staff. 

From  the  detail  of  the  force  given  below,  f it  will  be  seen  that  there 


the  day’s  consumption  was  to  be  purchased.  We  had  occasionally  to  trench 
upon  the  reserve,  but  we  nearly  made  it  up  at  other  places,  and  we  arrived  at 
Kandahar  with  three  days'  supplies  in  hand. 

* The  followers  consisted  of : 


Doolie-bearers 

Transport  and  other  def>artments 
Private  servants,  and  saiccs  of  Native 
regiments .... 

Cavalry 

2,192 

4,698 

1,244 

Total 

- 

8,134 

t DETAIL  OF  FORCE. 

1st  Infantry  Brigade. 

92nd  Highlanders 

23rd  Pioneers  .... 

24th  Punjab  Native  Infantry  - 
2nd  Gurkhas  .... 

British. 

651 

Native. 

701 

575 

501 

Total 

651 

1,777 

2nd  Infantry  Brigade. 

72nd  Highlanders 
2nd  Sikh  Infantry 
3rd  Sikh  Infantry 

5th  Gurkhas  .... 

British. 

787 

Native. 

612 

570 

561 

Total 

787 

1,743 

476 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


was  no  wheeled  Artillery,  and  that  the  number  of  guns  was  not  in  pro- 
portion to  the  strength  of  the  other  branches.  This  was  my  own 
doing ; I was  pressed  to  take  more  and  heavier  guns,  but,  after  due 
consideration,  I decided  that  I would  only  have  Mountain  batteries. 
We  could  not  tell  how  long  the  Kandahar  garrison  would  be  able  to 
hold  out,  so  that  our  first  object  must  be  to  reach  that  place  with  the 


3rd  Infantry  Brigade. 


60th  Rifles,  2nd  Battalion 

15th  Sikhs  ..... 

25th  Punjab  Native  Infantry  - 

4th  Gurkhas  ..... 

British.  Native. 

616  — 

— 650 

— 629 

— 637 

Total  - 

616  1,916 

Cavalry  Brigade. 

9th  Queen’s  Royal  Lancers 
3rd  Bengal  Cavalry  .... 

3rd  Punjab  Cavalry  .... 

Central  India  Horse  .... 

British.  Native. 
318 

— 394 

— 408 

— 495 

Total  - 

318  1,297 

Artillery  Division. 

British. 

6-8th  Royal  Artillery — screw  guns  - 95 

11 -9th  Royal  Artillery  - - 95 

No.  2 Mountain  Battery  - - — 

Native.  Gum. 

139  6 

139  6 

140  6 

Total  - 190 

418  18 

Total  of  Force. 

British  troops  .... 
Native  ,, 

British  officers  .... 
Guns  ..... 
Cavalry  horses  .... 
Artillery  mules  .... 

- 2,562 

- 7,151 

273 

18 

- 1,779 

450 

Two  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  were  taken  for  each  Infantry  soldier: 
seventy  rounds  were  carried  by  each  man,  thirty  rounds  were  in  reserve  with 
the  regiment,  and  a hundred  rounds  in  the  Field  Park. 


Each  Mountain  battery  had  : 

Common  shell  ......  264 

Double  shell  - - - - - - 60 

Shrapnel  shell  - - - - - - 144 

Star  shell  - - - - - - 24 

Case  shot  - - - - - 48 


Total  - 

And  thirty  rounds  per  gun  in  the  Field  Park. 


540  rounds. 


i8So] 


COMMISSARIAT  AND  TRANSPORT 


477 


least  possible  delay,  and  wheeled  Artillery  would,  in  a country  where 
there  were  practically  no  roads,  have  only  prevented  our  moving  as 
rapidly  as  we  might  otherwise  have  done. 

For  the  equipment  of  the  force,  inclusive  of  carriage  for  footsore 
soldiers*  and  followers,  and  allowing  ten  per  cent,  spare,  more  than 
8,000f  animals  were  required. 

Fortunately,  it  turned  out  that  a fair  amount  of  Indian  corn  in  the 
ear  was  almost  everywhere  procurable,  which  was  so  nutritious  that  a 
large  majority  of  the  Cavalry  horses  and  transport  animals  reached 
Kandahar  in  excellent  condition. 

Throughout  the  march  great  difficulties  were  experienced  in  pro- 
curing food,  but  they  were  always  overcome,  with  the  able  assistance 
of  Major  Hastings  and  his  political  staff, J and  by  means  of  the 
admirable  arrangements  made  by  the  Commissariat§  and  Transport  | 
officers,  who  were  quite  untiring,  and  after  the  longest  march,  and  with 
the  prospect  of  having  to  start  again  at  an  early  hour  the  following 
morning,  had  often  to  work  far  into  the  night. 

The  want  of  fuel  was  our  chief  drawback.  We  had  on  many  occa- 
sions to  purchase  houses  and  pull  them  to  pieces  for  the  sake  of  the 
wood  to  be  got  out  of  them,  and  frequently  there  was  nothing  to  cook 


* British  troops  were  allowed  .ponies  at  the  rate  of  2 per  cent,  of  strength. 
Native  troops  were  allowed  ponies  at  the  rate  of  2A  per  cent  of  strength. 
Followers  were  allowed  ponies  at  the  rate  of  H per  cent,  of  strength. 


Yabus,  or 
Afghan 
ponies. 

Mules. 

Indian 

ponies. 

Donkeys. 

Camels. 

t Number  of  animals  that 
left  Kabul 

1,589 

4,510 

1,244 

912 

6> 

Purchased  during  the 
march* 3  - 

35 

1 

208 

171 

Number  of  animals  that 
reached  Kandahar 

1,179 

4,293 

1,138 

1,078 

177 

Casualties  during  the 
march  - 

445 

218 

106 

42 

t Major  E.  Hastings,  Captain  West  Ridgeway,  Major  Euan  Smith,  C.S.  I., 
and  Major  M.  Prothero. 

§ Major  A.  Badcock,  Captain  A.  Rind,  and  Lieutenants  C.  Fitzgerald, 
H.  Hawkes,  and  H.  Lyons  Montgomery,  all  of  the  Bengal  Staff  Corps. 

II  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  Low,  Bengal  Staff  Corps  ; Captain  W.  Wynter, 
33rd  Foot ; Captains  G.  H.  Eliot  and  C.  R.  Macgregor,  Bengal  Staff  Corps  ; 
Lieutenants  L.  Booth,  33rd  Foot,  H.  Elverson,  2nd  Foot,  R.  Fisher,  10th 
Hussars,  R.  Wilson,  10th  Hussars,  and  C.  Robertson,  8th  Foot. 


1 With  hospital  equipment. 

3 Only  twice  had  animals  to  be  taken  against  the  will  of  the  owners,  and 
on  both  occasions  the  matter  was  amieablv  settled  in  the  cud 


478 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


with  save  tiny  roots  of  southernwood,  which  had  to  be  dug  out  and 
collected  after  a long  day’s  march  before  the  men  could  prepare  their 
food  and  satisfy  their  hunger. 

One  day’s  corn  was  carried  by  each  animtJ  in  addition  to  the 
ordinary  load,  and  as  far  as  Ghazni  grain  was  tolerably  plentiful; 
beyond  that  we  had  to  depend  for  forage  on  the  crops  still  standing. 
At  the  end  of  the  day’s  march,  certain  fields  were  told  off  to  the 
several  brigades ; from  these  all  that  was  required  was  cut  and  carried 
away,  the  fields  were  then  measured  and  assessed,  and  compensation 
was  awarded  by  the  political  officers,  who  also  adjusted  all  claims  on 
account  of  wrecked  houses,  and  fruit,  vegetables,  etc.,  brought  in  for  the 
troops. 

On  Sunday,  the  8th  August,  the  force  moved  into  camp  by  brigades, 
my  Head-Quarters  being  with  the  first  and  third  Infantry  brigades  at 
Beni  Hissar,  on  the  way  to  the  Logar  valley,  which  route  I had  chosen 
instead  of  the  slightly  shorter  line  by  Maidan,  on  account  of  the  greater 
facility  it  afforded  for  supplies. 

Sir  Donald  Stewart  paid  us  a farewell  visit  in  the  afternoon,  and  at 
6 a.m.  the  following  morning  wc  began  the  march  to  Kandahar. 


CHAPTER  LXI. 

Before  daybreak  on  the  11th  August,  as  I was  starting  from  camp,  I 
received  my  last  communication  from  the  outside  world  in  the  shape 
of  a telegram  from  my  wife,  sent  off  from  a little  village  in  Somerset- 
shire, congratulating  me  and  the  force,  and  wishing  us  all  God’s  speed. 
She  had  taken  our  children  to  England  a few  months  before,  thinking 
that  the  war  in  Afghanistan  was  over,  and  that  I would  soon  be  able 
to  follow. 

Four  days  brought  us  to  the  end  of  the  Logar  valley,  a distance  of 
forty-six  miles.  So  far  the  country  was  easy  and  supplies  plentiful.  I 
thought  it  wise,  however,  not  to  attempt  long  distances  at  first,  that 
both  men  and  animals  might  become  gradually  hardened  before  enter- 
ing on  the  difficult  and  scantily  cultivated  ground  between  Ghazni  and 
Kelat-i-Ghilzai,  where  I knew  that  forced  marches  were  inevitable, 
and  that  their  powers  of  endurance  would  be  sorely  taxed.  Moreover, 
it  was  necessary  to  begin  quietly,  and  organize  some  system  by  which 
confusion  in  the  crowded  camping-grounds  might  be  avoided,  and  the 
physical  strain  upon  everyone  lightened  as  much  as  possible. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  daily  supply  for  over  18,000  men 
and  11,000  animals  had  to  be  drawn  from  the  country  after  arrival  in 
camp,  that  food  had  to  be  distributed  to  every  individual,  that  the  fuel 


i88o] 


THE  ORDER  OF  MARCHING 


479 


with  which  it  was  cooked  had  often  to  be  brought  from  long  distances, 
and  that  a very  limited  time  was  available  for  the  preparation  of  meals 
and  for  rest,  it  will  readily  be  understood  how  essential  it  was  that  even 
the  stupidest  follower  should  bo  able  to  find  his  place  in  camp  speedily, 
and  that  everyone  should  know  exactly  what  to  do  and  how  to  set  about 
doing  it. 

On  the  march  and  in  the  formation  of  the  camps  the  same  prin- 
ciples were,  as  far  as  possible,  applied  each  day.  The  ‘ rouse  ’ 
sounded  at  2.45  a.m.,  aad  by  four  o’clock  tents  had  been  struck, 
baggage  loaded  up,  and  everything  was  ready  for  a start. 

As  a general  rule,  the  Cavalry  covered  the  movement  at  a distance  of 
about  five  miles,  two  of  the  four  regiments  being  in  front,  with  the 
other  two  on  either  flank.  Two  of  the  Infantry  brigades  came  next, 
each  accompanied  by  a Mountain  battery ; then  followed  the  field 
hospitals,  Ordnance  and  Engineer  parks,  treasure,  and  the  baggage, 
massed  according  to  the  order  in  which  the  brigades  were  moving. 
The  third  Infantry  brigade  with  its  Mountain  battery  and  one  or  two 
troops  of  Cavalry  formed  the  rear  guard. 

A halt  of  ten  minutes  was  made  at  the  end  of  each  hour,  which  at 
eight  o’clock  was  prolonged  to  twenty  minutes  to  give  time  for  a hasty 
breakfast.  Being  able  to  sleep  on  the  shortest  notice,  I usually  took 
advantage  of  these  intervals  to  get  a nap,  awaking  greatly  refreshed 
after  a few  minutes’  sound  sleep. 

On  arrival  at  the  resting-place  for  the  night,  the  front  face  of  the 
camp  was  told  off  to  the  brigade  on  rear  guard,  and  this  became  the 
leading  brigade  of  the  column  on  the  next  day’s  march.  Thus  every 
brigade  had  its  turn  of  rear  guard  duty,  which  was  very  arduous,  more 
particularly  after  leaving  Ghazni,  the  troops  so  employed  seldom 
reaching  the  halting-ground  before  six  or  seven  o’clock  in  the  evening, 
and  sometimes  even  later. 

One  of  the  most  troublesome  duties  of  the  rear  guard  was  to  prevent 
the  followers  from  lagging  behind,  for  it  was  certain  death  for  anyone 
who  strayed  from  the  shelter  of  the  column;  numbers  of  Afghans 
always  hovered  about  on  the  look-out  for  plunder,  or  in  the  hope  of 
being  able  to  send  a Kaffir,  or  an  almost  equally-detested  Hindu,  to 
eternal  perdition.  Towards  the  end  of  the  march  particularly,  this 
duty  became  most  irksome,  for  the  wretched  followers  were  so  weary 
and  footsore  that  they  hid  themselves  in  ravines,  making  up  their 
minds  to  die,  and  entreating,  when  discovered  and  urged  to  make  an 
effort,  to  be  left  where  they  were.  Every  baggage  animal  that  could 
possibly  be  spared  was  used  to  carry  the  worn-out  followers  ; but  not- 
withstanding this  and  the  care  taken  by  officers  and  men  that  none 
should  be  left  behind,  twenty  of  these  poor  creatures  were  lost,  besides 
four  Native  soldiers. 

The  variation  of  temperature  (at  times  as  much  as  eighty  degrees 


480 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


between  day  and  night)  was  most  trying  to  the  troops,  who  had  to 
carry  the  same  clothes  whether  the  thermometer  was  at  freezing-point 
at  dawn  or  at  110°  Fahr.  at  mid-day.  Scarcity  of  water,  too,  was  a 
great  trouble  to  them,  while  constant  sand-storms,  and  the  suffocating 
dust  raised  by  the  column  in  its  progress,  added  greatly  to  their 
discomfort. 

Daily  reports  regarding  the  health  of  the  troops,  followers,  and 
transport  animals  were  brought  to  me  each  evening,  and  I made  it 
my  business  to  ascertain  how  many  men  had  fallen  out  during  the 
day,  and  what  had  been  the  number  of  casualties  amongst  the 
animals. 

On  the  12th  August  the  Head-Quarters  and  main  body  of  the  force 
halted  to  allow  the  Cavalry  and  the  second  Infantry  brigade  to  push 
on  and  get  clear  over  the  Zamburak  Kotal  (8,100  feet  high)  before  the 
rest  of  the  column  attempted  its  ascent.  This  kotal  presented  a 
serious  obstacle  to  our  rapid  progress,  the  gradient  being  in  many 
places  one  in  four,  and  most  difficult  for  the  baggage  animals ; but  by 
posting  staff  officers  at  intervals  to  control  the  flow  of  traffic,  and  by 
opening  out  fresh  paths  to  relieve  the  pressure,  we  got  over  it  much 
more  quickly  than  I had  expected. 

On  the  15th  we  reached  Ghazni,  ninety-eight  miles  from  Kabul,  a 
place  of  peculiar  interest  to  me  from  the  fact  that  it  was  for  his 
share  in  its  capture,  forty-one  years  before,  that  my  father  was  given 
the  C.B. 

I was  met  by  the  Governor,  who  handed  me  the  keys  of  the  fortress, 
and  I placed  my  own  guards  and  sentries  in  and  around  the  city  to 
prevent  collisions  between  the  inhabitants  and  our  troops,  and  also  to 
make  sure  that  our  demands  for  supplies  were  complied  with.  Up  to 
this  point  we  had  been  fairly  well  off  for  food,  forage,  and  water. 

Our  next  march  was  across  a barren,  inhospitable  track  for  twenty 
miles  to  a place  called  Yarghati.  On  the  way  we  passed  Ahmedkhel, 
where  Sir  Donald  Stewart  won  his  victory ; the  name  had  been  changed 
by  the  Natives  to  ‘ the  Resting-place  of  Martyrs,’  and  the  numerous 
freshly-covered- in  graves  testified  to  the  ghazis'  heavy  losses.  The 
remains  of  the  few  British  soldiers,  who  had  been  buried  where  they 
had  fallen,  had  been  desecrated,  and  the  bones  were  exposed  to  view 
and  scattered  about. 

At  Chardeh,  our  next  halting-place,  a communication  from  Colonel 
Tanner,  Commanding  at  Kelat-i-Ghilzai,  was  brought  to  me  by  a 
Native  messenger ; it  was  dated  the  12th  August,  and  informed  me 
that  Kandahar  was  closely  invested,  but  that  the  garrison  had  supplies 
for  two  months  and  forage  for  fifteen  days. 

On  the  2lst  we  arrived  at  a point  thirty  miles  from  Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 
whence  we  opened  heliograph  communication  with  that  place,  and 
were  told  of  an  unsuccessful  sortie  made  from  Kandahar  five  days 


CROSSING  THE  ZAMHURAK  KOTAL. 


1880]  GHAZNI  AND  KELA T-I-GHILZA I 48i 

before,  in  which  General  Brooke  and  eight  other  British  officers  had 
been  killed. 

On  the  23rd  Kelat-i-Ghilzai  was  reached.  The  garrison*  had  been 
well  taken  care  of  by  Colonel  Tanner,  f and  a large  quantity  of  food 
for  man  and  beast  had  been  collected ; but  I thought  it  unadvisable  at 
present  to  continue  to  hold  the  place,  and  have  to  keep  open  com- 
munication between  it  and  Kandahar,  and  as  I could  see  no  compen- 
sating advantage  in  doing  so,  I determined  to  withdraw  the  troops  and 
take  them  along  with  me. 

Colonel  Tanner’s  report  satisfied  me  there  was  no  immediate  danger 
to  be  apprehended  at  Kandahar,  so  I decided  to  halt  for  one  day ; both 
men  and  animals  greatly  needed  rest  after  a continuous  march  of  225 
miles. 

I had  endeavoured  to  keep  the  Government  of  India  informed  of  my 
progress  by  a message  from  Ghazni,  and  one  from  Oba  Karez  on  the 
18th  August,  but  neither  reached  its  destination.  I now  despatched  a 
message  which  was  more  successful,  and  was  delivered  at  Simla  on 
the  30th  August.  It  was  as  follows : 

‘ Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 

23 rd  August,  1880. 

‘The  force  under  my  command  arrived  here  this  morning.  The  authorities 
at  Kandahar  having  stated  on  the  17th  instant  that  they  have  abundant 
supplies  and  can  make  forage  last  until  1st  September,  I halt  to-morrow  to 
rest  the  troops,  and  more  especially  the  transport  animals  and  camp-followers. 
The  force  left  Ghazni  on  the  16th,  and  has  marched  136  miles  during  the  last 
eight  days  ; the  troops  are  in  good  health  and  spirits.  From  this  I purpose 
moving  by  regular  stages,  so  that  the  men  may  arrive  fresh  at  Kandahar.  I 
hope  to  be  in  heliographic  communication  with  Kandahar  from  Robat,  distant 
twenty  miles,  on  the  29th.  If  General  Phayre  reaches  Takht-i-Pul,  I should 
also  hope  to  communicate  with  him  and  arrange  a combined  movement  on 
Kandahar.  I am  taking  the  Kelat-i-Ghilzai  garrison  with  me,  making  the 
Fort  over  to  Mahomed  Sadik  Khan,  a Toki  Chief,  who  had  charge  of  the 
place  when  we  arrived  in  1879  ; the  present  Governor,  Sirdar  Sherindil  Khan, 
refuses  to  remain.  We  have  met  with  no  opposition  during  the  march,  and 
have  been  able  to  make  satisfactory  arrangements  for  supplies,  especially 
forage,  which  at  this  season  is  plentiful.  The  Cavalry  horses  and  Artillery 
mules  are  in  excellent  order  ; our  casualties  to  date  are,  one  soldier  72nd 
Highlanders,  one  sepoy  23rd  Pioneers,  one  2nd  Sikhs,  two  sepoys  3rd  Sikhs 
dead  ; one  sepoy  4th  Gurkhas,  two  sepoys  24th  Punjab  Native  Infantry,  one 
Duffadar  3rd  Punjab  Cavalry  missing  ; six  camp-followers  dead,  five  missing. 
The  missing  men  have,  I fear,  been  murdered.  I telegraphed  from  Ghazni  on 
the  loth,  and  from  Oba  Karez  on  the  18th  August.’ 

I wrote  also  to  Major-General  Phayre,  telling  him  of  the  date  on 
which  I expected  to  reach  Kandahar,  and  that  if  I heard  of  his  being 

* The  garrison  consisted  of  2 guns  of  C/2,  Royal  Artillery,  145  rifles  of 
the  66th  Foot,  100  of  the  3rd  Sind  Horse,  and  the  2nd  Baluch  Regiment, 
639  strong. 

t Now  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Oriel  Tanner,  K.C.B, 


482 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


anywhere  near  I would  arrange  my  movements  to  suit  his,  in  order 
that  the  two  forces  might  make  a combined  attack  on  Ayub  Khan’s 
position. 

As  I was  afraid  the  supplies  at  Kandahar  would  be  insufficient  for 
the  additional  troops  about  to  be  collected  there,  I sent  General  Phayre 
a memorandum*  of  the  amount  of  food  required  daily  by  my  force, 
and  begged  him  to  get  pushed  up  from  the  rear  such  articles  as  were 
more  particularly  wanted.  I pointed  out  that  we  were  badly  off  for 
boots,  and  that  the  92nd  Highlanders  had  only  one  hundred  great- 
coats fit  for  wear,  which  were  used  by  the  men  on  night  duties. 

On  the  25th  we  marched  to  Jaldak,  seventeen  miles,  and  the  same 
distance  the  next  day  to  Tirandaz,  where  I received  a letter  from 
Lieutenant-General  Primrose,  informing  me  that  Ayub  Khan  had 
raised  the  siege  on  the  23rd,  and  was  entrenching  himself  at  Mazra, 
beyond  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal,  in  the  valley  of  the  Arghandab. 

I awoke  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  feeling  very  unwell,  and  soon 
found  I was  in  for  an  attack  of  fever.  The  heat  during  the  day  was 
becoming  more  and  more  overpowering  as  we  proceeded  south,  and  I 
had  lately  been  feeling  somewhat  knocked  up  by  it  and  by  exposure  to 
the  sun.  I had  now  to  give  in  for  the  time  being,  and  was  compelled 
to  perform  the  march  in  a doolie,  a most  ignominious  mode  of  con- 
veyance for  a General  on  service ; but  there  was  no  help  for  it,  for  I 
could  not  sit  a horse. 


* Estimate  of  daily  requirements  for  the  Kabul-Kandahar  Field  Force  and 


e Kelat-i-Ghilzai  garrison : 

Europeans 

- 

- 

- 3,200 

Native  troops  - 

- 

- 

- 8,000 

Followers 

- 

- 

- 8,500 

Horses 

- 

- 

- 2,300 

Transport  — yabus  1,592, 

mules 

and  ponies 

5,926,  camels  400, 

donkeys  400. 

Meat  - 

- 4,000  lbs. 

Bread-stuff 

40  maunds.1 

Vegetables 

. 

- 4,000  lbs. 

Rice  - 

- 800  „ 

Salt 

- 133  „ 

Sugar  - 

600  „ 

Tea  - 

- 150  „ 

Rum,  25  per  cent. 

80  gallons. 

Atta  - - - 

320  maunds. 

Dali  - 

51J  „ 

Ghee  - - - 

19*  .. 

Salt 

8*  „ 

Grain  - 

700  ,, 

A.  R.  BADCOCK,  Major, 

Deputy  Commissary-General. 

Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 

24 th  August,  1880. 

1 A maund  is  equivalent  to  80  lbs. 


A LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  PHAYRE 


483 


1880] 

That  day  the  3rd  Bengal  and  3rd  Punjab  Cavalry  marched  thirty- 
four  miles  to  Robat,  in  order  to  establish  direct  heliographic  com- 
munication with  Kandahar.  The  main  body  halted  about  half-way, 
when  I again  reported  progress  as  follows  : 


1 Shahr-i-Sa?a, 

“27th  August,  1880. 

1 My  force  arrived  here  to-day.  I received  a letter  yesterday,  dated  25th, 
from  Colonel  St.  John.  He  writes : “The  rumours  of  the  approach  of  your 
force  have  been  sufficient  to  relieve  the  city  from  investment.  On  Monday 
night  the  villages  on  the  east  and  south  were  abandoned  by  their  mixed 
garrisons  of  ghazis  and  regulars.  Yesterday  morning  Ayub  struck  his  camp, 
and  marched  to  a position  on  the  Arghandab,  between  Baba  AVali  and  Sheikh 
Chela,  due  north  of  the  city,  and  separated  from  it  by  a range  of  rocky  hills. 
He  has  about  4,000  Infantry  regulars,  six  12-pounaers  and  two  9-pounders 
rifled,  four  6-pounder  smooth-bore  batteries,  ana  one  4-pounder  battery,  2,000 
sowars,  and  perhaps  twice  that  number  of  ghazis,  of  whom  a third  have  tire- 
arms.  The  Kizilbashes  and  Kohistanis  in  his  army,  about  1,200  Infantry 
and  300  Cavalry,  ottered  to  desert  and  join  us  directly  we  made  a show  of 
attack.  They  are  at  last  aware  of  Abdur  Rahman’s  succession,  but  I think 
Ayub  will  remain  unmolested  until  the  arrival  of  the  Kabul  force,  provided 
he  waits,  which  is  unlikely.  He  will,  I expect,  strike  away  north  into 
Khakrez,  on  which  line  a vigorous  pursuit  will  give  us  his  guns.  Maclaine, 
Royal  Horse  Artillery,  is  still  a prisoner  ; I am  making  every  etfort  to  obtain 
his  release,  but  I am  not  very  hopeful  of  success.  This  morning,  the  25th, 
I went  to  the  field  of  the  unlucky  sortie  of  the  16th,  and  found  the  bodies  of 
the  poor  fellows  who  fell  there,  some  forty  in  number  ; they  will  be  buried 
this  afternoon.  All  the  wounded  are  doing  well.  No  signs  or  tidings  of 
Phayre.”  General  Gough,  with  two  regiments  of  Cavalry,  is  at  Robat ; they 
are  in  heliographic  communication  with  Kandahar.  General  Primrose  helio- 
graphs that  Ayub  Khan  has  entrenched  his  camp  at  Baba  Wali.  The  force 
marches  for  Robat  to-morrow,  seventeen  miles  distant  from  Kandahar.’ 

The  following  day  the  column  joined  the  two  Cavalry  regiments  at 
Robat,  where  I was  met  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  St.  John,  from  whom 
I heard  that  Ayub  Khan  was  likely  to  make  a stand.  I thought  it 
prudent,  therefore,  to  halt  on  Sunday,  the  29th,  and  divide  the  last 
twenty  miles  into  two  short  marches,  in  order  that  the  men  and  animals 
might  arrive  as  fresh  as  possible,  and  fit  for  any  work  which  might  be 
required  of  them ; for  should  Ayub  Khan  retire  towards  Herat,  he 
would  have  to  be  followed  up,  and  his  army  attacked  and  defeated 
wherever  we  might  overtake  him. 

Before  leaving  Robat,  a letter  arrived  from  General  Phayre,  which 
put  an  end  to  all  hope  of  his  force  being  able  to  co-operate  with  mine, 
for  his  leading  brigade,  he  wrote,  had  only  just  got  to  the  Kohjak  Pass. 
This  was  to  be  regretted,  but  it  was  unavoidable.  I was  well  aware 
of  the  strenuous  efforts  the  gallant  Commander  had  made  to  relieve 
the  beleaguered  garrison,  and  I knew  if  co-operation  had  been  possible 
it  would  have  been  effected. 


32 


484  FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA  [1880 

We  encamped  at  Momund  on  the  30th,  whence  I sent  the  following 
telegram  to  Simla : 

‘ My  force  arrived  here  to-day ; we  march  to  Kandahar  to-morrow.  General 
Primrose  heliographs  that  a letter  from  Ayub’s  camp  brings  information  that 
the  mother  of  the  late  Heir-Apparent,  Abdulla  Jan,  with  other  ladies,  has 
been  sent  to  Zamindawar.  Arrival  of  the  young  Musa  Jan  in  Ayub’s  camp  is 
confirmed.  Hasliim  Khan  is  also  there.  The  position  is  being  strengthened, 
especially  on  the  Pir  Paimal  side,  where  two  guns  have  been  placed  with  two 
regiments.  From  further  information,  I learn  that  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal  is 
occupied  by  three  regiments  and  two  guns.  The  Kotal-i-Murclia  is  held  by 
the  Kabul  regiments,  and  Ayub’s  own  camp  is  at  Mazra,  where  it  is  said  that 
the  majority  of  his  guns  are  parked.  I propose  to  encamp  the  Infantry  to  the 
west  of  Kandahar  immediately  under  the  walls,  and  the  Cavalry  under  the 
walls  to  the  south.  Should  I hear  that  Ayub  contemplates  flight,  I shall 
attack  without  delay.  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  intends  to  resist,  I shall  take 
my  own  time.  The  country  he  is  occupying  is,  from  description  and  map, 
extremely  difficult  and  easily  defensible,  and  each  separate  advance  will  require 
careful  study  and  reconnaissance  to  prevent  unnecessary  loss  of  life.’ 

On  the  morning  of  the  31st  we  marched  into  Kandahar,  just  over 
313  miles  from  Kabul.  The  fever,  which  had  attacked  me  rather 
sharply,  had  left  me  extremely  weak,  and  I was  unable  to  ride  the 
whole  way.  I got  on  my  horse,  however,  some  distance  from  Kandahar 
to  meet  Generals  Primrose,  Burrows,  and  Nuttall,  who  came  out  to 
receive  the  column.  As  we  approached  the  city,  the  whole  garrison 
turned  out  and  gave  us  a hearty  welcome;  officers  and  men,  Native 
and  British,  crowded  round  us,  loud  in  their  expressions  of  gratitude 
for  our  having  come  so  quickly  to  their  assistance.  We,  on  our  side, 
were  all  anxiety  to  learn  the  particulars  about  Maiwand,  how  they  had 
fared  while  invested,,  and  all  they  could  tell  us  of  Ayub  Khan,  his 
position,  strength  of  his  army,  etc. 

I confess  to  being  very  greatly  surprised,  not  to  use  a stronger  ex- 
pression, at  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
garrison  ;*  there  were  notable  exceptions,  f but  the  general  bearing  of 
the  troops  reminded  me  of  the  people  at  Agra  in  1857.  They  seemed 
to  consider  themselves  hopelessly  defeated,  and  were  utterly  de- 
spondent ; they  never  even  hoisted  the  Union  Jack  until  the  relieving 
force  was  close  at  hand.  The  same  excuses  could  not,  however,  be 
made  for  them,  who  were  all  soldiers  by  profession,  as  we  had  felt 
inclined  to  make  for  the  residents  at  Agra,  a great  majority  of  whom 
were  women,  children,  and  civilians.  The  wallsj  which  completely 

* The  effective  garrison  consisted  of  1,000  British  soldiers,  3,000  Native 
soldiers,  and  fifteen  Field  guns. 

+ One  and  all  bore  testimony  to  the  unfailing  good  behaviour  and  creditable 
bearing  of  the  Royal  Artillery  and  the  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners,  not  only 
during  the  investment,  but  in  the  very  trying  time  of  the  retreat  from 
Maiwand. 

t The  walls  had  an  average  height  of  30  feet,  and  breadth  of  15  feet  on  the 
north  and  east  fronts, 


i88o] 


KANDAHAR 


485 


surrounded  Kandahar  were  so  high  and  thick  as  to  render  the  city 
absolutely  impregnable  to  any  army  not  equipped  with  a regular  siege- 
train.  Scaling-ladders  had  been  prepared  by  the  enemy,  and  there 
was  an  idea  that  an  assault  would  be  attempted ; but  for  British 
soldiers  to  have  contemplated  the  possibility  of  Kandahar  being  taken 
by  an  Afghan  army  showed  what  a miserable  state  of  depression  and 
demoralization  they  were  in. 

I halted  the  column  for  two  hours  outside  the  south  wall  of  the  city, 
where  it  was  sheltered  from  the  enemy’s  fire,  Ayub  Khan's  position 
being  within  long  range  directly  north  of  Kandahar.  While  the  men 
rested  and  breakfasted,  and  the  baggage  animals  were  being  unloaded, 
fed,  and  watered,  I went  into  the  citadel  to  talk  matters  over  with 
General  Primrose  and  Colonel  St.  John,  and  inquire  whether  there 
was  sufficient  accommodation  for  the  sick  men  of  my  force,  numbering 
940,  who  needed  to  be  taken  into  hospital.  The  thermometer  now 
registered  105°  Fahr.  in  tents  during  the  day,  but  the  nights  were  still 
bitterly  cold,  and  the  sudden  changes  of  temperature  were  extremely 
trying  to  people  in  bad  health. 

On  the  advice  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Chapman,  whose  intimate 
acquaintance  with  the  neighbourhood  of  Kandahar,  gained  while 
serving  on  Sir  Donald  Stewart’s  staff,  was  now  most  valuable  to  me,  I 
determined  to  take  up  a position  to  the  wTest  of  the  city,  with  my  right 
on  the  cantonment  and  my  left  touching  Old  Kandahar.  This  enabled 
me  to  cover  the  city,  gave  me  command  of  a good  supply  of  water,  and 
placed  me  within  striking  distance  of  Ayub  Khan’s  camp. 

At  10  a.m.  the  first  and  third  brigades  moved  off  and  occupied 
Piquet  Hill,  Karez  Hill,  and  the  north-east  spur  of  the  hill  above  Old 
Kandahar.  A few  shots  were  fired  at  the  advance  guard  from  distant 
orchards,  and  the  ground  proved  to  be  within  range  of  some  of  the 
enemy’s  Field-pieces  on  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal,  but  it  was  a case  of 
Hobson’s  choice,  as  water  was  not  to  be  found  anywhere  else  at  a 
come-at-able  distance. 

Large  numbers  of  men  were  to  be  seen  crowning  the  Baba  Wali 
Kotal,  and  constructing  shelter-trenches  along  the  crest  of  the  low 
black  ridge,  which  jutted  out  in  a south-easterly  direction  from  the 
more  lofty  range  on  which  the  kotal  is  situated.  Piquets  were  imme- 
diately sent  to  occupy  the  northern  spur  of  the  Kohkeran  Hill  com- 
manding the  road  to  Gundigan,  the  village  of  Abbasabad,  the  Karez 
Hill,  the  village  of  Chihal  Dukhtaran,  the  greater  and  lesser  Piquet 
Hills,  and  the  village  of  Kalachi,  all  of  which  were  found  to  be 
deserted. 

From  a cursory  examination  of  the  ground,  I satisfied  myself  that 
any  attempt  to  carry  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal  by  direct  attack  must  result 
in  very  severe  loss,  and  I determined  to  turn  it.  But  before  I could 
decide  how  this  could  best  be  done,  it  was  necessary  to  ascertain  the 

32—2 


486 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


strength  and  precise  extent  of  the  Afghan  position.  I therefore 
detailed  a small  party,*  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Hugh  Gough,  to  make  as  complete  a reconnaissance  as  time  would 
allow.  In  the  meantime  I despatched  the  following  telegram  to  the 
authorities  at  Simla : 

‘ Kandahak, 

‘31s<  August,  1880. 

‘ The  force  under  my  command  arrived  here  this  morning  without  opposi- 
tion. Enemy  are  said  to  be  in  considerable  strength  at  Mazra,  but  the  ridge 
of  hills  which  divides  Kandahar  from  the  Arghandab  completely  covers  their 
position,  and  at  present  I have  only  been  able  to  ascertain  that  the  Baba  Wali 
Kotal  and  one  or  two  other  points  on  this  ridge  are  held  in  great  strength, 
and  that  the  enemy  are  busily  engaged  in  defensive  works.  Reconnaissances 
are  now  being  conducted,  and  I shall  soon,  I hope,  be  sufficiently  acquainted 
with  affairs  generally  to  enable  me  to  arrange  for  an  attack.  The  Kandahar 
garrison  are  in  good  health  ; the  horses  and  transport  animals  appear  to  be  iu 
good  condition.  Major  Vandeleur,  7th  Fusiliers,  has  died  of  his  wounds  ; the 
remainder  of  the  wounded,  both  officers  and  men,  are  generally  doing  well. 
The  troops  from  Kabul  are  in  famous  health  and  spirits.  The  assurance  of 
the  safety  of  this  garrison  enabled  comparatively  short  marches  to  be  made 
from  Kelat-i-Ghilzai,  which  much  benefited  both  men  and  animals.  The 
Cavalry  horses  and  Artillery  mules  are  in  excellent  condition,  and  the  trans- 
port animals  are,  as  a rule,  in  very  fair  order.  General  Primrose  has  arranged 
for  the  sick  of  the  force  from  Kabul  being  accommodated  inside  the  city  ; 
many  of  the  eases  are  sore  feet ; none  are  serious.  To-morrow  .he  telegraph 
line  towards  India  will  commence  to  be  re-constructed,  and  as  General  P hay  re 
is  probably  on  this  side  of  the  Kohjak  to-day,  through  communication  should 
soon  be  restored.’ 

The  reconnaissance,  which  started  at  1 p.m.,  proceeded  towards  the 
high  ground  immediately  above  the  villages  of  Gundigan  and  Murghan. 
Here  the  Infantry  and  guns  were  halted,  while  the  Cavalry  advanced 
between  two  or  three  miles,  avoiding  the  numerous  orchards  and  en- 
closures, and  coming  out  in  front  of  Pir  Paimal,  which  was  found  to 
be  strongly  entrenched. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy’s  fire  along  this  line  had  been  drawn,  the  3rd 
Bengal  Cavalry  fell  back,  admirably  handled  by  their  Commandant, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  A.  Mackenzie.  In  the  meantime,  two  guns  of 
No.  11  Battery  9th  Brigade  were  brought  into  action,  partly  to  test  the 
range,  and  partly  to  check  the  enemy,  who  were  passing  rapidly  into 
the  gardens  near  Gundigan.  The  Infantry  and  Artillery  then  retired 
within  the  line  of  piquets,  and  the  moment  they  began  to  fall  back  the 
Afghans  came  after  them  in  great  strength  ; they  were  so  persistent 
that  I ordored  the  whole  of  the  3rd  Brigade  and  part  of  the  1st  Brigade 
under  arms.  The  enemy,  however,  were  unable  to  come  to  close 
quarters  owing  to  the  bold  front  shown  by  the  15th  Sikhs,  under  the 

* Two  Royal  Artillery  guns,  3rd  Bengal  Cavalry,  and  15tli  Sikhs. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Chapman  accompanied  the  party,  and  was  of  great 
assistance  to  Brigadier-General  Gough. 


i8So] 


A TURNING  MOVEMENT 


487 


command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hennessy,  and  before  dark  the  troops 
were  all  back  in  camp,  with  a loss  of  five  men  killed  and  fifteen 
wounded. 

From  the  information  obtained  by  this  reconnaissance,  I found  that 
it  was  quite  practicable  to  turn  the  Afghan  right,  and  thus  place  myself 
in  rear  of  the  Baba  Wali  range  ; I decided,  therefore,  to  attack  the 
position  the  following  morning.  It  was  too  close  to  our  camp  to  risk 
delay.  Moreover,  I knew  that  the  retrograde  movement  of  Gough’s 
small  body  would  be  construed  into  a defeat  by  the  enemy,  who,  if  we 
did  not  move  at  once,  would  assuredly  think  that  we  were  afraid  to 
take  the  initiative,  and  would  become  correspondingly  bold. 

I accordingly  issued  orders  for  the  troops  to  breakfast  at  7 a.m.,  and 
for  one  day’s  cooked  rations  to  be  carried  by  the  Infantry  and  two 
days  by  the  Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery.  Brigades  were  to  be  in 
position  by  eight  o’clock,  tents  being  previously  struck  and  the  baggage 
stored  in  a walled  enclosure. 

The  night  passed  quietly  except  for  occasional  bursts  of  musketry 
along  the  line  of  piquets  to  the  west,  showing  that  the  Afghans  were 
holding  the  villages  they  had  occupied  the  previous  evening. 


CHAPTER  LXII. 

The  next  morning,  the  1st  September,  in  accordance  with  instructions 
from  Simla,  I assumed  command  of  the  army  in  southern  Afghanistan. 
There  was  no  return  to  show  the  strength  or  composition  of  General 
Phayre’s  column,  but  the  troops  at  Kandahar  all  told  now  amounted 
in  round  numbers  to  3,800  British  and  11,000  Native  soldiers,  with 
36  guns. 

An  hour  before  daybreak  the  whole  of  the  troops  were  under  arms, 
and  at  6 a.m.  I explained  to  Generals  Primrose  and  Ross  and  the 
officers  commanding  brigades  the  plan  of  operations.  Briefly,  it  was 
to  threaten  the  enemy’s  left  (the  Baba  Wali  Kotal),  and  to  attack  in 
force  by  the  village  of  Pir  Paimal. 

The  Infantry  belonging  to  the  Kabul  column,  upon  whom  devolved 
the  duty  of  carrying  the  enemy’s  position,  were  formed  up  in  rear  of 
the  low  hills  which  covered  the  front  of  our  camp,  their  right  being  at 
Piquet  Hill  and  their  left  resting  on  Chitral  Zina.  The  Cavalry  of  the 
Kabul  column  were  drawn  up  in  rear  of  the  left,  ready  to  operate  by 
Gundigan  towards  the  head  of  the  Arghandab,  so  as  to  threaten  the 
rear  of  Ayub  Khan’s  camp  and  his  line  of  retreat  in  the  direction  of 
Girishk.  Four  guns  of  E Battery  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  two  companies 
of  the  2 — 7th  Fusiliers,  and  four  companies  of  the  28th  Bombay  Infantry, 
were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough,  whose 


4«8 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


orders  were  to  occupy  with  these  troops  the  position  above  Gundigan, 
which  had  been  so  useful  during  the  previous  day’s  reconnaissance, 
and  to  push  his  Cavalry  on  to  the  Arghandab. 

Guards  having  been  detailed  for  the  protection  of  the  city,  the 
remainder  of  Lieutenant-General  Primrose’s  troops  were  ordered  to 
be  disposed  as  follows  : Brigadier-General  Daubeny’s  brigade  to  occupy 
the  ground  between  Piquet  Hill  and  Chitral  Zina  as  soon  as  the 
Infantry  of  the  Kabul- Kandahar  Field  Force  advanced  to  the  attack. 
The  remnant  of  Brigadier- General  Burrows’s  brigade,  with  No.  5 
Battery,  11th  Brigade  Boyal  Artillery,  under  Captain  Hornsby,  and 
the  Cavalry  under  Brigadier-General  Nuttall,  to  take  up  a position 
north  of  the  cantonment,  from  which  the  40-pounders  could  be  brought 
to  bear  on  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal,  while  the  Cavalry  could  watch  the 
pass,  called  Kotal-i-Murcha,  and  cover  the  city. 

From  an  early  hour  it  was  clear  that  the  enemy  contemplated  an 
offensive  movement ; the  villages  of  Gundigan  and  Gundi  Mulla 
Sahibdab  were  being  held  in  strength,  and  a desultory  fire  was  brought 
to  bear  on  the  British  front  from  the  orchards  connecting  these  two 
villages  and  from  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal. 

The  Bombay  Cavalry  moved  out  at  7.30  a. in.,  and  Daubeny’s 
brigade  at  eight  o’clock.  Burrows’s  troops  followed,  and  shortly  after 
9 a.m.,  their  disposition  being  completed,  Captain  Hornsby  opened  fire 
upon  the  kotal,  which  was  one  mass  of  ghazis. 

This  feint,  made  by  General  Primrose’s  troops,  having  had  the 
effect  I had  hoped,  of  attracting  the  enemy’s  attention,  I gave  the 
order  for  Major-General  Boss  to  make  the  real  attack  with  the  1st  and 
2nd  Brigades  of  his  division.  The  3rd  Brigade,  under  Brigadier- 
General  Macgregor,  I placed  in  front  of  the  village  of  Abbasabad, 
with  the  double  object  of  being  a reserve  to  the  1st  and  2nd  Brigades 
and  of  meeting  a possible  counter-attack  from  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal. 

Boss’s  orders  were  to  advance  against  Gundi  Mulla  Sahibdad, 
capture  the  village,  and  then  drive  the  enemy  from  the  enclosures 
which  lay  between  it  and  the  low  spur  of  Pir  Paimal  hill.  This  duty 
he  entrusted  to  Brigadier  - General  Macpherson,  and  he  directed 
Brigadier-General  Baker  to  advance  to  the  west,  to  keep  touch  with 
the  1st  Brigade,  and  to  clear  the  gardens  and  orchards  in  his  immediate 
front. 

Greig’s  9-pounder  and  Bobinson’s  7-pounder  (screw  gun)  batteries 
covered  the  attack  on  Gundi  Mulla  Sahibdad,  which  was  made  by  the 
2nd  Gurkhas,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Arthur  Battye,  and  the  92nd 
Highlanders,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  Parker,  supported  by  the 
23rd  Pioneers,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  Collett,  and  the  24th 
Punjab  Infantry,  under  Colonel  F.  Norman.  The  village  was  carried 
with  the  utmost  gallantry,  Highlanders  and  Gurkhas,  always  friendly 
rivals  in  the  race  for  glory,  by  turns  outstripping  each  other  in  their 


i8So] 


HIGHLANDERS  AND  SIKHS 


489 


efforts  to  be  first  within  its  walls.  The  enemy  sullenly  and  slowly 
withdrew,  a goodly  number  of  ghazia  remaining  to  the  very  last  to 
receive  a bayonet  charge  of  the  92nd.  Meanwhile,  Baker’s  troops  had 
been  threading  their  way  through  the  narrow  lanes  and  loop-holed 
enclosures  which  lay  in  the  line  of  their  spirited  attack ; the  resistance 
they  encountered  was  most  stubborn,  and  it  was  during  this  advance 
that  the  72nd  lost  their  dashing  Commander,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
F.  Brownlow,*  Captain  Frome,  and  Lance-Sergeant  Cameron,  the 
latter  a grand  specimen  of  a Highland  soldier. 

In  the  2nd  Brigade,  the  72nd  Highlanders  and  the  2nd  Sikhs  bore 
the  brunt  of  the  fighting ; they  were  the  leading  battalions,  and 
frequently  had  to  fix  bayonets  to  carry  different  positions  or  to  check 
the  desperate  rushes  of  the  Afghans. 

After  continued  and  severe  fighting,  both  leading  brigades  emerged 
at  the  point  of  the  hill  close  to  Pir  Paimal,  and,  wheeling  to  their  right, 
they  pressed  rapidly  on,  sweeping  the  enemy  through  the  thickly- 
wooded  gardens  which  covered  the  western  slopes,  until  noon,  when 
the  whole  of  Pir  Paimal  was  in  our  possession. f 

During  the  early  part  of  the  advance  the  Afghans  collected  in  great 
strength  on  the  low  hills  beneath  the  Baba  Wali  Kotal,  evidently  pre- 
paring for  a rush  on  our  guns  ; their  leaders  could  be  seen  urging  them 
on,  and  a portion  of  them  came  down  the  hill,  but  the  main  body 
apparently  refused  to  follow,  and  remained  on  the  crest  until  the 
position  was  turned,  when  they  at  once  retreated. 

Having  become  assured  of  General  Ross’s  complete  success,  and 
seeing  that  there  was  now  no  necessity  for  detaining  Macgregor’s 
(the  3rd)  brigade  to  meet  a counter-attack,  I pushed  on  with  it  to  join 
Ross,  who,  however,  knowing  how  thoroughly  he  could  depend  upon 
his  troops,  without  waiting  to  be  reinforced,  followed  up  the  retreating 

* Brownlow's  death  was  a great  loss,  for  throughout  the  war  he  had 
frequently  distinguished  himself  as  a leader — at  the  Peiwar  Kotal,  during  the 
operations  round  Kabul,  and  notably  on  the  14th  December,  when  he  won 
the  admiration  of  the  whole  force  by  his  brilliant  conduct  in  the  attack  on 
the  Asmai  heights. 

t The  following  Native  officers,  British  and  Native  non-commissioned 
officers,  and  Native  soldiers  were  brought  forward  as  having  been  very  con- 
spicuous during  this  part  of  the  light : 

Colour- Sergeant  G.  Jacobs  - - - 72nd  Highlanders. 

Colour-Sergeant  R.  Lauder  - - - ,,  ,, 

Lance-Corporal  J.  Gordon  - - - ,,  ,, 

Subadar-Major  Gurbaj  Sing  - - 2nd  Sikhs. 

Jemadar  Alla  Sing  - - - ,,  ,, 

Naiek  Dir  Sing  - - - - ,,  ,, 

Sepoy  Hakim  - - - - ,,  ,, 

Sepoy  Taj  Sing  - - - - ,,  ,, 

Sepoy  Pertap  Sing  - - - - „ 

Sepoy  Bit  Sing  - - - „ „ 


490 


FORTY- ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


foe,  until  he  reached  an  entrenched  position  at  the  other  side  of  the 
Baba  Wali  Kotal,  where  the  Afghans  made  another  most  determined 
stand.  Ghazis  in  large  numbers  flocked  to  this  spot  from  the  rear, 
while  the  guns  on  the  kotal  were  turned  round  and  brought  to  bear  on 
our  men,  already  exposed  to  a heavy  Artillery  fire  from  behind  the 
entrenched  camp. 

It  now  became  necessary  to  take  this  position  by  storm,  and  recog- 
nizing the  fact  with  true  soldierly  instinct,  Major  White,  who  was 
leading  the  advanced  companies  of  the  92nd,  called  upon  the  men  for 
just  one  charge  more  ‘ to  close  the  business.’  The  battery  of  screw 
guns  had  been  shelling  the  position,  and,  under  cover  of  its  fire  and 
supported  by  a portion  of  the  2nd  Gurkhas  and  23rd  Pioneers,  the 
Highlanders,  responding  with  alacrity  to  their  leader’s  call,  dashed 
forward  and  drove  the  enemy  from  their  entrenchments  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.* 

Major  White  was  the  first  to  reach  the  guns,  being  closely  followed 
by  Sepoy  Inderbir  Lama,  who,  placing  his  rifle  upon  one  of  them, 
exclaimed,  ‘ Captured  in  the  name  of  the  2nd  (Prince  of  Wales’  Own) 
Gurkhas  !’ 

Whilst  the  1st  Brigade  was  advancing  towards  the  last  position,  a 
half-battalion  of  the  3rd  Sikhs  (belonging  to  the  2nd  Brigade),  under 
Lieutenant  Colonel  G.  Money,  charged  a body  of  Afghans  and  captured 
three  guns. 

The  enemy  were  now  absolutely  routed,  but,  owing  to  the  nature  of 
the  ground,  it  was  impossible  for  General  Boss  to  realize  how  complete 
had  been  his  victory,  and  he  fully  expected  that  the  enemy  would  take 
up  a fresh  position  further  on  ; he  therefore  ordered  the  1st  and  2nd 
Brigades  to  halt  while  they  replenished  their  ammunition,  and  then 
proceeded  for  about  a mile,  when  they  suddenly  came  in  sight  of  Ayub 
Khan’s  enormous  camp.  It  was  entirely  deserted,  and  apparently 
stood  as  it  had  been  left  in  the  morning  when  the  Afghans  moved  out 
to  the  attack.  With  his  camp  was  captured  the  whole  of  Ayub  Khan’s 
Artillery,  thirty-two  pieces,  including  our  two  Horse  Artillery  gunst 
which  had  been  taken  at  Maiwand  on  the  27th  July. 

* During  this  engagement  the  following  officers  and  men  were  specially 
remarked  for  their  gallantry  : 

Major  G.  White  - - - - 92nd  Highlanders. 

Lieutenant  C.  Douglas  - - - ,,  ,, 

Corporal  William  McGillvray  ,,  ,, 

Private  Peter  Grieve  - - - ,,  ,, 

Private  1).  Grey  - - - - „ ,, 

Major  Sullivan  Becher  - - - 2nd  Gurkhas. 

Havildar  Gopal  Borah  - - ,,  ,, 

Sepoy  Inderbir  Lama  - - - „ ,, 

Sepoy  Tikaram  Kwas  - - ,,  ,, 

f These  guns  were  presented  to  me  by  the  Indian  Government,  and  are  now 
at  the  Royal  Hospital  Dublin. 


i8So] 


AYUB  KHAN'S  CAMP 


491 


Further  pursuit  by  the  Infantry  being  valueless,  the  1st  and  2nd 
Brigades  halted  on  the  far  side  of  Mazra,  where  I with  the  3rd  Brigade 
shortly  afterwards  joined  them. 

Brigadier-General  Hugh  Gough,  having  satisfied  himself  as  to  the 
security  of  our  left  flank,  scouted  as  far  as  Kohkeran,  and  then  pro- 
ceeded with  the  Cavalry  of  the  Kabul- Kandahar  Field  Force  to  execute 
the  extended  movement  entrusted  to  him.  He  crossed  the  Arghandab, 
and  pushed  round  to  get  in  front  of  the  line  of  the  enemy’s  retreat 
towards  Kliakrez.  Some  ghazis  and  Irregular  Afghan  troops  were 
overtaken,  but  no  Regular  regiments  were  met  with,  the  soldiers 
having,  as  is  their  custom,  quickly  divested  themselves  of  their 
uniform  and  assumed  the  garb  of  harmless  agriculturists. 

Ayub  Khan  himself  had  fled  early  in  the  day  with  his  principal 
Sirdars. 

As  I rode  into  the  abandoned  camp,  I was  horrified  to  hear  that  the 
body  of  Maclaine,  the  Horse  Artillery  officer  who  had  been  taken 
prisoner  at  Maiwand,  was  lying  with  the  throat  cut  about  forty  yards 
from  Ayub  Khan’s  own  tent.  From  what  I could  learn,  the  latter  had 
not  actually  ordered  the  murder,  but  as  a word  from  him  would  have 
prevented  it,  he  must  be  held  responsible  for  the  assassination  of  an 
officer  who  had  fallen  into  his  hands  as  a prisoner  of  war. 

Our  losses  during  the  day  comprised : killed,  3 British  officers,* 
1 Native  officer,  and  36  men ; wounded,  11  British  officers,  4 Native 
officers,  and  195  men,  18  of  whom  succumbed  to  their  wounds.  It 
was  difficult  to  estimate  the  loss  of  the  enemy,  but  it  must  have  been 
heavy,  as  between  Kandahar  and  the  village  of  Pir  Paimal  alone 
600  bodies  were  buried  by  us. 

With  the  exception  of  the  1st  Brigade,  which  remained  at  Mazra  for 
the  night  to  protect  the  captured  guns  and  stores,  the  troops  all  re- 
turned to  camp  before  9 p.m.f 

Utterly  exhausted  as  I was  from  the  hard  day’s  work  and  the 
weakening  effects  of  my  late  illness,  the  cheers  with  which  I was 


* The  third  British  officer  killed  was  Captain  Straton,  22nd  Foot,  Super- 
intendent of  Army  Signalling,  a most  accomplished  officer,  under  whose  direc- 
tion signalling  as  applied  to  Field  Service  reached  a wonderful  pitch  of 
perfection.  His  energy  knew  no  difficulties,  and  his  enthusiasm  was  beyond 
praise. 

t The  ammunition  expended  by  the  Kabul- Kandahar  Field  Force  on  the 
31st  August  and  1st  September  was  : 


Rounds. 

f Shrapnell  shell  78 
\ Common  ,.  24 

/Martini-Henry  15,129 
\Snider  42,576 

and  in  addition  313  rounds  were  fired  by  the  Artillery  and  4,971  rounds  by 
the  Infantry  of  the  Kandahar  Garrison. 


Gun 

Rifle 


102 


- 57,705 


492 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


greeted  by  the  troops  as  I rode  into  Ayub  Khan’s  camp  and  viewed  the 
dead  bodies  of  my  gallant  soldiers  nearly  unmanned  me,  and  it  was 
with  a very  big  lump  in  my  throat  that  I managed  to  say  a few 
words, of  thanks  to  each  corps  in  turn.  When  I returned  to  Kandahar, 
and  threw  myself  on  the  bed  in  the  little  room  prepared  for  me,  I was 
dead-beat  and  quite  unequal  to  the  effort  of  reporting  our  success  to 
the  Queen  or  to  the  Viceroy.  After  an  hour’s  rest,  however,  knowing 
how  anxiously  news  from  Kandahar  was  looked  for  both  in  England 
and  India,  I managed  to  pull  myself  together  sufficiently  to  write  out 
and  despatch  the  following  telegram  : 

‘ Kaxdahar, 

‘ls<  September,  1880  (6  p.m.). 

‘ Ayub  Khan’s  army  was  to-day  defeated  and  completely  dispersed  with,  I 
hope,  comparatively  slight  loss  on  our  side  ; his  camp  was  captured,  the  two 
lost  guns  of  E Battery,  B Brigade  Royal  Horse  Artillery  were  recovered,  and 
several  wheeled  guns  of  various  calibre  fell  to  the  splendid  Infantry  of  this 
force  ; the  Cavalry  are  still  in  pursuit.  Our  casualties  are : 22nd  Foot, 
Captain  Straton,  killed  ; 72nd  Highlanders,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Brownlow, 
Captain  Frome,  killed,  Captain  Murray  and  Lieutenant  Monro,  wounded, 
7 men  killed,  18  wounded  ; 92nd  Highlanders,  Lieutenants  Menzies  and 
Donald  Stewart  wounded,  11  men  killed  and  39  wounded  ; 2nd  Gurkhas, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Battye,  and  2nd  Sikhs,  Major  Slater  wounded.  It  is  at 
present  impossible  to  ascertain  the  casualties  amongst  the  Native  troops, 
but  I have  no  reason  to  believe  they  are  excessive  ; full  details  will  be  tele- 
graphed to-morrow.  The  quite  recently  murdered  remains  of  Lieutenant 
Maclaine,  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  were  found  on  the  arrival  of  the  British 
troops  in  Ayub  Khan’s  camp.  Ayub  Khan  is  supposed  to  have  fled  towards 
Herat.’ 

It  can  easily  be  imagined  with  what  an  intense  sense  of  relief  I 
awoke  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd  September — the  march  had  ended, 
Kandahar  had  been  relieved,  Ayub  Khan’s  army  had  been  beaten  and 
dispersed,  and  there  was  an  adequate  force  in  southern  Afghanistan 
to  prevent  further  disturbances. 

Amongst  the  innumerable  questions  of  detail  which  now  confronted 
me  was  the  all-important  one,  and  that  which  caused  me  greatest 
anxiety,  of  how  the  large  body  of  troops  hastily  concentrated  at  Kan- 
dahar, and  for  which  the  produce  of  the  country  was  quite  inadequate, 
were  to  be  fed. 

No  supplies  and  very  little  forage  were  procurable  between  Quetta 
and  Kandahar,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  latter  place  there  was 
now  hardly  anything  in  the  shape  of  food  for  man  or  beast  to  be  had 
for  love  or  money,  the  resources  of  this  part  of  the  country  having  been 
quite  exhausted.  Relief  could  only  be  obtained  by  reducing  the 
number  of  mouths  to  be  fed,  and  with  this  object  I scattered  the 
troops  in  different  directions,  to  posts  as  far  distant  from  each  other  as 
possible,  consistent  with  safety ; and  in  accordance  with  my  promise 
to  the  Kabul- Kandahar  Field  Force,  that  they  should  not  be  required 


i88o] 


PARTING  WITH  THE  TROOPS 


493 


to  garrison  Kandahar  when  the  fighting  was  at  an  end,  I arranged  to 
despatch  without  delay  to  India  the  corps  which  had  come  with  me 
from  northern  Afghanistan. 

One  column  proceeded  to  Maiwand  to  inter  the  bodies  of  our  soldiers 
who  fell  on  the  27th  July.  The  Cavalry  brigade  moved  with  a number 
of  sick  men  and  transport  animals  to  Kohkeran.  Macgregor’s  brigade 
started  for  Quetta  on  the  8th,  and  was  followed  soon  after  by  Baker’s 
and  Macpherson’s  brigades.  I accompanied  Macgregor  in  the  hope 
that  the  change  to  Quetta  (where  I remained  about  a month)  would 
pick  me  up,  and  enable  me  to  meet  Lord  Ripon’s  wish  that  I should 
retain  the  command  in  southern  Afghanistan  until  some  satisfactory 
settlement  could  be  arrived  at. 

Before  leaving  Kandahar  I issued  an  order  thanking  all  ranks  of  the 
Kabul-Kandahar  Field  Force  for  the  work  they  had  so  nobly  performed, 
and  I had  the  gratification  of  acknowledging,  on  their  behalf  and  my 
own,  congratulatory  messages  from  the  Queen,  the  Duke  of  Cambridge, 
the  Marquis  of  Ripon,  and  many  others.  On  the  way  to  Quetta  I had 
the  further  gratification  of  being  informed  by  the  Viceroy  that  Her 
Majesty  had  been  graciously  pleased  to  make  me  a G.C.B.,  and  to 
appoint  me  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Madras  Army. 

I now  heard  that  Abdur  Rahman  had  been  finally  nominated  Amir 
of  Kabul  on  the  10th  August,  and  that  immediately  after  the  ceremony 
of  installation  Sir  Donald  Stewart  had  marched  the  whole  British  force 
of  6,678  men  of  all  arms  out  of  Kabul  on  their  return  to  India.  Sir 
Donald  left  Peshawar  to  take  up  his  appointment  of  Military  Member 
of  Council  at  Simla  on  the  31st  August,  and  by  the  7th  September  the 
last  of  his  troops  had  arrived  at  the  former  plaee,  except  one  brigade 
left  as  a temporary  measure  in  the  Khyber  Pass. 

At  Quetta  I stayed  with  Sir  Robert  Sandeman,  the  capable  Resident, 
who  by  his  great  personal  influence  had  done  much  to  allay  excitement 
amongst  the  tribes,  and  to  prevent  serious  trouble  in  Baluchistan  and 
along  the  border.  I had  never  before  been  to  that  part  of  the  frontier, 
and  I was  greatly  impressed  by  the  hold  Sandeman  had  obtained  over 
the  country ; he  was  intimately  acquainted  with  every  leading  man, 
and  there  was  not  a village,  however  out  of  the  way,  which  he  had  not 
visited.  ‘Sinniman  sahib,’  as  the  Natives  called  him,  had  gained 
the  confidence  of  the  lawless  Baluchis  in  a very  remarkable  manner, 
and  it  was  mainly  owing  to  his  power  over  them  that  I was  able 
to  arrange  with  camel  contractors  to  transport  to  Quetta  and  Kandahar 
the  huge  stocks  of  winter  clothing,  medical  comforts,  grain,  and  the 
various  requirements  of  an  army  in  the  field,  which  had  been  brought 
by  rail  to  Sibi,  and  had  there  remained  for  want  of  transport  to  take 
them  further  on. 

As  the  change  to  Quetta  did  not  benefit  me,  and  as  I found  that, 
owing  to  indifferent  health,  I was  unable  to  carry  on  my  duty  with 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


494 


[1880 


satisfaction  to  myself,  I applied  to  be  relieved.  My  request  was  acceded 
to,  and  I started  on  the  12th  October  for  India. 

Riding  through  the  Bolan  Pass  I overtook  most  of  the  regiments  of 
the  Kabul-Kandahar  Field  Force  marching  towards  Sibi,  thence  to 
disperse  to  their  respective  destinations.  As  I parted  with  each  corps 
in  turn  its  band  played  ‘Auld  Lang  Syne,’  and  I have  never  since 
heard  that  memory-stirring  air  without  its  bringing  before  nay  mind’s 
eye  the  last  view  I had  of  the  Kabul-Kandahar  Field  Force.  I fancy 
myself  crossing  and  re-crossing  the  river  which  winds  through  the 
pass  ; I hear  the  martial  beat  of  drums  and  plaintive  music  of  the 
pipes  ; and  I see  Riflemen  and  Gurkhas,  Highlanders  and  Sikhs,  guns 
and  horses,  camels  and  mules,  with  the  endless  following  of  an  Indian 
army,  winding  through  the  narrow  gorges,  or  over  the  interminable 
boulders  which  made  the  passage  of  the  Bolan  so  difficult  and  weari- 
some to  man  and  beast. 

I shall  never  forget  the  feeling  of  sadness  with  which  I said  good-bye 
to  the  men  who  had  done  so  much  for  me.  I looked  upon  them  all, 
Native  as  well  as  British,  as  my  valued  friends.  And  well  I might,  for 
never  had  a Commander  been  better  served.  From  first  to  last  a grand 
spirit  of  camaraderie * pervaded  all  ranks.  At  the  Peiwar  Kotal,  at 
Charasia,  and  during  the  fighting  round  Kabul,  all  were  eager  to  close 
with  the  enemy,  no  matter  how  great  the  odds  against  them.  Throughout 
the  march  from  Kabul  all  seemed  to  be  animated  with  but  one  desire, 
to  effect,  cost  what  it  might  in  personal  risk,  fatigue,  or  discomfort,  the 
speedy  release  of  their  beleaguered  fellow- soldiers  in  Kandahar ; and 
the  unflagging  energy  and  perseverance  of  my  splendid  troops  seemed 
to  reach  their  full  height,  when  they  realized  they  were  about  to  put 
forth  their  strength  against  a hitherto  successful  enemy.  Their  exem- 
plary conduct,  too,  under  circumstances  often  of  the  most  trying  nature, 
cannot  be  praised  in  terms  too  strong  or  too  full.  Notwithstanding  the 
provocation  caused  by  the  cruel  murder  of  any  stragglers  who  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Afghans,  not  one  act  infringing  the  rules  of  civilized 

* The  72nd  Highlanders  and  5th  Gurkhas  were  brigaded  together  through- 
out the  campaign,  and  at  their  return  to  India  the  latter  regiment  presented 
the  former  with  a shield  bearing  the  following  inscription  : 

FROM  THE 

MEN  OF  THE  5th  GURKHAS 

TO  THE 

MEN  OF  THE  72nd  (DUKE  OF  ALBANY’S  OWN)  HIGHLANDERS 

IN  REMEMBRANCE  OF 

The  Afghan  Campaign,  1878  to  1880. 

The  gift  was  entirely  spontaneous,  and  was  subscribed  for  by  the  Native 
officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  men. 

In  return,  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  of  the  72nd  gave  the  5th 
Gurkhas  a very  handsome  ebony,  silver-mounted  Drum-Major’s  staff, 


88o] 


RECEPTION  IN  ENGLAND 


495 


warfare  w’as  committed  by  my  troops.  The  persons  and  property  of 
the  Natives  were  respected,  and  full  compensation  for  supplies  was 
everywhere  given.  In  short,  the  inhabitants  of  the  district  through 
which  we  passed  could  not  have  been  treated  with  greater  consideration 
nor  with  a lighter  hand,  had  they  proved  themselves  friendly  allies, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  troops  will  ever  be  to  me  as  pleasing  a memory 
as  are  the  results  which  they  achieved. 


CHAPTER  LXIII. 

On  the  15th  October  I handed  over  my  command  to  Major-General 
Phayre,  and  started  for  England,  making,  by  the  desire  of  the  Viceroy, 
a diversion  to  Simla,  where  Lord  Ripon  received  me  most  kindly,  and, 
to  my  great  pride  and  pleasure,  delivered  to  me  a letter  from  the 
Queen-Empress,  written  by  Her  Majesty’s  own  hand,  which  conveyed 
in  the  most  gracious  terms  the  Queen’s  satisfaction  at  the  manner  in 
which  the  service  entrusted  to  me  had  been  performed,  thanks  to  ‘ the 
brave  officers  and  men  under  my  command,’  sorrow  ‘ for  those  of  her 
gallant  soldiers  who  fell  for  Queen  and  country,’  and  anxiety  for  the 
wounded.  Her  Majesty  also  wrote  of  ‘ the  thrill  of  horror  ’ with  which 
the  news  of  the  fate  of  Lieutenant  Maclaine  had  been  received,  and 
concluded  with  words  of  hope  that  my  own  health  and  that  of  the 
troops  would  remain  good,  and  that  success  might  attend  us  ‘ till  the 
blessings  of  peace  are  restored.’ 

A gracious  letter,  truly  1 And  to  me  a deeply  appreciated  reward 
for  what  I had  been  able  to  do. 

I landed  at  Dover  on  the  17th  November.  The  reception  I met  with 
from  my  countrymen  was  as  enthusiastic  as  it  was  unexpected  and 
gratifying.  After  an  absence  of  twelve  years  there  must  almost  always 
be  more  or  less  of  sadness  mingled  with  the  pleasure  of  the  home- 
coming, and  two  vacant  places  in  my  family  circle — those  of  my  father 
and  sister — cast  a deep  shadow  upon  what  would  otherwise  have  been 
a most  joyous  return,  for  my  mother  was  alive  to  welcome  me,  and  I 
found  my  children  flourishing  and  my  wife  well,  notwithstanding  all 
the  anxiety  she  had  undergone. 

I was  feted  and  feasted  to  almost  an  alarming  extent,  considering 
that  for  nearly  two  years  I had  been  restricted  to  campaigning  diet ; 
but  it  surprised  me  very  much  to  find  that  the  kind  people,  by  whom  I 
w7as  so  greatly  honoured,  invariably  appeared  to  think  the  march  from 
Kabul  to  Kandahar  was  a much  greater  performance  than  the  advance 
on  Kabul  the  previous  autumn,  while,  to  my  mind,  the  latter  operation 
was  in  every  particular  more  difficult,  more  dangerous,  and  placed 
upon  me  as  the  Commander  infinitely  more  responsibility  The  force 


496 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1880 


with  which  I started  from  Kuram  to  avenge  the  massacre  of  our 
fellow-countrymen  was  little  more  than  half  the  strength  of  that  with 
which  I marched  to  Kandahar.  Immediately  on  crossing  the  Shutar- 
gardan  I found  myself  in  the  midst  of  a hostile  and  warlike  people, 
entirely  dependent  on  the  country  for  supplies,  heavily  handicapped  by 
want  of  transport,  and  practically  as  completely  cut  off  from  communi- 
cation with  India  as  I was  a year  later  on  the  march  to  Kandahar. 
The  Afghans’  fanatical  hatred  of  Europeans  had  been  augmented  by 
their  defeats  the  year  before,  and  by  the  occurrences  at  Kabul,  and  they 
looked  upon  my  small  column  as  a certain  prey  delivered  into  their 
hands  by  a sympathizing  and  all-powerful  Allah. 

Before  me  was  Kabul,  with  its  large  and  well-equipped  arsenal, 
defended  by  an  army  better  organized  and  more  highly  trained  than 
that  possessed  by  any  former  Euler  of  Afghanistan.  On  all  sides  of  me 
were  tribesmen  hurrying  up  to  defend  the  approaches  to  their  capital, 
and  had  there  been  on  our  part  the  smallest  hesitation  or  delay,  we 
should  have  found  ourselves  opposed  by  as  formidable  a combination 
as  we  had  to  deal  with  two  months  later  at  Sherpur.  Nothing  could 
then  have  saved  the  force,  not  one  man  of  which  I firmly  believe 
would  have  ever  returned  to  tell  the  tale  in  India.  Worse  than  all,  I 
had  in  my  own  camp  a traitor,  in  the  form  of  the  Amir,  posing  as  a 
friend  to  the  British  Government  and  a refugee  seeking  our  pro- 
tection, while  he  was  at  heart  our  bitterest  enemy,  and  was  doing 
everything  in  his  power  to  make  my  task  more  difficult  and  ensure  our 
defeat. 

The  march  to  Kandahar  was  certainly  much  longer,  the  country  was 
equally  unfriendly,  and  the  feeding  of  so  large  a number  of  men  and 
animals  was  a continual  source  of  anxiety.  But  I had  a force  capable 
of  holding  its  own  against  any  Afghan  army  that  could  possibly  be 
opposed  to  it,  and  good  and  sufficient  transport  to  admit  of  its  being 
kept  together,  with  the  definite  object  in  view  of  rescuing  our  besieged 
countrymen  and  defeating  Ayub  Khan  ; instead  of,  as  at  Kabul,  having 
to  begin  to  unravel  a difficult  political  problem  after  accomplishing  the 
defeat  of  the  tribesmen  and  the  Afghan  army. 

I could  only  account  to  myself  for  the  greater  amount  of  interest  dis- 
played in  the  march  to  Kandahar,  and  the  larger  amount  of  credit 
given  to  me  for  that  undertaking,  by  the  glamour  of  romance  thrown 
around  an  army  of  10,000  men  lost  to  view,  as  it  were,  for  nearly  a 
month,  about  the  fate  of  which  uninformed  speculation  was  rife  and 
pessimistic  rumours  were  spread,  until  the  tension  became  extreme, 
and  the  corresponding  relief  proportionably  great  when  that  army  re- 
appeared to  dispose  at  once  of  Ayub  and  his  hitherto  victorious  troops. 

I did  not  return  to  India  until  the  end  of  1881,  six  weeks  out  of 
these  precious  months  of  leave  having  been  spent  in  a wild-goose 
chase  to  the  Capo  of  Good  Hope  and  back,  upon  my  being  nominated 


i8So] 


A FRUITLESS  JOURNEY 


497 


by  Mr.  Gladstone’s  Government  Governor  o.'  Natal  and  Commander 
of  the  Forces  in  South  Africa,  on  the  death  of  Sir  George  Colley  and 
the  receipt  of  the  news  of  the  disaster  at  Majuba  Hill.  While  I was 
on  my  way  out  to  take  up  my  command,  peace  was  made  with  the 
Boers  in  the  most  marvellously  rapid  and  unexpected  manner.  A 
peace,  alas ! ‘ without  honour,’  to  which  may  be  attributed  the  recent 
regrettable  state  of  affairs  in  the  Transvaal— a state  of  affairs  which 
was  foreseen  and  predicted  by  many  at  the  time.  My  stay  at  Cape 
Town  was  limited  to  twenty-four  hours,  the  Government  being 
apparently  as  anxious  to  get  me  away  from  Africa  as  they  had  been 
to  hurry  me  out  there. 

In  August  I spent  three  very  enjoyable  and  instructive  weeks  as 
the  guest  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  while 
the  manoeuvres  at  Hanover  and  Schleswig-Holstein  were  taking 
place. 

Shortly  before  leaving  England  for  Madras,  I was  asked  by  Mr. 
Childers,  the  then  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  whether  I would 
accept  the  appointment  of  Quartermaster  - General  at  the  Horse 
Guards,  in  succession  to  Sir  Garnet  Wolseley.  The  offer,  in  some 
ways,  was  rather  a temptation  to  me,  for  I had  a great  wish  to  take 
part  in  the  administration  of  our  army;  and  had  it  been  made 
sooner,  before  my  arrangements  for  going  to  Madras  had  been  com- 
pleted, I think  I should  have  accepted  it  at  once ; as  it  was,  I begged 
to  be  allowed  to  join  my  new  command,  and  leave  the  question  of  the 
Quartermaster- Generalship  in  abeyance  until  it  was  about  to  become 
vacant.  This  was  agreed  to,  and  I started  for  Madras,  taking  my 
wife  and  two  little  daughters  with  me,  the  boy  being  left  at  school  in 
England. 

On  arriving  in  Madras,  on  the  27th  November,  I had  the  pleasure 
to  find  myself  associated  as  a colleague  in  Council  with  Mr.  Grant- 
Duff,*  who  had  recently  been  appointed  Governor  of  the  Presidency. 
We  spent  a few  pleasant  days  with  him  and  Mrs.  Grant-Duff  at 
Government  House,  before  proceeding  to  deposit  our  children  at 
Ootacamund,  that  Queen  of  Indian  Hill-stations,  which  was  to  be  our 
home  for  four  years.  We  spent  Christmas  there,  and  then  went  to 
Burma,  visiting  the  Andaman  Islands  on  the  way.  We  had  on  board 
our  ship  some  prisoners  destined  for  that  convict  settlement,  amongst 
whom  cholera  unfortunately  broke  out  a few  hours  after  we  left 
Madras.  They  were  accommodated  just  outside  my  wife’s  cabin,  and 
their  cries  and  groans  were  most  distressing.  Very  little  could  be 
done  for  them  on  board,  for  the  Native  Doctor  accompanying  us 
possessed  no  remedy  but  castor  oil ! and  as  the  disease  was  spreading 
rapidly,  I took  upon  myself  to  have  the  party  landed  at  Vizagapatam. 


Now  Sir  Mount-Stuart  Grant-Duff,  G.C.S.I. 


498 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


1880 


The  cholera  patients  were  put  into  tents  on  the  sea-shore,  under  the 
charge  of  a medical  officer,  and  every  arrangement  possible  for  their 
comfort  and  relief  was  made  before  we  proceeded  on  our  journey. 

During  our  stay  at  Port  Blair,  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Andaman 
Administration,  we  were  the  guests  of  the  hospitable  Superintendent, 
Lieutenant -Colonel  Protheroe,  who  had  been  one  of  the  political 
officers  on  my  staff  in  Afghanistan.  The  group  of  islands  forming 
the  settlement  are  extremely  beautiful,  but  it  is  tropical  beauty,  and 
one  pays  the  penalty  for  the  luxuriant  vegetation  in  the  climate,  which 
is  very  much  like  a Turkish  bath,  hot  and  damp.  While  going 
through  the  prisons,  I came  across  some  of  the  sepoys  of  the  29th 
Punjab  Infantry  who  deserted  during  the  advance  on  the  Pei  war 
Kotal.  I was  told  that  they  were  behaving  well,  and  might  in  time  be 
allowed  some  remission  of  their  sentences. 

A voyage  of  thirty-six  hours  brought  us  to  Rangoon,  where  we  had 
the  pleasure  of  meeting  and  being  entertained  by  our  old  friends, 
Mr.  Bernard,*  the  Chief  Commissioner  of  Burma,  and  his  wife. 

In  1882  Thyetmyo  and  Tonghu  were  the  two  frontier  stations  of 
Burma,  and  I had  been  asked  to  consider  the  question  of  the  defence 
of  the  proposed  railway  termini  at  these  places.  I accordingly  visited 
them  both,  and  as  I thought  I foresaw  that  the  lines  of  railway  could 
not  end  as  then  contemplated,  I recommended  that  the  absolutely 
necessary  works  only  should  be  attempted,  and  that  these  should  be 
as  inexpensive  as  possible.  Ere  many  years  had  passed,  the  line,  as  I 
anticipated,  was  completed  to  Mandalay. 

The  defences  of  Rangoon  had  also  to  be  arranged  for.  An  examina- 
tion of  the  approaches,  however,  satisfied  me  that  no  elaborate  system 
of  fortification  was  necessary,  and  that  Rangoon’s  best  security  lay  in 
her  winding,  dangerous  river ; so  I gave  it  as  my  opinion  that,  with 
two  small  batteries  at  Monkey  Point  and  King’s  Point,  and  a couple  of 
torpedo-boats,  Rangoon  would  be  reasonably  safe  against  attack. 

Before  leaving  Burma  I received  letters  from  H.R.H.  the  Duke  of 
Cambridge  and  Mr.  Childers,  in  which  were  repeated  the  offer  of  the 
Quartermaster-Generalship  at  the  Horse  Guards.  But  I had  by  this 
time  begun  to  like  my  new  work,  and  had  no  desire  to  leave  Madras ; 
I therefore  definitely  declined  the  appointment. 

From  Burma  we  returned  to  Ootacamund,  via  Calcutta,  where  we 
spent  a few  days  with  Lord  and  Lady  Ripon  and  Sir  Donald  and  Lady 
Stewart. 

Life  at  ‘ Ooty  ’ was  very  pleasant ; such  peace  and  repose  I had 
never  before  experienced ; 1 thoroughly  enjoyed  the  rest  after  the 
turmoil  of  the  preceding  years,  and  I quite  recovered  my  health, 
which  had  been  somewhat  shattered.  Unlike  other  hill  stations, 


Now  Sir  Charles  Bernard,  K.C.S.I. 


THE  MADRAS  ARMY 


499 


1882] 

Ootacamund  rests  on  an  undulating  tableland,  7,400  feet  above  the 
sea,  with  plenty  of  room  in  the  neighbourhood  for  riding,  driving,  and 
hunting ; and,  although  the  scenery  is  nothing  like  as  grand  as  in  the 
Himalayas,  there  are  exquisite  views  to  be  had,  and  it  is  more  restful 
and  homelike.  We  made  many  warm  friends  and  agreeable  acquaint- 
ances, who  when  our  time  in  Madras  came  to  an  end  presented  my 
wife  with  a very  beautiful  clock  ‘ as  a token  of  esteem  and  affection  ' ; 
we  were  very  sorry  to  bid  farewell  to  our  friends  and  to  our  Nilgiri 
home. 

Each  cold  season  I made  long  tours  in  order  to  acquaint  myself 
with  the  needs  and  capabilities  of  the  men  of  the  Madras  Army.  I 
tried  hard  to  discover  in  them  those  fighting  qualities  which  had  dis- 
tinguished their  forefathers  during  the  wars  of  the  last  and  the  begin- 
ning of  the  present  century.  But  long  years  of  peace,  and  the  security 
and  prosperity  attending  it,  had  evidently  had  upon  them,  as  they 
always  seem  to  have  on  Asiatics,  a softening  and  deteriorating 
effect ; and  I was  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  ancient  military 
spirit  had  died  in  them,  as  it  had  died  in  the  ordinary  Hindustani  of 
Bengal  and  the  Mahratta  of  Bombay,  and  that  they  could  no  longer 
with  safety  be  pitted  against  warlike  races,  or  employed  outside  the 
limits  of  southern  India. 

It  was  with  extreme  reluctance  that  I formed  this  opinion  with 
regard  to  the  successors  of  the  old  Coast  Army,  for  which  I had  always 
entertained  a great  admiration.  For  the  sake  of  the  British  officers 
belonging  to  the  Madras  Army,  too,  I was  very  loath  to  be  convinced 
of  its  inferiority,  for  many  of  them  were  devoted  to  their  regiments, 
and  were  justly  proud  of  their  traditions. 

However,  there  was  the  army,  and  it  was  my  business  as  its  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  to  do  all  that  I possibly  could  towards  rendering  it  an 
efficient  part  of  the  war  establishment  of  India. 

Madrassies,  as  a rule,  are  more  intelligent  and  better  educated  than 
the  fighting  races  of  northern  India,  and  I therefore  thought  it  could 
not  be  difficult  to  teach  them  the  value  of  musketry,  and  make  them 
excel  in  it.  To  this  end,  I encouraged  ritie  meetings  and  endeavoured 
to  get  General  Officers  to  take  an  interest  in  musketry  inspections,  and 
to  make  those  inspections  instructive  and  entertaining  to  the  men.  I 
took  to  rifle-shooting  myself,  as  did  the  officers  on  my  personal  staff,* 
who  were  all  good  shots,  and  our  team  held  its  own  in  many  exciting 
matches  at  the  different  rifle  meetings. 

At  that  time  the  importance  of  musketry  training  was  not  so 
generally  recognized  as  it  is  now,  especially'  by  the  senior  officers,  who 

* Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  T.  Pretyman,  R.A.,  was  Assistant  Military  Secre- 
tary until  1884,  when  he  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  Pole-Carew, 
Coldstream  Guards.  Lieutenant  Neville  Chamberlain,  Central  India  Horse 
and  Captain  Ian  Hamilton,  the  Gordon  Highlanders,  were  Aides-de-camp. 

33 


500 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1882 

had  all  entered  the  service  in  the  days  of  ‘ Brown  Bess.’  Some  of 
them  had  failed  to  note  the  remarkable  alteration  which  the  change 
from  the  musket  to  the  rifle  necessitated  in  the  system  of  musketry 
instruction,  or  to  study  the  very  different  conditions  under  which  we 
could  hope  to  win  battles  in  the  present  day,  compared  with  those 
under  which  some  of  our  most  celebrated  victories  had  been  won.  It 
required  time  and  patience  to  inspire  officers  with  a belief  in  the 
wonderful  shooting  power  of  the  Martini-Henry  rifle,  and  it  was  even 
more  difficult  to  make  them  realize  that  the  better  the  weapon,  the 
greater  the  necessity  for  its  being  intelligently  used. 

I had  great  faith  in  the  value  of  Camps  of  Exercise,  and  notwith- 
standing the  difficulty  of  obtaining  an  annual  grant  to  defray  their  cost, 
I managed  each  year,  by  taking  advantage  of  the  movement  of  troops 
in  course  of  relief,  to  form  small  camps  at  the  more  important  stations, 
and  on  one  occasion  was  able  to  collect  9,000  men  together  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Bangalore,  where  the  Commanders-in-Chief  in  India 
and  of  Bombay  (Sir  Donald  Stewart  and  the  Hon.  Arthur  Hardinge) 
were  present  — the  first  and  last  time  that  the  ‘ three  Chiefs  ’ in  India 
met  together  at  a Camp  of  Exercise.  The  Sappers  and  Miners  were  a 
brilliant  exception  to  the  rest  of  the  Madras  Army,  being  indeed  a most 
useful,  efficient  body  of  men,  but  as  no  increase  to  that  branch  was 
considered  necessary,  I obtained  permission  to  convert  two  Infantry 
regiments  into  Pioneers  on  the  model  of  the  Pioneer  Corps  of  the 
Bengal  Army,  which  had  always  proved  themselves  so  useful  on 
service.  Promotion  amongst  the  British  officers  was  accelerated, 
recruits  were  not  allowed  to  marry,  or,  if  married,  to  have  their  wives 
with  them,  and  many  other  minor  changes  were  made  which  did  much 
towards  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  Native  portion  of  the  Madras 
Army ; and  I hope  I was  able  to  increase  the  comfort  and  well-being 
of  the  British  portion  also  by  relaxing  irksome  and  useless  restrictions, 
and  by  impressing  upon  commanding  officers  the  advisability  of  not 
punishing  young  soldiers  with  the  extreme  severity  which  had  hitherto 
been  considered  necessary. 

I had  been  unpleasantly  struck  by  the  frequent  Courts-Martial  on 
the  younger  soldiers,  and  by  the  disproportionate  number  of  these  lads 
to  be  met  with  in  the  military  prisons.  Even  when  the  prisoners 
happened  to  be  of  some  length  of  service,  I usually  found  that  they 
had  undergone  previous  imprisonments,  and  had  been  severely 
punished  within  a short  time  of  their  enlistment.  I urged  that,  in 
the  first  two  or  three  years  of  a soldier’s  service,  every  allowance 
should  be  made  for  youth  and  inexperience,  and  that  during  that  time 
faults  should,  whenever  practicable,  be  dealt  with  summarily,  and  not 
visited  with  the  heavier  punishment  which  a Court-Martial  sentence 
necessarily  carries  with  it,  and  I pointed  out  that  this  procedure  might 
receive  a wider  application,  and  become  a guiding  principle  in  the 


THE  THREE  COMMANDEliS-IN-CIIIEF  IN  INDIA 


i884] 


MEMORIES  OF  MADRAS 


501 

treatment  of  soldiers  generally.  I suggested  that  all  men  in  possession 
of  a good-conduct  badge,  or  who  had  had  no  entry  in  their  company 
defaulter  sheets  for  one  year,  should  be  granted  certain  privileges,  such 
as  receiving  the  fullest  indulgence  in  the  grant  of  passes,  consistent 
with  the  requirements  of  health,  duty,  and  discipline,  and  being 
excused  attendance  at  all  roll-calls  (including  meals),  except  perhaps  at 
tattoo.  I had  often  remarked  that  those  corps  in  which  indulgences 
were  most  freely  given  contained  the  largest  number  of  well-behaved 
men,  and  I had  been  assured  that  such  indulgences  were  seldom 
abused,  and  that,  while  they  were  greatly  appreciated  by  those  who 
received  them,  they  acted  as  an  incentive  to  less  well  conducted  men 
to  try  and  redeem  their  characters. 

The  reports  of  commanding  officers,  on  the  results  of  these  small 
ameliorations,  after  a six  months’  trial,  were  so  favourable  that  I was 
able  to  authorize  still  further  concessions  as  a premium  on  good 
behaviour. 

The  Madras  Presidency  abounds  in  places  of  interest  connected  with 
our  earlier  struggles  in  India,  and  it  was  possible  to  combine  pleasure 
with  duty  in  a very  delightful  manner  while  travelling  about  the 
country.  My  wife  frequently  accompanied  me  in  my  tours,  and 
enjoyed  as  much  as  I did  our  visits  to  many  famous  and  beautiful 
places.  Madras  itself  recalled  the  struggles  for  supremacy  between 
the  English  and  French  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Arcot  reminded  one  that  it  was  in  the  brilliant  capture  and  still  more 
brilliant  defence  of  the  fort  at  that  place  that  Clive’s  soldierly  genius 
first  became  conspicuous.  Trichinopoly  and  Wandewash  made  one 
think  of  Stringer  Lawrence’s  and  Eyre  Coote’s  splendid  services,  and 
while  standing  on  the  breach  at  Seringapatam,  one  was  reminded  of 
Wellington’s  early  life  in  India,  and  marvelled  how  heavily-armed  men 
could  have  ventured  to  cross  the  single  plank  which  alone  spanned  the 
deep,  broad  ditch  of  the  inner  defences. 

I should  like  to  dwell  on  the  architectural  wonders  of  Tanjore  and 
the  Caves  of  Ellora  ; the  magnificent  entertainments  and  Princely 
hospitality  accorded  to  us  by  the  Nizam  of  Hyderabad,  the  late  Maha- 
rajas of  Mysore  and  Travancore,  the  Maharaja  of  Vizianagram,  the 
Raja  of  Cochin,  and  many  other  Rulers  of  Native  States  ; the  delights 
of  a trip  along  the  west  coast  by  the  beautiful  ‘ back-water,’  and  the 
return  journey  through  the  glorious  forests  of  Cannara  and  Mysore ; 
the  pleasure  of  visiting  the  lovely  ‘ White  Lady  ’*  and  the  wonderful 
Kaveri  falls ; but  to  give  my  readers  any  idea  of  their  marvels  would 
be  to  put  too  great  a strain  upon  their  patience,  which  I fear  has 
already  been  severely  taxed. 

The  late  Maharaja  of  Travancore  was  an  unusually  enlightened 

* The  finest  of  the  Gassapa  falls. 

33—2 


502 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1884 


Native.  He  spoke  and  wrote  English  fluently  ; his  appearance  was 
distinguished,  and  his  manners  those  of  a well-bred,  courteous  English 
gentleman  of  the  old  school.  His  speech  on  proposing  the  Queen’s 
health  was  a model  of  fine  feeling  and  fine  expression,  and  yet  this  man 
was  steeped  in  superstition.  His  Highness  sat,  slightly  retired  from 
the  table,  between  my  wife  and  myself  while  dinner  was  going  on  ; 
he  partook  of  no  food  or  wine,  but  his  close  contact  with  us  (he  led  my 
wife  in  to  dinner  and  took  her  out  on  his  arm)  necessitated  his  under- 
going a severe  course  of  purification  at  the  hands  of  the  Brahmins  as 
soon  as  the  entertainment  was  over ; he  dared  not  do  anything  without 
the  sanction  of  the  priests,  and  he  spent  enormous  sums  in  propitiating 
them. 

Notwithstanding  the  high  civilization,  luxury,  and  refinement  to  be 
found  in  these  Native  States,  my  visits  to  them  strengthened  my 
opinion  that,  however  capable  and  enlightened  the  Euler,  he  could 
have  no  chance  of  holding  his  country  if  deprived  of  the  guiding  hand 
of  the  British  Government  as  embodied  in  the  Resident.  It  is  just  that 
control,  so  light  in  ordinary  times  as  to  be  hardly  perceptible,  but  firm 
enough  when  occasion  demands,  which  saves  the  State  from  being  rent 
by  factions  and  internal  intrigue,  or  swallowed  up  by  a more  powerful 
neighbour,  for,  owing  to  the  induence  of  the  Brahmins  and  the  prac- 
tical seclusion  which  caste  prejudices  entail,  involving  ignorance  of 
what  is  taking  place  immediately  outside  their  own  palaces,  the  Native 
Princes  of  the  less  warlike  peoples  would  have  no  chance  amidst  the 
anarchy  and  confusion  that  would  follow  the  withdrawal  of  British 
influence. 

A remark  made  to  me  by  the  late  Sir  Madhava  Rao,  ex-Minister  of 
the  Baroda  State,  which  exemplifies  my  meaning,  comes  back  to  me 
at  this  moment.  Sir  Madhava  was  one  of  the  most  astute  Hindu 
gentlemen  in  India,  and  when  discussing  with  him  the  excitement 
produced  by  the  ‘ Ilbert  Bill,’  he  said  : 1 Why  do  you  English  raise 
these  unnecessary  questions  ? It  is  your  doing,  not  ours.  We  have 
heard  of  the  cry,  “ India  for  the  Indians,”  which  some  of  your  philan- 
thropists have  raised  in  England ; but  you  have  only  to  go  to  the 
Zoological  Gardens  and  open  the  doors  of  the  cages,  and  you  will  very 
soon  see  what  would  be  the  result  of  putting  that  theory  into  practice. 
There  would  be  a terrific  fight  amongst  the  animals,  which  would  end 
in  the  tiger  walking  proudly  over  the  dead  bodies  of  the  rest.’  1 Whom,’ 
I inquired,  ‘ do  you  consider  to  be  the  tiger  ?’  ‘ The  Mahomedan  from 
the  North,’  was  his  reply. 


THE  MARQUIS  OF  DUFFERIN,  K.P..  G.C.B.,  G.C.M.G.,  G.M.S.I.,  G.M.I.E., 

Viceroy  of  India. 

From 

an  engraving  ly  the  Fine  Art  Society  of  a portrait  by  the  late  Frank  Holl,  R.A. 


DISTURBING  ACTION  OF  RUSSIA 


503 


1885] 


CHAPTER  LXIY. 

In  March,  1885,  we  again  visited  Calcutta.  The  Marquis  of  Ripon  had 
departed,  and  the  Earl  of  Dufferin  reigned  in  his  stead. 

Affairs  on  our  north-west  and  south-east  frontiers  were  at  this  time 
in  a very  unsettled  state.  Indeed,  the  political  outlook  altogether  had 
assumed  rather  a gloomy  aspect.  Our  relations  with  the  French  had 
become  somewhat  strained  in  consequence  of  their  interference  with 
Upper  Burma  and  our  occupation  of  Egypt ; while  Russia’s  activity 
in  the  valley  of  the  Oxus  necessitated  our  looking  after  our  interests  in 
Afghanistan.  These  considerations  rendered  it  advisable  to  increase 
the  army  in  India  by  11,000  British  and  12.000  Native  troops,  bring- 
ing the  strength  of  the  former  up  to  nearly  70,000,  with  414  guns, 
and  that  of  the  latter  to  128,636. 

I Russia’s  movements  could  not  be  regarded  with  indifference,  for, 
while  we  had  retreated  from  our  dominating  position  at  Kandahar,  she 
had  approached  considerably  nearer  to  Afghanistan,  and  in  a direction 
infinitely  more  advantageous  than  before  for  a further  onward  move. 
Up  to  1881  a Russian  army  advancing  on  Afghanistan  would  have  had 
to  solve  the  difficult  problem  of  the  formidable  Hindu  Kush  barrier,  or 
if  it  took  the  Herat  line  it  must  have  faced  the  deserts  of  Khiva  and 
Bokhara.  But  all  this  was  changed  by  Skobeloff’s  victories  over  the 
Tekke  Turkomans,  which  gave  Merv  and  Sarakhs  to  Russia,  and  en- 
abled her  to  transfer  her  base  from  Orenburg  to  the  Caspian — by  far 
the  most  important  step  ever  made  by  Russia  in  her  advance  towards 
India.  I had  some  years  before  pointed  out  to  the  Government  of 
India  how  immeasurably  Russia  would  gain,  if  by  the  conquest  of 
Merv — a conquest  which  I then  looked  upon  as  certain  to  be  accom- 
| plished  in  the  near  future — she  should  be  able  to  make  this  transfer. 
My  words  were  unheeded  or  ridiculed  at  the  time,  and  I,  like  others 
who  thought  as  I did,  was  supposed  to  be  suffering  from  a disease 
diagnosed  by  a distinguished  politician  as  ‘ Mervousness.’  But  a little 
I later  those  words  were  verified.  Merv  had  become  a Russian  possession, 
and  Turkestan  was  in  direct  communication  by  rail  and  steamer  with 
St.  Petersburg.  And  can  it  be  denied  that  this  fact,  which  would  have 
\ enabled  the  army  in  the  Caucasus  to  be  rapidly  transported  to  the 
» scene  of  operations,  made  it  possible  for  General  Komaroff  practically 
1 to  dictate  terms  to  the  Boundary  Commission  which  was  sent  to  define 
. the  northern  limits  of  Afghanistan,  and  to  forcibly  eject  an  Afghan 
garrison  from  Panjdeh  under  the  eyes  of  British  officers  ? 

Lord  Dufferin  took  up  the  reins  of  the  Government  of  India  at  a 
time  when  things  had  come  to  such  a pass  that  a personal  conference 
with  the  Amir  was  considered  necessary  to  arrange  for  the  defence 
and  demarcation  of  His  Highness's  frontier,  the  strengthening  of 


504 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1885 

Herat,  the  extension  of  the  Sakkur-Sibi  i-ailway  to  Quetta,  and  the 
discussion  of  the  general  situation.  Abdur  Rahman  was  therefore 
invited  to  meet  the  Viceroy  at  Rawal  Pindi,  where  a large  standing 
camp  was  prepared,  and  my  wife  and  I were  bidden  amongst  a 
numerous  company,  including  Their  Royal  Highnesses  the  Duke  and 
Duchess  of  Connaught,  the  Ruling  Punjab  Chiefs,  and  the  high  officers 
of  Government  from  various  parts  of  India,  to  be  the  guests  of  His 
Excellency  and  Lady  Dufferin  on  the  interesting  occasion. 

The  meeting  was  fixed  for  the  end  of  March,  and  as  there  was 
scarcely  time  for  us  to  return  to  Madras  and  get  back  again  before 
then,  we  proceeded  leisurely  up  country,  visiting  different  places  and 
one  or  two  old  friends  on  the  way. 

At  Multan  I received  a cipher  telegram  from  Sir  Donald  Stewart 
informing  me  that  it  had  been  decided  to  mobilize  two  Army  Corps, 
and  that  I was  to  have  command  of  the  first.  This  was  exciting  news, 
and  we  lost  no  time  in  making  our  way  to  Rawal  Pindi,  where  we 
should  be  in  direct  communication  with  Head-Quarters,  and  hoped  to 
hear  what  had  taken  place  since  we  left  Calcutta  to  make  it  necessary 
to  prepare  for  war. 

I soon  found  out  that  this  action  on  the  part  of  the  Government 
was  forced  on  them  by  the  representatives  of  Russia  on  the  Boundary 
Commission,  who  were  persistent  in  then’  attempts  to  encroach  on 
Afghan  territory,  in  order  that  they  might  be  in  a position  to  control 
the  approaches  to  Herat,  a Russian  occupation  of  which  fortress  we 
could  not  permit. 

Abdur  Rahman  arrived  at  Rawal  Pindi  on  the  last  day  of  March ; 
he  was  about  forty-five  years  of  age,  and  although  he  required  a stick 
to  walk  with,  being  a martyr  to  rheumatism,  and  very  stout,  his 
appearance  was  decidedly  dignified  and  imposing.  He  had  a manly, 
clever,  and  rather  handsome  face,  marred  only  by  the  cruel  expression 
of  the  mouth,  and  his  manner  was  sufficiently  courteous  though  some- 
what abrupt. 

Several  semi-private  meetings  took  place  between  the  Viceroy  and 
the  Amir,  at  the  first  of  which  His  Highness,  after  expressing  his 
appreciation  of  the  flattering  and  cordial  reception  he  had  met  with, 
reminded  Lord  Dufferin  that  he  had  consistently  warned  the  British 
Government  of  the  approach  of  the  Russians  towards  Afghanistan  and 
of  the  unsettling  effect  their  advance  was  producing  on  the  minds  of 
his  countrymen  ; and  he  advocated  the  necessity  for  timely  action. 
No  attention,  he  said,  had  been  paid  to  his  warnings,  owing,  probably, 
to  the  strife  of  parties  in  England,  and  to  the  excessive  caution  of  the 
British  Government. 

Lord  Dufferin,  in  reply,  pointed  out  that  the  Amir  had  been  advised 
to  strengthen  northern  Afghanistan,  and  that  the  services  of  Engineer 
officers  had  been  offered  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  putting  Herat  into 


WB 


HIS  HIGHNESS 

ABDXJR  RAHMAN,  AMIR  OF  AFGHANISTAN. 


THE  HAWAL  P1NDI  DURBAR 


505 


1885] 

a satisfactory  state  of  defence.  His  Excellency  declared  that  England 
was  resolved  that  a Russian  advance  on  Herat  should  be  met  by  a 
declaration  of  war;  that  preparations  were  then  being  made  to  give 
effect  to  that  resolve ; and  that  it  was  now  absolutely  necessary  for 
His  Highness  to  make  up  his  mind  which  of  his  two  powerful 
neighbours  he  would  elect  to  choose  as  his  ally. 

Abdur  Rahman  thanked  the  Viceroy  for  his  offer  of  help,  but 
showed  plainly  that  he  had  no  intention  of  availing  himself  of  the 
services  of  our  Engineers.  He  vowed  that  his  own  personal  wishes 
were  entirely  in  favour  of  a close  and  practical  alliance  with  the 
British,  but  that  his  subjects  did  not  share  his  feelings  towards  us. 
They  were  ‘ rude,  uneducated,  and  suspicious.’  He  hoped  that  in 
time  they  might  become  more  disposed  to  be  friendly,  but  at  present 
he  could  not  pretend  to  rely  upon  them.  He  then  disclosed  the  real 
reason  for  his  ready  response  to  the  Viceroy’s  invitation  by  saying  that 
lie  would  gratefully  receive  the  assistance  of  the  British  Government 
in  the  shape  of  money,  arms,  and  munitions  of  war. 

At  a later  visit  the  conversation  turned  upon  the  difficulty  of  the  , 
position  in  which  the  British  members  of  the  Boundary  Commission 
were  placed,  and  the  impossibility  of  the  Afghan  posts  being  able  to 
hold  their  own  in  the  face  of  a Russian  advance  was  explained  to  the 
Amir.  A map  was  produced,  on  which  the  country  to  the  north  of 
Herat  was  carefully  examined,  and  Russia’s  claims  were  made  known 
to  him.  Abdur  Rahman’s  ideas  of  topography  were  not  very  accurate, 
but  he  displayed  considerable  intelligence  in  his  questions  and  percep- 
tion of  the  meaning  of  the  answers,  and  eventually  expressed  his 
willingness  to  leave  the  question  of  the  delimitation  of  his  northern 
frontier  in  the  hands  of  the  British  Government. 

On  the  6th  April  there  was  a parade  of  the  troops,  17,000  in  number, 
and  that  evening  the  Amir  was  present  at  a state  banquet,  at  which, 
after  the  usual  loyal  toasts,  the  Viceroy  proposed  the  Amir’s  health. 
His  Highness,  in  reply,  expressed  a fervent  hope  that  the  prosperity 
of  the  British  Empire  might  long  endure,  as  with  it  the  welfare  of 
Afghanistan  was  bound  up.  He  had  watched,  he  said,  the  progress  of 
India  under  British  rule,  and  he  hoped  that  Afghanistan  might  flourish 
in  like  manner  ; and  he  ended  with  a prayer  that  the  Almighty  would 
preserve  Her  Majesty’s  troops  in  safety,  honour,  and  efficiency. 

Two  days  later  the  Amir  was  publicly  received  in  durbar  by  the 
Viceroy,  on  whose  right  hand  he  was  placed,  while  the  Duke  of 
Connaught  occupied  the  seat  on  his  left.  After  a few  words  had  been 
exchanged,  Abdur  Rahman  rose,  and  spoke  as  follows  : ‘ I am  deeply 
sensible  of  the  kindness  which  I have  received  from  His  Excellency 
the  Viceroy,  and  of  the  favour  shown  me  by  Her  Majesty  the  Queen- 
Empress.  In  return  for  this  kindness  and  favour,  I am  ready  with  my 
army  and  people  to  render  any  services  that  may  be  required  of  me  or 


506 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1885 

of  the  Afghan  nation.  As  the  British  Government  has  declared  that  it 
will  assist  me  in  repelling  any  foreign  enemy,  so  it  is  right  and  proper 
that  Afghanistan  should  unite  in  the  firmest  manner,  and  side  by  side 
by  the  British  Government.’ 

On  being  presented,  amongst  other  gifts,  with  a sword  of  honour,  he 
said  in  a loud  and  determined  voice : ‘ With  this  sword  I hope  to  smite 
any  enemy  of  the  British  Government.’ 

That  same  evening  the  Viceroy  received  news  of  the  Russian  attack 
on  Panjdeh,  and  communicated  it  to  the  Amir,  who  heard  it  with 
extraordinary  equanimity,  not  appearing  to  attach  any  great  importance 
to  the  matter,  and  attributing  the  defeat  of  his  troops  to  the  inferiority 
of  their  weapons.  He  observed  that  the  excuse  given  by  the  Russians, 
that  the  Afghans  intended  to  attack  them,  was  a frivolous  pretext,  and 
declared  all  that  his  men  had  done  was  very  properly  to  make  pre- 
parations to  defend  themselves. 

Abdur  Rahman  had  expressed  a desire  for  a British  decoration,  so 
shortly  before  his  departure  from  India  he  was  invested,  informally, 
with  the  G.C.S.I.  As  the  train  was  moving  off,  he  said  to  the  British 
officers  assembled  on  the  platform  : ‘ I wish  you  all  farewell,  and  com- 
mend you  to  the  care  of  God.  May  your  Government  endure  and  your 
honour  increase.  I have  been  greatly  pleased  and  gratified  by  the 
sight  of  the  British  Army.  I hope  and  am  certain  that  the  friendship 
now  existing  between  us  will  last  for  ever.’ 

Abdur  Rahman  had,  indeed,  every  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the 
result  of  his  visit,  for  not  only  was  Lord  Ripon’s  promise  that  England 
would  defend  his  kingdom  against  foreign  aggression  ratified  by  Lord 
Dufferin,  but  the  Amir  was  given,  in  addition  to  the  large  sums  of 
money  and  the  considerable  amount  of  munitions  of  war  already 
received  by  him,  ten  lakhs  of  rupees,  20,000  breech-loading  rifles,  a 
Heavy  battery  of  four  guns  and  two  howitzers,  a Mountain  battery, 
and  a liberal  supply  of  ammunition  for  both  guns  and  rifles. 

On  the  Amir’s  departure  the  great  camp  was  broken  up,  and  the 
troops  returned  to  their  respective  stations,  all  prepared  to  move 
towards  the  Quetta  frontier  at  a moment’s  notice.  The  Native  Chiefs, 
in  taking  their  leave  of  the  Viceroy,  were  profuse  in  their  offers  and 
promises  of  help  should  a recourse  to  arms  be  found  necessary ; and 
Lord  and  Lady  Dufferin’s  numerous  guests,  who,  like  my  wife  and 
myself,  had  for  more  than  a fortnight  been  recipients  of  the  most 
profuse  hospitality,  wished  their  generous  host  and  hostess  a hearty 
good-bye. 

Interesting  as  the  whole  proceeding  had  been,  by  far  the  most 
gratifying  result  of  the  gathering  was  the  unmistakable  loyalty  dis- 
played by  the  Native  Rulers  who  were  present,  as  well  as  by  those  in 
distant  parts  of  India,  on  hearing  of  the  unprovoked  attack  made  by 
the  Russians  on  the  Afghan  troops  at  Panjdeh,  and  our  consequent 


.Ara/sk 
„Fort  Kasala 


,Julck 


Viernii 


irkestan 


,Hazret- 


’Chimkent 


Tashkent 


, Andijan 


gnovods'k 


ntargelan 


Yam-Knrgaiu 


>arnarkand 


^izjJarvat 


Sariyazi 


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yulatan  Andkl 


K ; Balkh0  ’»« 

■lazar-i-Sherif0  fashkurgkm i 

Daulnta Lick/'  ■ ’ ~ J 

niaimena  / . , 1 L'— 


>arakhs, 


Meshed 


Taruchah 


-Zulfikan 


+Ihera  \ 
jiairabciQ\ 


?ajat  -Ghazr 


Pindiir 

kjhelum 


f hushalgarl 


immu 


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rlsmail  s 


Girishl 


Kohjah  PasfW3  J 
Quetta-KacJ-T;akq 


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fjacobabad'b, 

Shikarpur 

! 


i y.'  N s Orenburg 


Teheran 


THE 

RUSSIAN  FRONTIERS 


CENTRAL  ASIA 

English  Miles 


1885]  UNMISTAKABLE  LOYALTY  OF  THE  NATIVES 


507 


preparations  for  war.  The  greatest  enthusiasm  prevailed,  and  the 
various  military  camps  at  Rawal  Pindi  were  crowded  with  men  desirous 
of  joining  the  ranks  of  our  army.  I was  literally  besieged  by  old 
soldiers,  begging  that  they  might  be  allowed  to  return  to  the  colours 
and  fight  once  more  for  the  SirTtar ; and  one  Native  officer,  who  had 
been  with  me  in  Afghanistan,  came  to  me  and  said : ‘ I am  afraid, 
sahib,  I am  too  old  and  infirm  to  do  more  work  myself ; but  you  must 
take  my  two  sons  with  you — they  are  ready  to  die  for  the  Angrcse.'* 

We  hastened  back  to  Madras,  and  reached 'Ootacamund  after  seven 
consecutive  nights  in  the  train,  with  a thermometer  at  104°  in  the 
daytime,  the  only  pause  in  our  journey  being  at  Poona,  where  we 
spent  a few  hours  with  our  friend  General  Sir  John  Boss. 

I left  my  horses  at  Lahore,  and  for  some  weeks  lived  in  daily 
expectation  of  being  ordered  back  to  the  Punjab  to  take  command  of 
the  1st  Army  Corps.  A change  of  Government,  however,  took  place 
just  in  time  to  prevent  the  war.  Lord  Salisbury’s  determined  attitude 
convinced  Russia  that  no  further  encroachments  on  the  Afghan  frontier 
would  be  permitted ; she  ceased  the  * game  of  brag  ’ she  had  been 
allowed  to  play,  and  the  Boundary  Commission  were  enabled  to  proceed 
with  the  work  of  delimitation. 


CHAPTER  LXV. 

We  only  remained  three  months  at  1 Ooty,’  for  on  the  8th  July  a 
telegram  arrived  from  Lord  Dufferin  announcing  the  Queen’s  approval 
of  my  being  appointed  to  succeed  Sir  Donald  Stewart  as  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  India,  and  granting  me  leave  to  visit  England  before  taking 
up  the  appointment. 

At  the  end  of  a fortnight  all  our  preparations  for  departure  had  been 
made,  and  on  the  18th  August  we  left  Bombay,  in  the  teeth  of  the 
monsoon. 

Our  boy,  whose  holidays  had  just  commenced,  met  us  at  Venice, 
and  we  loitered  in  Italy  and  Switzerland  on  our  way  home.  I spent 
but  six  weeks  in  England,  returning  to  the  East  at  the  end  of  November, 
to  join  my  new  command.  I met  Lord  Dufferin  at  Agra,  and  accom- 
panied him  to  Gwalior,  whither  his  Excellency  went  for  the  purpose  of 
formally  restoring  to  the  Maharaja  Sindhia  the  much  coveted  fortress 
of  Gwalior,  which  had  been  occupied  by  us  since  1858 — an  act  of  sound 
policy,  enabling  us  to  withdraw  a brigade  which  could  be  far  more 
usefully  employed  elsewhere. 

At  Gwalior  we  received  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Mandalay,  and  I 

* A Native  corruption  of  the  word  ! English.’ 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


508 


[1885 


sent  a telegram  to  Lieutenant-General  Prendergast,*  to  congratulate 
him  on  the  successful  conduct  of  the  Burma  Expedition. 

Affairs  in  Burma  had  been  going  from  bad  to  worse  from  the  time 
King  Thebaw  came  to  the  throne  in  1878.  Wholesale  murders  were  of 
constant  occurrence  within  the  precincts  of  the  palace ; dacoity  was 
rife  throughout  the  country,  and  British  officers  were  insulted  to  such 
an  extent  that  the  Resident  had  to  be  withdrawn.  In  1883  a special 
Mission  was  sent  by  the  King  of  Burma  to  Paris,  with  a view  to 
making  such  a treaty  with  the  French  Government  as  would  enable 
him  to  appeal  to  France  for  assistance,  in  the  event  of  his  being 
involved  in  difficulties  with  England.  The  Mission  remained  eighteen 
months  in  Paris,  and  succeeded  in  ratifying  what  the  French  called  a 
‘ Commercial  Convention,’  under  the  terms  of  which  a French  Consul 
was  located  at  Mandalay,  who  soon  gained  sufficient  ascendancy  over 
King  Thebaw  to  enable  him  to  arrange  for  the  construction  of  a rail- 
way between  Mandalay  and  Tonghu,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
French  bank  at  Mandalay,  by  means  of  which  France  would  speedily 
have  gained  full  control  over  the  principal  sources  of  Burmese  revenue, 
and  power  to  exclude  British  trade  from  the  valley  of  the  Irrawaddy. 
In  furtherance  of  these  designs,  the  King  picked  a quarrel  with  a 
British  trading  company,  threatened  to  cancel  their  leases  for  cutting 
timber,  and  demanded  a fine  of  ten  lakhs  of  rupees. 

The  Chief  Commissioner  proposed  arbitration,  but  this  was  declined, 
and  the  King  refusing  to  modify  his  action  with  regard  to  the  trading 
company,  the  Viceroy  proposed  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India  that 
an  ultimatum f should  be  sent  to  King  Thebaw. 

In  approving  of  the  ultimatum,  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  expressed 
his  opinion  that  its  despatch  should  be  concurrent  with  the  movement 
of  troops  and  ships  to  Rangoon,  that  an  answer  should  be  demanded 
within  a specified  time,  and  that  if  the  ultimatum  were  rejected,  an 
immediate  advance  on  Mandalay  should  be  made. 

A force!  of  nearly  10,000  men  and  77  guns,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant-General  Prendergast,  was  accordingly  ordered  to  be  in 
readiness  at  Thyetmyo  by  the  14th  November,  and  as  the  reply  of  the 

* Now  General  Sir  Harry  Prendergast,  V.C.,  K.C.B. 

f The  ultimatum  informed  King  Thebaw  that  the  British  Government 
insisted  upon  an  Envoy  being  received  at  Mandalay,  with  free  access  to  the 
King,  without  having  to  submit  to  any  humiliating  ceremony  ; that  proceed- 
ings against  the  trading  company  would  not  be  permitted  ; that  a British 
Agent,  with  a suitable  guard  of  honour  and  steamer  for  his  personal  protection, 
must  be  permanently  stationed  at  the  Burmese  capital  ; that  the  Burmese 
Government  must  regulate  their  external  relations  in  accordance  with  Biitish 
advice  ; and  that  proper  facilities  must  be  granted  for  the  opening  up  of 
British  trade  with  China  via  Bhamo. 

I The  force  consisted  of  364  seamen  and  69  Marines  formed  into  a Naval 
Brigade,  with  49  guns,  including  27  machine  guns,  and  3,029  British  and 
6,005  Native  soldiers,  with  28  guns. 


CAMP  OF  EXERCISE  AT  DELHI 


509 


1885] 

Burmese  Government  was  tantamount  to  a refusal,  Prendergast  was 
instructed  to  advance  on  Mandalay,  with  the  result  which  it  was  my 
pleasant  duty  to  congratulate  him  upon  in  my  capacity  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Army  in  India. 

From  Gwalior  I went  to  Delhi  to  prepare  for  a Camp  of  Exercise  on 
a much  larger  scale  than  had  ever  before  been  held.  Many  weak 
points  in  the  Commissariat  and  Transport  Department  having  become 
only  too  apparent  when  the  mobilization  of  the  two  Army  Corps  had 
been  imminent,  the  previous  spring,  it  was  considered  necessary  to  test 
our  readiness  for  war,  and  orders  for  the  strength  and  composition  of 
the  force  to  be  manoeuvred  had  been  issued  before  Sir  Donald  Stewart 
left  India. 

The  troops  were  divided  into  two  Army  Corps.  The  northern 
assembled  at  Umballa,  and  the  southern  at  Gurgaon,  25  miles  from 
Delhi,  the  points  of  concentration  being  150  miles  apart. 

After  a fortnight  passed  in  brigade  and  divisional  movements,  the 
opposing  forces  advanced,  and  on  the  7tli  January  they  came  into 
contact  on  the  historic  battlefield  of  Panipat.* 

Lord  Dufferin,  whose  interest  in  the  efficiency  of  the  army  induced 
him  to  come  all  the  way  from  Calcutta  to  witness  the  last  two  days’ 
manoeuvres,  was  present — with  the  twelve  ‘ foreign  officers ’f  from  the 
principal  armies  of  Europe  and  America,  who  had  been  invited  to 
attend  the  camp — -at  a march-past  of  the  whole  force  of  85,000  men  on 
the  18th.  It  was  a fine  sight,  though  marred  by  a heavy  thunderstorm 
and  a perfect  deluge  of  rain,  and  was  really  a greater  test  of  what  the 
troops  could  do  than  if  we  had  had  the  perfect  weather  we  had  hoped 
for.  The  ‘ foreign  officers  ’ were,  apparently,  somewhat  surprised  at 
the  fine  physique  and  efficiency  of  our  Native  soldiers,  but  they  all 
remarked  on  the  paucity  of  British  officers  with  the  Indian  regiments, 
which  I could  not  but  acknowledge  was,  as  it  still  is,  a weak  point  in 
our  military  organization. 

When  the  camp  was  broken  up,  I accompanied  the  Viceroy  to 
Burma,  where  we  arrived  early  in  February,  1886.  Lord  Dufferin 
must,  I think,  have  been  pleased  at  the  reception  he  met  with  at 
Rangoon.  The  people  generally  tried  in  every  possible  way  to  show 

* Panipat  is  famous  for  three  great  battles  fought  in  its  immediate  neigh- 
bourhood : one  in  1526,  by  the  Emperor  Baber  against  Sultan  Ibrahim,  which 
resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  Mogul  dynasty  ; the  second  in  1556, 
when  the  Emperor  Akbar  beat  the  Hindu  General  of  the  Afghan  usurper,  and 
re-established  the  Moguls  in  power  ; and  the  third  in  1761,  when  Ahmed 
Shah  Durani  defeated  the  Mahrattas. 

t I was  much  gratified  at  receiving  subsequently  from  His  Imperial  Majesty 
the  Emperor  William  I.  and  from  the  Crown  Princess  of  Prussia  autograph 
letters  of  acknowledgment  of,  and  thanks  for,  the  reception  accorded  and  the 
attention  paid  to  Majors  von  Huene  and  von  Hagenau,  the  two  representatives 
of  the  German  army  who  attended  these  manoeuvres. 


S'o 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1886 


their  gratitude  to  the  Viceroy,  under  whose  auspices  the  annexation  of 
Upper  Burma  had  been  carried  out,  and  each  nationality  had  erected  a 
triumphal  arch  in  its  own  particular  quarter  of  the  town. 

From  Rangoon  we  went  to  Mandalay,  where  Lord  Dufferin  formally 
announced  the  annexation  by  England  of  all  that  part  of  Upper  Burma 
over  which  King  Thebaw  had  held  sway.  We  then  proceeded  to 
Madras,  where  I parted  from  the  Viceregal  party  and  travelled  to 
Bombay  to  meet  my  wife.  Leaving  her  at  Simla  to  arrange  our 
house,  which  had  been  considerably  altered  and  added  to,  I proceeded 
to  the  North-West  Frontier,  for  the  question  of  its  defence  was  one 
which  interested  me  very  deeply,  and  I hoped  that,  from  the  position 
I now  held  as  a member  of  the  Government  of  India,  I should  be  able 
to  get  my  ideas  on  this,  to  India,  all-important  subject  listened  to,  if 
not  altogether  carried  out. 

The  defence  of  the  frontier  had  been  considered  under  the  orders  of 
my  predecessor  by  a Committee,  the  members  of  which  had  recorded 
their  several  opinions  as  to  the  means  which  should  be  adopted  to 
make  India  secure.  But  Sir  Donald  Stewart  relinquished  his  command 
before  anything  could  be  done  to  give  effect  to  the  measures  they 
advised. 

The  matter  had  therefore  to  be  taken  up  afresh  by  me,  and  I 
carefully  studied  the  recommendations  of  the  ‘ Defence  Committee  ’ 
before  visiting  the  frontier  to  refresh  my  memory  by  personal 
inspection  as  to  the  points  to  be  defended. 

It  seemed  to  me  that  none  of  the  members,  with  the  exception  of 
Sir  Charles  Macgregor  and  the  secretary,  Major  W.  G.  Nicholson,  at 
all  appreciated  the  great  change  which  had  taken  place  in  our  position 
since  the  near  approach  of  Russia,  and  our  consequent  promise  to  the 
Amir  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  his  kingdom,  had  widened  the  limit 
of  our  responsibilities  from  the  southern  to  the  northern  boundary  of 
Afghanistan. 

Less  than  a year  before  we  had  been  on  the  point  of  declaring  war 
with  Russia  because  of  her  active  interference  with  1 the  authority  of 
a sovereign — our  protected  ally — who  had  committed  no  offence*;’ 
and  even  now  it  was  not  certain  that  peace  could  be  preserved,  by 
reason  of  the  outrageous  demands  made  by  the  Russian  members  of 
the  Boundary  Commission  as  to  the  direction  which  the  line  of 
delimitation  between  Russian  and  Afghan  territory  should  take. 

It  was  this  widening  of  our  responsibilities  which  prevented  me 
from  agreeing  with  the  recommendations  of  the  Defence  Committee, 
for  the  majority  of  the  members  laid  greater  stress  on  the  necessity 
for  constructing  numerous  fortifications,  than  upon  lines  of  com- 
munication, which  I conceived  to  be  of  infinitely  greater  importance, 

* Words  used  by  Mr.  Gladstone  when  asking  for  a vote  of  credit  for 
£6,500,000  for  special  preparations  in  connection  with  the  Afghan  difficulty. 


QUETTA  AND  PESHAWAR 


S'i 


1886] 

as  affording  the  means  of  bringing  all  the  strategical  points  on  the 
frontier  into  direct  communication  with  the  railway  system  of  India, 
and  enabling  us  to  mass  our  troops  rapidly,  should  we  be  called  upon 
to  aid  Afghanistan  in  repelling  attack  from  a foreign  Power. 

Fortifications,  of  the  nature  of  entrenched  positions,  were  no  doubt, 
to  some  extent,  necessary,  not  to  guard  against  our  immediate 
neighbours,  for  experience  had  taught  us  that  without  outside 
assistance  they  are  incapable  of  a combined  movement,  but  for  the 
protection  of  such  depots  and  storehouses  as  would  have  to  be 
constructed,  and  as  a support  to  the  army  in  the  field. 

The  line  chosen  at  that  time  for  an  advance  was  by  Quetta  and 
Kandahar.  In  the  first  instance,  therefore,  I wended  my  way  to 
Baluchistan,  where  I met  and  consulted  with  the  Governor-General’s 
Agent,  Sir  Robert  Sandeman,  and  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Sind- 
Pishin  Railway,  Brigadier-General  Browne.* 

We  together  inspected  the  Kwaja-Amran  range,  through  which  the 
Kohjak  tunnel  now  runs,  and  I decided  that  the  best  position  for  an 
entrenched  camp  was  to  the  rear  of  that  range,  in  the  space  between 
the  Takatu  and  Mashalik  mountains.  This  open  ground  was  less 
than  four  miles  broad ; nature  had  made  its  flanks  perfectly  secure, 
and  in  front  was  a network  of  ravines  capable  of  being  made  quite 
impassable  by  simply  flooding  them.  It  was  unfortunate  that  the 
railway  had  been  marked  out  in  front  instead  of  in  rear  of  the 
Takatu  range,  and  that  its  construction  wras  too  far  advanced  before 
the  question  of  defence  came  to  be  considered  to  admit  of  its  being 
altered,  otherwise  this  position  would  have  been  a complete  protection 
for  the  line  of  rail  also. 

Having  come  to  a definite  conclusion  as  to  the  measures  to  be  taken 
for  meeting  the  offensive  and  defensive  requirements  of  Quetta  and 
the  Bolan  Pass,  I turned  my  attention  to  Peshawar  and  the  Khyber 
Pass,  which  were  infinitely  more  difficult  to  deal  with,  because  of  the 
political  considerations  involved. 

Over  the  whole  of  Baluchistan  we  had  entire  control,  so  that  in  the 
event  of  an  army  moving  in  that  direction  we  could  depend  upon  the 
resources  of  the  country  being  at  our  disposal,  and  the  people 
remaining,  at  least,  neutral.  But  on  the  Peshawar  side  the  circum- 
stances were  altogether  different : the  tribes  were  hostile  to  a degree, 
and  no  European’s  life  was  safe  across  the  frontier.  Except  in  the 
Khyber  itself  (where  the  policy  of  establishing  friendly  relations  with 
the  Afridis,  and  utilizing  them  to  keep  open  the  pass,  had  been  most 
successfully  practised  by  the  political  officer,  Lieutenant  - Colonel 
Warburton),  we  could  not  depend  on  the  tribesmen  remaining  passive, 

* The  late  Major-General  Sir  James  Browne,  K.C.S.I.,  C.B.,  who,  like  Sir 
Robert  Sandeman,  died  while  holding  the  important  and  responsible  position 
of  Governor-General's  Agent  in  Baluchistan. 


5>2 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1886 


much  less  helping  us  if  we  advanced  into  Afghanistan.  While,  should 
an  army  attempt  to  invade  India  from  that  direction,  we  should  to  a 
certainty  have  every  man  of  the  200,000  warlike  people  who  inhabit 
the  mountainous  district  from  Chitral  to  Baluchistan  combining 
against  us,  and  pouring  into  India  from  every  outlet. 

For  these  reasons  I recorded  a strong  opinion  in  opposition  to  the 
proposals  of  the  Defence  Committee,  which  were  in  favour  of  the 
construction  of  a large  magazine  at  Peshawar  and  extensive  entrenched 
works  at  the  mouth  of  the  Khyber.  I pointed  out  the  extreme  danger 
of  a position  communication  with  which  could  be  cut  off,  and  which 
could  be  more  or  less  easily  turned,  for  it  was  clear  to  me  that  until 
we  had  succeeded  in  inducing  the  border  tribes  to  be  on  friendly  terms 
with  us,  and  to  believe  that  their  interests  were  identical  with  ours,  the 
Peshawar  valley  would  become  untenable  should  any  general  disturb- 
ance take  place ; and  that,  instead  of  entrenchments  close  to  the 
Khyber  Pass,  we  required  a position  upon  which  the  garrisons  of 
Peshawar  and  Nowshera  could  fall  back  and  await  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements. 

For  this  position  I selected  a spot  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Kabul 
river,  between  Khairabad  and  the  Indus ; it  commanded  the  passage 
of  the  latter  river,  and  could  easily  be  strengthened  by  defensive 
works  outside  the  old  fort  of  Attock. 

It  will  be  readily  understood  by  those  of  my  readers  who  have  any 
knowledge  of  our  North-West  Frontier,  or  are  interested  in  the 
question  of  the  defence  of  India,  that  other  routes  exist  between  the 
Bolan  and  the  Khyber  Passes  which  might  be  made  use  of  either  by 
an  army  invading  India,  or  by  a force  sent  from  India  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Afghanistan ; and  by  such  it  will  probably  be  asked,  as  was 
the  case  when  my  recommendations  were  being  discussed,  why  I did 
not  advise  these  lines  to  be  similarly  guarded.  My  reply  was,  and  is, 
that  there  are  no  arsenals  or  depots  near  these  passes  to  be  protected, 
as  at  Quetta  and  Rawul  Pindi ; that  we  should  not  be  likely  to  use 
them  for  an  army  moving  into  Afghanistan;  that,  although  small 
parties  of  the  enemy  might  come  by  them,  the  main  body  of  a force 
operating  towards  India  is  bound  to  advance  by  the  Khyber,  for  the 
reason  that  it  would  debouch  directly  on  highly  cultivated  country 
and  good  roads  leading  to  all  the  great  cities  of  the  Punjab ; and 
finally  that,  even  if  our  finances  would  admit  of  the  construction  of 
such  a long  line  of  forts,  it  would  be  impossible  for  our  limited  army 
to  supply  the  garrisons  for  them. 

Having  completed  my  inspection  of  the  frontier,  I returned  to  Simla 
and  drew  up  a memorandum  declaring  the  conviction  I had  arrived  at 
after  careful  deliberation,  that  the  improvement  of  our  communications 
was  of  far  greater  importance  than  the  immediate  construction  of  forts 
and  entrenchments,  and  that,  while  I would  not  spare  money  in 


1 886]  COMMUNICATIONS  VERSUS  FORTIFICATIONS 


S'3 

strengthening  well-defined  positions,  the  strategical  value  of  which  was 
unmistakable,  I would  not  trouble  about  those  places  the  primary  im- 
portance of  fortifying  which  was  open  to  argument,  and  which  might 
never  be  required  to  be  defended  ; these,  I contended,  might  be  left 
alone,  except  so  far  as  to  make  a careful  study  of  their  localities  and 
determine  how  they  could  best  be  taken  advantage  of  should  occasion 
require.  My  note  ended  with  the  following  words : ‘ Meanwhile  I 
would  push  on  our  communications  with  all  possible  speed ; we  must 
have  roads,  and  we  must  have  railways  ; they  cannot  be  made  on  short 
notice,  and  every  rupee  spent  upon  them  now  will  repay  us  tenfold 
hereafter.  Nothing  will  tend  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  frontier  so 
much  as  the  power  of  rapidly  concentrating  troops  on  any  threatened 
point,  and  nothing  will  strengthen  our  military  position  more  than  to 
open  out  the  country  and  improve  our  relations  with  the  frontier  tribes. 
There  are  no  better  civilizers  than  roads  and  railways ; and  although 
some  of  those  recommended  to  be  made  may  never  be  required  for 
military  purposes,  they  will  be  of  the  greatest  assistance  to  the  civil 
power  in  the  administration  of  the  country.’ 

Accompanying  this  paper  was  a statement  of  the  defensive  works 
which,  in  my  opinion,  should  be  taken  in  hand  without  delay ; also  of 
the  positions  which  required  careful  study,  and  the  roads  and  rail- 
ways which  should  be  constructed,  to  make  the  scheme  of  defence 
complete. 

Seven  years  later,  when  I gave  up  my  command  of  the  Army  in 
India,  I had  the  supreme  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  I left  our  North- 
West  Frontier  secure,  so  far  as  it  was  possible  to  make  it  so,  hampered 
as  we  were  by  want  of  money.  The  necessary  fortifications  had  been 
completed,  schemes  for  the  defence  of  the  various  less  important 
positions  had  been  prepared,  and  the  roads  and  railways,  in  my  esti- 
mation of  such  vast  importance,  had  either  been  finished  or  were  well 
advanced. 

Moreover,  our  position  with  regard  to  the  border  tribes  had  gradually 
come  to  be  better  understood,  and  it  had  been  realized  that  they  would 
be  a powerful  support  to  whichever  side  might  be  able  to  count  upon 
their  aid ; the  policy  of  keeping  them  at  arm’s  length  had  been  aban- 
doned, and  the  advantages  of  reciprocal  communication  were  becoming 
more  appreciated  by  them  and  by  us. 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  these  results  could  be  achieved  without 
a considerable  amount  of  opposition,  owing  partly  to  the  majority  of 
our  countrymen  (even  amongst  those  who  had  spent  the  greater  part 
of  their  lives  in  India)  failing  to  recognize  the  change  that  had  taken 
place  in  the  relative  positions  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  in  Asia,  and 
to  their  disbelief  in  the  steady  advance  of  Russia  towards  Afghanistan 
being  in  any  way  connected  with  India,  or  in  Russia’s  wish  or  power 


514 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1886 


to  threaten  our  Eastern  Empire.*  The  idea  was  very  common,  too, 
amongst  people  who  had  not  deeply  considered  the  subject,  that  all 
proposal;,  for  gaining  control  over  our  troublesome  neighbours  on  the 
border,  or  for  facilitating  the  massing  of  troops,  meant  an  aggressive 
policy,  and  were  made  with  the  idea  of  annexing  more  territory,  instead 
of  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  safety  of  India,  and  enabling  us  to 
fulfil  our  engagements. 

Happily,  the  Viceroys  who  governed  India  while  I was  Commander- 
in-Chief  were  not  amongst  those  who  held  these  opinions  ; and  while 
they  had  no  expectation  of  India  being  invaded  in  the  near  future,  they 
realized  that  we  could  not  unconcernedly  look  on  while  a great  Power 
was,  step  by  step,  creeping  closer  to  our  possessions.  It  was  a fortunate 
circumstance,  too,  that,  for  the  first  five  years  I was  at  the  head  of  the 
Army  in  India,  I had  as  my  military  colleague  in  Council  the  late 
General  Sir  George  Chesney,  a man  of  unquestionable  talent  and  sound 
judgment,  to  whose  cordial  support,  not  only  in  frontier  affairs,  but  in 
all  my  efforts  to  promote  the  efficiency  and  welfare  of  the  soldier,  I 
was  very  greatly  indebted. 


CHAPTER  LXVI. 

Many  interesting  and  important  questions  had  to  be  dealt  with  during 
this  my  first  year  as  a member  of  the  Viceroy’s  Council,  and  it  was 
pleasant  to  me  to  be  able  to  bring  before  the  Government  of  India  a 
scheme  which  my  wife  had  had  very  much  at  heart  for  many  years — 
for  supplying  skilled  nursing  to  the  military  hospitals  in  India.  That 
our  sick  soldiers  (officers  and  men)  should  bo  entirely  dependent  for 
nursing,  even  in  times  of  the  most  dangerous  illness,  on  the  tender 
mercies  of  ‘ the  orderly  on  duty,’  who,  whether  kind-hearted  or  the 
reverse,  was  necessarily  utterly  untrained  and  ignorant  of  the  require- 
ments of  sickness,  was  a source  of  unhappiness  to  her,  and  had  been 
felt  as  a cruel  want  by  many ; but  whenever  she  had  discussed  the 
subject  with  those  who  might  have  helped  her,  she  was  told  that  pro- 
posals for  supplying  this  want  had  already  been  made,  that  the 
Government  could  not,  nor  would  they  ever  be  able  to,  act  on  such 
proposals,  on  account  of  the  prohibitory  expense,  so  she  felt  there  was 
no  use  in  making  any  appeal  until  I might  be  in  a position  to  see  that 
any  suggestions  made  by  her  would  bo  certain  to  receive  the  careful 

* A Statesman  of  high  reputation  in  England  was  so  strong  in  his  disbelief 
of  the  necessity  for  making  any  preparations  in  India,  that  he  publicly  stated 
that  if  the  only  harrier  between  Russia  in  Asia  and  Britain  in  Asia  were  a 
mountain  ridge,  or  a stream,  or  a fence,  there  would  he  no  difficulty  in  pre- 
serving peace  between  Russia  an<l  the  United  Kingdom.  -Speech  delivered  by 
the  Right  Hon.  John  Bright,  M.P.,  at  Birmingham  ou  the  16th  April,  1879. 


LADY  ROBERTS  OF  KANDAHAR. 


From 

a photograph  by  Messrs.  Johnson  and  Hoffmann. 


886] 


NURSING  FOR  THE  SOLDIER 


515 

consideration  of  Government.  This  time  had  now  arrived,  and  almost 
directly  Lady  Roberts  returned  to  India  in  1886  she  drew  up  a scheme 
for  supplying  lady  nurses  to  the  military  hospitals  throughout  India, 
and  set  to  work  to  try  and  get  the  support  of  some  of  the  principal 
Medical  officers.  To  her  great  joy,  her  recommendations  were 
accepted  by  Lord  Dufferin  and  his  Council,  and  her  note  upon  the 
subject  was  sent  home  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  strongly  backed  up 
by  the  Government  of  India.  Lord  Cross  happily  viewed  the  matter 
in  a favourable  light,  and  consented,  not  only  to  a certain  number  of 
nurses  being  sent  out  the  following  year  as  an  experiment,  but  to  the 
whole  of  the  cost  of  the  movement  being  borne  by  the  State,  with  the 
exception  of  the  provision  of  ‘ Homes  in  the  Hills  ’ for  the  nursing 
sisters  as  health  resorts,  and  to  prevent  the  expense  to  Government  of 
their  having  to  be  sent  home  on  sick-leave  when  worn  out  by  their 
trying  work  in  the  plains.  The  Secretary  of  State,  however,  declared 
these  ‘ Homes  ’ to  be  ‘ an  important  part  ’ of  the  nursing  scheme,  ‘ and 
indispensable  to  its  practical  working,’  but  considered  that  they  should 
be  provided  by  private  subscription,  a condition  my  wife  undertook  to 
carry  out.  She  appealed  to  the  Army  in  India  to  help  her,  and  with 
scarcely  an  exception  every  regiment  and  battery  generously  responded 
— even  the  private  soldiers  subscribed  largely  in  proportion  to  their 
small  means — so  that  by  the  beginning  of  the  following  year  my  wife 
was  able  to  set  about  purchasing  and  building  suitable  houses. 

‘ Homes  ’ were  established  at  Murree,  Kasauli  and  Quetta,  in 
Bengal,  and  at  Wellington*  in  Madras,  and  by  making  a further 
appeal  to  the  officers  of  the  army,  and  with  the  assistance  of  kind  and 
liberal  friends  in  England  and  India,  and  the  proceeds  of  various  enter- 
tainments, Lady  Roberts  was  able  to  supply,  in  connexion  with  the 
‘ Homes  ’ at  Murree  and  Kasauli,  wards  for  the  reception  of  sick 
officers,  with  a staff  of  nursesf  in  attendance,  whose  salaries,  passages, 
etc.,  are  all  paid  out  of  ‘ Lady  Roberts’s  Fund.’  My  wife  was  induced 
to  do  this  from  having  known  many  young  officers  succumb  owing  to 
want  of  care  and  improper  food  at  hotels  or  clubs  on  being  sent  to  the 
Hills  after  a hard  fight  for  life  in  the  plains,  if  they  were  not  fortunate 
enough  to  have  personal  friends  to  look  after  them.  Although  it  is 
anticipating  events,  I may  as  well  say  here  that  the  nursing  experiment 
proved  a complete  success,  and  now  every  large  military  hospital  in 
India  has  its  staff  of  nurses,  and  there  are  altogether  4 superintendents, 

* The  homes  at  Quetta  and  Wellington  were  eventually  taken  over  by 
Government,  and  Lady  Roberts’  nurses,  who  worked  in  the  military  hospitals 
at  these  -stations,  were  replaced  by  Government  nurses  when  the  increase  to 
the  Army  Nursing  Service  admitted  of  this  being  done. 

t When  the  ‘ Homes  in  the  Hills  ’ are  closed  during  the  cold  months,  these 
nurses  attend  sick  officers  in  their  own  houses  in  the  plains,  free  of  charge 
except  travelling  expenses. 


34 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1886 


516 

9 deputy  superintendents,  and  39  nursing  sisters,  in  India.  There  are 
many  more  wanted  in  the  smaller  stations,  where  there  is  often  great 
loss  of  life  from  lack  of  proper  nursing,  and  surely,  as  my  -wife  pointed 
out  in  her  first  appeal,  ‘ when  one  considers  what  an  expensive  article 
the  British  soldier  is,  costing,  as  he  does,  £100  before  landing  in  India, 
it  seems  certain  that  on  the  score  of  economy  alone,  altogether  setting 
aside  the  humane  aspect  of  the  question,  it  is  well  worth  the  State’s 
while  to  provide  him  with  the  skilled  nursing  care  ’ which  has  up  to 
now  saved  so  many  lives. 

That  officers  as  well  as  men  might  benefit  by  the  devotion  of  the 
‘ nursing  sister,’  I was  able  to  arrange  in  all  the  large  hospitals  for 
some  room,  or  rooms,  used  until  then  for  other  purposes,  to  be  appro- 
priated for  an  officers’  ward  or  wards,  and  these  have  proved  a great 
boon  to  the  younger  officers  whose  income  does  not  admit  of  their 
obtaining  the  expensive  care  of  a nurse  from  one  of  the  large  civil 
hospitals  in  the  Presidency  towns. 

The  next  most  interesting  question,  and  also  the  most  pressing, 
which  had  to  be  considered  by  the  Viceroy’s  Council  during  the 
summer  of  1886,  was  the  pacification  of  Upper  Burma.  People  in 
England  had  expressed  surprise  at  this  being  so  long  delayed.  It  is 
extremely  easy,  however,  to  sit  at  home  and  talk  of  what  should  be 
done,  but  very  difficult  to  say  how  to  do  it,  and  more  difficult  still  to 
carry  it  out.  To  establish  law  and  order  in  a country  nearly  as  large 
as  France,  in  which  dacoity  is  looked  upon  as  an  honourable  profession, 
would  be  no  fight  task  even  in  Europe  : but  when  the  country  to  be 
settled  has  a deadly  climate  for  several  months  in  the  year,  is  covered 
to  a great  extent  with  jungle,  and  is  without  a vestige  of  a road,  the 
task  assumes  gigantic  proportions.  In  Upper  Burma  the  garrison  was 
only  sufficient  to  keep  open  communication  along  the  fine  of  the 
Irrawaddy,  and,  to  add  to  the  embarrassment  of  the  situation,  dis- 
affection had  spread  to  Lower  Burma,  and  disturbances  had  broken 
out  in  the  almost  unknown  district  between  Upper  Burma  and  Assam. 

It  was  arranged  to  send  strong  reinforcements  to  Burma  so  soon  as 
the  unhealthy  season  should  be  over  and  it  would  be  safe  for  the  troops 
to  go  there,  and  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Herbert  Macpherson  (who  had 
succeeded  me  as  Commander-in-Chief  in  Madras)  was  directed  to 
proceed  thither. 

In  October  my  wife  and  I,  with  some  of  my  staff,  started  from  Simla 
on  a trip  across  the  Hills,  with  the  object  of  inspecting  the  stations  of 
Dhurmsala  and  Dalhousie  before  it  was  cool  enough  to  begin  my 
winter  tour  in  the  plains.  We  crossed  the  Jalaurie  Pass,  between 
11,000  and  12,000  feet  high,  and  travelling  through  the  beautiful  Kulu 
valley  and  over  the  Bubbu  mountain,  we  finally  arrived  at  Palampur, 
the  centre  of  the  tea  industry  in  the  Kangra  valley.  Having  been  cut 
off  from  telegraphic  communication  for  some  time,  wo  went  straight 


PACIFICATION  OF  BURMA 


5 1 7 


1 886] 

to  the  telegraph-office  for  news,  and  found  at  the  moment  a message 
being  deciphered  which  brought  me  the  terribly  sad  information  that 
General  Macpherson  had  died  of  fever  in  Burma.  In  him  the  country 
had  lost  a good  soldier,  and  I a friend  and  comrade  for  whom  I had  a 
great  regard  and  admiration.  We  were  discussing  his  untimely  end, 
and  I was  considering  who  should  replace  him,  when  a second  message 
arrived.  This  was  from  Lord  Dufferin,  telling  me  that  he  wished  me 
to  transfer  my  Head-Quarters  to  Burma,  and  arrange  to  remain  there 
until  ‘ the  neck  of  the  business  was  broken.’ 

I hurried  to  Calcutta,  embarked  in  the  first  mail-steamer,  and  landed 
at  Rangoon  on  the  9th  November. 

Sir  Charles  Bernard  (the  Chief  Commissioner)  and  General  White 
had  done  well  under  very  difficult  circumstances  ; but  owing  partly  to 
large  districts  being  impassable  from  months  of  heavy  rain,  and  partly 
to  the  change  in  Commanders,  unavoidable  inaction  had  been  forced 
upon  our  troops,  and  the  dacoits  had  in  consequence  made  head 
against  us. 

Having  been  in  constant  correspondence  with  General  White,  I had 
been  kept  informed  of  his  plans,  and,  as  his  responsible  Chief,  I had 
approved  of  them  ; I therefore  had  the  somewhat  complicated  military 
situation  at  my  fingers’  ends,  and  did  not  need  to  lose  a single  day  in 
arranging  for  a series  of  combined  movements  being  carried  on  all 
over  the  country. 

It  was  hoped  that  the  recently  arrived  reinforcements  would  be 
sufficient  for  all  requirements,  but  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the 
difficulties  connected  with  the  pacification  of  Burma  had  been  under- 
rated, and  that,  in  addition  to  more  troops,  an  efficient  civil  administra- 
tion would  have  to  be  provided,  to  take  the  place  of  military  authority 
so  soon  as  anything  like  organized  resistance  had  been  crushed ; for  to 
deal  with  ordinary  robbers  I conceived  to  be  work  more  suited  to  police 
than  to  soldiers.  Upwards  of  thirty  years’  experience  had  proved  that 
the  Burmese  could  not  be  relied  upon  for  this  kind  of  service  ; I there- 
fore recommended  that  a large  body  of  police  should  be  raised  in  India 
without  delay,  and  given  a semi-military  organization,  and  in  the 
meantime  I asked  for,  and  was  given,  five  additional  regiments. 

I felt  very  confident  of  success,  for  I had  taken  great  care  in  the 
selection  of  the  brigade  commanders  and  staff  officers,  and  I knew  the 
troops  could  be  depended  upon  in  any  emergency  that  was  likely  to 
arise.  Nevertheless,  as  the  work  they  would  have  to  perform  was  of 
rather  an  unusual  character,  irksome  as  well  as  difficult,  I thought  it 
advisable  to  issue  some  general  instructions  for  the  guidance  of  the 
officers  in  command  of  the  different  columns.*  These  instructions 
were  carried  out  so  intelligently,  and  the  troops  did  such  good  service, 

* These  instructions  are  given  in  the  Appendix. 


34—2 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1887 


518 

especially  a very  fine  body  of  Mounted  Infantry  raised  and  organized 
by  Major  Symons,  of  the  South  Wales  Borderers,  that  before  I returned 
to  India  in  February,  1887,  I was  able  to  report  that  the  country  was 
gradually  becoming  quiet  and  the  Burmese  reconciled  to  our  rule. 
Most  of  the  principal  dacoit  leaders  had  been  killed  or  captured,  and 
villages  which  had  been  in  their  hands  for  months  were  being  re- 
occupied by  their  legitimate  inhabitants  ; caravans  were  coming  into 
Mandalay  almost  daily  from  districts  on  the  Chinese  borders ; contracts 
for  making  roads  were  readily  taken  up,  and  there  was  no  difficulty  in 
obtaining  labour  for  the  railway  then  being  constructed  between  Lower 
Burma  and  Mandalay,  the  first  sod  of  which  was  turned  within  a 
month  of  my  arrival  at  that  place. 

In  achieving  these  satisfactory  results  I was  materially  aided  by 
the  hearty  co-operation  of  Sir  Charles  Bernard  and  the  civil  officers 
serving  under  him ; while  the  entire  absence  of  fanaticism  amongst  the 
Burmese,  and  their  cheerful,  happy  natures,  facilitated  our  intercourse 
with  them.  I received,  besides,  most  valuable  assistance  from  the 
Buddhist  Poonghies,  or  monks,  with  many  of  whom  I made  friends. 
From  the  fact  that  education,  secular  and  religious,  is  imparted  by 
these  monks,  and  that  every  male,  from  the  King  to  the  humblest 
peasant,  was  obliged  to  enter  a monastery  and  wear  the  saffron  garb  of 
a monk  for  a certain  period,  the  priesthood  had  enormous  influence 
with  the  Burmese.  There  are  no  hereditary  Chiefs  or  Nobles  in 
Burma,  the  Poonghies  being  the  advisers  of  the  people  and  the  centre 
round  which  Native  society  revolves. 

Our  occupation  of  Upper  Burma  was  necessarily  a great  blow  to  the 
Buddhist  priesthood,  for  many  of  the  monasteries*  were  kept  up 
entirely  by  the  King,  Queen,  and  Ministers  of  State  ; and,  as  it  was 
most  advisable  to  have  the  influence  of  the  monks  in  our  favour,  I 
recommended  that  a monthly  stipend  should  be  paid  to  the  Archbishop 
and  two  senior  Bishops  of  Mandalay.  They  showed  their  gratitude  by 
doing  all  they  could  to  help  me,  and  when  I was  leaving  the  country 
the  old  Thathanabain  (Archbishop)  accompanied  me  as  far  as 
Rangoon.  We  corresponded  till  his  death,  and  I still  hear  occasionally 
from  one  or  other  of  my  Poonghie  friends. 

I remained  only  a short  time  in'Calcutta  on  my  return  to  India,  and 
then  started  off  again  for  the  North-West  Frontier,  in  company  with 
General  Chesney,  who  had  previously  expressed  his  general  concurrence 
in  my  defence  proposals,  but  was  anxious  to  see  the  several  positions 
and  judge  for  himself,  from  an  Engineer’s  point  of  view,  of  their 
suitability  to  be  treated  as  I suggested.  It  was  a great  source  of  con- 
tontment  to  me  to  find  that  the  sites  chosen  and  the  style  of  entrench- 

* Monasteries  in  Burma  are  not  merely  dwelling-places  for  the  monks,  but 
are  the  sehools  where  all  education  is  carried  on. 


THE  REGIMENTAL  INSTITUTE 


• SS7] 


519 


meats  1 had  advocated  commended  themselves  to  my  expert  com- 
panion. 

Simla  was  more  than  usually  gay  during  the  summer  of  1887,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  numerous  entertainments  given  in  celebration  of  Her 
Majesty’s  Jubilee.  We  had  just  added  a ballroom  to  ‘ Snowdon,’  and 
we  inaugurated  its  opening  by  a fancy  ball  on  the  21st  June,  in  honour 
of  the  auspicious  anniversary. 

My  name  appeared  in  the  Jubilee  Gazette  as  having  been  given  the 
Grand  Cross  of  the  Indian  Empire,  but  what  I valued  still  more  was 
the  acceptance  by  the  Government  of  India  of  my  strong  recommenda- 
tion for  the  establishment  of  a Club  or  Institute  in  every  British 
regiment  and  battery  in  India.  In  urging  that  this  measure  should  be 
favourably  considered,  I had  said  that  the  British  Army  in  India  could 
have  no  better  or  more  generally  beneficial  memorial  of  the  Queen’s 
Jubilee  than  the  abolition  of  that  relic  of  barbarism,  the  canteen,  and 
its  supersession  by  an  Institute,  in  which  the  soldier  would  have  under 
the  same  roof  a reading-room,  recreation  room,  and  a decently- 
managed  refreshment-room. 

Lord  Dufferin’s  Government  met  my  views  in  the  most  liberal  spirit, 
and  with  the  sanction  of  Lord  Cross  1 The  Regimental  Institute  ’ 
became  a recognized  establishment,  a fact  wliich  my  colleagues  in 
Council  referred  to  as  a second  Jubilee  honour  for  me  1 

At  a time  when  nearly  every  soldier  could  read  and  write,  and  when 
we  hoped  to  attract  to  the  army  men  of  a better  stamp  and  more 
respectable  antecedents  than  those  of  which  it  was  composed  in  4 the 
good  old  days,’  it  appeared  to  me  a humiliating  anachronism  that  the 
degrading  system  of  the  canteen  should  still  prevail,  and  that  it  was 
impossible  for  any  man  to  retain  his  self-respect  if  he  were  driven  to 
take  his  glass  of  beer  under  the  rules  by  which  regimental  canteens 
were  governed.  I believed,  too,  that  the  more  the  status  of  the  rank 
and  file  could  be  raised,  and  the  greater  the  efforts  made  to  provide 
them  with  rational  recreation  and  occupation  in  their  leisure  hours,  the 
less  there  would  be  of  drunkenness,  and  consequently  of  crime,  the  less 
immorality  and  the  greater  the  number  of  efficient  soldiers  in  the  army. 

Funds  having  been  granted,  a scheme  was  drawn  up  for  the  erection 
of  buildings  and  for  the  management  of  the  Institutes.  Canteens  were 
reduced  in  size,  and  such  attractions  as  musical  instruments  were 
removed  to  the  recreation-rooms ; the  name  4 liquor  bar  ’ was  substi- 
tuted for  that  of  ‘canteen,’  and,  that  there  should  be  no  excuse  for  fre- 
quenting the  4 liquor  bar,’  I autho.  ized  a moderate  and  limited  amount 
of  beer  to  be  served,  if  required,  with  the  men’s  suppers  in  the  refresh- 
ment-room— an  arrangement  which  has  been  followed  by  the  happiest 
results. 

At  first  it  was  thought  that  these  changes  would  cause  a great  falling 
off  in  regimental  funds,  but  experience  has  proved  the  reverse.  With 


520 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1887 


good  management,  the  profits  from  the  coffee-shop  and  the  soda-water 
manufactory  far  exceed  those  to  be  derived  from  the  canteen,  and  this 
without  permitting  anyone  outside  the  regiment  to  purchase  from  the 
coffee-shop  and  without  interfering  at  all  with  local  tradesmen. 

Another  measure  which  I succeeded  in  carrying  through  the  same 
year  was  the  amalgamation  of  the  various  sectarian  societies  that 
existed  in  India  for  the  prevention  of  drunkenness  in  the  army  into  one 
undenominational  society,  under  the  name  of  the  Army  Temperance 
Association,  which  I hoped  would  admit  of  more  united  action  and  a 
more  advantageous  use  of  funds,  besides  making  it  easier  for  the 
Government  to  assist  the  movement.  The  different  religious  and  • total 
abstinence  ’ associations  had  no  doubt  done  much  towards  the  object 
they  had  in  view,  but  their  work  was  necessarily  spasmodic,  and  being 
carried  on  independently  of  regimental  authority,  it  was  not  always 
looked  upon  with  favour  by  officers. 

There  was  of  necessity  at  first  a good  deal  of  opposition  on  the  part 
of  the  promoters  of  the  older  societies,  but  those  who  were  loudest  in 
denouncing  my  proposals  soon  came  to  understand  that  there  was 
nothing  in  the  constitution  of  the  Army  Temperance  Association  which 
could  in  any  way  interfere  with  total  abstinence,  and  that  the  only 
difference  between  their  systems  and  mine  consisted  in  mine  being 
regimental  in  its  character,  and  including  men  for  whom  it  was  not 
necessary  or  expedient  to  forego  stimulants  altogether,  but  who  ear- 
nestly desired  to  lead  temperate  lives,  and  to  be  strengthened  in  their 
resolve  by  being  allowed  to  share  in  the  advantages  of  the  new 
Institution. 

To  make  the  movement  a complete  success,  it  was  above  all  things 
important  to  secure  the  active  co-operation  of  the  ministers  of  the 
various  religions.  To  this  end  I addressed  the  heads  of  the  different 
churches,  explaining  my  reasons  and  the  results  I hoped  to  attain  in 
establishing  the  amalgamated  association,  and  I invited  them  to  testify 
their  approval  of  the  scheme  by  becoming  patrons  of  it.  With  two 
exceptions,  the  dignitaries  to  whom  I appealed  accepted  my  invitation, 
and  expressed  sympathy  with  my  aims  and  efforts,  an  encouragement 
I had  hardly  dared  to  hope  for,  and  a proof  of  liberal-mindedness  on 
the  part  of  the  prelates  which  was  extremely  refreshing. 

The  Government  of  India  were  good  enough  to  sanction  the  allot- 
ment of  a separate  room  in  each  soldiers’  Institute  for  the  exclusive 
use  of  the  Association,  where  alcohol  in  any  shape  was  not  admitted, 
and  to  the  grant  of  this  room  I attribute,  in  a great  measure,  the 
success  of  the  undertaking.  The  success  was  proved  by  the  fact  that, 
when  I left  India,  nearly  one  third  of  the  70,000  British  soldiers  in 
that  country  were  members  or  honorary  members  of  the  Army  Tem- 
perance Association. 


1 888]  DEFENCE  AND  MOBILIZATION  COMMITTEES 


521 


CHAPTER  LXVII. 

In  December  I made  a prolonged  tour  along  the  North-West  Frontier, 
accompanied  by  my  wife,  who  was  greatly  delighted  at  being  able  at 
last  to  see  many  places  and  meet  many  people  of  whom  she  had  often 
heard  me  speak.  Part  of  this  trip  was  made  in  company  with  the 
Viceroy  and  Lady  Dufferin,  who  visited  all  the  principal  stations  on 
the  frontier,  including  Quetta.  I rode  with  Lord  Dufferin  through  the 
Khyber  Pass,  and  to  the  top  of  the  Kwaja  Amran  range,  our  visit  to 
this  latter  point  resulting,  as  I earnestly  hoped  it  would,  in  His 
Excellency  being  convinced  by  personal  inspection  of  the  advantage  to 
be  gained  by  making  the  Kohjak  tunnel,  and  of  the  necessity  for  our 
endeavouring  to  cultivate  more  friendly  relations  with  the  border 
tribes.  We  ended  this  very  enjoyable  tour  at  Eawal  Pindi  in  order  to 
be  present  at  the  winding-up  of  a Cavalry  Camp  of  Exercise  in  the 
neighbourhood.  There  were  assembled  together  under  the  direction 
of  Major-General  Luck  one  regiment  of  British  and  eight  regiments  of 
Native  Cavalry,  with  two  batteries  of  Royal  Horse  Artillery,  and  it  was 
a pretty  sight,  their  advance  at  full  gallop,  and  the  halt,  as  of  one  man, 
of  that  long  line  of  Cavalry  within  a few  yards  of  the  Viceroy,  for  the 
Royal  salute.  The  spectators  were  much  impressed  with  Lord  Dufferin’s 
nerve  in  being  able  to  remain  perfectly  calm  and  still  on  his  horse  in 
the  face  of  such  an  onslaught,  and  it  certainly  did  seem  rather  close 
quarters ; but  General  Luck  knew  his  regiments,  and  had  confidence 
in  his  men,  and  we  knew  General  Luck. 

In  the  early  part  of  1888  I visited  all  the  chief  military  stations  in 
the  Bengal  Presidency,  and  attended  Camps  of  Exercise  for  all  arms, 
held  at  Rawal  Pindi,  Umballa,  Meerut,  and  Lucknow,  before  going  to 
Calcutta  for  the  usual  discussion  on  the  Budget;  after  which  the 
Government  generally  breaks  up  for  the  hot  weather,  and  assembles  in 
Simla  two  or  three  weeks  later. 

During  1887  and  1888  much  useful  work  was  got  through  by  the 
Defence  Committee,  and  by  another  Committee  which  was  assembled 
for  the  consideration  of  all  questions  bearing  upon  the  mobilization  of 
the  army.  As  Commander-in-Chief  I presided  over  both,  and  was 
fortunate  in  being  able  to  secure  as  my  secretaries  two  officers  of 
exceptional  ability,  Lieutenant -Colonel  W.  Nicholson,  R.E.,  for  defence, 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  Elies,  R.A.,  for  mobilization.  It  was  in  a 
great  measure  due  to  Colonel  Nicholson’s  clear-sighted  judgment  on 
the  many  knotty  questions  which  came  before  us,  and  to  his  technical 
knowledge,  that  the  schemes  for  the  defence  of  the  frontier,  and  for 
the  ports  of  Bombay,  Karachi,  Calcutta,  Rangoon  and  Madras,  were 
carried  out  so  rapidly,  thoroughly  and  economically  as  they  were  ;* 

* The  total  cost  of  the  coast  and  frontier  defences  amounted  to  the  very 
moderate  sum  of  five  crores  of  rupees,  or  about  three  and  a half  millions  sterling. 


522 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1888 

and  with  regard  to  measures  for  rendering  the  army  mobile,  Colonel 
Elies  proved  himself  equally  capable  and  practical.  The  Secretary  to 
Government  in  the  Military  Department,  Major-General  Edwin  Collen, 
was  a particularly  helpful  member  of  the  Committees*  from  his  inti- 
mate acquaintance  with  the  various  subjects  which  had  to  be  discussed. 

If  my  readers  have  had  the  patience  to  follow  in  detail  the  several 
campaigns  in  which  I took  part,  they  will  have  grasped  the  fact  that 
our  greatest  difficulties  on  all  occasions  arose  from  the  want  of  a 
properly  organized  Transport  Department,  and  they  will  understand 
that  I was  able  to  make  this  very  apparent  when  the  necessity  for 
mobilizing  rapidly  only  one  Army  Corps  came  to  be  seriously  con- 
sidered. We  were  able  to  demonstrate  conclusively  the  impossibility 
of  putting  a force  into  the  field,  sufficiently  strong  to  cope  with  a 
European  enemy,  without  a considerable  increase  to  the  existing 
number  of  transport  animals,  and  without  some  description  of  light 
cart  strong  enough  to  stand  the  rough  work  of  a campaign  in  a country 
without  roads ; for  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  in  the  autumn  of 
1880,  when  I left  Kandahar,  it  would  have  been  possible  to  have  picked 
out  the  road  thence  to  Quetta,  and  onward  to  Sibi,  a distance  of  250 
miles,  with  no  other  guide  than  that  of  the  line  of  dead  animals  and 
broken-down  carts  left  behind  by  the  several  columns  and  convoys 
that  had  marched  into  Afghanistan  by  that  route. 

Soon  after  I took  over  the  command  of  the  Army  in  India,  while 
voyaging  to  Burma,  I had  brought  this  most  pressing  question  of 
transport  to  the  notice  of  Lord  Dufferin,  who,  with  his  usual  quick 
appreciation  of  a situation,  at  once  fully  recognized  its  urgency,  and 
promised  to  give  me  all  possible  help  in  my  endeavour  to  render  the 
army  mobile — a promise  which  he  amply  fulfilled  by  taking  a keen 
personal  interest  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Committee,  and  giving  his 
hearty  support  to  our  various  recommendations. f 

Our  labours  resulted  in  several  thousand  good  pack  animals  (chiefly 
mules)  being  purchased,  and  information  collected  and  recorded  as  to 
the  districts  where  others  could  be  rapidly  procured  in  case  of  emergency. 
A transport  service  was  established,  for  which  officers  had  to  go  through 

* The  Committees  consisted,  besides  the  Military  Member  of  Council  and 
myself,  of  the  heads  of  Departments  with  the  Government  of  India  and  at 
Army  Head -Quarters. 

f When  the  report  of  the  Mobilization  Committee  was  submitted  to  the 
Viceroy,  he  recorded  a minute  expressing  his  ‘warm  admiration  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  arduous  duty  had  been  conducted,’  and  ‘ his  belief  that 
no  scheme  of  a similar  description  had  ever  been  worked  out  with  greater 
thoroughness,  in  more  detail,  and  with  clearer  apprehension  of  the  ends  to  be 
accomplished.’  He  concluded  by  conveying  to  the  members  an  expression 
of  his  groat  satisfaction  at  what  had  been  done,  and  recording  that  ‘ the  result 
of  the  Committee’s  labours  is  a magnificent  monument  of  industry  and  pro- 
fessional ability.’ 


THE  TRANSPORT  DEPARTMENT 


523 


1 888] 

a regular  course  of  instruction,  and  pass  an  examination  in  the  loading 
and  general  management  of  the  animals.  A prize  was  offered  for  a 
strong,  useful  light  cart ; and  when  the  most  suitable  had  been  selected, 
large  numbers  were  made  up  of  the  same  pattern.*  The  constitution 
of  two  Army  Corps,  to  be  in  readiness  for  taking  the  field  on  short 
notice,  was  decided  upon,  and  the  units  to  form  the  several  divisions 
and  brigades  were  told  off  and  provided  with  the  necessary  equipment. 
A railway  time-table  was  prepared,  giving  the  hours  at  which  the 
troops  should  leave  their  stations  so  as  to  avoid  any  block  en  route. 
Special  platforms  were  constructed  for  training  and  detraining  Cavalry 
and  Artillery,  and  storehouses  were  erected  and  stocked  at  those 
stations  where  road  marching  would  probably  commence.  Finally,  the 
conclusions  we  had  arrived  at  were  embodied  in  a manual  entitled 
* General  Regulations  for  Mobilization.’  It  was  extremely  gratifying 
to  me  to  learn  from  India  that  this  manual,  with  such  additions  and 
alterations  as  our  subsequent  experience  in  Burma  and  various  frontier 
expeditions  proved  would  be  advantageous,  was  the  guide  by  which  the 
Chitral  relieving  force  was  last  year  so  expeditiously  and  completely 
equipped  and  despatched. 

Of  the  many  subjects  discussed  and  measures  adopted  during  this, 
the  last  year  of  Lord  Dufferin’s  Viceroyalty,  I think  the  scheme  for 
utilizing  the  armies  of  Native  States,  as  an  auxiliary  force  for  the 
service  of  the  Empire,  was  the  most  important  both  from  a political  and 
military  point  of  view. 

The  idea  was,  in  the  first  instance,  propounded  by  Lord  Lytton,  who 
appointed  a committee  to  consider  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  question.  I 
was  a member  of  that  committee,  but  at  that  time  I,  in  common  with 
many  others,  was  doubtful  as  to  the  wisdom  of  encouraging  a high 
state  of  efficiency  amongst  the  troops  of  independent  States ; the  excel- 
lent work,  however,  done  by  the  Native  Contingent  I had  with  me  in 
Kuram,  and  the  genuine  desire  of  all  ranks  to  be  allowed  to  serve  side 
by  side  with  our  own  soldiers,  together  with  the  unmistakable  spirit  of 


* Statement  of  transport  carriage  maintained  in  India  in  the  years  1878 
and  1893  for  military  purposes,  exclusive  of  animals  registered  by  the  civil 
authorities  on  the  latter  date,  and  liable  to  be  requisitioned  in  time  of  war : 


Date. 

c 

o' 

Camels.  | 

W 

© 

1 

I 

Bullocks. 

Donkeys. 

Army 

Transport 

Carts. 

Field 

Ambulance 

Carta. 

September, 

1878 

733 

6,353 

1,536 

1,424 

April, 

1893 

359 

3,175 

16,825 

782 

7,211 

31 

5,316 

799 

524 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1888 

loyalty  displayed  by  Native  Eulers  when  war  with  Eussia  was  imminent 
in  1885,  convinced  me  that  the  time  had  arrived  for  us  to  prove  to  the 
people  of  India  that  we  had  faith  in  their  loyalty,  and  in  their  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  their  concern  in  the  defence  of  the  Empire  was  at 
least  as  great  as  ours,  and  that  we  looked  to  them  to  take  their  part  in 
strengthening  our  rule  and  in  keeping  out  all  intruders.  I believed,  too, 
that  we  had  now  little  to  fear  from  internal  trouble  so  long  as  our  Govern- 
ment continued  just  and  sympathetic,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
could  not  expect  to  remain  free  from  outside  interference,  and  that  it 
would  be  wise  to  prepare  ourselves  for  a struggle  which,  as  my  readers 
must  be  aware,  I consider  to  be  inevitable  in  the  end.  We  have  done 
much,  and  may  still  do  more,  to  delay  it,  but  when  that  struggle  comes 
it  will  be  incumbent  upon  us,  both  for  political  and  military  reasons, 
to  make  use  of  all  the  troops  and  war  material  that  the  Native  States 
can  place  at  our  disposal,  and  it  is  therefore  to  our  advantage  to  render 
both  as  efficient  and  useful  as  possible. 

The  subject  was,  of  course,  most  delicate  and  complex,  and  had  to  be 
treated  with  the  greatest  caution,  for  not  only  was  the  measure  adapted 
to  materially  strengthen  our  military  position  in  India,  but  I was  con- 
vinced it  was  politically  sound,  and  likely  to  be  generally  acceptable  to 
the  Native  Eulers,  provided  we  studied  their  wishes,  and  were  careful 
not  to  offend  their  prejudices  and  susceptibilities  by  unnecessary  inter- 
ference. 

It  was  very  satisfactory  to  find  how  cordially  the  Chiefs  responded 
to  Lord  Dufferin’s  proposals,  and  extremely  interesting  to  watch  the 
steady  improvement  in  their  armies  under  the  guidance  of  carefully 
selected  British  officers.  Substantial  results  have  been  already  obtained, 
valuable  help  having  been  afforded  to  the  Chitral  expedition  by  the 
transport  trains  organized  by  the  Maharajas  of  Gwalior  and  Jaipur,  and 
by  the  gallantry  of  the  Imperial  Service  Troops  belonging  to  His  High- 
ness the  Maharaja  of  Kashmir  at  Hunza-Nagaand  during  the  siege  and 
relief  of  Chitral. 

Two  minor  expeditions  took  place  this  year : one  against  the  Thi- 
betans in  retaliation  for  their  having  invaded  the  territory  of  our  ally, 
the  Eaja  of  Sikim  ; the  other  to  punish  the  Black  Mountain  tribes  for 
the  murder  of  two  British  officers.  Both  were  a success  from  a military 
point  of  view,  but  in  the  Black  Mountain  the  determination  of  the  Pun- 
jab Government  to  limit  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  troops,  and  to  hurry 
out  of  the  country,  prevented  our  reaping  any  political  advantage.  We 
lost  a grand  opportunity  for  gaining  control  over  this  lawless  and 
troublesome  district ; no  survey  was  made,  no  roads  opened  out,  the 
tribesmen  were  not  made  to  feel  our  power,  and,  consequently,  very 
soon  another  costly  expedition  had  to  be  undertaken. 

In  November,  1888,  Lord  Dufferin  left  India  amidst  a storm  of 
regret  from  all  classes  of  Her  Majesty's  subjects.  lie  was  succeeded 


THE  MAKQI'ESS  OF  LANSDOV  HE,  K.G..  G.C.M.G.,  G.M.S.I.,  G.M.I.E., 
Viceboy  of  India. 

From 

a photograph  by  Cowell,  Simla. 


1 889]  MARQUIS  OF  LANSDOWNE  BECOMES  VICEROY 


525 


by  Lord  Lansdowne,  one  of  whose  earliest  communications  to  me 
rejoiced  my  heart,  for  in  it  His  Excellency  inquired  whether  anything 
could  be  done  towards  improving  our  relations  with  the  frontier  tribes. 
This  augured  well  for  the  abandonment  of  the  traditional,  selfish,  and, 
to  my  mind,  short-sighted  policy  of  keeping  aloof,  and  I hoped  that  en- 
deavours would  at  last  be  made  to  turn  the  tribesmen  into  friendly 
neighbours,  to  their  advantage  and  ours,  instead  of  being  obliged  to 
have  recourse  to  useless  blockades  or  constant  and  expensive  expedi- 
tions for  their  punishment,  or  else  to  induce  them  to  refrain  from 
troubling  us  by  the  payment  of  a heavy  blackmail. 

After  a visit  to  the  frontier  in  the  autumn  to  see  how  the  defences 
were  advancing,  I attended  a Cavalry  Camp  of  Exercise  at  Delhi,  and 
an  Artillery  Practice  Camp  at  Gurgaon,  and  then  went  to  Meerut  to  be 
present  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  Bengal  Presidency  Rifie  Association, 
which  was  most  interesting  and  successful.  We  spent  Christmas  in 
camp — the  first  Christmas  we  had  all  been  together  for  ten  years. 
Our  boy,  having  left  Eton,  came  out  in  the  early  part  of  the  year  with 
a tutor,  to  be  with  us  for  eighteen  months  before  entering  Sandhurst. 

At  the  end  of  December  I proceeded  to  Calcutta  rather  earlier  than 
usual,  to  pay  my  respects  to  the  new  Viceroy,  and  in  January  of  the 
following  year,  accompanied  by  my  wife  and  daughter,  I started  off  on 
a long  tour  to  inspect  the  local  regiments  in  Central  India  and  Rajpu- 
tana,  and  to  ascertain  what  progress  had  been  made  in  organizing  the 
Imperial  Service  Troops  in  that  part  of  India. 

Did  space  permit,  I should  like  to  tell  my  readers  of  the  beauties  of 
Udaipur  and  the  magnificent  hospitality  accorded  to  us  there,  as  well  as 
at  Bhopal,  Jodhpur,  Jaipur,  and  Clwar,  but,  if  I once  began,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  stop,  and  I feel  I have  already  made  an  unconscionably 
heavy  demand  on  the  interest  of  the  public  in  things  Indian,  and  must 
soon  cease  my  ‘ labour  of  love.’  I must  therefore  confine  myself  to 
those  subjects  which  I am  desirous  should  be  better  understood  in 
England  than  they  generally  are. 

Upon  seeing  the  troops  of  the  Begum  of  Bhopal  and  the  Maharana 
of  Udaipur,  I recommended  that  Their  Highnesses  should  be  invited  to 
allow  their  share  of  Imperial  defence  to  take  the  form  of  paying  for 
the  services  of  an  increased  number  of  officers  with  their  respective 
local  corps,*  for  I did  not  think  it  would  be  possible  to  make  any 
useful  addition  to  our  strength  out  of  the  material  of  which  their  small 

* According  to  treaty,  the  Bhopal  State  pays  nearly  two  lakhs  of  rupees  a 
year  towards  the  cost  of  the  local  battalion  maintained  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment for  the  purpose  of  keeping  order  within  the  State  itself.  The  battalion, 
however,  has  only  four,  instead  of  eight,  British  officers,  and  it  appeared  to 
me  only  reasonable  that  the  Begum  should  he  invited  to  pay  the  additional 
amount  necessary  to  make  the  battalion  as  efficient  as  the  rest  of  the  Native 
army,  as  a ‘ premium  of  insurance  ’ for  the  peace  and  prosperity  which  Her 
Highness’s  State  enjoys  under  our  protection,  and  as  her  quota  towards  the 
general  scheme  for  the  defence  of  the  Empire. 


526 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1889 

armies  were  composed.  The  men  were  relics  of  a past  age,  fit  only  for 
police  purposes,  and  it  would  have  been  a waste  of  time  and  money  to 
give  them  any  special  training.  My  recommendation,  however,  was 
not  accepted,  and  neither  of  these  States  takes  any  part  in  the  defence 
scheme. 

At  Jodhpur,  on  the  contrary,  there  was  splendid  material,  and  a 
most  useful  force  was  being  organized  by  the  Maharaja’s  brother, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Sir  Pertap  Sing,  himself  a Rajput,  and  of  the 
bluest  blood  of  India.  The  Cavalry  were  specially  fine.  The  gallant 
Rajput  horsemen  of  Jodhpur  had  always  been  famous  for  their  chival- 
rous bravery,  unswerving  fidelity,  and  fearless  self-devotion  in  their 
wars  with  the  Mahrattas  and  the  armies  of  the  Mogul  Emperors,  and 
I felt,  as  the  superbly  mounted  squadrons  passed  before  me,  that  they 
had  lost  none  of  their  characteristics,  and  that  blood  and  breeding 
must  tell,  and  would,  if  put  to  the  test,  achieve  the  same  results  now 
as  of  old.  There  could  be  but  one  opinion  as  to  the  value  of  the 
‘ Sirdar  Rissala,’*  so  named  after  the  Maharaja’s  son  and  heir,  Sirdar 
Sing,  a lad  of  only  nine  years  old,  who  led  the  little  army  past  the 
saluting  flag  mounted  on  a beautiful  thorough  bred  Arab. 

The  Jaipur  troops  were  much  on  a par  with  those  of  Bhopal  and 
Udaipur.  I was  glad,  therefore,  that  in  lieu  of  troops,  the  Maharaja 
had  agreed  to  organize,  as  his  contribution  to  the  Imperial  service,  a 
transport  corps  of  1,000  fully-equipped  animals. 

At  Ulwar  I found  the  600  Cavalry  and  1,000  Infantry  (all  Rajputs) 
well  advanced  in  their  drill  and  training ; this  was  evidently  owing  to 
the  personal  interest  taken  in  them  by  the  Maharaja,  who  seldom 
allowed  a day  to  pass  without  visiting  the  parade  grounds. 

By  the  end  of  March  I had  finished  my  tour  in  Central  India  and 
Rajputana,  and  as  the  heat  was  every  day  becoming  more  intense,  I 
was  not  sorry  to  turn  my  steps  northwards  towards  Kashmir,  the 
army  of  which  State  still  remained  to  be  inspected,  and  the  measures 
most  suitable  for  its  re-organization  determined  upon. 

Our  whole  family  party  re-assembled  at  Murree  early  in  April,  and 
we  all  went  into  the  ‘ Happy  Valley  ’ together,  whero  between  business 
and  pleasure  we  spent  a most  delightful  six  weeks.  The  Maharaja 
personally  superintended  the  arrangements  for  our  comfort.  Our 
travelling  was  made  easy — indeed  luxurious— and  everything  that  the 
greatest  care  and  forethought  and  the  most  lavish  hospitality  could 
accomplish  to  make  our  visit  happy  was  done  by  the  Maharaja  and  by 
the  popular  Resident,  Colonel  Nisbet. 

The  Kashmir  army  was  much  larger  than  any  of  those  belonging  to 
the  Native  States  I had  lately  visited  ; it  consisted  of  18,000  men  and 
66  guns— more  than  was  needed,  even  with  the  Gilgit  frontier  to  guard. 

* Rissala  is  a body  of  Cavalry. 


MUSKETRY  INSTRUCTION 


527 


1889] 

Some  of  the  regiments  were  composed  of  excellent  material,  chiefly 
Dogras ; but  as  the  cost  of  such  a force  was  a heavy  drain  upon  the 
State,  and  as  many  of  the  men  were  old  and  decrepit,  I recommended 
that  the  Maharaja  should  be  invited  to  get  rid  of  all  who  were 
physically  unfit,  and  to  reduce  his  army  to  a total  of  10,000  thoroughly 
reliable  men  and  30  guns.  I knew  this  would  be  a very  difficult, 
and  perhaps  distasteful,  task  for  the  Commander-in  Chief  (who  was 
also  the  Maharaja’s  brother),  Raja  Ram  Sing,  to  perform,  so  I recom- 
mended that  a British  officer  should  be  appointed  military  adviser  to 
the  Kashmir  Government,  under  whose  supervision  the  work  of 
reformation  should  be  carried  out. 

At  that  time  we  had  none  of  our  own  troops  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Gilgit,  and  as  I thought  it  advisable,  in  case  of  disturbance,  that  the 
Kashmir  troops  should  be  speedily  put  into  such  a state  of  efficiency 
as  would  enable  us  to  depend  upon  them  to  hold  the  passes  until  help 
could  arrive  from  India,  I urged  that  the  military  adviser  should  be 
given  three  British  officers  to  assist  him  in  carrying  out  his  difficult  and 
troublesome  duty ; and  at  the  same  time  I pointed  out  that  it  was 
absolutely  essential  to  construct  at  an  early  date  a serviceable  road 
between  Kashmir  and  Gilgit,  as  the  sole  approach  to  that  strategic 
position  was  not  only  difficult,  but  very  dangerous. 

All  these  proposals  commended  themselves  to,  and  were  acted  upon 
by,  the  Viceroy. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Neville  Chamberlain — a persona  grata  to  the 
Kashmir  authorities — was  appointed  Military  Secretary  to  the  Kashmir 
State,  and  by  his  ability,  tact,  and  happy  way  of  dealing  with  Natives, 
quickly  overcame  all  obstacles.  The  Maharaja  and  his  two  brothers, 
Rajas  Ram  Sing  and  Amar  Sing,  entered  heartily  into  the  scheme ; the 
army  was  remodelled  and  rendered  fit  for  service ; and  an  excellent 
road  was  made  to  Gilgit. 

During  the  summer  of  1889  I was  able  to  introduce  several  much 
needed  reforms  in  the  annual  course  of  musketry  for  the  Native  Army. 
The  necessity  for  these  reforms  had  not  been  overlooked  by  my  dis- 
tinguished predecessors,  nor  by  the  able  officers  who  served  under 
them  in  the  Musketry  Department,  but  it  had  not  been  possible  to 
do  much  with  a system  which  dated  from  a period  when  fire  disci- 
pline was  not  thought  of,  and  when  the  whole  object  of  the  course  was 
to  make  soldiers  individually  good  shots.  After  the  Delhi  Camp  of 
Exercise  in  1885-86,  when  the  want  of  fire  control  was  almost  the  only 
point  unfavourably  criticized  by  the  foreign  officers,  the  Army  in  India 
made  a great  advance  in  this  important  branch  of  musketry  training ; 
nevertheless,  I felt  that  further  progress  was  possible,  and  that  the 
course  of  instruction  was  not  altogether  as  practical  as  it  might  be.  I 
therefore  gave  over  the  work  of  improvement  in  this  respect  to  an 
enthusiast  in  the  matter  of  rifle-shooting  and  an  officer  of  exceptional 


528 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


energy  and  intelligence,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ian  Hamilton,  and  directed 
him,  as  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  Musketry,  to  arrange  a course 
of  instruction,  in  which  the  conditions  should  resemble  as  nearly  as 
possible  those  of  field  service,  and  in  which  fire  discipline  should  be 
developed  to  the  utmost  extent.  He  was  most  successful  in  carrying 
out  my  wishes,  and  the  results  from  the  first  year’s  trial  of  the  new 
system  were  infinitely  better  than  even  I had  anticipated. 

Simultaneously  with  the  improvement  in  musketry,  a great  advance 
was  made  in  gunnery.  Artillery,  like  Infantry  officers,  had  failed  to 
realize  the  value  of  the  new  weapon,  and  it  required  the  teaching  of  a 
man  who  himself  thoroughly  believed  in  and  understood!  the  breech- 
loading gun  to  arouse  Artillerymen  to  a sense  of  the  tremendous  power 
placed  in  their  hands,  and  to  the  importance  of  devoting  much  more 
care  and  attention  to  practice  than  had  hitherto  been  thought  neces- 
sary. Such  a man  was  Major-General  Nairne,  and  I was  happily  able 
to  induce  the  Government  to  revive  in  him  the  appointment  of 
Inspector-General  of  Artillery. 

Under  the  unwearying  supervision  of  this  officer,  there  was  quite  as 
remarkable  an  improvement  in  Artillery  shooting  as  Colonel  Hamilton 
had  effected  in  musketry.  Practice  camps  were  annually  formed  at 
convenient  localities,  and  all  ranks  began  to  take  as  much  pride  in 
belonging  to  the  ‘ best  shooting  battery  ’ as  they  had  hitherto  taken 
in  belonging  to  the  1 smartest,’  the  ‘ best-horsed,’  or  the  ‘ best-turned- 
out  ’ battery.  I impressed  upon  officers  and  men  that  the  two 
things  were  quite  compatible  ; that,  according  to  my  experience,  the 
smartest  and  best-turned-out  men  made  the  best  soldiers  ; and  while  I 
urged  every  detail  being  most  carefully  attended  to  which  could  enable 
them  to  become  proficient  gunners  and  take  their  proper  place  on  a field 
of  battle,  I expressed  my  earnest  hope  that  the  Royal  Artillery  would 
always  maintain  its  hitherto  high  reputation  for  turn-out  and  smartness. 

The  improvement  in  the  Cavalry  was  equally  apparent.  For  this 
arm  of  the  service  also  the  Government  consented  to  an  Inspector- 
General  being  appointed,  and  I was  fortunate  enough  to  be  able  to 
secure  for  the  post  the  services  of  Major-General  Luck,  an  officer  as 
eminently  fitted  for  this  position  as  was  General  Nairne  for  his. 

Just  at  first  the  British  officers  belonging  to  Native  Cavalry  were 
apprehensive  that  their  sowars  would  be  turned  into  dragoons,  but 
they  soon  found  that  there  was  no  intention  of  changing  any  of  their 
traditional  characteristics,  and  that  the  only  object  of  giving  them  an 
Inspector-General  was  to  make  them  even  better  in  their  own  way  than 
they  had  been  before,  the  finest  Irregular  Cavalry  in  the  world,  as 
I have  not  the  slightest  doubt  they  will  always  prove  themselves  to  be. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  Simla  season  of  1889,  Lord  Lansdowne,  to 
my  great  satisfaction,  announced  his  intention  of  visiting  the  frontier, 
and  asked  me  to  accompany  him. 


ARTILLERY  AND  CAVALRY  TRAINING 


529 


1890] 

We  rode  through  the  Khyber  and  Gomal  Passes,  visited  Peshawar, 
Kohat,  Bannu,  Dera  Ismail  Khan,  and  Quetta,  looked  into  the  Kohjak 
tunnel,  and  attended  some  interesting  manoeuvres,  carried  out  with  a 
view  of  testing,  in  as  practical  a manner  as  possible,  the  defensive  power 
of  the  recently-finished  Takatu-Mashalik  entrenchment.  The  principal 
works  were  fired  upon  by  Artillery  and  Infantry,  and,  notwithstanding 
the  excellent  practice  made,  infinitesimal  damage  was  done,  which 
proved  the  suitability  of  the  particular  design  adopted  for  the  defences. 

Lord  Lansdowne  expressed  himself  greatly  interested,  and  much  im- 
pressed by  all  he  saw  of  the  frontier ; and  he  was  confirmed  in  his 
opinion  as  to  the  desirability  of  establishing  British  influence  amongst 
the  border  tribes.  With  this  object  in  view,  His  Excellency  authorized 
Sir  Robert  Sandeman  (the  Governor-General’s  Agent  at  Quetta)  to 
establish  a series  of  police  posts  in  the  Gomal  Pass,  and  encourage 
intercourse  between  the  people  of  the  Zhob  district  and  ourselves. 

It  was  high  time  that  something  should  be  done  in  this  direction,  for 
the  Amir’s  attitude  towards  us  was  becoming  day  by  day  more  un- 
accountably antagonistic.  He  was  gradually  encroaching  on  territory 
and  occupying  places  altogether  outside  the  limits  of  Afghan  control ; 
and  every  movement  of  ours — made  quite  as  much  in  His  Highness’s 
interest  as  in  our  own — for  strengthening  the  frontier  and  improving 
the  communications,  evidently  aroused  in  him  distrust  and  suspicion  as 
to  our  motives. 


CHAPTER  LXVIII. 

New  Year’s  Day,  1890,  found  me  in  Calcutta,  where  I went  to  meet 
Prince  Albert  Victor  on  his  arrival  in  India.  On  my  way  thither  I 
received  a letter  from  Mr.  Edward  Stanhope,  Secretary  of  State  for 
War,  telling  me  that  he  had  heard  from  Lord  Cross,  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  India,  that  there  was  a proposal  to  ask  me  to  retain  my 
appointment  of  Commander-in-Chief  in  India  for  some  time  after  the 
expiration  of  the  usual  term  of  office ; but  that,  while  such  an  arrange- 
ment would  have  his  hearty  approval,  he  thought  the  question 
should  be  considered  from  another  point  of  view,  and  that  it  would 
be  extremely  agreeable  to  himself,  and  he  felt  to  the  Duke  of  Cambridge 
also,  if  he  could  secure  me  for  the  post  of  Adjutant-General  in  succes- 
sion to  Lord  Wolseley.  Mr.  Stanhope  went  on  to  say  he  would  like 
to  know  whether  I would  be  willing  to  accept  the  appointment,  or 
whatever  position  Lord  Wolseley’s  successor  would  fill,  should  the 
report  of  Lord  Hartington’s  Commission  cause  a change  to  be  made 
in  the  staff  at  the  Horse  Guards. 

1 was  pleased,  though  somewhat  surprised,  at  this  communication, 


53° 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1890 


and  I replied  to  the  Right  Honourable  gentleman  that  I would  gladly 
accept  the  offer,  and  that  I could  arrange  to  join  on  the  1st  October, 
when  the  appointment  would  become  vacant,  but  that,  as  Lord  Lans- 
downe  had  expressed  a wish  that  I should  remain  in  India  over  the 
next  cold  season,  I hoped,  if  it  were  possible,  some  arrangement 
might  be  made  to  admit  of  my  doing  so.  The  idea  of  employment  in 
England,  now  that  I allowed  myself  to  dwell  upon  it,  was  very 
attractive,  for  dearly  as  I loved  my  Indian  command,  and  bitterly  as 
I knew  I should  grieve  at  leaving  the  country,  the  peoples,  and  the 
grand  army,  which  were  all  sources  of  such  intense  interest  to  me, 
I felt  that  the  evil  day  at  longest  could  only  be  postponed  for  a few 
years,  and  that  there  is  a limit  to  the  time  that  even  the  strongest 
European  can  with  impunity  live  in  an  eastern  climate,  while  I was 
glad  to  think  I should  still  be  in  a position  to  work  for  my  country 
and  for  the  benefit  of  the  army. 

From  Calcutta  I travelled  north  to  Muridki,  where  a large  force  of 
Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry  was  assembled  for  practice,  and  where 
we  had  a standing  camp,  at  which  Prince  Albert  Victor  did  us  the 
honour  of  being  our  guest  for  the  final  manoeuvres.  I think  His  Royal 
Highness  enjoyed  the  novelty  of  camp  life,  and  was  greatly  attracted 
by  the  picturesque  and  soldier-like  appearance  of  the  Native  troops. 
The  Native  officers  were  very  proud  at  being  presented  to  the  grand- 
son of  their  Empress,  and  at  His  Royal  Highness  being  appointed 
Honorary  Colonel  of  the  1st  Punjab  Cavalry. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  I returned  to  Simla  for  what  I thought 
was  to  be  our  last  season  in  that  place ; and  shortly  after  I got  up 
there,  a telegram  from  Mr.  Stanhope  informed  me  that  my  appoint- 
ment had  been  accepted  by  the  Cabinet,  and  that  my  presence  in 
England  was  strongly  desired  in  the  autumn.  It  was  therefore  with 
very  great  surprise  that  I received  a second  telegram  three  weeks  later 
from  the  Secretary  of  State,  telling  me  that,  as  it  was  then  found  to 
be  impossible  to  choose  my  successor,  and  as  the  exigencies  of  the 
public  service  urgently  required  my  presence  in  India,  the  Cabinet, 
with  the  approval  of  Her  Majesty  and  the  concurrence  of  the  Duke  of 
Cambridge,  had  decided  to  ask  me  to  retain  my  command  for  two 
more  years. 

I felt  it  my  duty  to  obey  the  wishes  of  the  Queen,  Her  Majesty’s 
Government,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief;  but  I fully  realized  that 
in  doing  so  I was  forfeiting  my  chance  of  employment  in  England, 
and  that  a long  and  irksome  term  of  enforced  idleness  would  in  all 
probability  follow  on  my  return  home,  and  I did  not  attempt  to 
conceal  from  Mr.  Stanhope  that  I was  disappointed. 

At  the  latter  end  of  this  year,  and  in  the  early  part  of  1891,  it  was 
found  necessary  to  undertake  three  small  expeditions : one  to  Zhob, 
under  the  leadership  of  Sir  George  White,  for  the  protection  of  our 


FIELD-MARSHAL  LORD  ROBERTS  ON  HIS  ARAB  CHARGER  • VONOLEL.' 


1891] 


EFFICIENCY  OF  THE  NATIVE  ARMY 


53' 


newly- acquired  subjects  in  that  valley ; one  on  the  Kohat  border, 
commanded  by  Sir  William  Lockhart,  to  punish  the  people  of  the 
Miranzai  valley  for  repeated  acts  of  hostility ; and  the  third,  under 
Major-General  Elies,*  against  the  Black  Mountain  tribes,  who,  quite 
unsubdued  by  the  fruitless  expedition  of  1888,  had  given  trouble  almost 
immediately  afterwards.  All  these  were  as  completely  successful  in 
their  political  results  as  in  their  military  conduct.  The  columns  were 
not  withdrawn  until  the  tribesmen  had  become  convinced  that  they 
wero  powerless  to  sustain  a hostile  attitude  towards  us,  and  that  it  was 
their  interest,  as  it  was  our  wish,  that  they  should  henceforth  be  on 
amicable  terms  with  us. 

While  a considerable  number  of  troops  were  thus  employed,  a fourth 
expedition  had  to  be  hurriedly  equipped  and  despatched  in  quite  the 
opposite  direction  to  punish  the  ltaja  of  Manipur,  a petty  State  on  the 
confines  of  Assam,  for  the  treacherous  murder  of  Mr.  Quinton,  the 
Chief  Commissioner  of  Assam,  and  four  other  British  officers. 

Notwithstanding  its  inaccessibility,  two  columns,  one  from  Burma, 
the  other  from  Cacliar,  quickly  and  simultaneously  reached  Manipur, 
our  countrymen  were  avenged,  and  the  administration  of  the  State  was 
taken  over  for  a time  by  the  Government  of  India,  f 

Towards  the  end  of  January  the  Cesarewitch  came  to  Calcutta, 
where  I had  the  honour  of  being  introduced  to  our  august  visitor,  who 
expressed  himself  as  pleased  with  what  he  had  seen  of  the  country 
and  the  arrangements  made  for  His  Imperial  Highness’s  somewhat 
hurried  journey  through  India. 

In  April  my  military  colleague  in  the  Viceroy’s  Council  for  five 
years,  and  my  personal  friend,  General  Sir  George  Chesnej',  left  India, 
to  my  great  regret.  We  had  worked  together  most  harmoniously,  and, 
as  he  wrote  in  his  farewell  letter,  there  was  scarcely  a point  in  regard 
to  the  Army  in  India  about  which  he  and  I did  not  agree. 

Sir  George  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-General  Brackenbury,  who 
had  been  Director  of  Military  Intelligence  at  the  War  Office.  I was 
relieved  to  find  that,  although  in  some  particulars  my  new  coadjutor’s 
views  differed  from  mine,  we  were  in  accord  upon  all  essential  points, 
particularly  as  to  the  value  of  the  Indian  Army  and  the  necessity  for 
its  being  maintained  in  a state  of  preparedness  for  war. 

From  the  time  I became  Commander-in-Chief  in  Madras  until  I 
left  India  the  question  of  how  to  render  the  army  in  that  country  as 
perfect  a fighting  machine  as  it  was  possible  to  make  it,  was  the  one 
which  caused  me  the  most  anxious  thought,  and  to  its  solution  my 
most  earnest  efforts  had  been  at  all  times  directed. 

The  first  step  to  be  taken  towards  this  end  was,  it  seemed  to  me,  to 

* The  late  Lieutenant-General  Sir  W.  K.  Elies,  K.C.  B. 

t A detachment  of  the  Calcutta  Volunteer  Rifles,  at  the  particular  request 
of  the  regiment,  took  part  in  the  expedition,  and  did  good  service. 


85 


532 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1891 


substitute  men  of  the  more  warlike  and  hardy  races  for  the  Hindustani 
sepoys  of  Bengal,  the  Tamils  and  Telagus  of  Madras,  and  the  so- 
called  Mahrattas  of  Bombay ; but  I found  it  difficult  to  get  my  views 
accepted,  because  of  the  theory  which  prevailed  that  it  was  necessary 
to  maintain  an  equilibrium  between  the  armies  of  the  three  Presi- 
dencies, and  because  of  the  ignorance  that  was  only  too  universal 
with  respect  to  the  characteristics  of  the  different  races,  which 
encouraged  the  erroneous  belief  that  one  Native  was  as  good  as 
another  for  purposes  of  war. 

In  former  days,  when  the  Native  Army  in  India  was  so  much 
stronger  in  point  of  numbers  than  the  British  Army,  and  there 
existed  no  means  of  rapid  communication,  it  was  only  prudent  to 
guard  against  a predominance  of  soldiers  of  any  one  creed  or 
nationality ; but  with  British  troops  nearly  doubled  and  the  Native 
Army  reduced  by  more  than  one-third,  with  all  the  forts  and  arsenals 
protected,  and  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Artillery  manned  by  British 
soldiers,  with  railway  and  telegraph  communication  from  one  end  of 
India  to  the  other,  with  the  risk  of  internal  trouble  greatly  diminished, 
and  the  possibility  of  external  complications  becoming  daily  more 
apparent,  circumstances  and  our  requirements  were  completely  altered, 
and  it  had  become  essential  to  have  in  the  ranks  of  our  Native  Army 
men  who  might  confidently  be  trusted  to  take  their  share  of  fighting 
against  a European  foe. 

In  the  British  Army  the  superiority  of  one  regiment  over  another  is 
mainly  a matter  of  training ; the  same  courage  and  military  instinct 
are  inherent  in  English,  Scotch,  and  Irish  alike,  but  no  comparison 
can  be  made  between  the  martial  value  of  a regiment  recruited 
amongst  the  Gurkhas  of  Nepal  or  the  warlike  races  of  northern  India, 
and  of  one  recruited  from  the  effeminate  peoples  of  the  south. 

How  little  this  was  understood,  even  by  those  who  had  spent  a great 
part  of  their  service  in  India,  was  a marvel  to  me ; but,  then,  I had 
had  peculiar  opportunities  of  judging  of  the  relative  fighting  qualities 
of  Natives,  and  I was  in  despair  at  not  being  able  to  get  people  to  see 
the  matter  with  my  eyes,  for  I knew  that  nothing  was  more  sure  to 
lead  to  disaster  than  to  imagine  that  the  whole  Indian  Army,  as  it  was 
then  constituted,  could  be  relied  on  in  time  of  war. 

General  Chesney  fortunately  shared  my  opinions,  and  as  Lords 
Dufferin  and  Lansdowne  trusted  us,  we  were  able  to  do  a great  deal 
towards  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  Native  Army  and  improving 
the  status  and  prospects  of  the  Native  soldier.  Several  companies  and 
regiments  composed  of  doubtful  material  were  disbanded,  and  men  of 
well-known  fighting  castes  entertained  instead.  Class  regiments  were 
formed,  as  being  more  congenial  to  the  men  and  more  conducive  to 
esprit  dc  corps ; recruiting  was  mado  the  business  ef  carefully  selected 
officers  who  understood  Native  character,  and  whose  duty  it  was  to 


•891] 


CONCESSIONS  TO  THE  NATIVE  ARMY 


533 


become  acquainted  with  the  various  tribes  inhabiting  the  districts 
from  which  tho  recruits  for  their  own  regiments  were  drawn ; and 
special  arrangements  were  made  with  the  Nepalese  Government  by 
which  a sufficient  number  of  the  best  class  of  men  could  be  obtained 
for  our  thirteen  Gurkha  regiments. 

The  pay  of  Cavalry  soldiers  was  improved,  and  it  was  pointed  out 
to  the  Government  that  an  increase  to  the  Infantry  soldiers’  pay 
could  not  be  long  deferred  ;*  the  issue  of  good-conduct  pay  was 
accelerated ; jagirsf  were  sanctioned  annually  for  a limited  number  of 
specially  distinguished  Native  officers;  full  pay  was  authorized  for 
recruits  from  date  of  enlistment  instead  of  from  the  date  of  joining 
their  regiments ; field  batta\  was  sanctioned  whenever  troops  should 
be  employed  beyond  sea  or  on  service ; pensions  were  granted  after  a 
shorter  period  of  service  than  heretofore ; medals  for  meritorious 
service  and  good  conduct  were  given  in  commemoration  of  Her 
Majesty’s  J ubilee ; bronze  war  medals  were  sanctioned  for  all 
authorized  Government  followers ; a reserve,  which  it  was  arranged 
should  undergo  an  annual  course  of  training,  was  formed  for  the 
Artillery  and  Infantry;  and  a system  of  linked  battalions  was 
organized,  three  battalions  being  grouped  together,  and  the  men 
being  interchangeable  during  war-time. 

While  the  tendency  of  these  alterations  and  concessions  was  to 
make  all  ranks  happy  and  contented,  their  training  was  carefully 
attended  to,  and,  as  I have  before  mentioned,  musketry  particularly 
reached  a very  high  standard. 

The  one  thing  left  undone,  and  which  I should  like  to  have  been 
able  to  accomplish  before  leaving  India,  was  to  induce  the  Government 
to  arrange  for  more  British  officers  to  be  given  to  the  Native  regiments 
in  time  of  war.  Nine  to  a Cavalry  and  eight  to  an  Infantry  corps 
may  be  sufficient  in  time  of  peace,  but  that  number  is  quite  too  small 
to  stand  the  strain  of  war.  Indian  soldiers,  like  soldiers  of  every 
nationality,  require  to  be  led;  and  history  and  experience  teach  us 
that  eastern  races  (fortunately  for  us),  however  brave  and  accustomed 
to  war,  do  not  possess  the  qualities  that  go  to  make  leaders  of  men, 
and  that  Native  officers  in  this  respect  can  never  take  the  place  of 
British  officers.  I have  known  many  Natives  whose  gallantry  and 
devotion  could  not  be  surpassed,  but  I have  never  known  one  who 
would  not  have  looked  to  the  youngest  British  officer  for  support  in 
time  of  difficulty  and  danger.  It  is  therefore  most  unwise  to  allow 
Native  regiments  to  enter  upon  a war  with  so  much  smaller  a 

* The  pay  of  the  Native  Infantry  has  been  suitably  increased  since  I left 

India. 

t Jaffirs  are  grants  of  land. 

J Batta.  extra  allowances  given  to  Native  soldiers  when  proceeding  on  field 
service. 


35—2 


534 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1891 

proportion  of  British  officers  than  is  considered  necessary  for 
European  regiments.  I have  no  doubt  whatever  of  the  fighting 
powers  of  our  best  Indian  troops ; I have  a thorough  belief  in,  and 
admiration  for,  Gurkhas,  Sikhs,  Dogras,  Kajputs,  Jats,  and  selected 
Mahomedans ; I thoroughly  appreciate  their  soldierly  qualities ; 
brigaded  with  British  troops,  I would  be  proud  to  lead  them  against 
any  European  enemy ; but  we  cannot  expect  them  to  do  with  less 
leading  than  our  own  soldiers  require,  and  it  is,  I maintain,  trying 
them  too  highly  to  send  them  into  action  with  the  present  establish- 
ment of  British  officers.* 

In  the  late  autumn  of  1891  our  latest  acquisition,  the  Zhob  Valley, 
was  included  in  my  frontier  tour,  which  I had  the  pleasure  of  making, 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  way,  in  the  company  of  General  Bracken- 
bury.  He  was  prevented  from  getting  as  far  as  Quetta  by  an  accident 
which  laid  him  up  for  some  time,  but  not,  as  he  told  me,  before  he  had 
seen  enough  of  the  frontier  to  satisfy  him  that  the  tribes  were  a factor 
in  our  system  of  defence  which  could  not  be  ignored,  and  that  I had 
not  exaggerated  the  importance  of  having  them  on  our  side. 

During  this  winter  the  brilliant  little  Hunza-Naga  campaign  took 

* During  the  Mutiny  the  casualties  amongst  the  British  officers  with  the 
six  Punjab  regiments  which  saw  the  most  fighting  amounted  to  60  per  cent. ! 
Luckily,  these  were  able  to  be  replaced  by  officers  belonging  to  corps  which 
had  mutinied.  This  supply,  however,  has  long  since  been  used  up,  and  it 
behoves  the  Government  either  to  provide  an  adequate  reserve  of  officers,  or  to 
arrange  for  a sufficient  number  being  sent  out  from  England  whenever  India 
is  likely  to  be  engaged  in  a serious  war. 


Corps. 

Number  of 
Officers 

Casualties. 

who  did 
Duty  with 
each  Corps. 

Killed  in 
Action. 

Died  of 
Wounds. 

Died  of 
Disease. 

Wounded. 

Invalided. 

1st  Punjab 
Cavalry  (1 
squadron) 

12 

1 

6 

7 

2nd  Punjab 
Cavalry 

20 

1 

5 

4 

5th  Punjab 
Cavalry  (1 
squadron) 

7 

1 

1 

1st  Punjab 
Infantry  - 

15 

3 

6 

2nd  Punjab 
Infantry  - 

22 

3 

4 

3 

4th  Punjab 
Infantry  - 

24 

2 

3 

2 

8 

Total 

100 

11 

4 

2 

29 

14 

THE  HUNZA-NAGA  CAMPAIGN 


535 


1892] 

place,  which  has  boon  so  graphically  described  in  Mr.  Knight’s  ‘ Where 
Three  Empires  Meet.’  It  was  brought  about  by  Russia’s  intrigues 
with  the  Rulers  of  the  petty  States  on  the  northern  boundary  of 
Kashmir ; and  our  attention  was  first  roused  to  the  necessity  for  action 
by  two  British  officers,  who  were  journeying  to  India  by  way  of  the 
Pamirs  and  Gilgit,  being  forced  by  Russian  soldiers  to  leave  what  the 
leader  of  the  party  called  1 newly-acquired  Russian  territory  ’* — 
territory  to  which  Russia  had  not  the  shadow  of  a claim. 

In  addition  to  this  unjustifiable  treatment  of  Captain  Younghusband 
and  Lieutenant  Davison,  Colonel  Yanoff  crossed  the  Hindu  Kush  with 
his  Cossacks  by  the  Korabliut  Pass,  and,  after  reconnoitring  the  country 
on  the  borders  of  Kashmir,  re-crossed  the  range  by  the  Baroghil  Pass. 
As  this  was  a distinct  breach  of  the  promises  made  by  the  Russian 
Government,  and  an  infringement  of  the  boundary  line  as  agreed  to 
between  England  and  Russia  in  1878,  it  was  necessary  to  take  steps  to 
prevent  any  recurrence  of  such  interference,  and  a small  force  was 
accordingly  sent  against  the  Chief  of  Hunza,  who  had  openly  declared 
himself  in  favour  of  Russia.  He  made  a desperate  stand,  but  was 
eventually  driven  from  his  almost  inaccessible  position  by  the  deter- 
mined gallantry  of  our  Indian  troops,  assisted  by  a Contingent  from 
Kashmir.  Three  Victoria  Crosses  were  given  for  this  business,  and 
many  more  were  earned,  but  of  necessity  there  must  be  a limit  to  the 
disposal  of  decorations;  and  in  an  affair  of  this  kind,  in  which  all 
proved  themselves  heroes,  each  individual  must  have  felt  himself 
honoured  by  the  small  force  being  awarded  such  a large  number  of  the 
coveted  reward,  in  proportion  to  its  size. 

We  reaped  the  benefit  of  having  taken  this  district  under  our  own 
control  when  Chitral  required  to  be  relieved,  and  the  Hunza-Naga 
people  afforded  Colonel  Kelly  such  valuable  help. 

On  the  1st  January,  1892,  I received  an  intimation  that  Her  Majesty 
had  been  graciously  pleased  to  bestow  a peerage  upon  me,  and  the 
same  day  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India  offered  me  a further 
extension  of  my  appointment  as  Commander-in-Chief — an  offer  I would 
gladly  have  accepted,  as  I knew  it  had  been  made  with  the  concurrence 
of  the  Viceroy,  if  I could  have  taken  even  a few  months’  leave  to 
England.  But  during  a quarter  of  a century  I had  only  been  able  to 
spend  eighteen  months  out  of  India,  and  I felt  the  need  of  change  of 
climate  and  a little  rest  after  so  many  years  of  continued  hard  work. 
Under  the  existing  regulations  a Commander  in-Chief  could  have  no 
leave.  Lord  Cross  had  tried  to  remedy  this  hard  rule  by  bringing  in 
the  ‘ Officers’  Leave  Bill  ’ ; but  as  he  informed  Lord  Lansdowne  it  was 
impossible  to  get  it  through  the  House  of  Commons  that  session,  I was 

* Captain  Younghusband  was  at  Bozai-Gumbaz,  and  Lieutenant  Davison 
on  the  Alichur  Pamirs,  both  places  being  south  of  the  Aksu  branch  of  the 
Oxus,  flowing  from  the  Little  Pamir  Lake. 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


536 


[1892 


obliged  very  reluctantly  to  beg  to  be  allowed  to  resign  my  command  in 
the  spring  of  1893. 

Before  returning  to  Simla  for  really  the  last  time,  my  wife  and  I 
made  another  trip  to  Burma  as  far  as  Mandalay,  and  after  this  was 
over  we  paid  a most  interesting  visit  to  Nepal,  having  received  the  very 
unusual  honour  of  an  invitation  to  Khatmandu  from  Maharaja  Bir 
Shumsher  Jung  Rana  Bahadur. 

Khatmandu  is  about  a hundred  miles  from  our  frontier  station  of 
Segowli,  by  a very  rough  road  over  a succession  of  steep,  high  hills  and 
along  deep,  narrow  valleys,  which  would  have  been  quite  impossible 
for  a lady  to  travel  by  but  for  the  excellent  arrangements  made  by  the 
Nepalese  officials;  the  last  descent  was  the  worst  of  all;  we  literally 
dropped  from  one  rock  to  the  next  in  some  places.  But  on  reaching 
the  base  of  the  mountain  all  was  changed.  A beautifully  cultivated 
valley  spread  itself  out  before  us ; comfortable  tents  were  prepared  for 
our  reception,  where  we  were  met  by  some  of  the  State  officials  ; and 
a perfectly  appointed  carriage- and-four  was  waiting  to  carry  us  on  to 
Khatmandu,  where  we  were  received  by  the  Resident,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Wylie,  and  his  wife,  old  friends  of  ours.  That  afternoon  the 
Maharaja  paid  me  a private  visit. 

The  next  morning  the  official  call  was  made,  which  I returned  soon 
afterwards ; and  in  the  evening  the  Maharaja,  accompanied  by  his 
eldest  son  and  eight  of  his  brothers,  all  high  officers  of  state,  were 
present  at  Mrs.  Wylie’s  reception,  wearing  military  frock-coats  and 
forage-caps.  They  all  spoke  English  fluently ; their  manners  were 
those  of  well-bred  gentlemen,  easy  and  quiet,  as  free  from  awkwardness 
as  from  forwardness  ; each,  coming  up  in  turn,  talked  very  pleasantly 
to  Lady  Roberts  for  a time,  and  then  made  way  for  someone  else. 
The  Maharaja  is  extremely  musical,  and  has  several  well-trained  bands, 
taught  by  an  English  bandmaster  ; three  of  them  were  in  attendance, 
and  were  directed  to  play  selections  from  our  favourite  operas,  and 
then  a number  of  the  beautiful  plaintive  Nepalese  airs.  Altogether, 
we  passed  a most  agreeable  evening. 

The  following  day  a review  of  all  the  troops  (18,000  men  and  78 
guns)*  was  held  on  a ground  one  mile  in  length  by  half  a mile  in 
breadth,  perfectly  level  and  well  turfed.  It  would  be  considered  a fine 
parade-ground  for  the  plains  of  India,  and  must  have  entailed  a con- 
siderable expenditure  of  time,  labour,  and  money  to  make  in  such  a 
hilly  place  as  Khatmandu. 

On  reaching  the  ground,  1 was  received  by  the  Maharaja  and  Deb 

* The  Infantry  comprised  twenty-four  battalions  drawn  up  in  line  of 
quarter  columns.  The  Artillery  consisted  of  one  battery  (six  7-pounders) 
carried  on  elephants,  six  batteries  (six  guns  each,  5-pounders  and  7-pounders) 
dragged  by  soldiers,  and  six  batteries  (six  guns  each,  3-pouuders  and 
5-pounders)  carried  by  Bhutia  coolies. 


1892] 


VISIT  TO  NEPAL 


537 


Shamsher  Jung,  the  eldest  of  his  many  brothers,  and  the  nominal 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  ; we  rode  along  the  line  together,  and 
the  march- past  then  began.  Everything  was  done  with  the  utmost 
precision  ; there  was  no  fuss  or  talking,  and  from  first  to  last  not  a 
single  bugle  sound  was  heard,  showing  how  carefully  officers  and  men 
had  been  drilled.  I was  told  that  the  executive  Commander-in-Chief, 
the  third  brother,  by  name  Chandra  Shamsher,  had  almost  lived  on  the 
parade-ground  for  weeks  before  my  arrival.  The  Maharaja’s  sons  and 
brothers,  who  all  knew  their  work,  and  were  evidently  fond  of  soldier- 
ing, commanded  the  several  divisions  and  brigades. 

The  troops  were  not,  perhaps,  turned  out  quite  so  smartly  as  those  in 
our  service,  and  several  of  the  officers  were  old  and  feeble ; but  these 
were  the  only  faults  perceptible,  and  I came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
great  majority  of  the  18,000  men  were  quite  as  good  as  the  Gurkhas 
we  enlist ; and  I could  not  help  thinking  that  they  would  be  a valuable 
addition  to  our  strength  in  the  event  of  war. 

General  Chandra  Shamsher  is  a very  red-hot  soldier.  He  said  to  my 
wife:  ‘Lady  Roberts,  when  are  the  Russians  coming?  I wish  they 
would  make  haste.  We  have  40,000  soldiers  in  Nepal  ready  for  war, 
and  there  is  no  one  to  fight !’ 

The  next  day  a grand  durbar  was  held,  at  which  the  King  (the 
Maharaja  Dhiraj,  as  he  is  called)  presided ; he  was  an  unusually 
handsome  lad  of  about  eighteen  years  of  age,  fairer  than  most  Nepalese, 
and  very  refined  looking.  As  on  all  previous  occasions,  everyone  wore 
uniform  except  the  King,  who  had  on  a perfectly  plain  dress  of  spotless 
white.  Great  deference  is  outwardly  paid  to  the  Dhiraj,  but  he  has  no 
power,  and  is  never  consulted  in  matters  of  State,  being  considered  too 
sacred  to  be  troubled  with  mundane  affairs.  Although  a mere  boy,  he 
had  four  wives,  two  of  them  daughters  of  the  Maharaja  Bir  Shamsher 
Jung. 

After  the  durbar,  I was  shown  over  the  principal  school  and  hospital; 
both  appeared  to  be  well  conducted,  and  evidently  no  expense  was 
spared  upon  them.  I was  then  taken  to  a magazine,  in  which  were  a 
number  of  guns  of  various  calibre  and  any  amount  of  ammunition.  I 
was  told  there  were  several  other  magazines,  which  I had  not  time  to 
see,  and  a few  miles  from  Khatmandu  extensive  workshops,  where  all 
kinds  of  munitions  of  war  were  manufactured. 

That  evening,  accompanied  by  Colonel  and  Mrs.  Wylie,  we  attended 
a reception  at  the  Maharaja’s  palace.  The  durbar  hall,  which  was 
filled  with  men  in  uniform,  was  of  beautiful  proportions,  and  very 
handsomely  decorated  and  furnished.  After  the  usual  introductions 
and  some  conversation  with  the  chief  officers,  we  were  invited  to  visit 
the  Maharani  in  her  own  apartments,  and  having  ascended  a flight  of 
steps  and  passed  through  numerous  corridors  and  luxuriously  furnished 
rooms,  we  were  shown  into  a spacious  apartment,  the  prevailing  colour 


538 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


[1892 

of  which  was  rose,  lighted  by  lamps  of  the  same  colour.  The  Maharani 
was  sitting  on  a sofa  at  the  further  end  of  the  room,  gorgeously 
apparelled  in  rose-coloured  gauze  dotted  over  with  golden  spangles; 
her  skirts  were  very  voluminous,  and  she  wore  magnificent  jewels  on 
her  head  and  about  her  person.  Two  Maids  of  Honour  stood  behind 
her,  holding  fans,  and  dressed  in  the  same  colour  as  their  mistress,  but 
without  jewels.  On  each  side  of  her.  forming  a semicircle,  were 
grouped  the  ladies  of  the  Court,  all  arrayed  in  artistically  contrasting 
colours  ; they  were  more  or  less  pretty  and  refined  looking,  and  the 
Maharani  herself  was  extremely  handsome.  My  wife  was  placed  by 
her  side  on  the  sofa,  and  carried  on  a long  conversation  with  her 
through  one  of  the  ladies  who  spoke  Hindustani  and  acted  as  Inter- 
preter. The  Maharani  presented  Lady  Roberts  with  a beautiful  little 
Chinese  pug-dog,  and  the  Maharaja  gave  me  a gold-mounted  kookri 
(Gurkha  knife).  After  this  little  ceremony  there  was  a grand  display 
of  fireworks,  and  we  took  our  leave. 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  kindness  we  met  with  during  our  stay  in 
Nepal.  The  Maharaja  endeavoured  in  every  way  to  make  our  visit 
enjoyable,  and  his  brothers  vied  with  each  other  in  their  efforts  to  do 
us  honour.  It  was  impressed  upon  me  that  the  Nepalese  army  was  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Queen-Empress,  and  hopes  were  repeatedly  expressed 
that  we  would  make  use  of  it  in  the  event  of  war. 

Notwithstanding  the  occasional  differences  which  have  occurred 
between  our  Government  and  the  Nepal  Durbar,  I believe  that,  ever 
since  1817,  when  the  Nepal  war  was  brought  to  a successful  conclusion 
by  Sir  David  Ochterlony,  the  Gurkhas  have  had  a great  respect  and 
liking  for  us  : but  they  are  in  perpetual  dread  of  our  taking  their 
country,  and  they  think  the  only  way  to  prevent  this  is  not  to  allow 
anyone  to  enter  it  except  by  invitation,  and  to  insist  upon  the  few  thus 
favoured  travelling  by  the  difficult  route  that  we  traversed.  Nepal  can 
never  be  required  by  us  for  defensive  purposes,  and  as  we  get  our  best 
class  of  Native  soldiers  thence,  everything  should,  I think,  be  done  to 
show  our  confidence  in  the  Nepalese  alliance,  and  convince  them  that 
we  have  no  ulterior  designs  on  the  independence  of  their  kingdom. 

On  leaving  Nepal  we  made  a short  tour  in  the  Punjab,  and  then 
went  to  Simla  for  the  season. 

One  of  the  subjects  which  chiefly  occupied  the  attention  of  the 
Government  at  this  time  was  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  fhe  Ruler  of 
Afghanistan  towards  us.  Abdur  Rahman  Khan  appeared  to  have 
entirely  forgotten  that  he  owed  everything  to  us,  and  that,  but  for  our 
support  and  lavish  aid  in  money  and  munitions  of  war,  he  could 
neither  have  gained  nor  held  the  throne  of  Kabul.  We  refused  to  Sher 
Ali  much  that  we  could  have  gracefully  granted  and  that  would  have 
made  him  a firm  friend,  but  in  our  dealings  with  Abdur  Rahman  we 
rushed  into  the  other  extreme,  and  showered  favours  upon  him ; in 


1892] 


PROPOSED  MISSION  TO  THE  AMIR 


539 


fact,  we  made  too  much  of  him,  and  allowed  him  to  get  out  of  hand. 
The  result  was  that  he  mistook  the  patience  and  forbearance  with 
which  we  bore  his  fits  of  temper  for  weakness,  and  was  encouraged  in 
an  overweening  and  altogether  unjustifiable  idea  of  his  own  importance ; 
he  considered  that  he  ought  to  be  treated  as  the  equal  of  the  Shah  of 
Persia,  and  keenly  resented  not  being  allowed  to  communicate  direct 
with  Her  Majesty’s  Ministers. 

In  the  hope  of  being  able  to  establish  more  satisfactory  relations 
with  the  Amir,  Lord  Lansdowne  invited  him  to  come  to  India,  and,  on 
His  Highness  pleading  that  his  country  was  in  too  disturbed  a con- 
dition to  admit  of  his  leaving  it,  the  Viceroy  expressed  his  willingness 
to  meet  him  on  the  frontier,  but  Abdur  Rahman  evaded  this  arrange- 
ment also  under  one  pretext  or  another.  It  was  at  last  proposed  to 
send  me  with  a Mission  as  far  as  Jalalabad,  a proposal  I gladly 
accepted,  for  I was  sanguine  enough  to  hope  that,  by  personal  explana- 
tion, I should  be  able  to  remove  the  suspicions  which  the  Amir 
evidently  entertained  as  to  the  motives  for  our  action  on  the  frontier, 
and  to  convince  him  that  our  help  in  the  time  of  his  need  must  depend 
upon  our  mutually  agreeing  in  what  manner  that  help  should  be 
given,  and  on  arrangements  being  completed  beforehand  to  enable  our 
troops  to  be  rapidly  transported  to  the  threatened  points. 

Abdur  Rahman  agreed  to  receive  me  in  the  autumn,  and  expressed 
pleasure  at  the  prospect  of  meeting  me,  but  eventually  he  apparently 
became  alarmed  at  the  size  of  the  escort  by  which  the  Government 
thought  it  necessary  that  I,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  should  be  accom- 
panied ; and,  as  the  time  approached  for  the  Mission  to  start,  he 
informed  Lord  Lansdowne  that  his  health  would  not  permit  of  his 
undertaking  the  journey  to  Jalalabad. 

Thus  the  opportunity  was  lost  to  which  I had  looked  forward  as  a 
chance  for  settling  many  vexed  questions,  and  I am  afraid  that  there 
has  been  very  little  improvement  in  our  relations  with  Abdur  Rahman 
since  then,  and  that  we  are  no  nearer  the  completion  of  our  plans  for 
the  defence  of  his  kingdom  than  we  were  four  years  ago* — a defence 
which  (and  this  cannot  be  too  strongly  impressed  upon  the  Amir)  it 
would  be  impossible  for  us  to  aid  him  to  carry  through  unless  Kabul 
and  Kandahar  are  brought  into  connexion  with  the  railway  system  of 
India. 

In  the  autumn,  just  before  we  left  Simla,  our  friends  bestowed  upon 
my  wife  a farewell  gift  in  the  shape  of  a very  beautiful  diamond 
bracelet  and  a sum  of  money  for  her  fund  for  ‘ Homes  in  the  Hills,  and 
Officers’  Hospitals,’  made  doubly  acceptable  by  the  kind  words  with 
which  Lord  Lansdowne,  on  behalf  of  the  donors,  presented  it.  Shortly 

* I am  not  unmindful  of  the  visit  which  Sir  Mortimer  Durand  paid  to  Kabul 
after  I had  left  India,  but  on  that  occasion,  I believe,  the  question  of  the 
defence  of  Afghanistan  was  not  discussed. 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


540 


[1892 


afterwards  we  bade  a regretful  adieu  to  our  happy  home  of  so  many 
years,  and  made  our  way  to  the  Punjab  for  a final  visit. 

We  spent  a few  days  at  Peshawar,  and  then  went  to  Eawal  Pindi  to 
be  present  at  a Camp  of  Exercise,  and  see  how  the  works  under  con- 
struction for  the  protection  of  the  arsenal  were  progressing.  These 
works  had  been  put  in  hand  in  1890,  when,  according  to  my  recom- 
mendation, it  had  been  decided  not  to  fortify  Multan.  No  place  in  the 
Punjab  appeared  to  my  mind  to  possess  the  same  military  value  as 
Rawal  Pindi,  its  strategical  importance  with  regard  to  the  right  flank 
of  the  frontier  line  being  hardly  inferior  to  that  of  Quetta  in  relation  to 
the  left  flank  ; but  of  late  the  advisability  of  completing  the  works  had 
been  questioned  by  my  colleagues  in  Council,  greatly  to  my  concern, 
for  I felt  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  leave  the  elaboration  of  the 
defences  of  such  a position  until  war  should  be  imminent.* 

In  January,  1893,  a series  of  farewell  entertainments  were  organized 
for  me  at  Lahore  by  the  people  of  the  Punjab,  as  touching  as  they 
were  highly  appreciated,  and  intensely  gratifying.  Amongst  the 
crowds  assembled  in  the  Town  Hall  to  bid  me  good-bye,  1 was 
greatly  pleased  to  see,  besides  the  Maharaja  of  Kashmir,  Chiefs  and 
men  from  bejjond  our  frontier,  from  Kuram,  from  the  confines  of 
Baluchistan,  even  from  the  wilds  of  Waziristan ; for  their  presence 
on  this  occasion  I felt  to  be,  not  only  a proof  of  their  kindly  feeling 
towards  me  personally,  and  of  their  approval  of  the  measures  for  their 
safety  and  welfare  that  I had  always  advocated,  but  a very  distinct  sign 
of  the  much  to  be  desired  change  that  was  taking  place  in  the  senti- 
ments of  the  border  tribes  towards  us  as  a nation. 

Four  addresses  were  presented  to  me,  from  the  Sikh,  Hindu, 
Mahomedan,  and  European  communities  of  the  Punjab,  respectively, 
which  I will  venture  to  give  in  the  Appendix,  as  I feel  sure  that  the 

* The  works  were  stopped  after  I left  India,  but  not,  I was  glad  to  think, 
before  the  redoubts  had  been  finished,  with  the  communications  thereto.  The 
reasons  given  were  that  a change  of  plans  was  necessary  for  economy’s  sake, 
and  that  the  construction  of  fortifications  might  induce  the  Natives  to  think 
we  were  doubtful  of  the  continuance  of  our  supremacy.  As  regarded  the 
first,  I explained  that  the  total  outlay  for  works  and  armaments  was  estimated 
at  only  £332,274 — considerably  less  than  one  half  the  cost  of  a British  line- 
of-battle  ship  ; and  as  to  the  second,  I urged  that  an  argument  of  this  sort 
against  frontier  defences  would  hardly  bear  examination  ; that  the  possibility 
of  external  attack  was  freely  discussed  in  every  newspaper  ; that  Russian 
movements  and  frontier  difficulties  were  known  and  commented  on  in  every 
bazaar  ; that  the  construction  of  fortifications  in  support  of  the  Ruling  Power 
had  been  an  Oriental  practice  from  time  immemorial  ; that  our  action  in  this 
respect  was  at  least  as  likely  to  instil  the  idea  that  we  meant  to  retain  our 
eastern  possessions  at  any  cost,  as  to  give  an  impression  of  weakness ; that 
the  progressive  re-organization  and  mobilization  of  our  army  were  well  known 
to  have  reference  to  service  beyond  the  frontier  ; and  that  we  had  extended 
our  confidence  in  this  respect  to  Native  Princes  by  encouraging  them  to  train 
their  own  troops  and  fit  them  to  take  their  place  in  line  with  ours. 


FAREWELL  ENTERTAINMENTS 


54i 


«893] 

spirit  of  loyalty  which  pervades  them  will  be  a revelation  to  many,  and 
a source  of  satisfaction  to  all  who  are  interested  in  the  country  to 
which  we  owe  so  much  of  our  present  greatness,  and  which  I conceive 
to  be  the  brightest  jewel  in  England’s  crown. 

It  was  a wonderful  and  moving  scene  upon  which  we  looked  from 
the  platform  of  the  Town  Hall  on  this  memorable  occasion,  made  up 
as  it  was  of  such  different  elements,  each  race  and  creed  easily  recog- 
nizable from  their  different  costumes  and  characteristics,  but  all  united 
by  the  same  kindly  desire  to  do  honour  to  their  departing  friend,  or 
comrade,  for  there  were  a great  number  of  old  soldiers  present. 

At  each  place  that  we  visited  on  our  way  to  Calcutta  there  was  the 
same  display  of  kindly  regret  at  our  departure ; friends  assembled  to 
see  us  off  at  the  railway-stations,  bands  played  ‘ Auld  lang  syne,’  and 
hearty  cheers  speeded  us  on  our  way. 

In  February  we  went  to  Lucknow  for  a few  days,  when  the  Taluk- 
dars  of  Oudh  gave  my  wife  and  me  an  entertainment  on  a very 
splendid  scale  in  the  Wingfield  Park,  and  presented  me  with  an 
address*  and  a sword  of  honour. 

On  our  return  to  Calcutta,  just  before  we  left  for  England,  the  Euro- 
pean community  entertained  me  at  a dinner,  at  which  more  than  two 
hundred  were  present,  presided  over  by  Sir  James  Mackay,  K.C.I.E., 
Chairman  of  the  Calcutta  Chamber  of  Commerce.  Sir  James  was  far 
too  kind  and  eulogistic  in  speaking  of  my  sendees,  but  for  his  appre- 
ciative allusion  to  my  wife  I could  only  feel  deeply  gratified  and 
thankful.  After  dinner  a reception  was  given  to  Lady  Roberts  and 
myself,  at  which  the  Yiceroy  and  Lady  Lansdowne  and  all  the  prin- 
cipal Native  and  European  residents  of  Calcutta  were  assembled.  An 
addressf  was  presented  to  me  on  this  never-to  be-forgotten  occasion, 
in  which,  to  my  supreme  satisfaction,  the  Native  noblemen  and  gentle- 
men expressed  their  hearty  approval  of  what  had  been  done  during  my 
tenure  of  office  as  Commander-in-Chief  to  strengthen  the  defences  of 
the  frontier  and  render  the  army  in  India  efficient,  and  declared  that 
‘ we  cheerfully  bear  our  share  of  the  cost,  as  in  possession  of  these 
protections  against  aggressions  from  without  we  believe  all  who  dwell 
within  the  borders  of  the  land  will  find  their  best  guarantee  for  peace, 
and  in  peace  the  best  safeguard  they  and  their  children  can  possess  to 
enable  them  to  pass  their  lives  in  happiness  and  prosperity,  and  escape 
the  misery  and  ruin  which  follow  war  and  invasion.’ 

We  travelled  to  Bombay  via  Jeypur  and  Jodhpur.  At  both  places  we 
were  royally  entertained  by  the  Rulers  of  those  states,  and  my  staff 
and  I were  given  excellent  sport  amongst  the  wild  boar,  which  was 
much  enjoyed  by  all,  particularly  by  my  son,  who,  having  joined  the 
King’s  Royal  Rifles  at  Rawal  Pindi,  was  attached  to  me  as  A.D.C. 


Given  in  the  Appendix 


t Ibid 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


542 


[:«93 


during  my  last  six  months  in  India,  and  had  not  before  had  an  oppor- 
tunity of  tasting  the  joys  of  pig-sticking. 

At  Jodhpur  my  friend  the  Maharaja  Sir  Pertap  Sing  gave  us  a signal 
proof  that  the  ancient  valour  of  the  Rajputs  had  not  deteriorated  in  the 
present  day.  I had  wounded  a fine  boar,  and  on  his  making  for  some 
rocky  ground,  where  I could  hardly  have  followed  him  on  horseback,  I 
shouted  to  Sir  Pertap  to  get  between  him  and  the  rocks,  and  turn  him 
in  my  direction.  The  Maharaja  promptly  responded,  but  just  as  he 
came  face-to-face  with  the  boar,  his  horse  put  his  foot  into  a hole  and 
fell ; the  infuriated  animal  rushed  on  the  fallen  rider,  and,  before  the 
latter  could  extricate  himself,  gave  him  a severe  wound  in  the  leg  with 
his  formidable  tushes.  On  going  to  his  assistance,  I found  Sir  Pertap 
bleeding  profusely,  but  standing  erect,  facing  the  boar  and  holding  the 
creature  (who  was  upright  on  his  hind-legs)  at  arms’  length  by  his 
mouth.  The  spear  without  the  impetus  given  by  the  horse  at  full  speed 
is  not  a very  effective  weapon  against  the  tough  hide  of  a boar’s  back, 
and  on  realizing  that  mine  did  not  make  much  impression,  Pertap  Sing, 
letting  go  his  hold  of  the  boar’s  mouth,  quickly  seized  his  hind -legs, 
and  turned  him  over  on  his  back,  crying:  ‘ Maro,  saliib,  vnaro  I' 
(‘  Strike,  sir,  strike  1’)  which  I instantly  did,  and  killed  him.  Anyone 
who  is  able  to  realize  the  strength  and  weight  of  a wild  boar  will  appre- 
ciate the  pluck  and  presence  of  mind  of  Sir  Pertap  Sing  in  this  perform- 
ance. Fortunately,  my  wife  and  daughter,  who  had  been  following  the 
pig-stickers  in  a light  cart,  were  close  at  hand,  and  we  were  able  to 
drive  my  friend  home  at  once.  The  wound  was  found  to  be  rather  a 
bad  one,  but  it  did  not  prevent  Sir  Pertap  from  attending  some  tent- 
pegging and  other  amusements  in  the  afternoon,  though  he  had  to  be 
carried  to  the  scene. 

A few  months  after  my  return  to  England  the  boar’s  head  arrived, 
set  up,  and  with  a silver  plate  attached  to  it,  on  which  was  an  in- 
scription commemorating  the  adventure. 

At  Ahmedabad,  where  the  train  stopped  while  we  lunched,  I was 
presented  with  an  address  by  the  President  and  members  of  the  Muni- 
cipality, who,  ‘ with  loyal  devotion  to  Her  Imperial  Majesty  the  Queen 
and  Empress  of  India,  to  whose  glorious  reign  we  sincerely'  wish  a 
continuance  of  brilliant  prosperity,’  expressed  their  hope  that  Lady 
Roberts  and  I would  have  ‘a  happy  voyage  home  and  enjoyment  of 
perfect  health  and  prosperity  in  future.’ 

The  day  before  we  left  Bombay  for  England,  the  members  of  the 
Byculla  Club  gave  me  a parting  dinner.  It  was  with  great  difficulty  I 
could  get  through  my  speech  in  response  to  the  toast  of  my  health  on 
that  occasion,  for,  pleased  and  grateful  as  I was  at  this  last  mark  of 
friendship  and  approval  from  my  countrymen,  I could  not  help  feeling 
inexpressibly  sad  and  deeply  depressed  at  the  thought  uppermost  in  my 


>893] 


LAST  DAYS  IN  INDIA 


543 


mind,  that  the  time  had  come  to  separate  myself  from  India  and  my 
gallant  comrades  and  friends,  British  and  Native. 

In  dwelling  on  the  long  list  of  farewell  addresses  and  entertainments 
with  which  I was  honoured  on  leaving  India,  I feel  that  I may  be  lay- 
ing myself  open  to  the  charge  of  egotism  ; but  in  writing  of  one’s  own 
experiences  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  being  egotistical,  and  distasteful  as  it 
is  to  me  to  think  that  I may  be  considered  so,  I would  rather  that,  than 
that  those  who  treated  me  so  kindly  and  generously  should  deem  me 
unmindful  or  ungrateful. 

Thus  ended  forty-one  years  in  India.  No  one  can,  I think,  wonder 
that  I left  the  country  with  heartfelt  regret.  The  greater  number  of 
my  most  valued  friendships  had  been  formed  there;  from  almost  every- 
one with  whom  I had  been  associated,  whether  European  or  Native, 
civilian  or  soldier,  I had  experienced  unfailing  kindness,  sympathy,  and 
support ; and  to  the  discipline,  bravery,  and  devotion  to  duty  of  the 
Army  in  India,  in  peace  and  war,  I felt  that  I owed  whatever  success  it 
was  my  good  fortune  to  achieve. 


APPENDICES 


[ 547  3 


APPENDIX  I. 

(See  p.  97.) 

The  9th  Native  Infantry,  to  which  Captain  Donald  Stewart  belonged,  was 
divided  between  Aligarh,  Mainpuri,  Bulandshahr,  and  Etawa,  Stewart  being 
with  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  regiment  at  Aligarh. 

The  news  from  Meerut  and  Delhi  had  caused  a certain  amount  of  alarm 
amongst  the  residents  at  Aligarh,  and  arrangements  had  been  made  for 
sending  away  the  ladies  and  children,  hut,  owing  to  the  confidence  placed  in 
the  men  of  the  9th,  none  of  them  had  left  the  station.  Happen  what  might 
in  other  regiments,  the  officers  were  certain  that  the  9th  could  never  be  faith- 
less to  their  salt  ! The  Native  officers  and  men  were  profuse  in  their  expres- 
sions of  loyalty,  and  as  a proof  of  their  sincerity  they  arrested  and  disarmed 
several  rebel  sepoys,  who  were  making  for  their  homes  in  Oudh  and  the 
adjoining  districts.  As  a further  proof,  they  gave  up  the  regimental  pandit 
for  endeavouring  to  persuade  them  to  mutiny.  He  was  tried  by  a Court- 
Martial  composed  of  European  and  Native  officers,  found  guilty,  and  sentenced 
to  be  hanged.  The  sentence  was  carried  out  that  same  afternoon.  It  was 
intended  that  the  regiment  should  witness  the  execution,  but  it  did  not  reach 
the  gaol  in  time  ; the  men  were  therefore  marched  back  to  their  lines,  and 
Stewart,  in  his  capacity  of  Interpreter,  was  ordered  to  explain  to  them  the 
purpose  for  which  they  had  been  paraded.  While  he  was  speaking  a man  of 
his  own  company  shouted  out  something.  Stewart  did  not  hear  the  words, 
and  no  one  would  repeat  them.  The  parade  was  then  dismissed,  when  the 
same  man,  tearing  off  his  uniform,  called  upon  his  comrades  not  to  serve  a 
Government  which  had  hanged  a Brahmin.  A general  uproar  ensued.  The 
Commanding  Officer  ordered  the  few  Sikhs  in  the  regiment  to  seize  the  ring- 
leader ; they  did  so,  but  not  being  supported  by  the  rest  they  released  him. 
The  Subadar  Major  was  then  told  to  arrest  the  mutineer,  but  he  took  no 
notice  whatever  of  the  order.  This  Native  officer  had  been  upwards  of  forty 
years  in  the  regiment  and  was  entitled  to  his  full  pension.  He  had  been  a 
member  of  the  Court-Martial  which  tried  the  pandit,  and,  though  a 
Brahmin  himself,  had  given  his  vote  in  favour  of  the  prisoner  being  hanged  ; 
moreover  he  was  a personal  friend  of  all  the  officers.  Stewart,  who  had  been 
for  many  years  Adjutant,  knew  him  intimately,  and  believed  implicitly  in  his 
loyalty.  The  man  had  constantly  discussed  the  situation  with  Stewart  and 
others,  and  had  been  mainly  instrumental  in  disarming  the  sepoys  who  had 
passed  through  Aligarh  ; and  yet  when  the  hour  of  trial  came  he  failed  as 
completely  as  the  last -joined  recruit. 

The  British  officers  went  amongst  their  men  and  tried  to  keep  order,  but 
the  excitement  rapidly  spread  ; some  of  the  young  soldiers  began  to  load,  and 

36 


548 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


the  older  ones  warned  the  officers  that  it  was  time  for  them  to  be  off.  The 
sepoys  then  plundered  the  treasury,  broke  open  the  gaol  doors,  released  the 
prisoners,  and  marched  in  a body  towards  Delhi.* 

Stewart,  being  thus  left  without  a regiment,  attached  himself  to  the 
magistrate  of  the  district,  and  took  command  of  a small  body  of  volunteers 
sent  from  Agra  by  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  North-West  Provinces,  to 
aid  the  civil  authorities  in  restoring  order.  Not  caring  for  this  work,  and 
thinking  he  might  be  more  usefully  employed,  Stewart  made  up  his  mind  to 
find  his  way  to  Delhi ; his  idea  was  to  try  and  get  there  vid  Meerut,  but  before 
deciding  on  the  route,  he  went  to  Agra,  where  he  had  been  invited  by  the 
Lieutenant-Governor.  At  the  interview,  Mr.  Colvin  advised  Stewart  to 
travel  vid  Muttra,  as  the  safer  of  the  two  routes,  and  told  him  that 
despatches  had  been  received  from  the  Government  in  Calcutta  for  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  then  understood  to  be  with  the  army  before  Delhi.  At 
the  same  time  the  Lieutenant-Governor  impressed  upon  Stewart  that  he  was 
not  giving  him  any  order  to  go,  and  that  if  he  undertook  to  carry  the 
despatches  it  must  be  a voluntary  act  on  his  part,  entailing  no  responsibility 
on  the  Government  of  the  North-West  Provinces. 

Stewart  accepted  the  duty,  and  took  his  leave  of  Mr.  Colvin  as  the  sun  was 
setting  on  the  18th  June,  delighted  at  the  chance  of  being  able  to  join  the 
army  before  Delhi.  He  reached  Muttra,  thirty-five  miles  distant,  without 
mishap.  The  streets  of  this  city  were  crowded  with  men,  all  carrying  arms 
of  some  sort ; they  showed  no  signs  of  hostility,  however,  and  even  pointed 
out  to  Stewart  the  house  of  which  he  was  in  search.  The  owner  of  this 
house,  to  whose  care  he  had  been  commended  by  the  Agra  authorities,  was  a 
Brahmin  holding  an  official  position  in  the  town.  This  Native  gentleman 
behaved  with  civility,  but  did  not  attempt  to  conceal  his  embarrassment  at 
the  presence  of  a British  officer,  or  his  relief  when  Stewart  announced  his 
intention  of  resuming  his  journey  an  hour  or  so  before  daybreak. 

The  Brahmin  provided  him  with  two  sowars  belonging  to  the  Raja  of 
Bhartpur  with  orders  to  accompany  him  as  far  as  Kosi.  They  were  cut- 
throat-looking individuals,  and  Stewart  felt  rather  inclined  to  dispense  with 
their  services,  but,  thinking  it  unwise  to  show  any  signs  of  distrust,  he 
accepted  them  with  the  best  grace  he  could. 

After  riding  fifteen  or  sixteen  miles,  Stewart’s  horse  fell  from  exhaustion, 
on  which  his  so-called  escort  laughed  uproariously,  and  galloped  oft',  leaving 
our  poor  traveller  to  his  own  devices. 

Believing  the  horse  could  not  recover,  Stewart  took  off  the  saddle  and 
bridle  and  tramped  to  the  nearest  village,  where  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  buy 
or  hire  an  animal  of  some  kind  on  which  to  continue  his  journey.  No  one, 
however,  would  help  him,  and  he  was  forced  to  seize  a donkey  which  he  found 
grazing  in  a field  hard  by.  About  sunset  he  reached  Kosi,  thirty-seven  miles 
from  Muttra.  The  tehsildar\  received  him  courteously,  and  gave  him  some 
bread  and  milk,  but  would  not  hear  of  his  staying  for  the  night.  He  told 
him  that  his  appearance  in  the  town  was  causing  considerable  excitement,  and 
that  lie  could  not  be  responsible  for  his  safety.  Stewart  was  much  exhausted 
after  his  hot  ride,  but  as  the  tchsilclar  stood  firm  there  was  nothing  for  him  to 
do  but  to  continue  his  journey,  and  he  consented  to  start  if  he  were  provided 
with  a horse.  The  tchsildar  promptly  offered  his  own  pony,  and  as  soon  as  it 

* While  the  regiment  was  in  the  act  of  mutinying  one  of  the  sepoys  left  the 
parade-ground,  and  running  round  to  all  the  civilians’  houses,  told  the  occu- 
pants what  had  happened,  and  warned  them  to  make  their  escape.  He  asked 
for  no  reward,  and  was  never  seen  again. 

t Native  magistrate. 


APPENDIX  I. 


549 


was  dark  Stewart  set  out  for  the  Jaipur  camp.  His  progress  during  the  night 
was  slow,  and  it  was  not  until  eight  o'clock  the  next  morning  t hat  he  reached 
his  destination,  where  he  was  hospitably  received  by  the  Political  Agent, 
Major  Eden,  who  introduced  him  to  the  Maharaja’s  Wazir.  This  official  at 
first  promised  to  give  Stewart  a small  escort  as  far  as  Delhi,  but  on  various 
pretexts  he  put  him  off  from  day  to  day.  At  the  end  of  a week  Stewart  saw 
that  the  Wazir  either  could  not  or  would  not  give  him  an  escort,  and  thinking 
it  useless  to  delay  any  longer,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  start  without  one. 

There  were  several  refugees  in  the  camp,  and  one  of  them,  Mr.  Ford, 
collector  and  magistrate  of  Gurgaon,  offered  to  join  Stewart  in  his  venture. 

Stewart  and  his  companion  left  the  Jaipur  camp  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
27th  June,  and  reached  Palwal  soon  after  dark.  Ford  sent  for  the  kotwal ,* 
who  was  one  of  his  own  district  officials,  and  asked  him  for  food.  This  was 
produced,  but  the  kotwal  besought  the  sahibs  to  move  on  without  delay, 
telling  them  that  their  lives  were  in  imminent  danger,  as  there  was  a rebel 
regiment  in  the  town,  and  he  was  quite  unable  to  protect  them.  So  they 
continued  their  journey,  and,  escaping  from  one  or  two  threatened  attacks  by 
robbers,  reached  Badshahpur  in  the  morning.  Here  they  rested  during  the 
heat  of  the  day,  being  kindly  treated  by  the  villagers,  who  were  mostly 
Hindus. 

The  travellers  were  now  not  far  from  Delhi,  but  could  hardly  proceed 
further  without  a guide,  and  the  people  of  Badshahpur  declined  to  provide 
one.  They  pleaded  that  they  were  men  of  peace,  and  could  not  possibly 
leave  their  village  in  such  evil  times.  Suddenly  a man  from  the  crowd 
offered  his  services.  His  appearance  was  against  him,  and  the  villagers 
declared  that  he  was  a notorious  cattle-lifter,  who  was  strongly  suspected  of 
having  set  fire  to  the  collector’s  (Mr.  Ford’s)  office  at  Gurgaon,  in  order  that 
the  evidences  of  his  offences  might  be  destroyed.  Not  a pleasant  compagnon 
de  voyage,  but  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  accept  his  offer. 

As  soon  as  it  was  dark  a start  was  made,  and  at  daybreak  on  the  29th  the 
minarets  of  Delhi  rose  out  of  the  morning  mist,  while  an  occasional  shell 
might  be  seen  bursting  near  the  city. 

On  reaching  the  Hansi  road,  the  guide,  by  name  Jumna  Das,  who,  in  spite 
of  appearances,  had  proved  true  to  his  word,  stopped  and  said  he  could  go  no 
further.  He  would  not  take  any  reward  that  it  was  then  in  the  power  of 
Stewart  or  Ford  to  offer  him,  but  he  expressed  a hope  that,  when  the  country 
became  settled,  the  slight  service  he  had  performed  would  not  be  forgotten. 
They  gratefully  assured  him  on  this  point,  and  thanked  him  cordially,  giving 
him  at  the  same  time  a letter  testifying  to  his  valuable  service.  Stewart  then 
went  to  the  nearest  village,  and  for  a small  reward  found  a man  who  under- 
took to  conduct  them  safely  to  one  of  our  piquets. 

One  curious  circumstance  remarked  by  Stewart  throughout  the  ride  was 
that  the  peasants  and  villagers,  though  not  generally  hostile  to  him,  had 
evidently  made  up  their  minds  that  the  British  raj  was  at  an  end,  and  were 
busily  engaged  in  rendering  their  villages  defensible,  to  meet  the  troubles  and 
disturbances  which  they  considered  would  surely  follow  on  the  resumption  of 
Native  rule. 

It  is  difficult  to  over-estimate  the  pluck  and  enterprise  displayed  by  Stewart 
during  this  most  adventurous  ride.  It  was  a marvel  that  he  ever  reached 
Delhi.  His  coming  there  turned  out  to  be  the  best  thing  that  ever  happened 
to  him,  for  the  qualities  which  prompted  him  to  undertake  and  carried  him 
through  his  dangerous  journey,  marked  him  as  a man  worthy  of  advancement 
and  likely  to  do  well. 


City  magistrate. 


36—2 


55° 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


APPENDIX  II. 

(These  two  memoranda  are  referred  to  in  the  note  on  page  196.) 

Memorandum  by  Lieutenant  McLeod  Innes. 

*1.  Sir  H.  Lawrence  joined  at  Lucknow  about  the  end  of  March,  1857, 
succeeding  Mr.  Coverley  Jackson  in  the  Chief  Commissionership. 

‘2.  On  his  arrival  he  found  himself  in  the  midst  of  troubles,  of  which  the 
most  important  were  these  : 

I.  A general  agitation  of  the  empire,  from  the  discontent  of  the  soldiery. 

II.  A weak  European  force  at  Oudh,  with  all  the  military  arrangements 

defective. 

III.  Grievous  discontent  among  several  classes  of  the  population  of  Oudh, 
viz.,  the  nobility  of  Lucknow  and  the  members  and  retainers  of  the 
Royal  Family,  the  official  classes,  the  old  soldiery  and  the  entire 
country  population,  noble  and  peasant  alike. 

* 3.  This  third  was  due  to  disobedience  of,  or  departure  from,  the  instruc- 
tions laid  down  by  Government  at  the  annexation,  as  very  clearly  shown  in 
Lord  Stanley’s  letter  of  October  13,  1858.  The  promised  pensions  had  either 
been  entirely  withheld  or  very  sparingly  doled  out ; the  old  officials  were 
entirely  without  employment ; three-quarters  of  the  army  the  same ; while 
the  country  Barons  had,  by  forced  interpretation  of  rules,  been  deprived  of 
the  mass  of  their  estates,  which  had  been  parcelled  out  among  their  followers, 
who,  for  clannish  reasons,  were  more  indignant  at  the  spoliation  and  loss  of 
power  and  place  of  their  Chiefs  than  they  were  glad  for  their  own  individurl 
acquisitions. 

‘ i.  The  weakness  of  the  European  force  could  not  be  helped  ; it  was 
deemed  politic  to  show  the  country  that  the  annexation  did  not  require  force. 

‘ 5.  But  the  inefficiency  of  the  military  arrangements  arose  from  mere 
want  of  skill,  and  was  serious,  under  the  threatening  aspect  of  the  political 
horizon. 

‘ 6.  The  discontent  of  the  province,  and  the  coming  general  storm,  had 
already  found  vent  in  the  brigandage  of  Fuzl  Ali,  and  the  seditions  of  the 
Fyzabad  Moulvie. 

‘ 7.  And  with  all  these  Sir  H.  Lawrence  had  to  grapple  immediately  on  his 
arrival. 

‘8.  But  I may  safely  say  that  ten  days  saw  the  mass  of  them  disappear. 
The  Fyzabad  Moulvie  had  been  seized  and  imprisoned.  Fuzl  Ali  had  been 
surrounded  and  slain.  The  promised  pensions  had  been  paid,  by  Sir  H. 
Lawrence's  peremptory  orders,  to  the  members  and  retainers  of  the  Royal 
Family.  A recognition  had  been  published  of  the  fair  rights  of  the  old  Oudh 
officials  to  employment  in  preference  to  immigrants  from  our  old  provinces, 
and  instructions  had  been  issued  for  giving  it  etrect.  The  disbanded  soldiers 
of  the  Royal  Army  of  Oudh  were  promised  preference  in  enlistment  in  the 
local  corps  and  the  police,  and  a reorganization  and  increase  to  the  latter, 
which  were  almost  immediately  sanctioned,  gave  instant  opportunities  for  the 
fulfilment  of  the  first  instalment  of  these  promises.  While  last,  but  not  least, 
durbars  were  held,  in  which  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  was  able  to  proclaim  his 
views  and  policy,  by  which  the  landholders  should  be  reinstated  in  the 
possessions  which  they  held  at  the  annexation,  the  basis  on  which  the 
instructions  had  been  originally  issued,  which  had  been  hitherto  practically 
ignored,  but  to  which  he  pledged  himself  to  give  effect. 

‘ 9.  To  strengthen  his  military  position,  he  placed  Artillery  with  the 
European  Infantry : he  distributed  his  Irregular  Cavalry  ; he  examined 
the  city,  decided  on  taking  possession  of  the  Muchee  Bawn  and  garrisoniug 


APPENDIX  II. 


55* 


it  as  a fort ; and  summoned  in  Colonel  Fisher  and  Captain  George  Hardinge  ; 
and  with  them,  Brigadier  Handscombe  and  Major  Anderson,  consulted  and 
arranged  for  future  plans  against  the  storms  which  he  saw  to  be  impending. 

‘ 10.  Much  of  this,  and  his  policy  for  remaining  in  Oudh,  and  the  conduct 
of  the  defence  of  Lucknow,  I know  from  recollections  of  what  he  occasionally 
lot  drop  to  me  in  his  confidential  conversations  while  inspecting  the  Muchee 
Bawu.  He  told  me  that  nearly  the  whole  army  would  go  ; that  he  did  not 
think  the  Sikhs  would  go  ; that  in  every  regiment  there  were  men  that,  with 
proper  management,  would  remain  entirely  on  our  side  ; and  that,  therefore, 
he  meant  to  segregate  from  the  rest  of  the  troops  the  Sikhs  and  selected  men, 
and  to  do  his  best  to  keep  them  faithful  allies  when  the  rest  should  go  ; that, 
if  Cawnpore  should  hold  out,  we  would  not  be  attacked  ; but  that  if  it  should 
fall,  wo  would  be  invested,  and  more  or  less  closely  besieged  ; that  no  troops 
could  come  to  our  relief  before  the  middle  of  August ; that  the  besieging 
forces  would,  he  thought,  be  confined  to  the  sepoys,  for  the  people  of  the 
country  had  always  liked  our  European  officers,  whom  they  had  frequently 
had  to  bless  for  the  safety  of  their  lives  and  the  honour  of  their  families  ; and 
the  whole  Hindu  population  had  a lively  recollection  of  our  friendly  line  of 
conduct  in  the  late  quarrel  with  the  Mussulmans  regarding  the  Hunnooman 
Gurhoe  ; that  to  hold  out  where  we  were  was  necessary,  for  the  slightest 
appearance  of  yielding,  or  of  not  showing  a bold  front,  would  result  in 
annihilation  ; that  to  hold  out  we  must  get  provisions  ; that  to  get  pro- 
visions and  prepare  for  an  efficient  defence  we  must  keep  open  our  communica- 
tion with  the  country,  and  keep  the  city  quiet ; that  to  the  former  end  the 
retention  of  the  cantonment  was  necessary,  and  of  the  Muchee  Bawn  to  the 
latter,  while  the  site  of  the  permanent  defences,  in  case  of  the  need  of  concen- 
tration, should  be  the  Residency. 

‘11.  All  this  I know,  as  before  said,  from  Sir  Henry  Lawrence’s  own 
casual  and  hurried  remarks  to  me.  Whether  they  are  officially  recorded 
anywhere  I do  not  know  ; but  they  must  have  been  written  in  letters  to 
various  persons,  and  repeated  to  others  of  his  subordinates  at  Lucknow.  I 
mention  these  matters  thus  early,  as  although  the  facts  on  which  they  bear 
did  not  immediately  occur,  still,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  had  prescience  of  them, 
and  had  decided  on  his  line  of  policy. 

‘ 12.  I understand,  further,  but  not  on  authentic  grounds,  that  Sir  Henry 
wrote  at  a very  early  stage  to  Sir  H.  Wheeler,  urging  him  to  construct 
entrenchments  at  the  magazine  at  Cawnpore,  and  to  ensure  his  command 
of  the  boats,  whatever  might  happen  ; that  he  wrote  early  to  the  Government, 
entreating  them  to  divert  one  of  the  European  regiments  in  the  course  of  relief, 
and  divide  it  between  Cawnpore  and  Allahabad  ; and  that  subsequently  he 
urged  on  Government  to  employ  the  troops'of  the  Persian  expedition  in 
Bengal,  and  to  stop  the  Chinese  force  for  the  same  end,  and  to  subsidize 
some  of  the  Nepal  troops  for  the  protection  of  our  older  provinces  east  of 
Oudh. 

‘13.  To  revert  to  the  narrative,  the  measures  already  mentioned  so  entirely 
pacified  the  province,  that,  in  spite  of  the  previous  discontent,  the  previous 
troubles,  the  proverbial  turbulence  of  its  inhabitants,  and  the  increasing 
agitation  throughout  the  empire,  there  was  no  difficulty  experienced  in 
collecting  the  revenue  by  the  close  of  April.  And  the  subsequent  dis- 
turbances were,  as  will  be  shown,  entirely  due  to  the  soldiery,  and,  till 
long  after  Sir  Henry’s  death,  participated  in  only  by  them,  by  the  city 
ruffians,  and  by  a few  of  the  Mussulman  families  of  the  country  population. 
The  mass  of  the  city  people  and  the  entire  Hindu  population  held  aloof,  and 
would  have  nothing  to  say  to  the  outbreak  ; and,  with  one  single  exception, 
every  Talookdar  to  whom  the  chance  ottered  itself  aided,  more  or  less 


552 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


actively,  in  the  protection  of  European  fugitives.  This  phase  in  the 
character  of  the  disturbances  in  Oudh  is  not  generally  known  ; but  it  is 
nevertheless  true,  and  is  due  emphatically  and  solely,  under  Divine  Provi- 
dence, to  the  benignant  personal  character  and  the  popular  policy  of  Sir 
Henry  Lawrence. 

‘ 14.  The  1st  of  May  saw  our  disturbances  commence  with  the  mutiny 
of  the  7th  Oudh  Irregular  Infantry.  This,  its  suppression,  and  the  durbar 
in  which  he  distributed  rewards  and  delivered  a speech  on  the  aspect  of 
affairs,  have  been  fully  described  elsewhere,  and  need  not  be  repeated  by  me. 

‘ 15.  The  durbar  was  held  on  the  twelfth.  I am  not  aware  whether  he  had 
any  intelligence  at  that  time  of  the  Meerut  outbreak.  The  telegrams,  when 
they  did  arrive,  were  vague  ; but  he  indubitably  kept  on  his  guard  imme- 
diately on  receiving  them.  The  Cavalry  were  piqueted  between  the  canton- 
ments and  the  Residency,  and  the  Infantry  and  Artillery  were  kept  prepared 
for  movement.  His  plans  were  evidently  already  decided  ; but  they  were  to 
be  effected  simultaneously  and  not  successively,  and  the  movements  of  the 
Europeans  were  somewhat  dependent  on  the  arrangements  of  the  Quarter- 
master-General’s Department.  It  was  not  until  the  sixteenth  that  the  tents 
required  for  the  32nd  were  ready  ; and  the  morning  of  the  17th  May  saw  an 
entirely  new  and  effective  disposition  of  the  troops.  Half  the  Europeans 
were  at  the  Residency,  commanding  the  Iron  Bridge  ; half,  with  the  Artillery, 
were  at  the  south  end  of  the  cantonments  ; the  bridge  of  boats  was  moved  and 
under  control,  while  the  Muchee  Bawn,  not  yet  sufficiently  cleansed  from  its 
old  conglomeration  of  filth,  was  garrisoned  by  a selected  body  of  Native 
troops.  The  whole  of  these  dispositions  could  not  have  been  effected  at  an 
earlier  date,  and  Sir  Henry  would  not  do  them  piecemeal  or  successively. 
Simultaneous,  they  were  effective,  and  tended  to  paralyze  any  seditious  plots 
that  may  have  been  hatching.  Successive  and  piecemeal,  they  would  have 
incited  the  sepoys  to  mutiny  and  the  turbulent  to  insurrection.’ 

Memorandum,  18 th  May,  inserted  in  Sir  Henry's  own  hand  in  his  ledger  hook. 

‘ Time  is  everything  just  now.  Time,  firmness,  promptness,  conciliation, 
and  prudence  ; every  officer,  each  individual  European,  high  and  low,  may  at 
this  crisis  prove  most  useful,  or  even  dangerous.  A firm  and  cheerful  aspect 
must  be  maintained — there  must  be  no  bustle,  no  appearance  of  alarm,  still 
less  of  panic  ; but,  at  the  same  time,  there  must  be  the  utmost  watchfulness 
and  promptness  ; everywhere  the  first  germ  of  insurrection  must  be  put  down 
instantly.  Ten  men  may  in  an  hour  quell  a row  which,  after  a day’s  delay, 
may  take  weeks  to  put  down.  I wish  this  point  to  be  well  understood.  In 
preserving  internal  tranquillity,  the  Chiefs  and  people  of  substance  may  bo 
most  usefully  employed  at  this  juncture  ; many  of  them  have  as  much  to 
lose  as  we  have.  Their  property,  at  least,  is  at  stake.  Many  of  them  have 
armed  retainers — some  few  are  good  shots  and  have  double-barrelled  guns. 
For  instance  [name  illegible],  can  hit  a bottle  at  100  yards.  He  is  with  the 
ordinary  soldiers.  I want  a dozen  such  men,  European  or  Native,  to  arm 
their  own  people  and  to  make  thannalis  of  their  own  houses,  or  some  near 
position,  and  preserve  tranquillity  within  a circuit  around  them.’ 


APPENDIX  III. 


553 


APPENDIX  III. 


(Referred  to  at  p.  351.) 

The  column  was  composed  as  follows  : 

F Battery,  A Brigade,  R.H.A.,  commanded  by  Colonel  W. 
Sterling... 

One  squadron  10th  Hussars,  commanded  by  Major  Bulkeley 
G Battery,  3rd  Brigade,  R.A.,  commanded  by  Major  Sydney 
Parry  ... 

2nd  Battalion  8th  Foot,  commanded  by  Colonel  Barry  Drew 
Wing  72nd  Highlanders,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
F.  Brownlow 


Men.  Guns. 

135  6 

102 

83  3 

620 

405 


Total  British  troops  ...  ...  1,345  9 


12th  Bengal  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Colonel  Hugh  Gough, 

V.C.  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  337 

No.  1 Mountain  Battery,  commanded  by  Captain  Kelso  ...  136 

7th  Company  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  ...  ...  113 

2nd  (Punjab  Frontier  Force)  Infantry,  commanded  by  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Tyndall  ...  ...  ...  ...  647 

5th  (Punjab  Frontier  Force)  Infantry,  commanded  by  Major 

McQueen  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  502 

5th  (Punjab  Frontier  Force)  Gurkhas,  commanded  by  Major 

Fitz-Hugli  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  438 

24st  Punjab  Infantry,  commanded  by  Major  Collis  ...  496 

23rd  Pioneers,  commanded  by  Colonel  Currie  ...  ...  650 

29th  Punjab  Infantry,  commanded  by  Colonel  J.  J.  Gordon  671 

Total  Natives  ...  ...  3,990 


4 


Grand  total  ...  ...  ...  5,335  13 


Lieutenant-Colonel  Alexander  Lindsay  commanded  the  Artillery,  Colonel 
iEneas  Perkins  was  Commanding  Royal  Engineer.  Colonel  Hugh  Gough  com- 
manded the  Cavalry,  Brigadier-Generals  Cobbe  (17th  Foot)  and  Thelwall  (21st 
Punjab  Infantry)  the  two  Infantry  brigades.  Major  W.  Galbraith  (85th  Foot) 
was  Assistant-Adjutant-General ; Major  H.  Collett,  Assistant,  and  Captains 
‘ Dick  ’ Kennedy  and  F.  Carr,  Deputy- Assistant-Quartermasters-General. 
Captains  G.  de  C.  Morton  and  A.  Scott,  V.C.,  Brigade-Majors.  Captain  A. 
Badcock,  Chief  Commissariat  officer ; Captain  J.  Colquhoun,  R.  A. , Com- 
missary of  Ordnance  ; Major  Moriarty,  Captain  Goad,  and  Lieutenant  F. 
Maisey,  Transport  officers  ; Captain  A.  Wynne  (51st  Foot),  Superintendent  o 
Field  Telegraphs  ; Captain  R.  Woodthorpe,  R.  E. , Superil  tendent  of  Surveys ; 
Deputy-Surgeon-General  F.  Allen,  Principal  Medical  officer ; Rev.  J.  W. 
Adams,  Chaplain, 


554 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


APPENDIX  IV. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  391.) 

Translation  of  a letter  from  Major-General  Sir  Frederick  Roberts 
to  His  Highness  the  Amir  of  Kabul. 

Alikhel,  18f/i  September,  1879. 

(After  the  usual  compliments.)  Your  Highness’s  letter  of  the  28th  Ramazan, 
with  the  enclosures  from  Herat  and  Turkestan,  reached  me  last  night.  I have 
acquainted  myself  with  the  contents.  I am  glad  to  find  your  Highness  is  in 
good  health,  but  sorry  to  hear  of  the  unfortunate  disturbances  in  your  High- 
ness’s dominions.  Your  Highness’s  letter,  in  original,  has  been  sent  with 
enclosures  to  His  Excellency  the  Viceroy.  I have  already  informed  your 
Highness  of  the  wishes  of  His  Excellency  the  Viceroy,  and  the  reasons  for 
the  movements  of  the  British  troops,  and  I have  requested  your  Highness  to 
send  a confidential  representative  to  my  camp.  I am  awaiting  a reply  to  that 
letter,  and  the  arrival  of  your  Highness’s  confidential  representative. 

In  the  meantime  I have  sent  a Proclamation  to  the  tribes,  and  letters  to 
some  of  the  Logar  maliks,  your  Highness’s  subjects,  to  assure  those  not  con- 
cerned iu  the  hateful  massacre,  and  asking  them  for  assistance  in  carriage  and 
supplies  on  payment.  As  it  appears  to  me  proper  I should  inform  your  High- 
ness of  what  I have  done,  I enclose  copies  of  the  Proclamation  to  the  tribes 
and  of  my  letter  to  the  Logar  maliks,  and  hope  that  your  Highness  may  also 
issue  necessary  orders  for  the  furtherance  of  our  plans.  Rest  assured  of  the 
support  of  the  Government  of  India. 


APPENDIX  V. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  391.) 

Notes  of  an  interview  between  General  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  the 
Amir’s  Agents,  Mustaufi  Habibulla  Khan  and  Wazir  Shah 
Mahomed  Khan.  Dated  Alikhel,  2Zrd  September,  1879. 

After  compliments,  General  Roberts  intimated  to  the  Agents  that  at  their 
desire  he  had  granted  them  a second  interview.  He  now  requested  them  to 
be  good  enough  to  speak  freely  all  that  they  wished  him  to  know. 

The  Mustaufi  then  spoke  in  the  following  sense  : The  interests  of  England 
and  Afghanistan  are  the  same,  and  the  Amir  and  his  officials  are  deeply 
grieved  at  the  late  occurrences  in  Kabul.  Moreover,  the  Amir  is  anxious  to 
do  whatever  the  British  Government  wishes,  and  most  desirous  that  the 
dignity  of  the  British  Government  should  be  maintained  by  any  means  which 
may  seem  proper  to  the  Viceroy.  But  His  Highness  cannot  conceal  from 
himself  that  the  mutinous  troops  and  his  people  in  general,  ryots  as  well  as 
soldiers,  are  in  fear  of  an  indiscriminate  revenge,  which  will  fall  alike  upon 
innocent  and  guilty.  He  hopes,  therefore,  that  measures  will  be  taken  to 
guard  against  the  possibility  of  a general  rising  consequent  on  fear. 

The  Mustaufi  was  here  reminded  of  the  tenor  of  General  Roberts’s  Proclama- 
tion on  15th  September.  He  answered  that  the  people  were  too  ignorant 
to  be  acted  upon  by  a Proclamation,  and  then  went  on  as  follows : 

Of  course,  it  is  possible  that  no  such  combination  may  take  place.  The 


APPENDIX  V. 


555 


Afghans  are  selfish,  and  divided  against  themselves.  Still,  lest  he  should  lie 
blamed  if  it  should  occur,  the  Amir  thinks  it  right  to  express  his  opinion, 
and  give  the  British  Government  all  the  information  in  his  power.  On  the 
whole,  his  advice,  as  an  earnest  friend,  is  that  the  advance  of  a British  force 
on  Kabul  should  be  delayed  for  u short  time  Panjroz  ’).  In  the  interval 
he  will  endeavour  to  disarm  the  Regular  troops,  raise  new  levies,  and,  by  the 
aid  of  the  latter,  punish  all  concerned  in  the  late  abominable  outrage.  His 
idea  is  to  got  rid  of  Slier  Ali's  soldiery — always  a source  of  danger  and  keep 
only  15,000  men  for  the  future.  It  would  be  very  desirable  to  delay  the 
advance  until  he  could  establish  his  power.  The  Amir  docs  not  mean  to 
imply  that  any  Afghan  army,  were  it  50,000  strong,  could  resist  the  British. 
The  mutinous  troops  have  neither  organization  nor  leaders.  But  the  mutinous 
troops  are  of  all  tribes  : and  if  the  British  army  destroys  them,  as  it  would 
undoubtedly  do  in  case  of  resistance,  the  whole  country  may  combine  against 
the  British  and  the  Amir.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  he  advises  delay,  and 
that  the  punishment  of  the  guilty  be  left  to  him.  The  Viceroy  may  rest 
assured  that  he  will  show  no  mercy.  He  will  make  an  example  which  will  be 
conspicuous  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  as  the  sun  at  noonday.  Already  everyone 
in  Kabul  regards  the  Amir  as  an  infidel,  because  of  the  way  in  which  he  and 
his  have  thrown  in  their  lot  with  the  British  Government. 

Notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said,  however,  things  might  go  right  if 
the  mutinous  troops  would  keep  together  and  attempt  a stand.  But  the  Amir 
fears  they  will  not  do  so.  They  are  more  likely  to  scatter  here  and  there,  and 
raise  the  country.  In  that  case  there  will  be  constant  attacks  on  the  com- 
munications of  the  force,  and  the  gathering  of  supplies  will  be  difficult. 
They  would  come  chiefly  from  the  direction  of  Ghazni,  partly  also  from  Logar. 
If  the  tribes  rise  it  would  be  hard  to  collect  them.  Only  one  month  remains 
before  the  setting  in  of  winter.  Of  course,  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  may 
happen.  There  may  be  no  opposition,  and  the  Amir  is  in  any  case  ready  to 
do  what  the  British  Government  desires.  But  he  feels  it  is  his  duty  to 
express  his  strong  opinion  that  the  present  season  is  unsuited  for  a forward 
movement. 

General  Roberts  replied  that  on  behalf  of  the  Viceroy  he  thanked  the  Amir 
for  his  kind  advice,  which  he  was  confident  was  the  advice  of  a friend.  He 
said  the  matter  was  important,  and  required  careful  consideration,  and  asked 
whether  the  Agents  had  anything  more  to  bring  forward. 

The  Mustaufi  then  spoke  as  follows  : The  Amir’s  advice  to  delay  the 
advance  is  that  of  a sincere  friend,  and  it  is  the  best  he  can  give.  But  if  the 
British  Army  is  to  march  on  Kabul,  there  is  one  thing  more  which  I am 
desired  to  say  : let  it  march  in  such  strength  as  to  crush  all  hopes  of  mischief, 
and  put  down  all  rebellion  throughout  the  country.  You  cannot  wait  for 
reinforcements.  If  you  come,  you  must  come  in  full  strength — in  sufficient 
strength  to  put  down  all  opposition.  There  may  be  no  opposition,  but  you 
cannot  count  on  this. 

General  Roberts  replied:  The  Amir’s  advice  is  of  great  importance,  and 
must  be  carefully  considered.  When  His  Highness  first  wrote,  announcing 
the  outbreak  at  Kabul  and  asking  for  help,  the  first  desire  of  the  Viceroy  was 
to  send  British  forces  without  delay.  I was  ordered  to  Kuram  at  once  to  lead 
the  force  here.  Simultaneously  the  Kandahar  force  was  ordered  by  telegram 
to  return  to  Kandahar,  which  it  was  then  leaving,  and  to  advance  towards 
Kelat-i-Ghilzai,  and  instructions  were  issued  to  collect  a third  force  at 
Peshawar  ; all  this  was  to  help  the  Amir.  The  Viceroy  from  the  first  con- 
templated the  possibility  of  such  a general  rising  as  the  Amir  now  fears,  and 
the  several  armies  were,  therefore,  by  His  Excellency’s  order,  made  up  to  such 
strength  that  all  Afghanistan  combined  could  not  stand  against  them  for  a 


556 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


moment.  The  Kandahar  troops  were  ready  in  a very  short  time,  and  are  now 
beyond  Kandahar,  on  the  road  to  Kabul.*  The  Peshawar  force  was  rapidly 
collected  and  pushed  on  ; and  the  Amir  may  rest  assured  that  the  British 
army  is  advancing  in  ample  strength.  I will  think  over  the  Amir's  advice, 
nevertheless,  for  it  is  important.  But  His  Highness  must  remember  that  the 
late  occurrences  at  Kabul  do  not  affect  only  the  English  officers  and  the  fifty 
or  sixty  men  who  were  treacherously  killed — the  honour  of  the  English 
Government  is  concerned  ; and  so  long  as  the  bodies  of  these  officers  and  men 
remain  unburied  or  uncared  for  in  Kabul,  I do  not  believe  the  English  people 
will  ever  be  satisfied.  They  will  require  the  advance  of  a British  force,  and 
the  adequate  punishment  of  the  crime.  Still,  the  Amir’s  advice,  which  I am 
convinced  is  that  of  a friend,  must  be  carefully  considered,  and  I will  think 
over  it  and  give  an  answer  later. 

The  Mustatjfi  then  said : We  quite  understand  what  has  been  said 
about  the  strength  of  the  British  army.  Doubtless  it  is  sufficient,  and  all 
Afghanistan  could  not  stand  against  it.  But  the  Amir  asked  us  to  mention, 
what  I have  hitherto  forgotten,  that  there  are  in  Turkestan  24  regiments  of 
Infantry,  6 of  Cavalry,  and  56  guns.  These  troops  were  the  first  to  show  a 
disaffected  spirit  at  Mazar-i-Sharif ; and  putting  aside  external  enemies,  there 
are  Abdur  Rahman  and  the  sons  of  Azim  Khan  waiting  their  chance.  Herat 
again  is  doubtful  ; when  the  troops  there  hear  what  has  occurred  at  Kabul, 
there  is  no  saying  what  they  may  do.  If  Abdur  Rahman  ingratiates  himself 
with  these  people,  Herat  and  Turkestan  will  be  permanently  severed  from  the 
Afghan  dominions.  This  is  another  reason  why  the  advance  of  the  British 
force  should  be  delayed,  in  order  that  the  Amir  may  have  time  to  gain  over 
the  Herat  and  Turkestan  troops. 

General  Roberts  replied  : All  these  reasons  will  have  full  consideration. 
The  Viceroy’s  first  order  was  to  push  on  at  once  to  help  the  Amir  ; but  I am 
sure  His  Highness’s  advice  is  friendly,  and  that  in  any  case  he  will  do  his 
utmost  to  co-operate  with  the  British  Government.  Therefore  every  con- 
sideration will  be  given  to  what  His  Highness  has  desired  you  to  say. 

The  Mustaufi  : The  Viceroy  may  be  sure  the  Amir  will  do  what  he  pleases. 

The  Wazir  : When  the  Amir  learnt  from  General  Roberts’s  letter  that  the 
Viceroy  had  given  General  Roberts  power  to  deal  with  the  whole  matter,  he 
was  very  pleased,  knowing  General  Roberts’s  character  as  a soldier  and  his 
kindness  of  heart. 

General  Roberts  replied  that  he  would  carefully  consider  the  proposals 
brought  forward,  and  give  an  answer  later  on.  Meanwhile,  he  must  request 
the  Agents  to  stay  a day  or  two  in  camp  until  he  should  have  thoroughly 
weighed  the  Amir’s  advice,  which  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  both  the 
British  and  Afghan  Governments. 

The  interview  then  came  to  an  end. 

(Signed)  H.  M.  DURAND, 

Political  Secretary  to  General  Roberts,  K.C. B.,  V.C., 
Commanding  Kabul  Field  Force. 


The  Agents  here  seemed  surprised  and  anxious. — H.  M.  D. 


APPENDIX  VI. 


557 


APPENDIX  VI. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  421.) 

From  Lieutenant-General  Sir  F.  Roberts,  K.C.B.,  V.C.,  Commanding 
Kabul  Field  Force,  to  A.  C.  Lyall,  Esq.,  C.  B.,  Secretary  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  India,  Foreign  Department. 

Kabul,  22 ml  November,  1879. 

1.  1 have  the  honour  to  submit  a brief  account  of  an  interview  which 
took  place  between  the  Amir  Yakub  Khan  and  myself  on  the  22nd  October. 
The  interview  was  a private  and  informal  one  ; but  recent  events  have  lent 
some  interest  to  what  passed  on  the  occasion,  and  I have,  therefore,  thought 
it  desirable  that  a report  should  be  prepared  for  the  information  of  the 
Governor-General  in  Council. 

2.  After  some  conversation  upon  matters  of  no  special  importance,  the  Amir 
introduced  his  father’s  name,  and  thus  gave  me  the  opportunity  I had  often 
wished  to  have  of  leading  him  on  to  speak  naturally  and  unconstrainedly 
about  Slier  Ali  Khan’s  feelings  and  policy  during  the  last  ten  years.  I was 
most  careful  to  avoid  any  expression  of  my  own  views  upon  the  subject  in 
order  that  I might,  if  possible,  obtain  from  the  Amir  a perfectly  spontaneous 
and  truthful  account  of  the  circumstances  which  led,  in  his  opinion,  to  Sher 
Ali’s  estrangement  from  ourselves  and  rapprochement  to  Russia.  In  this  I 
think  I succeeded.  Yakub  Khan  spoke  readily  and  freely  of  all  that  had 
passed,  and  needed  no  question  or  suggestion  from  me  to  declare  his  conviction 
regarding  the  cause  of  his  father’s  unfriendly  attitude  towards  us  during  the 
past  few  years. 

3.  The  substance  of  the  Amir’s  statement  was  as  follows  : 

‘In  1869  my  father  was  fully  prepared  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  you.  He 
had  suffered  many  reverses  before  making  himself  secure  on  the  throne  of 
Afghanistan  ; and  he  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  his  best  chance  of  hold- 
ing what  he  had  won  lay  in  an  alliance  with  the  British  Government.  He 
did  not  receive  from  Lord  Mayo  as  large  a supply  of  anus  and  ammunition  as 
he  had  hoped,  but,  nevertheless,  he  returned  to  Kabul  fairly  satisfied,  and  so 
he  remained  until  the  visit  of  Saiyad  Nur  Muhammud  to  India  in  1873. 
This  visit  brought  matters  to  a head.  The  diaries  received  from  Saiyad  Nur 
Mahomed  during  his  stay  in  India,  and  the  report  which  he  brought  back  on 
his  return,  convinced  my  father  that  he  could  no  longer  hope  to  obtain  from 
the  British  Government  all  the  aid  that  he  wanted  ; and  from  that  time  he 
began  to  turn  his  attention  to  the  thoughts  of  a Russian  alliance.  You  know 
how  this  ended. 

‘ When  my  father  received  from  the  Government  of  India  the  letter  inform- 
ing him  that  a British  Mission  was  about  to  proceed  to  Kabul,  he  read  it  out 
in  durbar.  The  members  of  the  Russian  Embassy  were  present.  After  the 
reading  was  finished,  Colonel  Stoiietoff  rose,  saluted  the  Amir  and  asked  per- 
mission to  leave  Kabul.  If  permitted,  he  would,  he  said,  travel  without 
delay  to  Tashkent,  and  report  the  state  of  affairs  to  General  Kauffmann,  who 
would  inform  the  Czar,  and  thus  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  England.  He 
promised  to  return  in  six  weeks  or  two  months,  and  urged  the  Amir  to  do 
everything  in  his  power  meanwhile  to  prevent  the  British  Mission  from 
reaching  Kabul. 

‘ Colonel  Stoiietoff  never  returned  to  Kabul.  He  lost  no  time  in  reaching 
Tashkent,  where  he  remained  for  a few  weeks,  and  he  then  started  for  Russia. 

‘ The  Afghan  official,  Mirza  Mahomed  Hassan  Khan,  generally  known  as 


558 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


the  “ Dabir-ul-Mulk,”  who  had  travelled  with  Colonel  Stolietotf  from  the 
Oxus  to  Kabul,  accompanied  him  on  his  return  journey  to  Tashkent.  Here 
the  Mirza  was  detained  under  pretence  that  orders  would  shortly  he  received 
from  the  Emperor,  until  the  news  of  my  father’s  flight  from  Kabul  reached 
General  Kauffmaun.  He  was  then  permitted  to  leave.  Two  Aides-de-Camp 
were  sent  with  him,  one  a European,  the  other  a Native  of  Bokhara. 

‘ My  father  was  strongly  urged  by  General  Kaufi'maim  not  to  leave  Kabul. 
At  the  same  time  the  members  of  the  Embassy  were  ordered  to  return  to 
Tashkent,  the  Doctor  being  permitted  to  remain  with  my  father  if  his  services 
were  required. 

‘Throughout,  the  Russian  Embassy  was  treated  with  great  honour,’  and  at 
all  stations  between  Mazar-i-Shariff  and  Kabul,  orders  were  given  for  the 
troops  to  turn  out,  aud  for  a salute  to  be  fired  on  their  arrival  and  departure.’ 

4.  I cannot,  of  course,  vouch  for  the  exact  words  used  by  Yakub  Khan,  but 
I am  confident  that  the  foregoing  paragraph,  which  is  written  from  notes 
taken  at  the  time,  contains  a substantially  accurate  record  of  the  conversation. 

5.  It  would  be  superfluous  for  me  to  advance  any  proof  of  the  fact  that  for 
one  reason  or  another,  Sher  Ali  did  during  the  latter  part  of  his  reign  fall 
away  from  us  and  incline  towards  an  alliance  with  Russia.  But  I think  the 
closeness  of  the  connection  between  Russia  and  Kabul,  and  the  extent  of  the 
Amir’s  hostility  towards  ourselves,  has  not  hitherto  been  fully  recognized. 
Yakub  Khan’s  statements  throw  some  light  upon  this  question,  and  they  are 
confirmed  by  various  circumstances  which  have  lately  come  to  my  knowledge. 
The  prevalence  of  Russian  coin  and  wares  in  Kabul,  and  the  extensive  military 
preparations  made  by  Sher  Ali  of  late  years,  appear  to  me  to  afford  an  in- 
stinctive comment  upon  Yakub  Khan’s  assertions.  Our  recent  rupture  with 
Sher  Ali  has,  in  fact,  been  the  means  of  unmasking  and  checking  a very 
serious  conspiracy  against  the  peace  and  security  of  our  Indian  Empire. 

6.  The  magnitude  of  Sher  Ali’s  military  preparations  is,  in  my  opinion,  a 
fact  of  peculiar  significance.  I have  already  touched  upon  this  point  in  a 
former  letter,  but  I shall  perhaps  be  excused  for  noticing  it  again.  Before  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  last  year  the  Amir  had  raised  and  equipped  with  arms 
of  precision  68  regiments  of  Infantry  and  16  of  Cavalry.  The  Afghan 
Artillery  amounted  to  nearly  300  guns.  Numbers  of  skilled  artizans  were 
constantly  employed  in  the  manufacture  of  rifled  cannon  and  breach-loading 
small  arms.  More  than  a million  pounds  of  powder,  and  I believe  several 
million  rounds  of  home-made  Snider  ammunition,  were  in  the  Bala  Hissar  at 
the  time  of  the  late  explosion.  Swords,  helmets,  uniforms,  and  other  articles 
of  military  equipment  were  stored  in  proportionate  quantities.  Finally,  Sher 
Ali  had  expended  upon  the  construction  of  the  Sherpur  cantonments  an 
astonishing  amount  of  labour  and  money.  The  extent  and  cost  of  this  work 
may  be  judged  of  from  the  fact  that  the  whole  of  the  troops  under  my  com- 
mand will  find  cover  during  the  winter  within  the  cantonment,  and  the  bulk 
of  them  in  the  main  line  of  rampart  itself,  which  extends  to  a length  of  nearly 
two  miles  under  the  southern  and  western  slopes  of  the  Bimaru  hills.  Slier 
Ali’s  original  design  was  apparently  to  carry  the  wall  entirely  round  the  hills, 
a distance  of  nearly  five  miles,  and  the  foundations  were  already  laid  for  a 
considerable  portion  of  this  length.  All  theso  military  preparations  were 
quite  unnecessary  except  as  a provision  for  contemplated  hostilities  with  our- 
selves, and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  their  entire  cost  could  have  been 
met  from  the  Afghan  treasury,  the  gross  revenue  of  the  country  amounting 
only  to  about  eighty  lakhs  of  rupees  per  annum. 

7.  I have  referred  to  the  prevalence  of  Russian  coin  and  wares  in  Kabul  as 
evidence  of  the  growing  connexion  between  Russia  and  Afghanistan.  I am 
unable  to  find  proof  that  the  Czar’s  coin  was  introduced  in  any  other  way 


APPENDIX  VII. 


559 


than  by  the  usual  channels  of  trade,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  bulk  of  it, 
if  not  the  whole,  came  in  gradually  by  this  means,  the  accumulation  of 
foreign  gold  in  particular  being  considerable  in  this  country,  where  little  gold 
is  coined.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  to  me  a curious  fact  that  the  amount  of 
Russian  money  in  circulation  should  be  so  large.  No  less  than  13,000  gold 
pieces  were  found  among  the  Amir’s  treasure  alone  ; similar  coins  are  exceed- 
ingly common  in  the  city  bazaar  ; and  great  numbers  of  them  are  known  to 
be  in  possession  of  the  Sirdars.  Of  course  English  goods  of  all  kinds  are 
plentiful  here — that  is  inevitable,  particularly  with  a considerable  body  of 
Hindu  merchants  settled  in  the  city,  but  Russian  goods  also  abound.  Glass, 
crockery,  silks,  tea,  and  many  other  things  which  would  seem  to  be  far  more 
easily  procurable  from  India  than  from  Russian  territory,  are  to  be  found  in 
great  quantities.  A habit,  too,  seems  to  have  been  growing  up  among  the 
Sirdars  and  others  of  wearing  uniforms  of  Russian  cut,  Russian  buttons, 
Russian  boots,  and  the  like.  Russian  goods  and  Russian  ways  seem,  in  fact, 
to  have  become  the  fashion  in  Afghanistan. 


APPENDIX  VII. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  421.) 

Translations  of  letters  from  General- Adjutant  Vox  Kauffmanx,  Governor- 
General  of  Turkestan,  to  the  address  of  the  Amir  of  Afghanistan, 
received  on  \0th  Shaban,  1295,  through  General  Stolietoff,  9 th 
August,  1878. 

Be  it  known  to  you  that  in  these  days  the  relations  between  the  British 
Government  and  ours  with  regard  to  your  kingdom  require  deep  consideration. 
As  I am  unable  to  communicate  my  opinion  verbally  to  you,  I have  deputed 
my  agent,  Major-General  Stolietoff.  This  gentleman  is  a near  friend  of  mine, 
and  performed  excellent  services  in  the  Russo-Turkisli  war,  by  which  he 
earned  favour  of  the  Emperor.  The  Emperor  has  always  had  a regard  for 
him.  He  will  inform  you  of  all  that  is  hidden  in  my  mind.  I hope  you  will 
pay  great  attention  to  what  he  says,  and  believe  Him  as  you  would  myself, 
and,  after  due  consideration,  you  will  give  him  your  reply.  Meanwhile,  be  it 
known  to  you  that  your  union  and  friendship  with  the  Russian  Government 
will  be  beneficial  to  the  latter,  and  still  more  so  to  you.  The  advantages  of  a 
close  alliance  with  the  Russian  Government  will  be  permanently  evident. 

This  friendly  letter  is  written  by  the  Governor-General  of  Turkestan  and 
Adjutant-General  to  the  Emperor,  Von  Kauffmann,  Tashkent,  Jamadial 
Akbar,  1295  ( = June,  1878). 

To  the  Amir  of  the  whole  of  Afghanistan,  Sher  Ali  Khan. 

(After  compliments.)  Be  it  known  to  you  that  our  relations  with  the 
British  Government  are  of  great  importance  to  Afghanistan  and  its  depen- 
dencies. As  I am  unable  to  see  you,  I have  deputed  my  trustworthy  (official) 
General  Stolietoff  to  you.  The  General  is  an  old  friend  of  mine,  and  during 
the  late  Russo-Turkish  war  earned  the  favour  of  the  Emperor  by  his  spirit  and 
bravery.  He  has  become  well  known  to  the  Emperor.  This  trustworthy 
person  will  communicate  to  you  what  he  thinks  best.  I hope  you  will  pay 
attention  to  what  he  says,  and  repose  as  much  confidence  in  his  words  as  if 
they  were  my  own  ; and  that  you  will  give  your  answer  in  this  matter  through 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


560 

him.  In  the  meantime,  he  it  known  to  you  that  if  a friendly  treaty  will  be 
of  benefit  to  us,  it  will  be  of  far  greater  benefit  to  yourself. 

General  Stolietoff  sent  the  following  letter,  on  his  return  to  Tashkent  from 
Kabul,  to  the  address  of  the  Foreign  Minister,  Wazir  Shah  Mahomed 
Khan,  dated  23 rd  of  the  holy  month  of  Ramazan,  1295  ( = 21s<  September, 
1878). 

Thank  God,  I reached  Tashkent  safely,  and  at  an  auspicious  moment  paid 
my  respects  to  the  Viceroy  (Yaroni  Padishah  means  ‘ half  king  ’).  I am  trying 
day  and  night  to  gain  our  objects,  and  hope  I shall  be  successful.  I am 
starting  to  see  the  Emperor  to-day,  in  order  to  inform  His  Majesty  personally 
of  our  affairs.  If  God  pleases,  everything  that  is  necessary  will  be  done  and 
affirmed.  I hope  that  those  wlw  want  to  enter  the  gate  of  Kabul  from  the  east 
will  see  that  the  door  is  closed  ; then,  please  God,  they  will  tremble.  I hope  you 
will  give  my  respects  to  His  Highness  the  Amir.  May  God  make  his  life  long 
and  increase  his  wealth  ! May  you  remain  in  good  health,  and  know  that  the 
protection  of  God  will  arrange  our  affairs  ! 

(Signed)  General  Stolietoff. 

From  General  Kauffmann  to  the  Amir,  dated  Tashkent,,  8th  Zekada, 
1295  ( = 22 nd  October,  1878). 

(After  compliments.)  Be  it  known  to  you  that  your  letter,  dated  12th 
Shawal,  reached  me  at  Tashkent  on  the  16th  October,  i.c.,  3rd  Zekada,  and 
I understood  its  contents.  I have  telegraphed  an  abstract  of  your  letter  to  the 
address  of  the  Emperor,  and  have  sent  the  letter  itself,  as  also  that  addressed 
to  General  Stolietoff,  by  post  to  Livadia,  where  the  Emperor  now  is.  I am 
informed  on  good  authority  that  the  English  want  to  come  to  terms  with  you  ; 
and,  as  a friend,  I advise  you  to  make  peace  with  them  if  they  offer  it. 

From  General  Stolietoff  to  Wazir  Shah  Mahomed  Khan,  dated 
8th  October,  1878. 

First  of  all,  I hope  you  will  be  kind  enough  to  give  my  respects  to  the 
Amir.  May  God  make  his  life  long  and  increase  his  wealth  ! I shall  always 
remember  his  royal  hospitality.  I am  busy  day  and  night  in  his  affairs,  and, 
thank  God,  my  labours  have  not  been  without  result.  The  great  Emperor  is 
a true  friend  of  the  Amir’s  and  of  Afghanistan,  and  His  Majesty  will  do  what- 
ever he  may  think  necessary.  Of  course,  you  have  not  forgotten  what  I told 
you,  that  the  affairs  of  kingdoms  are  like  a country  which  has  many  mountains, 
valleys,  and  rivers.  One  who  sits  on  a high  mountain  can  see  things  well. 
By  the  power  and  order  of  God,  there  is  no  empire  equal  to  that  of  our  great 
Emperor.  May  God  make  his  life  long  ! Therefore,  whatever  our  Govern- 
ment advises  you,  you  should  give  ear  to  it.  I tell  you  the  truth  that  our 
Government  is  wise  as  a serpent  and  harmless  as  a dove.  There  are  many 
things  which  you  cannot  understand,  but  our  Government  understands  them 
well.  It  often  happens  that  a thing  which  is  unpleasant  at  first  is  regarded 
as  a blessing  afterwards.  Now,  my  kind  friend,  I inform  you  that  the  enemy 
of  your  famous  religion  wants  to  make  peace  with  you  through  the  Kaisar 
(Sultan)  of  Turkey.  Therefore  you  should  look  to  your  brothers  who  live  on 
the  other  side  of  the  river.  If  God  stirs  them  up,  and  gives  the  sword  of 
fight  into  their  hands,  then  go  on,  in  the  name  of  God  (Bismilla),  otherwise 
you  should  he  as  a serpent ; make  peace  openly,  and  in  secret  prepare  for  war, 
and  when  God  reveals  His  order  to  you,  declare  yourself.  It  will  be  well, 
when  the  Envoy  of  your  enemy  wants  to  enter  the  country,  if  you  send  an 
able  emissary,  possessing  the  tongue  of  a serpent  and  full  of  deceit,  to  the 


APPENDIX  VII.  561 

enemy’s  country,  so  that  he  may  with  sweet  -vords  perplex  the  enemy’s  mind, 
and  induce  him  to  give  up  the  intention  of  fighting  with  you. 

My  kind  friend,  I entrust  you  to  the  protection  ot  God.  May  God  he  the 
protector  of  the  Amir’s  kingdom,  and  may  trembling  fall  upon  the  limbs  of 
your  enemies  ! Amen. 

Write  to  me  soon,  and  send  the  letter  to  the  capital.  Please  write  in 
Arabic  characters,  so  that  I may  be  able  to  read  your  letter. 

From  General  Kauffmann  to  the  Amir  of  Afghanistan,  dated  30 th 
Zckada  ( = 26 th  November,  1878). 

(After  compliments.)  I was  much  pleased  to  receive  your  letter,  dated 
24th  Zekada,  1295  ( = 18th  November,  1878),  and  to  hear  of  yourgood  health. 
I have  also  received  a copy  of  the  letter  which  you  sent  to  the  Governor- 
General.  May  God  be  pleased  with  you.  The  British  Ministers  have  given  a 
pledge  to  our  Ambassador  in  London  that  they  will  not  interfere  with  the 
independence  of  Afghanistan.  I am  directed  by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  to 
communicate  this  news  to  you,  and  then,  after  forming  friendship,  to  go  to 
His  Majesty.  I intend  to  go  to  the  Russian  capital  after  I have  arranged  the 
affairs  of  this  country  (Turkestan).  As  1 do  not  consider  it  advisable  to  keep 
your  trusted  officials,  whom  you  are  in  want  of,  here  any  more,  I send 
Mahomed  Hassan  Khan,  lvamuah  (Deputy-Governor),  and  Gholam  Haidar 
Khan,  with  two  officers,  back  to  you.  I hope  you  will  consider  me  a well- 
wisher  of  your  kingdom,  and  write  to  me  now  and  then.  I have  given 
instructions  that,  until  my  return,  every  letter  of  yours  which  they  receive  at 
Turkestan  should  be  forwarded  to  the  capital.  Your  good  fortune  is  a cause 
of  happiness  to  me,  and  if  any  troubles  come  upon  you,  I also  shall  be  grieved. 
Some  presents  have  been  sent  by  me  through  Mirza  Mahomed  Hassan, 
Kamuah  ; perhaps  they  may  be  accepted. 

Translation  of  a letter  from  General  Kauffmann  to  General  Vozgonoff, 
dated  Zel  Hijja,  1295  ( = December,  1878). 

The  Amir  knows  perfectly  well  that  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  assist  him 
with  troops  in  winter.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  that  war  should  not  be  com- 
menced at  this  unseasonable  time.  If  the  English,  in  spite  of  the  Amir’s 
exertions  to  avoid  the  war,  commence  it,  you  must  then  take  leave  of  the 
Amir  and  start  for  Tashkent,  because  your  presence  in  Afghanistan  in  winter 
is  useless.  Moreover,  at  such  a juncture  as  the  commencement  of  war  in 
Afghanistan,  you  ought  to  come  here  and  explain  the  whole  thing  to  me,  so 
that  I may  communicate  it  to  the  Emperor.  This  will  be  of  great  benefit  to 
Afghanistan  and  to  Russia. 

From  General  Kauffmann  to  the  Amir  of  Afghanistan,  dated  25 th 
December,  1878  ( Russian , 1 Zth  Muharram,  1296). 

Your  letter,  dated  27th  Zel  Hijja  ( = 20th  November),  1878,  has  reached  me. 
I was  pleased  to  hear  tidings  of  your  good  health.  The  Emperor  has  caused 
the  British  Government  to  agree  to  the  continuance  of  Afghan  independence. 
The  English  Ministers  have  promised  this.  I earnestly  request  you  not  to 
leave  your  kingdom.  As  far  as  possible,  consider  your  own  interests,  and  do 
not  lose  yonr  independence.  For  the  present  come  to  terms  with  the  British 
Government.  If  you  do  not  want  to  go  back  to  Kabul  for  this  purpose,  you 
can  write  to  your  son,  Mahomed  Yakub  Khan,  to  make  peace  with  the  English 
as  you  may  direct  him.  Do  not  leave  the  soil  of  Afghanistan  at  this  time, 
because  it  will  be  of  benefit  to  you.  My  words  are  not  without  truth,  because 
your  arrival  in  Russian  territory  will  make  things  worse. 


~o2  FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 

From  General  Kauffmann  to  the  Amir  of  Afghanistan,  received  at  Mazir- 
i- Sharif  on  the  17 th  January , 1879. 

I have  received  your  friendly  letter,  dated  13th  Zel  Hijja  ( = 8th  December, 
1878).  In  that  letter  you  asked  me  to  send  you  as  many  troops  as  could  bo 
got  ready.  I have  written  to  you  a letter  to  the  effect  that  the  Emperor,  on 
account  of  your  troubles,  had  communicated  with  the  British  Government, 
and  that  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  had  obtained  a promise  from  the 
British  Ministers  to  the  effect  that  they  would  not  injure  the  independence  oi 
Afghanistan.  Perhaps  you  sent  your  letter  before  you  got  mine.  Now,  I 
have  heard  that  you  have  appointed  your  son,  Mahomed  Yakub,  as  your 
Regent,  and  have  come  out  of  Kabul  with  some  troops.  I have  received  an 
order  from  the  Emperor  to  the  effect  that  it  is  impossible  to  assist  you  with 
troops  now.  I hope  you  will  be  fortunate.  It  all  depends  on  the  decree  oi 
God.  Believe  me,  that  the  friendship  which  I made  with  you  will  be  per- 
petual. It  is  necessary  to  send  back  General  Vozgonoff  and  his  companions. 
You  can  keep  Dr.  Yuralski  with  you  if  you  please.  No  doubt  the  doctor  will 
be  of  use  to  you  and  to  your  dependents.  I hope  our  friendship  will  continue 
to  be  strengthened,  and  that  intercourse  will  be  carried  on  between  us. 

From  General  Kauffmann  to  the  Amir  Sher  Ali,  dated  29 th  December , 
1878  ( = 17 th  Muharram,  1296). 

(After  compliments.)  The  Foreign  Minister,  General  Gortchakoff,  has 
informed  me  by  telegraph  that  the  Emperor  has  directed  me  to  trouble  you  to 
come  to  Tashkent  for  the  present.  I therefore  communicate  this  news  to  you 
with  great  pleasure  ; at  the  same  time,  I may  mention  that  I have  received 
no  instructions  about  your  journey  to  St.  Petersburg.  My  personal  interview 
with  you  will  increase  our  friendship  greatly. 

Translation  of  a letter  from  Major-General  Ivanoff,  Governor  of  Zaraf- 
shan,  to  the  Heir- Apparent,  Mahomed  Musa  Khan,  and  others. 

On  the  26th  of  Rabi-ul-Awul,  at  an  auspicious  moment,  I received  your 
letter  which  you  sent  me,  and  understood  its  contents.  I was  very  much 
pleased,  and  at  once  communicated  it  to  General  Kauffmann,  the  Governor- 
General.  With  regard  to  what  you  wrote  about  the  friendly  relations  between 
the  Russian  and  Afghan  Governments,  and  your  own  desire  for  friendship,  I 
have  the  honour  to  state  that  we  are  also  desirous  of  being  friends.  The 
friendship  between  the  two  Governments  existed  in  the  time  of  the  late  Amir, 
and  I hope  that  it  will  be  increased  and  strengthened  by  Amir  Mahomed 
Yakub  Khan. 

May  God  change  the  wars  in  your  country  to  happiness  ; may  peace  reign 
in  it ; and  may  your  Government  be  strengthened  ! I have  been  forwarding 
all  your  letters  to  the  Governor-General,  General  Kauffmann.  May  God  keep 
you  safe  ! 

The  Zarafshan  Province  Governor, 

Major-General  Ivanoff. 

Written  and  sealed  by  the  General. 

Written  on  29th  Mart  (March),  1879  ( = 5th  Rabi-ul-Saui,  1296). 

Treaty  between  the  Russian  Government  and  Amir  Sher  Ai.i  Khan  ; 
written  from  memory  by  Mirza  Mahomed  Nahri. 

1.  The  Russian  Government  engages  that  the  friendship  of  the  Russian 
Government  with  the  Government  of  Amir  Sher  Ali  Khan,  Amir  of  all 
Afghanistan,  will  be  a permanent  and  perpetual  one. 

2.  The  Russian  Government  engages  that,  as  Sirdar  Abdulla  Khan,  son  of 


APPENDIX  VI It. 


$63 


the  Amir,  is  dead,  the  friendship  of  the  Russian  Government  with  any  person 
whom  the  Amir  may  appoint  Heir- Apparent  to  the  throne  of  Afghanistan, 
and  with  the  heir  of  the  Heir-Apparent,  will  remain  firm  and  perpetual. 

3.  The  Russian  Government  engages  that  if  any  foreign  enemy  attacks 
Afghanistan,  and  the  Amir  is  unahle  to  drive  him  out,  and  asks  the  assistance 
of  the  Russian  Government,  the  Russian  Government  will  repel  the  enemy, 
either  by  means  of  advice,  or  by  such  other  means  as  it  may  consider  proper. 

4.  The  Amir  of  Afghanistan  will  not  wage  war  with  any  foreign  power  with- 
out consulting  the  Russian  Government,  and  without  its  permission. 

5.  The  Amir  of  Afghanistan  engages  that  he  will  always  report  in  a friendly 
manner  to  the  Russian  Government  what  goes  on  in  his  kingdom. 

6.  The  Amir  of  Afghanistan  will  communicate  every  wish  and  important 
affair  of  his  to  General  Kauffmann,  Governor-General  of  Turkestan,  and  the 
Governor-General  will  be  authorized  by  the  Russian  Government  to  fulfil  the 
wishes  of  the  Amir. 

7.  The  Russian  Government  engages  that  the  Afghan  merchants  who  may 
trade  and  sojourn  in  Russian  territory  will  be  safe  from  wrong,  and  that  they 
will  be  allowed  to  carry  away  their  profits. 

8.  The  Amir  of  Afghanistan  will  have  the  power  to  send  his  servants  to 
Russia  to  learn  arts  and  trades,  and  the  Russian  officers  will  treat  them  with 
consideration  and  respect  as  men  of  rank. 

9.  (Does  not  remember.) 

10.  I,  Major-General  Stolietoff  Nicholas,  being  a trusted  Agent  of  the 
Russian  Government,  have  made  the  above-mentioned  Articles  between  the 
Russian  Government  and  the  Government  of  Amir  Slier  Ali  Khan,  and  have 
put  my  seal  to  them. 


APPENDIX  VIII. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  461.) 

Letter  from  Sirdar  Abdl'r  Rahman  Khan  to  Lepel  Griffin,  Esq., 
dated  15 th  April , 1880. 

Whereas  at  this  happy  time  I have  received  your  kind  letter.  In  a spirit  of 
justice  and  friendship  you  wrote  to  inquire  what  I wished  in  Afghanistan. 
My  honoured  friend,  the  servants  of  the  great  [British]  Government  know 
well  that,  throughout  these  twelve  years  of  exile  in  the  territories  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  night  and  day  I have  cherished  the  hope  of  revisiting  my 
native  land.  When  the  late  Amir  Slier  Ali  Khan  died,  and  there  was  no  one  to 
rule  our  tribes,  I proposed  to  return  to  Afghanistan,  but  it  was  not  fated  [that 
I should  do  so]  ; then  I went  to  Tashkent.  Consequently,  Amir  Mahomed 
Yakub  Khan,  having  come  to  terms  and  made  peace  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment, was  appointed  Amir  of  Afghanistan  ; but  since,  after  he  had  left  you, 
he  listened  to  the  advice  of  every  interested  [dishonest]  person,  and  raised 
fools  to  power,  until  the  ignorant  men  directed  the  affairs  of  Afghanistan, 
which  during  the  reign  of  my  grandfather,  who  had  eighteen  able  sons,  was 
so  managed  that  night  was  bright  like  day,  Afghanistan  was,  in  consequence, 
disgraced  before  all  States,  and  ruined.  Now,  therefore,  that  you  seek  to 
learn  my  hopes  and  wishes,  they  are  these  : that  as  long  as  your  Empire  and 
that  of  Russia  exist,  my  countrymen,  the  tribes  of  Afghanistan,  should  live 
quietly  in  ease  and  peace  ; that  these  two  States  should  find  us  true  and 
faithful,  and  that  we  should  rest  at  peace  between  them  [England  and 

87 


564 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


Russia],  for  my  tribesmen  are  unable  to  struggle  with  Empires,  and  are  ruined 
by  want  of  commerce  ; and  we  hope  of  your  friendship  that,  sympathizing 
with  and  assisting  the  people  of  Afghanistan,  you  will  place  them  under 
the  honourable  protection  of  the  two  Powers.  This  would  redound  to  the 
credit  of  both,  would  give  peace  to  Afghanistan,  and  quiet  and  comfort  to 
God’s  people. 

This  is  my  wish ; for  the  rest,  it  is  yours  to  decide. 


APPENDIX  IX. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  462.) 

Letter  from  A.  C.  Lyall,  Esq.,  C.  B.,  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India, 
Foreign  Department,  to  Lepel  H.  Griffin.  Esq.,  C.S.I.,  Chief  Political 
Officer,  Kabul,  dated  Simla,  April,  1880. 

I have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  the  Governor-General  has  received  and 
considered  in  council  your  telegrams  of  the  22nd  and  23rd  instant,  forw  arding 
the  translation  of  a letter  received  by  you  from  Sirdar  Abdur  Rahman  on  the 
21st  instant,  together  with  a summary  of  certain  oral  explanations  which 
accompanied  that  letter,  and  a statement  of  the  recommendations  suggested 
by  it  to  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  and  yourself. 

In  conveying  to  you  its  instructions  on  the  subject  of  this  important  com- 
munication, the  Government  of  India  considers  it  expedient  to  recapitulate 
the  principles  on  which  it  has  hitherto  been  acting  in  northern  Afghanistan, 
and  clearly  to  define  the  point  of  view  from  which  it  contemplates  the  present 
situation  of  affairs  in  that  country.  The  single  object  to  which,  as  you  are  well 
aware,  the  Afghan  policy  of  this  Government  has  at  all  times  been  directed 
and  limited,  is  the  security  of  the  North-West  frontier  of  India.  The  Govern- 
ment of  India  has,  however,  no  less  invariably  held  and  acted  on  the  convic- 
tion that  the  security  of  this  frontier  is  incompatible  with  the  intrusion  of 
any  foreign  influence  into  the  great  border  State  of  Afghanistan.  To  exclude 
or  eject  such  influence  the  Government  of  India  has  frequently  subsidized 
and  otherwise  assisted  the  Amirs  of  Kabul.  It  has  also,  more  than  once, 
taken  up  arms  against  them.  But  it  has  never  interfered,  for  any  other 
purpose,  in  the  affairs  of  their  kingdom.  Regulating  on  this  principle  and 
limiting  to  this  object  the  conduct  of  our  relations  with  the  rulers  of  Kabul, 
it  was  our  long-continued  endeavour  to  find  in  their  friendship  and  their 
strength  the  requisite  guarantees  for  the  security  of  our  own  frontier.  Failing 
in  that  endeavour,  wc  were  compelled  to  seek  the  attainment  of  the  object  to 
which  our  Afghan  policy  was,  and  is  still,  exclusively  directed,  by  rendering 
the  permanent  security  of  our  frontier  as  much  as  possible  independent  of 
such  conditions. 

This  obligation  was  not  accepted  without  reluctance.  Not  even  when 
forced  into  hostilities  by  the  late  Amir  Sher  Ali  Khan’s  espousal  of  a Russian 
alliance,  proposed  by  Russia  in  contemplation  of  a rupture  with  the  British 
Government,  did  we  relinquish  our  desire  for  the  renewal  of  relations  with  a 
strong  and  friendly  Afghan  Power,  and,  when  the  son  of  Slier  Ali  subsequently 
sought  our  alliance  and  protection,  they  were  at  once  accorded  to  him,  on 
conditions  of  which  His  Highness  professed  to  appreciate  the  generosity.  The 
crime,  however,  which  dissolved  the  Treaty  of  Gandamak,  and  the  disclosures 
which  followed  that  event,  finally  convinced  the  Government  of  India  that 


APPENDIX  IX. 


565 

the  interests  committed  to  its  care  could  not  but  be  gravely  imperilled  by 
further  adhesion  to  a policy  dependent  for  its  fruition  on  the  gratitude,  the 

food  faith,  the  assumed  self-interest,  or  the  personal  character  of  any  Afghan 
rince. 

When,  therefore,  Her  Majesty’s  troops  re-entered  Afghanistan  in  September 
last,  it  was  with  two  well-defined  and  plainly-avowed  objects.  The  first  was 
to  avenge  the  treacherous  massacre  of  the  British  Mission  at  Kabul  ; the 
second  was  to  maintain  the  safeguards  sought  through  the  Treaty  of  Gan- 
daniak,  by  providing  for  their  maintenance  guarantees  of  a more  substantial 
and  less  precarious  character. 

These  two  objects  have  been  maintained  : the  first  by  the  capture  of  Kabul 
and  the  punishment  of  the  crime  committed  there,  the  second  by  the  severance 
of  Kandahar  from  the  Kabul  power. 

Satisfied  with  their  attainment,  the  Government  of  India  has  no  longer  any 
motive  or  desire  to  enter  into  fresh  treaty  engagements  with  the  Rulers  of 
Kabul.  The  arrangements  and  exchange  of  friendly  assurances  with  the  Amir 
Slier  Ali,  though  supplemented  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  India  by 
subsidies  and  favours  of  various  kinds,  wholly  failed  to  secure  the  object  of 
them,  which  was,  nevertheless,  a thoroughly  friendly  one,  and  no  less  con- 
ducive to  the  security  and  advantage  of  the  Afghan  than  to  those  of  the 
British  Power.  The  treaty  with  Yakub  Khan,  which  secured  to  him  our 
friendship  and  material  support,  was  equally  ineffectual.  Moreover,  recent 
events  and  arrangements  have  fundamentally  changed  the  situation  to  which 
our  correspondence  and  engagements  with  the  Amir  of  Afghanistan  formally 
applied.  Our  advance  frontier  positions  at  Kandahar  and  Kuram  have 
materially  diminished  the  political  importance  of  Kabul  in  relation  to  India, 
and  although  we  shall  always  appreciate  the  friendship  of  its  Ruler,  our 
relations  with  him  are  now  of  so  little  importance  to  the  paramount  objects  of 
our  policy  that  we  no  longer  require  to  maintain  British  agents  in  any  part  of 
his  dominions. 

Our  only  reasons,  therefore,  for  not  immediately  withdrawing  our  forces 
from  northern  Afghanistan  have  hitherto  been — first,  the  excited  and  unsettled 
condition  of  the  country  round  Kabul,  with  the  attitude  of  hostility  assumed 
by  some  leaders  of  armed  gatherings  near  Ghazni ; and,  secondly,  the  inability 
of  the  Kabul  Sirdars  to  agree  among  themselves  on  the  selection  of  a Ruler 
strong  enough  to  maintain  order  after  our  evacuation  of  the  country. 

The  first-named  of  these  reasons  has  now  ceased  to  exist.  In  a minute 
dated  the  30th  ultimo  the  Viceroy  and  Governor-General  stated  that  1 the 
Government  is  anxious  to  withdraw  as  soon  as  possible  the  troops  from  Kabul 
and  from  all  points  beyond  those  to  be  occupied  under  the  Treaty  of  Gandamak, 
except  Kandahar.  In  order  that  this  may  be  done,  it  is  desirable  to  find  a 
Ruler  for  Kabul,  which  will  be  separated  from  Kandahar.  Steps,’  continued 
His  Excellency,  ‘ are  being  taken  for  this  purpose.  Meanwhile,  it  is  essential 
that  we  should  make  such  a display  of  strength  in  Afghanistan  as  will  show 
that  we  are  masters  of  the  situation,  and  will  overawe  disaffection.’  . . . 

‘ All  that  is  necessary,  from  a political  point  of  view,  is  for  General  Stewart 
to  march  to  Ghazni,  break  up  any  opposition  he  may  find  there  or  in  the 
neighbourhood,  and  open  up  direct  communication  with  General  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts  at  Kabul.’  The  military  operations  thus  defined  have  been  accom- 
plished by  General  Stewart’s  successful  action  before  Ghazni. 

With  regard  to  the  second  reason  mentioned  for  the  retention  of  our  troops 
in  northern  Afghanistan,  the  appearance  of  Abdur  Rahman  as  a candidate  for 
the  throne  of  Kabul,  whose  claims  the  Government  of  India  has  no  cause  to 
oppose,  and  who  seems  to  be  approved,  and  likely  to  be  supported,  by  at  least 
St  majority  of  the  population,  affords  fair  ground  for  anticipating  that  our 

37—2 


566 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


wishes  in  regard  to  the  restoration,  before  our  departure,  of  order  in  that  part 
of  the  country  will  now  be  fulfilled. 

The  Governor-General  in  Council  has  consequently  decided  that  the  evacua- 
tion of  Kabul  shall  be  effected  not  later  than  October  next,  and  it  is  with 
special  reference  to  this  decision  that  the  letter  and  message  addressed  to  you 
by  Sirdar  Abdur  Rahman  have  been  carefully  considered  by  His  Excellency 
in  Council. 

What  first  claims  notice  in  the  consideration  of  that  letter  is  the  desire  that 
it  expresses  for  the  permanent  establishment  of  Afghanistan  with  our  assist- 
ance and  sympathy  under  the  joint  protection  of  the  British  and  Russian 
Empires.  This  suggestion,  which  is  more  fully  developed  in  the  Sirdar’s 
unwritten  message,  cannot  be  entertained  or  discussed. 

As  already  stated,  the  primary  object  and  declared  determination  of  the 
Government  of  India  have  been  the  exclusion  of  foreign  influence  or  inter- 
ference from  Afghanistan.  This  cardinal  condition  of  amicable  relations  with 
Afghanistan  has,  at  all  times  and  in  all  circumstances,  been  deemed  essential 
for  the  permanent  security  of  Her  Majesty’s  Indian  Empire.  As  such,  it  has 
hitherto  been  firmly  maintained  by  successive  Governors-General  of  India 
under  the  explicit  instructions  of  Her  Majesty’s  Government.  Nor  has  it 
ever  been  ignored,  or  officially  contested,  by  the  Russian  Government.  That 
Government,  on  the  contrary,  has  repeatedly,  and  under  every  recent  change 
of  circumstances  in  Afghanistan,  renewed  the  assurances  solemnly  given  to  the 
British  Government  that  ‘ Russia  considers  Afghanistan  as  entirely  beyond  the 
sphere  of  her  influence.’ 

It  is  tine  that  negotiations  at  one  time  passed  between  the  two  Governments 
with  a view  to  the  mutual  recognition  of  certain  territories  as  constituting  a 
neutral  zone  between  their  respective  spheres  of  legitimate  influence  and 
action,  and  that  at  one  time  it  was  proposed  by  Russia  to  treat  Afghanistan 
itself  as  a neutral  territory.  Those  negotiations,  however,  having  proved 
fruitless,  the  northern  frontier  of  Afghanistan  was  finally  determined  by 
mutual  agreement,  and  in  1876  the  Russian  Government  formally  reiterated 
its  adherence  to  the  conclusion  that,  ‘ while  maintaining  on  either  side  the 
arrangement  come  to  as  regards  the  limits  of  Afghanistan,  which  is  to 
remain  outside  the  sphere  of  Russian  action,  the  two  Cabinets  should  regard 
as  terminated  the  discussions  relative  to  the  intermediate  zone,  which  pro- 
mised no  practical  result.  ’ 

The  position  of  Afghanistan  as  defined  and  settled  by  these  engagements 
was  again  distinctly  affirmed  on  behalf  of  the  Queen’s  Government  by  the 
Marquis  of  Salisbury  in  1879,  and  the  Government  of  India  unreservedly 
maintains  it  in  the  fullest  conviction  of  its  essential  necessity  for  the  peace- 
able protection  of  Her  Majesty’s  Indian  dominions.  It  is  therefore  desirable 
that  you  should  take  occasion  to  inform  Abdur  Rahman  that  the  relations  of 
Afghanistan  to  the  British  and  Russian  Empires  are  matters  which  the 
Government  of  India  must  decline  to  bring  into  discussion  with  the  Sirdar. 
The  Afghan  states  and  tribes  are  too  contiguous  with  India,  whose  North- 
Western  frontier  they  surround,  for  the  Government  of  India  ever  willingly  to 
accept  partnership  with  any  other  Power  in  the  exercise  of  its  legitimate  and 
recognized  influence  over  those  tribes  and  States. 

The  Governor-General  in  Council  is,  nevertheless,  most  anxious  that  the 
Sirdar  should  not  misunderstand  the  light  in  which  his  personal  sentiments 
and  obligations  towards  Russia  are  regarded  by  the  Government  of  India.  So 
long  as  the  Rulers  of  Kabul  were  amenable  to  its  advice,  this  Government  has 
never  ceased  to  impress  on  them  the  international  duty  of  scrupulously  re- 
specting all  the  recognized  rights  and  interests  of  their  Russian  neighbour, 
refraining  from  every  act  calculated  to  afford  the  Russian  authorities  in 


APPENDIX  IX. 


■67 


Central  Asia  any  just  cause  of  umbrage  or  complaint.  The  intelligence  and 
good  sense  which  are  conspicuous  in  the  Sirdar's  letter  and  messages  to  you 
will  enable  him  to  appreciate  the  difference  between  conduct  regulated  on 
these  principles  and  that  which  cost  Slier  Ali  the  loss  of  his  throne.  This 
Government  does  not  desire,  nor  has  it  ever  desired,  to  impose  on  any  Ruler 
of  Kabul  conditions  incompatible  with  that  behaviour  which  Russia,  as  a 
powerful  and  neighbouring  Empire,  is  entitled  to  expect  from  him  ; least  of 
all  can  we  desire  to  impose  such  conditions  on  a Prince  who  has  received 
hospitality  and  protection  in  Russian  territory.  I am  therefore  to  observe 
that,  in  the  natural  repugnance  expressed  by  Abdur  Rahman  to  conditions 
which  ‘ might  make  him  appear  ungrateful ' to  those  ‘ whose  salt  lie  has 
eaten,’  the  Governor-General  in  Council  recognizes  a sentiment  altogether 
honourable  to  the  Sirdar,  and  perfectly  consistent  with  the  sincerity  of  his 
professed  goodwill  towards  ourselves. 

These  observations  will  furnish  you  with  a suflicient  answer  to  the  question 
asked  by  Abdur  Rahman  as  to  the  ‘ nature  of  our  friendship  ’ and  ‘ its  con- 
ditions. ’ 

The  frankness  with  which  he  has  explained  his  position  entitles  him  to 
receive  from  us  a no  less  unreserved  statement  of  our  own.  The  Government 
of  India  cordially  shares  the  wish  expressed  by  Abdur  Rahman  that,  between 
the  British  and  Russian  Empires,  his  ‘ tribes  and  countrymen  may  live  quietly 
in  ease  and  peace.’  We  do  not  desire  to  place  them  in  a position  of  un- 
friendliness towards  a Power  which  is  pledged  to  us  to  regard  their  country 
as  ‘entirely  beyond  the  sphere  of  its  action.’  The  injury  to  Afghan  commerce 
caused  by  the  present  condition  of  Afghanistan,  to  which  the  Sirdar  has 
alluded,  is  fully  appreciated  by  the  Government  of  India,  and  on  the  restora- 
tion of  peace  between  the  two  countries  the  revival  and  development  of  trade 
intercourse  need  present  no  difficulty.  As  regards  our  own  friendship,  it  will, 
if  sincerely  sought,  be  freely  given,  and  fully  continued  so  long  as  it  is  loyally 
reciprocated.  But  we  attach  to  it  no  other  condition.  We  have  no  concessions 
to  ask  or  make,  and  the  Sirdar  will  therefore  perceive  that  there  is  really  no 
matter  for  negotiation  or  bargain  between  him  and  us. 

On  this  point  your  reply  to  Abdur  Rahman  cannot  be  too  explicit.  Previous 
to  the  Sirdar’s  arrival  in  Turkestan,  the  hostility  and  treachery  of  those  whose 
misconduct  he  admits  and  deplores  had  compelled  the  Government  of  India 
to  make  territorial  arrangements  of  a material  and  permanent  character  for 
the  better  protection  of  our  frontier.  The  maintenance  of  these  arrangements 
is  in  no  wise  dependent  on  the  assent  or  dissent,  on  the  good-will  or  ill-will, 
of  any  Chief  at  Kabul.  The  character  of  them  has  been  so  fully  explained  by 
you  to  all  the  other  Kabul  Sirdars  that  it  is  probably  well  known  to  Abdur 
Rahman.  But  in  order  that  our  present  intercourse  and  future  relations  with 
the  Sirdar  may  be  perfectly  clear  of  doubt  on  a point  affecting  the  position  he 
aspires  to  till,  the  Governor-General  in  Council  authorizes  you,  if  necessary, 
to  make  him  plainly  understand  that  neither  the  district  assigned  to  us  by 
the  Treaty  of  Gandamak,  nor  any  part  of  the  province  of  Kandahar,  will  ever 
be  restored  to  the  Kabul  Power. 

As  regards  this  last-mentioned  province,  the  Government  of  India  has  been 
authorized  by  that  of  Her  Majesty  to  give  to  Sher  Ali  Khan,  the  present  Wali 
of  Kandahar,  a distinct  assurance  that  he  will  be  not  only  recognized,  but 
maintained,  by  the  British  Government  as  the  Ruler  of  that  province.  Sher 
Ali  Khan  is  one  of  the  Native  nobles  of  Kandahar.  He  is  administering  the 
province  with  ability,  good  sense,  and  complete  loyalty  to  the  British 
Government,  which  has  promised  him  the  support  of  a British  garrison 
so  long  as  he  requires  such  support.  The  Governor-General  in  Council 
cannot  doubt  that  Sirdar  Abdur  Rahman  will  readily  recognize  the  obligation 


568 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


incumbent  on  the  honour  of  the  British  Government  to  keep  faith  with  all 
who,  whether  at  Kandahar  or  elsewhere,  have  proved  themselves  tine  and 
loyal  adherents.  Yakub  Khan  forfeited  our  alliance,  and  with  it  his  throne, 
by  mistrusting  the  assurances  we  gave  him,  and  falsifying  those  which  he  had 
given  to  us.  If,  misled  by  his  example,  Yakub  Khan’s  successor  attempts  to 
injure  or  oppress  the  friends  of  the  British  Government,  its  power  will  again 
be  put  forth  to  protect  or  avenge  them.  Similarly,  if  the  next  Kabul  Ruler 
reintroduces  into  his  Court  or  country  foreign  influences  adverse  to  our  own, 
the  Government  of  India  will  again  take  such  steps  as  it  may  deem  expedient 
to  deal  with  such  a case.  These  contingencies,  however,  cannot  occur  if  the 
sentiments  of  Abdur  Rahman  are  such  as  he  represents  them  to  be.  Mean- 
while, the  territorial  and  administrative  arrangements  already  completed  by 
ns  for  the  permanent  protection  of  our  own  interests  are  not  susceptible  of 
negotiation  or  discussion  with  Abdur  Rahman  or  any  other  claimant  to  the 
throne  of  Kabul. 

To  the  settlement  of  Herat,  which  is  not  included  in  these  completed 
arrangements,  the  Governor-General  in  Council  cannot  authorize  you  to  make 
or  invite  any  reference  in  your  reply  to  Abdur  Rahman.  The  settlement  of 
the  future  administration  of  Herat  has  been  undertaken  by  Her  Majesty’s 
Government ; with  those  present  views  in  regard  to  this  important  question, 
the  Government  of  India  is  not  yet  acquainted. 

Nor  can  our  evacuation  of  Kabul  constitute  any  subject  for  proposals  in 
your  correspondence  with  the  Sirdar.  This  measure  was  determined  on  by 
the  Government  of  India  long  before  the  appearance  of  Abdur  Rahman  as  a 
candidate  for  the  government  of  the  country  we  are  about  to  evacuate.  It 
has  not  been  caused  by  the  hostility,  and  is  not,  therefore,  conditional  on  the 
goodwill,  of  any  Afghan  Power. 

The  Government  of  India  is,  however,  very  willing  to  carry  out  the 
evacuation  of  Kabul  in  the  manner  most  conducive  to  the  personal  advantage 
of  Abdur  Rahman,  whose  interests  we  believe  to  be,  more  than  those  of  any 
other  Sirdar,  in  accordance  with  the  general  interests  of  the  Afghan  people. 
For  this  reason  it  is  desirable  that  you  should  inform  Abdur  Rahman  of  our 
intention  to  evacuate  Kabul,  and  our  desire  to  take  that  opportunity  of  un- 
conditionally transferring  to  his  authority  the  whole  of  the  country  from 
which  our  troops  will  be  withdrawn.  You  are  authorized  to  add  that  our 
military  and  political  officers  at  Kabul  will  be  empowered  to  facilitate  any 
practical  arrangement  suggested  by  the  Sirdar  for  promptly  and  peaceably 
effecting,  in  co-operation  with  him,  the  transfer  thus  contemplated  on  his 
behalf.  Such  arrangement  must,  however,  be  consistent  with  our  obligations 
towards  those  who  have  served  and  aided  the  British  Government  during  our 
occupation  of  those  territories. 

For  this  purpose,  it  appears  to  the  Governor-General  in  Council  desirable 
that  the  Sirdar  should  lose  no  time  in  proceeding  to  Kabul,  and  there  settling, 
in  conference  with  General  Stewart  and  yourself,  such  preliminary  arrange- 
ments as  may  best  promote  the  undisturbed  establishment  of  his  future 
government. 

The  Governor-General  in  Council  has,  however,  no  desire  to  press  this 
suggestion,  should  it  appear  to  the  Sirdar  that  his  presence  at  Kabul,  previous 
to  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops  for  the  purpose  of  personal  conference  with 
the  British  authorities,  might  have  the  effect  of  weakening  his  popularity,  or 
compromising  his  position  in  the  eyes  of  his  future  subjects. 

The  point  is  one  which  must  be  left  entirely  to  the  Sirdar's  own  judgment 
and  inclination. 

But  Abdur  Rahman  is  doubtless  aware  that  there  are  at  present,  in  and 
around  Kabul,  personages  not  destitute  of  influence,  who  themselves  aspire  to 


APPENDIX  X. 


569 


the  sovereignty  he  seeks,  and  that  the  family  of  Yakub  has  still  numerous 
personal  adherents,  who  may  possibly  take  advantage  of  the  withdrawal  of 
our  troops  to  oppose  the  Sirdar’s  authority  if  lie  is  not  personally  present  to 
assert  it. 

It  should  on  both  sides  be  remembered  and  understood  that  it  is  not  the 
policy  of  this  Government  to  impose  upon  the  Afghan  people  an  unpopular 
Ruler  or  to  interfere  uninvited  in  the  administration  of  a friendly  one.  If 
Abdur  Rahman  proves  able  and  disposed  to  conciliate  the  confidence  of  his 
countrymen,  without  forfeiting  the  good  understanding  which  lie  seeks  with 
us,  he  will  assuredly  find  his  best  support  in  our  political  appreciation  of  that 
fact.  Our  reason  for  unconditionally  transferring  to  him  the  government  of 
the  country,  from  which  our  forces  will  in  any  case  be  withdrawn  a few 
months  hence,  is  that,  on  the  whole,  he  appears  to  be  the  Chief  best  able  to 
restore  order  in  that  country,  and  also  best  entitled  to  undertake  such  a task. 
In  his  performance  of  it  he  will  receive,  if  he  requires  it,  our  assistance.  But 
we  neither  need  nor  wish  to  hamper,  by  preliminary  stipulations  or  provisoes, 
his  independent  exercise  of  a sovereignty  which  he  declares  himself  anxious 
to  maintain  on  a footing  of  peace  and  friendship  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment. 

The  present  statement  of  the  views  and  intentions  of  His  Excellency  the 
Governor-General  in  Council  respecting  Abdur  Rahman  will  enable  you  to 
represent  them  with  adequate  accuracy  in  your  reply  to  the  Sirdar’s  friendly 
overtures,  and  it  will  now  be  your  duty  to  convey  to  Abdur  Rahman,  without 
any  avoidable  delay,  the  answer  of  the  Government  of  India  to  the  letter  and 
message  received  from  him.  His  Excellency  feels  assured  that  you  will  give 
full  expression  to  the  spirit  of  candour  and  goodwill  in  which  these  com- 
munications have  been  received  and  are  reciprocated. 

But  I am  to  impress  on  your  attention  the  importance  of  avoiding  any 
expression  which  might  appear  to  suggest  or  admit  matter  for  negotiation  or 
discussion  in  reference  to  the  relative  positions  of  the  Sirdar  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  India. 

In  conclusion,  I am  to  request  that  on  receipt  of  this  letter  you  will  be  so 
good  as  to  lose  no  time  in  submitting  its  contents  to  Gcneial  Sir  Donald 
Stewart,  should  he  then  have  reached  Kabul.  In  any  case,  you  will,  of 
course,  communicate  them  to  General  Roberts,  and  act  upon  them  in  con- 
sultation with  the  chief  military  authority  on  the  spot. 


APPENDIX  X. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  464.) 

Extract  from  a Report  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Frederick  Roberts, 
V.C.,  K.C.B.,  to  the  Quartermaster-General  in  India,  dated  Kabul, 
17 th  April,  1880. 

25.  I think  I have  now  dealt  with  all  the  points  of  military  importance  con- 
nected with  the  military  position  in  northern  Afghanistan,  but  there  are  a 
few  questions  of  more  general  interest  which  I desire  to  bring  to  the  notice  of 
His  Excellency  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  Government  of  India. 


S7o 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


Daily  ration  of  Native  soldiers: 

Atta*  i - - 12chittackst 

DallJ  - 
Ghi§  • 

Salt  - 
Meat  • 

Rum  • 


1 ehittack 

L 

3 IJ 

1 lb.  bi-weekly 
1 dram 


26.  First  with  regard  to  rations.  The  daily  scale  of  issue  to  Native  troops 
is  given  in  the  margin.  It  has  been  found 
throughout  the  campaign,  even  when  the 
men  were  employed  upon  hard  work,  that 
‘12  cliittacks  ’ of  ‘atta’  daily  are  amply 
sufficient  for  the  Native  troops,  supplemented, 
as  of  late,  through  the  liberality  of  Govern- 
ment, by  a bi-weekly  issue  of  1 lb.  of  meat. 

In  a climate  like  Afghanistan,  where  the  inhabitants  are  all  meat-eaters,  this 
liberality  has  been  most  wise.  Every  endeavour  was  made,  before  this  s inction 
was  granted,  to  supply  the  Native  portion  of  the  force  with  meat  on  payment, 
and  I attribute  to  this  in  great  measure  the  sound  health  and  excellent 
stamina  which  they  now  exhibit. 

With  regard  to  the  issue  of  rum,  I would  suggest  that  it  should  not  be 
issued  free  to  Native  troops,  except  under  exceptional  circumstances  of  fatigue 
and  weather,  but  that  the  Commissariat  Department  should  be  authorized  to 
have  in  store  a sufficiency  of  rum  to  admit  of  a bi  weekly  issue  to  such  troops 
as  drink  the  spirit,  on  payment, , and  then  only  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Medical  Officer,  and  under  the  sanction  of  the  General  Officer  commanding. 
On  all  occasions  when  rum  is  sanctioned,  either  free  or  on  payment,  those 
who  do  not  partake  of  spirits  should  be  allowed  a ration  of  tea  and  sugar 
under  similar  conditions. 

27.  The  scale  of  rations  for  Native  followers  requires  no  alteration. 

28.  The  European  rations  now  under  issue  in  Kabul  are  as  per  margin,  and 


Daily  ration  of 
European  soldiers : 


Meat  - 

- IJ  lb. 

Bread 

- li  „ 

Vegetables 

- U „ 

Rice  - 

- 4 oz. 

Salt  - 

- s „ 

Tea  - 

- 2 „ 

Sugar 

* 3 „ 

Rum  - 

- 1 dr. 

with  reference  to  them  I would  make  the  following 
remarks  : The  increase  of  \ lb.  in  bread  and  meat  is, 
in  my  opinion,  very  desirable,  for  not  only  is  the 
meat,  as  a rule,  on  service  inferior  to  that  served  in 
cantonments,  but  the  extras  which  can  be  procured 
from  the  coffee-shop  are  not  here  forthcoming.  When 
the  vegetable  ration  consists  of  potatoes,  1 lb.  is 
sufficient,  but  when  it  is  made  of  mixed  vegetables 
1|  lb.  is  necessary.  The  substitution  of  dall  for  any 
portion  of  the  vegetable  ration  I consider  undesirable. 

Tinned  soups  and  meats  and  biscuits  are  most  valuable,  and  should  be 
liberally  supplied  to  every  force  in  the  field.  They  are  portable  and  liked  by 
the  men,  to  whom  they  furnish  a very  welcome  change  of  diet.  I would  very 
strongly  recommend  that  a much  larger  issue  of  these  articles  than  has 
hitherto  been  sanctioned  should  be  provided. 

29.  A question  which  has  arisen  during  this  campaign,  and  which  may 
crop  up  again,  has  been  the  provision  of  firewood  for  cooking  to 
Firewood.  Native  troops  and  followers.  Throughout  the  winter  firewood 
could  not  be  purchased  at  Kabul,  and  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
to  issue  it  to  these  men.  This  was  done  at  the  rate  of  one  sec?i|  per  man, 
but  this  amount  is  not  arbitrary,  and  might,  under  certain  circumstances,  be 
diminished.  Since  roads  were  re-opened  and  markets  re-established  the  issue 
of  wood  has  been  discontinued.  In  framing  any  future  rules  for  the  guidance 
of  a force  in  the  field,  the  question  of  providing  firewood  through  the  Com- 
missariat Department  for  Native  troops  and  followers,  free  or  on  payment, 
should  be  vested  in  the  General  Officers  commanding. 


* Flour.  + A ehittack  = 2 ounces. 

£ A kind  of  pea.  § Clarified  butter. 

||  A seer  = 2 lb. 


APPENDIX  X. 


S7i 


30.  The  scale  of  clothing  authorized  by  Government  for  Native  troops  and 
followers  was  found,  even  in  the  rigorous  climate  of  Afghanistan,  to  be  most 
liberal,  except  that  during  the  very  coldest  weather  a second  blanket  was 
required.  This  want  I was  able  to  meet  from  stock  in  hand,  and  as  the 
weather  became  milder  these  extra  blankets  were  withdrawn  and  returned 
into  store.  Warm  stockings,  too,  are  very  necessary  in  a climate  where  frost- 
bite is  not  uncommon  ; fortunately,  some  thousands  wore  procured  locally 
and  issued  to  followers.  The  ordinary  Native  shoe  of  India,  as  provided  by 

the  Commissariat  Department,  is  utterly  unfitted  for  a country  such 
Shoes,  as  Afghanistan.  Major  Badcock  will  send  to  Peshawar  (where  they 
can  easily  be  made  up)  a pattern  Ivabali  shoe,  which  I am  convinced 
would  bo  found  admirably  suited  for  Native  troops  and  followers  crossing  the 
frontier.  We  are  now  almost  entirely  dependent  on  the  local  market  for  our 
shoes. 

A large  supply  of  English-made  ammunition  boots  should  always  accom- 
pany a force  in  the  field,  in  order  to  allow  those  Natives 
Ammunition  boots,  who  use  them,  and  who  are  often  crippled  by  wearing  other 
descriptions  of  shoe,  to  obtain  them  on  payment  at  the 
moderate  rate  now  fixed,  viz.,  Rs.  4 per  pair. 

The  country-made  waterproof  sheets,  though  slightly  heavier,  have  proved 
themselves  quite  as  serviceable,  if  not  more  so,  than  the 
Waterproof  sheets.  English-made  ones. 

At  the  close  of  the  campaign,  I would  very  strongly  re- 
commend that  an  intelligent  committee  should  be  required  to  go  thoroughly 
into  these  questions  of  clothing  for  troops,  British  and  Native,  and  for 
followers.  I would  also  suggest  that  when  a decision  is  arrived  at,  sealed 
patterns  of  every  article  approved  should  be  deposited  at  all  manufacturing 
centres  and  in  all  the  large  jails,  so  that  when  certain  articles  are  required 
they  need  only  be  called  for,  and  precious  time  (often  wasted  in  reference  and 
correspondence)  saved. 

31.  The  number  of  doolie-bearers  with  the  two  divisions  of  the  Kabul 

Field  Force  now  at  Kabul  is  3,536,  with  the  very  moderate 
Doolie-bearers.  sick  report  of  35,  or  1 per  cent,  of  strength. 

Doolies  and  dandies  are  distributed  as  follows  : 

British  troops/*001,}?8’  V"*  ^ 

1 1 dandies,  2 per  cent. 

Native  troons/d°olieS’  2 Per  cent 
l ( dandies,  3 per  cent. 

— a percentage  which  I consider  sufficient  for  field-service,  as,  in  the  event  of 
any  unusual  number  of  casualties,  transport  animals  could  and  would  be  made 
use  of,  and  it  is  most  undesirable  to  increase  the  number  of  followers. 

The  Lushai  dandy  for  this  sort  of  warfare  is  much  preferable  to  the  carpet 
or  dhurrie  dandy,  as  it  can  be  made  into  a bed,  and  men 
are  not  so  liable  to  fall  out  of  it. 

Bourke’s  doolie  is  very  good,  but  liable  to  get  out  of 
order,  and  difficult  to  repair  when  broken  ; the  ordinary 
kind  is  fairly  good  and  serviceable. 

32.  I would  urge  that  in  future  all  field-service  tents  should  be  made  after 

the  pattern  of  the  Mountain  Battery  tent,  single  fly  for 
Field-service  tents.  Natives,  double  for  Europeans,  and  that  the  poles  should 
be  constructed  on  the  telescopic  principle : that  is,  that 
no  thinning  of  the  wood  where  it  enters  the  socket  should  be  allowed  either 
on  uprights  or  ridge-pole,  and  that  the  old  system  of  paring  away  should  be 
abandoned.  Instead,  the  upper  section  should  sit  flat  on  the  lower.  Doubt- 
less the  sockets  will  have  to  be  longer  and  stronger  than  those  now  in  use, 


The  Lushai  dandy. 


Bourke’s  doolie. 


572 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


but  this  is  the  only  means  by  which  tents  can  be  adapted  to  mule  and  pony 
carriage,  which  will  no  doubt  in  future  wars  be  our  chief  means  of  transport. 

33.  The  Waler  horses  of  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery  have  stood  the  strain 

remarkably  well,  considering  the  hard  work  and  great  ex- 
Waler  horses.  posure  they  have  had  to  bear,  and  also  that  for  a considerable 
time  they  were  entirely  deprived  of  green  food.  I feel  sure 
this  information  will  be  most  satisfactory,  seeing  that,  for  the  future,  the 
Artillery  and  Cavalry  in  India  must  mainly  depend  upon  the  Australian 
market  for  their  remounts. 

34.  As  there  are  some  minor  points  of  detail  which  might  advantageously 

be  considered  by  those  who  have  had  the  experience 
Committee  to  record  sugges-  0f  recent  service,  I have  convened  a committee,  with 
tions  on  equipment.  QoM  MacGreg0r>  C Bi>  as  President,  which  will 

take  suggestions  and  record  opinions  regarding  packing  transport  animals, 
equipment,  kit,  dress,  etc. , of  both  officers  and  men  of  the  several  branches 
of  the  service.  From  the  constitution  of  the  committee,  I feel  certain  that 
their  recommendations  cannot  but  be  valuable,  and  I hope  to  have  the  honour 
of  submitting  them  shortly  for  the  consideration  of  His  Excellency  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. 


APPENDIX  XI. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  517.) 

INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  THE  GUIDANCE  OF  GENERAL  AND  OTHER  OFFICERS 
COMMANDING  COLUMNS  IN  BURMA. 

Mandalay, 

20 th  November,  18S6. 

The  following  general  instructions  for  the  guidance  of  Brigadier-Generals 
and  Officers  in  command  of  columns  are  published  by  order  of  His  Excellency 
the  Commander-in-Chief  in  India  : 

ls£. — Columns  sent  out  for  the  pacification  of  a district,  or  in  pursuit  of  a 
particular  gang  of  dacoits,  must  be  amply  provided  and  able  to 
keep  the  field  for  ten  days  at  least.  To  enable  this  to  be  done 
without  employing  an  undue  number  of  transport  animals,  it  is 
necessary  that  every  endeavour  be  made  to  obtain  grain  for  Cavalry 
horses  and  Transport  ponies  from  the  villages  passed  through  ; 
careful  inquiry  must  be  made  as  to  where  supplies  can  be  obtained 
locally,  and  the  line  of  advance  determined  accordingly.  Arrange- 
ments must  be  made  for  replenishing  the  supply  when  necessary 
from  depots  which  must  be  formed  at  convenient  centres  when  the 
nature  of  the  operations  may  necessitate  it.  These  depots  should 
be  pushed  forward  from  time  to  time  as  the  troops  advance.  The 
work  of  a column  obliged  to  return  to  its  base  of  supply  before  it 
has  had  an  opportunity  of  completing  the  object  of  the  expedition 
must  be  more  harmful  than  beneficial,  as  its  failure  emboldens  the 
enemy  and  weakens  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  our  power  to 
protect  them  and  to  reach  the  offenders. 

2nd. — Where  two  or  more  columns  are  acting  in  concert,  the  details  of  time 
and  place  of  movement  should  bo  settled  beforehand  with  the 
greatest  nicety,  and  the  commanding  officers  of  all  such  columns 


AI'PLSDIX  XI. 


573 


should  be  provided  with  the  same  maps,  or  tracings  from  them,  so 
that  subsequent  changes  of  plan,  rendered  necessary  by  later  in- 
formation, may  be  understood  and  conformed  to  by  all.  Officers 
commanding  columns  must  do  their  utmost  to  get  into,  and  keep 
up,  communication  with  one  another.  This  can  he  effected  by  : 
Visual  signalling, 

Spies  ana  scouts, 

Patrolling. 

3rd. — Movements  to  be  executed  in  concert  with  the  troops  in  other 
brigades  or  commands,  or  likely  to  tell  directly  or  indirectly  on 
the  districts  commanded  by  other  officers,  will  be  fully  communi- 
cated to  those  officers,  both  beforehand  and  when  in  progress. 

4 th. — Brigadier-Generals  are  empowered  to  give  very  liberal  remuneration 
for  the  effective  service  of  guides  and  for  information  involving 
danger  to  those  who  give  it.  They  may  delegate  this  power  to 
selected  officers  in  detached  commands,  but  a close  watch  must  be 
kept  on  expenditure  under  this  head.  Opportunities  should  be 
afforded  to  timid  informers  who  are  afraia  to  compromise  them- 
selves by  entering  camp  to  interview  officers  at  some  distance  out 
and  in  secrecy. 

5 th. — Cavalry  horses  and  Mounted  Infantry  ponies  must  be  saved  as  much 
as  is  compatible  with  occasional  forced  and  rapid  marches.  On 
ordinary  occasions  the  riders  should  dismount,  from  time  to  time, 
and  march  alongside  of  their  horses  or  ponies. 

6th. — The  special  attention  of  all  officers  is  called  to  the  careful  treatment 
of  pack-animals,  and  officers  in  command  of  columns  and  parties 
will  be  held  strictly  responsible  that  the  animals  are  properly 
loaded  for  the  march,  saved  as  much  as  possible  during  it,  and 
carefully  attended  to  and  fed  after  it.  Officers  in  command  will 
ascertain  by  daily  personal  supervision  and  inspection  that  these 
orders  are  carried  out. 

7th. — It  must  be  remembered  that  the  chief  object  of  traversing  the  country 
with  columns  is  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  the  inhabitants, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  put  before  them  evidences  of  our  power, 
thus  gaining  their  good-will  and  their  confidence.  It  is  therefore 
the  bounden  duty  of  commanding  officers  to  ascertain  that  the 
troops  under  their  command  are  not  permitted  to  injure  the 
property  of  the  people  or  to  wound  their  susceptibilities. 

8th. — The  most  injurious  accounts  of  our  intentions  have  been  circulated 
amongst,  and  believed  by,  the  people,  and  too  much  pains  cannot 
be  taken  to  eradicate  this  impression,  and  to  assure  the  people  both 
by  act  and  word  of  our  good-will  towards  the  law-abiding.  Chief 
men  of  districts  should  be  treated  with  consideration  and  distinc- 
tion. The  success  of  the  present  operations  will  much  depend  on 
the  tact  with  which  the  inhabitants  are  treated. 

9th. — When  there  is  an  enemy  in  arms  against  British  rule,  all  arrangements 
must  be  made  not  only  to  drive  him  from  his  position,  but  also  to 
surround  the  position  so  as  to  inflict  the  heaviest  loss  possible. 
Resistance  overcome  without  inflicting  punishment  on  the  enemy 
only  emboldens  him  to  repeat  the  game,  and  thus,  by  protracting 
operations,  costs  more  lives  than  a severe  lesson  promptly  ad- 
ministered, even  though  that  lesson  may  cause  some  casualties  on 
our  side.  Arrangements  should  be  made  to  surround  villages  and 
jungle  retreats  with  Cavalry,  and  afterwards  to  hunt  them  closely 
with  Infantry.  In  the  pursuit  the  broadest  margin  possible  will 


574 


FORTY  ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


be  drawn  between  leaders  of  rebellion  and  the  professional  dacoit 
on  the  one  part,  and  the  villagers  who  have  been  forced  into  com- 
binations against  us.  Bohs  and  leaders  will  generally  be  found 
heading  the  column  of  fugitives,  and  a portion  of  the  Cavalry 
should  be  directed  to  pursue  them  without  wasting  time  over  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  enemy. 

10 111. — Unless  otherwise  ordered,  columns  of  occupation  should  move  in  short 
marches,  halting  at  the  principal  towns  and  villages.  This  will 
give  civil  officers  opportunities  for  becoming  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  their  districts,  and  give  military  officers  time  to  reconnoitre 
and  sketch  the  country. 

11  th. — "Where  troops  are  likely  to  be  quartered  for  some  time,  bamboo  plat- 
forms should  be  erected  to  keep  the  men  off  the  ground.  Tents, 
if  afterwards  provided,  can  be  pitched  on  the  platforms. 

12 th. — The  greatest  latitude  will  be  allowed  to  Brigadier-Generals  and 
officers  in  local  command  in  ordering  and  carrying  out  movements 
for  the  pacification  of  their  districts.  They  will,  however,  report 
as  fully  as  possible  all  movements  intended  and  in  progress, 
through  the  regular  channel,  for  the  information  of  His  Excellency 
the  Commander-in-Chief. 

13 th. — Civil  officers  will  be  detailed  under  the  orders  of  the  Chief  Commis- 
sioner to  accompany  columns.  As  they  are  in  a position  to  reward 
loyalty  and  good  service,  they  will  be  able  to  obtain  more  reliable 
guides  and  intelligence  than  the  military  officers  can  hope  to  get. 
The  Chief  Commissioner  has  authorized  selected  Burmans,  men  of 
position  who  may  look  for  official  appointments,  being  employed 
as  scouts  by  the  civil  officers  of  districts  and  being  attached  to 
columns.  These  scouts  should  wear  some  distinguishing  and  con- 
spicuous mark  or  badge  to  prevent  them  being  fired  on  by  the 
troops.  They  should  not  be  called  upon  to  take  the  front  when 
approaching  an  unbroken  enemy,  or  where  ambuscades  may  be 
expected,  but  their  services  will  be  most  valuable  in  gaining 
information,  and  later  in  hunting  down  the  individuals  of  a 
broken-up  gang. 

14 th. — Absolute  secrecy  must  be  maintained  regarding  movements  against 
the  enemy  and  every  device  resorted  to  to  mislead  him. 

15 th. — When  civil  officers  accompany  columns,  all  prisoners  will  be  handed 
over  to  them  for  disposal.  When  no  civil  officer  is  present,  the 
officer  commanding  the  column  will,  ex  officio,  have  magisterial 
powers  to  inflict  punishment  up  to  two  years'  imprisonment,  or 
30  lashes.  Offenders  deserving  heavier  punishment  must  be 
reserved  for  disposal  by  the  civil  officers. 

Officers  commanding  columns  will  be  held  responsible  that  the  troops 
are  not  kept  in  unhealthy  districts,  and  that,  when  a locality  has 
proved  itself  unhealthy,  the  troops  are  removed  at  the  earliest 
possible  opportunity.  Military  officers  are  responsible  for  the 
location  of  the  troops.  The  requisitions  of  civil  officers  will  be 
complied  with,  whenever  practicable,  but  military  officers  are  to 
judge  in  all  matters  involving  the  military  or  sanitary  suitability 
of  a position. 

17 th. — In  the  class  of  warfare  in  which  we  arc  now  engaged,  where  night 
surprises  and  ambuscades  are  the  only  formidable  tactics  of  the 
enemy,  the  greatest  care  must  be  taken  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the 
camp  at  night.  To  meet  ambuscades,  which  usually  take  the 
form  of  a volley  followed  by  flight,  and  which,  in  very  dense 


APPENDIX  XII. 


575 


jungle,  it  may  be  impossible  to  discover  or  guard  against  by  means 
of  Hankers,  His  Excellency  the  Commander-in-Ckief  would  wish 
the  following  plan  to  be  "tried  : Supposing,  for  instance,  the  lire 
of  the  enemy  to  be  delivered  from  the  right,  a portion  of  the  force 
in  front  should  be  ready  to  dash  along  the  road  for  100  yards,  or 
so,  or  until  some  opening  in  the  jungle  offers  itself.  The  party 
should  then  turn  to  the  right  and  sweep  round  with  a view  to 
intercepting  the  enemy  in  his  flight.  A party  in  rear  should 
similarly  enter  the  jungle  to  their  right  with  the  same  object. 
The  centre  of  the  column  would  hold  the  ground  and  protect  the 
baggage  or  any  wounded  men.  The  different  parties  must  be 
previously  told  off,  put  under  the  command  of  selected  leaders, 
and  must  act  with  promptitude  and  dash.  Each  party  must  be 
kept  in  compact  order,  and  individual  firing  must  be  prohibited, 
except  when  there  is  a clear  prospect.  Past  experience  suggests 
the  adoption  of  some  such  plan  as  the  above,  but  in  guerilla  war- 
fare officers  must  suit  their  tactics  to  the  peculiar  and  ever- varying 
circumstances  in  which  they  may  find  themselves  engaged. 

IS th. — The  Government  have  ordered  a general  disarmament  of  the  country, 
as  soon  as  the  large  bands  of  rebels  and  dacoits  arc  dispersed. 
The  orders  for  this  disarmament  direct  that  all  firearms  are  to  be 
taken  from  the  people,  but  that  a moderate  number  may  be  returned 
to  responsible  villagers  who  are  loyal  and  are  able  to  defend  them- 
selves. No  firearms  will  be  returned  save  under  registered  licenses ; 
and  licenses  will  be  given  only  for  villages  which  can  produce  a 
certain  number  (5  to  10)  guns,  and  are  either  stockaded  or  fenced 
against  sudden  attack.  The  duty  of  disarming  lies  on  civil  officers 
and  the  police but  as  it  is  desirable  that  the  disarmament  should 
be  effected  as  quickly  as  possible,  officers  commanding  posts  and 
columns  will  give  such  assistance  as  may  be  in  their  power  in 
carrying  it  out. 


APPENDIX  XII. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  540.) 

To  His  Excellency  the  Right  Honourable  Frederick  Baron  Roberts 
of  Kandahar  and  Waterford,  Bart.,  V.C.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.I.E.,  R.A., 
Commander-in-Chief  of  Ha-  Majesty's  Forces  in  India. 

May  it  please  Your  Excellency, 

We,  the  undersigned,  representing  the  Sikhs  of  the  Punjab,  most  re- 
spectfully beg  to  approach  Your  Excellency  with  this  humble  address  of  fare- 
well on  Your  Lordship's  approaching  departure  from  this  country.  We  cannot 
give  adequate  expression  to  the  various  ideas  which  arc  agitating  our  minds 
at  this  juncture,  relating  as  they  do  to  the  past,  present,  and  future,  making 
us  feel,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  grateful,  happy,  and  sorrowful.  The 
success  which  Your  Excellency  has  achieved  in  Asia  is  such  as  makes  India 
and  England  proud  of  it.  The  history  of  the  British  Empire  in  India  has 
not,  at  least  for  the  last  thirty  years,  produced  a hero  like  Your  Lordship, 
whose  soldier-like  qualities  are  fully  known  to  the  world.  The  country  which 
had  been  the  cradle  of  Indian  invasions  came  to  realize  the  extent  of  your 
power  and  recognized  your  generalship.  The  victories  gained  by  Sale,  Nott, 


576 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


and  Pollock  in  the  plains  of  Afghanistan  have  been  shadowed  by  those  gained 
by  Your  Excellency.  The  occupation  of  Kabul  and  the  glorious  battle  of 
Kandahar  are  among  the  brightest  jewels  in  the  diadem  of  Your  Lordship’s 
Baronage.  Your  Excellency’s  achievements  checked  the  aggressive  advance 
of  the  Great  Northern  Bear,  whose  ambitious  progress  received  a check  from 
the  roar  of  a lion  in  the  person  of  Your  Lordship  ; and  a zone  of  neutral 
ground  has  now  been  fixed,  and  a line  of  peace  marked  by  the  Boundary 
Commission.  The  strong  defences  which  Your  Excellency  has  provided  on 
the  frontier  add  another  bright  stone  to  the  building  of  your  fame,  and  con- 
stitute in  themselves  a lasting  memorial  of  Your  Excellency’s  martial  skill. 
Never  had  any  British  General  to  face  more  arduous  tasks,  and  none  has 
proved  more  completely  successful  in  overcoming  them  than  Your  Lordship. 
The  result  is  that  India  has  been  rendered  safe  from  the  fear  of  invasion  from 
without.  Your  Excellency  is  not  only  adorned  with  heroic  qualifications,  but 
the  love  and  affection  with  which  the  people  of  India  regard  Your  Lordship 
show  what  admirable  qualities  are  exhibited  in  the  person  of  Your  Excellency. 
Terrible  in  war  and  merciful  in  peace,  Your  Excellency’s  name  has  become  a 
dread  to  the  enemies  of  England  and  lovely  to  your  friends.  The  interest 
which  Your  Lordship  has  always  taken  in  the  welfare  of  those  with  whom 
you  have  worked  in  India  is  well  known  to  everybody.  The  Sikhs  in 
particular  are,  more  than  any  other  community  in  India,  indebted  to  Your 
Lordship.  We  find  in  Your  Excellency  a true  friend  of  the  Sikh  community 
■ — a community  which  is  always  devoted  heart  and  soul  to  the  service  of  Her 
Most  Gracious  Majesty  the  Empress  of  India.  No  one  understands  better 
than  Your  Excellency  the  value  of  a Sikh  soldier,  and  we  feel  very  grateful 
that  the  military  authorities  recognize  the  necessity  of  requiring  every  Sikh 
recruit  to  be  baptized  according  to  the  Sikh  religion  before  admission  to  the 
Army — a practice  which  makes  the  Sikhs  more  true  and  faithful,  and  which 
preserves  the  existence  of  a very  useful  community.  The  Sikhs  are  said  to 
be  born  soldiers,  but  they  undoubtedly  make  very  good  citizens  in  time  of 
peace  also.  Unfortunately,  however,  they  have  had  no  opportunity  of  fully 
developing  their  mental  powers,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  advance  with  the 
spirit  of  the  age.  We  thank  God  that  Your  Excellency  was  among  those  who 
most  desired  to  see  the  Sikhs  refined  and  educated  by  establishing  a Central 
College  in  the  Punjab  for  the  use  of  the  Sikh  people,  and  we  confidently  hope 
that  the  Sikhs,  of  whom  a large  portion  is  under  Your  Excellency’s  command, 
will  give  their  mite  in  support  of  this  national  seminary.  The  subscriptions 
given  by  You  Lordship,  His  Excellency  the  Viceroy,  and  His  Honour  the 
late  Lieutena  t-Governor,  were  very  valuable  to  the  Institution,  and  the 
Sikhs  are  highly  gratified  by  the  honour  Your  Excellency  has  lately  given  to 
the  Klialsa  Diwan  by  becoming  its  honorary  patron.  In  conclusion,  we  beg  only 
to  repeat  that  it  is  quite  beyond  our  power  to  state  how  much  we  are  indebted 
to  Your  Excellency,  and  how  much  we  arc  all'ccted  by  the  news  that  Your 
Lordship  will  shortly  leave  this  land.  The  very  idea  of  our  separation  from 
the  direct  contact  of  so  strong  and  affectionate  a leader,  as  Your  Excellency 
undoubtedly  is,  makes  us  feel  very  sorrowful  ; but  as  our  hearts  and  prayers 
will  always  be  with  you  and  Lady  Roberts,  we  shall  be  consoled  if  Your 
Excellency  would  only  keep  us  in  your  memory,  and  on  arrival  in  England 
assure  Her  Most  Gracious  Majesty,  the  Motner-Emprcss,  that  all  Sikhs, 
whether  high  or  low,  strong  or  weak,  old  or  young,  arc  heartily  devoted  to 
her  Crown  and  her  representatives  in  this  country.  Before  retiring,  we  thank 
Your  Excellency  for  the  very  great  honour  that  has  been  done  to  tne  people  of 
Lahore  by  Your  Lordship’s  visit  to  this  city. 


APPENDIX  XIII. 


577 


APPENDIX  XIII. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  540.) 

To  His  Excellency  General  the  Right  Honourable  Frederick  Baron 
Roberts  of  Kandahar  and  Waterford,  Bart.,  V.C.,  G.C.B., 
G.C.I.E.,  R.A.,  Commandcr-in-Chief  of  Her  Majesty's  Forces  m India. 

May  it  please  Your  Excellency, 

We  are  proud  to  stand  in  Your  Lordship’s  presence  to-day  on  behalf 
of  the  Hindus  of  the  Punjab,  the  loyal  subjects  of  the  Queen -Em press,  who 
appreciate  the  countless  blessings  which  British  Rule  has  conferred  upon  this 
country,  to  give  expression  to  the  feelings  of  gratitude  which  are  uppermost 
in  their  hearts.  We  feel  it  really  an  honour  that  we  are  able  to  show  our 
appreciation  of  British  Rule  in  the  presence  of  the  eminent  soldier  and 
statesman  who  has  taken  an  important  part  in  making  the  India  of  to-day 
what  it  is — contented  within  and  strengthened  against  aggression  from  abroad. 
The  Punjab  is  the  province  where  the  military  strength  of  the  Empire  is  being 
concentrated,  and  the  bravery  of  the  warlike  races  inhabiting  it,  which  furnish 
the  flower  of  Her  Gracious  .Majesty’s  forces  of  the  Army  in  India,  has  been 
conspicuously  displayed  on  several  occasions  during  the  last  thirty  years.  We 
Hindus  have  availed  ourselves  the  most  of  the  facilities  which  British  Rule 
has  provided  for  the  progress  of  the  people  in  commercial  enterprise,  educa- 
tional advance,  and  political  progress.  We  are,  therefore,  all  the  more  proud 
that  we  have  been  allowed  to-day  to  greet  in  person  the  mighty  soldier,  the 
sympathetic  Commander,  and  the  sagacious  Statesman,  the  record  of  whose 
distinguished  career  in  the  East  is  virtually  the  history  of  nearly  half  a 
century  of  glorious  victories — victories  both  of  peace  and  war — achieved  by 
the  British  Power  in  Asia,  to  show  how  intense  is  our  gratitude  towards  the 
Queen-Empress  and  one  of  her  eminent  representatives  in  India,  who  have 
striven  to  do  their  duty  by  the  people  of  this  country,  and  done  it  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  people  and  of  their  Gracious  Sovereign.  The  interests  of 
India  and  England  are  identical,  and  the  Hindus  of  the  Punjab  regard  British 
Rule  as  a Providential  gift  to  this  country — an  agency  sent  to  raise  the 
people  in  the  scale  of  civilization.  Anything  that  is  done  to  guarantee  the 
continuance  of  the  present  profoundly  peaceful  condition  of  the  country  is 
highly  appreciated  by  us,  and  we  are,  therefore,  all  the  more  grateful  to  Your 
Lordship  for  all  that  your  courage,  foresight,  sagacity,  and  high  statesman- 
ship have  been  able  to  achieve.  At  a time  when  all  the  races  and  communities 
inhabiting  this  frontier  province,  which  has  been  truly  described  as  the 
sword-hand  in  India,  are  vying  with  each  other  in  showing  their  high  appre- 
ciation of  the  good  work  done  by  Your  Excellency,  of  which  not  the  least 
significant  proof  lies  in  the  arrangement  for  the  defence  of  the  country  at  all 
vulnerable  points  of  the  frontier,  the  Hindus  are  anxious  to  show  that  they 
yield  to  none  in  the  enthusiasm  which  marks  the  demonstrations  held  in  your 
honour.  But  Your  Excellency  commands  our  esteem  and  regard  on  other 
grounds  also.  The  deep  interest  that  you  have  throughout  your  career  felt  in 
the  welfare  of  the  sepoy,  and  the  closest  ties  of  genuine  friendship  which  you 
have  established  with  many  a notable  of  our  community,  have  laid  us  under 
deep  obligations  to  Your  Excellency.  The  encouragement  that  you  have 
given  to  the  organization  of  the  Imperial  Service  Troops  of  the  Native  States 
is  also  gratefully  appreciated  by  us  ; and  only  the  other  day  we  were  gratified 
to  learn  the  high  opinion  Your  Excellency  entertained  of  the  appearance  and 


578 


FORTY-ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


military  equipment  of  the  Imperial  Service  Troops  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir, 
the  most  important  Hindu  State  in  this  part  of  India.  We  should  be  wanting 
in  duty,  we  feel,  did  we  not  on  this  occasion  give  expression  to  the  great 
regret  which  the  news  of  your  approaching  departure  from  India  has  caused 
among  the  Hindus  of  the  Punjab,  who  feel  that  they  are  parting  from  a kind 
friend  and  a sympathetic  Ruler.  At  the  same  time,  we  feel  that  the  country 
will  not  lose  the  benefit  of  your  mature  experience  and  wise  counsel  for  long  ; 
for  we  are  hopeful  that  you  may  some  day  be  called  upon  to  guide  the  helm 
of  the  State  in  India,  a work  for  which  you  are  so  specially  fitted.  In  con- 
clusion, we  have  only  to  pray  to  the  Father  of  All  Good  that  He  may  shower 
His  choicest  blessings  upon  you  and  your  consort — that  noble  ladv  who  has, 
in  addition  to  cheering  you  in  your  hard  and  onerous  work  in  India,  herself 
done  a great  deal  for  the  comfort  of  the  soldier  and  the  sepoy,  and  that  He 
may  grant  you  many  years  of  happy  life — a life  which  has  done  so  much  for 
the  Queen-Empress’s  dominions,  and  which  may  yet  do  much  more. 


APPENDIX  XIV. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  540.) 

To  His  Excellency  General  the  Right  Honourable  Frederick  Baron 
Roberts  of  Kandahar  and  Waterford,  Bart.,  V.C.,  G.C.B., 
G.C.I.E.,  R.A.,  Commander-in-Chief  of  Her  Majesty's  Forces  in  India. 

May  it  please  Your  Excellency, 

We,  the  Mahomedans  of  the  Punjab,  have  dared  to  approach  Your 
Excellency  with  this  address  with  eyes  tear-bedimmed,  but  a face  smiling.  The 
departure  of  a noble  and  well-beloved  General  like  yourself  from  our  country 
is  in  itself  a fact  that  naturally  fills  our  eyes  with  tears.  What  could  be 
more  sorrowful  than  this,  our  farewell  to  an  old  officer  and  patron  of  ours, 
who  has  passed  the  prominent  portion  of  his  life  in  our  country,  developed 
our  young  progeny  to  bravery  and  regular  soldiery,  decorated  them  with 
honours,  and  created  them  to  high  titles  ? Your  Excellency’s  separation  is 
the  harder  to  bear  for  the  men  of  the  Punjab  because  it  is  our  Punjab  that 
is  proud  of  the  fact  that  about  forty  years  ago  the  foundation  stone  of  all 
your  famous  and  noble  achievements,  which  not  only  India,  but  England, 
rightly  boasts  of,  was  laid  down  in  one  of  its  frontier  cities,  and  that  the 
greater  part  of  your  indomitable  energies  was  spent  in  the  Punjab  frontier 
defence.  If,  therefore,  we  are  sad  at  separating  from  Your  Excellency,  it  w ill 
not  in  any  way  be  looked  upon  as  strange.  But  these  feelings  of  sorrow  are 
mixed  with  joy  when  we  see  that  the  useful  officer  whom  in  1852  we  had 
welcomed  at  Peshawar,  when  the  star  of  his  merits  was  beginning  to  rise, 
departs  from  us  in  splendour  and  glory  in  the  capacity  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Armies  of  a vast  Empire  like  India,  and  is  an  example  of  the 
highest  type  to  all  soldiers.  This  address  is  too  brief  for  a detail  of  all  the 
meritorious  services  rendered  by  your  Excellency  in  the  Punjab,  India  and 
other  foreign  countries  from  that  early  epoch  to  this  date.  Your  zeal  in  the 
Mutiny  of  1857,  your  heroic  achievements  in  the  Abyssinian  and  Afghan  wars, 
your  repeated  victories  of  Kandahar,  and  your  statesmanlike  conduct  of  the 
Burma  wars — all  these  are  facts  which  deserve  to  be  written  in  golden 
characters  in  the  annals  of  Indian  history.  Your  appointment  as  legislative 
and  executive  member  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Government  of  Iudia  for 


APPENDIX  XIV. 


579 


a considerable  period  has  proved  a source  of  blessings  to  the  whole  of  India, 
and  Your  Excellency  deserves  an  ample  share  of  the  credit  due  to  the  Council 
for  all  its  useful  regulations  and  reforms.  The  great  liking  that  men  of  noble 
birth  in  India  have  been  showing  for  some  time  towards  military  service  is  a 
clear  demonstration  of  the  excellent  treatment  received  at  your  hands  by 
military  officers,  as  in  the  reforms  made  by  you  in  the  military  pay  and 
pension  and  other  regulations.  Another  boon  for  which  the  Natives  of  India 
will  always  remember  your  name  with  gratitude,  is  that  you  have  fully  relied 
upon,  and  placed  your  confidence  in,  the  Natives,  thus  uniting  them  the 
more  firmly  to  the  British  Crown,  making  them  more  loyal,  and  establishing 
the  good  relations  between  the  Rulers  and  the  ruled  on  a firmer  footing  to 
their  mutual  good.  Especially  as  Mussulmans  of  the  Punjab  are  we  proud 
that  before  Your  Excellency's  departure  you  have  had  the  opportunity  of 
reviewing  the  Imperial  Service  Troops  of  the  Mahomedan  State  of  Bhawalpur, 
one  of  the  leading  Native  States  of  the  Punjab,  whose  Ruler’s  efforts  to  make 
his  troops  worthy  to  take  their  place  by  the  side  of  British  troops  for  the 
defence  of  India  is  only  one  instance  of  the  spirit  of  active  loyalty  which  we 
are  glad  to  say  animates  the  entire  Mussalmau  community  of  the  Punjab. 
Disturbances  arising  from  foreign  intrusions  are  not  unknown  to  us,  and  we 
have  not  sufficient  words  to  thank  your  Lordship  for  the  admirable  manage- 
ment of  the  frontier  defence  work  carried  on  to  protect  our  country  from  all 
possible  encroachments.  The  greatest  pleasure  and  satisfaction,  however, 
that  we  Mahomedans  feel  in  presenting  this  address  to  Your  Lordship 
emanates  from  the  idea  that  you  go  on  your  way  home  to  your  native 
country  with  a high  and  favourable  opinion  of  the  Mahomedans  of  India, 
true  and  loyal  subjects  to  Her  Majesty  the  Queen-Empress,  whose  number 
exceeds  six  crores,  and  who  are  rapidly  growing.  During  the  Mutiny  of  1857 
the  Chieftains  and  soldiers  of  our  nation  spared  neither  money  nor  arms  in 
the  reduction  and  submission  of  the  rebels.  Your  Lordship  is  also  aware 
what  loyalty  was  displayed  by  the  Mahomedans  of  India  during  the  Afghan 
and  Egyptian  wars,  waged  against  their  own  co-religionists,  and  the  cheer- 
fulness shown  by  them  in  following  your  Lordship  in  all  your  victories. 
Frontier  services,  such  as  the  Kabul  Embassy  and  the  Delimitation  Com- 
mission, rendered  by  the  officers  of  our  creed  are  also  well  known  to  you. 
We  are  therefore  sanguine  that  Your  Lordship’s  own  observation  wrill  enable 
all  the  members  of  the  Ruling  race  in  India  to  form  an  opinion  of  the  relations 
that  exist  between  us  and  the  British  Crown.  The  Mahomedans  of  India 
and  the  Punjab  are  proud  of  being  the  devoted  subjects  of  the  Queen- 
Empress.  In  so  acting  we  perform  our  religious  duties,  for  our  sacred  religion 
enjoins  upon  us  faithfulness  and  obedience  towards  our  Ruling  monarch,  and 
teaches  us  to  regard  the  Christians  as  our  own  brethren.  The  regard  and 
esteem  which  we  should  have,  therefore,  for  a Christian  Government,  as  that 
of  our  kind  mother  the  Queen- Empress,  needs  no  demonstration.  Although, 
for  certain  reasons  wThich  we  need  not  detail  here,  our  nation  has  been  deficient 
in  education,  and  we  have  been  left  much  behind  in  obtaining  civil  employ- 
ment, we  hope  that  your  long  experience  of  our  sendee  will  prove  a good 
testimonial  in  favour  of  the  warlike  spirit,  military  genius,  and  loyalty  of  our 
nation,  and  if  the  circle  of  civil  employment  has  become  too  straitened  for  us, 
the  military  line  will  be  generously  opened  to  us.  We  do  not  want  to 
encroach  upon  Your  Lordship’s  valuable  time  any  further.  We  therefore 
finish  our  address,  offering  our  heartfelt  thanks  to  your  Lordship  for  all  those 
kindnesses  you  have  been  wont  to  show  during  your  time  towards  India  and 
Indians  in  general,  and  the  Punjab  and  Punjabis  in  particular,  and  take  leave 
of  Your  Lordship  with  the  following  prayer  : ‘ May  God  bless  thee  wherever 
thou  mayest  be,  and  may  thy  generosities  continue  to  prevail  upon  us  for  a 

38 


580 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


long  time.’  While  actuated  by  these  feelings,  we  are  not  the  less  aware  that 
our  country  owes  a great  deal  to  Lady  Roberts,  to  whom  wre  beg  that  Your 
Excellency  will  convey  our  heartfelt  thanks  for  her  lively  interest  in  the 
welfare  of  Indian  solaiers  in  particular  and  the  people  generally.  In  con- 
clusion, we  wish  Your  Excellencies  God- speed  and  a pleasant  and  safe  voyage. 
That  Your  Excellencies  may  have  long,  happy,  and  prosperous  lives,"  and 
achieve  ever  so  many  more  distinctions  and  honours,  and  return  to  us  very 
shortly  in  a still  higher  position,  to  confer  upon  the  Empire  the  blessings  of  a 
beneficent  Rule,  is  our  heartfelt  and  most  sincere  prayer. 


APPENDIX  XV. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  540.) 

To  His  Excellency  General  the  Right  Honourable  Frederick 
Baron  Roberts  of  Kandahar  and  Waterford,  Bart.,  V.C., 
G.C.B.,  G.C.I.E.,  R.A.,  Commander-in-Chicf  of  Her  Majesty's  Forces 
in  India. 

May  it  please  Your  Excellency, 

We,  the  representatives  of  the  European  community  in  the  Punjab,  are 
the  prouder  to-day  of  our  British  blood,  in  that  it  links  us  in  close  kinship  to 
one  who  has  so  bravely  maintained  the  honour  of  the  British  Empire  alike  in 
the  years  of  peace  and  storm  that  India  has  seen  during  the  last  three  decades. 
During  the  Mutiny  Your  Excellency  performed  feats  of  gallantry  that  are 
historic.  Since  then  your  career  has  been  one  of  brilliant  success  and 
growing  military  renown.  Whenever,  in  the  histories  of  war,  men  speak 
of  famous  marches,  that  from  Kabul  to  Kandahar  comes  straightway  to  the 
lips.  When  our  mind  turns  to  military  administration,  we  remember  the 
unqualified  success  of  Your  Excellency’s  career  as  Quartermaster-General  and 
as  Commander-in-Chief  of  Her  Majesty’s  Forces  in  India,  in  both  of  which 
high  offices  you  have  added  honour  and  glory  to  your  great  name,  which  will 
never  be  forgotten  in  India.  When  the  private  soldier,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
thinks  he  has  a grievance,  his  desire  is  only  that  somehow  it  may  be  brought 
to  the  notice  of  Your  Excellency,  from  whom,  through  experience,  he  expects 
full  justice  and  generous  sympathy.  When  we  look  towards  our  frontier  and 
see  the  strategic  railways  and  roads,  and  the  strong  places  of  arms  that 
threaten  the  invader,  we  know  that  for  those  safeguards  the  Empire  is  in  no 
small  degree  indebted  to  the  resolute  wisdom  of  Your  Excellency  as  military 
adviser  to  the  Government  of  India.  Last,  but  not  least,  as  a Statesman, 
Your  Excellency  ranks  second  to  none  in  the  Empire  in  the  opinion  of  your 
countrymen  in  this  North-West  frontier  province  ; and  we  should  gladly 
welcome  the  day,  if  it  might  ever  arrive,  when  Your  Excellency  returned  to 
India.  It  is  here  that  we  see  most  clearly  the  passage  of  events  beyond  our 
borders  and  mark  the  signs  of  brooding  trouble  ; and  our  hope  has  always 
been  that,  when  that  trouble  should  break  forth,  yours  might  be  the  hand  to 
guide  England’s  flag  to  victory  again.  The  Punjab  is  the  sword  of  India, 
and  Your  Excellency  has  had  the  courage  to  lean  most  strongly  upon  that 
sword.  It  is  here  that  the  pulse  of  the  army  beats  in  India  : it  is  hence  that 
the  enemies  of  our  country  shall  feel  the  downright  blow  ; and  it  is  here  that 
the  greatest  grief  is  felt  in  parting  from  so  true  a soldier  and  so  far-seeing  a 
Statesman  as  Your  Excellency.  It  is  meet,  therefore,  that  here  we  should 
assemble  upon  this  occasion  of  farewell  to  express  the  great  sorrow  which  we, 


APPENDIX  XVI. 


58  r 

the  representatives  of  the  Europeans  in  the  Punjab,  feel  at  the  prospect  of 
losing  so  soon  the  clear  brain  and  strong  hand  that  Your  Excellency  has 
always  brought  to  the  control  of  the  Army  in  India  and  to  the  solution  of  all 
questions  of  political  or  military  moment.  In  doing  so,  we  mourn  for  the  loss 
of  one  of  the  best  statesmen,  the  best  general,  and  the  best  friend  to  the 
soldier  in  India.  We  say  nothing  of  the  kindly  relations  Your  Excellency 
has  always  been  able  to  establish  with  the  other  races  in  India  ; our  fellow- 
subjects  here  will  doubtless  do  so  in  their  turn.  We  say  nothing  of  Your 
Excellency’s  and  Lady  Roberts’  charming  social  qualities,  nor  Her  Ladyship's 
philanthropic  work  in  India.  We  are  here  only  to  express  our  grief  at  parting 
with  one  wnom  we  value  so  highly  for  the  sake  of  our  commou  country,  and 
our  hope  that  as  your  past  has  been  full  of  glory  to  the  Empire  and  honour  to 
yourself,  so  may  your  future  be  ; and  that  you  may  be  spared  for  many  years 
to  wield  the  sword  and  guide  the  counsels  of  our  country. 


APPENDIX  XVI. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  541.) 

To  His  Excellency  General  the  Right  Honourable  Frederick 
Baron  Roberts  of  Kandahar  and  Waterford,  Bart.,  V.C., 
G.C.B.,  G.C.I.E.,  R.A.,  Commander-in-Chief  of  Her  Imperial  Majesty’s 
Army  in  India. 

May  it  please  Your  Excellency, 

We,  the  Talukdars  of  Oudh,  as  loyal  and  faithful  subjects  of  the 
Empress  of  India,  avail  ourselves  of  the  present  opportunity  of  offering 
Your  Excellency  a most  cordial  and  respectful  welcome  to  the  Capital  of 
Oudh. 

The  long  and  valuable  services  rendered  by  Your  Excellency  to  the  Crown 
and  the  country  are  wtell  known  to,  and  are  deeply  appreciated  by,  us.  Your 
Excellency’s  wise  and  vigorous  administration  of  Her  Majesty’s  Army  in  India 
has  won  for  you  our  respectful  admiration  ; while  your  prowess  in  the  battle- 
field, and  your  wisdom  in  Council  during  the  eventful  period  of  your  supreme 
command  of  Her  Majesty’s  Indian  Forces,  have  inspired  us  with  confidence  in 
your  great  military  talents  and  your  single-minded  and  earnest  devotion  to 
duty.  In  many  a battle  you  have  led  the  British  Army  to  victory,  and  the 
brilliant  success  which  has  invariably  attended  the  British  Arms  under  Your 
Excellency’s  command  has  added  to  the  glory  of  the  British  Empire. 

But  the  pride  and  pleasure  we  feel  at  being  honoured  by  Your  Excellency’s 
presence  in  our  capital  town  give  place  to  sorrow  and  regret  at  the  approaching 
retirement  of  Your  Excellency  from  the  great  service  of  which  you  are  an 
ornament. 

In  grateful  acknowledgment  of  the  most  important  services  rendered  by 
Your  Excellency  to  our  Empress  and  our  country,  we  beg  to  be  allowed  the 
privilege  of  presenting  you  with  a Sword  of  Indian  manufacture,  which  will, 
we  hope,  from  time  to  time,  remind  you  of  us  and  of  Oudh. 

Wishing  Your  Lordship  a safe  and  pleasant  voyage  home,  and  a long  and 
happy  life, 

We  subscribe  ourselves, 

Your  Lordship’s  most  humble 

and  obedient  servants 

The  Talukdars  of  Oudh. 

38—2 


582 


FORTY -ONE  YEARS  IN  INDIA 


APPENDIX  XVII. 

(Referred  to  at  p.  541.) 

To  His  Excellency  General  the  Right  Honourable  Sir  Frederick 
Sleigh,  Baron  Roberts  of  Kandahar  and  Waterford,  Bart., 
V.C.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.I.E.,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.,  R.A.,  Commander -in- Chief  in 
India. 

Your  Excellency, 

Viewing  with  concern  and  regret  your  approaching  departure  from 
India,  we  beg — in  bidding  you  farewell — to  express  our  admiration  of  your 
life  and  work  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Imperial  Forces  in  India,  and  to 
request  you  to  permit  your  portrait  to  be  placed  in  the  Town  Hall  of  Calcutta, 
in  token  for  the  present  generation  of  their  high  appreciation  of  your  eminent 
services,  and  in  witness  to  a future  generation  of  the  esteem  in  which  you 
were  held  by  your  contemporaries. 

With  foresight  denoting  wise  statesmanship,  Governments  which  you  have 
served  have  initiated  and  maintained  a policy  of  Frontier  Defence,  and  en- 
couraged the  increased  efficiency  of  the  Forces. 

In  the  furtherance  of  these  objects  we  recognize  the  salient  points  of  your 
career  and  character  whilst  holding  the  high  rank  of  Commander-in-Chief. 

In  your  continued  efforts  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  private  soldier 
we  recognize  broad  humanity.  In  the  increasing  efficiency  of  the  Army, 
which,  in  our  belief,  characterizes  your  tenure  of  command,  we  recognize  high 
soldierly  qualities.  In  the  state  of  strength  which  the  Frontier  Defences  have 
attained,  mainly  due,  we  believe,  to  you,  we  recognize  practical  sagacity,  con- 
spicuous ability  in  discernment  of  requirements,  and  in  pursuit  of  your  aims 
an  unwearying  industry,  a resolute  persistence,  and  a determination  that  no 
difficulty  can  turn,  in  which  a noble  example  for  all  true  workers  may  be 
found. 

In  a word,  your  life  and  work  are  to  us  identified  with  Frontier  Defence 
and  Efficient  Forces.  We  cheerfully  bear  our  share  of  the  cost,  as  in  posses- 
sion of  these  protections  against  aggression  from  without,  we  believe  all  who 
dwell  within  the  borders  of  the  land  will  find  their  best  guarantee  for  peace, 
and  in  peace  the  best  safeguard  they  and  their  children  can  possess  to  enable 
them  to  pass  their  lives  in  happiness  and  prosperity,  and  escape  the  misery 
and  ruin  which  follow  war  and  invasion.  For  all  that  you  have  done  to  give 
them  such  security,  we  feel  you  deserve,  and  we  freely  give,  our  heartfelt 
thanks. 

Within  the  limitations  of  a farewell  address,  we  hardly  feel  justified  in 
personal  allusions  trenching  on  your  private  life,  but  we  cannot  refrain  from 
noticing  with  responsive  sympathy  the  feeling  of  personal  attachment  to 
yourself  which  is  widespread  throughout  India,  ana  assuring  you  that  we 
share  in  it  to  the  fullest  extent  that  private  feeling  can  be  affected  by  public 
services.  We  endorse  our  assurance  with  an  expression  of  the  wish  that, 
in  whatever  part  of  the  British  Empire  your  future  life  may  be  spent,  it 
may  be  attended,  as  in  the  past,  with  honour,  and,  by  the  blessing  of  God, 
with  health  and  happiness  for  yourself  and  all  those  you  hold  dear. 

It  is  the  prerogative  of  the  Crown  alone  to  bestow  honours  on  those  who 
have  served  their  country  well,  and  none  have  been  better  merited  than  those 
which  you  enjoy,  and  to  which,  we  trust,  additions  may  bo  made.  It  is  the 
privilege  of  a community  to  make  public  profession  of  merit  in  a fellow- 


APPENDIX  XVII. 


583 


citizen  where  they  consider  it  is  due,  and  in  availing  ourselves  of  the  privilege 
to  make  this  public  recognition  of  the  great  services  which,  in  our  opinion, 
you  have  rendered  to  India,  we  beg  with  all  sincerity  to  add  a hearty  God- 
speed and  a regretful  Farewell. 

We  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Your  Excellency, 

Your  obedient  servants. 

Calcutta, 

1KA  March,  1893. 


NOTE 

{to  Chapter  XVIII.,  page  133,  footnote). 

Such  is  the  story  which  has  been  generally  believed.  The  church  exists  at 
the  present  day,  but  it  is  only  right  to  state  that  Skinner’s  children  deny 
that  their  father  erected  a temple  and  a mosque.  Whether  Skinner  did  or 
did  not  build  a temple  will  probably  always  remain  open  to  question,  but 
as  regards  the  mosque,  the  date  inscribed  on  it  shows  it  was  built  at  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  or  long  before  ho  was  born. 


r 585 1 


INDEX. 


PERSONS. 


Abbott,  General  Sir  James,  K.C.B., 
19.  23 

Abdulla  Jan,  330,  343,  484,  559 
Abdur  Rahman,  303,  304,  305,  306, 
422,  458,  459,  460,  461,  462,  46S, 

466,  467,  468,  471,  472,  473,  483. 

493,  503,  504,  505,  506,  510,  529, 

538,  539,  553,  560,  562,  563,  564, 

565,  566 

Adams,  Rev.  W.  J.,  360,  361,  436,  550 
Adye,  General  Sir  John,  G.C.  B.,  285, 
2S7,  289,  291 
Afzal  Khan,  303,  304,  305 
Ahmed  Shah  Durani,  509 
Aitken,  Major,  189 
Akbar,  The  Emperor,  20,  148,  509 
Akram  Khan,  370 

Albert  Victor,  H.R.H.  Prince,  529 
530 

Ali,  183 
Ali  Khan,  303 
Alison,  Sir  Archibald,  185 
Alla  Sing,  Jemadar,  489 
Allen,  Surgeon-General,  550 
Allgood,  Captain,  185,  264 
Amar  Sing,  Raja,  527 
Anderson,  Captain,  361,  362 
Anderson,  Major,  548 
Anson,  Major  Augustus,  144,  179,  182, 
207,  218,  220,  224 

Anson,  General  the  Hon.  G.,  38,  44, 
45,  50,  51,  52,  53,  54,  55,  56,  57, 
58,  63,  79,  82,  83,  87,  138 
Aslam  Khan,  Lieutenant  - Colonel, 
C.I.E.,  10 

Asmatulla  Khan,  420 

Ata  Mahomed  Khan,  Nawab,  329 

Auckland,  Lord,  306,  338,  339 


Ayub  Khan,  422,  459,  460,  466,  468, 
469,  470,  471,  4S2,  483,  484,  485, 
487,  490,  491,  492 
Azim  Khan,  303,  304,  305,  553 
Azimulla  Khan,  162,  210,  238,  239 
Aziz  Khan,  Subadar  Major,  354 

Baber,  The  Emperor,  509 
Badcock,  Major,  350,  368,  388,  439, 
474,  477,  482,  550,  568 
Badshah  Khan,  387 
Bahadur  Shah,  237 
i Baigrie,  Colonel,  323,  324 
Baird,  Sir  David,  187 
Baird-Smith.  Colonel,  88,  89,  100,  102, 
117.  119,  120,  122,  123,  131,  134 
Baker,  Brigadier-General  Sir  Thomas, 
K.C.B.,  385,  389.  394,  395.  403, 
404,  405,  406,  408,  409,  410,  426, 

427,  430,  432,  433,  438,  439,  440, 

441,  443,  444,  445,  446,  447,  449, 

450,  456,  475,  4S8,  489,  493 
Baker,  Colonel  Valentine,  323 
Bakram  Khan,  420 
Bannatyne,  Captain,  142 
Barnard,  Major-General  Sir  Henry,  52, 
53,  54,  55,  58,  70,  78,  82,  83,  84,  85, 
86,  89,  90,  92,  93,  94,  95,  97,  98,  99, 
101,  102,  108,  327 

Barnston,  Major  Roger,  180,  184,  187 
Ban-,  Captain,  23,  30 
Barter,  Major  Richard,  122,  123,  126, 
171 

Mrs.,  123 

Battye,  Captain  Wigram,  344,  448 
Colonel  Arthur,  488,  492 
Frederick,  Captain,  447 
Quintin,  Lieutenant,  90,  447 


586 


INDEX 


Beaconsfield,  The  Earl  of,  328,  458,  464 
Beadon,  Sir  Cecil,  258 
Becher,  Captain,  19 

Major-General  Arthur,  24,  97,  263, 
280 

Major  Sullivan,  490 
Bellew,  Dr.,  31,  343,  417,  422 
Benares,  Maharaja  of,  259 
Bentinck,  Lord  William,  235.  241 
Bernard,  Sir  Charles,  K.C.S.  I.,  498, 
508,  517,  518 
Bertrand,  Father,  123 
Bhartpur.  Raja  of,  545 
Bhopal,  Begum  of,  272,  273.  274,  525 
Biddulph,  Brigadier-General  M.,  346 
Biddulph,  Colonel,  191 
Birbul,  362 
Birsing,  Sepoy,  489 
Blackwood,  Major,  316 
Blanc,  Dr.,  298 

Blunt,  Colonel,  120,  141,  144.  151, 
152,  178,  179,  180,  204 
Bogle,  Captain,  298 
Booth,  Lieutenant,  477 
Bourchier,  General  Sir  George,  K.C.  B., 
63,  141,  151,  170,  172,  173,  178,  180. 
191,  203,  204,  205,  206,  310,  311,  315, 
316,  317,  318 
Bowring,  Mr.  Lewin,  263 
Brabazon,  Lieutenant,  362,  385 
Brackenbury,  General,  531,  534 
Bradshaw,  Dr.,  332 
Brasyer,  Colonel,  226,  227 
Bridge,  Captain,  201 
Bright,  John,  The  Right  Hon.,  514 
General  Sir  Robert,  G.C.B.,  418, 
424,  430,  440,  443,  448,  452, 
464,  465,  468 

Blind,  Brigadier  Frederick,  59 

General  Sir  James,  G.C.B.,  120, 
136 

Broadfoot,  Captain,  384 
Brooke,  Brigadier-General,  481 
Brown,  Major-General  Rodney,  19 
Major  Tod,  52,  176 

Browne,  Dr.  John  Campbell,  107, 
229 

Sir  James,  511 

General  Sir  Samuel,  V.C.,  G.C.B  , 
K.C.S. I.,  175,  228,  229,  346, 
351,  369,  373,  378,  384 
Brownlow,  Colonel  F.,  358,  359,  385, 
437,  450,  489,  492,  550 
Brownlow,  General  Sir  Charles,  G.C.B.. 
283,  286.  289.  310,  317 


Biuce,  Major-General  H.  Legeyt,  C.B., 
208,  215 

Brunow,  Baron,  340 
Budgen,  Lieutenant,  201,  202 
Bukhtiar  Khan,  377,  378 
Bulkeley,  Major,  550 
Bunny,  Lieutenant  Arthur,  174 
Burgess,  Corporal,  126 
Burn-Murdoch,  Lieutenant,  385 
Burnes,  Sir  Alexander,  338,  339 
Burroughs,  Captain,  181 
Burrows,  Brigadier,  468,  469,  470,  471, 
484,  488 

Bushman,  Colonel,  437 

Butler,  Colonel  Thomas.  V.C.,  223 

Butson,  Captain,  443 

Cambridge,  H.R.H.  the  Duke  of,  217, 
301,  302,  493,  498,  529,  530 
Cameron,  Captain,  298 
Lance-Sergeant,  489 
Campbell,  Colonel  (Bays),  226,  227 
Campbell,  Colonel,  63,  64,  67.  73,  118, 
124,  127,  128,  129,  131 
Campbell,  Lady,  263 
Major,  120,  121 
Sir  Colin.  Sec  Clyde 
Sir  Edward,  262,  263 
Sir  George,  84,  231 

Canning,  Lady,  255,  257,  259,  262, 
263,  264,  267,  271,  272,  273,  274, 
2 75 

Canning,  Viscount,  Governor-General 
and  Viceroy,  succeeds  Lord  Dalhousie, 
30  ; condemns  action  of  Meerut  au- 
thorities, 45  ; praises  General  Wilson 
and  the  Army  of  Delhi,  140  ; advised 
by  Sir  Henry  Lawrence,  195,196;  not 
in  accord  with  Sir  Colin  Campbell, 
215  ; insists  on  employment  of  Ne- 
palese troops,  216;  proposals  regard- 
ing native  recruits,  243  ; Viceregal 
progress,  255-267  ; passes  the  income 
tax  against  much  opposition,  268, 
269  ; marches  through  Central  India, 
271-273  ; durbar  at  Jubbulporc,  272  ; 
durbar  at  Lucknow,  273  ; durbar  at 
Allahabad,  274  ; third  durbar  at 
Lucknow,  274  ; loses  his  wife,  275  ; 
leaves  India,  277  ; unjustly  criticized, 
277  ; his  character,  277  ; 42,  44, 
51,  57,  125,  157,  195,  196,  215,  216, 
217,  243,  254,  271,  272,  276,  331 
Carey,  Captain,  159,  160 
Carmichael,  Sergeant,  126 


INDEX 


5«7 


Carr,  Captain,  355,  550 
Case,  Major,  189 
Mrs.,  189 

Cavagnari,  Lieutenant  - Colonel  Sir 
Louis,  K.C.B.,  C.S.I.,  341,  843,  344, 
345,  369,  373,  376,  377,  378,  380, 
381,  383,  386,  388,  389,  401,  420, 
425,  459 

Cavagnari,  Lady,  381 
Cesarewitch,  H.I.H.  the,  531 
Chalmers,  Major  Henry,  155 
Chamberlain,  General  Crawford,  C.S.  I. , 
9,  70,  71,  72,  103 

Chamberlain,  General  Sir  Neville,  9, 
35,  36,  38,  39,  62,  63,  64,  67,  68, 
73,  97,  103,  105,  106,  112,  117,  118, 
131,  134,  137,  138,  276,  280,  282, 
283,  284,  285,  343,  344,  345,  350 
Chamberlain,  Colonel  Neville,  344,  350, 
423,  438,  499,  527 
Chamberlain,  Mrs.,  9 
Chandra  Shamsher,  537 
Channer,  Major-General.  V.C.,  C.B., 
361 

Chapman,  Lieutenaut  - Colonel,  468, 
475,  485,  486 

Chelmsford,  General  Lord,  G.C.B.,  325 
Chesney,  Sir  George,  514,  518,  531,  532 
Chester,  Colonel,  55,  73,  86 
Childers,  The  Bight  Hon.  Hugh,  497, 
498 

Chisholme,  Captain,  443 
Christie.  Mr.,  3S4 
Churchill,  Lord  Randolph,  508 
Clarendon.  The  Earl  of,  340 
Clarke,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  405,  444, 
445 

Cleland.  Lieutenant-Colonel,  385,  434, 
435,  436,  437 
Clerk,  Sir  George,  246 
Clive,  Lord,  56,  94,  133,  194,  309,  501 
Clyde,  Lord  (Sir  Colin  Campbell),  lays 
out  cantonment  of  Peshawar,  11,  12  ; 
substituted  helmets  for  cocked  hats, 
104  ; orders  to  his  men  at  the  Alma, 
115;  appointed  Commander-in-Chief 
in  India,  142  ; starts  for  relief  of 
Lucknow,  164  ; takes  command  of 
relieving  force,  166  ; plans  and  pre- 
parations for  the  relief,  168-170  ; his 
personal  attention  to  details,  170 ; 
fixes  his  Head-Quarters  in  the  Mar- 
tiniere,  173  ; makes  a feint,  174  ; 
orders  more  ammunition,  175,  176  ; 
wounded,  179  ; selects  point  for 


Clyde,  Lord  ( continued ) — 
breach,  180  ; orders  assault  of  Sikan- 
darbagh,  180  ; leads  the  93rd  to  the 
attack,  184  ; his  aide  - de  - camp 
wounded,  185  ; quartered  in  the 
Shah  Najaf,  186  ; his  prudence,  187  ; 
orders  second  assault,  187  ; orders 
colours  to  be  planted  on  mess-house, 
187 ; meeting  with  Havelock  and 
Outram,  188  ; his  soldierly  instincts, 
189  ; evacuation  of  the  Residency, 
190-193  ; thanks  the  troops  for  their 
services,  199  ; march  to  Cawnpore, 
200-203 ; defeats  Nana  Sahib  and 
Tantia  Topi  at  Cawnpore,  204-207  ; 
high  opinion  of  Hope  Grant,  209  ; 
favoured  Highlanders  unduly,  213  ; 
action  at  Khudaganj,  213-215 ; invidi- 
ous selection  of  commanders,  217  ; 
prepares  for  siege  of  Lucknow,  217  ; 
adopts  Napier’s  plan  of  attack,  221  ; 
interview  with  Jung  Bahadur,  224  ; 
makes  an  error  of  judgment,  226, 
227  ; his  good  use  of  artillery,  229  ; 
kindness  of  heart,  264,  265  ; accom- 
panies Lord  Canning  to  Peshawar, 
267  ; succeeded  by  Sir  Hugh  Rose, 

269;  171,  177,  178,  181,  197,  208, 

210,  211,  212,  216,  217,  220,  222, 

230,  255,  256,  257,  259,  263,  266, 

267,  279 

Cobbe,  Brigadier,  357,  360,  362,  550 
Cochin.  Raja  of,  501 
Coke,  General  Sir  John,  G.C.B.,  62, 
68,  100,  101,  110,  111,  114,  130,  140 
Collen,  Major  - General  Sir  Edwin, 
K.C.I.E.,  298,  522 

Collett,  Colonel,  350,  355,  356,  388, 
488,  550 

Colley,  Major  - General  Sir  George, 
K.C.B.,  377,  497 
Collis,  Major,  550 
Colquhoun,  Captain,  550 
Colvin,  Mr.,  154,  155,  156,  157,  545 
Combe,  Major-General,  C.B.,  386 
Congreve,  Colonel,  108 
Connaught,  H.R.H.  the  Duchess  of, 

504 

Connaught,  H.R.H.  the  Duke  of,  504, 

505 

Conolly,  Captain,  383,  384,  387 
Cook,  Major,  378,  379,  404,  431,  438, 
439 

Cooper,  Lieutenant,  181 
Sir  George,  324 


588 


INDEX 


Coote,  Sir  Eyre,  501 
Corbett,  Brigadier,  65,  66,  67,  68 
Cosserat,  Captain,  175,  228,  229 
Cotton,  Captain,  405 

General  Sir  Sydney,  G.C.B.,  13, 
25,  26,  27,  35,  36,  37,  38,  39, 
60 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  152 
Courtney,  Mr.,  11 
Cowie,  Rev.  W.  G.,  287 
Cracklow,  Lieutenant,  144 
Cranbrook,  Earl  of,  347,  348,  353,  417, 
458,  461 

Craster,  Major,  454 
Cross,  The  Viscount,  515,  519,  529, 
535 

Crosse,  Captain,  127 
Crutchley,  Captain,  203 
Cunnyngham,  Lieutenant  Dick,  442 
Currie,  Colonel,  361,  385,  550 

D’Aguilar,  Major,  222 
Dalhousie,  The  Marquess  of  (Governor- 
General  of  India),  his  epitaph  on 
Colonel  Mackeson,  15  ; his  Afghan 
policy,  28  ; treaty  with  Dost  Ma- 
homed, 29  ; resigns,  11,  30  ; 33.  162, 
234,  235,  236,  237,  242 
Dal  Sing,  Jemadar,  140 
Daly,  General  Sir  Henry,  G.C.B.,  62, 
93,  117,  131 

Daubeny,  Brigadier-General,  488 
Daud  Shah,  388,  395,  413,  424,  426, 
451 

Davidson,  Colonel,  35 
Davison,  Lieutenant,  535 
Dawes,  Major,  63 
Deb  Shamshcr  Jung,  537 
Delafosse,  Lieutenant,  163 
Delhi,  King  of,  88,  110,  111,  136,  137, 
143,  237,  238,  239,  260 
Denison,  Sir  William,  285,  287 
Denniss,  Colonel,  73 
Dholpur,  Raja  of,  261 
Dinkar  Rao,  154,  261 
Dir  Sing,  Naick,  489 
Disney,  Lieutenant,  298 
Dost  Mahomed  Khan,  10,  11,  27,  28, 
29,  30,  31,  238,  303,  304,  305,  306, 
338,  339,  457,  461,  466 
Douglas,  Brigadier,  227 
Lieutenant  C.,  490 
Drew,  Colonel  Barry,  362,  371,  550 
Drummond,  Colour-Sergeant,  442 
Mr.,  155 


Drysdale,  General  Sir  William,  K.C.B., 
143,  144 

Dufferin,  The  Marchioness  of,  504, 
506,  521 

Dufferin,  The  Marquess  of,  503,  504, 
505,  506,  507,  508,  509,  510,  514, 
515,  516,  517,  519,  521,  522,  523, 
524,  525,  532 
Duke,  Dr.  Joshua,  445 
Dunbar,  Captain,  91 
Dundas,  Captain,  V.C.,  454 
Dundu  Pant.  See  Nana  Sahib 
Dupuis,  Major-General,  204 
Durand,  Sir  Henry  Marion,  K.C.S.I., 
C.B.,  284 

Sir  Mortimer,  K.C.S.I.,  K.C.I.E., 
386,  414,  422,  439,  460,  539,  553 

Earle,  Captain,  113 
Eden,  Major,  546 
Sir  Ashley,  382 

Edgar,  Sir  John,  K.C.S.I.,  311,  318 
Edwardes,  Sir  Herbert,  Commissioner 
of  Peshawar,  11  ; his  remarkable 
character,  27  ; advocates  friendly 
relations  with  Kabul,  27  ; strongly 
supported  by  Lord  Dalhousie,  28  ; 
his  magnanimity,  29  ; Lawrence’s 
counsellor,  58 ; John  Nicholson’s 
dearest  friend,  138  ; 11,  17,  18,  35, 
36,  37,  39,  60,  61,  125,  138,  246 
Egerton,  Lieutenant,  447 
Elgin,  The  Earl  of,  Viceroy  of  India, 
112,  277,  280,  285 
Eli  Bux,  453 
Eliot,  Captain,  477 
Ellcnborougli,  Lord,  259 
Elies,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.,  521,  522 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  W.  K., 
K.C.B.,  531 

Elphinstone,  General,  419,  449 
Lord,  269 
Mountstuart,  246 
Elverson,  Lieutenant,  477 
English,  Colonel,  218 
Ewart,  General  Sir  John,  K.C.B. , 174, 
180.  181,  203 

Faiz  Mahomed  Khan,  303,  344,  345 
Farakabad,  Nawab  of,  212 
Fanvell,  Major,  385 
Finnis,  Colonel,  46,  47 
Fisher,  Colonel,  548 
Lieutenant,  477 
Fitzgerald,  Lieutenant,  126 


INDEX 


589 


Fitzgerald,  Lieutenant  Mordaunt,  26 
Lieutenant  C.,  477 
Major,  71 

Fitz-Hugh,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  354, 
358,  359,  379,  385,  404,  405,  431,  550 
Forbes,  Lieutenant,  442 
Ford,  Mr.,  546 

Forrest,  Mr.  George,  86,  91,  94,  110, 
120,  241 

Forsyth,  Sir  Douglas,  C.B.,  K.C.S.I., 
57,  81,  321,  323,  330 
Franks,  Major-General,  217,  220,  226 
Fraser,  Colonel,  157,  158 
Fraser-Tytler,  Colonel,  113 
French,  Captain,  152 
Frere,  Sir  Bartle,  Bart.,  G.C.B., 
G.C.S.I.,  274,  328 
Frome,  Captain,  489,  492 
Futteh  Khan,  440 
Fuzl  Ali,  547 

Fyzabad,  Moulvie  of,  228,  547 

Gaisford,  Lieutenant,  447 
Galbraith,  Major,  350,  356,  359,  379, 
550 

Ganda  Sing,  Captain,  227,  228 
Bakslii,  375 

Garvock,  General  Sir  John,  G.C.B., 
287,  288,  290 
Gawler,  Colonel,  278 
Mrs.,  278 

Ghazi-ud-din  Haidar,  183 
Ghulam  Haidar  Khan,  Sardar,  29 
Ghulam  Hussein  Khan,  Nawab  Sir, 
K.C.S.I.,  344,  346,  347,  351,  389, 
416,  422 

Ghulam  Hyder,  455 
Gibbon,  Major,  222 
Gladstone,  The  Eight  Hon.  W.  E., 
464,  497,  510 
Goad,  Captain,  367,  550 
Gokal  Sing,  Jemadar,  181 
Goldsmid,  General  Sir  Frederick, 
K.C.M.G.,  321 
Gomm,  Sir  William,  24 
Gopal  Borah,  Havildar,  490 
Gordon,  Captain,  134,  141 
Captain,  447 

Colonel  B.,  384,  385,  431,  433, 
434,  449 

General  John,  354,  355,  358,  364, 
550 

Brigadier-General  T.,  394 
Lance-Corporal,  489 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  180 


Gortchakoff,  Prince,  323,  339 
Gough,  Brigadier-General  Charles,  424. 

440,  443,  448,  452,  454,  455,  456 
Gough,  Captain  Bloomfield,  434 

Lieutenant  - General  Sir  Hugh, 
V.C.,  G.C.B.,  48,  49,  141,  144, 
151,  170,  176,  177,  178,  214, 
230,  362,  363,  371,  373,  377, 
386  417,  435,  439,  450,  453, 
463  475,  483,  486,  487,  491,  550 
Lord,  2 
Sir  John,  2 

Grant,  Lieutenant,  406 

General  Sir  Hope,  G.C.B.,  85,  93, 
94,  127,  129,  130,  142, 159, 160, 
164,  165,  166,  169,  172,  173, 
176,  179,  184,  186,  190,  197, 
198,  199,  202,  206,  207,  208, 
209,  212,  213,  216,  218,  220, 
221,  222,  223,  224,  227,  228, 
229,  230,  256,  257,  264 
Field-Marshal  Sir  Patrick,  G.C.B., 
G.C.S.I.,  24,  112,  113 
Grant-Duff,  Lady,  497 

Sir  Mount  Stewart,  G.C.S.I. 
497 

Grantham,  Captain  Frank,  12 
Graves,  Brigadier,  85,  108 
Greathed,  Brigadier-General,  142,  143, 
146,  150,  151,  152,  158,  159,  169, 
178,  183,  203,  204,  205,  214 
Greathed,  Lieutenant,  121,  122,  126 
Greaves.  General  Sir  George,  G.C.B., 
G.C.M.G. , 472 
Green,  Major,  385,  452 

Major-General  Sir  George.  K.C.B.. 
62,  141,  187 
Greensill,  Captain,  109 
Greer,  Sergeant,  367 
Greig,  Lieutenant,  488 
Grey,  Sir  George,  112 
Private,  490 
Grieve,  Private,  490 

j Griffin,  Sir  Lepel,  460,  461,  462,  466, 
467,  468,  472,  473,  560,  561 
Griffiths,  Major,  399,  400,  431,  438 
Guise,  Captain,  187 
Gurbaj  Sing,  Subadar- Major,  489 
Gwalior,  Maharaja  of,  261,  524 

Habibulla  Khan,  Mirza,  346 

Mustaufi,  391,  392,  393,  413,  427, 
459,  462,  466,  551,  552,  553 
Hagenau,  Major  von,  509 
Haines,  Sir  Frederick,  328,  332,  335, 


590 


INDEX 


Haines,  Sir  Frederick  ( continued ) — 
350,  367,  384,  385,  418,  448,  469, 
472,  566,  569 
Hakim,  Sepoy,  489 
Hale,  Brigadier,  191,  197,  198 
Hall,  Captain,  404,  445 
Hallifax,  Brigadier,  54,  57,  85 
Hammick,  Captain  St.  V.,  343 
Hamilton,  Lieutenant,  380 
Colonel  Ian,  499,  528 
Ham-mond,  Major,  406,  443,  447 
Hanbury,  Surgeon-General,  475 
Handscombe,  Brigadier,  548 
Haidinge,  Captain  George,  548 

General  the  Hon.  A.  E.,  326,  327, 
500 

The  Viscount,  235 
Hardy,  Captain,  172,  180 
Harness,  Colonel,  204,  229 
Harris,  Rev.  J.,  189 
Hartington,  The  Marquis  of,  464,  529 
Hashim  Khan,  484 
Hastings,  Major,  386,  414,  422,  477 
Havelock,  General  Sir  Henry,  K.C.B., 
letter  from,  112,  113  ; fails  to  force 
his  way  to  Lucknow,  141  ; note  from, 
in  Greek  character,  146  ; made 
K.C.B.,  188  ; meeting  with  Sir  Colin 
Campbell,  188  ; his  death,  199  ; 114, 
148,  158,  163,  164,  167,  169,  173, 
189,  194,  195,  197,  208,  210,  256 
Hawkes,  Lieutenant,  477 
Hawthorne,  Bugler,  126 
Hay,  Lord  William.  See  Tweeddale 
Major,  406 

Hayes,  Captain  Fletcher,  159,  160 
Mrs.,  189 

Haythorne,  General  Sir  Edmund. 
K.C.B.,  280 

Hearsay,  General,  41,  42,  43 
Heath,  Admiral  Sir  Leopold,  K.C.B.. 
301 

Heathcotc,  Lieutenant  A.  136 
Major  Mark,  386,  465 
Honnessy,  Colonel,  487 
Hewitt,  General,  44,  45,  47,  48,  55,  57 
Hills-Johnes,  Lieutenant-General  Sir 
James,  V.C.,  G.C.B.,  96,  102,  103, 
263,  298,  394,  416,  435,  440,  450, 
455,  465 

Hinde,  Major,  141 

Hodson,  Major,  84,  85,  105,  115,  130, 
137,  138,  141,  144,  148,  151,  178, 
225 

Holkar,  Maharaja,  261,  272 


Home,  Lieutenant,  121,  122,  126,  136, 
141,  145 

Hood,  General  Cockburn,  C.B.,  228 
Hope,  Colonel  the  Hon.  Adrian,  169, 
170,  173,  178,  179,  180,  184,  185, 
203,  204,  205,  206,  210,  212,  213, 
214,  223 

Hopkins,  Captain,  187,  218 
Hornsby,  Captain,  488 
Hovenden,  Lieutenant,  33,  126 
Hudson,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  John, 
K.C.B.,  371,  385,  443,  450,  451,452 
Huene,  Major  von,  509 
Hughes,  General  Sir  W.  T.,  K.C.B., 
71 

Hughes,  Major-General  T.  E.,  C.B., 
286,  289 

Hunt,  Captain,  404 
Hyderabad,  Nizam  of,  334,  501 

Ibrahim  Khan,  303 
Sultan,  509 

Inderbir  Lama,  Sepoy,  490 
Inge,  Captain,  384 

Inglis,  Brigadier,  160,  203,  204,  205, 
206,  207 

Inglis,  Lady,  189 

Innes,  Lieutenant-General  McLeod, 
V.C.,  193,  196 
Ivanoff,  General,  559 

Jacob,  Major,  129 
Jacobs,  Colour-Sergeant,  489 
Jackson,  Mr.  Coverley,  547 
Jaipur,  Maharaja  of,  261,  262,  334. 

524,  526,  541,  546 
Janies,  Captain,  160 

Major,  285,  287,  288,  290 
Jaora,  Nawab  of,  261 
Jelaladin  Ghilzai,  383,  384 
Jenkins,  Colonel  F..  344,  441,  450, 
451,  453,  463 

Jenkins,  Mr.  William,  380 
Jervis,  Ensign,  223 
Jhansi,  Rani  of,  168,  204,  278,  279 
Jhind,  Raja  of,  57,  81,  100,  114,  116, 
260,  265 

Jodhpur,  Maharaja  of,  526,  541,  542 
Johnson,  Colonel  Alured,  475 
Major  Charles,  280 
General  Sir  Edwin,  G.C.  B. . 96,  97, 
121,  129,  132,  263,  276,  280, 
301,  320,  321,  326,  327 
Johnstone,  Brigadier,  74 
Jones,  Captain  Oliver,  218 


INDEX 


S9i 


Jones,  Lieutenant,  152 

Lieutenant-Colonel  John,  57,  109, 
110 

Brigadier,  85,  124,  127,  128 
Jumna  Das,  546 
Jung  Bahadur,  216,  224 
Sir  Salar,  334 

Kapnrthala,  Raja  of,  8,  74,  75,  76,  265, 
266 

Karnoli,  Raja,  261 

Kashmir,  Maharaja  of,  267,  275,  320, 
335,  524,  526,  527 

Ivauffniann,  General,  329,  341,  342, 
421,  554,  555,  556,  557,  558,  559 
Kavanagh,  Mr.,  167,  169,  173,  178 
Kaye,  Major,  120 

Kaye,  Sir  John,  51,  55,  97,  221,  424 
Keen,  Major-General,  C.B.,  186 
Kelly,  Dr.,  380 
Colonel,  535 
Kelso,  Captain,  359,  550 
Kennedy,  Captain  ‘Dick,’  350,  400, 
550 

Keyes,  General  Sir  Charles,  G.C.  B., 
286,  289,  337 
Khan  Sing  Rosa,  131 
Khelat,  Khan  of,  328 
Kinleside,  Major,  175 
Kiunthal,  Raja  of,  54 
Knight,  Mr.,  535 
Knowles,  Colonel,  385 
Knox,  Captain,  91 
Komaroff,  General,  503 

Lafont,  A.,  239 

Lake,  Colonel  Edward,  74,  75,  76,  265 
Lord,  89,  133 

Lalbura,  Chief,  314,  315,  317 
Lalla  Joti  Persad,  155 
Lally,  Count  de,  167 
Lang,  Colonel,  121,  122,  134,  135,  141 
Lansdowne,  The  Marquis  of,  525,  527, 
528,  529,  530,  532,  535,  539,  541 
Lansdowne,  The  Marchioness  of,  541 
Lauder,  Colour-Sergeant,  4*S9 
Law,  Captain,  81,  110 
Lawrence,  Lord,  Chief  Commissioner 
of  the  Punjab,  27  ; made  K.C.B., 
27  ; opposed  to  Edwardes’  frontier 
policy,  28,  30  ; meets  Dost  Mahomed, 
30 ; hopeful  of  affairs  in  Punjab, 
43  ; urges  advance  on  Delhi,  55,  56  ; 
trusts  the  Phulkian  Rajas,  57  ; his 
wise  measures  for  preserving  order  in 


Lawrence.  Lord  ( continued ) — 
the  Punjab,  58,  59  ; gratitude  of 
Army  of  Delhi  to,  138 ; begs  for 
return  of  troops  to  Punjab,  141  ; 
favours  a retirement  cis-Indus,  267  ; 
appointed  Viceroy,  293  ; leaves  India 
for  good,  303  ; his  unique  career, 

303  ; neutrality  towards  rival  Amirs, 

304  ; his  policy  of  ‘ masterly  in- 
action,’ 306  ; subsidizes  Slier  Ali, 

305  ; farewell  letter  to  the  Amir, 
307  ; 17,  18,  29,  32,  36,  37,  38,  39, 
43,  57,  62,  63,  64,  70,  71,  83,  97, 
117,  138,  141,  246,  340 

Lawrence,  Sir  Henry,  K.C.B.,  Corps  of 
Guides  raised  under  his  auspices,  25  ; 
first  British  ruler  of  the  Punjab,  113  ; 
foresight  in  provisioning  the  Lucknow 
Residency,  160  ; his  admirable  ar- 
rangements for  its  defence,  173 ; 
predicted  the  Mutiny  fourteen  years 
before  its  occurrence,  194  ; his  char- 
acter as  a Statesman  and  Ruler,  195, 
196  ; friendliness  for  Natives,  196  ; 
suggests  employment  of  Nepalese 
troops,  216  ; opposed  to  annexation 
of  Oudh,  235  ; letter  to  Lord  Can- 
ning, 243  ; his  dispositions  for  coping 
with  the  Mutiny,  547-549  ; memor- 
andum in  his  ledger-book,  549  ; 74, 
112,  113,  159,  160,  173,  193,  200, 
216,  246 

Lawrence,  Captain  Samuel,  V.C.,  193 
Major  Stringer,  501 
Lennox,  General  Sir  Wilbraham.  V.C., 
K.C.B.,  169,  187,  188 
Liddell,  Lieutenant,  445 
Lindsay,  Colonel,  550 
Little,  Brigadier,  173,  174,  204 
Lockhart,  Lieutenant  - General  Sir 
William,  K.C.B.,  K.C.S.I.,  430,  531 
Longden,  Captain,  169,  187,  204,  205, 
206 

Longfield,  Brigadier,  108,  124 
Longhurst,  Dr.,  276 
Loughman,  Captain,  189 
Low,  Colonel,  11 
Low,  General,  235 

Low,  Major-General  Sir  Robert,  G.C.B., 
465,  477 

Lowther,  Commissioner,  6 
Luck,  General,  521,  528 
Lugard,  General  the  Right  Hon.  Sir 
Edward,  G.C.B.,  217,  228 
Luke.  Mr.,  426 


592 


INDEX 


Lumsden,  Captain,  181 

General  Sir  Harry,  K.C.S.I., 
K.C.B.,  25,  31,  304,  417 
General  Sir  Peter,  G.C.B.,  13,  25, 
27,  31,  264,  280,  302,  304.  320, 
327,  332,  417 
Lady,  320,  332 

Lyall,  Sir  Alfred,  G.C.I.E.,  K.C.B., 
143,  145,  380,  384,  460,  472,  473, 
554,  561 

Lyons-Montgomery,  Lieutenant,  477 
Lytton,  The  Earl  of,  262,  328,  329, 
330,  331,  332,  333,  334,  335,  336, 

337,  342,  343,  344,  345,  346,  347, 

348,  350,  351,  352,  353,  365,  369, 

375,  376,  377,  378,  379,  381,  383, 

384,  386,  391,  392,  393,  397,  411, 

413,  414,  415,  418,  420,  448,  458, 

459,  460,  461,  462,  464,  523,  551, 

552,  553,  554,  562,  563,  564,  565, 

566 

Lytton,  The  Countess  of,  332,  334 

Macdonald,  Colour-Sergeant,  394,  406 
Macdonnell,  Captain,  229 
Macdonnell,  Major-General,  326 
MacGregor,  Captain  C.  R.,  477 
MacGregor,  Sir  Charles,  K.C.  B.,  228, 
386,  417,  422,  439,  459,  468,  475, 
488,  489,  493,  510,  569 
Mackay,  Sir  James,  K.C.I.E.,  541 
Mackenzie,  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.,  486 
Mackeson,  Colonel,  11,  14,  15,  16,  19, 
27 

Mackinnon,  Major,  222 
Maclaine,  Lieutenant,  483,  491,  492, 
495 

MacMahon,  Private,  405 
Macnabb,  Sir  Donald,  K.C.S.  I.,  321 
Macpherson,  Lieutenant-General  Sir 
Herbert,  V.C.,  K.C.B.,  385,  401, 
402,  403,  407,  409,  410,  424,  426, 

430,  431,  432,  433,  434,  435,  437, 

438,  439,  440,  441,  442,  444,  446, 

447,  450,  463,  464,  475,  488,  493, 

516,  517 

Macqueen,  Colonel,  385 
Madhoo,  Havildar,  126 
Mahomed,  The  Prophet,  183 

Hussein  Khan,  Mirza,  427,  455, 
463,  554,  558 
Nabbi,  Mirza,  559 
Hyat  Khan,  417 

Jan,  409,  432,  433,  434,  435,  437, 
439,  440,  441,  450,  451,  455,  462 


Mahomed  Sadik  Khan,  48 
Usman  Khan,  10 
Mainpuri,  Raja  of,  159 
Maisey,  Lieutenant,  550 
Malcolm,  Sir  John,  236,  243 
Mangal  Pandy,  34,  43 
Manipur,  Raja  of,  531 
Manners-Smith,  Lieutenant,  386 
Mansfield,  Sir  William.  See  Sandhurst 
Martin,  Claude,  167,  168 
Captain  Gerald,  439 
Lieutenant,  405 
Martindale,  Miss,  146 
Massy,  Brigadier  - General,  384,  385 
386,  408,  409,  410,  417,  432,  433, 
434,  435,  437,  438,  439,  440,  443, 

450,  454 

Matthew,  Bishop,  295 
Mrs.,  295 

Maxwell,  Major  Henry  Hamilton,  213 
Mayne,  Lieutenant  Otway,  164,  166, 
173,  174 

Mayo,  Lord,  303,  307,  308,  310,  318, 
319,  321,  341,  421,  554 
Mazr  Ali,  Jemadar,  436 
McGillivray,  Corporal,  490 
McQueen,  Sir  John,  136,  183,  362, 

451,  550 

Medley,  Lieutenant,  121,  122 
Mehtab  Sing,  General,  75,  76 
Menzies,  Lieutenant,  492 
Merewether,  Colonel,  298 
Metcalfe,  Sir  Charles,  246 
Sir  Theophilus,  129 
Middleton,  Major,  169,  178,  185,  204, 
205,  206,  222,  227 
Mir  Bacha,  455 

Mubarak  Shah,  101 
Jaffir,  101 
Moir,  Captain,  171 

Money,  Colonel  G.  N.,  385,  395,  399, 
417,  431,  441,  442,  443,  490 
Monro,  Lieutenant,  492 
Montanaro,  Lieutenant,  445 
Montgomery,  Sir  Robert,  G.C.B.,  65 
66,  67,  83,  281,  284,  337 
Moore,  Major  Henry,  312,  332 
Rev.  Thomas,  230 
Mrs.,  230 

Moresby,  Captain,  1 
Morgan,  Captain,  384,  431 
Moriarty,  Major,  423,  550 
Morton,  Captain  G.  de  C.,  385,  550 
Mowatt,  Colonel,  54 
Mukarrab  Khan,  Sepoy,  181,  182 


INDEX 


593 


Munro,  Sir  Thomas,  246 
Murphy,  Private,  163 
Murray,  Lieutenant,  405,  492 
Musa  Khan,  395,  414,  415,  450,  458, 
459  559 

Mushk-i-Alam,  429,  451,  453,  484 
Mysore,  Maharaja  of,  501 

Nabha,  Raja  of,  57,  79,  260,  265 
Nadir  Shah,  263,  435 
Nairne,  Major-General,  528 
Nana  Sahib,  113,  161,  162,  168,204, 
205,  206,  208,  209,  217,  236,  238, 
239 

Napier,  Ensign,  84 

Napier  (of  Magdala),  Field  - Marshal 
Lord,  G.C.B.,  K.C.S.I.,  89,  120,  188, 
192,  216,  217,  221,  229,  253,  299, 
300,  301,  309,  310,  315,  319,  320, 
321,  324,  325,  326,  327,  328 
Napier,  Lord  (of  Murchiston),  319 
Sir  Charles,  335 
Nek  Mahomed  Khan,  400,  401 
Nepal,  Maharaja  of,  536,  537,  538 
Nepal,  Maharani  of,  537,  538 
Neville,  Captain  Philip,  434,  435,  437 
Nicholson,  Lieutenant  Charles,  62, 
130,  140 

Colonel  W.  G.,  510,  521 
Brigadier  - General  John,  C.B., 
a name  to  conjure  with  in  the 
Punjab,  33  ; the  beau-ideal  of  a 
soldier  and  a gentleman,  33 ; 
takes  command  of  Movable 
Column,  73 ; punishment  of 
Mehtab  Sing,  75 ; his  soldierly 
instincts,  7 6 ; defeats  the  rebels 
atNajafgarh,  115;  his  masterful 
spirit,  118  ; the  man  to  do  a 
desperate  deed,  125  ; the  first 
to  ascend  the  breach,  126  ; 
mortally  wounded,  129 ; the 
author’s  last  sight  of  him,  130  ; 
his  anger  at  the  suggestion  of 
retreat,  132  ; his  death,  28,  32, 
35,  36,  37,  38,  39,  40,  58,  59,  60, 
61,  73,  78,  111,  114,  116,  117, 
121,  123,  124,  127,  128,  134, 
138,  144,  246,  287 ; his  funeral, 
142 

Lieutenant-General  Sir  Lothian, 
K.C.B.,  223 
Nisbet,  Colonel,  526 
Norman,  Colonel  F.  488 

General  Sir  Henry  G.C.B., 


G.C.M.G.,  13,  91,  96,  112,  116, 

117,  119,  120,  132,  138,  142, 

143,  150,  151,  158,  169,  184, 

187,  188,  230,  263,  271,  276, 

285  319 

Northbrook,  The  Earl  of,  319,  321, 
322,  323,  324,  325,  326,  327,  329, 
330,  336 

Northcote,  Lady,  301 
Sir  Staffordf,  301 
Nott,  General,  428 
Nugent,  Lieutenant,  454 
Nur  Jehan,  20 
Nuttall,  General,  484,  488 

Obcd  Ulla  Khan,  Sirdar,  344 
Ochterlony,  Sir  David,  538 
Oldfield,  Lieutenant,  183 
Olpherts,  General  Sir  William,  V.C., 
K.C.B.,  189 
Omar  Pasha,  239 
Onslow,  Captain,  343 
Oudh,  Begum  of,  164 

King  of,  164,  167,  173,  216,  235, 
236,  237,  239 

Outram,  General  Sir  James,  G.C.B., 
the  Bayard  of  the  East,  167  ; his 
military  acumen,  168  ; his  courage 
and  chivalry,  188  ; differs  with  Sir 
Colin  Campbell,  190  ; interview  with 
the  author,  192  ; commands  an  In- 
fantry division  at  siege  of  Lucknow, 
217  ; preparation  for  the  siege,  220  ; 
maintains  his  high  reputation,  221 ; 
captures  the  Chakar  Kothi,  223  ; 
accomplished  all  that  was  expected 
of  him,  225  ; overruled  by  Sir  Colin 
Campbell,  226 ; completes  the  occupa- 
tion of  Lucknow,  227  ; his  views  on 
the  administration  of  Oudh,  235, 
259  ; leaves  India  on  account  of  fail- 
ing health,  268  ; 11,  28,  160,  163, 
164,  169,  173,  176,  178,  187,  191, 
194,  195,  197,  198,  199,  200,  208, 
216,  222,  224,  225,  246 
Ouvry,  Major,  141,  144,  147 
Owen,  Dr.,  455 
Oxley,  Captain,  405 

Packe,  Lieutenant,  81,  98,  99 
Palmer,  Brigadier-General,  7 

Major-General  Sir  Arthur,  K.C.B. 

362 

Parker,  Colonel,  385,  488 
Parry,  Major,  384,  405,  550 


INDEX 


591 

Patiala,  Maharaja  of,  57,  260,  265,  274 
Paton,  Colonel,  280 
Paul,  Lieutenant,  180,  183 
Payn,  General  Sir  William,  K.C.B., 
213 

Peacock,  Sir  Barnes,  2 
Peel,  Sir  William,  164,  169,  173,  178, 
184,  185,  186,  187,  196,  197,  204, 
205,  206,  213,  219,  223,  230 
Pelly,  Sir  Lewis,  329,  335 
Perkins,  General  Sir  iEneas,  K.C.B., 
355,  362,  373,  384,  394,  449,  450, 
456,  475,  550 

Persia,  Shah  of,  30,  238,  321,  539 
Pertap  Sing,  Maharaja,  344,  526,  542 
Pertap  Sing,  sepoy,  489 
Peshwa,  The,  238 

Phayre,  General  Sir  Robert,  G.C.B., 
471,  481,  482,  483,  486,  487,  495 
Picot,  Lieutenant,  361 
Pole-Carew,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  C.B.. 
435,  499 

Pollock,  General  Sir  George,  377,  428 
Major  - General  Sir  Frederick, 
K.O.S.I.,  321 

Polwhele,  Brigadier,  156,  157 
Porter,  General,  221 
Powell,  Captain,  2 
Captain,  367 
Powlett,  Captain,  187 
Pratt,  Major,  443 

Prendergast,  General  Sir  Hany,  V.C., 
K.C.B.,  508,  509 

Pretyman,  Lieutenant -Colonel,  C.  B., 
350,  356,  499 
Prideaux,  Lieutenant,  298 
Primrose,  General,  468,  469,  470,  482, 
483,  484,  485,  486,  487,  488 
Probyn,  General  Sir  Dighton,  V.C., 
G.C.V.O.,  K.C.B.,  62,  130,  141,  144, 
146,  151,  152,  161,  172,  175,  207, 
214,  230,  282,  287,  289 
Protheroe,  Colonel,  477,  498 
Prussia,  Crown  Princess  of,  509 
Pursoo  Khatri,  Jemadar,  378,  379 

Quinton,  Mr.,  531 

Ragobir  Nagarkoti,  Subadar,  378 
Ram  Sing,  Raja,  527 
Rampur,  Nawab  of,  260,  274 
Rao,  Sir  Madhava,  502 
Rassain,  Mr.,  298 
Rawlinson,  Sir  Henry,  306,  307 
Reade,  Mr.,  155,  157 


Reed,  General,  27,  31,  35,  36,  37,  39, 
64,  70,  102,  105,  108,  109,  112 
Reegan,  Private,  114 
Reid,  General  Sir  Charles,  G.C.B.,  90, 
93,  95,  105,  120,  124,  127,  129,  131, 
326,  327 

Remmington,  Captain,  141,  151,  172, 
173,  191,  204,  222 
Rennick,  Captain,  365 
Rewa,  Maharaja  of,  259,  260 
Rich,  Captain,  303 
Ricketts,  George,  C.B.,  78,  79,  80 
Ridgeway,  Colonel  Sir  West  K.C. B., 
460,  477 

Rind,  Captain,  477 
Ripon,  The  Marchioness  of,  498 
Ripon,  The  Marquis  of,  464,  472,  473, 
492,  493,  495,  498,  503,  506 
Roberts.  General  Sir  Abraham,  2,  5, 
6,  7,  9,  10,  11,  12,  13,  16,  17,  24, 
252,  264,  295,  325,  397,  480,  495 
Roberts,  Hon.  Frederick  Hugh  Sherston, 
315,  497,  507,  525,  541 
Roberts,  Lady  (widow' of  Sir  Abraham), 
252,  295,  495 

Roberts,  The  Hon.  Aileen  Mary,  268 
271,  273,  497,  542 

Roberts,  The  Hon.  Ada  Edwina,  497 
Roberts,  Miss,  252,  295,  495 
Roberts,  Lady,  252,  253,  254,  255,  256, 
257,  259,  262,  263,  264,  267,  268, 

269,  271,  272,  273,  274,  276,  277, 

278,  292,  293,  294,  295,  298,  302, 

303,  308,  309,  318,  319,  320,  323, 

324,  326,  331,  336,  337,  375,  381, 

382,  383,  387,  478,  495,  496,  497, 

499,  501,  502,  504,  506,  510,  514, 

515,  516,  521,  525,  536,  537,  538, 

539,  541,  542,  575,  577,  578 
Roberts,  Field-Marshal  Lord,  V.C., 
K.P.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I.,  G.C.I.E., 
leaves  England,  1 ; arrives  in  India, 
2 ; life  in  Calcutta,  3-6  ; journey  to 
Peshawar,  6-9  ; at  Peshawar,  9-19  ; 
visits  Kashmir,  19-22  ; joins  Horse 
Artillery,  22  ; at  Umballa,  22,  23  ; 
revisits  Kashmir,  23  ; first  visit  to 
Simla,  23,  24  ; returns  to  Pcshaw'nr, 
24 ; at  Mian  Mir,  24  ; first  Staff 
appointment,  25 ; studies  native 
languages,  25  ; passes  examination, 

26  ; rides  a hundred  miles  in  one 
day,  27  ; tour  with  General  Reed, 

27  ; w'itnesses  meeting  between  Dost 
Mahomed  and  Sir  John  Lawrence, 


INDEX 


595 


30  ; second  Staff  appointment,  31  ; 
second  tour  with  General  Reed,  31, 
32  ; refuses  appointment  in  P.W.D., 
32  ; reports  on  sanatorium  of  Cherat, 

32  ; first  meeting  with  Nicholson, 

33  ; returns  to  Peshawar,  33  ; hears 
first  tidings  of  Mutiny,  34  ; at  a 
Council  of  War,  36  ; Staff  Officer  to 
Brigadier  Chamberlain,  38  ; at  the 
mercy  of  a sentry,  40  ; starts  for 
Rawal  Pindi,  40  ; with  Sir  John 
Lawrence  at  Rawal  Pindi,  58,  59  ; 
joins  Movable  Column  at  Wazirabad, 
63 ; en  route  to  Delhi,  62-82 ; at 
Lahore,  65-69  ; arrives  at  Delhi,  82  ; 
before  Delhi,  96-136 ; appointed 
D.A.Q.M.G.  with  Artillery,  97  ; 
first  under  fire,  98 ; fidelity  of  his 
servants,  104  ; wounded,  106  ; 
intimacy  with  Nicholson,  118 ; 
knocked  over  by  a round  shot,  121 ; 
last  sight  of  Nicholson,  130  ; charger 
killed,  132  ; takes  part  in  storming 
of  the  palace,  136  ; leaves  Delhi  with 
Greatlied’s  column  for  Cawnpore, 
142  ; in  action  at  Bulandshahr,  143  ; 
narrow  escape,  144  ; in  fight  at  Ali- 
garh, 147  ; in  fight  at  Agra,  ISO- 
152  ; first  sight  of  Taj  Mahal,  154  ; 
leaves  Agra,  158  ; arrives  at  Cawn- 
pore, 161  ; meets  Sir  Colin  Campbell, 
169  ; marches  to  Lucknow,  170-172  ; 
meets  with  a night  adventure,  175- 
178;  in  the  storming  of  the  Sikandar- 
bagh,  181,  182  ; in  the  attack  on 
the  Shah  Najaf,  184,  185;  plants 
the  colour's  on  the  mess-house,  187  ; 
accompanies  Outram  and  Havelock 
to  the  Residency,  188  ; meets  the 
‘ hero  of  the  Redan,’  201  ; in  fight  at 
Cawnpore,  205-208  ; in  fight  at 
Khudaganj,  213,  214  : wins  the  V.C., 
215  ; at  the  siege  of 'Lucknow,  220- 
226  ; with  Outram  at  capture  of  the 
Chakar  Kothi,  223 ; meets  Jung 
Bahadur,  224  ; complimented  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  230  ; his  views 
on  the  Mutiny,  231-244 ; on  our 
present  position  in  India,  246-251 ; 
takes  furlough,  251  ; marries,  252  ; 
receives  the  V.C.  from  the  hands  of 
the  Queen,  252 ; returns  to  India, 

253  ; refuses  post  in  Revenue  Survey, 

254  ; accompanies  Lord  Canning  on 
his  Viceregal  progress,  255-267  ; loses 


chance  of  service  in  China,  264  ; 
visits  Simla,  268,  269  ; accompanies 
Lord  Canning  through  Central  India, 
271-273  ; returns  to  Simla,  273  ; 
ordered  to  Allahabad,  274  ; accom- 
panies Commander-in-Chief  on  tour, 
275, 276 ; returns  to  Simla,  277 ; again 
on  tour  with  Commander-in-Chief, 
278,  279  ; has  a sunstroke,  279  ; made 
A.Q.M.G.,  2S0;  serves  with  Umbeyla 
expedition,  280-293  ; too  junior  to 
be  a Lieutenant-Colonel,  293  ; voy- 
age round  the  Cape,  294 ; at  home 
again,  295  ; returns  to  India,  295  ; 
serves  with  Abyssinian  Expedition, 
295-301  ; bearer  of  the  Abyssinian 
despatches,  301  ; first  A.Q.M.G. 
302  ; returns  to  India,  303  ; birth  of 
daughter,  303  ; serves  with  Lushai 
Expedition,  310-318  ; receives  the 
C.  B.,  320  ; officiating  Q.M.G.,  326  ; 
with  the  Prince  of  Vales  at  Delhi, 

327  ; first  meeting  with  Lord  Lytton  ; 

328  ; takes  part  in  the  Imperial 
Assemblage  at  Delhi,  332-335  ; 
accepts  command  of  Punjab  Frontier 
Force,  336  ; assumes  command  of 
Kurara  Field  Force,  348  ; short- 
comings of  his  column,  348,  349;  his 
able  staff,  350  ; advances  into  the 
Kuraru  valley,  352-355 ; takes  the 
Peiwar  Kotal,  355-364  ; devotion  of 
his  orderlies,  361  ; congratulated  by 
the  Queen,  365  ; hampered  by  want 
of  transport,  368  ; punishment  of 
treachery,  368 ; action  at  Khost, 
371  ; misrepresented  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  372  ; dismisses  a war  cor- 
respondent, 374  ; holds  a Queen’s 
birthday  parade,  378 ; farewell  to 
Cavagnari,  380,  381 ; serves  on  the 
Army  Commission,  382  ; his  recom- 
mendations gradually  carried  out, 
382 ; appointed  Commander  of  Kabul 
Field  Force,  384  ; starts  for  Kabul, 
387  ; correspondence  with  Yakub 
Khan,  388  ; issues  a Proclamation 
to  the  people  of  Kabul,  390  ; meet- 
ing with  Yakub  Khan,  395  ; issues  a 
Proclamation  and  an  order,  397 ; 
takes  the  Shutargardan,  399  ; defeats 
the  Afghans  at  Charasia,  403-406  ; 
advances  on  Kabul,  407-410;  instruc- 
tions from  the  Government  of  India, 
411,  412  ; inspects  the  Embassy  and 

39 


596 


INDEX 


the  Bala  Hissar,  412,  413  ; receives 
abdication  of  Yakub  Khan,  414  ; 
issues  a Proclamation,  415,  .416  ; 
makes  a formal  entry  into  Kabul, 
416  ; adopts  measures  for  carrying 
on  administration,  417  ; misrepre- 
sented in  House  of  Commons,  417  ; 
congratulated  by  the  Queen  and  the 
Viceroy,  418  ; wintering  at  Kabul, 
418-427  ; attacked  by  the  tribesmen 
on  all  sides,  428-440  ; life  saved  by 
Mazr  Ali,  436  ; storming  of  the 
Takht-i-Shah,  441,  442;  further 
attacks,  444-447  ; concentrates  his 
forces  at  Sherpur,  448,  449  ; 

strengthens  his  defences,  449,  450  ; 
arrests  Daud  Shah,  451  ; defeats  and 
disperses  the  tribesmen,  453,  454  ; 
reopens  communication  with  India, 
455  ; issues  a Proclamation,  455  ; 
fortifies  Sherpur,  456  ; negotiations 
at  Kabul,  456-462  ; holds  a durbar, 
462  ; hands  over  supreme  command 
to  Sir  Donald  Stewart,  465  ; visits 
Jalalabad,  468  ; hears  news  of  Mai- 
wand,  468  ; telegram  to  Adjutant- 
General,  472  ; appointed  Commander 
of  Kabul-Kandahar  Field  Force,  473  ; 
preparations  for  the  march,  473,  474; 
details  of  the  Force,  475,  476  ; com- 
missariat and  transport,  477,  478  ; 
starts  for  Kandahar,  478  ; order  of 
marching,  479  ; reaches  Ghazni,  480  ; 
reaches  Kelat-i-Ghilzai,  481  ; tele- 
graphs progress  to  Government,  481  ; 
food  required  daily  for  the  force,  482  ; 
down  with  fever,  482  ; reports  pro- 
gress, 483 ; letter  from  General 
Phayre,  483  ; telegraphs  to  Simla, 
484 ; reaches  Kandahar,  484 ; de- 
moralized condition  of  the  garrison, 
484  ; encamps  to  the  west  of  the 
city,  485  ; reconnoitres  the  enemy's 
position,  486  ; assumes  command  of 
the  Army  of  Southern  Afghanistan, 
487  ; defeats  Ayub  Khan,  488-491  ; 
and  captures  his  camp,  491  ; tele- 
graphs the  news,  492 ; difficulties 
about  supplies,  492  ; congratulated 
by  the  Queen  and  the  Duke  of  Cam- 
bridge, '.493 ; made  G.C.B.,  493; 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Madras  Army,  493  ; proceeds  to 
Quetta,  493  ; parting  with  the 
troops,  494  ; pleasant  memories, 


494  ; receives  autograph  letter  from 
the  Queen,  495  ; reception  in  Eng- 
land, 495  ; appointed  Governor  of 
Natal  and  Commander  of  the  Forces 
in  South  Africa,  497  ; witnesses  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  German  Army, 
497  ; offered  the  Quartermaster- 
Generalship,  497  ; proceeds  to  Madras, 
497  ; visits  the  Andaman  Islands, 

497  ; proceeds  to  Burma,  498  ; de- 
clines the  Quartermaster-Generalship, 

498  ; measures  for  improving  the 
Madras  Army,  499-501  ; memories 
of  Madras,  501,  502  ; visits  Calcutta, 
503  ; meeting  with  Abdur  Rahman 
at  Rawal  Pindi,  504-506  ; returns  to 
Madras,  507  ; appointed  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  India,  507  ; brief  visit  to 
England,  507  ; accompanies  Lord 
Dufferin  to  Gwalior,  507 ; proceeds 
to  Delhi,  509  ; Camp  of  Exercise  at 
Delhi,  509  ; accompanies  Lord  Duf- 
ferin to  Burma,  509,  510  ; proceeds 
to  the  North-West  Frontier,  510  ; 
makes  a tour  of  inspection,  510-512  ; 
draw's  up  a memorandum  on  frontier 
defence,  512,  513  ; Lady  Roberts’s 
Homes, 514,  515;  sends  reinforcements 
to  Burma,  516  ; lands  at  Rangoon, 
517;  measures  for  pacification  of  Upper 
Burma,  518  ; inspects  North-West 
Frontier  with  General  Chesney,  518  ; 
receives  Grand  Cross  of  the  Indian 
Empire,  519  ; establishes  ‘ Regi- 
mental Institutes,’  519  ; establishes 
the  Army  Temperance  Association, 

520  ; makes  a tour  with  Lord  Duf- 
ferin along  the  North-West  Frontier, 

521  ; official  inspections,  521  ; pre- 
sides over  Defence  and  Mobilization 
Committees,  522  524  ; supports  Lord 
Dufferin ’s  scheme  for  the  utilization 
of  Native  States’  armies,  524  ; visits 
the  frontier,  525  ; spends  Christmas 
in  camp,  525  ; visits  Calcutta,  525  ; 
makes  a tour  of  inspection  in  Cen- 
tral India  and  Rajputana,  525-527  ; 
and  in  Kashmir,  527  ; remodels  the 
system  of  musketry  instruction  for 
the  Native  Army,  527 ; improve- 
ments in  Artillery  and  Cavalry,  528  ; 
visits  the  frontier  with  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  529 ; offered  the  post  of 
Adjutant-General,  529  ; meets  Prince 
Albert  Victor  in  Calcutta,  529  ; 


INDEX  597 


entertains  the  Prince  at  Muridki, 

530  ; extension  of  command,  530  ; 
meets  the  Cesarewitch  in  Calcutta, 

531  ; views  on  the  Native  Army, 
532 ; steps  taken  to  increase  its 
efficiency,  532,  533  ; concession  to  the 
Native  Army,  533  ; unable  to  remedy 
the  under-officering  of  Native  regi- 
ments, 533  ; inspects  the  Zliob 
valley  with  General  Brackenbury, 
534  ; raised  to  the  peerage,  535 ; 
visits  Burma,  536 ; visits  Nepal, 

536  ; review  of  the  Maharaja’s  troops, 

537  ; a grand  durbar,  537  ; an  even- 
ing reception  at  the  palace,  537,  538  ; 
e short  tour  in  the  Punjab,  538 ; pro- 
posed Mission  to  the  Amir,  530  ; the 
Mission  abandoned,  539  ; adieu  to  I 
Sinda,  540  ; final  tour  in  the  Pun-  j 
jab,  540  ; farewell  entertainments  at  ] 
Lahore,  540  ; at  Lucknow,  541  ; and 
at  Calcutta,  541  ; pig-sticking  at 
Jaipur  and  Jodhpur,  542  ; address 
from  the  municipality  of  Ahmeda- 
bad,  542 ; parting  dinner  at  the 
Byculla  Club,  542  ; the  end  of  forty- 
one  years  in  India,  543  ; letter  to 
Yakub  Khan,  551  ; interview  with 
Yakub  Khan’s  agents,  551-553 ; 
official  report  on  interview  with 
Yakub  Khan,  554-556  ; extract  from 
Report  on  Commissariat,  566-569  ; 
instructions  to  officer's  commanding 
Column  in  Burma,  569-572  ; farewell 
address  from  Sikhs  of  the  Punjab. 
572,  573  ; from  Hindus  of  the  Pun- 
jab, 574,  575  ; from  Mahomedans  of 
the  Punjab,  575-577  ; from  the 
European  community  of  the  Punjab,  j 
577,  578  ; from  the  Talukdars  of 
Oudh,  578  ; from  the  citizens  of 
Calcutta,  579,  580 

Robertson,  Lieutenant,  477 
Robinson,  Lieutenant,  488 
Romanofski,  General,  304 
Rose,  Sir  Hugh.  See  Strathnairn 
Ross,  General  Sir  John,  G.C.B.,  457, 
463,  465,  475,  487,488,  489,  490.  507 
Ross,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  385 
Dr.  Tyrrell,  214,  215,  267 
Mrs.  Tyrrell,  267 
Rothney,  Captain,  62,  79 
Runjit  Sing,  20,  267 
Russell,  Brigadier  D.,  169,  173,  178. 
186,  190,  191 


Russell,  General  Sir  Edward  Lechmere, 
K.C.S.I.,  298,  301 
Russell,  Lieutenant,  52 
Russia,  Czar  of,  369,  462,  554,  555, 

556,  557,  558 

Ruttun  Sing,  Subadar,  139,  110 

St.  John,  Sir  Oliver,  343,  460,  470, 
483,  485 

Saiyad  Nur  Mahomed,  308,  321,  322, 
323,  329,  335,  421,  554 
Sale,  Sir  Robert,  14,  77,  107,  377, 
424,  468 

Salisbury,  The  Marquis  of,  329,  347, 
507,  563 

Salkeld,  Lieutenant,  126 
Salmon,  Sir  Nowell,  185 
Salmond,  Lieutenant,  207 
Samandar  Khan,  455 
Sandeman,  Colonel,  77 

Sir  Robert,  77,  227,  330,  493, 
511,  529 

Sandford,  Major,  222,  223 
Sandhurst,  General  Lord,  G.C.B. , 
G.C.S.I.  (Sir  “William  Mansfield) 
166,  179,  184,  197,  198,  202,  206, 
207,  208,  212,  213,  222,  226,  257. 
295,  296,  297,  299,  302,  309 
Sandhurst,  Lady,  257 
Sankar  Dass,  Native  Doctor,  378 
Sarel,  Captain,  144 
Schouvaloff,  Count,  340 
Scott,  Captain  A.,  550 
Major,  83,  89,  120 
Seaton,  Brigadier,  212 
Shafto,  Captain,  418 
Shah  Jehan,  238 

Shah  Mahomed  Khan,  Wazir,  391,  392, 
393,  401,  413,  427,  551,  557 
Shah  Shuja,  10.  14,  339 
Shaidad  Khan,  Rcsaidar,  71 
Sher  Ali,  Amir,  303,  304,  305,  306, 
307,  308,  321,  322,  323,  328,  329, 

330,  331,  335,  336,  338,  340,  341, 

342,  343,  344,  345,  346,  347,  348, 

351,  352,  353,  354,  368,  369,  373, 

375,  377,  421,  428,  457,  458,  459, 

466,  467,  538,  552,  554,  555,  556, 

557,  558,  559,  560,  561,  562,  563, 

564 

Sher  Ali,  Sirdar,  468,  469 
j Sherindil  Khan,  Sirdar,  481 
j Sher  Mahomed,  Jemadar,  394 
| Shirres,  Lieutenant,  362,  453 
Sherston,  Lieutenant  John.  435 
39—2 


598 


INDEX 


Shore,  Sir  John.  See  Teignmouth 
Showers,  Brigadier,  85,  95,  99,  105, 
109,  110,  113.  114 
Sikim,  Raja  of,  524 
Sindhia,  Maharaja,  154,  168,  262,  274, 
278,  279,  334,  507 
Sirdar  Sing,  526 
Skinner,  James,  133 
Skobeletf,  General,  503 
Sladen,  Mrs.,  277,  278,  293,  298 
Slater,  Major,  492 
Sleeman,  Colonel,  235,  246 
Smith,  Captain,  204,  205 
Major  Euan,  477 
Major  Percy,  221 
Smyth,  Colonel,  48 
Smyth-Windham,  Major,  384,  434, 
435,  436 

Somerset,  Sir  Henry,  112 
Spens,  Captain,  447 
Spottiswoode,  Colonel,  62 
Spratt,  Lieutenant,  384 
Stanhope,  The  Hon.  E.,  417.  529, 
530 

Stanley,  Lord,  547 
Staveley,  Lady,  335 
Sir  Charles,  335 
Sterling,  Colonel,  550 
Stewart,  John,  2,  3 
Patrick,  178 

Field-Marshal  Sir  Donald  Martin, 
Bart.,  G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I.,  C.I.E., 
9,  97,  230,  263,  271,  280,  293, 
296,  297,  298,  300,  310,  318, 
326,  346,  384,  394,  456,  459, 
460,  462,  463,  464,  465,  467, 
468,  471,  472,  473,  474,  478, 
480,  485,  493,  498,  500,  504, 
507,  509,  510,  544,  545,  546, 
562,  565,  566 
Lieutenant  Donald,  492 
Lady,  9,  271,  293,  297,  498 
Sir  Herbert,  320 

Stewart-Mackenzie,  Captain,  436,  437 
Stillman,  Lieutenant,  102,  103 
Stolietoff,  General,  341,  342,  343,  421, 
554,  555,  556,  557 

Strathnairn,  Field  - Marshal  Lord, 
G.C.B.,  G.C.S.I.  (Sir  Hugh  Rose), 
75,  76,  229,  269,  270,  271,  274,  275, 
276,  277,  278,  279,  280,  281,  285, 
287,  288,  293,  295,  320 
Stratton,  Captain,  385,  407,  491, 
492 

Sullivan,  Gunner,  163 


Sultan  Jan,  Shahzada,  372,  373 
Swat,  Akhund  of,  282,  283,  284,  286, 
291 

Swinley,  Captain,  371,  384,  445 
Syad  Ahmed  Shah,  281 
Symons,  Major,  518 
Synge,  Captain,  127 

Taj  Sing,  Sepoy,  489 
Tamerlane,  263 

Tanner,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Oriel, 
K.C.B.,  480,  481 

Tantia  Topi,  162,  168,  205,  208,  210, 
211,  261,  278,  279 
Taylor,  Corporal,  127 

Colonel  Reynell,  283,  284,  285, 
286,  291,  292 

General  Sir  Alexander,  G.C.B., 
99,  117,  119,  121,  134,  282, 
291 

Teignmouth,  Lord,  303 
Temple,  Sir  Richard,  325,  326 
Thebaw,  King,  508,  510 
Thelwall,  Brigadier,  357,  550 
Theodore,  King,  295,  298,  301 
Thesiger,  General.  See  Chelmsford 
Thomson,  Lieutenant,  72 
Lieutenant,  163 
Thornhill,  M.,  154,  155,  156 
Thornton,  Thomas,  C.S.I.,  79,  80 
Tikaram  Ivwas,  Sepoy,  490 
Tombs,  Major-General  Sir  Harry,  Y.C., 
K.C.B.,  83,  93,  96,  102,  103,  120, 
127,  129,  130 
Tonk,  Nawab  of,  261 
Townsend,  Dr.,  394 
Travancore,  Maharaja  of,  501 
Travers,  Lieutenant  Eaton,  111,  140 
Major,  169,  178,  180 
Trevelyan,  Sir  Charles,  268,  269 
Trower,  Lieutenant,  443 
Tryon,  Admiral  Sir  George,  K.C. B., 
301 

Turner,  Colonel  F.,  151,  218 

Brigadier  - General  Sir  W.  W. , 
K.C.  B.,  288,  289,  290 
Tweeddale,  "William  Hay,  Marquess  of, 
54 

Tyndall,  Colonel,  550 
Tytler,  Captain,  87  88 
Mrs.  87 

Udaipur,  Maharana  of,  334,  525 
Ulwar,  Maharaja  of,  261,  526 
Unjur  l'iwari,  208,  209,  217 


INDEX 


599 


Vandeleur,  Major,  486 
Yauglian,  Lieutenant,  213 

General  Sir  T.  L.,  K.C.B.,  288 


Victor: 

ia,  H. 

M.  Queen, 

162, 

252, 

254, 

259, 

260, 

261, 

262, 

266, 

270, 

298, 

325, 

327, 

331, 

333, 

334, 

335, 

365, 

378, 

405, 

418, 

492, 

493, 

495, 

502, 

505, 

507, 

519, 

530, 

533, 

535, 

538, 

539, 

542, 

562, 

563, 

564, 

565, 

573, 

574, 

575, 

576, 

577,  l 

>78 

Villier9,  Colonel,  350 
Vitkievitcli,  Captain,  338,  339 
Vizianagram,  Maharaja  of,  501 
Vonolel,  Chief,  317 
Vousdcn,  Captain,  446 
Vozgonoff,  General,  558 

Wakhan,  Mir  of,  330 
Wale,  Captain,  227 

Wales,  H.R.H.  the  Prince  of,  120,  302, 
326,  327,  328,  335 
Wales,  H.R.H.  the  Princess  of,  302 
Walidad  Khan,  143,  144 
Wali  Mahomed  Khan,  303,  373,  395, 
396,  398,  419,  429,  439,  448,  469 
Walker,  General  James,  C.B.,  62,  63 
Waller,  Major  Robert,  14 
Walpole,  Brigadier,  204,  205,  212,  217, 
222,  227 

Walton,  Captain,  180,  181 
Warburton,  Colonel,  511 
Waterfield,  Colonel  Garrow,  350,  362, 
365,  370 

Waterford,  The  Marchioness  of,  264 
The  Marquess  of,  252 
Watson,  General  Sir  John,  V.C., 
K.C.B.,  23,  62,  72,  130,  141,  143, 
144,  146,  150,  151,  152,  161,  172, 
175,  178,  219,  222,  230,  375 
Welchman,  Colonel,  95 
Wellesley,  The  Marquess,  234,  237 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  194,  501 
Wheeler,  Sir  Hugh,  112, 159,  161,  162, 
548 

Talboys,  333,  335 

White,  Sir  George,  32,  404,  405,  406, 
407,  408,  409,  410,  441,  442,  490, 
517,  530 

Wilde,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Alfred, 


I K.C.B.,  K.C.S.I.,  62,  141,  142,  181, 
228,  288,  289 

William  I.,  The  Emperor,  497,  509 
Williams,  Lieutenant,  78,  79,  80 
Colonel,  385,  443,  446,  454 
Willoughby,  Lieutenant,  183 
WilsoD,  Sir  Archdale,  44,  47,  48,  57, 
83,  84,  86,  97,  108,  116,  117,  118, 
119,  122,  123,  129,  130,  131,  132, 
133,  134,  136,  137,  140,  141,  142, 
217 

Wilson,  Colonel,  163 
James,  268 
Lieutenant,  477 
Winchester,  Mary,  310,  317 
Windham,  Sir  Charles,  201,  202,  204, 
205,  210,  211,  266 

Wolseley,  Field  - Marshal  Viscount, 
K.P.,  Commander-in-Chief,  187,  230, 
497,  529 

Woodthorpe,  Captain,  385,  550 
Wright,  Major,  36,  38,  290,  291 
Wylie,  Colonel,  536,  537 
Mrs.,  536,  537 
Wynne,  Captain,  360,  550 
Wynter,  Captain.  477 

Yahia  Khan,  388,  413,  427 
Yakub  Khan,  305,  329,  330,  352,  368, 
369,  373,  375,  376,  377,  378,  380, 

383,  387,  388,  389,  390,  391,  392, 

393,  394,  395,  396,  397,  398,  399, 

400,  401,  402,  404,  407,  411,  412. 

413,  414,  415,  416,  417,  419,  420, 

421,  422,  423,  425,  426,  427,  429, 

450,  451,  459,  460,  462,  463,  466, 

468,  496,  551,  552,  553,  554,  555, 

559,  560,  562,  565,  566 
Yanoff,  Colonel,  535 
Yorke,  Lieutenant,  79,  98 
Younghusband,  Captain  F.,  535 

Lieutenant  George,  62,  100,  101, 

130,  141,  144,  151,  152,  176, 

177,  214,  215,  223 
Major,  77 

Yule,  Colour- Sergeant,  442 
Yuralski,  Doctor,  555,  559 

Zakariah  Khan,  413,  427 


6oo 


INDEX 


CHIEF  PUBLIC  EVENTS. 


Abdur  Rahman  proclaimed  Amir,  467 
Abolition  of  offices  of  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  Bombay  and  Madras,  382 
Abyssinian  Expedition,  295-302 
Afghan  War,  first,  241 
Agra,  Fight  at,  150-153 
Ahmedkhel,  Battle  of,  463,  480 
Aligarh,  Fight  at,  147 
Alipur,  Attack  on,  100,  101 
Army  Commission,  379,  382 

Temperance  Association.  Establish- 
ment of,  520 

Assassination  of  Colonel  Mackeson,  15 
of  Lord  Mayo,  318 
Assaye,  Battle  of,  194 

Barrackpore,  Outbreak  at,  43 
Berhampur,  Outbreak  at,  42 
Berlin  Treaty,  341,  342 
Black  Mountain  Expeditions,  524,  531 
Bulandshahr,  Action  at,  143 
Burma  Expedition,  508,  509,  510  515- 
518 

Cawnpore,  Fight  at,  204-207 
Massacre  at,  161-163 
Cesarewitch  visits  India,  531 
Charasia,  Fights  at,  403-406,  463,  464 
Chardeh  Valley,  Fight  in  the,  440-443, 
444,  446 

Chitral  Expedition,  524,  535 
Delhi,  Camp  of  Exercise  at,  509 

Siege  of,  82-140  ; the  first  victory, 

83  ; enthusiasm  of  the  troops, 

84  ; Barnard’s  success,  85  ; the 
Flagstaff  Tower,  87  ; attacking 
force  placed  in  position,  88  ; the 
weak  point  of  our  defence,  88  ; 
defences,  89  ; death  of  Quintin 
Battye,  90  ; the  besiegers  be-  , 
sieged,  93 ; hard  fighting,  94,  ; 
95 ; arrival  of  reinforcements, 
98 ; death  of  Barnard,  101  ; 
Reed  takes  command,  102 ; j 
treachery  in  camp,  105  ; more 
hard  fighting,  106 ; sufferings 
of  sick  ana  wounded,  107 : 
Wilson  takes  command,  108 . 
Nicholson  and  the  Movable 
Column  arrive,  114  ; Baird- 


Delhi  {continued) — 

Smith  plans  attack,  117 ; 
breaching  batteries  at  work,  119 ; 
the  assault,  125-128  ; Nicholson 
wounded,  129  ; storming  of  the 
palace,  136 ; Hodson  captures 
the  King,  137  ; Hodson  shoots 
the  Princes,  137 ; Nicholson  dies, 
137  ; the  siege  ended,  138 
Dost  Mahomed,  Treaty  with,  27-31 
Death  of,  303 

European  Forces,  Amalgamation  of  the 
269,  270 

Ferozepore,  Outbreak  at,  69 

Oandamak,  Treaty  of,  378,  419,  420, 
561,  562,  564 

Catling  Guns,  First  use  of,  406 
Gwalior  fortress,  Rendition  of,  507 

Homes  in  the  Hills,  Establishment  of 
515 

Hunza-Naga  Campaign,  534,  535 
Hurdwar  Fair,  closing  of,  247 

Imperial  assemblage  of  1877,  331-335 

Jowaki  Expedition,  17,  18 

Kabul,  Cavagnari’s  Mission  to,  380 , 
381,  383,  384 
Expedition,  384-468 
Massacre  of  Embassy  at,  383 
Repulse  of  British  Mission  to,  343- 
345 

Russian  Mission  to,  341,  342 
Kandahar,  Defeat  of  Ayub  Khan  at, 
487-491 

March  to,  473-485 
Ivhost,  Action  at,  370,  371 
Khudaganj,  Fight  at,  213-215 
Kohat,  Expedition  near,  530 
Kuram  Expedition,  348-375 

Lucknow,  Relief  of,  170-189  ; Sir 
Colin’s  preparations,  170  ; the 
advance  begun,  170  ; reinforce- 
ments arrive,  171  ; attack  by  the 


INDEX 


601 


Lucknow  ( continued ) — 

enemy,  173  ; ammunition  want- 
ing, 175  ; the  advance,  178  ; 
Sir  Colin  wounded,  179  ; attack 
on  the  Sikandarbagh,  180-182  ; 
the  Shah  Najaf,  184,  185;  the 
relief  effected,  187  ; meeting  of 
the  Generals,  188;  the  evacua- 
tion, 192 

Siege  of,  220-226  ; Napier’s  plan 
adopted,  221  ; capture  of  the 
Chakar  Kothi,  223  ; capture  of 
the  iron  bridge,  223,  224  ; visit 
from  Jung  Bahadur,  224;  Hod- 
son  mortally  wounded,  225;  Sir 
Colin’s  mistake,  226;  the  city 
taken.  229 

Lushai  Expedition,  310-319 

Maiwand,  Disaster  at,  470-471 
Majuba  Hill,  Disaster  at,  497 
Mandalay,  Capture  of,  507 
Manipur  Expedition,  531 
Meerut,  Mutiny  at,  44-50 
Merv,  Russian  Occupation  of,  503 
Mianganj,  Taking  of,  217,  218 
Mian  Mir,  Disarmament  at,  66-67 
Multan,  Disarmament  at,  70-72 
Mutiny,  The,  of  1857-1858,  34-251 
Causes  of,  231-244 
Chances  of  its  recurrence,  245-251 
First  tidings  of,  34-40 
New  light  on,  241 
Predicted  by  Sir  Henry  Lawrence, 


Mutiny,  The  ( continued ) — 

194  ; and  by  Sir  John  Malcolm, 
236 

Oudh,  Annexation  of,  234-236 

Panipat,  Three  Battles  of,  509 
Panjdeh,  Incident  at,  503 
Peiwar  Kotal,  Taking  of,  355-364 
Persia,  War  with,  30,  238 
Plassy,  Battle  of,  194,  242 
Centenary  of,  94,  95 
Prince  Albert  Victor  visits  India,  529. 
530 

Prince  of  Wales  visits  India,  326-328 

Regimental  Institutes,  Establishment 
of,  519 

Royal  Proclamation  of  1859,  254 

Sheorajpur,  Fight  at,  209 
Sher  Ali,  Death  of,  375 

Russian  Treaty  with  421,  559 
Shutargardan,  Attack  on  the,  399 
Sikandarbagh,  Attack  on  the,  178-182 
Sikim  Expedition,  524 
Staff-Corps,  Introduction  of  the,  270, 
271 

Takht-i-Shah,  Taking  of  the,  441,  442 

Umbeyla  Expedition,  18,  181,  280-293 
Upper  Burma,  Annexation  of,  510 

Zhob  Expedition,  530 


THE  END 


BILLING  AND  SONS,  PRINTERS,  GUILDFORD. 


